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Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2009 00:44:13 +0300
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From: Dorin Cheptea <dorin.cheptea@gmail.com>
To: Wikipedia statistics <folks@wikipedometer.net>
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	Content preview: The current events in Iran make a small parallel to
	the
	recent events in Moldova, although the latter were at a much smaller
	scale and passed unobserved by most of the world. PArallels can be
	drawn
	to other countries. Here are a few main features that, IMHO, are common
	to these crisis: 1) *An essentially non-democratic regime that decided
	to play the "democracy" game (elections).* All regimes in the modern
	world soon or later realize that rigging elections is easy and hard for
	the opponents to prove. It gives unprecedented possibility to claim you
	are democratically legitimate, it allows to test the loyalty and ability
	of your local men to deliver [...] 
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Subject: Re: [WPM] Russia and Iran
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	Content preview:  The current events in Iran make a small parallel to the
	recent events in Moldova, although the latter were at a much smaller
	scale and passed unobserved by most of the world. PArallels can be drawn
	to other countries. Here are a few main features that, IMHO, are common
	to these crisis: 1) *An essentially non-democratic regime that decided
	to play the "democracy" game (elections).* All regimes in the modern
	world soon or later realize that rigging elections is easy and hard for
	the opponents to prove. It gives unprecedented possibility to claim you
	are democratically legitimate, it allows to test the loyalty and ability
	of your local men to deliver [...] 
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The current events in Iran make a small parallel to the recent events in
Moldova, although the latter were at a much smaller scale and passed
unobserved by most of the world. PArallels can be drawn to other countries.
Here are a few main features that, IMHO, are common to these crisis:
1) *An essentially non-democratic regime that decided to play the
"democracy" game (elections).* All regimes in the modern world soon or later
realize that rigging elections is easy and hard for the opponents to prove.
It gives unprecedented possibility to claim you are democratically
legitimate, it allows to test the loyalty and ability of your local men to
deliver

2) ... *at basically no cost other than the long-term risk that your own
population would rise against you seeing the extent of your
falsity.*Authoritarian societies (such as dictatorships) survive
longer because
ordinary people are not allowed to see the extent things are being
falsified, thus many believe that only locally and exactly in their
neighborhood there are problems while the overall system is correct. You can
thus compare the reaction of people in countries such as Belarus (a couple
years ago), Moldova, Venezuela, Lebanon, Iran, partly also Serbia (when
Miloshevic fell) to the reaction of people in China, for example. You see
large instability in the former and long-term stability in the latter
because of the choice to play or not to play the democracy game.

3) These regimes are not well structured along ideological lines. Therefore
they have to reply on building a loyal power apparatus. There was always a
simply method to do that: *promote sub-qualified people and link the
financial survival of their families to loyalty towards you.* Such people,
and only such people deliver. If you have some qualification for the
position you hold, if you are respected professionally, you would think 5
times before executing an order that does not seem totally right to you. But
if you are underqualified, you will disregard morality issues. Morality is a
very strong feeling for every person. The only way one dismisses moral
considerations is by convincing himself that by following moral
consideration he would be led to starvation. Morality can yield to survival.
Therefore, many dictatorships strongly support spreading rumors such as "We
don't need freedom and democracy, we need to have something to eat first.
What good are human rights for if we don't get salaries on time?"

4) *The country passes through an economic crisis or downturn.* For example,
it is well-known that the Soviet Union was forced to seek reforms mainly
because there was no way to any longer spend 20-25% of GDP for military
industry, plus even that was not enough, as in money equivalent that meant
the equivalent of 2-3% of the GDP of the USA.  Also you all know how the oil
prices fell in early 1980s, and how USSR, which was hooked on oil revenue,
started choking. Without an economic crisis, a totalitarian system can
survive. Totalitarian systems' Achille's tendon is that it economically and
technologically underperforms in long-term compared to the free world. But
the down line is drawn only when the economic conditions are ripe.

5) *Rejection of dialog, dismissal of opponents as thugs and rioters*. In
all democracies around the world there will always be loosers after
elections. A good government knows that it is essential that the entire
people feel represented. Therefore, again and again, newly elected
democratic leaders among the first things would say that they now become
representatives of everybody, and not only of those that elected them.
Immediately they offer to be more moderate. If you know that your grievances
would be listened tomorrow and not after 4-5 years (and only if the party
you supports wins) when there would be new elections, then you are prepared
to play along. But if you receive rejection, if you are despised by the
"winners", you don't want to play along. Which is more, most of this new
breed of leaders (Putin, Medvedev, Voronin, Chavez, Ahmadinejad, etc) enjoy
mockering their political enemies. That comes at no price when your
political enemies are politicians just like you, but when you make a large
portion of the population you political enemy (be it only 30-40%, although
in reality in all these countries it is rather 50-60%), you are looking for
fire. The people I just mention were not born, nor raised as the cultural
and professional elite of their countries. They all came to power by
unexpected personal circumstances. They are themselves underqualified for
the job. They see in their job only the toughness and rule the system
component, often they don't even realize there is a "representative of
everybody" component. They like having some public disorder, because then
(they imagine) they can "defend the symbols/institutions of the
state/nations". They underqulified servants also like that expression,
because they get to fell as "state/national institution" rather that "worse
in this job in the last half-century". The effect is always that of
antagonizing the society.

--001636c5bbd139f855046c923148
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

The current events in Iran make a small parallel to the recent events in Mo=
ldova, although the latter were at a much smaller scale and passed unobserv=
ed by most of the world. PArallels can be drawn to other countries. Here ar=
e a few main features that, IMHO, are common to these crisis:<div>
<br></div><div>1) <b>An essentially non-democratic regime that decided to p=
lay the &quot;democracy&quot; game (elections).</b> All regimes in the mode=
rn world soon or later realize that rigging elections is easy and hard for =
the opponents to prove. It gives unprecedented possibility to claim you are=
 democratically legitimate, it allows to test the loyalty and ability of yo=
ur local men to deliver=A0</div>
<div><br></div><div>2) ... <b>at basically no cost other than the long-term=
 risk that your own population would rise against you seeing the extent of =
your falsity.</b> Authoritarian societies (such as dictatorships) survive l=
onger because ordinary people are not allowed to see the extent things are =
being falsified, thus many believe that only locally and exactly in their n=
eighborhood there are problems while the overall system is correct. You can=
 thus compare the reaction of people in countries such as Belarus (a couple=
 years ago), Moldova, Venezuela, Lebanon, Iran, partly also Serbia (when Mi=
loshevic fell) to the reaction of people in China, for example. You see lar=
ge instability in the former and long-term stability in the latter because =
of the choice to play or not to play the democracy game.<br>
<br></div><div>3) These regimes are not well structured along ideological l=
ines. Therefore they have to reply on building a loyal power apparatus. The=
re was always a simply method to do that: <b>promote sub-qualified people a=
nd link the financial survival of their families to loyalty towards you.</b=
> Such people, and only such people deliver. If you have some qualification=
 for the position you hold, if you are respected professionally, you would =
think 5 times before executing an order that does not seem totally right to=
 you. But if you are underqualified, you will disregard morality issues. Mo=
rality is a very strong feeling for every person. The only way one dismisse=
s moral considerations is by convincing himself that by following moral con=
sideration he would be led to starvation. Morality can yield to survival. T=
herefore, many dictatorships strongly support spreading rumors such as &quo=
t;We don&#39;t need freedom and democracy, we need to have something to eat=
 first. What good are human rights for if we don&#39;t get salaries on time=
?&quot;</div>
<div><br></div><div>4) <b>The country passes through an economic crisis or =
downturn.</b> For example, it is well-known that the Soviet Union was force=
d to seek reforms mainly because there was no way to any longer spend 20-25=
% of GDP for military industry, plus even that was not enough, as in money =
equivalent that meant the equivalent of 2-3% of the GDP of the USA. =A0Also=
 you all know how the oil prices fell in early 1980s, and how USSR, which w=
as hooked on oil revenue, started choking. Without an economic crisis, a to=
talitarian system can survive. Totalitarian systems&#39; Achille&#39;s tend=
on is that it economically and technologically underperforms in long-term c=
ompared to the free world. But the down line is drawn only when the economi=
c conditions are ripe.</div>
<div><br></div><div>5) <b>Rejection of dialog, dismissal of opponents as th=
ugs and rioters</b>. In all democracies around the world there will always =
be loosers after elections. A good government knows that it is essential th=
at the entire people feel represented. Therefore, again and again, newly el=
ected democratic leaders among the first things would say that they now bec=
ome representatives of everybody, and not only of those that elected them. =
Immediately they offer to be more moderate. If you know that your grievance=
s would be listened tomorrow and not after 4-5 years (and only if the party=
 you supports wins) when there would be new elections, then you are prepare=
d to play along. But if you receive rejection, if you are despised by the &=
quot;winners&quot;, you don&#39;t want to play along. Which is more, most o=
f this new breed of leaders (Putin, Medvedev, Voronin, Chavez, Ahmadinejad,=
 etc) enjoy mockering their political enemies. That comes at no price when =
your political enemies are politicians just like you, but when you make a l=
arge portion of the population you political enemy (be it only 30-40%, alth=
ough in reality in all these countries it is rather 50-60%), you are lookin=
g for fire. The people I just mention were not born, nor raised as the cult=
ural and professional elite of their countries. They all came to power by u=
nexpected personal circumstances. They are themselves underqualified for th=
e job. They see in their job only the toughness and rule the system compone=
nt, often they don&#39;t even realize there is a &quot;representative of ev=
erybody&quot; component. They like having some public disorder, because the=
n (they imagine) they can &quot;defend the symbols/institutions of the stat=
e/nations&quot;. They underqulified servants also like that expression, bec=
ause they get to fell as &quot;state/national institution&quot; rather that=
 &quot;worse in this job in the last half-century&quot;. The effect is alwa=
ys that of antagonizing the society. =A0</div>

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