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# The Global Intelligence Files

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

## Re: [CT] DISCUSSION - Anonymous vs Cartels

Released on 2012-03-02 01:00 GMT

Email-ID | 1272397
Date | 2011-10-25 03:18:15
From | sean.noonan@stratfor.com
To | analysts@stratfor.com
List-Name | analysts@stratfor.com

Yes, in response to your first question.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Colby Martin" <colby.martin@stratfor.com>
To: analysts@stratfor.com
Sent: Monday, October 24, 2011 7:47:49 PM
Subject: Re: [CT] DISCUSSION - Anonymous vs Cartels
Sean, just to be clear
Your point is that Anonymous hasn't mattered? Is your argument that
hackers haven't mattered either? because if Anonymous is a mob of hackers
as you argue, how haven't they mattered to their targets? what about all
the money spent fighting them? and as Tristan just pointed out - how
about HBGary Federal? He said the CEO's SSN and address were posted on
Twitter. What about all the sensitive emails that were lost? We have no
way of knowing what was in those emails, or how they are being used to
make money at the expense of HBGary. I have always agreed that they
haven't reached a level of threat to the US, but that surely doesn't mean
they won't. And there are quite a few countries, organizations, and
people below that rather high standard who could not withstand an attack,
including an email purge of personal emails onto the web.
On 10/24/11 7:33 PM, Tristan Reed wrote:
As far as Aurora, I haven't followed it closely. Did they ever identify
the attackers or number of attackers? I thought the target set was the
only thing that led people to believe the Chinese government was
responsible.
2. NSA will tell you otherwise. SIGINT is not the NSA's only
responsibility. SIGINT assets do not carry over to investigating cyber
intrusion, unless you are trying to corroborate, in this case HUMINT is
just as significant as SIGINT. A country's SIGINT capabilities does not
indicate its capabilities in tracking hackers. NSA may have there own
department for tracking hackers but it does not make it SIGINT.
Ok, Please define SIGINT for me.
Wikipedia provides an indepth explanation on SIGINT . But in short,
SIGINT is the capability in exploiting signals provided by communication
devices, and what can be obtained by exploiting the signals. Combining
computer network operations and SIGINT is innaccurate, because while
SIGINT may be used with other intelligence disciplines in order to
identify a hacker, it is not necessary and is no more related than any
other intel discipline. SIGINT could help you identify a computer
devices (not the operator) emitting a signal (wifi), and cryptanalysis,
which is also separate from SIGINT but often used in conjunction, could
help in providing methods to decrypt messages over a network, but SIGINT
wouldn't obtain those messages.
In order to exploit computer network operations, the operators involved
are specifically trained in computer science disciplines and
technologies tailored specifically for computer activity.
NSA also is the primary agency for cryptanalysis. Because of
technological demands of SIGINT and cryptanalysis, NSA has enormous
resources in R&D, so I can see why the USG would move some CNO to NSA.
But their SIGINT capabilities are not indicators of CNO capabilities.
Writing the code and hacking was just a small part of necessary labor
for the Stuxnet operation. I also don't think we are discussing
operations on the scale of causing physical damage to extremely
sensitive equipment . Well, this is an example of a cyber attack that
matters, whereeas Anonymous so far has not mattered. You chose the most
prolific example of a cyber attack (which the whole operation consisted
mainly outside of the cyber attack itself). Anything that falls short of
this doesn't matter? Define what matters. None of anonymous' attacks
have physically damaged secret Iranian nuclear facilities, but I think
you are downplaying too much the significance of exposing corporate
secrets, halting businesses' revenues, and embarrassing State actors by
defacing their websites.
On 10/24/11 5:38 PM, Sean Noonan wrote:
On 10/24/11 5:07 PM, Tristan Reed wrote:
On 10/24/11 3:12 PM, Sean Noonan wrote:
1. Look at the anonymous hackers tacked down already The USG
arrested 10 Russian spies last year, are you willing to say
foreign intel is not capable of conducting espionage undetected?
No, of course not. But I also would not argue that the SVR is so
good to be immune to detection, as you are arguing with hackers.
I'm saying they are more detectable than you think. There is no
such thing as truly anonymous. Everythign leaves a trail. Will
that trail in every instance lead to a single individual? no. but
it can lead to a place, an organization, and often, an
individual.
2. NSA will tell you otherwise. SIGINT is not the NSA's only
responsibility. SIGINT assets do not carry over to investigating
cyber intrusion, unless you are trying to corroborate, in this
case HUMINT is just as significant as SIGINT. A country's SIGINT
capabilities does not indicate its capabilities in tracking
hackers. NSA may have there own department for tracking hackers
but it does not make it SIGINT.
Ok, Please define SIGINT for me.
The question is if the attack is high priority enough. Many
people assume there is no attribution because there is no
response, but I don't think that is accurate. Many people say
this, because no attribution is one reason for no response. Yes,
they do, and if they think that is the primary reason for lack of
response, then I think they are wrong.
3. Your example is short-sighted. You don't just open a new
laptop and start hacking e-mail addresses. A cyber attack
involves much more than a recently bought laptop. In the same way
there is an attack cycle for a terrorist attack or crime, there is
one for a cyber attack. A very simple attack may be as hard to
trace as a nearly-random mugging in the dark in a neighborhood
with much more serious crime and no CCTV cameras. A more
complicated attack, however, involves pre-operational
surveillance, developing exploits, developing programs and code,
gaining access, exploiting that, and carrying out an attack.
Discovering exploits and writing code can be done entirely
offline, out of sight of law enforcement or intel agencies.
Pre-operational surveillance and gaining access (the point of the
exploit you write offline) would fit in my example. The point is,
if you don't link your computer to identifiable information, you
remain anonymous. Just like people use certain methods to build
IEDs, people use certain mehtods to design programs and code for
cyber attacks. Over time, those methods become identifiable and
more and more attributable. This is, for example, how AURORA is
linked back to the Chinese. and very specific Chinese, I may add.
Being connected or unconnected doesn't matter, eventually you have
to use what you develop, or copy from someone, and all of those
things can be analyzed. And that takes time, giving more time
for your exposure Exposure comes from network activity with the
target, a lot of the pre-operational phase of an attack can occur
without network activity. Look at everything that went into
Stuxnet as a great example, that couldn't be done with one person
with a new laptop. Writing the code and hacking was just a small
part of necessary labor for the Stuxnet operation. I also don't
think we are discussing operations on the scale of causing
physical damage to extremely sensitive equipment . Well, this is
an example of a cyber attack that matters, whereeas Anonymous so
far has not mattered. All of this activity provides activity and
evidence which helps for attribution. Of course it is always
possible to develop an attack, just like any other operation, that
even the best law enforcement and national intelligence agencies
have trouble or cannot attribute. That's fine. My point is that
it's very difficult for someone to successfully use Anonymous as a
cover and have NSA, GHQ, MID, Aman, etc, be unable to attribute
it. How do you know if NSA or GHQ is effective in identifying
hackers?I don't, but I'm confident they are far better than you
are allowing for. They may not choose to cover it if it is
small scale crime, however.
On 10/24/11 1:38 PM, Tristan Reed wrote:
I wouldn't doubt using Anonymous as a cover for state sponsored
cyber warfare. Not sure the number of benefits in actually doing
that, since you can conduct a cyber attack without associating
with a hacker group and still deny / cover actions on behalf of
the State. An individual attacking US computer assets from
China, may be working by himself or on behalf of the Chinese
government, but unless the US has other intel on the Chinese
government's cyber warfare activities in order to corroborate
there is little capability to distinguish.
It is very difficult to track down hackers. Computer network
operations do not fall under the discipline of SIGINT. Assets
from SIGINT would not directly help you track an individual
responsible for hacking State run servers. In the past, I have
turned to SIGINT organizations for collections on computer
related material, but this was due to the US being behind in
cyber warfare, and not knowing where to assign responsibility.
However, this has changed dramatically in the last couple of
years.
Online activities, with adequate OPSEC, truly are anonymous. As
an extreme scenario of OPSEC: If I purchase a laptop in cash, go
to a Starbucks with free public wifi, and never attribute the
online activity to something revealing (accessing personal email
accounts, tweeting, entering personal information to the laptop,
etc..), and begin hacking government email accounts then never
use the laptop again. Unless LEA could get an accurate
description of my appearance from Starbuck's patrons or possible
security cameras, I can not think of way to identify me.
Governments, attempting to track cyber enemies, do not refer to
these enemies as individuals. Instead as generic entities tied
to specific computer-related activities because of the
difficulty in identifying individuals.
I think the most likely way for a "Anonymous cover" to be blown,
would be the chatter in all the IRC channels. But what if a
common participant in "Anonymous" activities, was working for a
State? Anonymous has denounced state governments before, if that
State agent organizes an attack amongst his IRC / Twitter
buddies, what signs could a LEA look for to distinguish?
On 10/24/11 12:38 PM, Sean Noonan wrote:
In reply to Kerley (my comments on the discussion coming in a
bit)
1. Anonymous has not shown the capability to do anything
actually harmful or devastating. I'm not saying they can't,
but i'm very doubtfoul. Tristan's discussion shows the first
real case where they could do some minor damage--to individual
people, not not to an organization or anything that would come
as a serious or strategic threat.
2. Attribution by the world' leading SIGINT agencies is
actually pretty good. I see the fear of using 'anonymous' as
a cover, but that would be pretty easy to bungle, and could
probably still be attributed if important enough to those
agencies. The recent attack on Sony actually brings this
issue up- Whoever is calling themselves anonymous denies they
did it. And keep in mind how much they have claimed an
publicized attacks in the past, even before they were carried
out. The attack on the Playstation Network was more
sophisticated than anonymous' usual work (though potentially
coordinated with Anonymous' DDOS attacks that distracted
Sony's IT security). But whoever did it, again, no real
damage came of it. Congress is holding hearings over data
security, but this is no different than the OC groups stealing
your credit card information. LE will go after them, have
some success, but the threat is not that large.
On 10/24/11 11:04 AM, Kerley Tolpolar wrote:
I see the Zetas/Anonymous affairs as a good opportunity to
have a broader piece on Anonymous. I believe our readers no
nothing, or almost nothing about what this group is and the
threat it poses. Reviewing their list of attacks
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anonymous_%28group%29), in
most of the cases, they are the a**gooda** guys, sort of a
Robin Hood of the internet . The interesting thing when it
comes to their interactions with the cartels is the dubious
role they play: at the same time they can be fighting crime
by revealing cartel members/supporters, but they can also
put lives in risk.
However, I believe this is only one of the threats posed by
Anonymous. The idea that states, and anyone else on Earth,
can conduct a cyber attack under a**Anonymousa** is
worrisome.
(http://www.zdnet.co.uk/blogs/security-bullet-in-10000166/akamai-cyber-spies-are-hiding-behind-anonymous-10024573/)
If I run an organization, if I am responsible for government
websites, or if I am just a internet user, I would like to
know more about these guys. Who they are? What are they
interested in? How they operate? Who they have targeted so
far? How can I defend myself from them? In what countries
are they active? Should I worry about them at all? Can I use
them to achieve any particular goal?
On 10/24/11 10:22 AM, Colby Martin wrote:
nice. i still think the central focus, and what
everything else can build off of, is that Anonymous
doesn't know the threat they pose to innocent people
caught up in the terror that is Mexico. By focusing on
journalists or taxi drivers they show little understanding
of the situation. This has long term implications in not
just Mexico. They don't consider the consequences of
their actions and they act without understanding the
environment. It was the same when they released
information on the Sony Playstation network to protest
Sony. They hurt innocent people to prove a point.
On 10/24/11 9:32 AM, Tristan Reed wrote:
Reposting this with a new shorter focus. Instead of
discussing possible cartel responses, the focus is on
what type of threat Anonymous can pose to cartels. The
video released by Anonymous, threatens revealing
personal information on cartels as well as states a
member had been kidnapped. I could not find any sources
outside of Anonymous' claims of the individual being
kidnapped. According to their facebook sites (Anonymous
Mexico and Anonymous Veracruz) it sounds like it may be
an individual posting flyers in Veracruz as part of the
Operation Paperstorm protest, although that is
speculation.
Anonymous, a well-publicized hacker group famous for
distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attacks on
government websites, lashed out at drug cartels via the
Internet with a statements denouncing Mexicoa**s
criminal cartels, including a video depicting a masked
individual addressing Mexican drug cartels on October
10? With the most recent video release, Anonymous makes
bold threats towards the criminal cartels in Mexico.
Threats such as releasing identities of taxi drivers,
police, politicians, and journalists who collude with
criminal cartels. The hacker group demanded Los Zetas
release a fellow kidnapped member otherwise face
consequences. In the Anonymousa** video, this coming
November 5th was mentioned as a day cartels could expect
Anonymousa** reaction if their demands of releasing a
kidnapped member are not met. The potential of conflict
between Mexicoa**s criminal cartels and hackers,
presents a unique threat towards TCOs. We know of
cartels lashing out at online bloggers, but I havena**t
seen any reporting on cartels dealing with any headaches
from hackers before.
What Anonymous brings to the table in a conflict
a*-c- Anonymous would not pose a direct physical
security threat to Mexican cartels.
a*-c- Anonymous' power base is the ability to
exploit online media
a*-c- Anonymous hackers do not have to be in
Mexico to lash out at cartels
While not certain, there is a potential for Anonymous to
pose a threat
a*-c- It is unknown if Anonymousa**s claims to
possess identifiable information on cartel members
a*-c- It is unknown what information Anonymous
could acquire on cartels
a*-c- Bank accounts, any online transactions or
communications, identifiable information on cartels
members have to be considered in the realm of
possibilities for
Anonymous
o Anonymous has demonstrated ita**s
ability to reveal illicit online activity (child
pornography rings)
Anonymous hackers likely have not been involved in the
ultra-violent world of drug trafficking in Mexico. As a
result, their understanding of cartel activities may be
limited. Anonymous may act with confidence when sitting
in front of a computer, but this may blind them to any
possible retribution. They may not even know the impact
of any online assault of cartels.
a*-c- Revealing information on taxi drivers and
journalists will cost lives. Anonymous may not
understand some of these individuals are forced to
collude with cartels. Taxi drivers are
often victims of extortion or coerced to act as
halcones. Revealing the identity of these individuals
will not have a significant impact on cartel
operations. Politicans have been accused of
working with cartels (Guerrero & Veracruz' governor)
before, however there has yet to be any consequences
from this.
a*-c- Anonymous hackers may not understand the
extent cartels are willing to go protect their
operations.
o Any hackers in Mexico are at risk.
o Cartels have reached out to the computer
science community before, coercing computer science
majors into working for them.
o This provides the cartels with the
possibility of discovering hackers within Mexico.
On 10/17/11 10:19 AM, Marc Lanthemann wrote:
Oh man we are threading new ground here - I like the
idea but there are several issues to address and fix
here.
These are the bullets of my main analytical concern
with the discussion:
a*-c- we don't know who got kidnapped or why.
that's fine but we can't gloss over that fact
a*-c- "hackers" is a blanket term - there's a
difference between stealing bank records from
government computers and overloading www.loszetas.com
main page.
a*-c- There's no thought out process of what
sort of information could anon have on the cartels.
What kind of info is kept online and accessible to
potential attacks? You seem to be talking about
identities, whose? If anything it's dirty cops,
politicians and businessmen who need to worry about
what anon is going to be saying. Think about why the
bloggers and media were killed in previous instances.
Was it because they revealed operational details,
because they acted as informants, because they exposed
links with officials or because they somehow sullied
the cartel's reputation? In short, what kind of
information is damaging to the cartels themselves?
a*-c- Once you identify this info - think about
if anon can realistically access it and disseminate it
so it causes a measure of damage. Anon doesn't have
any intelligence capacity except for the technical
ability by a very small number of its members to
infiltrate certain networks and databases and steal
information. Now what kind of information would a
cartel keep on a network that is connected to the
internet (aka no intranet)? Where else could
information be found? Government databases? Once we
know what kind of information is accessible, we can
also know more about the consequences of
dissemination.
a*-c- What's the IT capacity of a cartel?
Sufficient to trace back attacks? If it's not, there
risks to be a lot of killings done by people who may
not understand the difference between an anon hacker
and a blogger.
On 10/17/11 9:47 AM, Colby Martin wrote:
wanted to forward Karen's thoughts to analyst
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: [CT] DISCUSSION - Anonymous vs Cartels
Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2011 09:28:18 -0500
From: Karen Hooper <hooper@stratfor.com>
Reply-To: CT AOR <ct@stratfor.com>
To: CT AOR <ct@stratfor.com>
you've got some of the issues here, but this is
going to need a lot more work
You need to lay out:
a) What exactly is going on with Anonymous, your
trigger section is unclear
b) what our assessment of the online cartel presence
is, and therefore their vulnerabilities and
capabilities
c) How capable is Anonymous of breaching high
security anything
d) how far the cartels would be willing to travel to
kill anyone who breaches their systems or exposes
their connections
I also just want to point out that we have
reasonable reliable insight that Sinaloa at the very
least has some significant levels of sophistication
in their online presence, to include the use of
cyber currencies and significant IT capacity. There
is no reason to assume that Los Zetas don't also
conduct business online, in a protected fashion.
Karen Hooper
Latin America Analyst
o: 512.744.4300 ext. 4103
c: 512.750.7234
STRATFOR
www.stratfor.com
On 10/17/11 8:46 AM, Renato Whitaker wrote:
On 10/17/11 8:25 AM, Tristan Reed wrote:
--
Sean Noonan
Tactical Analyst
Office: +1 512-279-9479
Mobile: +1 512-758-5967
Strategic Forecasting, Inc.
www.stratfor.com