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# The Global Intelligence Files

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

## Re: Turkey/IMF analysis - Marko's turn

Released on 2012-08-27 00:00 GMT

Email-ID | 1566321
Date | 2010-01-25 22:26:48
From | reva.bhalla@stratfor.com
To | marko.papic@stratfor.com, emre.dogru@stratfor.com

some comments in bold. pls send one final version for us to look out
before this gets sent to the list
thanks, all
On Jan 25, 2010, at 7:59 AM, Marko Papic wrote:
Emre Dogru wrote:
Cleared up once again. I've also put a transition paragraph between the econ
ass. and politics angle that you suggested. (in red) Thanks much, guys. This was
a tremendous experience.
Btw, are we still waiting for the IMF dude to come to Turkey or are we going to
publish this as a without-trigger-piece that G initiated in last week's meeting?
Turkey - IMF
Analysis
The ruling AK Party has begun to give strong indications that Turkey
will soon sign a stand-by deal (an IMF arrangement that assures the
signatory country to use IMF financing up to a specific amount and
during one or two years) with the IMF that the two sides have been
negotiating over since 2008. IMF Chief Dominique Strauss-Kahn is
expected to arrive in Ankara (XXXX) for the final signing. A closer
look at how Turkey has coped with the 2008 financial crisis reveals
how the decision to take this IMF loan is primarily politically driven
to keep the AK Party*s domestic rivals in check and ensure the party*s
success in the 2011 elections.
The Worst is Already Over
Though the Turkish economy does not require immediate loan assistance,
the AK Party would not mind using a loan to reassure investors and
markets, not to mention Turkish voters, that Ankara has already gone
through the worst part of the storm.
As a rapidly emerging market, the Turkish economy had experienced an
average growth of 6.5% since 2005. When the global economic recession
hit in the summer of 2008, Turkey*s GDP plummeted by 6.5% in the
fourth quarter. The GDP decline in early 2009 was even worse than that
which took place during the *financial crisis of
2001*(LINK:http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/argentina_turkey_linked_crisis).
As the Turkish economy appeared to be sliding towards a 2001-style
recession, investors feared that that Turkey would be hit the hardest
among emerging economies *as an OECD report illustrated in 2008*
(LINK:http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081126_turkeys_footing_global_economic_crisis).
But this was not the case. The sharp decline of GDP did not mean
complete collapse of the economy as the country suffered in the past.
The global recession exacerbated a quarterly economic slowdown of the
Turkish economy that was already underway.
Graph: GDP growth since 2005 (with 2009 and 2010 IMF forecasts)
Graph: Industrial production (and/or manufacturing) stats
With the Turkish economy lumped in with other struggling emerging
economies, like Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria at the onset of
the crisis, the lira*s value started to drop against the Euro in
September 2008. But Turkey did not suffer from this depreciation as
much as other emerging European economies for two reasons. First,
Turkish exports became more competitive in the European market, which
is the destination of roughly half of overall Turkish exports, as the
lira's value against the euro declined. Despite the drastic decline in
Europe*s demand during the recession, Turkish exports to the EU
dropped by only 10 percent compared to 2007 pre-crisis figures.
Meanwhile, Turkish exporters diversified the destination of their
goods by trading with other markets in the Middle East, such as Egypt,
Libya and Syria as a result of Turkish government*s efforts to boost
Turkey*s trade ties with those economies.
Graph: Turkish lira against the Euro
Graph: Turkish exports to the EU (and ME countries if available as
stats)
Second, Turkish foreign debt totals around $67 billion (equivalent to
10% of GDP), whereas troubled Central European economies (LINK) hover
at debt levels of 20 percent of GDP. Furthermore, the foreign debt of
the private sector stands at $185 billion in 2008, equivalent to one
fourth of country's GDP, a manageable number when compared to most
troubled emerging market economies like Russia (31.6%), Kazakhstan
(80.4%) and Bulgaria (94.1%). The relatively low level of foreign
denominated debt meant that lira's devaluation did not cause a panic
in the banking system like it did in Central Europe where domestic
currency depreciation was a serious problem due to high rates of
foreign lending.
Unlike the 2001 Turkish financial crisis, no major financial
institution failed or collapsed this time and no official intervention
was needed. Aside from manageable debt levels, this also had to do
with the fact that regulators have steadily increased capital reserve
requirements to protect against potential surprises in the system.
Also, having drawn lessons from the banking turmoil in 2001, the
Turkish Central Bank was granted greater autonomy to better cope with
country*s chronic inflation and the remaining banks were taken under
firm control to assure the transparency of their debt stocks.
Combination of low debt levels and post-2001 regulation has meant that
even at the height of the credit crunch, Turkey*s banks remained on
solid footing. While non-performing loan (NPL) ratio -- key indicator
of the growth of bad debt in bank's portfolio -- grew to 5.3 percent
in November 2009, this level is not out of the ordinary for Turkish
conditions -- from Jan. 2005 until the start of the crisis in Sept.
2008, Turkey has averaged 4.1 percent level of NPLs.
Graph: Loan, Deposit, NPL
Even though this what are you referring to here? the NPL levels? will
likely bring risks if it continues so, current resilience of the
Turkish economy to weather shocks of the financial crisis led rating
upgrades from Moody*s and Fitch. this whole sentence is really unclear
to me. on what basis did moody's and fitch upgrade and when?
While this posivitive outlook of the Turkish economy explains the
reason that Turkey and the IMF did not come to terms before, it also
gives a clear understanding as to the size of the loan unclear. need
to explain more succinctly the meaning behind the size of the loan.
this is for security, not economic necessity. Use the comparisons to
the other countries to explain that point. it's not coming through as
written. A STRATFOR source confirmed the rumours that the deal will be
around $25 billions. Compared with other countries this amount of
money remains dwarf in terms of percent of GDP. The IMF loan that
Turkey might get will be equivalent to 3.1% of its GDP, whereas
financial aids that Hungary and Romania received from the IMF, the
European Union and World Bank combined are equivalent to 10.1% and
13.5% of their respective GDPs.
Might want to also include Serbia and Latvia in here as well. Just to
show that there is a difference between countries in danger and
countries just looking for security.
The Politics Behind the IMF Deal
Though negotiations between the Turkish government and IMF began in
2008, the AK Party was in no rush to take a loan. Instead, the ruling
party appeared to have an intent all along to use the IMF loan to its
political advantage, waiting for the worst of the global downturn to
pass so that the government could avoid looking desperate in accepting
a loan.
Now, after demonstrating the resilience of the economy under AK Party
rule, the government intends to use the loan to assure investors and
voters of the soundness of the government*s economic policies showing
that it can abide by IMF's conditions will be an encouragement in of
itself. The party already has strong political and financial support
from the Anatolian-based small and medium-sized business class. For
long-term political survival, however, the AK party also needs
stronger alliances with the Istanbul-based financial giants, who are
heavily exposed to the external market and debt and are strongly
supporting the decision to take the IMF loan. Therefore, the loan will
provide the AK Party with another tool to build critical political
support ahead of 2011 elections.
The AK Party*s ability to claim credit for the country*s economic
health is also essential to its ability to maintain a dominant
position in the Turkish political landscape. Turkey has a long history
of unstable coalition governments and military coups. It was not until
2002, when the AK Party came to power, that Turkey began experiencing
steady, economic growth, allowing the AK Party to build up influence
among Turkey*s business class. The AK Party has used its immense
political clout to pursue an aggressive, and frequently controversial,
agenda at home and abroad. For example the AK Party has steadily
undermined the role of the military in Turkish politics, and is
continuing a push to bring more elements of the Turkish security
apparatus under civilian control.
The AK Party also faces immense criticism from its political rival in
the main opposition People*s Republican Party (CHP) which regularly
accuses the ruling party of eroding the country*s secularist
tradition. The military and political forces will watch and wait for
the AK Party to stumble in its policies in hopes of regaining a
political edge. This could be seen most recently in the AK Party*s
push forward with its *Kurdish initiative*, which produced (with the
help of the military and the Nationalist Movement Party) widespread
popular backlash. But even as the AK Party stumbled in its Kurdish
policy, it was able to quickly reassert itself and contain its rivals.
(link)
The AK Party would have a far more challenging time maneuvering the
Turkish political landscape if the country were not on stable economic
footing. As many within the Turkish military apparatus will privately
lament, there is little the AK Party*s rivals can do to undercut the
ruling party as long as it carries broad popular support. The AK
Party*s broad popular support rests on its ability to maintain a
healthy economic environment, and the IMF loan is just the boost that
the party is looking for to keep the economy*s reputation in good
shape.
--
Marko Papic
STRATFOR
Geopol Analyst - Eurasia
700 Lavaca Street, Suite 900
Austin, TX 78701 - U.S.A
TEL: + 1-512-744-4094
FAX: + 1-512-744-4334
marko.papic@stratfor.com
www.stratfor.com