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# The Global Intelligence Files

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

## Re: Portuguese para-statals - readthrough. an interesting distressed/sovereign analysis situation.

Released on 2012-08-30 00:00 GMT

Email-ID | 3864142
Date | 2011-09-15 17:53:01
From | alfredo.viegas@stratfor.com
To | zeihan@stratfor.com, invest@stratfor.com

Near term I am curious to see how the IMF/EU rescue package for portugal
gets interpreted by the market and if the conclusion is that Portugal can
achieve the requirements. That I see as a 1-3 month time frame. Next I
think, structurally i would want to watch how they handle the upcoming
budget pressures, and deal with the parastatals. The specific trade here
is probably short term if we can decide when to step in. longer term on
this specific bond the key time period will be 1Q 2013 when the bonds
begins to be convertible.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Peter Zeihan" <zeihan@stratfor.com>
To: "Alfredo Viegas" <alfredo.viegas@stratfor.com>
Cc: "Invest" <invest@stratfor.com>
Sent: Thursday, September 15, 2011 11:07:27 AM
Subject: Re: Portuguese para-statals - readthrough. an interesting
distressed/sovereign analysis situation.
ok - i think i follow - it all comes down to whether or not portugal will
suck every last bit of marrow out of ParPublica when the shit hits the fan
what's your timeframe for this shit splattering? that seems to be where i
can best help evaluate (since i don't have intimate knowledge of the inner
workings of the portuguese state)
On 9/15/11 9:48 AM, Alfredo Viegas wrote:
hmmm...
The portuguese state has a number of parastatal companies it owns. One
of these is a holding company called ParPublica. This entity does not
have a direct sovereign guarantee, instead it is seen as a quasi
supported institution, oweing to the government owning 100%. Meanwhile,
in the good times this entity was used by the government as its primary
vehicle to sell stakes in government owned companies, using its own
balance sheet -- which the government sprinkled with equity stakes of a
number of formerly state owned companies such as the oil and electricity
companies. OK, during the crisis the market quickly subordinated the
debts of ParPublica as it saw it as less credit worthy than the
government, having to rely on the government for cash flow to meet its
obligations. Ok... Nwo following the IMF disbursements we learn that
the Portuguese state intends to preserve this entity and somehow allow
it to go it alone, using its equity stakes to somehow make it a private
entity. Now what makes this interesting is that one particular holding
is the stake in Portuguese oil company, GALP a $20Bn value company.
For our purposes I see basically a disconnect in the market as financial
experts cannot figure out how to ascertain whether or not the Portuguese
government will allow this subordinate institution, ParPublica to live
or die. if they let it die, they could take back the stock in the
profitable companies -- like GALP -- and sell it thereby raising money
for the Treasury. Of course this would be bad news for ParPublica
creditors. So the political risk as the market perceives it is that the
Portuguese state will scalp ParPublica stakeholders in order to steal
the assets here for itself. The IMF report seems to suggest that this
is not really a worry. If we believe that to be the case, then
ParPublica debt linked to GALP stock -- the PARPUB 5.25 bonds -- are a
very interesting asset to own, as you get stock worth basically 94 cents
on the dollar today for a bond trading at 82 cents on the dollar. If
the stock goes higher you could even make more. Hence, the disconnect
here is that the finanacial merits of this instrument are confused with
the political will of the sovereign and its intentions. The market
distrusts the sovereign and has handicapped the recovery in this bond
due to its distrust.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Peter Zeihan" <zeihan@stratfor.com>
To: "Alfredo Viegas" <alfredo.viegas@stratfor.com>
Cc: "Invest" <invest@stratfor.com>
Sent: Thursday, September 15, 2011 10:35:57 AM
Subject: Re: Portuguese para-statals - readthrough. an interesting
distressed/sovereign analysis situation.
i
....
i didn't follow any of this
On 9/15/11 7:34 AM, Alfredo Viegas wrote:
Kevin/Peter/Everyone:
Take a look at this note below from a colleague of mine. I think if
he is reading the IMF/Portuguese government intentions correctly, then
this sets up some very intereesting trading opportunities in
Portuguese and possibly other PIIGS related para-statal debtors. At
issue for Portugal specifically is you have 2 basic para-statal
issuers - those that are insolvent (railroads, metros -
CAMFER/REFER/METLIS) and then the state holding company PARPUB which
in turn owns stakes in EDP, GALP, TAP and other money making
enterprises. For me the most interesting asset is the PARPUB 5.25
bond (I enclose the term sheet). What makes this bond very
interesting is that it is convertible into GALP - that oil company.
Indeed, the conversion price is E 15.25 while the current price is E
14.57. We can discuss how to value convertible bonds at some point in
the future... but suffice it to say that a pure value for this bond
would be about 94 (parity) or depending on assumptions used for the
implicit option embedded, one could argue its actually worth over
110. Meanwhile this bond trades at 83. Why does it trade so low?
Because the market is worried that the portuguese government would not
only default, but that it would strip away the underlying stock
leaving the bondholders unprotected. Hence, this trade easily
straddles the analysis of Financial and Political. A sweet spot for
what we should be able to accomplish...
Happy to discuss
-------------------------
On 12 September the IMF stated in a press release that it had
completed its first review under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) with
Portugal and that it approved the disbursement of a*NOT3.98bn in
funds. This follows Portugala**s submission of an updated Memorandum
of Economic and Financial Policies on 1 September. A copy of this is
posted on the IMF website and well worth a read as it provides some
useful pointers as to the potential action plan for the countrya**s
state-owned enterprises (SOE). There are three important takeaways for
us.
Firstly, the government is pushing ahead with its privatization
programme and will fully divest its share in EdP, TEN, GALP and market
conditions permitting TAP by the end of 2011. Aguas de Portugal and
RTP will be privatized by the end of 2012.
Secondly, SOE with commercial operations will be restructured
operationally and financially. Those entities providing/producing
non-essential services/goods will be divested or closed. Steps will be
taken so that the a**most problematic casesa** will have a a**zero
operational deficit by the end of 2012a**. A strategy document will be
published by the end of this month that will lay out numerical targets
both on the cost and revenue side for these entities. The memorandum
also makes clear that Portugal will a**impose progressively stricter
limits on the SOEa**s borrowing requirement from 2012 onwards.a**
Interestingly Portugal raises the specter of equitisation of debt
holders in select SOE as it states: a**For the firms with the most
entrenched financial and operational difficulties restructuring may
take longer, and require a recomposition of their liabilities from
debt to equity.a** Again the end-of-September strategy document will
also address the financing issues. In this respect it is important to
revisit the bond documentation of affected SOE which we assume could
include REFER and CAMFER to gauge to what extent an equitisation could
be possible and what the wider implications would be (e.g.
cross-default). The MoU makes it clear though that there would be a
transition period a**to long-term viabilitya** during which the
government would help SOE a**meet their commitments on timea**.
Finally, we think the MoU is supportive for PARPUBLICA debt and in
line with our thinking. The government aims to develop a strategic
plan for PARPUBLICA as it realizes that its sources of income will be
affected by the privatization. The plan will be prepared before the
end of 2011 and will actually reconsider the role of Parpublica as a
public company. Importantly the government is considering amongst
others to eliminate the obligation to remit the proceeds of the sale
of assets to the Treasury in return for new assets. This would enhance
debt repayment capacity of PARPUBLICA greatly in our view. Also
unsurprisingly the government is considering a**the possibility of
winding down the company or consolidating it with the general
government.a** In this case PARPUBLICA debt would become explicit
government debt in our view and as such the discount to sovereign
bonds should close. Importantly, a**in the interim we will ensure that
Parpublica will have sufficient income generating assets to manage its
debt and financing needs.a**
The MoU can be found here:
http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2011/prt/090111.pdf