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# The Global Intelligence Files

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

## Security Weekly... it is in EDIT, so you may want to read and comment SOON

Released on 2012-08-22 00:00 GMT

Email-ID | 1808963
Date | 1970-01-01 01:00:00
From | marko.papic@stratfor.com
To | fdlm@diplomats.com

On November 3, the US district Court in El Paso began hearing a case
concerning members of a group that calls itself Barrio Azteca (BA). The
charges include drug trafficking and distrbution, extortion, money
laundering and murder. The six defendants are the three bosses of the
organization - Benjamin Alvarez, Manuel Cardoza, Carlos Perea a** a
sergeant a** Said Francisco Herrera a** lieutenant a** Eugene Mona- and
associate a** Arturo Enriquez. It is the first major trial involving the
BA and the testimony is revealing a lot about how this El Paso-based
prison gang operates and interfaces with the Mexican drug cartel allies
that supply its drugs. The BA is, of course, not the only street gang
operating in the US with ties to Mexico. Getting narcotics over the
border into the US and distributing it requires a large presence and
street gangs in the US are filling this need. The details that are coming
out now can be applied to other gangs like the Mexican Mafia, the Texas
Syndicate, SureA+-os and even transnational street gangs like <MS-13 >.
Stratfor has covered the increasing <violence in Mexico
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20081112_worrying_signs_border_raids >
heavily. The struggles amongst various cartels for territory and the
struggle between the cartels and the Mexican military over control of
Mexico have led to thousands of deaths in the past years. There are no
indications that this will let up. But these cartels are in the business
of selling drugs (marijuana, cocaine, heroin, etc.) in the United States.
Large amounts of narcotics flow north and large amounts of cash flow
south. Managing these transactions requires a physical presence in the US
that has an allegiance to the cartels in Mexico. Most of these gangs are,
like the BA, comprised mostly of Mexican immigrants or Mexican-Americans,
but white supremacist groups, mixed-race motorcycle gangs and black street
gangs are also heavily involved Gangs like the BA are very territorial
and usually only cover a specific region, so one Mexican cartel may work
with three to four street gangs in the US. Certainly they are not all the
same, but looking at the mechanics of how the Barrio Azteca operates
certainly gives insight into how other gangs, allies and rivals, operate
as well.
The BA started off as a prison gang in a Texas state penitentiary in
1986. Five inmates from El Paso started up the gang as a means of
protection, as ethnic tension in prisons can be brutal. The name Barrio
Azteca means a**the Aztec Neighborhooda** and is likely a reference to an
area of El Paso where the gang is from. By the 1990s the gang had spread
through other prisons and had established a presence on the streets of El
Paso. Reports indicate that in the late 1990s, the BA worked with the
Joacquin Guzmana**s Sinaloa Federation Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO)
which then controlled the drug shipments to Juarez a** El Pasoa**s sister
city across the border.
However, testimony from several different witnesses on both sides of the
trial have confirmed that the BA is now only working with the Vicente
Carrillo-Fuentes (VCF) DTO which has always controlled much of Chihuahua
state and Ciudad Juarez, but broke away from the Sinaloa Federation
earlier in 2008. BA followed VCF and is working for them to traffic drugs
across the border at the Juarez plaza.
According to testimony from the ongoing RICO case, drugs are taken at
discount from the supplier on the Mexico side and then distributed to
dealers on the street. These must pay a**taxesa** to BA collectors in
order to keep up their activities. According to testimony from Josue
Aguirre (a former gang member and FBI informant), the BA collects taxes
from 47 different street level narcotic operations in El Paso alone.
Failure to pay these taxes results in death. One of the murder charges in
the current RICO case involves the death of an El Paso dealer because he
failed to pay-up when the collectors came to get his money.
Once collected, the money goes in several different directions. First,
the lieutenants and captains a** the mid-level members of the gang a**
receive $50 and $200 per month respectively for compensation. The rest of
the ganga**s profits are then transferred using money orders to accounts
belonging to the head bosses (Alvarez, Cardoza and Perea) in prison. Cash
payments are also brought back to Juarez to pay the suppliers of the drug
a** the VCF.
The BA receives discounts on drugs from Juarez by providing tactical help
to their associates south of the border. VCF bosses in Juarez can go into
hiding in El Paso under BA protection if their lives are in danger in
Juarez and on the flip side, the VCF can order the BA to track down
enemies hiding in El Paso. Gustavo Gallardo, a former BA member,
testified that in 2005, he was sent to pick up a man in downtown El Paso
who had cheated the cartel of money. Upon delivery, the man was bound
with rope and duct tape and driven to Juarez where Gallardo assumed that
he was killed.
The constant illegal activity that the gang is involved in means that its
members constantly cycle in and out of prison. Many of the current BA
members were involved in smaller, local El Paso gangs before they were
picked up and sent to prison. Once in prison, they join the BA by being
sponsored by a a**godfathera** who walks the recruit through the process.
The BA performs a kind of background check on the new recruit by
circulating his name throughout the organization. Specifically, the BA is
looking for any evidence that the new recruit has cooperated with the
police.
Prison gangs are endemic to prison systems, where security comes in
numbers. Tensions that mount (usually along racial lines) between
dangerous and violent people regularly break out into conflict that is
often deadly. Being a member of a gang within a prison affords a certain
amount of protection against rival groups. Once a gang grows and
establishes a clear hierarchy, its leader wields an impressive amount of
power a** some even go on to take over the prison like Pablo Escobar did
in Colombia. The ancestors of Russiaa**s organized crime clans organized
themselves in prisons and essentially took them over, running them for a
profit and enjoying a great deal of freedom. Within the US, there are no
fewer than nine prison gangs that have connections to Mexican drug
cartels. The Barrio Azteca is one prison gang among many.
It may seem strange that members on the outside send money to and answer
to bosses in prison since they are locked up, but these bosses wield a
great deal of power. Disobedience in the gang is punishable by death and
regardless of whether a boss is in prison or not, he can order a hit on a
member who has crossed him. Another thing for these gang members to
remember is that if they end up in prison again (which is very likely)
they will depend on the help of these bosses to stay alive and perhaps
earn some money while doing time. The fact that BA has a gang in
virtually every penitentiary in Texas means that wherever you are sent,
you will have a protection network in place. For those with an
illustrious prison record, they might know the leader of every prison
chapter which increases his prestige. The constant cycling of members
from the outside world into prison, then, does not inhibit the gang but
makes them more cohesive a** it uses the prison system to increase bonds
between gang members.
Some challenges do come up as far as communication, but the BA seems to
have overcome this. Edward Ruiz, a former member who testified in the
trial, said that he operated an address where letters and packages were
sent from jailed members and then he distributed the mail to the other
members from 2003 to 2007. He was essentially the ganga**s mailman. This
tactic would ensure that all prison communications would be connected to
only one address and wouldna**t give away the location of other members.
Gang members maintained coded communications this way, keeping the outside
and inside members in touch.
The BA also allegedly used Sandy Valles New, who worked in the
investigations section of the Federal Public Defender's office in El Paso
from 1996 to 2002, to pass communications between the two branches of the
gang. She had access to inmates, with whom she would communicate and then
pass on information to members on the street and vise-versa. Recorded
conversations caught her talking to one of the bosses and lead defendants,
Carlos Perea about her fear of losing her job. She even talked of
crossing over to Juarez to and communicating with BA members in Mexico.
The BA might have had sources on the inside helping them, but the FBI was
able to <infiltrate LINK> the BA, too. Josue Aguirre and Johnny
Michelleti both informed on gang activities to the FBI since 2003 and 2005
respectively. Edward Ruiz, the mailman, also handed over stacks of
letters to the FBI.
Barrio Azteca is only one of dozens of gangs that operate along the
US/Mexico border that help Mexican DTOs smuggle narcotics across the
border and then go on to distribute them. Having a representative group
in the US is fundamental to Mexican DTOs since the border is the most
difficult chokepoint to pass in the narcotics supply chain. Getting large
amounts of drugs across the border on a daily basis requires local
connections that can pay-off corrupt border guards or border town
policemen. Border gangs also have the contacts on the street who sell
drugs on the retail level, where markups bring in large profits. But, as
we have seen in this trial, the partnership goes beyond just narcotics and
involved violence, too. Considering the raging violence in Mexico
surrounding narcotics trafficking, there is a genuine worry that this
violence (and the corruption) could bring instability to the US.
The details that this case has brought out indicate that the BA works
closely with the VCF in Mexico and has contributed to drug related
violence in the US. Killing a street dealer who failed to pay his fees
occurs across the country and is not a unique practice to Mexican drug
traffickers. However, apprehending offenders in El Paso and driving them
across the border to Juarez to be held or killed does draw a very clear
link between violence in Mexico and the US. It is not new though.
Previous operations like the one targeting a delinquent drug dealer in
<Phoenix
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexican_cartels_and_fallout_phoenix >,
kidnappings and attacks against <US Border Patrol agents
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/u_s_mexico_violence_along_border > have
indicated that violence has been creeping over. So far violence related
to drug trafficking has <come close to
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/u_s_targeted_officer_killings_crossing_border
> but not killed any law enforcement officials or innocent US civilians
a** Mexican cartels and their US allies have stayed disciplined so far,
only targeting those involved in the drug trade.
One of the roles that the BA and other street gangs fill is that of
enforcer. They have tight control over a specific territory because that
is how they survive. They keep tabs on people to make sure they are
paying their taxes and not affiliating with rival gangs. To draw an
analogy, they are the local police who know the situation on the ground
and can enforce specific rules handed down by a broader organization. The
BAa**s ability to strike has been proven to be real a** they may not be as
well trained as a group like the Zetas or the tactical team that carried
out a home invasion <in Phoenix in XXXX LINK> but they nevertheless have
tight control over their territory.
Another invitation to cross-border violence is the fact that the BA is
obliged to offer refuge to Mexican cartel members seeking safety in the
US. The cartel members that cross into the US most likely have a bounty
on their head and, although cartels have thus far mostly shown restraint
in following targets into the US, it isna**t clear if this will be the
case forever. The more violent Mexico (and particularly Juarez) becomes,
the greater the risk that cartel leaders face and the more pressure they
will be under to cross into the US in search of refuge. The more leaders
cross over and hide with gangs like the BA, the greater the temptation is
to follow them across and kill them in the US. If other border gangs in
California, Arizona and New Mexico are doing this (and we dona**t doubt
that they are) then the risk for cross-border violence increases as
targets in Mexico relocate to the US. The trend has already been seen
<within Mexico http://www.stratfor.com/mexicos_newest_criminal_refuge >,
but crossing the border into the US is a different story.
For now, there are two primary reasons for why Mexican cartel violence has
for the most part stopped short of crossing the US border. First, the
prospect of provoking US law enforcement does not pan out well for DTOs
operating along the border. They do not want to provoke a coordinated
response from a highly capable federal US police force like the DEA, ATF
and FBI. By keeping violence low and primarily aimed at other gang
members and drug dealers, they are able to lessen their profile in the
eyes of these agencies. But if violence increased and police or civilians
were killed intentionally or otherwise, scrutiny would dramatically
increase.
The second reason that violence has not crossed the border wholesale is
that gangs like the BA are in place to enforce the DTOsa** laws for them.
There is less of a need to send cartel members into the US to kill an
offending drug dealer when you have a tight alliance with a border gang
that keeps your drug and money supply moving smoothly and carries out
occasional killings to maintain order.
While US federal law enforcement agents keep a sharp eye on violence along
the border and promise a swift response, the integrity of the BA and its
ability to carry out the writ of larger DTOs in Mexico may not be quite so
certain. Trials like the one that began November 3 appear likely to
undermine BA activity in crucial trafficking corridors like El
Paso/Juarez. The indictment and possible incarceration of the six alleged
BA members would not damage the gang so bad a** afterall, the gang is used
to operating out of prison and there are certainly members ready to step
up to fill some shoes. However, the fact that the ganga**s secrets and
m.o. is being publicized and disseminated to law enforcement officials and
the general public alike will likely increase scrutiny on the gang and
could very well lead to many more arrests. Considering the fact that the
FBI had at least two informants in the gang, gang leaders have probably
moved to contain the damages and isolate the members that those informants
jeopardized; this shakes up and organization and disrupts the daily flow
of business, making them less effective.
If the BA is shaken up enough by this trial and the sensitive information
that is has released, then the VCF in Juarez has a weaker hand in El
Paso. The BA will no doubt survive this round of investigations and
trials remaining largely in tact, but given the high stakes across the
border in Mexico, if the BA is off of its game, then the VCF may not be
able to rely on the BA as much as it did before. A degradation of the
relationship could mean that the VCF would either rely on its own members
in Juarez to carry out hits against offenders and would have to provide
its own security to leaders seeking refuge there, or that it would turn to
a new gang under less police scrutiny. If either scenario were to happen,
the spillover of violence from Mexico into the US could increase either
through direct Mexican cartel involvement or the beginning of a rivalry
over control of El Paso.
Assuming that the relationship between the VCF and the BA is
representative of other relationships between Mexican cartels and allied
gangs in the US, this scenario could play out not just between the VCF and
the BA, but also between gangs like Hermanos de Pistoleros Latinos in
Houston, the Texas Syndicate and Tango Blast operating in the valley and
their suppliers in the Gulf cartel; the Mexican Mafia in California and
Texas who work with the Tijuana and Sinaloa cartels and other gangs
operating in the US with ties to Mexican cartels like Mexikanemi, Nortenos
and Surenos. Also, BA does not only operate in El Paso, but elsewhere in
West Texas, New Mexico and Arizona.
The fact remains that Mexican cartels are not eager to tangle with US law
enforcement, but they will (and have) in the past when forced to. As
their enforcers stateside face more legal pressure, it will be interesting
to watch how the cartels will respond.
--
Marko Papic
Stratfor Junior Analyst
C: + 1-512-905-3091
marko.papic@stratfor.com
AIM: mpapicstratfor