The Global Intelligence Files,
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# The Global Intelligence Files

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

## Re: Insight - CIA Killings ** pls do not forward **

Released on 2012-07-29 00:00 GMT

Email-ID | 1094236
Date | 2010-01-05 03:48:06
From | marko.papic@stratfor.com
To | analysts@stratfor.com, friedman@att.blackberry.net
List-Name | analysts@stratfor.com

leaving the middle and upper management in the hands of people trained in
the 1990s--a very different world and very different training missions.
That really seems to me as an intrinsic problem... not just for the
intelligence community, but also for the State, the military, etc.
----- Original Message -----
From: "George Friedman" <gfriedman@stratfor.com>
To: "Analyst List" <analysts@stratfor.com>
Cc: friedman@att.blackberry.net
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2010 8:45:44 PM GMT -06:00 US/Canada Central
Subject: Re: Insight - CIA Killings ** pls do not forward **
There is a good and a bad reason for doing this. The bad reason is that
you either don't understand the difference or you don't have enough
trained staff. That's DIA's problem--both of them.
But there is no inherent reason why an analyst can't learn the operators
craft and vice versa. Granted there are profound issues of personality
type, but there are those who can bridge that. However, to bridge that
requires time, training, mentoring and maturing. It also requires time in
both roles for the person to learn where analysis stops and operations.
And it requires training by people who understand and accept both sides.
This is very hard to do in a war where many of the senior people have
left. Over the past ten years a stunning number of people in the IC have
retired, leaving the middle and upper management in the hands of people
trained in the 1990s--a very different world and very different training
missions. Their numbers and skill are missing and limits their mentoring
ability. People are happy if they get baseline capable analysts and
operators, let alone cross-breeding them.
Reva Bhalla wrote:
i had heard a while back how in Iraq especially they would allow a lot
more analysts in DIA and other agencies to interact more directly with
sources... sounds like a trend that grew out of limited resources
On Jan 4, 2010, at 8:34 PM, Fred Burton wrote:
The spooks told me tonight that DOD have lost 350 soldiers in similar
events but it has never made the press.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: analysts-bounces@stratfor.com [mailto:analysts-bounces@stratfor.com] On
Behalf Of George Friedman
Sent: Monday, January 04, 2010 8:31 PM
To: Analysts
Subject: Re: Insight - CIA Killings ** pls do not forward **
At the age of 25 or so an analyst or an ops officer are about equally
skilled in the field. The training prepares you to start learning. The
problem is that they haven't got enough experience out there. Twenty
years in do as opposed to di makes a big difference. In my view
getting trained at the farm and spending a year in camaroon prepares
you for squat. The problem isn't the directorate but that both
directirates have kids playing way abobe their pay grade.
Sent via BlackBerry by AT&T
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Fred Burton" <burton@stratfor.com>
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2010 20:28:29 -0600
To: 'Analyst List'<analysts@stratfor.com>
Subject: RE: Insight - CIA Killings ** pls do not forward **
An OPS officer is in the field from the DO, the clandestine service.
He/she is specifically trained in HUMINT collection, asset
development and asset operation. They run the assets and work out the
commo bwt the source and OPS officer. Ops officers are also called
case officers.
An analyst (the DI) reads the reports collected by the OPS officer and
very rarely meets w/a HUMINT source, unless its an intelligence
liaison source.
Training and skillset are apples and oranges.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: analysts-bounces@stratfor.com [mailto:analysts-bounces@stratfor.com] On
Behalf Of Sean Noonan
Sent: Monday, January 04, 2010 8:18 PM
To: Analyst List
Subject: Re: Insight - CIA Killings ** pls do not forward **
Fred, can you clarify what exactly a "analyst vice clandestine
operational officer" position is?
Fred Burton wrote:
Fiasco
When balls are dropped in this business, they are usually fatal.
The call from an operational asset for an emergency meeting should
have sent off the alarm bells.
The only rational explanation is the call went to the Jordanian GID
handler first, than the Jordanian spook caused the CIA meeting.
Very Arab like. (lesson learned: Never, ever let an operational
asset control the meeting site, especially in Injun Country.)
Obviously, the double agent told his terrorist handlers that he
would not be checked for bombs or weapons. This operation has been
in the works for a long time.
My hats off to aQ. Job well done.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: analysts-bounces@stratfor.com [mailto:analysts-bounces@stratfor.com] On
Behalf Of Reva Bhalla
Sent: Monday, January 04, 2010 8:04 PM
To: Analyst List
Subject: Re: Insight - CIA Killings ** pls do not forward **
wow, there are all kinds of lessons built into this
On Jan 4, 2010, at 8:02 PM, Fred Burton wrote:
Politics and CIA political correctness.
Since 9-11, analysts (like John Brennan, who was COS Riyadh w/zero
ops training) are placed in operational management jobs.
This analyst believed their source. First mistake in agent
handling. Source was running the analyst. Lesson learned.
Inexperience field personnel pushed out due to the scope of duties
that surpass CIA's bandwidth.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: analysts-bounces@stratfor.com [mailto:analysts-bounces@stratfor.com] On
Behalf Of Reva Bhalla
Sent: Monday, January 04, 2010 7:58 PM
To: Analyst List
Subject: Re: Insight - CIA Killings ** pls do not forward **
why was an analyst handling the source?
On Jan 4, 2010, at 7:56 PM, Fred Burton wrote:
** Note -- This cannot be sourced to the CIA. Pls do not
forward **
According to a CIA source, there are several factors that caused
the catastrophic incident. Preliminary assessment follows:
1) Inexperienced analyst vice clandestine operational officer
brought the asset into the secure setting.
2) The gathering of approx. 13 CIA staff should never have
occurred.
3) Failure to screen the source for weapons or bombs. Asset
handling 101.
4) COS Amman and COS Afghanistan have been recalled for
"consultations."
5) Jordanian spooks arrived Langley today.
--
Sean Noonan
Research Intern
Strategic Forecasting, Inc.
www.stratfor.com
--
George Friedman
Founder and CEO
Stratfor
700 Lavaca Street
Suite 900
Austin, Texas 78701
Phone 512-744-4319
Fax 512-744-4334