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## Re: [CT] DISCUSSION - Anonymous vs Cartels

Released on 2012-03-02 01:00 GMT

Email-ID | 1273433
Date | 2011-10-25 02:33:59
From | tristan.reed@stratfor.com
To | analysts@stratfor.com
List-Name | analysts@stratfor.com

As far as Aurora, I haven't followed it closely. Did they ever identify
the attackers or number of attackers? I thought the target set was the
only thing that led people to believe the Chinese government was
responsible.
2. NSA will tell you otherwise. SIGINT is not the NSA's only
responsibility. SIGINT assets do not carry over to investigating cyber
intrusion, unless you are trying to corroborate, in this case HUMINT is
just as significant as SIGINT. A country's SIGINT capabilities does not
indicate its capabilities in tracking hackers. NSA may have there own
department for tracking hackers but it does not make it SIGINT.
Ok, Please define SIGINT for me.
Wikipedia provides an indepth explanation on SIGINT . But in short, SIGINT
is the capability in exploiting signals provided by communication devices,
and what can be obtained by exploiting the signals. Combining computer
network operations and SIGINT is innaccurate, because while SIGINT may be
used with other intelligence disciplines in order to identify a hacker, it
is not necessary and is no more related than any other intel discipline.
SIGINT could help you identify a computer devices (not the operator)
emitting a signal (wifi), and cryptanalysis, which is also separate from
SIGINT but often used in conjunction, could help in providing methods to
decrypt messages over a network, but SIGINT wouldn't obtain those
messages.
In order to exploit computer network operations, the operators involved
are specifically trained in computer science disciplines and technologies
tailored specifically for computer activity.
NSA also is the primary agency for cryptanalysis. Because of technological
demands of SIGINT and cryptanalysis, NSA has enormous resources in R&D, so
I can see why the USG would move some CNO to NSA. But their SIGINT
capabilities are not indicators of CNO capabilities.
Writing the code and hacking was just a small part of necessary labor for
the Stuxnet operation. I also don't think we are discussing operations on
the scale of causing physical damage to extremely sensitive equipment .
Well, this is an example of a cyber attack that matters, whereeas
Anonymous so far has not mattered. You chose the most prolific example of
a cyber attack (which the whole operation consisted mainly outside of the
cyber attack itself). Anything that falls short of this doesn't matter?
Define what matters. None of anonymous' attacks have physically damaged
secret Iranian nuclear facilities, but I think you are downplaying too
much the significance of exposing corporate secrets, halting businesses'
revenues, and embarrassing State actors by defacing their websites.
On 10/24/11 5:38 PM, Sean Noonan wrote:
On 10/24/11 5:07 PM, Tristan Reed wrote:
On 10/24/11 3:12 PM, Sean Noonan wrote:
1. Look at the anonymous hackers tacked down already The USG
arrested 10 Russian spies last year, are you willing to say foreign
intel is not capable of conducting espionage undetected? No, of
course not. But I also would not argue that the SVR is so good to
be immune to detection, as you are arguing with hackers. I'm saying
they are more detectable than you think. There is no such thing as
truly anonymous. Everythign leaves a trail. Will that trail in
every instance lead to a single individual? no. but it can lead to
a place, an organization, and often, an individual.
2. NSA will tell you otherwise. SIGINT is not the NSA's only
responsibility. SIGINT assets do not carry over to investigating
cyber intrusion, unless you are trying to corroborate, in this case
HUMINT is just as significant as SIGINT. A country's SIGINT
capabilities does not indicate its capabilities in tracking hackers.
NSA may have there own department for tracking hackers but it does
not make it SIGINT.
Ok, Please define SIGINT for me.
The question is if the attack is high priority enough. Many people
assume there is no attribution because there is no response, but I
don't think that is accurate. Many people say this, because no
attribution is one reason for no response. Yes, they do, and if
they think that is the primary reason for lack of response, then I
think they are wrong.
3. Your example is short-sighted. You don't just open a new laptop
and start hacking e-mail addresses. A cyber attack involves much
more than a recently bought laptop. In the same way there is an
attack cycle for a terrorist attack or crime, there is one for a
cyber attack. A very simple attack may be as hard to trace as a
nearly-random mugging in the dark in a neighborhood with much more
serious crime and no CCTV cameras. A more complicated attack,
however, involves pre-operational surveillance, developing exploits,
developing programs and code, gaining access, exploiting that, and
carrying out an attack. Discovering exploits and writing code can
be done entirely offline, out of sight of law enforcement or intel
agencies. Pre-operational surveillance and gaining access (the point
of the exploit you write offline) would fit in my example. The point
is, if you don't link your computer to identifiable information, you
remain anonymous. Just like people use certain methods to build
IEDs, people use certain mehtods to design programs and code for
cyber attacks. Over time, those methods become identifiable and
more and more attributable. This is, for example, how AURORA is
linked back to the Chinese. and very specific Chinese, I may add.
Being connected or unconnected doesn't matter, eventually you have
to use what you develop, or copy from someone, and all of those
things can be analyzed. And that takes time, giving more time for
your exposure Exposure comes from network activity with the target,
a lot of the pre-operational phase of an attack can occur without
network activity. Look at everything that went into Stuxnet as a
great example, that couldn't be done with one person with a new
laptop. Writing the code and hacking was just a small part of
necessary labor for the Stuxnet operation. I also don't think we are
discussing operations on the scale of causing physical damage to
extremely sensitive equipment . Well, this is an example of a cyber
attack that matters, whereeas Anonymous so far has not mattered.
All of this activity provides activity and evidence which helps for
attribution. Of course it is always possible to develop an attack,
just like any other operation, that even the best law enforcement
and national intelligence agencies have trouble or cannot
attribute. That's fine. My point is that it's very difficult for
someone to successfully use Anonymous as a cover and have NSA, GHQ,
MID, Aman, etc, be unable to attribute it. How do you know if NSA
or GHQ is effective in identifying hackers?I don't, but I'm
confident they are far better than you are allowing for. They may
not choose to cover it if it is small scale crime, however.
On 10/24/11 1:38 PM, Tristan Reed wrote:
I wouldn't doubt using Anonymous as a cover for state sponsored
cyber warfare. Not sure the number of benefits in actually doing
that, since you can conduct a cyber attack without associating
with a hacker group and still deny / cover actions on behalf of
the State. An individual attacking US computer assets from China,
may be working by himself or on behalf of the Chinese government,
but unless the US has other intel on the Chinese government's
cyber warfare activities in order to corroborate there is little
capability to distinguish.
It is very difficult to track down hackers. Computer network
operations do not fall under the discipline of SIGINT. Assets from
SIGINT would not directly help you track an individual responsible
for hacking State run servers. In the past, I have turned to
SIGINT organizations for collections on computer related material,
but this was due to the US being behind in cyber warfare, and not
knowing where to assign responsibility. However, this has changed
dramatically in the last couple of years.
Online activities, with adequate OPSEC, truly are anonymous. As an
extreme scenario of OPSEC: If I purchase a laptop in cash, go to a
Starbucks with free public wifi, and never attribute the online
activity to something revealing (accessing personal email
accounts, tweeting, entering personal information to the laptop,
etc..), and begin hacking government email accounts then never use
the laptop again. Unless LEA could get an accurate description of
my appearance from Starbuck's patrons or possible security
cameras, I can not think of way to identify me.
Governments, attempting to track cyber enemies, do not refer to
these enemies as individuals. Instead as generic entities tied to
specific computer-related activities because of the difficulty in
identifying individuals.
I think the most likely way for a "Anonymous cover" to be blown,
would be the chatter in all the IRC channels. But what if a common
participant in "Anonymous" activities, was working for a State?
Anonymous has denounced state governments before, if that State
agent organizes an attack amongst his IRC / Twitter buddies, what
signs could a LEA look for to distinguish?
On 10/24/11 12:38 PM, Sean Noonan wrote:
In reply to Kerley (my comments on the discussion coming in a
bit)
1. Anonymous has not shown the capability to do anything
actually harmful or devastating. I'm not saying they can't, but
i'm very doubtfoul. Tristan's discussion shows the first real
case where they could do some minor damage--to individual
people, not not to an organization or anything that would come
as a serious or strategic threat.
2. Attribution by the world' leading SIGINT agencies is actually
pretty good. I see the fear of using 'anonymous' as a cover,
but that would be pretty easy to bungle, and could probably
still be attributed if important enough to those agencies. The
recent attack on Sony actually brings this issue up- Whoever is
calling themselves anonymous denies they did it. And keep in
mind how much they have claimed an publicized attacks in the
past, even before they were carried out. The attack on the
Playstation Network was more sophisticated than anonymous' usual
work (though potentially coordinated with Anonymous' DDOS
attacks that distracted Sony's IT security). But whoever did
it, again, no real damage came of it. Congress is holding
hearings over data security, but this is no different than the
OC groups stealing your credit card information. LE will go
after them, have some success, but the threat is not that
large.
On 10/24/11 11:04 AM, Kerley Tolpolar wrote:
Link: themeData
I see the Zetas/Anonymous affairs as a good opportunity to
have a broader piece on Anonymous. I believe our readers no
nothing, or almost nothing about what this group is and the
threat it poses. Reviewing their list of attacks
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anonymous_%28group%29), in most
of the cases, they are the "good" guys, sort of a Robin Hood
of the internet . The interesting thing when it comes to their
interactions with the cartels is the dubious role they play:
at the same time they can be fighting crime by revealing
cartel members/supporters, but they can also put lives in
risk.
However, I believe this is only one of the threats posed by
Anonymous. The idea that states, and anyone else on Earth, can
conduct a cyber attack under "Anonymous" is worrisome.
(http://www.zdnet.co.uk/blogs/security-bullet-in-10000166/akamai-cyber-spies-are-hiding-behind-anonymous-10024573/)
If I run an organization, if I am responsible for government
websites, or if I am just a internet user, I would like to
know more about these guys. Who they are? What are they
interested in? How they operate? Who they have targeted so
far? How can I defend myself from them? In what countries are
they active? Should I worry about them at all? Can I use them
to achieve any particular goal?
On 10/24/11 10:22 AM, Colby Martin wrote:
nice. i still think the central focus, and what everything
else can build off of, is that Anonymous doesn't know the
threat they pose to innocent people caught up in the terror
that is Mexico. By focusing on journalists or taxi drivers
they show little understanding of the situation. This has
long term implications in not just Mexico. They don't
consider the consequences of their actions and they act
without understanding the environment. It was the same when
they released information on the Sony Playstation network to
protest Sony. They hurt innocent people to prove a point.
On 10/24/11 9:32 AM, Tristan Reed wrote:
Reposting this with a new shorter focus. Instead of
discussing possible cartel responses, the focus is on what
type of threat Anonymous can pose to cartels. The video
released by Anonymous, threatens revealing personal
information on cartels as well as states a member had been
kidnapped. I could not find any sources outside of
Anonymous' claims of the individual being kidnapped.
According to their facebook sites (Anonymous Mexico and
Anonymous Veracruz) it sounds like it may be an individual
posting flyers in Veracruz as part of the Operation
Paperstorm protest, although that is speculation.
Link: themeData
Anonymous, a well-publicized hacker group famous for
distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attacks on government
websites, lashed out at drug cartels via the Internet with
a statements denouncing Mexico's criminal cartels,
including a video depicting a masked individual addressing
Mexican drug cartels on October 10? With the most recent
video release, Anonymous makes bold threats towards the
criminal cartels in Mexico. Threats such as releasing
identities of taxi drivers, police, politicians, and
journalists who collude with criminal cartels. The hacker
group demanded Los Zetas release a fellow kidnapped member
otherwise face consequences. In the Anonymous' video, this
coming November 5th was mentioned as a day cartels could
expect Anonymous' reaction if their demands of releasing a
kidnapped member are not met. The potential of conflict
between Mexico's criminal cartels and hackers, presents a
unique threat towards TCOs. We know of cartels lashing out
at online bloggers, but I haven't seen any reporting on
cartels dealing with any headaches from hackers before.
What Anonymous brings to the table in a conflict
o Anonymous would not pose a direct physical
security threat to Mexican cartels.
o Anonymous' power base is the ability to exploit
online media
o Anonymous hackers do not have to be in Mexico
to lash out at cartels
While not certain, there is a potential for Anonymous to
pose a threat
o It is unknown if Anonymous's claims to possess
identifiable information on cartel members
o It is unknown what information Anonymous could
acquire on cartels
o Bank accounts, any online transactions or
communications, identifiable information on cartels
members have to be considered in the realm of
possibilities for
Anonymous
o Anonymous has demonstrated it's ability
to reveal illicit online activity (child pornography
rings)
Anonymous hackers likely have not been involved in the
ultra-violent world of drug trafficking in Mexico. As a
result, their understanding of cartel activities may be
limited. Anonymous may act with confidence when sitting in
front of a computer, but this may blind them to any
possible retribution. They may not even know the impact of
any online assault of cartels.
o Revealing information on taxi drivers and
journalists will cost lives. Anonymous may not understand
some of these individuals are forced to collude with
cartels. Taxi drivers are often victims of
extortion or coerced to act as halcones. Revealing the
identity of these individuals will not have a significant
impact on cartel operations. Politicans
have been accused of working with cartels (Guerrero &
Veracruz' governor) before, however there has yet to be
any consequences from this.
o Anonymous hackers may not understand the extent
cartels are willing to go protect their operations.
o Any hackers in Mexico are at risk.
o Cartels have reached out to the computer
science community before, coercing computer science majors
into working for them.
o This provides the cartels with the
possibility of discovering hackers within Mexico.
On 10/17/11 10:19 AM, Marc Lanthemann wrote:
Oh man we are threading new ground here - I like the
idea but there are several issues to address and fix
here.
These are the bullets of my main analytical concern with
the discussion:
o we don't know who got kidnapped or why.
that's fine but we can't gloss over that fact
o "hackers" is a blanket term - there's a
difference between stealing bank records from government
computers and overloading www.loszetas.com main page.
o There's no thought out process of what sort
of information could anon have on the cartels. What kind
of info is kept online and accessible to potential
attacks? You seem to be talking about identities, whose?
If anything it's dirty cops, politicians and businessmen
who need to worry about what anon is going to be saying.
Think about why the bloggers and media were killed in
previous instances. Was it because they revealed
operational details, because they acted as informants,
because they exposed links with officials or because
they somehow sullied the cartel's reputation? In short,
what kind of information is damaging to the cartels
themselves?
o Once you identify this info - think about if
anon can realistically access it and disseminate it so
it causes a measure of damage. Anon doesn't have any
intelligence capacity except for the technical ability
by a very small number of its members to infiltrate
certain networks and databases and steal information.
Now what kind of information would a cartel keep on a
network that is connected to the internet (aka no
intranet)? Where else could information be found?
Government databases? Once we know what kind of
information is accessible, we can also know more about
the consequences of dissemination.
o What's the IT capacity of a cartel?
Sufficient to trace back attacks? If it's not, there
risks to be a lot of killings done by people who may not
understand the difference between an anon hacker and a
blogger.
On 10/17/11 9:47 AM, Colby Martin wrote:
wanted to forward Karen's thoughts to analyst
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: [CT] DISCUSSION - Anonymous vs Cartels
Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2011 09:28:18 -0500
From: Karen Hooper <hooper@stratfor.com>
Reply-To: CT AOR <ct@stratfor.com>
To: CT AOR <ct@stratfor.com>
you've got some of the issues here, but this is going
to need a lot more work
You need to lay out:
a) What exactly is going on with Anonymous, your
trigger section is unclear
b) what our assessment of the online cartel presence
is, and therefore their vulnerabilities and
capabilities
c) How capable is Anonymous of breaching high security
anything
d) how far the cartels would be willing to travel to
kill anyone who breaches their systems or exposes
their connections
I also just want to point out that we have reasonable
reliable insight that Sinaloa at the very least has
some significant levels of sophistication in their
online presence, to include the use of cyber
currencies and significant IT capacity. There is no
reason to assume that Los Zetas don't also conduct
business online, in a protected fashion.
Karen Hooper
Latin America Analyst
o: 512.744.4300 ext. 4103
c: 512.750.7234
STRATFOR
www.stratfor.com
On 10/17/11 8:46 AM, Renato Whitaker wrote:
On 10/17/11 8:25 AM, Tristan Reed wrote:
Link: themeData
Trigger
Recently, Mexican cartels have faced a new enemy,
hackers. Anonymous, a well-publicized hacker group
famous for...?, lashed out at drug cartels via the
Internet with a statements denouncing Mexico's
criminal cartels, including a video released
depicting...? a person talking? a voice? words on a
screen? exactly when?. With the most recent video
release, Anonymous makes bold threats towards the
criminal cartels. Threats such as releasing identities
of Mexican? American? taxi drivers, police,
politicians, and journalists who collude with criminal
cartels. The hacker group demanded Los Zetas release a
fellow kidnapped member otherwise face consequences.
The potential of conflict between Mexico's criminal
cartels and hackers, presents an unprecedented war
front for the cartels. The vastly different operations
of Anonymous and Los Zetas leave a conflict both
Anonymous and the cartels have little experience in
handling. i believe that Anonymous has no experience
with the cartels. I do not believe for a second that
the cartels have no experience with hackers.
In the Anonymous' video, this coming November 5th was
mentioned as a day cartels could expect Anonymous'
reaction if their demands of releasing a kidnapped
member this should be mentioned right up front.
Cartels have a member, Anonymous is threatening to hit
back. Provide enough details so we understand who this
guy is and why/how he was abducted. are not met. If
Anonymous' claims of possessing revealing information
on cartel members and operations are true, cartels
will likely respond with violence against individuals
revealed as opposing cartel members huh? you mean
Anonymous members?. It also is likely that public
disclosure of GOM officials who collude with DTOs will
force the GOM to take action, giving the Anonymous
threat complexity i don't understand what this means.
You mean the GOM will threaten Anonymous?. How
effectively any cartel will be able to retaliate
against Anonymous remains unanswered . However,
cartels will continue their threats against any
individual using online media WC.... you mean tools?
or weapons? We're not talking about bloggers here.
against the cartels.
The Battle Space
Anonymous's and the cartels activities exist in two
separate realities from each other. Anonymous operates
solely in sphere of the computer networks. Anonymous
does not experience geographical boundaries. All
personalities within Anonymous, exist solely in cyber
space. (That is not entirely true. They are physical
people tho live in the real world. They have names and
addresses - although most of them are likely outside
of MX.) Anonymous' power base consists of their
technical capabilities in hacking. Any information
connected to the Internet is vulnerable to exploits by
hackers. (Identifying the pc's of individual cartel
members in the midst of Mexico's population could be
quite difficult. Remember that most of what Anonymous
has done are DDOS attacks. Sucks if you are
Mastercard or a big company with a website that brings
in revenue, but it does not really matter if you don't
run operations on the web. Los Z don't make much money
via e-commerce. They are also far less dependent on
the web than the jihadists.)
Anonymous is known for its hacking endevours, but it's
power base consists of the perceived anonymity that
its members believe themselves to have, real or
otherwise, by operating through the internet. This
gives an opening for people disgruntled by anything
and everything to practice general dickery. As the
popular meme goes, anonymity + audience = troll. Only
a fraction of the large web of people who identify
themselves as "anonymous" have any sort of serious IT
capability.
The largest threat towards a hacker's existence so far
has been from targeted arrests by Law Enforcement
Agencies.
The criminal cartels in Mexico operate on the streets
in US and Mexican cities. They are run as a business,
always looking to maximize profits and expand. But
they are bricks and mortar commerce. Yes..... but they
use the internet to launder money and issue commands.
We know that Sinaloa does that from insight. There is
no reason to assume that Los Zetas don't have a
similar capacity. Their power base is built by large
amounts of revenue and escalating brutal violence.
Cartels like Los Zetas, are experienced in facing
different types of threats. Cartels are always
suffering at the hands of cartel on cartel violence.
While battling each other, cartels still face arrests
by Law Enforcement Agencies. As cartels wish to avoid
any hindrance in the flow of drugs and money, cartels
have targeted media outlets. Murdering journalists and
online bloggers in order to cover details of their
operations. ok... but that's kind of a red herrng for
this discussion. You need to focus on the possible
vulnerabilities of the cartels. Don't just assume they
have no cyber presence.
Anonymous' Weapons
Whatever impact will be felt due to Anonymous' actions
against criminal cartels has yet to be seen.
Anonymous' only ability to combat cartels lay in
information operations, mainly disseminating sensitive
information on cartels and propagating anti-cartel
statements via social media and defaced websites in
Mexico you mean so far and that we know of?. As
Anonymous admitted in their video to cartels, they
cannot fight with guns. The significance of a
targeted information operations campaign by
technically elite individuals can not be overlooked
should not be underestimated. Cartels view main stream
media outlets and social media blogs as such a threat
to their operations, that they have continued to
target journalists and bloggers. Last month, a message
signed by Los Zetas was placed with a dead female
body more relevantly, on the body of a blogger. The
message threatened any users who denounce cartels on
blogging websites. getting repetitive here, and it's
not really addressing the subheading
As stated earlier, any information connected to the
internet risks disclosure by Anonymous. There is ample
reason to suggest Anonymous is capable of possessing
information they threaten to release. By releasing
identities of individuals cooperating with Mexican
cartels, Anonymous threatens the life of those
individuals. Anonymous's ability to disseminate
sensitive information is limited by what is available
via the Internet. Government computers connected to
the Internet should always be considered a possibility
of an attack. However, as with the compartmentalized
nature of the US governments computer networks,
information available to Mexico's intelligence
collection may not be easy to acquire. what are you
trying to say here? This isn't clear at all
Cartel's Defense
A counter response to the video? by the
cartels has yet to see fruition. However, Anonymous'
claims of a kidnapped member by Los Zetas suggest Los
Zetas have begun addressing the threat posed by
hackers so... how has there not been a counter
response? also this undermines your statements above
about how Anonymous is soley internet based, and
underlines the vulnerabilities of associated members.
How did they find teh Anonymous member? The answer to
that could very well give you some indication to the
technical ability of the cartels . As Anonymous exists
in abstract reality of the world wide web , the
cartels will face a number of challenges which rarely
are posed for them Again, how do you know? The USG has
whole agencies dedicated to fucking shit up in
cyberspace. You can assume (and we have good intel
indicating that) they are working on disrupting the
cartels.. Hackers threatening cartels, can operate in
any region of the world. Personal information
including locations is only available if a hacker
chooses to divulge it or if the subject of the attack
is savvy enough to figure it out. Hackers don't only
work for Anonymous. Cartels are only capable of
dealing with their online enemy, if they can
physically reach out to them. Or start employing
hackers of their own under their payroll? Stranger
things have happened, Why not a Zetas 2.0?
Cartels have been known to coerce the
services of Mexican citizens with a technical
background. Recruiting the help of computer science
majors through personal threats has been reported in
the past where? What cartels? reported where?. Since
cartels operate in the world of urban violence and
drug trafficking, they will likely need the assistance
of technical experts to help combat any threat by
computer hackers. While identifying bloggers inside
of Mexico has been demonstrated, it is unlikely
cartels are capable of identifying any hackers
operating outside of Mexico. Even law enforcement
agencies such as the FBi, with far more technical
experience and resources than cartels, struggle to
find hackers through investigations. A) How do you
know they are not in Mexico? (Who was the guy they
kidnapped???) B) I'm goign to assume that not all
hackers are equally difficult to track down
In order to compete with an online foe,
cartels will likely continue counter tactics they are
most familiar with, brute force. Cartels are still
capable of their HUMINT operations within Mexico
"still"? why would we assume they wouldn't be?.
Individuals with alleged connections to hacker
communities will likely be targeted and interrogated
by cartel members. Narco banners and public display
of violence will likely continue to be used to scare
online media into submission i'm not really seeing the
online media-international hacking group connection
here. The cruel manners in which cartels inflict
harm, is something computer hackers have unlikely
encountered before in their life. Whether the fear of
cartel violence softens the confidence of Anonymous
will remain to be seen until cartels are able to seek
out and capture members of the hacker group.. Or the
Narcos could call the collective bluff and simply go
on and shrug off any inconvenience that Anon can
inflict.
--
Marc Lanthemann
Watch Officer
STRATFOR
+1 609-865-5782
www.stratfor.com
--
Colby Martin
Tactical Analyst
colby.martin@stratfor.com
--
Sean Noonan
Tactical Analyst
Office: +1 512-279-9479
Mobile: +1 512-758-5967
Strategic Forecasting, Inc.
www.stratfor.com
--
Sean Noonan
Tactical Analyst
Office: +1 512-279-9479
Mobile: +1 512-758-5967
Strategic Forecasting, Inc.
www.stratfor.com
--
Sean Noonan
Tactical Analyst
Office: +1 512-279-9479
Mobile: +1 512-758-5967
Strategic Forecasting, Inc.
www.stratfor.com