The Global Intelligence Files,
files released so far...
2921
The Global Intelligence Files

### Index pages

List of Releases

### by Date of Document

unspecified
2001
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

### by Date of Release

2001-03-13
2010-03-10
2011-03-05
2011-03-15
2012-01-29
2012-02-27
2012-02-28
2012-02-29
2012-03-01
2012-03-02
2012-03-03
2012-03-04
2012-03-05
2012-03-06
2012-03-07
2012-03-08
2012-03-09
2012-03-10
2012-03-11
2012-03-12
2012-03-13
2012-03-14
2012-03-15
2012-03-16
2012-03-17
2012-03-19
2012-03-20
2012-03-23
2012-03-25
2012-03-26
2012-03-27
2012-04-01
2012-04-02
2012-04-24
2012-04-26
2012-04-30
2012-05-10
2012-06-18
2012-06-20
2012-07-01
2012-07-24
2012-07-28
2012-07-29
2012-07-30
2012-07-31
2012-08-01
2012-08-02
2012-08-05
2012-08-06
2012-08-07
2012-08-08
2012-08-09
2012-08-10
2012-08-11
2012-08-12
2012-08-13
2012-08-14
2012-08-15
2012-08-16
2012-08-17
2012-08-18
2012-08-19
2012-08-20
2012-08-21
2012-08-22
2012-08-23
2012-08-24
2012-08-25
2012-08-26
2012-08-27
2012-08-29
2012-08-30
2012-08-31
2012-09-01
2012-09-02
2012-09-03
2012-09-04
2012-09-05
2012-09-06
2012-09-07
2012-09-09
2012-09-10
2012-09-11
2012-09-12
2012-09-13
2012-09-14
2012-09-16
2012-09-17
2012-09-18
2012-09-19
2012-09-21
2012-09-22
2012-09-25
2012-09-27
2012-09-28
2012-09-29

### Our Partners

ABC Color - Paraguay
Al Akhbar - Lebanon
Al Masry Al Youm - Egypt
Asia Sentinel - Hong Kong
Bivol - Bulgaria
Carta Capital - Brazil
CIPER - Chile
Dawn Media - Pakistan
L'Espresso - Italy
La Repubblica - Italy
La Jornada - Mexico
La Nacion - Costa Rica
Malaysia Today - Malaysia
McClatchy - United States
Nawaat - Tunisia
NDR/ARD - Germany
Owni - France
Pagina 12 - Argentina
Philip Dorling - Fairfax media contributor - Australia
Plaza Publica - Guatemala
Publica - Brazil
Publico.es - Spain
Rolling Stone - United States
Russian Reporter - Russia
Ta Nea - Greece
Taraf - Turkey
The Hindu - India
The Yes Men - Bhopal Activists
Sunday Star-Times - New Zealand

### Community resources

Supporters Support Wikileaks Follow us on Twitter Twitter this Follow us on Facebook

courage is contagious

# The Global Intelligence Files

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

## Re: FOR COMMENT - S WEEKLY - Naxalite Threat to India

Released on 2012-09-19 09:00 GMT

Email-ID | 1160644
Date | 2010-07-07 18:42:29
From | bokhari@stratfor.com
To | analysts@stratfor.com
List-Name | analysts@stratfor.com

Lefftist politics in India is only significant to the extent that the
Naxalites are important. Besides, here we are not talking about India's
lefist political spectrum. Rather the political origins of the Naxalites.
A piece on these guys (and our first) is incomplete if we don't mention
the context from which they sprang, which takes about a graf or 2 at most.
As I mentioned earlier, my comments can serve that purpose easily.
On 7/7/2010 12:32 PM, scott stewart wrote:
I think it would be great if you guys would write a piece on leftist
politics in India. This is not that piece.
From: analysts-bounces@stratfor.com
[mailto:analysts-bounces@stratfor.com] On Behalf Of Kamran Bokhari
Sent: Wednesday, July 07, 2010 11:49 AM
To: analysts@stratfor.com
Subject: Re: FOR COMMENT - S WEEKLY - Naxalite Threat to India
All tactical pieces must be grounded in the underlying geopolitical
framework. Besides, we are not getting into the politics of the
Naxalites. Rather we are merely placing them in the context of the wider
leftist spectrum. We can do the big assessment later but we need to
briefly underscore the context from which the Naxalites have emerged. My
graf can be easily tweaked to serve that purpose. Don't need anything
elaborate.
On 7/7/2010 11:42 AM, Ben West wrote:
Here we need to place the Naxalite insurgent movement in the context of
the wider political communist movement in India. There are two rival
communist parties CPI and CPI-Marxist - both of which are engaged in
mainstream politics with governments in many Indian states and a
significant representation in the Indian parliament where they support
the ruling Congress-led United Progressive Alliance. In other words, the
Naxalites are to the wider communists what jihadists are to the wider
Islamist spectrum in Pakistan and many Muslim countries. It would be
useful to show how where and when the Naxalites splintered off from the
mainstream communist movement, which itself had undergone fragmentation.
We wanted to keep this piece pretty tactical and not get too much into
the politics. And frankly, I don't feel comfortable at this point to
really get into the politics of the Naxlites. We're still planning to do
a big assessment of them later this summer where we'll lay out more of
the background.
Kamran Bokhari wrote:
Nothing incorrect with this cut but I had lots of comments which could
greatly improve the quality of the piece.
On 7/6/2010 8:12 PM, Ben West wrote:
Exploring the Naxalite Threat in India
The Indian government issued a warning to railroad operators users July
6 after a militant group declared a two day strike in eastern India.
Unlike strikes elsewhere in the country, where workers protest low wages
or poor working conditions by refusing to work, strikes in eastern India
carry much heavier consequences. Strikes declared by the maoist militant
group popularly known as "Naxalites" (its formal name is Communist Party
of India -Maoists I think) have in the past led to train wrecks caused
by sabotage, many of which have killed dozens of people. Civilians are
typically left out of it, militants tend to focus on police forces
instead, but plenty of civilians are still affected by the violence.
Due to their historical follow through on the threats, the Naxalites are
typically successful at virtually halting public transportation during
these strikes. Passengers don't see it as worth the risk, so they plan
around the strike dates, and operators are the same. It's a tactic that,
symbolically, shows just how powerful Naxalites have become in eastern
India, and demonstrates their real ability to affect commercial activity
in the region. Let's mention the geographic region in which the operate
(in the various states running north-south along the eastern coast of
India. Would be good to have a map as well.
The strike comes as a retaliation for a Central Reserve Police Force
(CRPF - India's federal police force) operation that killed a senior
leader, original member do you mean founding member? and spokesman of
the Naxalites, <Cherukuri Rajkumar
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100702_brief_senior_naxalite_leader_killed>
(alias Azad) in the southeastern Andhra Pradesh state July 2. The news
was unexpected, as India has had little luck capturing or killing key
Naxal leaders in the past. Azad's absence is not expected to seriously
hamper the Naxalites capability (they are a very large, well organized
force that will be able to replace him) but it was bound to agitate a
response from the Naxalites like the strike declared July 6.
It's unclear exactly what precipitated the CRPF operation that killed
Azad, however it came after a busy spring in Naxalite territory need to
specify. On April 6, Naxalites mounted a textbook armed ambush that
<killed 76 CRPF members conducting a patrol in Chhattisgarh state
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100406_india_naxalite_tactics_and_deadly_ambush>,
the deadliest attack the Naxalites had carried out in their 43 year
history. Then, on <May 17, militants detonated an explosive device along
the road that targeted a bus
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100517_brief_death_toll_rises_indian_bus_bombing>
(again in Chhattisgarh state) that killed nearly 50 civilians and
police. The spokesman for the group at the time, Azad, issued several
statements to the press indicating that the group regretted the death of
so many civilians, but blamed them for riding on the bus with police
officers, something they had been warned against multiple times. Indeed,
police are typically not allowed to ride on public transportation Was
this a public trasnportation bus or one belonging to the CRPF, which has
its own buses to ferry personnel to various areas. Btw, we should point
out that the CRPF is a national police force as opposed to local due to
the threat of Naxalite attacks and the possibility of collateral damage.
Shortly thereafter, on May 28, <an act of sabotage against a railway
line in West Bengal
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100528_brief_indian_train_derailment_death_toll_hits_71>
state caused a train carrying only civilians to derail. It was
subsequently hit by a freight train, resulting in the death of nearly
150 people. While Naxalites initially denied that they were involved,
they later admitted that a rogue gang trained by them had carried out
the sabotage without permission from Naxalite central command. Do we buy
this? Why would they admit that renegade elements from their movement
were behind the assault?
Finally, in the wake of these very effective (if not all intentional)
attacks, the Naxalites reiterated on June 24 their intention to drive
out Multi National Corporations from India and that they would use
violence to do so. This most recent rhetorical threat drives at the
heart of the Naxals' primary interest and, backed up with <a proven
tactical ability to strike economic targets
http://www.stratfor.com/threat_against_multinationals_indias_high_tech_center
>, <embodies the worst nightmare of the Indian government
http://www.stratfor.com/india_escalating_naxalite_threat>. It is this
current situation in India that causes us at STRATFOR to take a look at
one of the worlds' longest running insurgencies to see what makes it
tick. Here we need to mention that many senior Indian government
officials including the pm himself has described the Naxal threat as the
greatest security problem for India - far greater than the one posed by
Pak-based Islamist militants
BACKGROUND
The Naxalites get their name from their starting point - the village of
Naxalbari in West Bengal where, in May 1967, a local communist party
leader promised to redistribute land to the peasants who worked, but did
not own any of, the land. This was not the first time such a
proclamation by a communist party member had been made before in eastern
India - many other attempts at fomenting a working class rebellion had
been started but faltered. This one, however, triggered a wave of
violence in which workers killed and intimidated land owners, in many
cases running them off their land and reclaiming it as their own. The
actions were justified by a sentiment held amongst the working class
(which was largely made up of tribal members) that they were merely
taking back what they had been forced to give up to wealthier
businessmen from the west who had gained the land from the locals
through debt schemes. Certainly neither side was innocent in all this,
and animosity ran deep through both communities.
However, on a grander, geopolitical level, it is significant that this
successful movement that began in Naxalbari. The Naxalites adopted the
ideology of Mao Zedong, the Chinese ruler that had converted China to
communism and who had just begun the cultural revolution there in 1966.
During the beginning of the Naxalite movement, there was much rhetorical
support between the Maoist regime in China and the Naxalites in India.
India is China's historical geopolitical rival, so fomenting unrest
within the border of its enemy would certainly be in China's interest.
There is little evidence of material support then (and both sides deny
connections now) but the Naxalite movement certainly did serve China's
goals of weakening its largest neighbor to the south. Here we need to
place the Naxalite insurgent movement in the context of the wider
political communist movement in India. There are two rival communist
parties CPI and CPI-Marxist - both of which are engaged in mainstream
politics with governments in many Indian states and a significant
representation in the Indian parliament where they support the ruling
Congress-led United Progressive Alliance. In other words, the Naxalites
are to the wider communists what jihadists are to the wider Islamist
spectrum in Pakistan and many Muslim countries. It would be useful to
show how where and when the Naxalites splintered off from the mainstream
communist movement, which itself had undergone fragmentation.
Although India was able to finally initially, no? put down the Naxalite
movement in 1971 and reinstate the status quo, the mentality that the
federal government in New Delhi had robbed tribal groups of their land
in eastern India persisted, The Naxalite movement continued in a
somewhat dormant phase, through the 1970s, 80s and early 1990s before
violence resumed again in the late 1990s and has been escalating over
the past ten yeas.
The rise in violence matches with India's economic growth. This is not
coincidental. As India has experienced a boom in economic growth over
the past twenty years that saw its per capita income rise approximately
100%. For comparison, it took India 40 years to complete its last
doubling of per capita income. This growth has been sustained by foreign
investors who have invested billions into India's economy. However,
India has not managed to shepherd this economic growth without social
cost. Put differently, the overall economic growth has not trickled down
to the common man - a problem which has cost the two main national
political parties BJP and Congress their governments in recent decades
and allowed the NAxalites a key lever with which to revive their
movement taking it to newer heights Eastern India, where which is the
core turf of the Naxalites call home, has been targeted by foreign
investment for its large supply of natural resources, namely iron ore
and coal - however the area is rich in many other minerals. Eager to
stimulate growth, the government promised foreign investors land where
they could set up operations without effectively negotiating these
concessions with locals. This has led to disputes between the locals,
the foreign companies and the government. A famous example of an
ongoing dispute is the <South Korean steel conglomerate, POSCO
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/india_poscos_steel_investment_challenge>,
which is in the process of acquiring some 4,000 acres in Orissa state
upon which it can build a $12 billion steel mill. The project has been
marred by protests and acts of violence by locals opposed to the project
and police have been unable to secure the area to permit building.
Compensation to locals for the land is only just now (some five years
after the land was promised to POSCO) being negotiated.
Exploitation
India's economic success has meant that foreign investors (like POSCO)
are increasing their presence in India, which means that locals like the
Naxalites are faced with both a threat and an possibility opportunity.
The threat is that they could lose their land - this time, not for
agricultural purposes, but for manufacturing purposes. Instead of
wealthy Indians from the center of the country, this time the outsiders
are foreign businessmen. If they don't fight for their land, they may
well lose it to these outsiders. On the other hand, there is
opportunity. Outside investment could potentially bring jobs and
development to an area that is desperately poor. There are two ways for
the Naxalites to capitalize on this opportunity. The first is to benefit
from the jobs that will be brought in by working at these manufacturing
sites. However, due to the long history of distrust between locals and
outsiders, Naxalites are skeptical of gaining worthwhile employment at
these sites - they don't want to become essentially endentured servants
just because the local steel mill is the only option they have. There is
also another key structural problem for their movement. While having
strong social roots among the population, the Naxalites are a radical
movement that has adopted armed struggle as its m.o. Employment in such
facilities could have a moderating effect on many of their members and
leaders - pushing them towards more mainstream politics, which could
lead to the splintering of the movement and the discipation of its
effectiveness given that there are already two mainstream communist
parties in these areas. Dividing the group from within is a key means
with which New Delhi could undermine the potency of the Naxalite
insurgency. But this will long be a work in progress because right now
the Indian govt is still debating on how best to tackle the Maoist
guerillas. Need to mention that the state is highly reluctant to deploy
the army and for a number of reasons. First, the army could very well be
sucked into a protracted jungle war where the insurgents have the
advanatge; 2) We are talking about a very wide geography, where civi
casulaties could further enflame the movement instead of containing it;
3) Deploying the army will send a very bad message around the world
especially to investors that the Naxalites have become such a major
threat that local/regional law enforcement agencies as well as the
national paramilitary (CRPF) can't handle it.
The other opportunity is to force the government or the foreign investor
to pay the group direct compensation for their land. Naxalites can
increase the value of the land by organizing a militant force that can
allow or deny access to certain areas, sabotage commercial activity and
mobilize locals to make up its cadres. This model has been implemented
and followed successfully by other militant groups, most notably the
<Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090316_nigerias_mend_different_militant_movement>
(MEND), which manages to extract concessions from energy giants
operation in the oil rich, but dismally poor Niger delta in Nigera.
While communist party leaders we need to specify which ones because as
I mention above there are many different types of commies in eastern
India do make statements on how commercial projects in the area need to
provide locals with jobs, it is clear that Naxalites are also
strengthening their capability to pursue the second option, as well.
The Threat
Naxalites maintain the capability to construct and deploy improvised
explosive devices (IED), conduct armed raids and maintain an extensive
and rapid reaction intelligence network. An example of the speed of
their intelligence capabilities and its interconnectedness with militant
units can be seen in the May 17 bus bombing in Chhatisgarh. Naxalites
confirmed that police had boarded the bus, passed the information along
and approximately 30 minutes later, a unit was able to deploy an IED
along the road that the bus was known to travel. This kind of
cooperation amongst the Naxalites is indicative of a very broad
indigenous support network. These networks operate along spectrums of
violence, from those who fully condone, promote violence and have
tactical training (these are the hardcore militant fighters who build
the bombs, deploy them and are skilled at small unit armed assaults) to
those who are sympathetic, yet may not necessarily approve of violence,
to those who are opposed, but are too afraid of the repercussions to
attempt to oppose the Naxalites. This spectrum of support is indicative
of an insurgency, however New Delhi does not see it that way.
New Delhi insists that, according to the constitution, the Naxalite
issue is one of law and order and, thus, a responsibility for the states
to address. New Delhi had deployed the CRPF, but has not gone so far to
deploy the military, something that many Indian politicians have called
for as the only solution to addressing the Naxalites. While military
advisors have been sent in to train local and federal police forces,
they have not engaged in any known anti-Naxalite operations. Not even
the air force has been granted the permission to support police forces
with helicopters for deploying and extracting forces from the dense,
hard to reach jungle areas where the only roads into and out of are
heavily mined and monitored by Naxalites.
The decision not to deploy the military is a complicated one, as India
has a bad memory of deploying their military to address domestic threats
in the past, such as the Sikh threat posed in the 1980s in which the
military response codenamed Operation Bluestar in June 1984 resulted in
a major army assault on Sikhism holiest site, the Golden Temple in the
major town of Amritsar near the Pakistani border was criticized as being
too heavy handed. The attack led to the assassination of then Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi later that year by two of her Sikh bodyguards
Also, the military is currently focused on fighting Islamist and
separatist forces in Jammu & Kashmir in northwest India along the
disputed border with Pakistan and are dealing with multiple
ethnno-separatist movements in the seven different regions in the
northeast sandwiched between the Chinese and Bangladeshi borders. While
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has labeled the Naxalite issue the
biggest threat to the country's internal security, incidents like the
<2008 Mumbai attacks
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081127_india_update_mumbai > provide
evidence to most Indians that Pakistan and the militants who hide there
pose a greater, external threat.
In the end, Naxalism is fairly contained. Despite threats and
indications from <Naxals to conduct attacks against urban targets
http://www.stratfor.com/sitrep/20100222_brief_naxalite_arrested_plans_attack_delhi
>, the group has not demonstrated a capability to pose a serious
militant threat outside of its jungle hideouts in the urban centers of
eastern India.
However, this does not mean that the threat will not materialize in
other forms. The Naxalites have a very sophisticated organization that
relies not only upon militant tactics, but also social unrest and
political tactics to increase its power vis-`a-vis the central
government. Naxalites have formed student groups in universities that
are sympathetic to their cause, they have human rights groups and
interest groups advocating in New Delhi and other regional capitals for
local tribal inhabitants in rural eastern India. This ability to subtly
pressure the central and local governments with hard, militant threats,
while maintaining a softer, steady pressure from social groups means
that even if the government did decide to deploy the military to combat
the Naxalites, it would not necessarily end the threat that the
Naxalites pose to India's internal stability.
--
Ben West
Tactical Analyst
STRATFOR
Austin, TX
--
Ben West
Tactical Analyst
STRATFOR
Austin, TX