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# The Global Intelligence Files

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

## Re: on German banks and Southern Europe

Released on 2012-09-29 00:00 GMT

Email-ID | 129685
Date | 2011-09-14 01:54:29
From | michael.wilson@stratfor.com
To | analysts@stratfor.com
List-Name | analysts@stratfor.com

I don't think we need to even look at German banking exposure to figure
out why the German's are bailout out greece (which the numbers priesler
put below clearly show are not the reason.) All we have to do is look back
to past STRATFOR pieces.
I put both the MittleEuropa piece below as well as the piece on
German-intra EU & eurozone exports below, which clearly shows they have an
incentive to continue bailout out greece as long as it threatens the
dissolution of the Eurozone, an entity which is in their interests to
continue
What if, instead of the euro being designed to further contain the
Germans, the Germans crafted the euro to rewire the European Union for
their own purposes?
.......It is not so much that STRATFOR now sees the euro as workable in
the long run - we still don't - it's more that our assessment of the euro
is shifting from the belief that it was a straightjacket for Germany to
the belief that it is Germany's springboard. In the first assessment, the
euro would have broken as Germany was denied the right to chart its own
destiny. Now, it might well break because Germany is becoming a bit too
successful at charting its own destiny. And as it dawns on one European
country after another that there was more to the euro than cheap credit,
the ties that bind are almost certainly going to weaken.
The paradigm that created the European Union - that Germany would be
harnessed and contained - is shifting. Germany now has not only found its
voice, it is beginning to express, and hold to, its own national interest.
A political consensus has emerged in Germany against bailing out Greece.
Moreover, a political consensus has emerged in Germany that the rules of
the eurozone are Germany's to refashion. As the European Union's anchor
member, Germany has a very good point. But this was not the "union" the
rest of Europe signed up for - it is the Mitteleuropa that the rest of
Europe will remember well.
Read more: Germany: Mitteleuropa Redux | STRATFOR
Of Germany's total exports in 2008, 43 percent went to the eurozone, 63
percent to the European Union (which includes the eurozone), and 37
percent to the rest of the world. When viewed this way, non-EU exports
only account for 16.5 percent of Germany's GDP, though that number grows
to 25.7 percent of GDP if Germany's exports to EU member states outside
the eurozone are considered.
Read more: Germany: An Examination of Exports | STRATFOR
On 9/13/11 2:48 AM, Benjamin Preisler wrote:
On 09/13/2011 03:01 AM, Michael Wilson wrote:
On 9/12/11 4:45 PM, Benjamin Preisler wrote:
This is the data from the last European-wide stress test of banks.
As you can see German exposure to Southern European government bonds
is somewhere around 60bnEUR. The data is from 12/2010 though and
since German banks have massively sold off Greek and Italian debt
especially (I remember a 9bnEUR figure for Italy alone, no link
though). If you want an indicator of the direction things have been
moving check out to what extent German banks were exposed to Italian
bonds alone in the previous stress test.
In addition to those sovereign bonds, German banks are holding about
12bnEUR worth of assets in Greece, 137bnEUR in Italy, 130bnEUR in
Spain. (I estimated those numbers real quick based on this.) Again,
these numbers are from 12/2010, so one can safely assume that they
have gone down since. (Also keep in mind that Commerzbank
effectively is still (semi-)nationalized.) btw who is buying all
this debt (assuming very cheaply and that Germany selling these down
is still at a loss) Good question, I don't know. Maybe they're not
even selling, I just assume they are to minimize their potential
write-offs. When I was in Greece over the summer business people
told me that right now is the time to buy assets cheap.
Just to put this into context: The ECB has bought bonds worth
143bnEUR by now, Ireland received a 85bnEUR bailout, Portugal
78bnEUR, Greece's two bailouts will total somewhere around 240bnEUR.
Random note, these numbers german to greek exposure right? German to
Southern Europe pale when you compare them with Spanish or French
bank exposure to these in absolute terms and Greek, Italian and
Spanish banks exposure within their own countries in relative terms.
Ok so what do we take from this? If Germany were to face a
bailout, just purely based on its exposure to greece it wouldnt be
that bad, right? ...it would less than what they have pledged to
EFSFII. German (direct) exposure to Greece is very, very limited and
mostly comes through the ECB (and then the Bundesbank). The private
banking sector isn't in any danger because of Greece (only more so if
you keep in mind that both HRE and Commerzbank are not really private
right now).
So they are worried about the larger fragility of the system. Is
that larger fragility due to say French exposure to Greece and German
exposure to France? In other words direct financial contagion? Or (I
assume more likely) is it due to Northern european exposure to all
southern economies and wanting to make sure they can still raise debt
at affordable levels. The European banks are linked all over the place
of course, the German banks would be exposed indirectly in a number of
ways through Spanish, French and Italian banks holding assets in
Southern Europe. One other thing to keep in mind though is that the
Southerners banking sectors would implode first, not the German banks.
If you add up all those numbers cited above you realize that it might
come cheaper for the Germans to simply buy up all of its banks'
exposure in Southern Europe than to continue bailout out those guys.
Benjamin Preisler
+216 22 73 23 19
--
Michael Wilson
Director of Watch Officer Group, STRATFOR
michael.wilson@stratfor.com
(512) 744-4300 ex 4112
--
Benjamin Preisler
+216 22 73 23 19
--
Michael Wilson
Director of Watch Officer Group, STRATFOR
michael.wilson@stratfor.com
(512) 744-4300 ex 4112