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# The Global Intelligence Files

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

## Re: FOR COMMENT - S WEEKLY - Naxalite Threat to India

Released on 2012-09-19 09:00 GMT

Email-ID | 1160956
Date | 2010-07-07 17:48:55
From | bokhari@stratfor.com
To | analysts@stratfor.com
List-Name | analysts@stratfor.com

All tactical pieces must be grounded in the underlying geopolitical
framework. Besides, we are not getting into the politics of the Naxalites.
Rather we are merely placing them in the context of the wider leftist
spectrum. We can do the big assessment later but we need to briefly
underscore the context from which the Naxalites have emerged. My graf can
be easily tweaked to serve that purpose. Don't need anything elaborate.
On 7/7/2010 11:42 AM, Ben West wrote:
Here we need to place the Naxalite insurgent movement in the context of
the wider political communist movement in India. There are two rival
communist parties CPI and CPI-Marxist - both of which are engaged in
mainstream politics with governments in many Indian states and a
significant representation in the Indian parliament where they support
the ruling Congress-led United Progressive Alliance. In other words, the
Naxalites are to the wider communists what jihadists are to the wider
Islamist spectrum in Pakistan and many Muslim countries. It would be
useful to show how where and when the Naxalites splintered off from the
mainstream communist movement, which itself had undergone fragmentation.
We wanted to keep this piece pretty tactical and not get too much into
the politics. And frankly, I don't feel comfortable at this point to
really get into the politics of the Naxlites. We're still planning to do
a big assessment of them later this summer where we'll lay out more of
the background.
Kamran Bokhari wrote:
Nothing incorrect with this cut but I had lots of comments which could
greatly improve the quality of the piece.
On 7/6/2010 8:12 PM, Ben West wrote:
Exploring the Naxalite Threat in India
The Indian government issued a warning to railroad operators users
July 6 after a militant group declared a two day strike in eastern
India. Unlike strikes elsewhere in the country, where workers
protest low wages or poor working conditions by refusing to work,
strikes in eastern India carry much heavier consequences. Strikes
declared by the maoist militant group popularly known as "Naxalites"
(its formal name is Communist Party of India -Maoists I think) have
in the past led to train wrecks caused by sabotage, many of which
have killed dozens of people. Civilians are typically left out of
it, militants tend to focus on police forces instead, but plenty of
civilians are still affected by the violence.
Due to their historical follow through on the threats, the Naxalites
are typically successful at virtually halting public transportation
during these strikes. Passengers don't see it as worth the risk, so
they plan around the strike dates, and operators are the same. It's
a tactic that, symbolically, shows just how powerful Naxalites have
become in eastern India, and demonstrates their real ability to
affect commercial activity in the region. Let's mention the
geographic region in which the operate (in the various states
running north-south along the eastern coast of India. Would be good
to have a map as well.
The strike comes as a retaliation for a Central Reserve Police Force
(CRPF - India's federal police force) operation that killed a senior
leader, original member do you mean founding member? and spokesman
of the Naxalites, <Cherukuri Rajkumar
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100702_brief_senior_naxalite_leader_killed>
(alias Azad) in the southeastern Andhra Pradesh state July 2. The
news was unexpected, as India has had little luck capturing or
killing key Naxal leaders in the past. Azad's absence is not
expected to seriously hamper the Naxalites capability (they are a
very large, well organized force that will be able to replace him)
but it was bound to agitate a response from the Naxalites like the
strike declared July 6.
It's unclear exactly what precipitated the CRPF operation that
killed Azad, however it came after a busy spring in Naxalite
territory need to specify. On April 6, Naxalites mounted a textbook
armed ambush that <killed 76 CRPF members conducting a patrol in
Chhattisgarh state
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100406_india_naxalite_tactics_and_deadly_ambush>,
the deadliest attack the Naxalites had carried out in their 43 year
history. Then, on <May 17, militants detonated an explosive device
along the road that targeted a bus
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100517_brief_death_toll_rises_indian_bus_bombing>
(again in Chhattisgarh state) that killed nearly 50 civilians and
police. The spokesman for the group at the time, Azad, issued
several statements to the press indicating that the group regretted
the death of so many civilians, but blamed them for riding on the
bus with police officers, something they had been warned against
multiple times. Indeed, police are typically not allowed to ride on
public transportation Was this a public trasnportation bus or one
belonging to the CRPF, which has its own buses to ferry personnel to
various areas. Btw, we should point out that the CRPF is a national
police force as opposed to local due to the threat of Naxalite
attacks and the possibility of collateral damage. Shortly
thereafter, on May 28, <an act of sabotage against a railway line in
West Bengal
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100528_brief_indian_train_derailment_death_toll_hits_71>
state caused a train carrying only civilians to derail. It was
subsequently hit by a freight train, resulting in the death of
nearly 150 people. While Naxalites initially denied that they were
involved, they later admitted that a rogue gang trained by them had
carried out the sabotage without permission from Naxalite central
command. Do we buy this? Why would they admit that renegade elements
from their movement were behind the assault?
Finally, in the wake of these very effective (if not all
intentional) attacks, the Naxalites reiterated on June 24 their
intention to drive out Multi National Corporations from India and
that they would use violence to do so. This most recent rhetorical
threat drives at the heart of the Naxals' primary interest and,
backed up with <a proven tactical ability to strike economic targets
http://www.stratfor.com/threat_against_multinationals_indias_high_tech_center
>, <embodies the worst nightmare of the Indian government
http://www.stratfor.com/india_escalating_naxalite_threat>. It is
this current situation in India that causes us at STRATFOR to take a
look at one of the worlds' longest running insurgencies to see what
makes it tick. Here we need to mention that many senior Indian
government officials including the pm himself has described the
Naxal threat as the greatest security problem for India - far
greater than the one posed by Pak-based Islamist militants
BACKGROUND
The Naxalites get their name from their starting point - the village
of Naxalbari in West Bengal where, in May 1967, a local communist
party leader promised to redistribute land to the peasants who
worked, but did not own any of, the land. This was not the first
time such a proclamation by a communist party member had been made
before in eastern India - many other attempts at fomenting a working
class rebellion had been started but faltered. This one, however,
triggered a wave of violence in which workers killed and intimidated
land owners, in many cases running them off their land and
reclaiming it as their own. The actions were justified by a
sentiment held amongst the working class (which was largely made up
of tribal members) that they were merely taking back what they had
been forced to give up to wealthier businessmen from the west who
had gained the land from the locals through debt schemes. Certainly
neither side was innocent in all this, and animosity ran deep
through both communities.
However, on a grander, geopolitical level, it is significant that
this successful movement that began in Naxalbari. The Naxalites
adopted the ideology of Mao Zedong, the Chinese ruler that had
converted China to communism and who had just begun the cultural
revolution there in 1966. During the beginning of the Naxalite
movement, there was much rhetorical support between the Maoist
regime in China and the Naxalites in India. India is China's
historical geopolitical rival, so fomenting unrest within the border
of its enemy would certainly be in China's interest. There is little
evidence of material support then (and both sides deny connections
now) but the Naxalite movement certainly did serve China's goals of
weakening its largest neighbor to the south. Here we need to place
the Naxalite insurgent movement in the context of the wider
political communist movement in India. There are two rival communist
parties CPI and CPI-Marxist - both of which are engaged in
mainstream politics with governments in many Indian states and a
significant representation in the Indian parliament where they
support the ruling Congress-led United Progressive Alliance. In
other words, the Naxalites are to the wider communists what
jihadists are to the wider Islamist spectrum in Pakistan and many
Muslim countries. It would be useful to show how where and when the
Naxalites splintered off from the mainstream communist movement,
which itself had undergone fragmentation.
Although India was able to finally initially, no? put down the
Naxalite movement in 1971 and reinstate the status quo, the
mentality that the federal government in New Delhi had robbed tribal
groups of their land in eastern India persisted, The Naxalite
movement continued in a somewhat dormant phase, through the 1970s,
80s and early 1990s before violence resumed again in the late 1990s
and has been escalating over the past ten yeas.
The rise in violence matches with India's economic growth. This is
not coincidental. As India has experienced a boom in economic growth
over the past twenty years that saw its per capita income rise
approximately 100%. For comparison, it took India 40 years to
complete its last doubling of per capita income. This growth has
been sustained by foreign investors who have invested billions into
India's economy. However, India has not managed to shepherd this
economic growth without social cost. Put differently, the overall
economic growth has not trickled down to the common man - a problem
which has cost the two main national political parties BJP and
Congress their governments in recent decades and allowed the
NAxalites a key lever with which to revive their movement taking it
to newer heights Eastern India, where which is the core turf of the
Naxalites call home, has been targeted by foreign investment for its
large supply of natural resources, namely iron ore and coal -
however the area is rich in many other minerals. Eager to stimulate
growth, the government promised foreign investors land where they
could set up operations without effectively negotiating these
concessions with locals. This has led to disputes between the
locals, the foreign companies and the government. A famous example
of an ongoing dispute is the <South Korean steel conglomerate, POSCO
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/india_poscos_steel_investment_challenge>,
which is in the process of acquiring some 4,000 acres in Orissa
state upon which it can build a $12 billion steel mill. The project
has been marred by protests and acts of violence by locals opposed
to the project and police have been unable to secure the area to
permit building. Compensation to locals for the land is only just
now (some five years after the land was promised to POSCO) being
negotiated.
Exploitation
India's economic success has meant that foreign investors (like
POSCO) are increasing their presence in India, which means that
locals like the Naxalites are faced with both a threat and an
possibility opportunity. The threat is that they could lose their
land - this time, not for agricultural purposes, but for
manufacturing purposes. Instead of wealthy Indians from the center
of the country, this time the outsiders are foreign businessmen. If
they don't fight for their land, they may well lose it to these
outsiders. On the other hand, there is opportunity. Outside
investment could potentially bring jobs and development to an area
that is desperately poor. There are two ways for the Naxalites to
capitalize on this opportunity. The first is to benefit from the
jobs that will be brought in by working at these manufacturing
sites. However, due to the long history of distrust between locals
and outsiders, Naxalites are skeptical of gaining worthwhile
employment at these sites - they don't want to become essentially
endentured servants just because the local steel mill is the only
option they have. There is also another key structural problem for
their movement. While having strong social roots among the
population, the Naxalites are a radical movement that has adopted
armed struggle as its m.o. Employment in such facilities could have
a moderating effect on many of their members and leaders - pushing
them towards more mainstream politics, which could lead to the
splintering of the movement and the discipation of its effectiveness
given that there are already two mainstream communist parties in
these areas. Dividing the group from within is a key means with
which New Delhi could undermine the potency of the Naxalite
insurgency. But this will long be a work in progress because right
now the Indian govt is still debating on how best to tackle the
Maoist guerillas. Need to mention that the state is highly reluctant
to deploy the army and for a number of reasons. First, the army
could very well be sucked into a protracted jungle war where the
insurgents have the advanatge; 2) We are talking about a very wide
geography, where civi casulaties could further enflame the movement
instead of containing it; 3) Deploying the army will send a very bad
message around the world especially to investors that the Naxalites
have become such a major threat that local/regional law enforcement
agencies as well as the national paramilitary (CRPF) can't handle
it.
The other opportunity is to force the government or the foreign
investor to pay the group direct compensation for their land.
Naxalites can increase the value of the land by organizing a
militant force that can allow or deny access to certain areas,
sabotage commercial activity and mobilize locals to make up its
cadres. This model has been implemented and followed successfully by
other militant groups, most notably the <Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090316_nigerias_mend_different_militant_movement>
(MEND), which manages to extract concessions from energy giants
operation in the oil rich, but dismally poor Niger delta in Nigera.
While communist party leaders we need to specify which ones because
as I mention above there are many different types of commies in
eastern India do make statements on how commercial projects in the
area need to provide locals with jobs, it is clear that Naxalites
are also strengthening their capability to pursue the second option,
as well.
The Threat
Naxalites maintain the capability to construct and deploy improvised
explosive devices (IED), conduct armed raids and maintain an
extensive and rapid reaction intelligence network. An example of the
speed of their intelligence capabilities and its interconnectedness
with militant units can be seen in the May 17 bus bombing in
Chhatisgarh. Naxalites confirmed that police had boarded the bus,
passed the information along and approximately 30 minutes later, a
unit was able to deploy an IED along the road that the bus was known
to travel. This kind of cooperation amongst the Naxalites is
indicative of a very broad indigenous support network. These
networks operate along spectrums of violence, from those who fully
condone, promote violence and have tactical training (these are the
hardcore militant fighters who build the bombs, deploy them and are
skilled at small unit armed assaults) to those who are sympathetic,
yet may not necessarily approve of violence, to those who are
opposed, but are too afraid of the repercussions to attempt to
oppose the Naxalites. This spectrum of support is indicative of an
insurgency, however New Delhi does not see it that way.
New Delhi insists that, according to the constitution, the Naxalite
issue is one of law and order and, thus, a responsibility for the
states to address. New Delhi had deployed the CRPF, but has not gone
so far to deploy the military, something that many Indian
politicians have called for as the only solution to addressing the
Naxalites. While military advisors have been sent in to train local
and federal police forces, they have not engaged in any known
anti-Naxalite operations. Not even the air force has been granted
the permission to support police forces with helicopters for
deploying and extracting forces from the dense, hard to reach jungle
areas where the only roads into and out of are heavily mined and
monitored by Naxalites.
The decision not to deploy the military is a complicated one, as
India has a bad memory of deploying their military to address
domestic threats in the past, such as the Sikh threat posed in the
1980s in which the military response codenamed Operation Bluestar in
June 1984 resulted in a major army assault on Sikhism holiest site,
the Golden Temple in the major town of Amritsar near the Pakistani
border was criticized as being too heavy handed. The attack led to
the assassination of then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi later that
year by two of her Sikh bodyguards Also, the military is currently
focused on fighting Islamist and separatist forces in Jammu &
Kashmir in northwest India along the disputed border with Pakistan
and are dealing with multiple ethnno-separatist movements in the
seven different regions in the northeast sandwiched between the
Chinese and Bangladeshi borders. While Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh has labeled the Naxalite issue the biggest threat to
the country's internal security, incidents like the <2008 Mumbai
attacks
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081127_india_update_mumbai >
provide evidence to most Indians that Pakistan and the militants who
hide there pose a greater, external threat.
In the end, Naxalism is fairly contained. Despite threats and
indications from <Naxals to conduct attacks against urban targets
http://www.stratfor.com/sitrep/20100222_brief_naxalite_arrested_plans_attack_delhi
>, the group has not demonstrated a capability to pose a serious
militant threat outside of its jungle hideouts in the urban centers
of eastern India.
However, this does not mean that the threat will not materialize in
other forms. The Naxalites have a very sophisticated organization
that relies not only upon militant tactics, but also social unrest
and political tactics to increase its power vis-`a-vis the central
government. Naxalites have formed student groups in universities
that are sympathetic to their cause, they have human rights groups
and interest groups advocating in New Delhi and other regional
capitals for local tribal inhabitants in rural eastern India. This
ability to subtly pressure the central and local governments with
hard, militant threats, while maintaining a softer, steady pressure
from social groups means that even if the government did decide to
deploy the military to combat the Naxalites, it would not
necessarily end the threat that the Naxalites pose to India's
internal stability.
--
Ben West
Tactical Analyst
STRATFOR
Austin, TX
--
Ben West
Tactical Analyst
STRATFOR
Austin, TX