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# The Global Intelligence Files

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## Pakistan, India: Nuclear Rivalry on the Subcontinent

Released on 2012-09-03 09:00 GMT

Email-ID | 1342783
Date | 2009-11-25 17:36:09
From | noreply@stratfor.com
To | allstratfor@stratfor.com

Stratfor logo
Pakistan, India: Nuclear Rivalry on the Subcontinent
November 25, 2009 | 1516 GMT
photo-Pakistani ballistic missiles on display in Karachi in November
2008
ASIF HASSAN/AFP/Getty Images
Pakistani ballistic missiles on display in Karachi in November 2008
Summary
Pakistan and India have been locked in a bitter regional rivalry since
their partition into separate entities on the Indian subcontinent in
1947. Three wars and a nuclear arms race later, the two countries are
miles apart in terms of strategic capability. India had a head start in
developing nuclear weapons and thus has more confidence in their
utility, while Pakistan remains geopolitically exposed and vulnerable -
with a greater need for a nuclear deterrent.
Analysis
Related Links
* The Geopolitics of India: A Shifting, Self-Contained World
* Part 1: The Perils of Using Islamism to Protect the Core
* Part 2: A Crisis in Indian-Pakistani Relations
* Part 3: Making It on Its Own
* Nuclear Weapons: Devices and Deliverable Warheads
* Nuclear Weapons: The Question of Relevance in the 21st Century
* Nuclear Weapons: Terrorism and the Nonstate Actor
* The North Korean Nuclear Test and Geopolitical Reality
* Debunking Myths About Nuclear Weapons and Terrorism
Related Special Topic Page
* Special Series: Countries In Crisis
In August, a pair of independent U.S. nuclear experts estimated that
Pakistan had 70 to 90 nuclear warheads in its arsenal, an increase over
their 2007 estimate of 60 weapons. But it was only in a follow-on
publication of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists released Nov. 10 that
the latest figure appeared, along with the estimate of the size of
India's arsenal - a lower figure of 60 to 80 warheads (the last full
assessment of India's arsenal was published in 2008). The report was
picked up a week later in the Indian press, on the heels of an article
in the Nov. 16 issue of The New Yorker on Pakistani nuclear security.
These are only the most recent high points in the ongoing media clamor
over Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, the status of nuclear forces on the
subcontinent and a pending Bush-era civilian nuclear deal between India
and the United States (Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh arrived in
Washington on Nov. 22 to discuss the deal). But the latest figures on
the size of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal are only estimates and provide
little perspective on the more complex underlying issues. While STRATFOR
continues to examine and closely monitor Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, we
thought it timely and appropriate to focus now on the realities of the
nuclear rivalry on the subcontinent.
A Brief History
India tested its first nuclear device in 1974, but it began planning to
construct the facility in which to reprocess the plutonium that would
ultimately produce the fissile material for that test in 1964. By
comparison, Pakistan's program began in earnest in 1972, following the
country's devastating defeat by India in 1971 that resulted in the loss
of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). But even though the program was
initiated, much needed to be done to consolidate control over the
country and reconstitute the military in the wake of that conflict. In
other words, when Pakistan began its nuclear program, India was already
nearing completion of its first full-scale nuclear device.
Nevertheless, then-Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto made it clear
following India's 1974 nuclear test that Pakistan would develop a
nuclear weapon even if the Pakistani people had to eat grass. Perhaps no
other statement better reflects Pakistan's determination to develop and
maintain a nuclear deterrent against India.
From its 1974 test until 1998, India had nearly a quarter century to
learn from the data and experience that came from the test and to focus
on refining the design of its warheads. By the time the two countries
faced off with a spate of nuclear tests in 1998, India had a series of
second-generation warheads - and what was reported to be a crude
thermonuclear configuration - ready to go. The relative maturity of
India's program given its previous experience and the comparative wealth
of intellectual, human and fiscal resources that New Delhi enjoyed meant
that India was in a position to take a much greater leap forward in
terms of nuclear weapons sophistication in 1998 than Pakistan was.
The Challenge of Nuclear Weapons
Despite this comparative advantage, however, India's five 1998 tests saw
only one or two clear, full-scale nuclear detonations. The larger
detonation, estimated to have been in the 12-25 kiloton range (i.e.,
from just smaller than the Hiroshima bomb to just larger than the
Nagasaki bomb), is thought to have been the crude thermonuclear design -
experts suggest that the second stage may have failed to ignite. India
claims a yield roughly three times that which was measured and that
several of the remaining tests were intended to have subkiloton yields.
The fact is, in the nearly half century since India began making plans
to reprocess plutonium for weapons purposes, it has not demonstrated a
full-scale weapons test indicative of destructive power beyond that of
the basic implosion device used against Nagasaki in 1945.
No doubt India has deployed nuclear weapons that are considerably
smaller in size and more efficient than those first American designs
from 1945. And it has no doubt adjusted its weapons designs based on the
1998 test data. But India's position today as a nuclear power serves as
a reminder of the challenges of weaponization. Even relatively crude and
simple nuclear warhead configurations are incredibly complex, involving
highly sophisticated metallurgy, explosives, quality assurance and
hardened and reliable circuitry. Having a high degree of confidence that
these weapons will work as designed in a crisis when they reach their
target is no small matter. After hasty assembly and dispersal, a warhead
will experience a wide range of extremes in terms of acceleration,
vibration and temperature during the delivery process.
photo-India*s Agni II medium-range ballistic missile
PRAKASH SINGH/AFP/Getty Images
India's Agni II medium-range ballistic missile
To attain a high degree of confidence, engineers must have an
experimental understanding of their warhead designs and configurations
that is as close as possible to an understanding of the weapon in its
operational environment. Much "subcritical" and other non-nuclear
testing can be done, but until these complex and sophisticated designs
are validated through actual testing, only relatively small and
conservative tweaks are likely to make it into final production weapons.
As a point of comparison, the United States has carried out more than
1,000 nuclear tests over the years, the Soviet Union more than 700. It
is on this basis and with this background that the world's most modern
and sophisticated nuclear weapons have been built. A modern and capable
country hardly needs hundreds of nuclear tests to build a credible
nuclear deterrent, but India's dearth of testing experience and data is
a pivotal constraint on the complexity and sophistication of its
deployed arsenal.
And Pakistan suffers from even more profound constraints. The country is
geopolitically fractious and fragile. It must expend a great deal of
effort to control peripheral territories and dissident populations while
mustering enormous resources to build and maintain a standing army to
defend Punjab - the country's core - from India's qualitatively and
quantitatively superior military. Meanwhile, its economy requires
considerable capital investment merely to function. For a country like
Pakistan to build and field a nuclear arsenal at all is an impressive
achievement.
But the existence of a Pakistani nuclear arsenal must first be
understood as a testament to the disadvantages Pakistan faces in its
rivalry with India. The intensity of this rivalry, even in times of
relative tranquility, is difficult to overstate. It is the omnipresence
of India and the Pakistani fear of Indian aggression - perhaps the one
thing that all the ethnic and religious groups in Pakistan can agree on
- that has made the immense investment in the nuclear arsenal over the
course of decades possible.
And at the end of the day, no matter what Pakistan does to further
develop its nuclear program, as long as the fundamental dynamics that
define the rivalry on the subcontinent persist, Pakistan is unlikely to
ever catch up with India. India started its program earlier and enjoyed
a considerable lead in terms of testing, and it continues to work
diligently to maintain that lead. And this gap is one India has a strong
incentive to maintain by continuing its own program development, which
means that Pakistan must work frantically simply to prevent the gap from
getting any wider.
Though Pakistan reportedly obtained some nuclear test data from China
(which was probably old test data) and some designs (which also may have
come from China) for the configuration of nuclear warheads, the real
trick was the application of this data. Testing data is far more
applicable to the arsenal of the country of origin and has only limited
applicability to a foreign country independently developing its own
arsenal. One country's test data also does not validate another
country's manufacturing or quality assurance processes. Because of this,
even if Pakistan received test data from a number of other countries, it
would not give Pakistan the boost it needed to surpass India.
Similarly, blueprints for proven weapons designs are certainly helpful,
but it is the testing of indigenously manufactured versions that really
validates a country's attempts to re-create or modify the designs. In
the case of both outside weapons designs and testing data, it is the
application of foreign data or other assistance and subsequent
validation that really matters.
This application began with Pakistan's six tests in 1998. Only two
produced yields in the kiloton range, and neither reached even the low
threshold of the roughly 16 kilotons of the Hiroshima bomb. (Pakistan
claims that several were intended to be subkiloton tests.) Though
Pakistan undoubtedly learned a great deal from these tests, it has not
had the opportunity - as India has had - to subject lessons learned from
those tests to a second round.
Correlation of Forces
This is not to say that the nuclear rivalry on the subcontinent is not
the most dynamic and fast-paced in the world today. It is. And this
certainly is not to say that the programs of both countries are not
advancing at a considerable pace. They are. But while estimates of the
size of their nuclear arsenals may spark some international concern or
have some geopolitical significance, they tell us next to nothing about
the strategic military balance on the subcontinent. This is because each
country approaches the issue of maintaining its nuclear arsenal from a
very different perspective.
map-Indian Subcontinent
India enjoys considerable strategic depth and holds the advantage in
terms of the range of its delivery systems. Its qualitative and
quantitative advantages extend to the conventional battlefield, and its
core is not immediately vulnerable to conventional Pakistani aggression.
In short, it has more time to react and can store some of its weapons
outside of Pakistan's reach, meaning that New Delhi can feel more secure
with fewer weapons.
Every weapon in Pakistan, by comparison, is within range of India's
arsenal. Indian forces poised on the Pakistani border are also poised on
the Punjabi core, the demographic, industrial, agricultural and
geographic heartland of Pakistan. Pakistan must have more nuclear
weapons to account for attrition of its arsenal and also to react on the
battlefield to overwhelming conventional Indian force. Islamabad does
not enjoy the luxury of time that New Delhi does. Similarly, Pakistan
has far more reason to be concerned about the reliability and
operational performance of its weapons in combat, which means that for
each target or operational need it must dedicate additional bombs to
account for that uncertainty.
Pakistan's strategic disadvantages, in other words, present a
substantial need for nuclear weapons. On the other hand, India enjoys
considerably more room to maneuver, allowing it to rely less on its
nuclear arsenal for its strategic security. Given (in all likelihood)
India's considerably higher degree of confidence in its weapons, its
ideal nuclear strength may actually be less than Pakistan's.
In any case, debating the precise status of the arsenals when the
details of each are a matter of national security - and especially when
estimates place them so close together - is largely academic. What is
knowable about the strategic balance between India and Pakistan is
defined by clear constraints and geopolitical realities. Despite
progress in developing the Pakistani arsenal, nothing in the last decade
has altered the fundamental realities of the nuclear rivalry on the
subcontinent.
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