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# The Global Intelligence Files

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

## ANALYSIS FOR COMMENT - syria throws fateh al islam under the bus

Released on 2012-09-14 00:00 GMT

Email-ID | 214636
Date | 2008-11-20 20:34:44
From | reva.bhalla@stratfor.com
To | analysts@stratfor.com

will have lots of links
Summary
Stratfor has learned that Syria has made a decision to cut off ties with
Fatah al Islam, a murky Islamist militant group operating in Lebanon whose
paychecks primarily come from Syrian military intelligence. The Syrian
move is intended to solidify ties with Lebanese President Michel Suleiman
to further Syrian interests in Lebanon. In the past, Syria counted on its
militant proxies in Fatah al Islam to undermine the Lebanese army and
build up a case for Syrian intervention in Lebanon. The Syrians will now
focus on Saudi-backed Islamist militants in Lebanon to serve this goal as
the Damascus-Riyadh rivalry continues to build. At the same time, Syria
appears to be signaling to the incoming U.S. administration that it is
prepared to dismantle militant groups in Lebanon - to include Hezbollah -
in exchange for normalizing relations.
Analysis
Stratfor sources have revealed a Syrian decision to cut off support for
militants belonging to Fatah al Islam, a shadowy Islamist militant group
based in Lebanon's Palestinian refugee camps that was largely a creation
of Syrian military intelligence. As Stratfor has discussed extensively,
the so-called jihadist movement in Lebanon is primarily a hodgepodge of
pseudo-Salafists on the payroll of various Arab intelligence agencies,
most notably those of Syria and Saudi Arabia who are locked in a battle of
influence over Lebanon.
Syria intended for Fatah al Islam to act as a destabilizing force in
Lebanon to expose the weakness of Lebanon's army and justify Syrian
military intervention down the road. Loyalties shift rapidly in the
Levant, however, and the Syrians now see a number of reasons to throw the
group under the bus.
First, the Syrians need to solidify their relationship with Lebanese
President Michel Suleiman. When Suleiman was army chief, his forces
suffered heavy casualties when they engaged in a deadly battle with Fatah
al Islam militants in the Nahr al Bared refugee camp in northern Lebanon
in Aug. 2007. Though Suleiman has a good working relationship with the
Syrians (link), he is still bitter about Syria's backing for the group and
the way in which Fatah al Islam exposed the Lebanese army's weaknesses. As
Syria prepares to reassert its influence in Lebanon, it needs a strong
ally in the Lebanese leadership to carry out its interests, especially
since Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora has an anti-Syrian agenda and
is heavily supported by Syria's Saudi rivals. In the more recent past,
former Lebanese President Emile Lahoud played the role of the Syrian proxy
in the Lebanese government. When Lahoud was out the door, Syria wasted no
time in building a relationship with Suleiman. While Suleiman is far more
independent than Lahoud, he has demonstrated an interest in working
closely with the Syrians. To fortify the link between the Syrian regime
and the Lebanese presidency, Syria is making clear to Suleiman that it is
dropping support for a militant group that has long been a nuisance for
Suleiman and the Lebanese army.
Second, the Syrians have a need to counter Saudi influence in Lebanon.
This is where things get complicated. Saudi Arabia also backs a number of
militant proxies in Lebanon, and has ample cash to support these groups.
Most of these militants are instruments of Saudi National Security chief
prince Bandar bin Sultan, who has supported his own crew of jihadists to
counter Syria's spread of influence in Lebanon. Saudi's agenda in Lebanon
is what led to the unusual alliance between Sunni secular leader Saad al
Hariri and a number of Sunni Salafist leaders in Lebanon. The Saudis
pursued this plan with the understanding that any attacks carried out by
these groups would be blamed on the Syrians, thereby building support for
the anti-Syrian movement in Lebanon and undermining Syria's political
relations inside Lebanon.
Da'iyat al-Islam al-Shahhal is a pro-Saudi militant who is known for his
contacts with Sunni extremists. Large posters of al Shahhal have been
recently displayed along the coastal highways between Beirut and Sidon and
Beirut and Tripoli. According to our sources, it appears that al-Shahhal
is operated by Saudi intelligence and is the main target of the Syrians.
In addition, Abdulrahman Mohammad Awad, who has been described to Stratfor
as the "acting prince" of Fatah al Islam since he succeeded Shaker al Absi
(who was also a tool of the Syrians), is believed to have split off from
the Syrians and switched to the Saudi side. Now receiving ample amounts
of cash from Saudi intelligence officers, Awad is presumed to have
financed attacks against the Lebanese army in the north. The Syrians,
whose intelligence network in Lebanon spreads far and wide, are now
cooperating with the Lebanese army against these militants and already
have a good deal of information on their hideouts to uproot them, which
explains the relative ease the Lebanese forces have recently rounded up
groups of Fatah al Islam militants. Palestinian militant group Fatah is
also determined to surrender Awad, who is being sheltered by Hamas forces
in the Ain al Hilweh camp in Lebanon, to the Lebanese army.
Third, the Syrians are looking for yet another way to open up to the
United States, and are laying the groundwork for what they hope will be a
political rapprochement between the al Assad regime and the incoming
administration led by President-elect Barack Obama. By privately
demonstrating to Washington and Beirut that it is cooperating against
significant militant groups in Lebanon, the Syrians are sending a
deliberate message to the incoming U.S. administration that Syria is
prepared and capable of dismantling militant organizations - to include
Hezbollah - in exchange for normalization of relations and support in the
Syrian-Israeli negotiations. The Syrians have also been exhibiting their
cooperation in clamping down on insurgent traffic into Iraq toward this
end.
This does not mean that Syria is prepared to give up all its militant
tools. To the contrary, Syria continues to sponsor more significant
militant groups such as the PFLP-General Command, Jund al Sham, Jund al
Islam and Fateh al Intifada, who all operate in Lebanon's Palestinian
refugee camps and who can be utilized by the Syrians to stir up conflict
and potentially justify Syrian intervention when the need arises.
Syria is playing an extraordinarily complex game in managing both its
foreign relations and its jihadist supply chain. While Syria is making
progress in strengthening its relationship with the Lebanese president and
countering Saudi assets in Lebanon, its ability to reengage with the
United States will require cooperation on militant groups of much higher
status than Fatah al Islam.