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# The Global Intelligence Files

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

## S-weekly for comment - Mexico and the 90 Percent Myth

Released on 2012-08-22 00:00 GMT

Email-ID | 1704294
Date | 2011-02-08 19:07:06
From | scott.stewart@stratfor.com
To | analysts@stratfor.com
List-Name | analysts@stratfor.com

I was planning on doing a section on the hyped-up VBIED rhetoric, but when
I finished the gun section I saw I was already over 1800 words, so I
decided to do a second piece later on the topic of VBIED hype.
Mexico and the 90 Percent Myth
Related Links:
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexico_dynamics_gun_trade
http://www.stratfor.com/pro/portal/mexico
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101218-mexican-drug-wars-bloodiest-year-date
External link: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09709.pdf
For several years now Stratfor has been closely watching developments in
Mexico that relate to what we consider the [link:
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090218_mexico_third_war ] three wars
being waged there. Those three wars are the war between the various drug
cartels; the war between the government and the cartels and the war being
waged against citizens and businesses by criminals.
In addition to watching the cartel wars develop on the ground tactically
and studying the dynamic of the conflict between the various warring
factions, we have also been paying close attention to the way that the
Mexican and U.S. governments have reacted to these developments. Perhaps
one of the most interesting aspects to watch has been the way in which the
Mexican government has attempted to deflect responsibility for the cartel
wars away from itself and onto the United States. According to this
Mexican narrative, the cartel wars are not a result of corruption in
Mexico or of economic and societal dynamics that leave many Mexicans
marginalized and desperate to find a way to make a living. Instead, the
cartel wars are due to the insatiable American appetite for narcotics and
the endless stream of guns that flows from the United States into Mexico
and that results in Mexican violence.
The part of this Mexican political narrative pertaining to guns has been
adopted by some politicians and government officials in the United States
in recent years. It has now become quite common to hear U.S. officials
confidently note that 90 percent of the illegal guns in Mexico come from
the U.S. However, a close examination of the dynamics of the cartel wars
in Mexico -- and of how the oft-echoed 90 percent number was reached --
clearly demonstrate the number is more political rhetoric than fact.
By the Numbers
As we've discussed in a [link
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090708_mexico_economics_and_arms_trade ]
previous analysis, the 90 percent number was derived from a June 2009 U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report to Congress on U.S. efforts
to combat arms trafficking to Mexico (see the external link).
According to the June 2009 GAO report, some 30,000 firearms were seized
from criminals by Mexican officials in 2008. Of these 30,000 firearms,
information pertaining to 7,200 of them, (24 percent) was submitted to the
U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) for
tracing. Of these 7,200 guns, only about 4,000 could be traced by the ATF,
and of these 4,000, some 3,480 (87 percent) were shown to have come from
the United States.
This means that the 87 percent figure relates to the number of weapons
submitted by the Mexican government to the ATF that could be successfully
traced and not from the total number of weapons seized by the Mexicans or
even from the total number of weapons submitted to the ATF for tracing. In
fact, the 3,480 guns positively traced to the United States equals less
than 12 percent of the total arms seized in Mexico in 2008 and less than
48 percent of all those submitted by the Mexican government to the ATF for
tracing.
In addition to the fact that many of the weapons either do not bear serial
numbers or have had their serial numbers altered or obliterated, it is
important to understand that the Mexican authorities simply don't bother
to submit some classes of weapons to the ATF for tracing. Such weapons
include firearms they identify as coming from their own military or police
forces or that they can trace back themselves as being sold through the
Mexican Defense Department's Arms and Ammunition Marketing Division
(UCAM). Likewise, they do not ask ATF to trace military ordnance from
third countries like the South Korean fragmentation grenades commonly used
in cartel attacks.
This point leads us to consider the types of weapons being used by the
cartels and which types of these weapons can be successfully traced by the
ATF.
Types and Sources of Guns
To gain an understanding of the dynamics of the gun flow inside Mexico, it
helps if one divides the guns seized by Mexican authorities from criminals
into three broad categories -- which, incidentally, just happen to come
from different sources.
The first category of weapons encountered in Mexico is weapons available
legally for sale in Mexico through UCAM. These include handguns smaller
than a .357 magnum such as .380, .38 Super and .38 Special.
Many popular handgun calibers such as 9mm .45 cal, .40 cal handguns are
reserved for the military and police, and are not available for sale to
civilians in Mexico. These guns, which are legally sold and very popular
in the U.S. yet unavailable in Mexico, comprise our second category. This
category also includes.50 caliber rifles, semi-Automatic versions of
assault rifles like the AK-47 and M-16 family, FN Five-Seven pistols, etc.
The third category of weapons encountered in Mexico is military grade
ordnance not generally available for sale within the U.S. or Mexico. This
category includes hand grenades, 40 mm grenades, rocket-propelled
grenades, fully automatic assault rifles and main battle rifles, light
machine guns, etc.
A large portion of the category one guns used by criminals are purchased
in Mexico. While UNAM does have very strict regulations for civilians to
purchase guns, criminals will use straw purchasers to obtain firearms from
UCAM or obtain them from corrupt officials. It is not uncommon to see .38
Super pistols seized from cartel figures and many of these pistols are of
Mexican origin. Likewise, cartel hitmen in Mexico commonly use [link
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexico_applying_protective_intelligence_lens_cartel_war_violence
].380 pistols equipped with suppressors in their assassinations. In many
cases, these pistols are purchased in Mexico, the suppressors are locally
manufactured and the guns adapted to receive them by Mexican gunsmiths.
It must be noted though that due to the cost and hassle of purchasing guns
in Mexico, some of the guns in this category will be purchased in the U.S.
and smuggled into the country. There are a lot of cheap .380's available
on the U.S. market. But still, it is quite unlikely that 90 percent of
these category one guns come from the US.
Additionally, most of the explosives the cartels have been using in
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Mexico over the past year have used
commercially available Tovex and we therefore consider these explosives to
be category one munitions. These IEDs are another area where the rhetoric
has been very interesting to watch,a nd we will explore this topic in a
later analysis.
When we consider the guns in group two, a large number of them are indeed
purchased in the U.S. Although there are many .45 and 9mm pistols and .357
revolvers obtained from deserters from the Mexican military and police,
purchased from corrupt Mexican authorities, or even brought in from South
America (guns manufactured by Taurus, Bersa, etc.) This category also
includes semi automatic variants of assault rifles and main battle rifles
which are oftentimes converted to be capable of full automatic fire by
Mexican gunsmiths.
One can buy these types of weapons on the international arms market, but
one pays a premium for such guns and it is cheaper and easier to simply
buy them in the U.S. or South America and smuggle them into Mexico. In
fact, there is an entire cottage industry that has developed to smuggle
such weapons, and not all the customers are narcos. There are many wealthy
Mexicans who own illegal guns in calibers such as .45, 9mm, .40 and .44
magnum for self-defense. Many Mexicans simply want to own and carry a
large-caliber handgun - even if it is illegal.
The weapons in group three are fairly difficult and very expensive to
obtain in the U.S. (especially in the large numbers in which the cartels
are employing them). They are also dangerous to obtain in the U.S. due to
heavy law enforcement scrutiny. Therefore, most of the military ordnance
used by the Mexican cartels comes from other sources, such as the
international arms market (increasingly from China via the same networks
that furnish precursor chemicals for narcotics manufacturing), or from
corrupt elements in the Mexican military or even deserters who take their
weapons with them. Besides, items such as South Korean fragmentation
grenades and RPG-7's simply are not in the U.S. arsenal. The end result is
that very few of the Category 3 weapons come from the U.S.
In recent years the cartels (especially enforcer groups such as Los Zetas,
Los Negros, and La Linea) have been increasingly using military ordnance
instead of sporting arms. A close examination of the arms seized from
these enforcer groups and their [link
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100517_mexico_security_memo_may_17_2010
] training camps clearly demonstrates this trend toward military ordnance
- including many weapons not readily available in the U.S. Some of these
seizures have included M-60 machineguns and [link
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090330_mexico_security_memo_march_30_2009
] hundreds of .40mm grenades obtained from foreign military arsenals.
There are also some cases of overlap between classes of weapons. For
example, the [link
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20081112_worrying_signs_border_raids ] FN
Five-Seven pistol is available for commercial purchase in the U.S., but
the 5.7 X 28 armor-piercing ammunition for the pistol favored by the
cartels is not - it is a restricted item. However, some of the Special
Forces units in the Mexican military are issued the Five-Seven as well as
the FN P-90 personal defense weapon, which also shoots the 5.7 X 28 round
- and the cartels are obtaining some weapons as well as the armor-piercing
ammunition from them, and not from the U.S. Conversely, we see bulk 5.56
and 7.62 ammunition bought in the U.S. and smuggled into Mexico where it
is used in fully-automatic AKs and M-16s purchased elsewhere. As noted
above, China has become an increasingly common source for military weapons
like grenades and fully automatic assault rifles in recent years.
To really understand Mexico's gun problem, however, it is necessary to
recognize that the same economic law of demand that fuels drug smuggling
into the U.S. also fuels gun smuggling into Mexico. The consequences of
this law dictate that even if it were somehow possible to hermetically
seal the U.S./Mexico border, and shut off all the guns coming from the
U.S., the cartels would still be able to obtain weapons elsewhere - just
as narcotics would continue to flow to the U.S. via other routes. The U.S.
provides cheap and easy access to certain types of weapons but as
demonstrated by groups such as the FARC in Colombia, weapons can be easily
obtained from other places via the black arms market -- albeit at a higher
price.
There has clearly been a long and well-documented history of arms
smuggling across the U.S./Mexico border, but it is also important to
recognize that while the U.S. is a significant source of certain classes
of weapons and ammunition, it is by no means the source of 90 percent of
the weapons used by the cartels.
Scott Stewart
STRATFOR
Office: 814 967 4046
Cell: 814 573 8297
scott.stewart@stratfor.com
www.stratfor.com