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# The Global Intelligence Files

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

## Re: DISCUSSION - SYRIA/LEBANON - Syria to give concessions in Lebanon?

Released on 2012-09-14 00:00 GMT

Email-ID | 1154727
Date | 2011-03-31 10:04:32
From | emre.dogru@stratfor.com
To | analysts@stratfor.com
List-Name | analysts@stratfor.com

Let's don't get bogged down in details. What I'm arguing is basically the
following. Since Mubarak has gone and Gaddhafi is under fire, Assad has
more than enough reasons to be concerned about Syrian regime's survival.
Regardless of what our Syrian contacts tell us about Assad's confidence,
we know and Assad knows that he is on the thin ice and needs US/Saudi
support for survival. US/Saudi (and by proxy, Qatar) back Assad not
because they fear things may get worse in Lebanon. Indeed, they think this
is the best time to put pressure on Assad to give concessions in Lebanon
due to his current weakness. Don't you really find it a bit unusual that
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United States did not even hesitate throwing their
support behind Assad at the very beginning? Washington could have easily
sent a warning to Damascus by saying that "Libya-like treatment for Syria
is one of the options". France was already willing to get engaged in
Syria. But US did the contrary. Remember, this is the guy who made the
Lebanese government collapse in January. There is a broader strategy
behind this, which is the following:
If US and its allies want to pull Syria out of the Iranian orbit and reach
accommodations in Lebanon and Gaza, this is the best time to do that
because Assad is very vulnerable. Look at how US said it was disappointed
by Assad's speech. Such warnings to Assad will continue and increase if he
seems reluctant to give concessions.
Do not overestimate Turkish mediation here. Turkey just understands this
dynamic and gives friendly advises Assad to hurry up. Ankara may give
security guarantees to Damascus from its part, the real deal is between
Syria and US/Saudi, in which Turkey plays its facilitating role.
Below are some recent OSINT pieces. I know they are pretty sketchy but at
least gives us an idea about what rumors are floating there=:
http://nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=256295
The source told the daily that Mikati is working on solving the issues
of Sunni cabinet representation and the crisis between President Michel
Sleiman and Change and Reform bloc leader MP Michel Aoun.
http://nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=256301
The paper quoted another source as saying that a Qatari initiative to
attempt to solve the Lebanese crisisa**which was discussed with
Syriaa**suggested for the renewal of Hariria**s cabinet to spare Lebanon
from the negative impacts of regional developments.
http://nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=256290
a**The cabinet formation needs more time, and the cabinet is not expected
to come to being before next week,a** a well informed anonymous source
said in remarks published on Thursday.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20110330/pl_afp/syriapoliticsunrestuspoliticscongress
US President Barack Obama should abandon his policy
of engaging Syria and stand foursquare behind opposition to the
government of President Bashar al-Assad, lawmakers urged Wednesday.
Republican Senator John McCain and Independent Senator Joe Lieberman
said Obama's effort to engage rather than shun Damascus had "little to
show for it" and declared it was time to back protesters against Assad's
rule.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Reva Bhalla" <bhalla@stratfor.com>
To: "Analyst List" <analysts@stratfor.com>
Sent: Thursday, March 31, 2011 6:32:33 AM
Subject: Re: DISCUSSION - SYRIA/LEBANON - Syria to give concessions in
Lebanon?
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Emre Dogru" <emre.dogru@stratfor.com>
To: "Analyst List" <analysts@stratfor.com>
Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 5:19:38 AM
Subject: DISCUSSION - SYRIA/LEBANON - Syria to give concessions in
Lebanon?
In a broader piece that we wrote couple of days ago (about
PNA/Turkey/Syria/Lebanon), we argued that Syria might be increasing the
sectarian tension in Lebanon in an attempt to distract attention away from
domestic unrest and urge Sunni Arab regimes to support the Syrian regime.
I think a bit differently about Syria-Lebanon dynamic (and this is
something that I've been discussing with Mesa team's new member, Nick) and
would like to lay out here as an alternative explanation to mull over.
My main argument is that Syria is not in a comfortable position in Lebanon
to push other Arab regimes support its regime survival. Actually, it's the
other way around. Assad takes the unrest very seriously and needs regional
support to survive. Qatar and Saudi Arabia gave full support to Assad
regime and why did they give that support? this past week and US made it
clear that Assad should be given a chance. Now, I think Assad will have to
pay for it. what does this mean? pay for it, how?
Second, it's not really clear to me what we mean by "distracting attention
away from domestic unrest". How come people in Dara'a can be distracted by
sectarian events in Lebanon while they go to funerals almost everyday?
Moreover, if a sectarian clash happens in Lebanon, it may have a negative
rather than positive effect on Syria's unrest. that is not what it was
saying.. it's about creating enough distraction in the region to deflect
attention away from the increasingly severe crackdowns the regime needs to
impose
We know things are not going well between Mikati and Aoun to form the new
government. They were unable to agree on conditions, despite Syria urged
Mikati to swiftly form the government almost 10 days ago. Moreover, Hariri
went to Riyadh and met with Saudis and later Qataris just few days ago. I
wonder what he was told there. he was asking for help. with syria
looking weak at home, they're trying to convince the Saudis to defend them
and use the opportunity to press syria. the insight ive been sending over
the past couple weeks has indicated that the Saudis have told Hariri every
time that they dont have time for this right now
Bottom-line is that I don't see Assad being able to manage the situation
in Lebanon what does he need to do manage the sitution in
Lebanon?Difficulty in forming a government is the norm in Lebanon.. there
is nothing that critical about that situation and it doesn't undermine
syria in any significant way. and even if he can (we know Syria has
assets there), he cannot use Lebanon to put pressure on Arab regimes while
he needs to contain the unrest at home. On the contrary, he mostly depends
on Qatari, Saudi and US support, for which he needs to pay. again, what
does this mean? in what way does Syrian regime survival depend on Qatari
(??), Saudi and US support?
Now, what will be the price that Syrians should pay is unknown. Nick
argues that they may ask for a decrease in Hez military force or greater
LAF presence in south Lebanon. I'm sure there are thousands of other
scenarios floating in Lebanon. These can change over the time as we know
how complex Lebanon is. it's not just about Lebanon... look at the
drawdown in Hamas/PIJ activity, the Turkish mediation with Syria, the
insight on Hamas and PIJ responding to the SYrians after the Turks
intervented. that was the point. But I think we need to revise our
previous assumption about Syria's position vis-a-vis other actors.
Thoughts?
Syria
Syriaa**s minority Alawite-Baathist regime is struggling to contain
opposition protests
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110325-update-protests-middle-east
that have been concentrated in the southwestern city of Deraa and have
shown signs of spreading (though not yet grown to significant size) to
Damascus, Latakia, Homs, Hama and Qamishli. The regime of Syrian
President Bashar al Assad is no stranger to heavy-handed crackdowns and
is likely to resort to more forceful tactics as the protests escalate,
but it also remains wary of the precedent set by the Westa**s ongoing
military intervention in Libya that was designed to protect civilians
against such crackdowns in the first place. Even though U.S. Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton has so far maintained that the situation in
Syria is different from that of Libya and not requiring intervention,
the ambiguity embedded in such statements puts the Syrian regime in a
most uncomfortable spot.
An outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Palestinian militant
factions in the Gaza Strip could serve as a useful distraction for Syria
as it resorts to more forceful tactics
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110319-syrian-crackdown-continues in
suppressing protests. There are also indications that Syria is
attempting to raise sectarian tensions in the Levant to demonstrate the
risks of regime collapse. Sectarian clashes that broke out between
Sunnis and Alawites in the coastal city of Latakia March X may have been
instigated by Syrian security forces toward this end. While still too
early to tell, recent militant activity in Lebanona**s Bekaa valley,
where Syrian intelligence is pervasive, could also be related to this
sectarian agenda. The March 23 kidnapping of seven Estonian cyclists and
March 27 bombing of an Orthodox church in the Shiite-concetrated city of
Zahle in the Bekaa valley have both been condemned by the Syrian regime
as the work of Sunni fundamentalists. Should such attacks continue and
spread to Beirut, where Syria also a number of militant assets at its
disposal, the threat of enflamed sectarianism could be used by Damascus
to compel the Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf to shore up their support
for the al Assad regime in its time of need.
--
--
Emre Dogru
STRATFOR
Cell: +90.532.465.7514
Fixed: +1.512.279.9468
emre.dogru@stratfor.com
www.stratfor.com