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# The Global Intelligence Files

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

## Re: S-weekly for comment: Mexican Cartels and Protection from the Long Arm of Uncle Sam

Released on 2012-08-22 00:00 GMT

Email-ID | 108466
Date | 2011-08-16 23:04:33
From | colby.martin@stratfor.com
To | analysts@stratfor.com
List-Name | analysts@stratfor.com

in blue
On 8/16/11 2:52 PM, Sean Noonan wrote:
On 8/16/11 2:20 PM, scott stewart wrote:
Link: themeData
Mexican Cartels and Protection from the Long Arm of Uncle Sam
Related Link:
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20091112_geopolitics_mexico_mountain_fortress_besieged
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110518-corruption-why-texas-not-mexico
Stratfor book:
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1449905714?ie=UTF8&tag=stratfor03-20&linkCode=a
It is summer in Juarez, and again this year we find the Vicente
Carrillo Fuentes organization (VCF) also known as the Juarez Cartel,
under pressure and making threats. At this timelast year [link
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100804_mexicos_juarez_cartel_gets_desperate
] the VCF had detonated a small improvised explosive device (IED)
inside a car and had threatened to employ a far larger IED (100 KG) if
the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and Drug Enforcement Agency
did not investigate the head of Chihuahua StatePolice intelligence,
who the VCF claimed was working for the Sinaloa Cartel.
The VCF did attempt to [link
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100913_mexico_security_memo_sept_13_2010
] employ another IED on Sept 10, 2010, but this device, which failed
to detonate, contained only 16 kilograms of explosives and was not the
large 100KG device the group had threatened.
This year, the unrelenting pressure of the Sinaloa Cartel has
continued, and the VCF, felling the pressure is again making threats.
On July 27, "narcomantas" - banners containing messages from drug
trafficking cartels - appeared in Juarez and Chihuahua signed by La
Linea the enforcement wing of the VCF making explicit threats against
the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Consulate in Juarez
and border crossings. Two days after the appearance of these narco
mantas, a senior La Linea leader - whose name appeared in the
threats, [link
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110801-mexico-security-memo-la-linea-leader-captured]
was arrested by Mexican Authorities who were aided by intelligence
provided by the U.S. Government.
As we have discussed elsewhere, the Mexican cartels, including the
VCF, [link
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110413-perceived-car-bomb-threat-mexico
] clearly possess the capability to construct and employ large vehicle
borne improvised explosive devices -- truck bombs - and yet they have
chosen not to do so. These groups are not adverse to bloodshed, or
even outright barbarity when they believe it is useful. The decision
to abstain from certain activities,such as employing truck bombs,
indicates that there must be compelling reasons for doing so. After
all, groups in Lebanon, Pakistan and Iraq have demonstrated that truck
bombs are a very effective means of killing perceived enemies and for
sending strong messages.
Perhaps the most compelling reason for the Mexican cartels to abstain
from such activities is that it allows them to maintain the buffer
that is currently insulating them from the full force of the U.S.
government: the Mexican government.
For me the most compelling reason is that their is not tactical advantage
to be gained by attacking the US or its proxies. The buffer is part of
that tactical reasoning, but there is another. Once the drugs hit the
border and are dispersed into the US the cartels do not need to follow or
protect the product. It has reached its market and the money is on the
way.
The Buffer
Despite their very public manifestations of machismo, the cartel
leaders clearly fear and respect the strength of the world's only
super power. This is evidenced by [link
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110518-corruption-why-texas-not-mexico
] the dramatic change in cartel activities at the U.S./Mexico border.
In Mexico, the cartels have the freedom to operate far more brazenly
than they can in the U.S. both in terms of drug trafficking and in
violence. Shipments ofnarcotics traveling through Mexico tend to be
far larger than shipments moving into and through the U.S. As these
large shipments reach the Mexican side of theborder, they are taken to
stash houses where they are then divided up into smaller quantities
for transport into and through the U.S.
As far as violence, while the cartels do kill people on the U.S. side
of the border, their use of violence tends to be far more discreet and
it has not yet incorporated the dramatic flair that is seen on the
Mexican side of the border, where bodies are frequently dismembered
and bodies are hung from pedestrian bridges over major thoroughfares.
The cartels are also careful not to assassinate public figures such as
police chiefs, mayors and reporters like they frequently do in Mexico.
The border does more than just constrain the cartels, however. It also
constrains the activities of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence
agencies. These agencies cannot pursue cartels on the Mexican side of
the border with the same vigor that they exercise on the U.S. side.
Occasionally, the U.S. government will succeed in luring a wanted
Mexican cartel leader outside ofMexico, as they did in the Aug. 2006
[link http://www.stratfor.com/mexico_price_peace_cartel_wars] arrest
of Javier Arellano Felix, or catching one operating in the U.S. like
they did Javier's oldest brother, Francisco Arellano Felix, but by and
large most wanted cartel figures remain in Mexico out of the reach of
U.S. law.
One facet of this buffer is corruption, which is endemic in Mexico and
which reaches all the way from the lowest municipal police officer
[link
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081229_mexico_arrest_and_cartel_sources_high_places
] to the Presidential palace. Indeed, Raul Salinas de Gortari, the
brother of former Mexican president Carlos Salinas is widely believed
to have been involved in cartel activity, even though he was acquitted
in a murder case in 2005. Over the years several senior Mexican
anti-drug officials [link
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081124_mexico_security_memo_nov_24_2008
] to include the nation's drug czar have been arrested and charged
with corruption.
However, the money generated by the Mexican cartels has far greater
effects than just promoting corruption. The billions of dollars that
come into the Mexican economy via the drug trade are important to the
Mexican banking sector and to industries where the funds are laundered
such as construction. Because of this, there are many powerful
Mexican businessmen who profit either directly or indirectly from the
narcotics trade and it would not be in their best interest for the
billions of drug dollars to stop flowing into Mexico.Such people can
place heavy pressure on the political system by either supporting or
withholding support from particular candidates or parties. Because of
this, sources in Mexico have been telling Stratfor that they believe
that Mexican politicians, like PresidentFilipe Calderon [link
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110415-mexican-drug-war-2011-update
] are far more interested in stopping drug violence than they are the
flow of narcotics. Then isn't the question why did Calderon start this
war in the first place? did he miscalculate the consequences? if so
i hope he burns in hell for that sort of short-sighted stupidityThis
is a pragmatic approach. Clearly, as long as demand for drugs in the
U.S. remains, there will be people who will find ways to meet that
demand. It is impossible to totally stop or even slow? the flow of
narcotics to the U.S. market.
In addition to corruption and the economic benefits Mexico realizes
from the drug trade, there is also another very important element that
causes the Mexican government to act as a buffer between the Mexican
cartels and the U.S. Government - [link
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20091112_geopolitics_mexico_mountain_fortress_besieged
] geopolitics. The Mexico/U.S. relationship is a long one and has
involved a lot of competition and conflict. From the Mexican
perspective, American imperialist aggression, through the Texas war of
independence and the Mexican American war, resulted in Mexico losing
nearlyhalf of its territory to its powerful northern neighbor. Less
than a century ago, U.S. troops invaded northern Mexico in response to
Pancho Villa's incursions into the U.S.
The U.S. also has a long history of meddling in Mexico and other parts
of Latin America. Because of this history, Mexico, like most of the
rest of Latin America, regards the UnitedStates as a threat to its
sovereignty. Th result of this perception is that the Mexican
government and the Mexican people in in general are very reluctant to
allow the U.S. to become too involved in Mexican affairs. The idea of
American troops or law enforcement agents withboots on the ground in
Mexico is considered as especially threatening.
A Thin Barrier
While Mexican sovereignty and international law, combine with
corruption and economics to create a barrier that prevents the U.S.
from pursuing the Mexican cartels with its full might, this barrier is
not totally inviolable. There are two distinct ways this type of
barrier can be breeched, by force and by consent.
An example of the first was seen following the 1985 kidnapping,
torture and murder of U.S. DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena. When
the U.S. DEA was not able to get what it viewed as satisfactory
assistance from the Mexican government in pursuing the case inspite of
tremendous pressure by the U.S. government. This caused the DEA to
unilaterally enter Mexico and kidnap two Mexican citizens connected to
the case. Honduran drug kingpin Juan Matta-Ballesteros was also
kidnapped from his home in Honduras due to his involvement in the
Camarena case. Would the political environment now allow for the same
US DEA action?
As a result of the U.S. reaction to the Camarena murder, the
Guadalajara cartel, Mexico's most powerful criminal organization was
decapitated with the arrests of powerful traffickers Miguel Angel
Felix Gallardo, Ernesto Fonseca Carrillo and Rafael Caro
Quintero.[were the previous three guys the ones the DEA went across
the border to arrest? or how exactly was their arrest a result of
Camarena's murder?] They also lost their connection to the Medellin
cartel (Matta-Ballesteros) and the organization was also fractured
[how exactly is this linked to Camarena's murder? What was the US
response exactly that you imply the cartels are so afraid of?] into
smaller units that would become what are today the Sinaloa, Juarez,
Gulf and Tijuana cartels. Couldn't you then argue it is only the
leaders who are afraid of US involvement? The Camarena case taught
the Mexican cartel bosses that they needed to be careful to not bring
the full wrath of the U.S. government down upon themselves, because
the U.S. government was powerful enough to disregard international law
and unilaterally take action if sufficiently provoked. (This lesson
was recently demonstrated by the assassination of Osama bin laden in
Abbottabad, Pakistan.)
But in addition to force, sometimes the U.S. government can be invited
into a country despite concerns about sovereignty. This happens when
the population has something that theyfear more than U.S. involvement,
and is what happened in Colombia in the late 1980's. In an effort to
influence the Colombian government not to cooperate with the U.S.
government and extradite him to the U.S., Colombian drug lord Pablo
Escobar resulted to terror. In 1989, he launched a string of terrorist
attacks that included the assassination of one presidential candidate,
the bombing a civilian airliner in an attempt to kill a second
presidential candidate, as well as several large VBIED attacks
including a 1,000 pound truck bomb in Dec. 1989 directed against the
Colombian Administrative Department of Security (DAS), the major
domestic security service [or whatever the correct description may
be], that caused massive damage in the area around the DAS building in
downtown Bogata. These attacks had a powerful impact on the government
and the Colombian people and caused them to reach out to the U.S. for
assistance in spite of their concern about U.S. power. Thatincreased
U.S. assistance led to the death of Escobar and the destruction of his
organization.
The lesson of the Escobar case was do not push your own government or
population too far or they willturn on you and invite the Americans
in.
Full Circle
So, coming back full circle to the situation in Mexico today, there
are indeed cartel organizations that have been heavily damaged. Over
the past few years, we have seen groups like the Beltran Leyva
Organization the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO) and the VCF heavily
damaged. Many of these damaged groups, such as VCF, AFO and Los Zetas
have been forced to resort to other criminal activity such as
kidnapping, extortion and alien smuggling to fund their operations.
However, they have not yet undertaken large-scale terrorist attacks.
The VCF tip-toed along the line last year, with their IED attacks, as
did the Gulf Cartel, but these groups were careful not to use IEDs
that were too large and the VCF never deployed the huge IED they
threatened to. In fact, the overall use of IEDs is down dramatically
in 2011 compared to 2010. This despite of the fact that explosives are
readily available in Mexico and the cartels have the demonstrated
capability to manufacture IEDs.
It is also important to recognize that over the past couple years when
the U.S. has become very heavily interested in an attack linked to the
Mexican cartels[what do you mean by this? that the US is super wary
of any such attacks and investigating for them? that the US
population and authorities are hypersenstive to them? (i think the
latter sounds most accurate)], that they have been able to apply
sufficient pressure to get the Mexican government to go after the
responsible parties without the U.S. having to resort unilateral
action. if the US did respond to cartel aggression, what would be the
cartel response? what is their nuclear option?
In several recent high-profile incidents with a U.S. nexus such as the
March 2010 murders of [link
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100315_mexico_security_memo_march_15_2010
] three people linked to the U.S.consulate in Juarez, the Sept. 30
2010 [link
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20101020_falcon_lake_murder_and_mexicos_drug_wars
] murder of David Hartley on Falcon Lake, the Feb. 15. [link
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110218-update-ice-attack-mexico ]
murder of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement special agent Jamie
Zapata, or even the previously mentioned, July 27 threats against U.S.
interests in Juarez, the cartel figures believed to be responsible
have been arrested or killed. This means that the chances of a cartel
attempting to get the U.S. involved without expecting to be impacted
directly are probably very slim.
As noted in [link
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110720-mexican-drug-wars-update-targeting-most-violent-cartels
] our last cartel update, we anticipate that in the coming months the
Mexican government campaign against Los Zetas will continue to impact
that group, as will the attacks against Los Zetas by the Gulf Cartel
and its criminal allies. Likewise we also anticipate that the
aforementioned Sinaloa pressure against the VCF in Juarez will
notrelent. However, we have seen nothing that would indicate that this
pressure will cause these groups to lash out in the form of
large-scale terrorist attacks like those associated with Pablo
Escobar. Even when wounded, these Mexican organizations want to
maintain the buffer that protects them from the long arm of the U.S.
--
Sean Noonan
Tactical Analyst
Office: +1 512-279-9479
Mobile: +1 512-758-5967
Strategic Forecasting, Inc.
www.stratfor.com
--
Colby Martin
Tactical Analyst
colby.martin@stratfor.com