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# The Global Intelligence Files

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

## Overview of the Source Review Process

Released on 2012-02-27 02:00 GMT

Email-ID | 5437150
Date | 2011-10-01 01:28:43
From | Anya.Alfano@stratfor.com
To | mfriedman@stratfor.com

Meredith,
As we discussed, I've included my thoughts about the review process
below. Please let me know if you have any questions. Hope you have a
safe trip and a good weekend!
Anya
This document is meant to provide my observations about the sources that
have been evaluated to date and our use of those sources. I've also
included some other observations about the source review process and the
thoughts about how to make our source process function more effectively.
To date the groups of sources that have not been reviewed include:
. MESA - All of Reva's sources, aside from ME1
. FSU - Lauren's Russia sources, aside from the first 20 and new
sources that Eugene has developed while in the region
. East Asia - All sources not managed by Jen (Rodger, Zhixing, Colby,
Chris, Lena)
. Topic Specific Sources - Sources that can discuss economics,
military, energy, minerals and other similar topics in multiple regions
and countries
Regional Overviews -
. Latam - We have a wide range of sources in Latin America that cover
political, security and economic matters, but we don't have a particular
depth in any one country or area, with the possible exception of security
sources in Mexico. Our coverage in Brazil could be especially good as both
Paulo and Allison further develop their current contacts. Paulo appears
to have a good selection of political, security, military and econ
contacts, though we don't have a good track record of information from
these contacts at this point. In other countries, we have a scattered
selection of sources that appear to be primarily political. We have some
gaps in full country coverage in Latin America, especially in Central
America, since these areas haven't been particularly important in the
past. We have some gaps in economics throughout the region, though we also
are largely lacking tactical details about events and situations within
the region.
. East Asia - The sources we've reviewed to date have been handled by
Jen, so there may be other gems buried among the team. Jen has a few
select sources that have a deep and broad base of knowledge about specific
subjects inside China, but mostly they have information specific to
certain corporations, industries or situations. Jen has several contacts
with economic and finance related information and analysis that we
currently utilize. There are also several sources with a solid
understanding of the political situation, as well as tactical events in
the country. Moving forward, it may be useful to us to establish
additional sources outside of Beijing and Shanghai to fill geographic
gaps, as most of our contacts are currently located in those areas. Our
coverage of Southeast Asia is largely dependent on two sources in each
country. We currently have good sources covering several countries that
all appear to have a good personal network of their own sources to assist
us. These networks appear to fill most gaps in our coverage throughout the
sub region.
. Europe/FSU - Of all regions, I was most troubled by our contacts in
the FSU region. While we have some contacts in Romania and Ukraine that
cover political and economic matters, there are very few contacts that
have proven to send us information on a reliable basis, and most of these
contacts have a very narrow focus. That said, both Eugene and Antonia have
identified a number of potential sources that could fill the gaps that we
currently see in these areas. Our sources in Kazakhstan include both broad
and narrowly focused areas of interest, though we don't have a good track
record of information from many of the sources that would appear to be
most valuable. This is also the case in many of the smaller countries in
the region. We've only covered the first 20 of Lauren's Russia sources,
though so far we appear to have a good grasp of political and energy
matters in the country. Europe-not including countries of the Former
Soviet Union - appears to be our weakest region by far. To date, we've
seen fewer than 10 sources in this region, but this may be due only to our
focus on other lesser-developed areas.
. MESA - We don't yet have a complete look at our capabilities in
MESA without a more detailed examination of the information that's being
provided by ME1's sub-sources and a review of Reva's sources outside of
ME1. While we have that information that ME1 has submitted in the archive,
it's not readily identifiable as belonging to any specific sources, thus
it's difficult to judge the credibility of the individuals providing
information. We also need to evaluate the rest of Reva's non-ME1
contacts. Kamran has a broad network of contacts with deep knowledge of
the history and strategic issues surrounding the Middle East. Changes in
coding systems and lack of coding for previous insight means we don't have
a good handle on the information that has previously been provided by
these contacts. Despite their vast knowledge, the majority of these
contacts do not have a tactical understanding of the day-to-day affairs in
the Middle East, or economic affairs throughout the region. While ME1
likely has sources that can cover these issues in the Levant, we have
significant gaps in coverage of tactical issues in most Middle Eastern
countries. The notable exceptions to these thoughts are Turkey and
Afghanistan, where we have several sources that can provide information on
both the strategic and tactical situations related to politics and
security. We also have a good selection of Turkish sources with economic
information, though we don't have a solid track record of information from
those contacts yet.
. Africa - Mark has a very large list of contacts that could provide
information on a wide variety of topics. However, outside of South
Africa, the majority of his sources appear to have a very narrow scope of
interest and are typically not easily accessible. Additionally, most of
these contacts are not regularly in communication with Mark, which may
make it difficult for us to tap into their knowledge on a regular basis.
Many would be useful in very specific circumstances, but few could be
considered to have an in-depth knowledge and expertise of broader topics
or fields of study. Mark has some sources in South Africa that have a
broader understanding of the political and security situation in South
Africa and the energy and mining situations throughout the southern Africa
region. However, most of the contact list appears to be related to
security, or specific corporations, leaving gags in the area of economics.
There are also gaps in some countries throughout the continent and gaps in
our understanding of larger economic, mining, and energy issues outside of
the southern regions.
General Impressions
. We found that many analysts frequently had not been sending insight
information, either because it they did not consider their information to
be insight, or because they had not yet coded the contact providing the
insight. A simplified way to provide source codes and updated guidance on
when a source should be given a code and what information should be sent
will solve this problem.
. In previous years, I would estimate that more than 50% of all
insight sent to the lists did not include a source code. Now that we're
attempting to evaluate each source based on the information that they're
providing, it's more important that source codes are used each time a
piece of insight is sent. The Watch Officers have already been extremely
helpful in making sure the analysts are using codes when possible. This
should aid in the next evaluation.
. Our use of sources is currently limited by the fact that the
analysts don't always know that a source exists. Obviously this is due in
part to operational security, but it may be beneficial if source
descriptions are provided among regional team members to make sure that
everyone is aware a certain source exists and it may be possible to tap
that individual for information.
. We have very few sources that are proactive in providing us with
information, despite some very long and beneficial relationships.
. Of all media sources, multiple regions noted that they frequently
interact with Reuters news agency more than others. I'm not sure if that
means something specific, but our analysts seem to interact with Reuters
journalists and bureau chiefs very frequently.
. I didn't see any specific trends related to the use of
Confederation partners among regions. While some have been very useful to
date, it seems that there may be a mismatch between the individuals our
analysts are speaking with and the people who actually have the
information we're seeking. In some cases, it seems like this might be
deliberate, or may be related to perceptions that we're competition within
the industry. In some cases, these partnerships appear to be flourishing
and providing us with good information. I don't recall hearing from any
analyst that the relationship was too draining or too demanding for us to
fulfill.
. Several analysts brought up the idea of "tag-teaming" some sources,
especially when dealing with confederation partners and indicated that
this was a good strategy for an all-sides approach to the company so that
we can try to ensure we're connecting as much as possible, especially in
cases where one person "clicks" more with the partner involved.