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# The Global Intelligence Files

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

## RE: Thoughts on Der Spiegel?

Released on 2012-08-11 00:00 GMT

Email-ID | 1095884
Date | 2010-01-25 19:22:15
From | bokhari@stratfor.com
To | analysts@stratfor.com
List-Name | analysts@stratfor.com

Not saying they are also false but the involvement is exaggerated. There
is no way A-Dogg has control over the nuclear establishment. He has
tremendous amount of influence over it but this is one of those projects
that the Sepah have control over and the Sepah go back to the SL.
Daneshjoo is an A-Dogg man and therefore is unlikely to be that
influential. Same thing with Fakhrizadeh. The article or the intelligence
it is based on is over privileging his role over an entire and complex
establishment.
From: analysts-bounces@stratfor.com [mailto:analysts-bounces@stratfor.com]
On Behalf Of Reva Bhalla
Sent: January-25-10 1:14 PM
To: Analyst List
Subject: Re: Thoughts on Der Spiegel?
well we really have no way of determining Daneshjoo's or Fakhrizadeh's
exact involvement in the program. doesn't mean the claims in the article
are necessarily false
On Jan 25, 2010, at 12:10 PM, Kamran Bokhari wrote:
This article has some oddities. First Kamran Daneshjoo is an A-Dogg ally
and thus hasn't been around for a long time. Until recently he was EC
chief. The nuclear establishment is very large. Between the AEO, SNSC,
IRGC, the SL's office, Majlis' Nat'l Security and Foreign Policy
Committee, he doesn't stand a chance to be a key player. The Defense
Ministry has an input into the nuclear establishment but it is one of many
players. The other guy, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who is an IRGC officer
(unknown rank) and is a nuclear physicist is also an obscure guy. It also
seems like the article uses Asgari and Amiri's involvement to rattle the
Iranian chain as they have been concerned about it.
From: analysts-bounces@stratfor.com
[mailto:analysts-bounces@stratfor.com] On Behalf Of Reva Bhalla
Sent: January-25-10 12:42 PM
To: Analyst List
Subject: Thoughts on Der Spiegel?
Any thoughts on Der Spiegel as an outlet for Mossad or any other
intelligence agencies? Have we seen examples of this in the past? They
have some insane detail here (read the second half) where they claim
they've got all this access to a classified doc on Iran's nuclear weapons
program
01/25/2010
The Secret Nuclear Dossier
Intelligence from Tehran Elevates Concern in the West
By Dieter Bednarz, Erich Follath and Holger Stark
The West has long been suspicous of Iran's nuclear program. SPIEGEL has
obtained new documents on secret tests and leadership structures that call
into question Tehran's claims to be exclusively interested in the peaceful
use of the technology.
It was probably the last attempt to defuse the nuclear dispute with Tehran
without having to turn to dramatic new sanctions or military action. The
plan, devised at the White House in October, had Russian and Chinese
support and came with the seal of approval of the US president. It was
clearly a Barack Obama operation.
Under the plan, Iran would send a large share of its low enriched uranium
abroad, all at once, for a period of one year, receiving internationally
monitored quantities of nuclear fuel elements in return. It was a deal
that provided benefits for all sides. The Iranians would have enough
material for what they claim is their civilian nuclear program, as well as
for scientific experiments, and the world could be assured that Tehran
would not be left with enough fissile material for its secret domestic
uranium enrichment program -- and for what the West assumes is the
building of a nuclear bomb.
PHOTO GALLERY
. <image001.jpg>
. <image002.jpg>
. <image003.jpg>
3 Photos
Photo Gallery: Iran's Nuclear Program
Tehran's leaders initially agreed to the proposal "in principle." But for
weeks they put off the international community with vague allusions to a
"final response," and when that response finally materialized, it came in
the form of a "counter-proposal." Under this proposal, Tehran insisted
that the exchange could not take place all at once, but only in stages,
and that the material would not be sent abroad. Instead, Tehran wanted the
exchange to take place in Iran.
Once again, the Iranian leadership has rebuffed the West with phony
promises of its willingness to compromise. The government in Tehran
officially rejected the nuclear exchange plan last Tuesday. To make
matters worse, after the West's discovery of a secret uranium enrichment
plant near Qom, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad defiantly announced that he
would never give in, and in fact would build 10 more enrichment plants
instead.
Highly Volatile Material
But officials in Washington and European capitals are currently not as
concerned about these cocky, unrealistic announcements as they are about
intelligence reports based on sources within Iran and information from
high-ranking defectors. The new information, say American experts, will
likely prompt the US government to reassess the risks coming from the
mullah-controlled country in the coming days and raise the alarm level
from yellow to red. Skeptics who in the past, sometimes justifiably so,
treated alarmist reports as Israeli propaganda, are also extremely
worried. They include the experts from the United Nations International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), whose goal is prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons.
After an extensive internal investigation, IAEA officials concluded that a
computer obtained from Iran years ago contains highly volatile material.
The laptop reached the Americans through Germany's foreign intelligence
agency, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), and was then passed on to the
IAEA in Vienna.
Reports by Ali Reza Asgari, Iran's former deputy defense minister who
managed to defect to the United States, where he was given a new identity,
proved to be just as informative. Nuclear scientist Shahram Amiri, who
"disappeared" during a pilgrimage to Mecca in June 2009, is also believed
to have particularly valuable information. The Iranian authorities accused
Saudi Arabia and the United States of kidnapping the expert, but it is
more likely that he defected.
Iran's government has come under pressure as a result of the new charges.
They center on the question of who exactly is responsible for the
country's nuclear program -- and what this says about its true nature. The
government has consistently told the IAEA that the only agency involved in
uranium enrichment is the National Energy Council, and that its work was
exclusively dedicated to the peaceful use of the technology.
But if the claims are true that have been made in an intelligence dossier
currently under review in diplomatic circles in Washington, Vienna, Tel
Aviv and Berlin, portions of which SPIEGEL has obtained, this is a
half-truth at best.
According to the classified document, there is a secret military branch of
Iran's nuclear research program that answers to the Defense Ministry and
has clandestine structures. The officials who have read the dossier
conclude that the government in Tehran is serious about developing a bomb,
and that its plans are well advanced. There are two names that appear
again and again in the documents, particularly in connection with the
secret weapons program: Kamran Daneshjoo and Mohsen Fakhrizadeh.
Secret Heart of Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program
Daneshjoo, 52, Iran's new minister of science, research and technology, is
also responsible for the country's nuclear energy agency, and he is seen
as a close ally of Ahmadinejad. Opposition leaders say he is a hardliner
who was partly responsible for the apparently rigged presidential election
in June. Daneshjoo's biography includes only marginal references to his
possible nuclear expertise. In describing himself, the man with the
steely-gray beard writes that he studied engineering in the British city
of Manchester, and then spent several years working at a Tehran "Center
for Aviation Technology." Western experts believe that this center
developed into a sub-organization of the Defense Ministry known as the
FEDAT, an acronym for the "Department for Expanded High-Technology
Applications" -- the secret heart of Iran's nuclear weapons program. The
head of that organization is Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, 48, an officer in the
Revolutionary Guard and a professor at Tehran's Imam Hossein University.
Western intelligence agencies believe that although the nuclear energy
agency and the FEDAT compete in some areas, they have agreed to a division
of labor on the central issue of nuclear weapons research, with the
nuclear agency primarily supervising uranium enrichment while the FEDAT is
involved in the construction of a nuclear warhead to be used in Iran's
Shahab missiles. Experts believe that Iran's scientists could produce a
primitive, truck-sized version of the bomb this year, but that it would
have to be compressed to a size that would fit into a nuclear warhead to
yield the strategic threat potential that has Israel and the West so
alarmed -- and that they could reach that stage by sometime between 2012
and 2014.
The Iranians are believed to have conducted non-nuclear tests of a
detonating mechanism for a nuclear bomb more than six years ago. The
challenge in the technology is to uniformly ignite the conventional
explosives surrounding the uranium core -- which is needed to produce the
desired chain reaction. It is believed that the test series was conducted
with a warhead encased in aluminum. In other words, everything but the
core was "real." According to the reports, the Tehran engineers used thin
fibers and a measuring circuit board in place of the fissile material.
This enabled them to measure the shock waves and photograph flashes that
simulate the detonation of a nuclear bomb with some degree of accuracy.
The results were apparently so encouraging that the Iranian government has
since classified the technology as "feasible."
SPIEGEL obtained access to a FEDAT organizational chart and a list of the
names of scientists working for the agency. The Vienna-based IAEA also has
these documents, but the Iranian president claims that they are forged and
are being used to discredit his country. After reporting two years ago
that the Iranians had frozen their nuclear weapons research in 2003, the
CIA and other intelligence agencies will probably paint a significantly
more sobering scenario just as the UN Security Council is considering
tougher sanctions against Iran.
Mulling Sanctions
When France assumes the Council's rotating chairmanship in February,
Washington could push for a showdown. While Moscow is not ruling out
additional punitive measures, China, which has negotiated billions in
energy deals with Iran, is more likely to block such measures.
China could, however, approve "smart" sanctions, such as travel
restrictions for senior members of the Revolutionary Guard and nuclear
scientists. Fakhrizadeh is already on a list of officials subject to such
restrictions, and Daneshjoo could well be added in the future.
But the West would presumably be on its own when enforcing sanctions that
would be truly harmful to Iran -- and to its own, profitable trade
relations with Tehran. The most effective trade weapon would be a fuel
embargo. Because of a lack of refinery capacity Iran, which has the
world's second-largest oil reserves, imports almost half of the gasoline
it uses. Sanctions would trigger a sharp rise in the price of gasoline,
inevitably leading to social unrest. Experts are divided over whether it
would be directed against the unpopular regime or if the country's leaders
could once again inflame the Iranian people against the "evil West."
This leaves the military option. Apart from the political consequences and
the possibility of counter-attacks, bombing Iran's nuclear facilities
would be extremely difficult. The nuclear experts have literally buried
themselves and their facilities underground, in locations that would be
virtually impossible to reach with conventional weapons.
While even Israeli experts are skeptical over how much damage bombing the
facilities could do to the nuclear program, the normally levelheaded US
General David Petraeus sounded downright belligerent when asked whether
the Iranian nuclear facilities could be attacked militarily. "Well, they
certainly can be bombed," he said just two weeks ago in Washington.
Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan