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# The Global Intelligence Files

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

## C.I.A. and Pakistan Work Together, but Do So Warily

Released on 2012-08-24 05:00 GMT

Email-ID | 1125785
Date | 2010-02-25 14:38:21
From | hooper@stratfor.com
To | analysts@stratfor.com
List-Name | analysts@stratfor.com

Fwd'ing from the OS list... this is a pretty interesting article profiling
cooperation between the two agencies. Pretty timely in light of all the
arrests the Pakistanis have been helping out with.
C.I.A. and Pakistan Work Together, but Do So Warily
By MARK MAZZETTI and JANE PERLEZ
Published: February 24, 2010
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/25/world/asia/25intel.html?ref=world
The C.I.A. and its Pakistani counterpart, theDirectorate of Inter-Services
Intelligence, have a long and often tormented relationship. And even now,
they are moving warily toward conflicting goals, with each maneuvering to
protect its influence after the shooting stops in Afghanistan.ISLAMABAD,
Pakistan - Inside a secret detention center in an industrial pocket of the
Pakistani capital called I/9, teams of Pakistani and American spies have
kept a watchful eye on a senior Taliban leader captured last month. With
the other eye, they watch each other.
Yet interviews in recent days show how they are working together on
tactical operations, and how far the C.I.A. has extended its extraordinary
secret war beyond the mountainous tribal belt and deep into Pakistan's
sprawling cities.
Beyond the capture of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, C.I.A. operatives
working with the ISI have carried out dozens of raids throughout Pakistan
over the past year, working from bases in the cities of Quetta, Peshawar
and elsewhere, according to Pakistani security officials.
The raids often come after electronic intercepts by American spy
satellites, or tips from Pakistani informants - and the spies from the two
countries then sometimes drive in the same car to pick up their quarry.
Sometimes the teams go on lengthy reconnaissance missions, with the ISI
operatives packing sunscreen and neon glow sticks that allow them to
identify their positions at night.
Successful missions sometimes end with American and Pakistani spies
toasting one another with Johnnie Walker Blue Label whisky, a gift from
the C.I.A.
The C.I.A.'s drone campaign in Pakistan is well known, which is striking
given that this is a covert war. But these on-the-ground activities have
been shrouded in secrecy because the Pakistani government has feared the
public backlash against the close relationship with the Americans.
In strengthening ties to the ISI, the C.I.A. is aligning itself with a
shadowy institution that meddles in domestic politics and has a history of
ties to violent militant groups in the region. A C.I.A. spokesman declined
to comment for this article.
Officials in Washington and Islamabad agree that the relationship between
the two spy services has steadily improved since the low point of the
summer of 2008, when the C.I.A.'s deputy director traveled to Pakistan
to confront ISI officials with communications intercepts indicating that
the ISI was complicit in the bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul,
Afghanistan.
The spy agencies have built trust in part through age-old tactics of
espionage: killing or capturing each other's enemies. A turning point came
last August, when a C.I.A. missile killed the militant leaderBaitullah
Mehsud as he lay on the roof of his compound in South Waziristan, his wife
beside him massaging his back.
Mr. Mehsud for more than a year had been responsible for a wave of terror
attacks in Pakistani cities, and many inside the ISI were puzzled as to
why the United States had not sought to kill him. Some even suspected he
was an American, or Indian, agent.
The drone attack on Mr. Mehsud is part of a joint war against militants in
Pakistan's tribal areas, where C.I.A. drones pound militants from the air
as Pakistani troops fight them on the ground.
And yet for two spy agencies with a long history of mistrust, the
accommodation extends only so far. For instance, when it comes to the
endgame in Afghanistan, where Pakistan hopes to play a significant role as
a power broker, interviews with Pakistani and American intelligence
officials in Islamabad and Washington reveal that the interests of the two
sides remain far apart.
Even as the ISI breaks up a number of Taliban cells, officials in
Islamabad, Washington and Kabul hint that the ISI's goal seems to be to
weaken the Taliban just enough to bring them to the negotiating table, but
leaving them strong enough to represent Pakistani interests in a future
Afghan government.
This contrasts sharply with the American goal of battering the Taliban and
strengthening Kabul's central government and security forces, even if
American officials also recognize that political reconciliation with
elements of the Taliban is likely to be part of any ultimate settlement.
Tensions in the relationship surfaced in the days immediately after Mullah
Baradar's arrest, when the ISI refused to allow C.I.A. officers to
interrogate the Taliban leader. Americans have since been given access to
the detention center. On Wednesday, Pakistani and Afghan officials meeting
in Islamabad said that a deal was being worked out to transfer Mullah
Baradar to Afghan custody, which could allow the Americans unrestrained
access to him.
Besides Mullah Baradar, several Taliban shadow governors and other senior
leaders have been arrested inside Pakistan in recent weeks.
A top American military officer in Afghanistan on Wednesday suggested that
with the arrests, the ISI could be trying to accelerate the timetable for
a negotiated settlement between the Taliban and the Afghan government.
"I don't know if they're pushing anyone to the table, but they are
certainly preparing the meal," the officer said.
In the three decades since the C.I.A. and the ISI teamed up to funnel
weapons to Afghan militias fighting the Soviets, the two spy services have
soldiered though a co-dependent, yet suspicious relationship. C.I.A.
officers in Islamabad rely on the Pakistani spy service for its network of
informants. But they are wary of the ISI's longstanding ties to militants
like the Taliban, which Pakistani spies have seen as a necessary ally to
blunt archrival India's influence in Afghanistan.
In Islamabad, officials are nervous about the intensification of the
C.I.A.'s drone campaign in North Waziristan against the network run
by Sirajuddin Haqqani, whom the ISI for years has used as a force to carry
out missions in Afghanistan that serve Pakistani interests.
C.I.A. officials believe that Mr. Haqqani's group played a role in
the killing of seven Americans in Khost, Afghanistan, in late December,
and since then have carried out more than a dozen drone strikes in the
Haqqani network's enclave in North Waziristan.
The ISI, an institution feared by most Pakistanis, is used to getting its
way. It meddles in domestic politics and in recent months has been
suspected by Western embassies in Islamabad of planting anti-American
stories in Pakistani newspapers.
It has also been criticized in reports by international human rights
organizations of using brutal interrogation tactics against its prisoners,
though the same could certainly be said of the C.I.A. in the period of
2002 to 2004. The annual human rights report of the State Department in
2007 said "there were persistent reports that security forces, including
intelligence services, tortured and abused persons."
The head of the Pakistani military, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, said in a
recent briefing that it was doubtful that a centralized government would
work in post-conflict Afghanistan, making it more important for Pakistan
to continue to influence the Taliban in the years to come.
As a result there remains a belief among American intelligence officials
that Pakistan will never completely abandon the Taliban, and officials
both in Washington and Kabul admit that they are almost completely in the
dark about Pakistan's long-term strategy regarding the Taliban.
"We have a better level of cooperation," said one top American official
who met recently in Islamabad with General Kayani. "How far that goes, I
can't tell yet. We'll know soon whether this is cooperation, or a
stonewall and kind of rope a dope."
--
Chris Farnham
Watch Officer/Beijing Correspondent , STRATFOR
China Mobile: (86) 1581 1579142
Email: chris.farnham@stratfor.com
www.stratfor.com