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On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

## [Fwd: Re: GUIDANCE - Questions on PKK]

Released on 2012-03-09 10:00 GMT

Email-ID | 1446311
Date | 2011-08-08 15:08:30
From | emre.dogru@stratfor.com
To | bhalla@stratfor.com, bokhari@stratfor.com, scott.stewart@stratfor.com, yerevan.saeed@stratfor.com

Reva and Scott, thank you for this great guidance. It's really helpful to
think about these questions and I think we will have very detailed
information on PKK (probably that no one else has) if we can answer even
one third of the questions below. However, I've no idea how I can even
start getting answers on this. Such a guidance requires an extensive
research and preparation period, plus travels to (Diyarbakir, Sirnak,
Ankara etc) to try to reach out to people who may be willing to share
information with us. I don't know what Yerevan thinks but as such, I would
say this guidance cannot be fulfilled by only calling people I know. (To
put this into perspective, my main journalist source, Cengiz Candar,
prepared an extensive PKK report - which was released two weeks ago - in
six months with the financial backing of the biggest think-tank in Turkey.
And there are still unanswered questions).
I honestly do not believe that we will have a clear answer to the main
question that we ask "What's the level of Ocalan's authority" at the end
of this process. Recall that we tried to learn exactly the same thing few
months ago (political conditions were similar - on which I can talk about
more in detail) and found out that this is not a question that we can
answer with certainty. Because such a thing would be our own
political/social assessment that we can come up with after answering your
questions below. (Assuming that we can).
So, if you really think we need to engage in this effort, I believe this
is a decision that you guys need to take at the company because there will
be costs of time, money, people etc. Please let me (and Yerevan) know.
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: GUIDANCE - Questions on PKK
Date: Fri, 05 Aug 2011 12:53:13 -0400
From: scott stewart <stewart@stratfor.com>
Reply-To: Analyst List <analysts@stratfor.com>
To: Analyst List <analysts@stratfor.com>
I guess the other thing I would add is that we don't want to just focus on
high-level contacts. Sometimes mid-level guys can help us get a far
clearer view of the dynamic within the group than upper level guys who are
insulated from the guys in the trenches.
In this case, it would be very important to understand how the rank and
file PKK members really feel about Ocalan and other leaders. That might be
far different than what the PR spinners are trying to portray and help us
identify any fractures in the Org. A
From: Reva Bhalla <bhalla@stratfor.com>
Reply-To: Analyst List <analysts@stratfor.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2011 10:37:22 -0500 (CDT)
To: <analysts@stratfor.com>
Subject: GUIDANCE - Questions on PKK
TFL was having a discussion this morning on the questions we need to
answer on PKK command and control.A No issue is too complex for us to
tackle. There is a process that we need to follow in collecting
information on this issue. We have both Kurdish and Turkish contacts that
can help in developing an assessment.A The following is my guidance on
how to approach this issue with sources and the types of questions you
need to be asking yourself and your sources. Tactical team, if you have
any input on this, would like to hear it.
Questions we need to answer:
A
What is the current command and control structure of the PKK?A More
directly, does Ocalan command as much authority as he used to over the
movement?
A
To answer this, begin with developing a foundation for the analysis:
A
How would you describe PKKa**s traditional command and control structure?
(how was the group organized between political and militant wings, what
was the leadership structure, how are orders disseminated from the
leadership to the rank and file members?)
A
How did Ocalan maintain authority while in jail?A Who did he rely on
principally to carry out his orders?A Are there examples in the past of
other PKK leaders competing for his authority?A How was that dealt with
in the past?
A
What are the main divisive issues that we see impacting the PKK?A A Is it
possible to identify the developing factions within the group? What does
each faction stand for? Who do they look to for leadership?
A
Is there a noticeable split in the group, for example, on whether PKK
should negotiate with the government or stick largely to a militant
campaign?A Are there serious tensions between PKK and BDP?A Between PKK
and KRG?A
A
When did those splits start arising?A What is exacerbating such splits?A
Examine the geopolitical climate a**A AKPa**s renewed political mandate
a** less of a need to cater to a Kurdish vote a** more of a need to reach
an accommodation with the military; KRG under pressure from Iraq
withdrawal a** needing to cooperate with both Turkey and Iran;A Iranian
offensive on PJAKA Syrian unrest fueling Kurdish protests, etc.
A
Take a look at the major attacks wea**ve seen recently. Were there any
noticeable signs of tensions among the PKK leadership over those attacks?
Contradictory statements?A (always keep in mind that playing up splits in
the group can also be a method of gaining plausible deniability in
negotiations; however, if you go too far and your leadership is not taken
seriously anymore, you lose clout in negotiations anyway.A What's the
reality here?A Is Ocalan playing a double game or is he really losing his
grip over the organization? that is the key question)
A
Once you develop some background, then youa**re ready to talk to your
sources.
A
Before talking to any source, always always always be honest with yourself
in internalizing the agenda of the source.A The sources know who you work
for, so dona**t kid yourself. Your goal is to get them to reveal things
that they otherwise are not going to put in a press release.
A
PKK sources will be expected to vehemently deny any splits, especially
when theya**re under a lot of pressure as they are now.
A
Turkish sources will be expected to portray the PKK as weak, fracturing
and unreliable as negotiating partners.
A
You already know that going into this. So, how do you get the answers you
want?
A
If youa**re talking to PKK. You start out with sympathizing, not with
demanding information immediately.. Theya**re under a ton of pressure
right now. Display your knowledge of the situation, express your
solidaritywith their cause.A Act annoyed by all the rumors that are
circulating a** how KRG is coordinating with Iran against PJAK, how the
Turks keep saying Ocalan cana**t even speak for the movement anymore.
Dona**t put yourself in a position where the source is immediately going
to respond with defiance.A First take their position, then probe for
deeper answers.A Once you get that conversation going, talk about how PKK
is very unique for maintaining cohesion while its leader has been isolated
from the group in prison. That in and of itself is a remarkable feat.A
But then start talking about how this is difficult to maintain for any
leader. There are a lot of pressures on the group right now (refer to the
background above.) Who then and and does Ocalan rely on to carry out
orders?A How exactly are those orders delegated? Refer to specific
attacks recently.A Are those examples of attacks ordered by Ocalan?A If
they sayA no, then you have an opening to dig deeper into the problem of
attacks being carried out without the leadera**s discretion. If they say
yes, then ask specifically how he is able to issue such orders and then
how is that impacting the negotiations with the govt? bring up the fact
that the AKP is past the elections now, doesna**t need to care as much
about the Kurdish vote now and is a lot more worried about reaching an
understanding with the military. Knowing this, how does PKK intend to
respond to these pressures? And when we say PKK can we really refer to the
group asaA single cohesive unit? Or are there different opinions as to
what needs to be done?A
A
Key thing is, you never want to take a stance that causes the source to
feel threatened or act defensive. You need to identify with the source,
internalize his agenda, keep your guard up mentally, but physically and
emotionally show that you understand where hea**s coming from and then
search for those small hints of tension to pick at in the discussion, all
while maintaining respect.
A
If youa**re talking to a Turkish source on this issue, you want to seek
out someone who is very close to this issue a** not someone at the
official level who is simply reading policy briefs.A Who understands the
internal dynamics of PKK on the Turkish side?A Express your admiration
and respect for their work, how important it is for Turkey to rely on
people like him to develop an accurate picture of PKK.A With all the
tensions going on between the govt and the military, the one issue all
turks can really agree on is the need for the military to get better at
counterinsurgency. To do that, Turkey needs solid, accurate analysis on
what is happening internally with PKK. Once you give the source the
impression that you respect his information for those reasons, hea**ll
feel more obliged to NOT feed you BS. Express your irritation at those
Turkish officials/analysts/etc. who throw blanket statements on PKK,
portraying thegroup as weak and totally fractured. Obv thata**s not the
case or else Turkey wouldna**t be having this problem with the PKK and
wouldna**ta** be calling for military reforms to improve in
counterinsurgency.A Express your Turkish nationalism here, how Turkey
needs to resolve its Kurdish problem but that the first step toward doing
that is to get an accurate read of PKKa**s internal structure and
stresses.A Talk about how PKK has stood out from most militant groups for
its cohesion, how Ocalan has been able to maintainauthority for a long
time despite his isolation. What frustrates Turkey most about negotiations
with PKK/Ocalan?A (feed of their replies here.A If they claim that
Ocalan cana**t deliver results, then ask, who can?A And is the govt
talking to them? )A ask how they would describe the splits within the PKK
and what each faction stands for. Who does Turkey believe it can negotiate
with more effectively?A At what point did they notice meaningful splits
emerging in the movement? What do they attribute those splits to?A
Is Turkey getting any intel cooperation from the KRG on PKK?
Now that the elections are over with, what is the developing AKP strategy
in dealing with PKK? How does the govt intend to use the PKK issue to try
and settle tensions with the military?A
A
Youa**ll need to feed off the replies you get in developing further
questions.A Same thing as before a** dona**t ever make your source feel
hostile or stupid.A After some time, you can express some skepticism and
politely call BS on what they say, but do so with tact.A Your goal should
always be to encourage them to talk, to get them to start venting, talk to
them in a more relaxed atmosphere if possible. Youa**re not conducting an
interview for a newspaper article and youa**re not quoting them in the
paper. What you need to make clear to them is that your agenda is simple
a** to learn whata**s really happening here, and using their expertise to
develop a deeper understanding of this issue.
A
When you collect the information, then we can examine this in-house and
check for bias and see where we can develop an analytical framework for
the current situation.A I want your insight emails to read more like
lengthy conversations, not news clippings. A Youa**re not calling and
demanding quick answers. Youa**re engaging someone in a conversation and
need to do the necessary preparation before talking to them so you make
them feel comfortable in sharing information with you.
A
This is a start. We can expand on this and I can answer more questions.
But this is how I would tackle this issue.
--
Emre Dogru
STRATFOR
Cell: +90.532.465.7514
Fixed: +1.512.279.9468
emre.dogru@stratfor.com
www.stratfor.com