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# The Global Intelligence Files

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

## CHINA/PAKISTAN/INDIA - Article says Pakistan interested in restraining India's nuclear "ambitions"

Released on 2012-09-03 09:00 GMT

Email-ID | 694224
Date | 2011-08-27 07:38:08
From | nobody@stratfor.com
To | translations@stratfor.com
List-Name | translations@stratfor.com

Article says Pakistan interested in restraining India's nuclear
"ambitions"
Text of article by Dr Farah Zahra "Credible minimum nuclear deterrence"
published by Pakistani newspaper Daily Times website on 26 August
Endeavouring to work out a relatively more precise and mutually agreed
definition of what may constitute 'minimum' could potentially add
further stability to the nuclear equation, but is patently of no
interest to India
(The preceding part of this column discussed problematic areas in the
concept of credible minimum deterrence; this part explores some aspects
of the South Asian strategic balance, and the last, forthcoming part
will search for some viable solutions to the issues raised.)
Credible minimum deterrence is an unwieldy concept with varying
connotations and implications for different audiences. It is used as a
blanket term by India and Pakistan, which prefer to be viewed by each
other as implementing a 'maximal' deterrence -- in the event of war they
are not only well equipped but also well prepared. The value of this
terminology may lie more in what it conceals, rather than in what it
reveals.
At least nine Indian nuclear analysts have offered their calculations on
what menu of nuclear weapons development India should follow. There is a
wide range in-between and no consensus. K Subrahmanyam, a leading Indian
strategic thinker, is of the view that "minimum deterrence is not a
numerical definition, but a strategic approach". This has been
outrightly rejected by those who believe that the number of weapons (or
estimate) is indeed decided upon but not disclosed. The decision makers
are attempting to suggest, through their claims that deterrence is not
about numbers, that they are not willing to disclose this to their own
body politic, their adversaries, or any other interested interlocutors,
including the US.
In Pakistan, there has been comparatively less debate on the
requirements of credible minimum deterrence. This may be seen as caused
by the de facto 'closed loop' of military thinking and decision-making
on nuclear issues during both civilian and military rule, continuing
after the recent formal 'civilianisation' of the National Command
Authority. Nonetheless, Pakistan has claimed that it will continue to
develop nuclear missiles and related strategic capability to maintain
minimum credible deterrence vis- -vis our eastern neighbour who is on a
path to major development of nuclear weapons, missiles, anti-missiles
and conventional arms.
Leading experts view Pakistan's strategic deterrence strategy as based
around five core elements: an effective conventional fighting force, a
minimum nuclear deterrence doctrine, an adequate stockpile of nuclear
weapons and delivery systems, survivable strategic forces and robust
strategic command and control. Conceptually, the shorter the period of
time that Pakistan's conventional military forces -- notably the
Pakistan Army and Air Force -- can hold out in a war, the quicker
nuclear weapons may be deployed.
The optimum size of any nuclear force required by Pakistan is a question
that has received a few (inconclusive) attempts. Even though Pakistan
may target cities, this type of targeting policy does not guarantee the
country's national defence. According to experts, under some
circumstances India may opt to attack and pay the price. Rodney Jones
states, "To be able to kill 50 percent of India's population (Pakistan)
might require...increase its current stockpile by about seven
times....require proportionate increases in Pakistan's ability to
produce fissile material, as well as similar increases in its missile
forces." He further calculates that if Pakistan wanted to destroy six
Indian ground force divisions (nine weapons per division) and the
aircraft on 10 airfields (three weapons per airfield), Pakistan would
require more nuclear weapons, and Pakistan's "current nuclear forces
have serious limitations with regard to the range of situations where
they could su! ccessfully protect Pakistan's independent existence". The
US government may not understand Pakistan's predicament, its blocking
the Fissile Material Treaty at the Conference on Disarmament and
increased production of fissile material, but scholars from the US, such
as Jones, clearly do.
Despite this type of independent analysis, it remains unclear how the
'minimum' deterrent is characterised by the 'strategic enclave' in
Pakistan, which is responsible for decision-making on nuclear and
military issues. Pakistan has officially adopted the same style of
diplomatic language and policy as India, leaving things open-ended and
undefined, keeping in view what India does with its own nuclear and
conventional arsenal. This planned capability may not be exactly as
ambitious as India's, at least to begin with, but, in the long term,
Pakistan may want to maximise its second strike options keeping in view
a number of evolving factors including budgetary issues and Indian
strategic acquisitions and developments.
India has pre-positioned any arms control or disarmament talks subject
to the progress of global nuclear arms control expanding the region to
'southern' Asia to include China. Pakistan, on the other hand, has
predicated global and regional nuclear arms control or disarmament
proposals upon India. It has also put forward regional proposals and
advocated potential solutions to nuclear proliferation, which India has
rejected. Endeavouring to work out a relatively more precise and
mutually agreed definition of what may constitute 'minimum' could
potentially add further stability to the nuclear equation, but is
patently of no interest to India. Whereas India so far seems to be
merely interested in risk reduction, Pakistan is also interested in
restraining India's nuclear capabilities and ambitions. In the absence
of sustained and systematic communication between India and Pakistan on
their respective positions and perspectives, it has not been possible
for them to ! explore avenues that might help to advance the interests
of both states.
Nuclear opacity is also viewed as having impeded Pakistani and Indian
efforts to openly propose, negotiate and accept nuclear arms control
agreements. On the other hand, policymakers may not even have the room
to formulate and discuss out of the box or politically unpopular
proposals, had that not been the case. Opaque nuclear proliferation may
have, in a way, constrained the nuclear arms race between India and
Pakistan, but it has also inhibited India and Pakistan from cultivating
domestic support for nuclear arms control.
(To be continued)
The writer is a Fellow at the Department of War Studies, King's College
London.
Source: Daily Times website, Lahore, in English 26 Aug 11
BBC Mon SA1 SADel ams
(c) Copyright British Broadcasting Corporation 2011