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## Special Report: Venezuela's Control of the Armed Forces

Released on 2012-04-02 04:00 GMT

Email-ID | 1759597
Date | 2010-05-03 16:36:25
From | noreply@stratfor.com
To | allstratfor@stratfor.com

Stratfor logo
Special Report: Venezuela's Control of the Armed Forces
May 3, 2010 | 1307 GMT
Special Report: Venezuela's Control of the Armed Forces
Summary
Controlling Venezuela requires controlling oil and the armed forces, and
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has managed to do both for more than a
decade. Challenges to this control have emerged, however, such as
enormous debt at the state-owned oil company and dissatisfaction in the
armed forces at the role of Cubans in the South American country's
military. Still, Chavez's hold appears secure so long as the oil
revenues keep flowing.
Analysis
PDF Version
* Click here to download a PDF of this report
In Venezuela, the key to state control lies in two things: oil and guns.
Those with the guns, i.e., the armed forces, have the ability to
threaten the state, but those with the oil have the revenues to silence
the guns and the populace. Therefore, if the state is to control the
populace and the armed forces, it must control the oil.
This model has worked relatively well for Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez in his 11-plus years in power. The state has taken control over
the oil revenues, the population has been heavily subsidized and for the
most part, the loyalty of the generals has been purchased by the regime.
The situation has by no means been all rosy for the Chavez government,
however. The government is dealing with a host of issues right now,
including a growing electricity crisis, preparations for legislative
elections in September, striking workers and mountains of debt owed by
state oil firm Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), all of which require
expensive short-term fixes. Venezuela's pocketbook is being stretched
and the economy is in a state of slow decay, but enough funds appear to
be flowing for now to keep Chavez in control.
A number of Venezuelan opposition media outlets (many of which influence
the U.S. media) regularly convey the impression that the Chavez
government is on its last legs. These reports paint a picture in which
disaffected generals in a military overrun by Cubans are on the verge of
rising up against the president. The so-called "Cubanization" of the
military has accelerated in recent years, and signs of stress are
visible in the regime - but not to the level portrayed in most political
analysis on Venezuela. In particular, the military has been impotent
against Chavez for years. In the following report, STRATFOR will take a
deeper look at the restructuring of the Venezuelan armed forces under
the Chavez government and the steps that the president has taken both to
enervate and appease the military as a form of political insurance.
Ensuring Loyalty with a Pay Bump
The Venezuelan government is wracking up a hefty bill for expensive
electricity generators, fuel imports to run those generators, debt
obligations to foreign oil firms and various forms of political
patronage in the lead-up to September legislative elections. At the same
time, Caracas needs to deny the armed forces the incentive to challenge
the government as the economic climate deteriorates. The short-term
answer for this is a pay bump for the armed forces.
In his weekly television address, Alo Presidente, Venezuelan President
Hugo Chavez announced April 25 his government's intent to invest $145.5
million bolivars ($33.8 million) to raise the salaries of all ranks in
the armed forces by 40 percent, paid retroactively from April 1. No
other details on the division and distribution of the salaries by rank
were released. The Venezuelan military, which reportedly had not been
given a raise in more than four years, reacted with predictable
enthusiasm to the raises. Along with the rest of the Venezuelan public,
military personnel have been struggling with the country's skyrocketing
inflation, which a recent currency devaluation has exacerbated. With the
salary increase, Chavez claimed a "recently commissioned lieutenant"
will now make a salary of nearly 2,500 bolivars ($581) a month.
Special Report: Venezuela's Control of the Armed Forces
JUAN BARRETO/AFP/Getty Images
Venezuelan army tanks during a military parade in Caracas on April 19
At first blush, a 40 percent wage increase for an 82,000-strong military
would appear to be a very large fiscal expense that would stress the
government's finances. However, two factors make this wage increase much
less financially burdensome. First, in light of the January devaluation
of the bolivar, local-currency proceeds from oil sales have now doubled,
meaning the government will have plenty of bolivars to support the wage
increase. Second, since the annual inflation rate - as reported by
Venezuela's central bank- stands at about 30 percent, the wage increase
only amounts to around 10 percent in real terms. The devaluation and
recent changes to the central bank's charter will likely increase
inflationary pressure in coming quarters, continuing the erosion of real
wages.
Cubanization
The salary increase for the military also comes amid rising public
criticism of the politicization and so-called Cubanization of the
Venezuelan military. Former Venezuelan Brig. Gen. Antonio Rivero claimed
the "the presence and meddling of Cuban soldiers" in the armed forces
prompted his April retirement. Rivero said Cubans were operating at some
of the highest levels in the Venezuelan military, delivering
intelligence, communications, weapons and other training for the troops.
He also denounced the extent to which Chavez has undermined military
professionalism, and complained of the government's move to expand its
civilian militia. In the same address in which he announced the salary
increase for the military, Chavez addressed Rivero's complaints, saying
he was saddened by the general's attempt to draw attention to himself.
Chavez also defended his decision to embrace the Cuban military presence
by criticizing previous Venezuelan administrations for allowing the U.S.
military to staff the offices of the country's Army Command Headquarters
and manage Venezuelan state secrets.
While the opposition is eager to exploit the public relations sensation
of a general condemning Chavez's military policy, retiring generals and
the Cuban links into the Venezuelan military are not exactly startling
developments in Venezuela. The deep integration of Cuban forces in the
Venezuelan military has been an open secret in recent years. By having
enlisted soldiers and trainers percolate throughout the armed services
at virtually all levels, the Chavez government has been able to tap
Cuba's security and intelligence expertise to keep tabs on dissidents
and quash any potential threats to the government. For its part, Cuba
benefits from being able to influence the policies of a regional,
oil-producing heavyweight in South America. As Chavez's political and
economic vulnerabilities have increased, so have the opportunities for
Cuba to entrench itself in Venezuela.
This symbiotic relationship saw its clearest manifestation with the July
2008 passage of the Organic Law of the National Armed Forces. The law
redefined the Venezuelan Armed Forces from a politically nonaligned
professional institution (as stated in the 1999 constitution) to a
patriotic, popular and anti-imperialist body, as described in the
legislation. Chavez, not wanting to be caught off guard again by his
generals as he was during an April 2002 coup attempt, created the law to
develop a military primarily tasked with protecting and defending the
regime from internal threats. The Cuban government, wanting to ensure
Venezuelan dependency on Cuban security, is believed to have had a role
in one of the more controversial articles in the law. This provision
allows for foreign nationals (i.e., Cubans) who have graduated from
Venezuelan defense institutions to earn the rank of officer in the
Venezuelan armed forces.
Another clause in the law forces officers into retirement if they are
not promoted after two years. Though such provisions are common in many
militaries, Caracas has used it with unusual frequency as a tool to
remove potential dissenters. Under this system, political allegiance can
easily supersede military merit when it comes to awarding promotions or
forcing resignations. Cuban advisers, who have been tasked with
identifying localized threats from within the armed forces, are believed
to have significant influence on these decisions.
Chavez recently remarked in Havana that he felt like he was "one more
Cuban." But many Venezuelans do not like the Cubans' methods or their
growing presence in the country, and Cuban integration in the Venezuelan
armed forces appears to have alienated several high-ranking members of
the military. Chavez, however, has knowingly incurred this risk, and
undermining powerful military leaders was likely one of his key goals.
Problematic generals can be forced into retirement while the Cubans
closely scrutinize the remaining military elite, who are given perks to
keep them loyal to the government.
While this comes at the cost of considerable expertise and
professionalism, Chavez's goal is to ensure that the upper ranks of the
military lack the operational control to challenge the president.
Mid-tier members of the military probably worry the Venezuelan president
more, however. After all, Chavez was a lieutenant colonel with the
charisma to rally a sizable portion of the military and lower classes
around him in his 1992 coup attempt and victorious 1998 presidential
campaign. As long as he is the one occupying the presidency, Chavez does
not wish to see any lieutenant colonels following in his footsteps.
Since Chavez lacks the same reach and oversight with the lower ranks of
the military than he has with the generals, pay raises are a way to help
mitigate potential threats emanating from below.
Militia Insurance
Chavez has also attempted to make up for any lingering dissent within
the armed forces through the creation of the National Bolivarian Militia
(NBM) in 2007, which has some 110,000 reservists, and has since
reportedly grown to roughly 300,000 (though these estimates are likely
exaggerated.) Efforts are also under way to bolster the NBM with peasant
recruits and perhaps to form a marine militia.
Special Report: Venezuela's Control of the Armed Forces
JUAN BARRETO/AFP/Getty Images
Members of the National Bolivarian Militia on Feb. 20 in Caracas
The militias present themselves as a security element operating at the
president's behest. Though the armed forces reputedly are responsible
for their training, the militia does not exhibit the skills of an
effective security force. Militia members are comprised of men and women
of all shapes, sizes and ages from Venezuela's lower classes. It is no
elite guerrilla unit; instead, it is a poorly trained peasant force. The
state uses their exercises and marches as photo opportunities to
demonstrate a military force ideologically bound to the regime. More
important, the incorporation of the NBM into the armed forces provides
the president a useful chip to keep the military elite in check.
The Venezuelan Defense Ministry has also strongly resisted the
deployment and armament of these militias. The ministry is believed to
keep tabs on the militia's activities by maintaining physical control
over it weapons arsenal, which consists mainly of AK-103 and AK-104
assault rifles acquired from Russia. The militia forces may not be
well-trained, but ideology can be a powerful motivational force, and
they could gain strength in numbers as Chavez continues his push to
expand the force. Chavez's purpose in building the militia appears to be
to make the cost of a coup too high, given the risk of a civil war
between the militia and the military.
Chavez*s militia-building efforts and apparent tendency to put more
trust in his Cuban advisers than his own generals may be sore points for
many within the military elite, but these are also the very tools he is
using to keep the armed forces too weak and divided to pose a real
threat to his regime. So far, the strategy has worked. And as long as
the oil revenues continue to flow, the electricity crisis is contained
and the military's wages can be paid, the Venezuelan president is likely
to have the political insurance he needs to hold onto power.
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