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# The Global Intelligence Files

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

## Re: Fw: CIA spies outed in Lebanon

Released on 2012-02-29 02:00 GMT

Email-ID | 5287911
Date | 2011-11-21 16:10:50
From | Anya.Alfano@stratfor.com
To | burton@stratfor.com, alfano@stratfor.com, korena.zucha@stratfor.com

Some of this feels like disinfo. If the CIA lost a few people in Beirut,
it would be reasonable for them to send a few "current and former US
Officials" to the AP to "leak" a story that the all US coverage of Hez has
been "wiped out" -- best way to stop the search for more informants.
On 11/21/11 10:03 AM, burton@stratfor.com wrote:
Sent via BlackBerry by AT&T
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Goldman, Adam" <agoldman@ap.org>
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2011 08:56:44 -0600 (CST)
To: Fred Burton<burton@stratfor.com>
Subject: RE: CIA spies outed in Lebanon
Thanks! Been working on this for a while. It's bad. CIA's Hezbollah
coverage has been wiped out.
From: Fred Burton [mailto:burton@stratfor.com]
Sent: Monday, November 21, 2011 8:05 AM
To: Goldman, Adam
Subject: Fwd: CIA spies outed in Lebanon
Great work Adam!
AP Exclusive: Spies Outed, CIA Suffers In Lebanon
http://www.salon.com/2011/11/21/ap_exclusive_spies_outed_cia_suffers_in_lebanon_2/
Monday, Nov 21, 2011 10:17 AM 11:15:26 GMT+0200
By Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo, Associated Press
WASHINGTON (AP) - The CIA's operations in Lebanon have been badly
damaged after Hezbollah identified and captured a number of U.S. spies
recently, current and former U.S. officials told The Associated Press.
The intelligence debacle is particularly troubling because the CIA saw
it coming.
Hezbollah's longtime leader, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, boasted on
television in June that he had rooted out at least two CIA spies who had
infiltrated the ranks of Hezbollah, which the U.S. considers a terrorist
group closely allied with Iran. Though the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon
officially denied the accusation, current and former officials concede
that it happened and the damage has spread even further.
In recent months, CIA officials have secretly been scrambling to protect
their remaining spies - foreign assets or agents working for the agency
- before Hezbollah can find them.
To be sure, some deaths are to be expected in shadowy spy wars. It's an
extremely risky business and people get killed. But the damage to the
agency's spy network in Lebanon has been greater than usual, several
former and current U.S. officials said, speaking on condition of
anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly about
security matters.
The Lebanon crisis is the latest mishap involving CIA
counterintelligence, the undermining or manipulating of the enemy's
ability to gather information. Former CIA officials have said that
once-essential skill has been eroded as the agency shifted from
outmaneuvering rival spy agencies to fighting terrorists. In the rush
for immediate results, former officers say, tradecraft has suffered.
The most recent high-profile example was the suicide bomber who posed as
an informant and killed seven CIA employees and wounded six others in
Khost, Afghanistan in December 2009.
Last year, then-CIA director Leon Panetta said the agency had to
maintain "a greater awareness of counterintelligence." But eight months
later, Nasrallah let the world know he had bested the CIA, demonstrating
that the agency still struggles with this critical aspect of spying and
sending a message to those who would betray Hezbollah.
The CIA was well aware the spies were vulnerable in Lebanon. CIA
officials were warned, including the chief of the unit that supervises
Hezbollah operations from CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., and the head
of counterintelligence. It remains unclear whether anyone has been or
will be held accountable in the wake of this counterintelligence
disaster or whether the incident will affect the CIA's ability to
recruit assets in Lebanon.
In response to AP's questions about what happened in Lebanon, a U.S.
official said Hezbollah is recognized as a complicated enemy responsible
for killing more Americans than any other terrorist group before
September 2001. The agency does not underestimate the organization, the
official said.
The CIA's toughest adversaries, like Hezbollah and Iran, have for years
been improving their ability to hunt spies, relying on patience and
guile to exploit counterintelligence holes.
In 2007, for instance, when Ali-Reza Asgari, a brigadier general in the
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps of Iran, disappeared in Turkey, it
was assumed that he was either killed or defected. In response, the
Iranian government began a painstaking review of foreign travel by its
citizens, particularly to places like Turkey where Iranians don't need a
visa and could meet with foreign intelligence services.
It didn't take long, a Western intelligence official told the AP, before
the U.S., Britain and Israel began losing contact with some of their
Iranian spies.
The State Department last year described Hezbollah as "the most
technically capable terrorist group in the world," and the Defense
Department estimates it receives between $100 million and $200 million
per year in funding from Iran.
Backed by Iran, Hezbollah has built a professional counterintelligence
apparatus that Nasrallah - whom the U.S. government designated an
international terrorist a decade ago - proudly describes as the "spy
combat unit." U.S. intelligence officials believe the unit, which is
considered formidable and ruthless, went operational in about 2004.
Using the latest commercial software, Nasrallah's spy-hunters unit began
methodically searching for spies in Hezbollah's midst. To find them,
U.S. officials said, Hezbollah examined cellphone data looking for
anomalies. The analysis identified cellphones that, for instance, were
used rarely or always from specific locations and only for a short
period of time. Then it came down to old-fashioned, shoe-leather
detective work: Who in that area had information that might be worth
selling to the enemy?
The effort took years but eventually Hezbollah, and later the Lebanese
government, began making arrests. By one estimate, 100 Israeli assets
were apprehended as the news made headlines across the region in 2009.
Some of those suspected Israeli spies worked for telecommunications
companies and served in the military.
Back at CIA headquarters, the arrests alarmed senior officials. The
agency prepared a study on its own vulnerabilities, U.S. officials said,
and the results proved to be prescient.
The analysis concluded that the CIA was susceptible to the same analysis
that had compromised the Israelis, the officials said.
CIA managers were instructed to be extra careful about handling sources
in Lebanon. A U.S. official said recommendations were issued to counter
the potential problem.
But it's unclear what preventive measures were taken by the Hezbollah
unit chief or the officer in charge of the Beirut station. Former
officials say the Hezbollah unit chief is no stranger to the necessity
of counterintelligence and knew the risks. The unit chief has worked
overseas in hostile environments like Afghanistan and played an
important role in the capture of a top terrorist while stationed in the
Persian Gulf region after the attacks of 9/11.
"We've lost a lot of people in Beirut over the years, so everyone should
know the drill," said a former Middle East case officer familiar with
the situation.
But whatever actions the CIA took, they were not enough. Like the
Israelis, bad tradecraft doomed these CIA assets and the agency
ultimately failed to protect them, an official said. In some instances,
CIA officers fell into predictable patterns when meeting their sources,
the official said.
This allowed Hezbollah to identify assets and case officers and unravel
at least part of the CIA's spy network in Lebanon. There was also a
reluctance to share cases and some files were put in "restricted
handling." The designation severely limits the number of people who know
the identity of the source but also reduces the number of experts who
could spot problems that might lead to their discovery, officials said.
Nasrallah's televised announcement in June was followed by
finger-pointing among departments inside the CIA as the spy agency tried
figure out what went wrong and contain the damage.
The fate of these CIA assets is unknown. Hezbollah treats spies
differently, said Matthew Levitt, a counterterrorism and intelligence
expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Studies who's writing a
book about the terrorist organization
"It all depends on who these guys were and what they have to say,"
Levitt said. "Hezbollah has disappeared people before. Others they have
kept around."
Who's responsible for the mess in Lebanon? It's not clear. The chief of
Hezbollah operations at CIA headquarters continues to run the unit that
also focuses on Iranians and Palestinians. The CIA's top
counterintelligence officer, who was one of the most senior women in the
clandestine service, recently retired after approximately five years in
the job. She is credited with some important cases, including the recent
arrests of Russian spies who had been living in the U.S. for years.
Officials said the woman was succeeded by a more experienced operations
officer. That officer has held important posts in Moscow, Southeast
Asia, Europe and the Balkans, important frontlines of the agency's spy
wars with foreign intelligence services and terrorist organizations.
The information contained in this communication is intended for the use
of the designated recipients named above. If the reader of this
communication is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified
that you have received this communication in error, and that any review,
dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly
prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please
notify The Associated Press immediately by telephone at +1-212-621-1898
and delete this email. Thank you.
[IP_US_DISC]msk dccc60c6d2c3a6438f0cf467d9a4938
--
Anya Alfano
Briefer
STRATFOR
T: 1.415.404.7344 | M: 221.77.816.4937
www.STRATFOR.com