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# The Global Intelligence Files

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

## Re: FOR COMMENT - S WEEKLY - Naxalite Threat to India

Released on 2012-09-19 09:00 GMT

Email-ID | 1770188
Date | 2010-07-07 17:42:42
From | ben.west@stratfor.com
To | analysts@stratfor.com
List-Name | analysts@stratfor.com

Here we need to place the Naxalite insurgent movement in the context of
the wider political communist movement in India. There are two rival
communist parties CPI and CPI-Marxist - both of which are engaged in
mainstream politics with governments in many Indian states and a
significant representation in the Indian parliament where they support the
ruling Congress-led United Progressive Alliance. In other words, the
Naxalites are to the wider communists what jihadists are to the wider
Islamist spectrum in Pakistan and many Muslim countries. It would be
useful to show how where and when the Naxalites splintered off from the
mainstream communist movement, which itself had undergone fragmentation.
We wanted to keep this piece pretty tactical and not get too much into the
politics. And frankly, I don't feel comfortable at this point to really
get into the politics of the Naxlites. We're still planning to do a big
assessment of them later this summer where we'll lay out more of the
background.
Kamran Bokhari wrote:
Nothing incorrect with this cut but I had lots of comments which could
greatly improve the quality of the piece.
On 7/6/2010 8:12 PM, Ben West wrote:
Exploring the Naxalite Threat in India
The Indian government issued a warning to railroad operators users
July 6 after a militant group declared a two day strike in eastern
India. Unlike strikes elsewhere in the country, where workers protest
low wages or poor working conditions by refusing to work, strikes in
eastern India carry much heavier consequences. Strikes declared by the
maoist militant group popularly known as "Naxalites" (its formal name
is Communist Party of India -Maoists I think) have in the past led to
train wrecks caused by sabotage, many of which have killed dozens of
people. Civilians are typically left out of it, militants tend to
focus on police forces instead, but plenty of civilians are still
affected by the violence.
Due to their historical follow through on the threats, the Naxalites
are typically successful at virtually halting public transportation
during these strikes. Passengers don't see it as worth the risk, so
they plan around the strike dates, and operators are the same. It's a
tactic that, symbolically, shows just how powerful Naxalites have
become in eastern India, and demonstrates their real ability to affect
commercial activity in the region. Let's mention the geographic region
in which the operate (in the various states running north-south along
the eastern coast of India. Would be good to have a map as well.
The strike comes as a retaliation for a Central Reserve Police Force
(CRPF - India's federal police force) operation that killed a senior
leader, original member do you mean founding member? and spokesman of
the Naxalites, <Cherukuri Rajkumar
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100702_brief_senior_naxalite_leader_killed>
(alias Azad) in the southeastern Andhra Pradesh state July 2. The news
was unexpected, as India has had little luck capturing or killing key
Naxal leaders in the past. Azad's absence is not expected to seriously
hamper the Naxalites capability (they are a very large, well organized
force that will be able to replace him) but it was bound to agitate a
response from the Naxalites like the strike declared July 6.
It's unclear exactly what precipitated the CRPF operation that killed
Azad, however it came after a busy spring in Naxalite territory need
to specify. On April 6, Naxalites mounted a textbook armed ambush that
<killed 76 CRPF members conducting a patrol in Chhattisgarh state
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100406_india_naxalite_tactics_and_deadly_ambush>,
the deadliest attack the Naxalites had carried out in their 43 year
history. Then, on <May 17, militants detonated an explosive device
along the road that targeted a bus
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100517_brief_death_toll_rises_indian_bus_bombing>
(again in Chhattisgarh state) that killed nearly 50 civilians and
police. The spokesman for the group at the time, Azad, issued several
statements to the press indicating that the group regretted the death
of so many civilians, but blamed them for riding on the bus with
police officers, something they had been warned against multiple
times. Indeed, police are typically not allowed to ride on public
transportation Was this a public trasnportation bus or one belonging
to the CRPF, which has its own buses to ferry personnel to various
areas. Btw, we should point out that the CRPF is a national police
force as opposed to local due to the threat of Naxalite attacks and
the possibility of collateral damage. Shortly thereafter, on May 28,
<an act of sabotage against a railway line in West Bengal
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100528_brief_indian_train_derailment_death_toll_hits_71>
state caused a train carrying only civilians to derail. It was
subsequently hit by a freight train, resulting in the death of nearly
150 people. While Naxalites initially denied that they were involved,
they later admitted that a rogue gang trained by them had carried out
the sabotage without permission from Naxalite central command. Do we
buy this? Why would they admit that renegade elements from their
movement were behind the assault?
Finally, in the wake of these very effective (if not all intentional)
attacks, the Naxalites reiterated on June 24 their intention to drive
out Multi National Corporations from India and that they would use
violence to do so. This most recent rhetorical threat drives at the
heart of the Naxals' primary interest and, backed up with <a proven
tactical ability to strike economic targets
http://www.stratfor.com/threat_against_multinationals_indias_high_tech_center
>, <embodies the worst nightmare of the Indian government
http://www.stratfor.com/india_escalating_naxalite_threat>. It is this
current situation in India that causes us at STRATFOR to take a look
at one of the worlds' longest running insurgencies to see what makes
it tick. Here we need to mention that many senior Indian government
officials including the pm himself has described the Naxal threat as
the greatest security problem for India - far greater than the one
posed by Pak-based Islamist militants
BACKGROUND
The Naxalites get their name from their starting point - the village
of Naxalbari in West Bengal where, in May 1967, a local communist
party leader promised to redistribute land to the peasants who worked,
but did not own any of, the land. This was not the first time such a
proclamation by a communist party member had been made before in
eastern India - many other attempts at fomenting a working class
rebellion had been started but faltered. This one, however, triggered
a wave of violence in which workers killed and intimidated land
owners, in many cases running them off their land and reclaiming it as
their own. The actions were justified by a sentiment held amongst the
working class (which was largely made up of tribal members) that they
were merely taking back what they had been forced to give up to
wealthier businessmen from the west who had gained the land from the
locals through debt schemes. Certainly neither side was innocent in
all this, and animosity ran deep through both communities.
However, on a grander, geopolitical level, it is significant that this
successful movement that began in Naxalbari. The Naxalites adopted the
ideology of Mao Zedong, the Chinese ruler that had converted China to
communism and who had just begun the cultural revolution there in
1966. During the beginning of the Naxalite movement, there was much
rhetorical support between the Maoist regime in China and the
Naxalites in India. India is China's historical geopolitical rival, so
fomenting unrest within the border of its enemy would certainly be in
China's interest. There is little evidence of material support then
(and both sides deny connections now) but the Naxalite movement
certainly did serve China's goals of weakening its largest neighbor to
the south. Here we need to place the Naxalite insurgent movement in
the context of the wider political communist movement in India. There
are two rival communist parties CPI and CPI-Marxist - both of which
are engaged in mainstream politics with governments in many Indian
states and a significant representation in the Indian parliament where
they support the ruling Congress-led United Progressive Alliance. In
other words, the Naxalites are to the wider communists what jihadists
are to the wider Islamist spectrum in Pakistan and many Muslim
countries. It would be useful to show how where and when the Naxalites
splintered off from the mainstream communist movement, which itself
had undergone fragmentation.
Although India was able to finally initially, no? put down the
Naxalite movement in 1971 and reinstate the status quo, the mentality
that the federal government in New Delhi had robbed tribal groups of
their land in eastern India persisted, The Naxalite movement continued
in a somewhat dormant phase, through the 1970s, 80s and early 1990s
before violence resumed again in the late 1990s and has been
escalating over the past ten yeas.
The rise in violence matches with India's economic growth. This is not
coincidental. As India has experienced a boom in economic growth over
the past twenty years that saw its per capita income rise
approximately 100%. For comparison, it took India 40 years to complete
its last doubling of per capita income. This growth has been sustained
by foreign investors who have invested billions into India's economy.
However, India has not managed to shepherd this economic growth
without social cost. Put differently, the overall economic growth has
not trickled down to the common man - a problem which has cost the two
main national political parties BJP and Congress their governments in
recent decades and allowed the NAxalites a key lever with which to
revive their movement taking it to newer heights Eastern India, where
which is the core turf of the Naxalites call home, has been targeted
by foreign investment for its large supply of natural resources,
namely iron ore and coal - however the area is rich in many other
minerals. Eager to stimulate growth, the government promised foreign
investors land where they could set up operations without effectively
negotiating these concessions with locals. This has led to disputes
between the locals, the foreign companies and the government. A
famous example of an ongoing dispute is the <South Korean steel
conglomerate, POSCO
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/india_poscos_steel_investment_challenge>,
which is in the process of acquiring some 4,000 acres in Orissa state
upon which it can build a $12 billion steel mill. The project has been
marred by protests and acts of violence by locals opposed to the
project and police have been unable to secure the area to permit
building. Compensation to locals for the land is only just now (some
five years after the land was promised to POSCO) being negotiated.
Exploitation
India's economic success has meant that foreign investors (like POSCO)
are increasing their presence in India, which means that locals like
the Naxalites are faced with both a threat and an possibility
opportunity. The threat is that they could lose their land - this
time, not for agricultural purposes, but for manufacturing purposes.
Instead of wealthy Indians from the center of the country, this time
the outsiders are foreign businessmen. If they don't fight for their
land, they may well lose it to these outsiders. On the other hand,
there is opportunity. Outside investment could potentially bring jobs
and development to an area that is desperately poor. There are two
ways for the Naxalites to capitalize on this opportunity. The first is
to benefit from the jobs that will be brought in by working at these
manufacturing sites. However, due to the long history of distrust
between locals and outsiders, Naxalites are skeptical of gaining
worthwhile employment at these sites - they don't want to become
essentially endentured servants just because the local steel mill is
the only option they have. There is also another key structural
problem for their movement. While having strong social roots among the
population, the Naxalites are a radical movement that has adopted
armed struggle as its m.o. Employment in such facilities could have a
moderating effect on many of their members and leaders - pushing them
towards more mainstream politics, which could lead to the splintering
of the movement and the discipation of its effectiveness given that
there are already two mainstream communist parties in these areas.
Dividing the group from within is a key means with which New Delhi
could undermine the potency of the Naxalite insurgency. But this will
long be a work in progress because right now the Indian govt is still
debating on how best to tackle the Maoist guerillas. Need to mention
that the state is highly reluctant to deploy the army and for a number
of reasons. First, the army could very well be sucked into a
protracted jungle war where the insurgents have the advanatge; 2) We
are talking about a very wide geography, where civi casulaties could
further enflame the movement instead of containing it; 3) Deploying
the army will send a very bad message around the world especially to
investors that the Naxalites have become such a major threat that
local/regional law enforcement agencies as well as the national
paramilitary (CRPF) can't handle it.
The other opportunity is to force the government or the foreign
investor to pay the group direct compensation for their land.
Naxalites can increase the value of the land by organizing a militant
force that can allow or deny access to certain areas, sabotage
commercial activity and mobilize locals to make up its cadres. This
model has been implemented and followed successfully by other militant
groups, most notably the <Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger
Delta
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090316_nigerias_mend_different_militant_movement>
(MEND), which manages to extract concessions from energy giants
operation in the oil rich, but dismally poor Niger delta in Nigera.
While communist party leaders we need to specify which ones because
as I mention above there are many different types of commies in
eastern India do make statements on how commercial projects in the
area need to provide locals with jobs, it is clear that Naxalites are
also strengthening their capability to pursue the second option, as
well.
The Threat
Naxalites maintain the capability to construct and deploy improvised
explosive devices (IED), conduct armed raids and maintain an extensive
and rapid reaction intelligence network. An example of the speed of
their intelligence capabilities and its interconnectedness with
militant units can be seen in the May 17 bus bombing in Chhatisgarh.
Naxalites confirmed that police had boarded the bus, passed the
information along and approximately 30 minutes later, a unit was able
to deploy an IED along the road that the bus was known to travel. This
kind of cooperation amongst the Naxalites is indicative of a very
broad indigenous support network. These networks operate along
spectrums of violence, from those who fully condone, promote violence
and have tactical training (these are the hardcore militant fighters
who build the bombs, deploy them and are skilled at small unit armed
assaults) to those who are sympathetic, yet may not necessarily
approve of violence, to those who are opposed, but are too afraid of
the repercussions to attempt to oppose the Naxalites. This spectrum of
support is indicative of an insurgency, however New Delhi does not see
it that way.
New Delhi insists that, according to the constitution, the Naxalite
issue is one of law and order and, thus, a responsibility for the
states to address. New Delhi had deployed the CRPF, but has not gone
so far to deploy the military, something that many Indian politicians
have called for as the only solution to addressing the Naxalites.
While military advisors have been sent in to train local and federal
police forces, they have not engaged in any known anti-Naxalite
operations. Not even the air force has been granted the permission to
support police forces with helicopters for deploying and extracting
forces from the dense, hard to reach jungle areas where the only roads
into and out of are heavily mined and monitored by Naxalites.
The decision not to deploy the military is a complicated one, as India
has a bad memory of deploying their military to address domestic
threats in the past, such as the Sikh threat posed in the 1980s in
which the military response codenamed Operation Bluestar in June 1984
resulted in a major army assault on Sikhism holiest site, the Golden
Temple in the major town of Amritsar near the Pakistani border was
criticized as being too heavy handed. The attack led to the
assassination of then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi later that year by
two of her Sikh bodyguards Also, the military is currently focused on
fighting Islamist and separatist forces in Jammu & Kashmir in
northwest India along the disputed border with Pakistan and are
dealing with multiple ethnno-separatist movements in the seven
different regions in the northeast sandwiched between the Chinese and
Bangladeshi borders. While Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has
labeled the Naxalite issue the biggest threat to the country's
internal security, incidents like the <2008 Mumbai attacks
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081127_india_update_mumbai >
provide evidence to most Indians that Pakistan and the militants who
hide there pose a greater, external threat.
In the end, Naxalism is fairly contained. Despite threats and
indications from <Naxals to conduct attacks against urban targets
http://www.stratfor.com/sitrep/20100222_brief_naxalite_arrested_plans_attack_delhi
>, the group has not demonstrated a capability to pose a serious
militant threat outside of its jungle hideouts in the urban centers of
eastern India.
However, this does not mean that the threat will not materialize in
other forms. The Naxalites have a very sophisticated organization that
relies not only upon militant tactics, but also social unrest and
political tactics to increase its power vis-`a-vis the central
government. Naxalites have formed student groups in universities that
are sympathetic to their cause, they have human rights groups and
interest groups advocating in New Delhi and other regional capitals
for local tribal inhabitants in rural eastern India. This ability to
subtly pressure the central and local governments with hard, militant
threats, while maintaining a softer, steady pressure from social
groups means that even if the government did decide to deploy the
military to combat the Naxalites, it would not necessarily end the
threat that the Naxalites pose to India's internal stability.
--
Ben West
Tactical Analyst
STRATFOR
Austin, TX
--
Ben West
Tactical Analyst
STRATFOR
Austin, TX