The Global Intelligence Files,
files released so far...
2569
The Global Intelligence Files

### Index pages

List of Releases

### by Date of Document

unspecified
2001
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

### by Date of Release

2001-03-13
2010-03-10
2011-03-05
2011-03-15
2012-01-29
2012-02-27
2012-02-28
2012-02-29
2012-03-01
2012-03-02
2012-03-03
2012-03-04
2012-03-05
2012-03-06
2012-03-07
2012-03-08
2012-03-09
2012-03-10
2012-03-11
2012-03-12
2012-03-13
2012-03-14
2012-03-15
2012-03-16
2012-03-17
2012-03-19
2012-03-20
2012-03-23
2012-03-25
2012-03-26
2012-03-27
2012-04-01
2012-04-02
2012-04-24
2012-04-26
2012-04-30
2012-05-10
2012-06-18
2012-06-20
2012-07-01
2012-07-24
2012-07-28
2012-07-29
2012-07-30
2012-07-31
2012-08-01
2012-08-02
2012-08-05
2012-08-06
2012-08-07
2012-08-08
2012-08-09
2012-08-10
2012-08-11
2012-08-12
2012-08-13
2012-08-14
2012-08-15
2012-08-16
2012-08-17
2012-08-18
2012-08-19
2012-08-20
2012-08-21
2012-08-22
2012-08-23
2012-08-24
2012-08-25
2012-08-26
2012-08-27
2012-08-29
2012-08-30
2012-08-31
2012-09-01
2012-09-02
2012-09-03
2012-09-04
2012-09-05
2012-09-06
2012-09-07
2012-09-09
2012-09-10

### Our Partners

ABC Color - Paraguay
Al Akhbar - Lebanon
Al Masry Al Youm - Egypt
Asia Sentinel - Hong Kong
Bivol - Bulgaria
Carta Capital - Brazil
CIPER - Chile
Dawn Media - Pakistan
L'Espresso - Italy
La Repubblica - Italy
La Jornada - Mexico
La Nacion - Costa Rica
Malaysia Today - Malaysia
McClatchy - United States
Nawaat - Tunisia
NDR/ARD - Germany
Owni - France
Pagina 12 - Argentina
Philip Dorling - Fairfax media contributor - Australia
Plaza Publica - Guatemala
Publica - Brazil
Publico.es - Spain
Rolling Stone - United States
Russian Reporter - Russia
Ta Nea - Greece
Taraf - Turkey
The Hindu - India
The Yes Men - Bhopal Activists
Sunday Star-Times - New Zealand

### Community resources

Supporters Support Wikileaks Follow us on Twitter Twitter this Follow us on Facebook

courage is contagious

# The Global Intelligence Files

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

## FOR EDIT - CAT 3 - RUSSIA/SERBIA: ICJ Opinion and Russia's Win-Win Scenario

Released on 2012-08-18 22:00 GMT

Email-ID | 1818838
Date | 2010-07-19 21:17:07
From | marko.papic@stratfor.com
To | analysts@stratfor.com

On July 22nd at 15:00 local time in The Hague the UN International Court
of Justice (ICJ) will present its advisory opinion on the legality of
Kosovo's February 2008 unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) from
Serbia. (LINK:
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/serbia_kosovo_declares_independence) The
opinion will not be legally binding -- it is an advisory opinion requested
by the General Assembly of the UN at the behest of Belgrade-- but will in
essence determine whether according to international law Kosovo's
declaration of independence of Kosovo was legal.
Russia, Serbia's main ally on the Kosovo matter, has stated that it hopes
the ICJ ruling will force new talks between Serbs and Kosovars. Speaking
on July 15, Russia's Ambassador to the UN Vitaly Churkin said that Russia
continues to oppose independence of Kosovo and supports Belgrade's line
that Kosovo is a sovereign part of Serbia. However, regardless of the ICJ
opinion, the circumstances surrounding Kosovo's de fact independence
remain unchanged and will not be altered by the ruling of the UN court.
Kosovo is still a de facto Western protectorate with explicit security
guarantees from NATO and Serbia lacks the military capacity to change the
status quo -- or the desire to try to do so in light of its efforts to
become an EU member state.
Regardless of the fact that the status quo is not expected to change,
Moscow stands to benefit no matter what the outcome of the ICJ
deliberations.
KOSOVO AND GEORGIA: Intertwined Crises
Kosovo's UDI came 9 years after the NATO's 1999 war against then
Yugoslavia forced Belgrade to relinquish its physical control over the
province. The stated reasons for NATO's military campaign in 1999 were
atrocities committed by Yugoslav military and paramilitary forces against
the Albanian population of Kosovo. After a long list of wars fought for
the purpose of expanding Belgrade's influence in the Balkans, the West
wanted to eliminate Serbia - and its leader Slobodan Milosevic -- as a
rival in the region for good.
But the underlying geopolitical context was also NATO's evolution from a
regional security grouping with no mandate to act outside of its
membership's immediate defense to an organization with a mandate to keep
order in Europe, and potentially (and ultimatelly eventually) beyond. The
NATO actions in Kosovo had no UN Security Council approval and were
undertaken despite strong Russian (and Chinese) opposition. The precedent
was set for the U.S. and its allies to act without addressing interests of
other fellow UNSC permanent members (as the U.S. would later repeat in the
run up to the 2003 Iraq invasion).
For Russia, NATO's actions in Kosovo were untenable. Since Russia is not
part of NATO - and was in fact the very reason the Alliance existed in the
first place, to defend Western Europe against Soviet invasion -- it
realized that Kosovo established an extraordinary precedent. The Western
Alliance acted as the judge, jury and executioner in a matter of European
security. What more, it did so against a stated Moscow ally, with dubious
evidence and reasoning. But the West did not stop there, 1999 was followed
by NATO expansion into former Soviet sphere in Eastern Europe and the
defeat of a pro-Kremlin Ukrainian government. Moscow stopped counting the
number of red lines crossed.
In this context, the 2008 Kosovo UDI was just another in a line of
decisions on European security taken by the West in which Moscow's
protestations were ignored. Russia therefore formulated a response to the
West. (LINK:
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/georgia_and_kosovo_single_intertwined_crisis)
On February 15, 2008 - two days before the Kosovo UDI - Russian foreign
minister Sergei Lavrov met with the Presidents of Georgian breakaway
republics South Ossetia and Abkhazia. After the Moscow meeting the Russian
foreign ministry released a statement stating "The declaration of
sovereignty by Kosovo and its recognition will doubtlessly be taken into
account in [Russia's] relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia." The West
did not heed the warning -- doubting Russia's resolve to respond -- and
Russia used a crisis in August 2008 in Georgia that allowed it to nearly
perfectly parallel West's actions against Serbia. It used supposed
Georgian atrocities against South Ossetians as the reason for a military
intervention that led to Moscow-supported independence of the two
breakaway republics.
RUSSIA AND THE ICJ OPINION
Today Moscow stands to benefit -- at least rhetorically -- no matter what
opinion the ICJ supports. A ruling that the UDI was legal also legitimizes
Russia's support for the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. While
the West has made the legal argument that the Kosovo case is unique and
sets no precedent, the non-Western opinion on the matter (with very few
exceptions) is that it does. In theory it also opens the possibility that
more countries will recognize the two republics as Moscow would have a
case that Kosovo and the two Georgian territories are not different.
However, Moscow does not need South Ossetia and Abkhazia to gain
international recognition for its control of the two provinces to pay
dividends. Moscow already controls the two provinces economically,
politically and militarily and can use them to pressure Georgia - still a
U.S. ally - if need be. Therefore, if the ICJ rules that the UDI was
illegal, Moscow will not fret much about the legal implications. Instead,
it will be able to show that its support for Belgrade has from the
beginning been justified and that the West, led by the U.S., broke
international law by encouraging Kosovo to declare independence
unilaterally and without recourse to the UN Security Council. Moscow will
use the ICJ opinion in that case to show that it has been a supporter of
international law and sanctity of sovereignty.
Kosovo was for Moscow a redline issue in 2008 because it set a precedent
that allowed the West to intervene militarily and redraw European borders
without bothering to ask Russia for its opinion. Russia's 2008 war against
Georgia was the response that Moscow used to counter West's perceived
belligerence. The ICJ opinion - whichever way it goes - is just icing on
the cake.
--
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Marko Papic
Geopol Analyst - Eurasia
STRATFOR
700 Lavaca Street - 900
Austin, Texas
78701 USA
P: + 1-512-744-4094
marko.papic@stratfor.com
--
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Marko Papic
Geopol Analyst - Eurasia
STRATFOR
700 Lavaca Street - 900
Austin, Texas
78701 USA
P: + 1-512-744-4094
marko.papic@stratfor.com