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# The Global Intelligence Files

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

## Re: DISCUSSION - Insight on Iranian intentions in negotiations

Released on 2012-08-05 16:00 GMT

Email-ID | 1180377
Date | 2010-08-02 16:40:08
From | bayless.parsley@stratfor.com
To | analysts@stratfor.com
List-Name | analysts@stratfor.com

Question: when we talk about our continued desire to get out of Iraq, do
we actually intend (at least publicly/legally) to fully withdraw these
final 50,000 troops, ever? Or if not "ever," in the next five-10 years?
Not familiar with what the SOFA mandates must be done once our combat
troops are all out. And obviously the answer would have a huge effect on
these negotiations.
Do we really "need" to pull them out, or would it not be that huge of a
strain on our military to maintain troops there, just like we do in
Europe, Korea, and tons of other places?
Kamran Bokhari wrote:
There isn't much time to do anything with the remaining troops. They are
leaving one way or another. Iran knows that. Also, the only situation
that I can see upsetting the drawdown schedule is massive violence
combined with the various factions rapidly hurling into a direction
opposite to that of a power-sharing formula. The talks are not going
anywhere but no sign that these guys are about to say fuck it. Also,
note that July was the deadliest month in terms of attacks since 2008.
But U.S. forces continue to drawdown and ahead of schedule. Iran is also
not interested in creating problems right now because it doesn't have
the Shia house in order with al-Maliki feuding with al-Hakim/al-Sadr.
The key issue is therefore the 50k troops that will be left behind. Even
then the Iranians don't have to do anything necessarily. Just play
around with U.S. perceptions. They know that DC needs to pull them out
but can't. Not without creating a vacuum that Tehran would exploit. So,
they say we can let you go with assurances if you give us what we want,
which is regime security, lifting of sanctions, and recognition of IRI's
regional role. Hence the bit about holding them hostage. That said, do
note that the al-Sadrites said recently that they will not tolerate any
long-term American bases in country even in Kurdistan. So Iran has that
option as well. but really their goal is to play with U.S. perceptions
to get what they want. They won't need to do much more unless the U.S.
says the 50K are digging in for the long haul.
Link: themeData
Link: colorSchemeMapping
On 8/2/2010 10:14 AM, Reva Bhalla wrote:
I think it's a bit of both. The demands outlined here make sense. At
the same time, iran will want to convey the message that it has the
upper hand and the US needs to be the one to make the first move.
This is why I'd like a better understanding of what can Iran actually
do to the remaining troops in Iraq to upset the withdrawal or hold the
leftover forces hostage?
On Aug 2, 2010, at 8:44 AM, Rodger Baker wrote:
if these are part of backchannel messaging to DC, how do we
interpret these? as accurate assessments of iran's views, or as the
position Iran wants people in the US admin and policy positions to
think is the iranian position?
On Aug 2, 2010, at 8:20 AM, Reva Bhalla wrote:
Please read the two pieces of insight below. They both come from
the same source, who (I believe) has used this communication link
through S4 in attempt to send messages to the US administration. I
believe this message below is being transmitted through a number
of backchannels.
I think this is important for us to publish in an article so we
can better define the Iranian position in this stage of the
negotiations. It is clear that the Iranian priority is Iraq in
these nuclear negotiations, which should come as no surprise to
STRATFOR. My biggest question is, are the Iranians overestimating
their leverage over the remaining US troops in Iraq? Perhaps
there is an Iranian contingency plan that we haven't fully
considered? Overall, the Iranians are not under any great
pressure to concede anything big right now. It's up to the US to
answer to their demands in Iraq, and it's unclear to me whether
the US is really that much of a blocker to what Iran wants to
achieve in Iraq right now. It's also unclear to what extent Iran
would cooperate in allowing in inspectors again and in temproarily
freezing enrichment.
PUBLICATION: for analysis
ATTRIBUTION: STRATFOR sources
SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Iranian diplomat -- strongly suspected of
using S4 as backchannel to US admin
SOURCE Reliability : D
ITEM CREDIBILITY: 3
DISTRIBUTION: Analysts
SOURCE HANDLER: Reva
Iran has informed the USA through back channels about its
perspective on resolving the current standoff with regard to the
Iranian nuclear program. The Iranian package includes the
following:
1. Iran wants the US to cease its support to secessionist ethnic
groups in Iran, namely the Balochs in Balochistan-Sistan and Arabs
in Khuzistan (Ahwas), in addition to Mujahidin e-Khalq.
2. Iran will suspend uranium enrichment for a year.
3. Iran will give international inspectors access to its nuclear
sites.
4. Iran will allow US troops to withdraw smoothly from Iraq.
5. The US gives Iran a free hand in Iraq and allows it to form the
cabinet of its choice.
The source believes Iran has the upper hand over the US, because
the Obama administration's main concern is to ensure a peaceful
and disruption free withdrawal from Iraq. Iran can make this
happen, otherwise it can easily transform US troops there into
hostages. The Iranians strongly feel that the fate of US troops in
Iraq lies within their hands. s Iran has the capacity to make or
unmake president Obama.
The Iranians have told the Americans that they will not go for
Allawi's prime ministership. They very much prefer the weak
character of Nuri al-Maliki, whom they can easily use to achieve
their goals in Iraq. Iran is quite hopeful that al-Maliki will
become next prime minister because Ayatollah Ali Sistani has
quietly endorsed his candidacy. He says the reappointment of
Maliki will neutralize the aspirations in Iraq of Syria, Turkey
and Saudi Arabia. Iran will not compromise on Iraq. It will delay
its nuclear program but it will not abandon it and they have made
this matter absolutely clear to the Americans. He thinks Iran will
prevail.
On 7/30/2010 9:59 AM, Antonia Colibasanu wrote:
PUBLICATION: analysis
ATTRIBUTION: STRATFOR sources
SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Iranian diplomat
SOURCE Reliability : D
ITEM CREDIBILITY: 3
DISTRIBUTION: Analysts
SOURCE HANDLER: Reva
** This supports my earlier assumption that Iran still feels
like it has enough leverage in other places to avoid making
any real concessions in this next round of talks.
There is nothing the Iranians like more than discussing their
nuclear program. Iran is keenly interested in negotiating its
nuclear options. He adds that "we are only interested in the
process of negotiation and do not intend to make concessions
that may harm our strategic nuclear objectives." He says the
Iranians feel quite safe as long as the West engages them in
talks. Talking is one thing and reaching firm agreements that
the Iranians will respect is another thing.
The source says the Iranians can withstand as much pressure as
the West can apply. The Iranian leadership's assessment is
that neither the US nor Israel will attack them, because the
repercussions for the US/Israel will be beyond their ability
to withstand. He says it would not make much sense for the US
to escalate militarily if they are so desperate to downsize
their miliarty presence in Iraq. He says Ahmadinejad chose to
sound concerned when he told Press TV last week that the US
will launch war against two countries in the Middle East.
Ahmadinejad wanted to give the impression that he is concerned
and that Iran may be willing to make serious concessions. His
real aim was to get the US to engage Iran and give it more
time until it achieves its nuclear objectives. He says
Ahmadinejad is basing his assumptions on the seeming
conviction that the West will limit its response to diplomatic
and economic sanctions. He says the US may use Israel to send
signals to Iran by authorizing the Israelis to hit at
Hizbullah in Lebanon. The Iranians are serious about talks but
they are not serious about making concessions that can
undermine their nuclear abmitions. Iran's decision om this
matter is strategic and irreversible.