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# The Global Intelligence Files

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

## Re: [CT] FW: Guidance on the leaks

Released on 2012-02-28 15:00 GMT

Email-ID | 402168
Date | 2010-07-26 20:52:03
From | burton@stratfor.com
To | gfriedman@stratfor.com, ct@stratfor.com, colby.martin@stratfor.com

We probably asked the ASIS to monitor Wiki coms and email, after the
soldier from Potomac was nabbed. So, its reasonable to assume we probably
already know who has done it.
The delay could be figuring out how to declassify and use the Aussie intel
on Wiki.
Wiki holding on to other docs is to protect their sources.
The owner is a peacenik. He needs his head dunked in a full toilet bowl at
Gitmo.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Colby Martin <colby.martin@stratfor.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 2010 13:47:38 -0500 (CDT)
To: <burton@stratfor.com>; CT AOR<ct@stratfor.com>
Subject: Re: [CT] FW: Guidance on the leaks
Sorry if this has been seen but it is a good article and goes with what we are
saying.
WikiLeaks' Afghan Documents and Me
http://motherjones.com/mojo/2010/07/wikileaks-afghan-documents-and-me-source
a** By Adam Weinstein
| Sun Jul. 25, 2010 10:28 PM PDT
a** Flickr/ Jabber1990 (Creative Commons)
[For more on the WikiLeaks Afghan document dump, read posts by Kevin Drum
here and senior editor Dave Gilson here.]
Here's a cliche for you: A little knowledge is a dangerous thing. And
here's a fact: A little knowledge is precisely what Julian Assange and his
WikiLeaks cohorts have given us in the "Afghan War Diary." The intimation
by Assange (and the media outlets he cherry-picked to preview the data) is
that these are the Pentagon Papers of the Afghan war. Certainly there are
a few eyebrow-raising details in the bunch, as Mark Mazzetti, Chris
Chivers & Co. at the New York Times point out. But in truth, there's not
much there. I know, because I've seen many of these reports beforea**at
least, thousands of similar ones from Iraq, when I was a contractor there
last year.
I haven't been through everything yet, but most of what you see on
WikiLeaks are military SIGACTS (significant activity reports). These are
theoretically accessible by anyone in Iraq, Afghanistan, or the Tampa,
Florida-based US Central Commanda**soldiers and contractorsa**who have
access to the military's most basic intranet for sensitive data, the
Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet). Literally thousands of
people in hundreds of locations could read them, and any one of them could
be the source for WikiLeaks' data. I regularly went through the daily
SIGACT reports in Iraq, not because my job required it, but because my
colleagues and I were curious. We heard mortars or car bombs explode in
the distance at night, and we couldn't help but wonder: What the hell was
that? Every time a US unit engaged the enemy, encountered munitions, saw
or heard something go boom, caught a criminal, or located a weapons cache,
a report was filed. So, each morning when I entered my office on Camp
Victory, I fired up my SIPR terminal and checked the SIGACTS for
interesting stuff.
The first time I did it, my pupils dilated. A vein in my throat warmed.
The reporter in me did backflips. I was about to breathe pure oxygen.
By day three or four, I was bored to tears. Here's what I learned:
Some SIGACTS are more detailed than others; most are mundane. Only a few
in WikiLeaks' bunch fall in the former category. For example, an October
2009 missive provides harrowing details of a battle in which Combat
Outpost Keating was overrun by Taliban fighters; Chivers at the NYT did an
amazing job of reconstructing that terrible massacre, in which eight US
soldiers died and 23 were wounded. But most SIGACTS are much more
routine-sounding; for instance, the Battle of Wanat on July 13, 2008, was
actually the deadliest battle of the war for US forces so far, and a
source of major controversy. Yet its secret report sounds dull by
comparison.
Probably the most significant thing about the SIGACTS is that they're
counted and graphed by the military as a metric of how we're doing, and
the obvious thing about the Afghan War Diary is that there are tons more
entries for recent months in 2008 and 2009 than there were in previous
months through the war. That's also a function of numbers of US and
coalition forces; just as crime goes up when you put more cops on the
street, SIGACTS probably should go up when you put more boots on the
ground. And bear in mind, it's not an apples-to-apples comparison; more
SIGACTS may mean more good things, like arrests and caches found, rather
than civilian and coalition casualties. Even so, the most recent numbers
are pretty sobering.
There are two categories of data in the WikiLeaks files that could be
really interestinga**and could cause some serious repercussions. One is
the military's FRAGOs, fragmentary orders. These are strategic directives
from headquarter to junior military commands in the field, and they cover
pretty much everythinga**from orders on how to deal with detainees to an
on-base visit by the wrestling stars of WWE. WikiLeaks provides a log of
these FRAGOs, but doesn't have the orders themselves. It's a great
bibliographic resource for reporters with time on their hands to file a
FOIA request for the actual orders. But in the meantime, it's not much by
itself.
The other interesting data are notes from what the military calls
KLEsa**key leader engagements. Military officers, as well as officials
from State, USAID, and other agencies regularly meet with important
players in a war zone to get their take on the situation. Often they're
dull and tell the interviewers little they didn't already know; sometimes,
though, they give insight to "atmospherics"a**how Afghan locals feel about
US forces or the Taliban. Many of these key leaders take their lives into
their hands; from my experience in Iraq, I know that numerous Shiites,
Sunnis and Kurds with high standing among their tribesa**and among our
enemiesa**took time to brief US officials, often to dish dirt on crooked
or violent elements in their vicinity. If they were ever outed as
collaborators with American forces, they'd be as good as dead. And
Wikileaks has 16 pages of secret military KLEs with individuals and groups
in Afghanistan, spanning six years. No names are redacted. In this case,
what retired general James Jones, the White House national security
adviser, said yesterday is correct: WL is putting some lives at serious
risk with that particular data dump.
I'll keep running through to see if there's anything else of importance.
But most of this information is tactical nuts and bolts, devoid of
context, and largely useless for a war narrative; what would be far more
valuable than this stuff is the strategic/political data: military info
that's TOP SECRET or above, which I haven't seen yet; or stuff from the
State Department or provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). (One
interesting item: A November 2006 report on the WL site suggests that at
least one PRTa**a team of anthropologists, political and developmental
specialists, and soldiers sent out to assist local Afghans in rebuilding
their nationa**engaged in propaganda, feeding broadcast information to
local radio stations. It's not exactly damning, but it doesn't quite jibe
with the PRTs' benevolent mission statement, either.)
By and large, like most of the stunts pulled by Assange, this one's long
on heat and short on light, nothing you didn't already know if you were
paying attention to our wars. (And to the extent that you weren't, well, I
guess the leak is on the whole a good thing.) For the best color
commentary on this document dump, check out the very succinct analysis of
Abu Muqawama at the Center for a New American Security. He pretty much
says it all.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Fred Burton" <burton@stratfor.com>
To: "CT AOR" <ct@stratfor.com>
Sent: Monday, July 26, 2010 1:23:16 PM
Subject: Re: [CT] FW: Guidance on the leaks
Stick and I could find the suspect in 3 days.
-----Original Message-----
From: Fred Burton <burton@stratfor.com>
Sender: ct-bounces@stratfor.com
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 2010 12:47:07
To: CT AOR<ct@stratfor.com>
Reply-To: CT AOR <ct@stratfor.com>
Subject: Re: [CT] FW: Guidance on the leaks
The first is an excerpt from an intelligence summary probably sent to
thousands; the second appears to be a DIA report, but could also be a
retransmitted CIA document possibly through DIA reports, based on the
the way the names are bracketed w/the ((. The brackets around the names
goes back to the old days, when this denoted that the names should be
cataloged on index cards by the ladies back home.
Matthew Powers wrote
> Attached are the only two reports that I have been able to find so far
> that deal with Gul. These are both classified secret. I am still
> trying to figure out who would have produced them, but wanted to post
> them in case someone here would know.
>
> MAGNETIC IED THREAT IN KABUL
> Organization(s) Involved: OPPOSING MILITANT FORCES
> 31 DEC 2006, CJTF-76 INTSUM, NIS
> 20061231-RC-C G2 -N/I S
> IED THREAT WARN - RC-C, KABUL, SIED & RCIED (MAGNETIC MINES), 30 DEC - 1
> JAN 07
> Importance: High
> Classification: NATO/ISAF SECRET
> FYI. Extract from:
> CJTF-76 Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE)
> CJTF-76 Air Support Operations Center (ASOC)
> Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan
> INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
> 30 Dec 06
> (290300Z Dec 06 - 300259Z Dec 06)
> Country-Wide Threats:
> (N/I R) On approximately 17 December 2006, following a meeting between
> senior members of the TALIBAN leadership in NOWSHAHRA, Pakistan
> (GEOCOORD NOT AVAILABLE), which included General Hamid GUL, the former
> Chief of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate of Pakistan.
> During this meeting GUL claimed he dispatched three unidentified
> individuals to KABUL City (GEOCOORD: 42S WD 15172 19937) to carry out
> IED attacks during the Eid celebration. GUL instructed two of the
> individuals to plant IEDs along the roads frequently utilized by
> Government of Afghanistan (GOA) and ISAF vehicles. The third individual
> is to carry out a suicide attack utilizing a suicide vest against GOA or
> ISAF entities. Reportedly GULs final comment to the three
> individuals was make the snow warm in KABUL, basically telling them to
> set KABUL aflame.
> (N/I R) The three individuals traveled from SOROBI (GEOCOORD: 42S WD
> 6817430407), SOROBI District KABUL Province to their current location in
> the MUSAYI District, KABUL Province, (GEOCOORD NOT AVAILABLE) NFI. The
> two individuals tasked with planting the IEDs will employ two types of
> IEDs, these being remotely detonated IEDs and a supposedly new Chinese
> made magnetic mine. The three individuals tasked with conducting these
> attacks will be assisted in entering KABUL City by a group of five
> unidentified individuals, described as a KABUL Province criminal gang
> that is associated with General AMANULLAH GOUZAR, the current KABUL City
> Chief of Police.
> (N/I R) The Chinese made magnetic mines were described as a metal plate
> with a magnet attached to one side and the explosives to the other. The
> mines are to be planted on roads frequently used by ISAF and GOA forces
> throughout KABUL, utilizing the snow as camouflage. Reportedly, once a
> vehicle drives over the camouflaged plated mine the magnetic side will
> attach itself to the passing vehicle. As the vehicle departs the area
> one of the unidentified individuals acting as a spotter will contact the
> second individual, who will be located on higher ground overlooking the
> road, via a cellular phone notifying him the package was picked up. In
> addition, the spotter will also relay the vehicle description to include
> its license plate number or vehicle description. Once the second
> individual receives this information and observes the vehicle he will
> then remotely detonate the mine. GUL reportedly has received
> approximately 50 of these mines in order for them to carry out their
> operation.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> INS MEET TO PLAN AN SVBIED ATTACK
> Organization(s) Involved: FOREIGN FIGHTERS,INTER-SERVICES INTELLIGENCE
> DIRECTORATE,OPPOSING MILITANT FORCES
> 14 JAN 2009, TF CASTLE INTSUM 4311, NSI
>
> (SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) AAF MOVE BLUE JINGLE TRUCK VBIED TO
> SAROBI DISTRICT
>
> ON 5 JANUARY 2009, FROM 2100 TO 2300 HOURS LOCAL TIME, AAF COMMANDERS
> ((NAZIR)), ((HALLIMULLAH)), ((MALANG)) BASED IN WANA, SOUTH WAZIRISTAN
> AGENCY (SWA), FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS (FATA), PAKISTAN, HELD
> A MEETING TO DISCUSS THEIR PLANS TO AVENGE THE DEATH OF ZAMARAI. THE
> MEETING WAS CONDUCTED AT THE RESIDENCE OF HAJI ((YACOUB)) IN WANA. ALSO
> IN ATTENDANCE WERE THREE UNIDENTIFIED OLDER ARAB MALES, WHO WERE
> CONSIDERED IMPORTANT. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE ARABS WERE BELIEVED TO BE
> IMPORTANT BECAUSE THEY HAD A LARGE SECURITY CONTINGENT WITH THEM.) AT
> LEAST ONE OF THE THREE UNIDENTIFIED ARABS IN ATTENDANCE WAS PROFICIENT
> IN THE PASHTUN LANGUAGE AND THE ARABS WERE ACCOMPANIED BY APPROXIMATELY
> 20 ARAB BODYGUARDS. ((HAMID GUL)), A FORMER MEMBER OF PAKISTAN'S
> INTER-SERVICES INTELLIGENCE (ISI), WAS IN ATTENDANCE AT THE MEETING
> ALSO. HAMID GUL WAS DESCRIBED AS BEING AN OLDER MAN AND A VERY
> IMPORTANT PERSON FROM ISI. (COMMENT: HAMID GUL WAS DIRECTOR GENERAL OF
> ISI FROM 1987-1989 AND, ACCORDING TO ISI, HAS NOT BEEN AN OFFICIAL WITH
> ISI SINCE THAT TIME. IT WAS NOT KNOWN WHETHER HAMID GUL WAS ACTING WITH
> THE KNOWLEDGE OR CONSENT OF ISI, OR WHETHER ANY PORTIONS OF ISI WERE
> AWARE OF HIS ACTIVITIES.)
> THE MEETING ATTENDEES WERE SADDENED BY THE NEWS OF ZAMARAI'S DEATH AND
> DISCUSSED PLANS TO COMPLETE ZAMARAI'S LAST MISSION BY FACILITATING THE
> MOVEMENT OF A SUICIDE VEHICLE-BORNE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (SVBIED)
> FROM PAKISTAN TO AFGHANISTAN THROUGH THE KHAN PASS, VARIANT: KHAND
> PASS. (COMMENT: THE KHAN PASS IS LOCATED IN SWA AND HAS BEEN
> FREQUENTLY USED BY AAF AND ARAB FORCES IN THE PAST.) THE SVBIED WAS
> DESCRIBED AS A DARK BLUE MAZDA JINGA TRUCK WITH A GRAYISH WHITE HOOD.
> AS OF 3 JANUARY, THE SVBIED WAS LOCATED IN AZAM WARSAK, SWA. DURING THE
> MEETING, THE ATTENDEES FORMULATED THE PLAN TO MOVE THE SVBIED, DRIVEN BY
> AN UNIDENTIFIED ARAB, ON 10 JANUARY 2009 THROUGH THE KHAN PASS. THE
> MILITANTS PLANNED TO TARGET SAROBI, AFGHANISTAN, WITH THE SVBIED.
> (COMMENT: SAROBI IS LIKELY A REFERENCE TO SAROBI DISTRICT, PAKTIKA
> PROVINCE.) HAMID GUL ENCOURAGED THE AAF LEADERS TO FOCUS THEIR OPERATION
> INSIDE OF AFGHANISTAN IN EXCHANGE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN'S
> SECURITY FORCES TURNING A BLIND EYE TO THE PRESENCE OF AAF COMMANDERS
> AND FIGHTERS IN PAKISTAN (NFI). ADDITIONALLY, THE AAF LEADERS APPROVED
> A PLAN TO SEND 50 ARAB AND 50 WAZIRI FIGHTERS TO GHAZNI PROVINCE,
> AFGHANISTAN IN EARLY FEBRUARY 2009. ACCORDING TO HAMID GUL, THE AERIAL
> THREATS IN THE AREA WERE CONTROLLED FROM THE AIRPORT IN WANA.
>
>
> scott stewart wrote:
>>
>> Thanks. Matt Powers from Research is working it too.
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* ct-bounces@stratfor.com [mailto:ct-bounces@stratfor.com] *On
>> Behalf Of *Ryan Abbey
>> *Sent:* Monday, July 26, 2010 1:26 PM
>> *To:* CT AOR
>> *Subject:* Re: [CT] FW: Guidance on the leaks
>>
>>
>>
>> On it.
>>
>>
------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> *From: *"scott stewart" <scott.stewart@stratfor.com>
>> *To: *"CT AOR" <ct@stratfor.com>
>> *Sent: *Monday, July 26, 2010 1:16:40 PM
>> *Subject: *[CT] FW: Guidance on the leaks
>>
>> Ryan and Colby,
>>
>>
>> Can you guys please look into this?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* scott stewart [mailto:scott.stewart@stratfor.com]
>> *Sent:* Monday, July 26, 2010 1:15 PM
>> *To:* 'Analyst List'
>> *Cc:* 'CT AOR'
>> *Subject:* RE: Guidance on the leaks
>>
>>
>>
>> Yes, it would be good to know where the information on Gul came from.
>>
>>
>>
>> Ia**ll get some people on it.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* analysts-bounces@stratfor.com
>> [mailto:analysts-bounces@stratfor.com] *On Behalf Of *George Friedman
>> *Sent:* Monday, July 26, 2010 1:09 PM
>> *To:* analysts@stratfor.com
>> *Subject:* Guidance on the leaks
>>
>>
>>
>> There was a huge amount of low level information in the leaks. It was
>> overwhelmingly low level tactical reports and trivia.
>>
>> There was one thing in them that wasn't. That was the stuff that
>> concerned ISI operations in Afghanistan as well as memos on
>> conversations between senior U.S. officials and Pakistani officials.
>> That stuff had much higher clearance and ought not have been in
>> databases containing after-action reports by small units. The ISI is
>> technically friendly intelligence agency and the discussion of their
>> covert operations in Afghanistan potentially reveals sources and
>> methods that are tightly compartmentalized, if for no other reason
>> than to keep the political fallout for a minimum.
>>
>> As in any intelligence dump, I'm not interested in 99 percent of the
>> stuff. It is this 1 percent that interests me for two reasons.
>> First, it should not have resided in the same database as the other
>> stuff. Second, very few people should have clearance to both
>> databases on a need to know basis. In other words, the person with
>> access to the ISI file might have clearance to tactical combat
>> reports, but normally he would be noticed accessing them.
>>
>> Regardless of classification, all systems have document tracking and
>> basic usage warnings. If someone were to access all of these
>> documents, he would be noticed. So the issue is first, what was the
>> ISI file doing mingled with tactical intelligence and who who would
>> have the ability and need to access both, because at this level of
>> usage, he would be noticed.
>>
>> In a case like this, you ignore the 99 percent. You focus on the 1
>> percent that shouldn't have been buried.
>>
>> I need someone to search what is available for information on ISI and
>> Gul. See what you can find. I am going to hold the Weekly until this
>> is done.
>>
>> --
>>
>> George Friedman
>>
>> Founder and CEO
>>
>> Stratfor
>>
>> 700 Lavaca Street
>>
>> Suite 900
>>
>> Austin, Texas 78701
>>
>>
>>
>> Phone 512-744-4319
>>
>> Fax 512-744-4334
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Ryan Abbey
>> Tactical Intern
>> Stratfor
>> ryan.abbey@stratfor.com
>>
>
> --
> Matthew Powers
> STRATFOR Research ADP
> Matthew.Powers@stratfor.com
>