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# The Global Intelligence Files

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

## RE: FOR COMMENT - S WEEKLY - Naxalite Threat to India

Released on 2012-09-19 09:00 GMT

Email-ID | 1763604
Date | 2010-07-07 18:32:07
From | scott.stewart@stratfor.com
To | analysts@stratfor.com
List-Name | analysts@stratfor.com

I think it would be great if you guys would write a piece on leftist
politics in India. This is not that piece.
From: analysts-bounces@stratfor.com [mailto:analysts-bounces@stratfor.com]
On Behalf Of Kamran Bokhari
Sent: Wednesday, July 07, 2010 11:49 AM
To: analysts@stratfor.com
Subject: Re: FOR COMMENT - S WEEKLY - Naxalite Threat to India
All tactical pieces must be grounded in the underlying geopolitical
framework. Besides, we are not getting into the politics of the Naxalites.
Rather we are merely placing them in the context of the wider leftist
spectrum. We can do the big assessment later but we need to briefly
underscore the context from which the Naxalites have emerged. My graf can
be easily tweaked to serve that purpose. Don't need anything elaborate.
On 7/7/2010 11:42 AM, Ben West wrote:
Here we need to place the Naxalite insurgent movement in the context of
the wider political communist movement in India. There are two rival
communist parties CPI and CPI-Marxist - both of which are engaged in
mainstream politics with governments in many Indian states and a
significant representation in the Indian parliament where they support the
ruling Congress-led United Progressive Alliance. In other words, the
Naxalites are to the wider communists what jihadists are to the wider
Islamist spectrum in Pakistan and many Muslim countries. It would be
useful to show how where and when the Naxalites splintered off from the
mainstream communist movement, which itself had undergone fragmentation.
We wanted to keep this piece pretty tactical and not get too much into the
politics. And frankly, I don't feel comfortable at this point to really
get into the politics of the Naxlites. We're still planning to do a big
assessment of them later this summer where we'll lay out more of the
background.
Kamran Bokhari wrote:
Nothing incorrect with this cut but I had lots of comments which could
greatly improve the quality of the piece.
On 7/6/2010 8:12 PM, Ben West wrote:
Exploring the Naxalite Threat in India
The Indian government issued a warning to railroad operators users July 6
after a militant group declared a two day strike in eastern India. Unlike
strikes elsewhere in the country, where workers protest low wages or poor
working conditions by refusing to work, strikes in eastern India carry
much heavier consequences. Strikes declared by the maoist militant group
popularly known as "Naxalites" (its formal name is Communist Party of
India -Maoists I think) have in the past led to train wrecks caused by
sabotage, many of which have killed dozens of people. Civilians are
typically left out of it, militants tend to focus on police forces
instead, but plenty of civilians are still affected by the violence.
Due to their historical follow through on the threats, the Naxalites are
typically successful at virtually halting public transportation during
these strikes. Passengers don't see it as worth the risk, so they plan
around the strike dates, and operators are the same. It's a tactic that,
symbolically, shows just how powerful Naxalites have become in eastern
India, and demonstrates their real ability to affect commercial activity
in the region. Let's mention the geographic region in which the operate
(in the various states running north-south along the eastern coast of
India. Would be good to have a map as well.
The strike comes as a retaliation for a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF
- India's federal police force) operation that killed a senior leader,
original member do you mean founding member? and spokesman of the
Naxalites, <Cherukuri Rajkumar
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100702_brief_senior_naxalite_leader_killed>
(alias Azad) in the southeastern Andhra Pradesh state July 2. The news was
unexpected, as India has had little luck capturing or killing key Naxal
leaders in the past. Azad's absence is not expected to seriously hamper
the Naxalites capability (they are a very large, well organized force that
will be able to replace him) but it was bound to agitate a response from
the Naxalites like the strike declared July 6.
It's unclear exactly what precipitated the CRPF operation that killed
Azad, however it came after a busy spring in Naxalite territory need to
specify. On April 6, Naxalites mounted a textbook armed ambush that
<killed 76 CRPF members conducting a patrol in Chhattisgarh state
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100406_india_naxalite_tactics_and_deadly_ambush>,
the deadliest attack the Naxalites had carried out in their 43 year
history. Then, on <May 17, militants detonated an explosive device along
the road that targeted a bus
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100517_brief_death_toll_rises_indian_bus_bombing>
(again in Chhattisgarh state) that killed nearly 50 civilians and police.
The spokesman for the group at the time, Azad, issued several statements
to the press indicating that the group regretted the death of so many
civilians, but blamed them for riding on the bus with police officers,
something they had been warned against multiple times. Indeed, police are
typically not allowed to ride on public transportation Was this a public
trasnportation bus or one belonging to the CRPF, which has its own buses
to ferry personnel to various areas. Btw, we should point out that the
CRPF is a national police force as opposed to local due to the threat of
Naxalite attacks and the possibility of collateral damage. Shortly
thereafter, on May 28, <an act of sabotage against a railway line in West
Bengal
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100528_brief_indian_train_derailment_death_toll_hits_71>
state caused a train carrying only civilians to derail. It was
subsequently hit by a freight train, resulting in the death of nearly 150
people. While Naxalites initially denied that they were involved, they
later admitted that a rogue gang trained by them had carried out the
sabotage without permission from Naxalite central command. Do we buy this?
Why would they admit that renegade elements from their movement were
behind the assault?
Finally, in the wake of these very effective (if not all intentional)
attacks, the Naxalites reiterated on June 24 their intention to drive out
Multi National Corporations from India and that they would use violence to
do so. This most recent rhetorical threat drives at the heart of the
Naxals' primary interest and, backed up with <a proven tactical ability to
strike economic targets
http://www.stratfor.com/threat_against_multinationals_indias_high_tech_center
>, <embodies the worst nightmare of the Indian government
http://www.stratfor.com/india_escalating_naxalite_threat>. It is this
current situation in India that causes us at STRATFOR to take a look at
one of the worlds' longest running insurgencies to see what makes it tick.
Here we need to mention that many senior Indian government officials
including the pm himself has described the Naxal threat as the greatest
security problem for India - far greater than the one posed by Pak-based
Islamist militants
BACKGROUND
The Naxalites get their name from their starting point - the village of
Naxalbari in West Bengal where, in May 1967, a local communist party
leader promised to redistribute land to the peasants who worked, but did
not own any of, the land. This was not the first time such a proclamation
by a communist party member had been made before in eastern India - many
other attempts at fomenting a working class rebellion had been started but
faltered. This one, however, triggered a wave of violence in which workers
killed and intimidated land owners, in many cases running them off their
land and reclaiming it as their own. The actions were justified by a
sentiment held amongst the working class (which was largely made up of
tribal members) that they were merely taking back what they had been
forced to give up to wealthier businessmen from the west who had gained
the land from the locals through debt schemes. Certainly neither side was
innocent in all this, and animosity ran deep through both communities.
However, on a grander, geopolitical level, it is significant that this
successful movement that began in Naxalbari. The Naxalites adopted the
ideology of Mao Zedong, the Chinese ruler that had converted China to
communism and who had just begun the cultural revolution there in 1966.
During the beginning of the Naxalite movement, there was much rhetorical
support between the Maoist regime in China and the Naxalites in India.
India is China's historical geopolitical rival, so fomenting unrest within
the border of its enemy would certainly be in China's interest. There is
little evidence of material support then (and both sides deny connections
now) but the Naxalite movement certainly did serve China's goals of
weakening its largest neighbor to the south. Here we need to place the
Naxalite insurgent movement in the context of the wider political
communist movement in India. There are two rival communist parties CPI and
CPI-Marxist - both of which are engaged in mainstream politics with
governments in many Indian states and a significant representation in the
Indian parliament where they support the ruling Congress-led United
Progressive Alliance. In other words, the Naxalites are to the wider
communists what jihadists are to the wider Islamist spectrum in Pakistan
and many Muslim countries. It would be useful to show how where and when
the Naxalites splintered off from the mainstream communist movement, which
itself had undergone fragmentation.
Although India was able to finally initially, no? put down the Naxalite
movement in 1971 and reinstate the status quo, the mentality that the
federal government in New Delhi had robbed tribal groups of their land in
eastern India persisted, The Naxalite movement continued in a somewhat
dormant phase, through the 1970s, 80s and early 1990s before violence
resumed again in the late 1990s and has been escalating over the past ten
yeas.
The rise in violence matches with India's economic growth. This is not
coincidental. As India has experienced a boom in economic growth over the
past twenty years that saw its per capita income rise approximately 100%.
For comparison, it took India 40 years to complete its last doubling of
per capita income. This growth has been sustained by foreign investors who
have invested billions into India's economy. However, India has not
managed to shepherd this economic growth without social cost. Put
differently, the overall economic growth has not trickled down to the
common man - a problem which has cost the two main national political
parties BJP and Congress their governments in recent decades and allowed
the NAxalites a key lever with which to revive their movement taking it to
newer heights Eastern India, where which is the core turf of the Naxalites
call home, has been targeted by foreign investment for its large supply of
natural resources, namely iron ore and coal - however the area is rich in
many other minerals. Eager to stimulate growth, the government promised
foreign investors land where they could set up operations without
effectively negotiating these concessions with locals. This has led to
disputes between the locals, the foreign companies and the government. A
famous example of an ongoing dispute is the <South Korean steel
conglomerate, POSCO
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/india_poscos_steel_investment_challenge>,
which is in the process of acquiring some 4,000 acres in Orissa state upon
which it can build a $12 billion steel mill. The project has been marred
by protests and acts of violence by locals opposed to the project and
police have been unable to secure the area to permit building.
Compensation to locals for the land is only just now (some five years
after the land was promised to POSCO) being negotiated.
Exploitation
India's economic success has meant that foreign investors (like POSCO) are
increasing their presence in India, which means that locals like the
Naxalites are faced with both a threat and an possibility opportunity. The
threat is that they could lose their land - this time, not for
agricultural purposes, but for manufacturing purposes. Instead of wealthy
Indians from the center of the country, this time the outsiders are
foreign businessmen. If they don't fight for their land, they may well
lose it to these outsiders. On the other hand, there is opportunity.
Outside investment could potentially bring jobs and development to an area
that is desperately poor. There are two ways for the Naxalites to
capitalize on this opportunity. The first is to benefit from the jobs that
will be brought in by working at these manufacturing sites. However, due
to the long history of distrust between locals and outsiders, Naxalites
are skeptical of gaining worthwhile employment at these sites - they don't
want to become essentially endentured servants just because the local
steel mill is the only option they have. There is also another key
structural problem for their movement. While having strong social roots
among the population, the Naxalites are a radical movement that has
adopted armed struggle as its m.o. Employment in such facilities could
have a moderating effect on many of their members and leaders - pushing
them towards more mainstream politics, which could lead to the splintering
of the movement and the discipation of its effectiveness given that there
are already two mainstream communist parties in these areas. Dividing the
group from within is a key means with which New Delhi could undermine the
potency of the Naxalite insurgency. But this will long be a work in
progress because right now the Indian govt is still debating on how best
to tackle the Maoist guerillas. Need to mention that the state is highly
reluctant to deploy the army and for a number of reasons. First, the army
could very well be sucked into a protracted jungle war where the
insurgents have the advanatge; 2) We are talking about a very wide
geography, where civi casulaties could further enflame the movement
instead of containing it; 3) Deploying the army will send a very bad
message around the world especially to investors that the Naxalites have
become such a major threat that local/regional law enforcement agencies as
well as the national paramilitary (CRPF) can't handle it.
The other opportunity is to force the government or the foreign investor
to pay the group direct compensation for their land. Naxalites can
increase the value of the land by organizing a militant force that can
allow or deny access to certain areas, sabotage commercial activity and
mobilize locals to make up its cadres. This model has been implemented and
followed successfully by other militant groups, most notably the <Movement
for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090316_nigerias_mend_different_militant_movement>
(MEND), which manages to extract concessions from energy giants operation
in the oil rich, but dismally poor Niger delta in Nigera. While
communist party leaders we need to specify which ones because as I mention
above there are many different types of commies in eastern India do make
statements on how commercial projects in the area need to provide locals
with jobs, it is clear that Naxalites are also strengthening their
capability to pursue the second option, as well.
The Threat
Naxalites maintain the capability to construct and deploy improvised
explosive devices (IED), conduct armed raids and maintain an extensive and
rapid reaction intelligence network. An example of the speed of their
intelligence capabilities and its interconnectedness with militant units
can be seen in the May 17 bus bombing in Chhatisgarh. Naxalites confirmed
that police had boarded the bus, passed the information along and
approximately 30 minutes later, a unit was able to deploy an IED along the
road that the bus was known to travel. This kind of cooperation amongst
the Naxalites is indicative of a very broad indigenous support network.
These networks operate along spectrums of violence, from those who fully
condone, promote violence and have tactical training (these are the
hardcore militant fighters who build the bombs, deploy them and are
skilled at small unit armed assaults) to those who are sympathetic, yet
may not necessarily approve of violence, to those who are opposed, but are
too afraid of the repercussions to attempt to oppose the Naxalites. This
spectrum of support is indicative of an insurgency, however New Delhi does
not see it that way.
New Delhi insists that, according to the constitution, the Naxalite issue
is one of law and order and, thus, a responsibility for the states to
address. New Delhi had deployed the CRPF, but has not gone so far to
deploy the military, something that many Indian politicians have called
for as the only solution to addressing the Naxalites. While military
advisors have been sent in to train local and federal police forces, they
have not engaged in any known anti-Naxalite operations. Not even the air
force has been granted the permission to support police forces with
helicopters for deploying and extracting forces from the dense, hard to
reach jungle areas where the only roads into and out of are heavily mined
and monitored by Naxalites.
The decision not to deploy the military is a complicated one, as India has
a bad memory of deploying their military to address domestic threats in
the past, such as the Sikh threat posed in the 1980s in which the military
response codenamed Operation Bluestar in June 1984 resulted in a major
army assault on Sikhism holiest site, the Golden Temple in the major town
of Amritsar near the Pakistani border was criticized as being too heavy
handed. The attack led to the assassination of then Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi later that year by two of her Sikh bodyguards Also, the military is
currently focused on fighting Islamist and separatist forces in Jammu &
Kashmir in northwest India along the disputed border with Pakistan and are
dealing with multiple ethnno-separatist movements in the seven different
regions in the northeast sandwiched between the Chinese and Bangladeshi
borders. While Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has labeled the
Naxalite issue the biggest threat to the country's internal security,
incidents like the <2008 Mumbai attacks
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081127_india_update_mumbai > provide
evidence to most Indians that Pakistan and the militants who hide there
pose a greater, external threat.
In the end, Naxalism is fairly contained. Despite threats and indications
from <Naxals to conduct attacks against urban targets
http://www.stratfor.com/sitrep/20100222_brief_naxalite_arrested_plans_attack_delhi
>, the group has not demonstrated a capability to pose a serious militant
threat outside of its jungle hideouts in the urban centers of eastern
India.
However, this does not mean that the threat will not materialize in other
forms. The Naxalites have a very sophisticated organization that relies
not only upon militant tactics, but also social unrest and political
tactics to increase its power vis-`a-vis the central government. Naxalites
have formed student groups in universities that are sympathetic to their
cause, they have human rights groups and interest groups advocating in New
Delhi and other regional capitals for local tribal inhabitants in rural
eastern India. This ability to subtly pressure the central and local
governments with hard, militant threats, while maintaining a softer,
steady pressure from social groups means that even if the government did
decide to deploy the military to combat the Naxalites, it would not
necessarily end the threat that the Naxalites pose to India's internal
stability.
--
Ben West
Tactical Analyst
STRATFOR
Austin, TX
--
Ben West
Tactical Analyst
STRATFOR
Austin, TX