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## [OS] 2009-#229-Johnson's Russia List

Released on 2012-08-27 00:00 GMT

Email-ID | 655061
Date | 2009-12-16 17:24:01
From | davidjohnson@starpower.net
To | recipient, list, suppressed:
List-Name | os@stratfor.com

Johnson's Russia List
2009-#229
16 December 2009
davidjohnson@starpower.net
A World Security Institute Project
www.worldsecurityinstitute.org
JRL homepage: www.cdi.org/russia/johnson
Support JRL: http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/funding.cfm
Your source for news and analysis since 1996
[Contents:
DJ: If you have been meaning to contribute to Johnson's Russia List
this year please do so now. Enjoy the holidays with JRL! The new
improved user-friendly JRL is coming in the new year.
1. New York Times: Russia=92s Market Reform Architect Dies.
(Yegor Gaidar)
2. www.russiatoday.com: Remembering Russia's =93shock doctor=94
Yegor Gaidar.
3. ITAR-TASS: Russians Angry They Have To Pay For 'Free'
Medical Services.
4. Andrej Krickovic and Steven Weber: Response to JRL 228,
Item #2/Moscow Times: Rebranding Russia=92s Agitprop]
5. Wall Street Journal: Medvedev Removes a Top Police Official.
6. BBC Monitoring: Head of Russian penal service explains
proposed reform.
7. Moscow Times: Fyodor Lukyanov, Tapping Into West=92s
Modernization Reservoir.
8. Paul Goble: Window on Eurasia: In Russia, Political
Anecdotes Point to Changes Ahead.
9. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: BENT ON REFORM. DMITRY MEDVEDEV
EXTENDS THE POLITICAL REFORMS TO RUSSIAN REGIONS.
10. ITAR-TASS: Medvedev Acquires Scholar Backing To His
Position At Climate Conference.
11. BBC Monitoring: Russian TV talk show discusses global
warming, swine flu threats.
12. AP: Beleagured Russian rights activists receive EU's top
human rights award.
13. Bloomberg: Soviet Union Was Safer Than Putin=92s Russia,
Dissidents Say.
14. Rossiyskaya Gazeta: Russian Human Rights Commissioner
Lukin on State of Democratic Institutions.
15. Russia Now: A Voice for Press Freedom in Russia.
(re Mikhail Fedotov)
16. RIA Novosti: Pundit names Russian regions most dangerous
for journalists.
17. Reuters: Muslim revival brings polygamy, camels to Chechnya.
18. RIA Novosti: Russia's economy to reach pre-crisis level
by late 2012.
19. Reuters: POLL-Russian equities set to continue rally in 2010.
20. ITAR-TASS: Russian nanotechnologies head Chubays
launches Internet blog.
21. Moscow Times: Gas Forum to Focus On Gaining Clout.
22. www.foreignpolicy.com: Paper Tiger. Russia's corporate giant
Gazprom inspires anxiety among those who suspect it of doing the
Kremlin's geopolitical dirty work. But changes in the global economy
are threatening to rob the company of its mojo.
23. RIA Novosti: Russia-NATO relations enter new stage - Medvedev.
24. RFE/RL: NATO Chief Urges Russia To Do More In Afghanistan.
25. Moscow Times: Kremlin to Press NATO Chief on Security Pact.
26. Gazeta: RUSSIA TO COVER NATO'S BACK AREAS...
in Afghanistan.
27. Reuters: U.S. shipping more to Afghanistan via Central Asia.
28. Reuters: No plans to sign Russia nuclear deal this week: U.S.
29. www.russiatoday.com: ROAR: =93New START will be more
favorable to Russia=92s interests.=94 (press review)
30. Russia Profile: Alexander Pikaev, Speed Bargaining.
It Took Nine Years to Negotiate START I, But Russian and American
Negotiators Have Just Months to Come Up With a Replacement.
31. Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor: Viktor
Yushchenko=92s Foreign Policy Agenda.
32. BBC Monitoring: Russian cartoon show mocks Ukrainian
leaders, Hillary Clinton.
33. Georgian Times: Georgian Journalists Meet Russian President.
34. Center for American Progress: Moldova at the Crossroads.
The United States Can Help the Country Through This Difficult Period.
35. The Washington Quarterly: David Kramer, Resetting
U.S.-Russian Relations: It Takes Two.]
********
#1
New York Times
December 17, 2009
Russia=92s Market Reform Architect Dies
By ANDREW E. KRAMER
MOSCOW =AD Yegor T. Gaidar, the economist who=20
oversaw the largest-ever transition from=20
Communism to capitalism as the first finance=20
minister of post-Soviet Russia, only to be=20
vilified by his countrymen for the decade of=20
poverty that followed, died on Wednesday, Russian=20
news agencies reported. He was 53 years old.
The cause was likely a blood clot, Interfax=20
reported. The news agency quoted police officials=20
who said Mr. Gaidar had died at his country home=20
in the Odintsovo region outside of Moscow early Wednesday.
Rising to power in a generation that first strove=20
to reform the Soviet Union from within but=20
instead wound up presiding over its collapse, Mr.=20
Gaidar began his career in a branch of the Soviet=20
planning bureaucracy studying possible reforms=20
for the creaking command economy.
But, as finance minister in charge of one of the=20
great blank slates of economic history after the=20
collapse of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gaidar decided=20
to rapidly liberalize prices and begin=20
privatizing state industry, rather than continue=20
gradual reforms of the type he had been studying.
It was a decision he said he never regretted. The=20
changes pushed millions of Russian into a life of=20
penury but also laid the foundation for Russia=92s=20
economic boom during the past decade.
Until the end, Mr. Gaidar remained unapologetic=20
for his role in laying to rest the Communist economic system.
In later academic writing he attributed the=20
collapse not only to the rigidity of the command=20
economy but also to something more prosaic =AD a=20
cyclical downturn in global oil prices in the=20
late 1980s that created an unsustainably large=20
trade deficit for the Soviet Union by crimping=20
revenues from its principal export commodity, crude oil.
=93Generally, economic history of the last 200=20
years at least shows that private property is=20
better, if it doesn=92t touch essential problems of=20
security of the state,=94 Mr. Gaidar said in an=20
interview last year. =93Nothing in Russian recent=20
economic history demonstrates that this is wrong.=94
A man of the Russian elite =AD Mr. Gaidar=92s=20
great-grandfather and grandfather were both=20
famous authors of fairy tales and children=92s=20
stories =AD Mr. Gaidar became minister of economy=20
and finance in November 1991, two months before the Soviet Union collapsed.
His tenure was brief, lasting until February,=20
1992, two months into the new Russia.
But it was long enough to set in motion the=20
economic reforms that dominated the following two decades.
Relying partly on Western advisers, Mr. Gaidar=20
decided on so-called =93shock therapy=94 methods then=20
in vogue for overhauling state-dominated=20
economies, first tested in Latin America.
Mr. Gaidar later served as an acting prime=20
minister before he was dismissed by President Boris N. Yeltsin in late 1992.
By then, it was already clear that austerity=20
measures needed to balance the disastrous late=20
Soviet trade deficits and service the public=20
sector debt were having a huge political impact.
The extreme hardships recalled those of the Great=20
Depression in the United States and wound up=20
thwarting the expectations of rapid improvement=20
in people=92s lives with the introduction of capitalism.
The fallout lingers, darkening many Russians=92=20
perception of both capitalism and democracy and,=20
in turn, easing the consolidation of state power=20
under Vladimir V. Putin, who succeeded Mr.=20
Yeltsin as president and is now prime minister.
After retiring from government, Mr. Gaidar headed=20
a Moscow think tank, the Institute of Economy in Transition, until his deat=
h.
The interplay of economic and political change=20
remained an overarching theme of his academic work.
In his book =93Collapse of an Empire,=94 Mr. Gaidar=20
argued that the Soviet government turned to West=20
European bank lending in the mid-1980s as the=20
value of crude oil exports plunged. That set in=20
play a dynamic that undermined the country even=20
before pro-democracy uprisings began in the=20
former satellite states of eastern Europe.
The Soviets=92 lack of a hard currency reserve led=20
to dependence on Western lending and limited the=20
Kremlin=92s options when nationalist movements=20
broke out. Any forceful response would surely=20
have prompted Western banks and governments to=20
call in their credit lines, which were propping=20
up the Soviet government by allowing food imports.
This balance-of-payments shock also prompted the=20
sweeping privatizations, liberalization of=20
consumer prices and introduction of a convertible=20
currency in the early 1990s =AD measures that=20
ultimately put the Russian economy on a modern footing.
The reforms implemented by Mr. Gaidar, and a=20
later wave of changes he advocated in the wake of=20
the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s,=20
prepared Russia for the oil price collapse last=20
autumn, when strong state reserves cushioned the=20
impact on the balance of payments and propped up the budget.
Mr. Gaidar is survived by a daughter, Maria=20
Gaidar, who works as an aide to a liberal-leaning provincial governor.
********
#2
www.russiatoday.com
December 16, 2009
Remembering Russia's =93shock doctor=94 Yegor Gaidar
By Robert Bridge
Gaidar, the young economic reformer under Boris=20
Yeltsin, was responsible for helping Russia make=20
the painful transition from a planned economy to capitalism.
The titanic implosion of the communist system=20
offered western economists a rare opportunity to=20
watch a planned economy adapt to capitalism and=20
the free market. They really had no idea what to=20
expect from the transition; there were simply too=20
many variables at play in post-Soviet Russia to risk any safe predictions.
At the time, Boris Yeltsin was the president of=20
Russia, a nation that was teetering on the edge=20
of collapse. Unlike his predecessor, Mikhail=20
Gorbachev, who was accused of initiating =93half=20
reforms=94 that left Russian store shelves bare,=20
Yeltsin wanted a rapid transition. He turned to=20
Yegor Gaidar as the man to do it.
=93For Gaidar it was a shock,=94 commented economist=20
Daniel Yergin in 'The Commanding Heights.' =93There=20
was no money in the treasury; there was no gold;=20
there was not even enough grain to get through=20
the winter. It was unclear who was even in charge of the nuclear weapons.=
=94
=93It was clear to me that the country was not=20
functioning,=94 Gaidar commented. =93The economy was=20
not working, and that if nothing were done and if=20
everyone feared that nothing would be done, it=20
would end in catastrophe, even a famine.=94
The smart young reformer =AD who served as Acting=20
Prime Minister from June 15, 1992 until December=20
14, 1992 =AD described the experience of taking=20
control of the Russian economy as =93flying in an=20
airplane and going into the cockpit and finding no one at the controls.=94
Indeed, at the tender age of 35, Gaidar found=20
himself in charge of steering Russia=92s battered=20
economy, bankrupt and corrupt after 70 years of=20
mismanagement. He quickly assembled a team of=20
youthful free-market reformers, among them 36-year-old Anatoly Chubais.
Communist hard-liners, seething from the=20
sidelines, dubbed them the "little boys in pink shorts.=94
Gaidar advocated liberal economic reforms=20
according to the largely untested principle of=20
=93shock therapy,=94 which had every risk of killing,=20
as opposed to rehabilitating, the ailing patient.
His most well-known decision was to abolish price=20
controls regulated by the state as opposed to the=20
=93invisible hand=94 of the market. The immediate=20
result was hyper-inflation across the board.
=93Inflation came 500 percent, 600 percent, 700=20
percent,=94 Grigory Yavlinsky recalled in The=20
Commanding Heights. =93The monies simply went to=20
the ashes, simply to nothing. The population was=20
simply smashed by that hyperinflation, and that=20
undermined all kind of belief in the economic changes.=94
Mikhail Gorbachev, who opposed Gaidar=92s reforms,=20
said in comments carried by the Itar-TASS news=20
agency that he =93personally grieves=94 Gaidar's=20
death. But he also made reference to what he=20
called the shortcomings of his policies.
=93Gaidar went into politics with many hopes but=20
his plan was to (resolve all the problems) in one shot,=94 Gorbachev said.
In a daring move, and with the Communists=20
breathing down their backs in Parliament, the=20
reformers set out to democratize state industries=20
by simply giving them away. In charge of this=20
privatization program was Anatoly Chubais, who=20
advocated giving Russian citizens vouchers that=20
they could use to buy shares in privatized companies.
=93We need millions of property owners, not just a=20
few millionaires,=94 then Russian President Boris=20
Yeltsin said. =93All Russian citizens, workers,=20
pensioners, and small children will be given=20
privatization vouchers worth 10,000 rubles.=94
Gaidar and Chubais knew if they didn't launch=20
privatization by December 9, 1992, when the=20
Congress of People's Deputies was getting=20
together, the Communists would kill the program.=20
They called on western banker, Boris Jordan, to=20
help finance the vast project and find a business to privatize.
The Bolshevik Biscuit Factory, on the outskirts=20
of Moscow, was selected to serve as a litmus test for privatization.
=93We gave managers of their factories and the=20
employees of the factories about 50 percent of=20
the stock in the company,=94 Jordan recalled. =93The=20
balance of the equity would be sold in the public=20
markets through these vouchers. We opened up the=20
first official auction of a Russian company to the public on December 8, 19=
92.=94
Although Gaidar ultimately lost his position as=20
prime minister to Viktor Chernomyrdin, state=20
companies were being bought, and a boisterous=20
trade in vouchers gave birth to a fledgling stock=20
exchange. Things were looking, if not up, then at=20
least not spiralling out of control.
But observers criticize the tactics employed by=20
Gaidar and his reform team as overly ambitious,=20
even reckless. Yet Gaidar's reform succeeded in=20
doing what it was supposed to do: give the first=20
impetus to a free market economy.
=93Gaidar was under remarkable political attack=20
from the first moment,=94 commented Jeffrey Sachs,=20
Harvard professor. =93It wasn't seven days after=20
the start of reform that the head of the=20
Parliament called for the resignation of the government.=94
One unfortunate by-product of Geidar=92s reform=20
initiatives surfaced in the late 1990s when a=20
wave of brutal violence, reminiscent of America=92s=20
1920 gangster era, swept the country.=20
Cold-blooded contract assassinations of business=20
owners and bankers in broad daylight became regular news.
It took years before the painful era of=20
privatization, deregulation and liberalization=20
gave way to a normally functioning market economy.
In 2006, Gaidar fell ill under mysterious=20
circumstances at a book launch in the Irish=20
capital Dublin. He speculated at the time that he=20
might have been poisoned by individuals who hoped=20
to smear Russia=92s image, although doctors found no evidence.
Gaidar, 53, graduated with honors from the Moscow=20
State University, Department of Economic, in=20
1978. He admitted to being strongly influenced by=20
the economic writings of Milton Friedman and=20
Frederick von Hayek, both affiliated with the=20
University of Chicago. Thus, Gaidar and Chubais=20
have been dubbed the =93Chicago boys.=94
America=92s popular =93Chicago School=94 of economics=20
is associated with a particular brand of=20
economics that advocates =93free market=94 support of=20
limited taxation and private sector regulation,=20
but differs from laissez-faire free-market=20
principles in its support of government-regulated monetary policy.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has sent=20
condolences to Yegor Gaidar's family and friends,=20
the Kremlin press service reported on Wednesday.
"An outstanding economist and a statesman, whose=20
name is associated with resolute steps on forming=20
foundations of free market and our country's=20
transition to a radically new path of=20
development, has passed away," Medvedev said in a letter.
Gaidar was a brave, honest, and determined man,=20
who "assumed responsibility for unpopular but=20
essential measures in a period of radical change," the president said.
********
#3
Russians Angry They Have To Pay For 'Free' Medical Services
MOSCOW, December 15 (Itar-Tass) -- Russians are=20
unhappy about the quality of available medical=20
services. Officially, they are free, but in real=20
life even retirees and disabled have to pay. In=20
all, 65 percent of Russians have to spend their=20
earnings on ostensibly free medical treatment.
Here is a story from Olga, a woman resident of Moscow, 40.
"I lost conscience on a street. The ambulance=20
took me to a hospital. I had nothing with me but=20
for the passport and some cash. Before the=20
operation - not a very complicated one and=20
formally, absolutely free - the doctor kindly=20
advised me that my husband who was to bring by=20
medical insurance card should not forget to=20
complement it with 800 dollars. When I replied=20
that my family had no cash to spare at the=20
moment, the lady wearing the snow-white garment=20
yelled: "Why don't you go and borrow? Those=20
patients have no shame at all! And what am I, the=20
anesthesiologist, to do, pay from my own pocket?"
Far from all medics behave this way, of course.
Natalya, 55, an allergologist, the holder of an=20
advanced scientific degree, says, "I cannot take=20
anything but flowers or a box of sweets from my=20
patients. After all, I was brought up in the=20
socialist era. But I am the only black sheep in=20
the family. Colleagues keep casting suspicious=20
looks at me. And you have to constantly seek odd=20
jobs on the side to survive," she said.
It has become a rule for all Russians that in any=20
medical establishment any type of medical=20
treatment, officially covered by the medical=20
insurance, should be paid for, if you want the=20
doctors to do their job right. Or just do it.=20
Those who cannot afford to be sick should better=20
stay healthy, some mass media say with a pinch of=20
grim irony. Judging by medical statistics, even=20
during the seasonal surge of flu and VRDs many=20
Russians prefer to take care of themselves on=20
their own, without going to the doctor, because,=20
they believe, each such visit entails hefty spending.
The fund of mandatory medical insurance promises=20
that by 2011 the health service situation will=20
get better, because the rate of mandatory medical=20
insurance will go up more than 50 percent and=20
doctors will be getting more money. One has to=20
remember, though that the government plans to=20
spend on the health service as much as this year,=20
so no dramatic improvement of the situation is anywhere in sight.
A poll by the non-governmental organization=20
Movement against Poverty has shown that "the=20
people's right to free medical services is=20
subject to wholesale abuse," says the daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta.
More than 50 percent of the respondents are=20
dissatisfied with the quality and availability of=20
medical care. Most of the polled (about 65=20
percent) said they have to "co-finance" free=20
medical services. In most cases they have to give=20
away 1,000-3,000 rubles (35-100 dollars).
"We all pay taxes that are expected to compensate=20
for the cost of treatment provided by the=20
state-run medical establishments. But in reality=20
we have to put up with flagrant or inconspicuous=20
milking of our wallets," the daily quotes the=20
coordinator of the Movement against Poverty,=20
Vitaly Kartamyshev as saying. "For instance, the=20
personnel of medical establishments keep claiming=20
that the mandatory insurance policy does not=20
cover all treatment costs, that there is not=20
enough personnel, that medications, chemical=20
agents and equipment are in short supply and that salaries are meager.
The net effect is "patients have ever less=20
confidence in mandatory medical insurance and=20
prefer to take care of their health on their own,=20
by paying cash, even there where the service should be free under the law."
The Health and Social Development Ministry back=20
last summer declared a war on "pocket money" -=20
the widely-spread unofficial custom of presenting=20
doctors with enveloped cash - either in=20
compensation for successful treatment, or in=20
pre-payment for yet to be provided services,=20
which should be free for all those covered by the=20
mandatory medical insurance system. From now on=20
each written complaint about the extortion of=20
illegal payments at a health service=20
establishment is to be considered within a=20
three-day deadline and handed over to the federal=20
health and social development watchdog for scrutiny.
As far as the state guarantees program are=20
concerned, in 2010 they will stay at the 2009=20
level, which has been insufficient for health=20
service establishments all the way. In the end=20
the health service situation in the country is=20
unlikely to change next year. Already now Russia=20
is way behind the industrialized countries in=20
terms of the health service spending-to-the-GDP=20
ratio. In Eastern Europe nearly 6 percent of the=20
GDP is spent on the health service, in Western=20
Europe, about 9 percent, and in the United=20
States, 14 percent. In Russia, government=20
spending on the health service went up from 2.6=20
percent of the GDP to 2.9 percent in 2006-2008.
As of 2010 the mandatory medical insurance fund=20
is shifting to a new mode of work. Instead of the=20
tax the employers will be paying insurance=20
contributions for their employees. And in one=20
year from now the rate of mandatory medical=20
insurance is to go up 50 percent from 3.1 percent to 5.1 percent.
It will be then that ordinary citizens will be=20
able to feel tangible changes for the better in=20
the quality of available medical services, the=20
chief of the mandatory medical insurance fund,=20
Andrei Yurin, told the government-published=20
Rossiiskaya Gazeta in an interview. Until then=20
most patients will have to wait. It has been=20
decided to keep the insurance rate unchanged due to the crisis.
These days the system of mandatory medical=20
insurance gets an injection of 450 billion=20
rubles. There is a tiny 3,000 rubles a year per=20
each insured person, although the official rate=20
is a little over 4,000 rubles. The rate's=20
increase by 50 percent is expected to change the situation for the better.
The extra money the mandatory medical insurance=20
fund will be getting as a result of the higher=20
rate as of 2011 is to be spent on easing the work=20
pressure on district therapists, on early=20
diagnostics, on comprehensive medical checkups,=20
on medical personnel training and retraining and=20
on purchases of materials for highly-effective diagnostics.
The bribes extortion situation at hospitals is to=20
improve, too, Yurin promised. In the first half=20
of 2009 the system of mandatory medical insurance=20
registered nearly 26,000 complaints from=20
patients, who were denied medical assistance for=20
the simple reason they refused to pay. Medical=20
establishments extort cash because 3,000 rubles a=20
year is not enough to provide qualified treatment, he agrees.
"If a health service establishment starts getting=20
7,000 rubles under the mandatory insurance=20
policy, instead of today' s 3,000 rubles, the=20
situation will be quite different. Extortion will=20
be the first to go," Yurin said with certainty.
"Secondly, the quality of medical assistance will=20
improve. It will be better available. The work=20
pressure on the doctor will ease, and that means=20
that queues will get shorter and new equipment=20
will begin to be introduced," the medical insurance fund chief promised.
********
#4
Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2009
Subject: Response to JRL 228, Item #2/Moscow Times:
Rebranding Russia=92s Agitprop]
From: Andrej Krickovic <akrickovic@gmail.com>
We thank Mr. Pryde, Mr. Fuss and Ms. Mitchell for their piece and
welcome the chance to open up these issues to further discussion and
debate. They make some very valid points about Russia=92s shortcomings
and about the need for change. We also agree that the current PR
efforts to rebrand Russia are misguided on several levels: they
target the wrong people, they are too focused on the past instead of
the future, and they do not recognize that the brand is owned by the
consumers. They try to bombard the audience with a prepackaged
message =AD instead of coaxing the audience to think about Russia in new
ways.
We think that Mr. Pryde, Mr. Fuss and Ms. Mitchell unfairly lump us
together with the stale and contrived =93agitprop=94 approach that Russia
has adopted to image making. We make it very clear in our piece that
you cannot create a brand that is a lie. Branding does not ignore
reality. It helps to shape the perception of a complex and
multifaceted reality that for any country, Russia included, can be
read in many ways (both positive and negative). We make the argument
that re-branding is as much an internal as it is an external process.
It must be based on reality and must reflect real changes for it to
work.
Last week was a particularly hard week for Russia, and reminded us of
the many problems that Russia still faces. However we believe that the
picture of Russia that Pryde, Fuss and Mitchell form is one-sided and
overly state-centric. It focuses on the (admittedly many) shortcomings
of the Russian state ad of governance in the country. But it ignores
the tremendous progress that Russia has made in emerging from
totalitarianism and from reversing the chaos and disintegration that
threatened the country in the 1990s
Russia still faces many challenges and problems. But let=92s not forget
where Russia was 20 or even just 10 years ago. Russia=92s society today
is arguably more open, dynamic and diverse than it has been at any
time in its history. While TV continues to be dominated by the state,
newspapers and internet are open to vibrant debate and criticism.
Savvy entrepreneurs are finding ways to maneuver through the endemic
corruption and bureaucracy of the economy to create wealth and
opportunity. Diversity in all its forms (ethnic, religious, class) is
thriving, as Russians are finding new ways to live together and build
a harmonious and prosperous future.
A country=92s brand reflects more than just the image of a country=92s
state. It also reflects its culture history and people. In some cases
the state may have very little impact on the brand (think Italy or
Australia). We believe that Russian society is where the real action
is and where the three brands we advocate can be formed.
Again we welcome further comments and the chance to discuss these issues.
Best wishes to all!
Andrej Krickovic and Steven Weber
********
#5
Wall Street Journal
December 16, 2009
Medvedev Removes a Top Police Official
By GREGORY L. WHITE and OLGA PADORINA
MOSCOW -- Russian President Dmitry Medvedev=20
removed a senior Moscow police official alleged=20
by Hermitage Capital to be a key figure in=20
criminal probes against the investment fund.
A lawyer for Hermitage, Sergei Magnitsky, died in=20
a Moscow jail last month where he had been held=20
for a year on charges related to that case.
Several top prison officials were removed and=20
disciplined after his death, which shook Russia's=20
business and legal communities. A criminal=20
investigation into his death is under way.
The Kremlin didn't provide any explanation for=20
the removal announced Tuesday. A spokeswoman for=20
the Moscow City Police said the official, Maj.=20
Gen. Anatoly Mikhalkin, tendered his retirement a=20
month ago and that Tuesday's announcement was a formality.
In mid-November, the city's new police chief, who=20
has been installing a team of top officers to=20
replace those he inherited, said Mr. Mikhalkin=20
was to be replaced as part of a normal personnel rotation.
Mr. Mikhalkin, who was head of the tax-crimes=20
unit in the Moscow police department, couldn't be reached to comment.
"This might appear to be the removal of a=20
midlevel official, but it's a serious blow" to=20
corruption, said Kirill Kabanov, head of the=20
National Anti-Corruption Committee, an=20
independent group. "The president is making=20
targeted strikes" in his campaign against corruption, he said.
Hermitage said that Mr. Mikhalkin's signature was=20
on a number of key orders in the criminal probe=20
against the fund and that he supervised the=20
investigator who Hermitage alleges was=20
responsible for a $230 million fraud committed by=20
corrupt officials against the Russian government that the fund says it expo=
sed.
Hermitage alleges that investigators illegally=20
took control of companies that had belonged to=20
the fund and fraudulently won refunds of taxes that Hermitage had paid.
The fund has provided detailed evidence for its=20
allegations to Russian prosecutors and other=20
authorities, but so far there has been no=20
response. Police officials have denied the=20
allegations and say that Hermitage evaded taxes.
Hermitage, founded by U.S.-born William Browder,=20
was one of the largest foreign-portfolio=20
investors in Russia and a frequent defender of=20
the Kremlin until Mr. Browder was denied entry=20
into Russia in 2005. He has been charged with tax evasion, which he denies.
"President Medvedev has taken an important step=20
by going after the people who are directly=20
responsible for the persecution of Sergei=20
Magnitsky and the loss of $230 million in state=20
funds," Mr. Browder said in a statement.
********
#6
BBC Monitoring
Head of Russian penal service explains proposed reform
Ekho Moskvy Radio
December 12, 2009
Aleksandr Reymer, director of the Russian Federal=20
Penal Service (FSIN), was the studio guest on the=20
Dura Lex slot on Gazprom-owned, but editorially=20
independent, Ekho Moskvy radio on 12 December.=20
The programme was presented by Mikhail=20
Barshchevskiy, a lawyer and liberal politician.=20
Topics covered during the interview included=20
various aspects of the proposed reform of FSIN=20
and the death of lawyer Sergey Magnitskiy in police custody.
Aleksandr Reymer was appointed to the post four=20
months ago. Until then he had worked for the=20
Russian Interior Ministry and has the rank of=20
police lieutenant-general. Barshchevskiy described him as a "liberal".
Reform of FSIN
According to Reymer, the Federal Penal Service needs reform.
The key element of the reform of the penal=20
service proposed by FSIN and the Justice Ministry=20
is the separation of prisoners, Reymer said.
He explained: "It is being proposed to separate=20
those who are in prison for the first time, those=20
who are convicted of crimes of medium gravity,=20
and, on the other hand, hardened criminals, who=20
have more than one conviction and who are members=20
or leaders of organized criminal groups."
"Moreover, this separation should be very rigid:=20
the former should be sent to colony settlements=20
that are not guarded but supervised and the=20
latter category should be sent to prisons, while=20
correctional (labour) colonies should be=20
eliminated as an institution altogether," Reymer said.
According to Reymer, prisons should provide work=20
opportunities but work should not be compulsory -=20
i.e. those who want to work should be able to=20
work while in prison. And prisoners' pay should=20
not be below subsistence level, he said.
The presenter said that, on average, every year=20
"about 25,000 people remanded in custody before=20
trial are freed in court". "They wasted their=20
time in custody," he added. "How should one deal with this problem?" he ask=
ed.
Reymer replied: "This year we have had a total of=20
125,648 people in remand centres. And 60,259 of them have been released."
"They include 22,114 people who were released=20
because they were given sentences that do not=20
carry imprisonment or were given suspended=20
sentences. Another 10,500 were released because=20
the length of their sentences was changed. And=20
about 3,000 - 2,776 to be precise - were released=20
because the criminal cases against them were=20
closed and they were acquitted. Well, and another=20
25,000 were released for other reasons. It turns=20
out that 28 per cent are released. And one can=20
say that this figure is the number of people who=20
should not have been kept in detention," Reymer said.
He said FSIN had submitted amendments to the law=20
aimed at improving the situation.
Reymer also said that "more than two-thirds of=20
those currently in Russian prisons are serving=20
sentences for committing grave and particularly grave crimes".
Magnitskiy case
Sergey Magnitskiy, a lawyer who worked for the=20
investment company, Hermitage Capital Management,=20
died in Moscow on 16 November while in police custody.
Magnitsky and his lawyers had filed numerous=20
complaints, including to Prosecutor-General Yuriy=20
Chayka, about his mistreatment in the remand=20
centre and the denial of medical treatment for=20
pancreatitis, a condition which he developed in prison.
Reymer did not give much detail about the=20
Magnitskiy case, saying that the investigation=20
into his death was still under way.
He admitted, though, that there had been=20
violations in the way Sergey Magnitskiy was=20
treated. "The Federal Penal Service has carried=20
out an internal investigation into the death of=20
Magnitskiy... As a result of the internal=20
investigation, we have found violations of=20
internal regulations of the Justice Ministry and=20
FSIN governing the way prisoners and detainees are treated in remand centre=
s."
At the same, he added, "as regards many of the=20
complaints in Sergey Magnitskiy's diary, we have=20
been unable either to confirm or deny them=20
because no proper records were kept".
He added that now the situation had changed.=20
"Records that should have been kept had not been=20
kept, but now they are being kept," he said.
As a result of the internal investigation, Reymer=20
said, several senior officials have lost their=20
jobs, including the head of the FSIN Moscow Directorate, Gen Vladimir Davyd=
ov.
Reymer denied that up to 4,000 people die in=20
Russian remand centres every year. He said that=20
"the figure of 4,000 applies to the system as a=20
whole", not just remand centres.
"As of 1 December 2009, a total of 386 people=20
have died in remand centres, including 43 from TB=20
and 174 from other diseases. Among other causes=20
of death are injuries, suicides etc., in total 169 people," Reymer explaine=
d.
He added that "it turns out that until now no-one=20
has tried to link the death of a person in=20
custody to the medical treatment provided to=20
him". He said he was going to change this state of affairs.
Personnel problems
For many years Reymer worked for the Russian=20
Interior Ministry. Of late the police have come=20
under attack, being accused of brutality,=20
lawlessness and corruption. The presenter asked=20
Reymer what should be done to restore the=20
prestige of the police service in Russia.
According to Reymer, the main problem is=20
personnel. In order to attract a better category=20
of people and eliminate corruption, police=20
officers should be paid five times the amount=20
they are paid now, he said. The current salary of=20
a policeman is R12,000 (about 400 dollars) a=20
month. In Reymer's view, it should be R50,000=20
(about 1,600 dollars) a month. Also, the MVD=20
social provisions, including housing and=20
nurseries, as well as the pension scheme, should be improved.
On the other hand, Reymer said, Interior Ministry=20
personnel can be cut by at least 20 per cent.
Commenting on medical personnel in the penal=20
service, Reymer said FSIN had enough doctors and=20
nurses. He added that FSIN had psychologists=20
working with prisoners, as well as psychologists=20
working with penal service personnel.
Death penalty
Reymer said he was against the death penalty but=20
insisted that those sentenced to life=20
imprisonment for committing particularly grave=20
crimes should serve their sentences in full.
*******
#7
Moscow Times
December 16, 2009
Tapping Into West=92s Modernization Reservoir
By Fyodor Lukyanov
Fyodor Lukyanov is editor of Russia in Global Affairs.
At the beginning of 2008, tensions between Russia=20
and the West increased with each passing month,=20
reaching a peak in August during and after=20
the Russia-Georgia war. That was followed by a=20
state of suspension with both sides unsure about=20
how events would unfold. This year started with a=20
gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine that=20
greatly increased the West=92s distrust of Moscow.=20
That was followed by a gradual relaxation of=20
tensions =AD a =93reset=94 in relations with the=20
administration of U.S. President Barack Obama, a=20
warming of relations with NATO and the European=20
Union, greater cooperation with the West=20
concerning Iran, a flexible approach to Ukraine=20
and a call to avoid a new flare-up over gas shipments.
President Dmitry Medvedev articulated his main=20
foreign policy principles during the=20
state-of-the-nation address in November. He said,=20
=93We must rid ourselves of our exaggerated sense=20
of self-importance.=94 He was equally direct when=20
he said, =93Instead of chaotic action dictated by=20
nostalgia and prejudice, we will carry out an=20
intelligent domestic and foreign policy based on purely pragmatic aims.=94
Medvedev, who is firm in his belief that=20
government policies need to be more =93pragmatic,=94=20
said the effectiveness of foreign policy =93should=20
be judged by a simple criterion: Does it=20
contribute to improving living standards in our=20
country?=94 He ordered the government to =93develop=20
clear criteria for assessing the results of=20
Russia=92s foreign policy =AD one that is designed to=20
meet the challenges of modernization and technological advances.=94
But developing specific criteria for what=20
constitutes =93pragmatic government policies=94 is=20
complicated because the word =93pragmatic=94 has=20
never been clearly defined in political terms. To=20
make matters worse, the word has been overused so=20
much that it has lost much of its meaning.
One passage of his state-of-the-nation address=20
hearkens back to an earlier speech and also sheds=20
some light on Medvedev=92s understanding of=20
pragmatism. He said: =93Our relations with other=20
countries should also be focused on the task of=20
modernizing Russia. =85 We are interested in=20
capital inflows, new technologies and innovative=20
ideas.=94 Further, the president said the results=20
of diplomacy should be reflected =93not only in the=20
form of specific assistance to Russia=92s companies=20
abroad and efforts to promote national commercial=20
brands =85 but it should also be designed to=20
increase the volume of foreign investments we=20
attract and, most important, the influx of new technologies.=94
Likewise, in the =93Go, Russia!=94 article Medvedev=20
said: =93The modernization of Russian democracy and=20
the establishment of a new economy will only be=20
possible if we use the intellectual resources of=20
post-industrial societies. And we should do so=20
without any complexes, openly and pragmatically.=94
There seems to be nothing new in these=20
statements, and yet their tone differs from what=20
we are accustomed to hearing from Russia=92s=20
leaders in the post-Soviet period. The task from=20
the early 1990s until only recently has been the=20
integration of Russia into the international=20
community of developed countries. The perception=20
of the conditions for this integration varied=20
because Russia itself was changing. In the=20
mid-1990s, Russia was overly eager to join=20
Western institutions on their terms and=20
conditions. And although Moscow=92s policy toward=20
the West changed significantly during Vladimir=20
Putin=92s two presidential terms, the general goal=20
of integration remained consistent through the=20
Boris Yeltsin and Putin presidencies =AD at least=20
up to the last year of Putin=92s second term.
Medvedev has referred to the West several times=20
as a rich source of investment and technology =AD a=20
=93reservoir=94 from which Russia can tap the=20
=93intellectual resources of post-industrial=20
societies.=94 It is clear that the task of making=20
Russia an integral part of that reservoir cannot=20
be compromised based on political factors. The=20
political focus on values, which until recently=20
was the basis of relations with the West, has clearly ended.
The current shift in Russia=92s foreign policy is=20
the result of various factors. The first reason=20
is that Russia=92s leaders are disappointed with=20
the results of the last 15 years of efforts at integration.
Second, shifts in the global economic balance has=20
weakened the West=92s monopoly on the world=92s=20
modernization reservoir. For the first time ever,=20
the theme of modernization is not tied=20
exclusively to Europe, but includes the Chinese,=20
South Korean and Singaporean models of development.
The third reason is historical. It is noteworthy=20
that Medvedev referred to the modernization=20
programs adopted by Peter the Great and Josef=20
Stalin, both of which were based on using the=20
West as a reservoir. This approach rationalizes=20
relations with the West, lessens the ideological=20
and emotional components and reduces them to a=20
purely commercial basis. In his =93Go, Russia!=94=20
article, Medvedev stated, =93The issue of=20
harmonizing our relations with Western=20
democracies is not a question of taste, personal=20
preferences or the prerogatives of given political groups.=94
Medvedev has a feasible plan to base relations=20
with Europe on business interests alone. Putin=92s=20
recent visit to France, where officials discussed=20
a wide range of business deals, became a concrete=20
illustration of Medvedev=92s statements. Certain=20
that profits are more important than ideology for=20
Western countries, Medvedev said, =93We know that=20
our partners are counting on a rapprochement with=20
Russia to realize their own priorities.=94 But=20
betting on pragmatism requires that one condition=20
be fulfilled =AD the ability to guarantee the rules=20
of the game. That can be called a stable=20
investment climate if those guarantees are based=20
on the rule of law. The other option is=20
authoritarian stability, and this is achieved=20
through political agreements with members of the ruling circle.
But whatever hopes that Russia=92s leaders might=20
hold, the lines between commerce, state=20
bureaucracy and law enforcement continues to be=20
blurred. This makes it impossible to give=20
investors any reliable guarantees. Even when=20
Western corporations believe that they can still=20
make a profit despite the lack of legal=20
guarantees, injustices such as the death of=20
corporate lawyer Sergei Magnitsky will cause many=20
Western investors to think twice before they increase their Russian exposur=
e.
Russia=92s =93reservoir philosophy=94 is aimed at using=20
the resources of the West to boost technological=20
and economic modernization. The problem is that=20
it does not set social modernization as its goal.=20
Russia needs social modernization most of all =AD=20
without which all attempts of achieving=20
technological modernization are bound to fail.
*******
#8
Window on Eurasia: In Russia, Political Anecdotes Point to Changes Ahead
By Paul Goble
Vienna, December 15 =AD More than=20
perhaps in any other country, anecdotes in Russia=20
not only provide insights into the nature of=20
politics there but also serve, perhaps more=20
reliably than anything else, as indicators of=20
either continuity or impending change, in the=20
latter case often far earlier than any other measure.
Today, Moscow commentator Konstantin=20
Remchukov writes in =93Nezavisimaya=20
gazeta-Politika,=94 =93political anecdotes are=20
becoming different and more funny,=94 an indication=20
that a 2009 is drawing to a close, =93something is=20
changing in Russia=94 although it is still too=20
early to be certain exactly what and how=20
(www.ng.ru/ng_politics/2009-12-15/9_2powers.html?mthree=3D1).
But it is not just anecdotes that=20
are changing, he suggests. For a few days in=20
October, the Duma actually resembled a parliament=20
when its members protested election=20
results. =93Everyone recalls the advice of the=20
head of the MVD to resist unjustifiably=20
aggressive militiamen.=94 And Russians have paid=20
more attentinto disasters and protests than in the past.
On top of that came President Dmitry=20
Medvedev=92s =93unexpected essay, =91Russia,=20
Forward!=92,=94 a document that presented =93an=20
anti-paternalistic platform, with a stress on the=20
individual strengths of the personality, the=20
market and freedom=94 and one so remarkable that it=20
was discussed for two months in the hopes that it=20
would represent a breakthrough.
When Medvedev delivered his message=20
to the Federal Assembly, however, =93no real=20
political and institutional structures of=20
modernization were presented.=94 And a few days=20
later, the Congress of United Russia adopted its=20
=93program of Russian conservatism,=94 which pointed=20
in an entirely different direction.
=93Thus,=94 the Moscow commentator=20
continues, =93the Medvedev themes of change and the=20
unbearable quality of paternalism and its=20
incompatibility with the ideals and values of the=20
contemporary state were enveloped in a=20
conservative jacket. In a conservative context, one might say.=94
Moreover, =93it became ever more=20
evident=94 that Vladimir Putin had =93thought through=20
all the risks connected with the temporary=20
departure from presidential responsibilities=94 and=20
even retained for himself =93the post of the leader=20
of the party so that the new president could not=20
automatically take control of it.=94
In addition, Putin=92s four-hour-long=20
television visit with the people was clearly=20
arranged so that people would hear the following=20
message: =93I will soon return, social expenditures=20
will grow at still higher tempos, and the=20
government will not leave you in the lurch,=94 a=20
very different message than Medvedev had been=20
sending and one that has drawn little support.
Drawing on the works of Joseph=20
Schumpeter, Remchukov points out both that=20
entrepreneurs play a key role in societal=20
transformations and that the economic and social=20
progress which they promote tends to spread =93as a=20
result of the diffusion of two types of=20
innovation=94: organizational and informational technology.
In Russia, the Moscow analyst=20
argues, the former is especially important given=20
the size and role of the state in the economy,=20
and change becomes an increasingly obvious=20
necessity as daily reports about =93tragedies,=20
catastrophes, accidents, explosions and fires=20
shows the inability of the [Russian] bureaucracy=20
to effectively fulfill its functions.=94
But this situation also shows,=20
Remchukov suggests, that =93the corrupt bureaucracy=20
is being transformed into an independent economic=20
and even political player, pitilessly defending=20
its own material interests,=94 which in many cases=20
are tied up with ownership of land, =93the most=20
natural manifestation of the deficit nature of an economy of our type.=94
All that makes the bureaucracy=20
extraordinarily dangerous to the future of the=20
country, Remchukov says, noting that Albert Speer=20
had told Hitler that the German bureaucracy was=20
behaving in such a way that it was becoming =93the=20
main cause of the defeat of Germany=94 in World War II.
Even if one finds that hyperbolic,=20
Remchukov suggests, =93at a minimum it forces us to=20
think again about the terrible potential of the=20
destructive power of the bureaucracy,=94 a=20
destructive power that is manifested in very=20
different ways at the political level than many people now appear to think.
Speer, for example, noted that=20
=93=92Churchill and Roosevelt without the slightest=20
vacillation forced their peoples to bear all the=20
burdens of war.=92=94 But in Germany, =93=91the=20
authoritative regime strove to win the sympathy=20
of the people.=92 That is, democratically elected=20
and thinking leaders told the people the truth=20
about the situation =85 But the authoritarian=20
bureaucracy only plays with the people =85 [and] does not speak the truth.=
=94
=93Playing with the people in this=20
way,=94 the Moscow commentator continues, =93is a=20
sign of a backward state, backward in the sense=20
of not being a contemporary on,=94 and =93a sign of=20
the underdevelopment of democratic institutions=20
and procedures,=94 but not just those but the=20
society itself. Unfortunately, precisely that=20
kind of approach is in evidence in Russia now.
Democracy requires not simply a set=20
of institutions by which the people can choose=20
its representatives who can then make decisions=20
for the common good, Remchukov says. It requires=20
the existence of =93rational opinion=94 among the=20
people who will vote their interests and values rather than be led astray.
=93This is a problem for Russia=94=20
because =93it is possible to organize elections=94=20
where =93people will vote for an irrational=20
opinion.=94 Russians ignore the problems in the=20
country and vote =93with their hearts, emotions,=20
and feelings but not with their rationality.=94=20
Many of them =93do not consider elections as a way=20
to improve their lot or even an occasion to speak to the powerful.=94
That reality, one that Putin very=20
much understands, represents =93a serious barrier=94=20
to what Medvedev says he wants to do. But the=20
situation is further complicated by the following=20
reality, Remchukov says. =93The economically and=20
socially active young in practice don=92t want federal television channels.
The very people =93who 10 to 20 years=20
from now will define the economics and politics=20
of Russia do not watch television and they do not=20
go to vote. =93 They thus constitute a =93different=94=20
Russia than the one that does watch television=20
and does vote for the party of power regardless of their situations.
This generational divide may not=20
help Medvedev immediately, but it poses a serious=20
threat to what Putin is trying to do at least in=20
the future. This rising generation =93sees the=20
greatness of Russia in a different way,=94 and it=20
evaluates the country on its ability to create=20
=93conditions for the self-realization of the creative potential of the per=
son.=94
=93The new patriotism consists in the=20
establishment of those institutions of freedom,=20
democracy, business, and innovation which=20
correspond in the greatest possible way to the=20
flowering of the individual.=94 It is not going to=20
develop the country in the =93sharashka=94 style of the Stalinist model.
That reality points to changes=20
ahead, but Medvedev may not be the person to lead=20
them. However much he believes in the ideas of=20
=93Russia, Forward!=94 the Kremlin leader has not=20
created a personal command as Putin has, although=20
perhaps he could create a new political party=20
=93directed at the modernization of Russia.=94
The current tandem, however, has had=20
one important consequence, Remchukov says: =93two=20
sources of power for Russia is a good thing,=94 and=20
=93in the current year, the number of genuinely=20
free people in the country has doubled. There=20
are now two; all the rest are not completely free.=94
=93All the rest are not completely=20
free,=94 Remchukov argues. =93Fear gives birth to=20
conformism, and conformism to stagnation, because=20
no one wants change=94 at least among the existing=20
elites, whose members will do almost anything to=20
hang onto power even if they must sacrifice the country in the process.
=93Democracy,=94 the Moscow commentator says, =93is a=20
special means of avoiding [such] power=20
dependence,=94 but introducing it requires not just=20
institutions but cultural change. Russians have=20
built =93enclave capitalism. Now perhaps is the=20
turn of enclave modernization?=94 If so, that will=20
fail, but the anecdotes have changed and so there=20
is a chance for a breakthrough.
********
#9
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
December 16, 2009
BENT ON REFORM
DMITRY MEDVEDEV EXTENDS THE POLITICAL REFORMS TO RUSSIAN REGIONS
Author: Elina Bilevskaya
[The Presidential Administration converted some of the theses of
the Message to the Federal Assembly into two draft laws.]
What information this newspaper has compiled indicates that
political initiatives President Dmitry Medvedev suggested in his
second message to the Federal Assembly will be forwarded to the
Duma in the form of draft laws before the end of the year. The
president said that he wanted them implemented by April 2010, and
the Kremlin is clearly in a hurry. It knows that Federation
subjects need time to adjust their legislations accordingly.
Medvedev's reforms are to be converted into four draft laws that
will stipulate amendment of the acting legislation. Two draft laws
are ready now, insiders say.
Addressing the Federal Assembly earlier this year, Medvedev
suggested extension of the political reforms to Russian regions.
He enumerated ten steps which he was convinced would make
political struggle fair. The president came up with the idea to
define criteria of regional legislatures' numerical strength. He
said as well that he thought it necessary to permit all political
parties represented in regional parliaments to form factions and
guarantee their representatives the right to occupy commanding
heights within the legislature.
Medvedev also suggested representation in regional
legislatures of the political parties that polled 5% and more.
Another idea concerned obviation of the necessity for political
parties with factions in regional legislatures but not in the
federal Duma to collect signatures prior to elections. Along with
everything else, the president demanded restoration of order with
early voting at regional and local levels.
Medvedev said that he wanted it all done by April 1, 2010.
These initiatives ought to be adopted by both houses of the
Federal Assembly and incorporated into regional legislations by
then.
Information available to this newspaper in the meantime
indicates that the Presidential Administration is determined to
carry out the orders well in advance of the deadline. Insiders who
know what they are talking about say that all necessary draft laws
might be forwarded to the Duma before the end of the year. All
initiatives will be compressed into four draft laws. (It is fair
to add that the ten political reforms Medvedev suggested in his
first Message made for nine draft laws.)
There is another nuance worth mentioning. Before getting down
to legislative initiatives this time, the Kremlin chose to discuss
the matter with political parties. The Presidential Administration
set up a permanent working group for electoral legislation
betterment (it includes representatives of all seven political
parties). The group met twice to consider numerical strength
criteria for regional legislatures and electoral barrier for the
political parties that polled 5% in local campaigns.
Draft law on size of regional parliaments is ready.
Officially registered political parties listened to, the
Presidential Administration is about to complete work on the
document. The impression is that it will be the first one to be
forwarded to the Duma.
The other draft law will concern electoral legislation
pertaining barriers for political parties and the necessity of
collection of signatures. Sources claim that the law will be
deliberately vague on the subject of the electoral barrier. In
other words, the Federation subjects where the barrier is set at
7% will be permitted to retain it (as opposed to bringing it down
to 5%) on the condition that a seat or two on the regional
legislature will be reserved for the political parties that polled
between 5% and 7%.
Another draft law will set the rules of early voting in
elections of regional legislatures and local self-government
structures.
The fourth draft law will permit all political parties
elected into regional parliaments to form factions and occupy
commanding heights. It seems that the idea is to let even an
individual lawmaker perform functions of a bona fide faction.
By and large, there is nothing to prevent regional
legislatures from amending local laws in accordance with what the
fourth draft law prepared by the Presidential Administration will
suggest. The problem is, United Russia functionaries in regional
parliaments where they have a majority (i.e. everywhere) will
fight tooth and claw to prevent commanding heights from falling
into the hands of other political parties. They will never part
with control of their own volition. Alexander Makarevich of Fair
Russia, leader of the second largest faction of the Murmansk
regional parliament, has been unable to persuade United Russia
that he is entitled to the status of a parliament deputy chairman
since 2007 (!).
*******
#10
Medvedev Acquires Scholar Backing To His Position At Climate Conference
MOSCOW, December 15 (Itar-Tass) -- Russian=20
President Dmitry Medvedev has acquired a solid=20
scholar backing to his position at the UN Copenhagen Climate Conference.
"I am very glad I have raised this subject," he=20
said after listening to the reports of=20
Academicians Nikolai Laverov and Yuri Israel and=20
Russian Academy of Sciences President Yuri Osipov at the Academy session.
The academicians said they were concerned about=20
'the artificial and anti-academic politicization of global warming'.
"I am better prepared for the Copenhagen forum=20
now. I will cite various opinions I have heard at=20
the Russian Academy of Sciences," Medvedev said.=20
"True, the subject is in the spotlight. Plenty of=20
my colleagues, leaders of large states, have=20
taken so much interest in the subject that they=20
fly long distances to discuss it."
He accepted the academicians' concern about the=20
possible involvement of Russia 'in somebody=20
else's political game' under the noble pretext of=20
the prevention of global warming.
"I recall the latest APEC summit in Singapore.=20
That is a long way from here, practically the=20
equator. Some of the leaders, among them the=20
organizers of the conference, flew all night to=20
discuss the issue (climate change) during a=20
20-minute lunch. The attention is extremely keen,=20
and I can feel the scent of money. Why should=20
they be so enthusiastic otherwise? Everything=20
would have been different if it had been a=20
regular academic debate. There would have been no=20
such deep involvement of world leaders. As you=20
know, they are not scholars and they have other=20
practical tasks to do," Medvedev said. "In this=20
case, we are dealing with politics and big money=20
and, at the same time, with a threat that must be=20
handled by joint efforts," he said.
Presidential aide Arkady Dvorkovich said a week=20
before that the Copenhagen Climate Conference was=20
unlikely to adopt a legally binding document.
"The delegates will issue a political statement,=20
alongside national declarations, and a roadmap of=20
further negotiations," he said.
"Russia is ready to assume national commitments,=20
which may be approved by an international agreement," Dvorkovich said.
It is very important for Russia that EU, G-8 and=20
BRIC member countries take part in the forum, he said.
Russia is ready to cut harmful atmospheric=20
emissions by 25%, as compared with 1990, he said.=20
"Yet we are not prepared to assume unlimited=20
liabilities in funding the poorest countries. We=20
will take part in this funding though," he said.=20
"Our liabilities must be comfortable for us."
Asked about the Russian attitude to the proposal=20
of shifting the Kyoto Protocol quotas onto the=20
new agreement, Dvorkovich said, "We would neither insist nor object."
"Russia will insist on the account of the role of=20
forests, because they absorb harmful emissions.=20
We also insist on the transfer of environmentally=20
friendly energy technologies," he said. Energy=20
saving technologies must become more accessible=20
for Russia and help reduce the amount of=20
emissions with available funds, Dvorkovich said.
Russia does not plan to sell greenhouse gas=20
emission quotas, presidential advisor Alexander=20
Bedritsky told last Friday's press conference=20
dedicated to the Russian participation in the UN Copenhagen Climate Confere=
nce.
"Yet we think that unused quotas set by the Kyoto=20
Protocol should be included in the new agreement.=20
That would imply the continuation of commitments," he said.
Russia does not want to have the same commitments=20
as countries, which have not reduced their=20
industrial production, Bedritsky said. "We will=20
not sacrifice our industrial growth. We are=20
already doing a lot. Russia leads by the=20
reduction of the man-made impact on climate. The=20
decline in Russian emissions is bigger than that in other countries," he sa=
id.
"In fact, the 25% reduction declared by Russia is=20
a rather ambitious goal. It is comparable with=20
the pledge of 27 EU member countries," Bedritsky said.
In all, the new agreement will stipulate the=20
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions of=20
developed countries by 10-40% before 2020 and by 50% before 2050.
The Russian president is ready to consider=20
support to developing countries in the reduction=20
of greenhouse gas emissions, the advisor said.
"Russia took part in the climate negotiations and=20
the drafting of the Kyoto Protocol from the very=20
start. It is ready to take a flexible stand now.=20
Yet, Russia sets a number of conditions. For=20
instance, the process must be global and involve=20
all countries. Secondly, the Russian role and=20
interests must be taken into account," he said.
"Russia has been the leader in the reduction of=20
greenhouse gas emissions in the past 20 years.=20
Russian GDP amounted to 105% of the 1990 level in=20
2007, while greenhouse gas emissions stood at=20
66%. In fact, our industries have switched to=20
modern technologies," Bedritsky said.
"Following the industrial decline of the 1990 and=20
the consequent reduction of greenhouse gas=20
emissions, Russia began to restore industries on=20
the basis of new technologies. Thus, we still=20
have a reserve of possible emissions. Even though=20
Russia may assume certain commitments at the=20
Copenhagen conference, it will be able to enlarge=20
the emissions. Russia reserves the right to use=20
these reserves if necessary," Bedritsky said.
*******
#11
BBC Monitoring
Russian TV talk show discusses global warming, swine flu threats
NTV Mir
December 14, 2009
The 14 December edition of the weekly political=20
discussion programme "Honest Monday" on Russian=20
Gazprom-owned NTV, hosted by regular presenter=20
Sergey Minayev, discussed the way that global=20
warming and the swine flu epidemic were being=20
reported in the media and asked whether the=20
threats were being deliberately overblown.
The studio guests this week were Konstantin=20
Simonov, director-general of the National Energy=20
Security Foundation; Aleksandr Belyayev, deputy=20
director of the Geography Institute of the=20
Russian Academy of Sciences; Nikolay Kaverin,=20
head of the virology laboratory of the Russian=20
Academy of Medical Sciences; and Yuriy=20
Krestinskiy, director of the Institute of Public Health Problems.
The programme invited viewers to answer the=20
following question: "Who benefits from the talk=20
about global catastrophes and epidemics?" Of the=20
three options given, 65 per cent of the 41,200=20
votes cast were given to business; 27 per cent=20
thought that politicians were the main=20
beneficiaries, while 8 per cent thought society had the most to gain.
Despite the presenter's repeated efforts to=20
encourage the guests to blame specific=20
individuals or groups for instilling a sense of=20
panic within society, the discussion was in fact=20
extremely general, with the guests merely giving=20
their opinions about the extent of the climate and epidemic threats.
Simonov said that there was no genuine consensus=20
among scientists about the threat posed by global=20
warming. Belyayev disagreed, asserting that=20
climate change is a fact. Simonov also said that he wished society
would tackle "more real threats", such as=20
diabetes or cancer, rather than global warming which may or may not exist.
Krestinskiy said that the danger presented by the=20
A/H1N1 virus had been exaggerated, as statistics=20
showed only 5,500 confirmed cases in Russia since=20
the start of 2009. He also criticised the fact=20
that ordinary people are having to pay for swine=20
flu medication, and called on the authorities to=20
explain why there is no universal medical=20
insurance. Kaverin, meanwhile, was far more=20
cautious, saying that he thought the media had=20
generally merely informed the public about the=20
threat, and insisted that there was no cause for panic.
*******
#12
Beleagured Russian rights activists receive EU's top human rights award
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
December 16, 2009
STRASBOURG, France =AD Three Russian activists=20
received the European Union's top human rights=20
award on Wednesday in recognition of the=20
difficult conditions they face at home.
Kremlin critics Lyudmila Alexeyeva, Sergei=20
Kovalyov and Oleg Orlov accepted the Sakharov=20
Prize at the legislature of the 27-nation EU on=20
behalf of the human rights organization Memorial on Wednesday.
The group was founded two decades ago to=20
memorialize the victims of Stalinist oppression=20
but quickly expanded to cover a broad array of=20
civil-society development issues.
European Parliament president Jerzy Buzek said=20
that despite the pride he felt for Memorial he=20
also was left with "bitterness that it is=20
necessary to award this kind of prize in Europe."
The three activists entered the legislature to=20
applause and a spontaneous standing ovation.=20
Minutes later Kovalyov asked the lawmakers to=20
rise again, this time in memory of slain Russian=20
activists like Natalya Estemirova, a Memorial=20
activist in Chechnya who was abducted and killed in July.
"It is Europe's duty not to remain silent" in the=20
face of Russian human rights abuses, said Kovalyov during a 20-minute speec=
h.
Human rights activists and journalists who work=20
with Memorial have been threatened, beaten and in=20
some cases killed in recent years.
"I hope that this prize will encourage them to=20
continue the fight for what we all believe in -=20
freedom and democracy", said Joseph Daul, the=20
chairman of the Christian Democrat EPP, the biggest group in the legislatur=
e.
Alexeyeva, 82, and Kovalyov, 79, were both=20
leading Soviet dissidents and have continued to=20
lead the fight for democracy and human rights in Russia.
Alexeyeva and Kovalyov shared the Olof Palme=20
Prize in 2004 with Anna Politkovskaya, a=20
journalist who exposed corruption and rights=20
abuses in Chechnya before she was killed in Moscow in 2006.
"Their killers have yet to be brought to=20
justice," Buzek said while speaking about Politkovskaya and Estemirova.
Kovalyov, who spent seven years in the Gulag, was=20
unyielding in his criticism of the new Russia=20
where many of the democratic achievements of the 1990s have been rolled bac=
k.
Kovalyov and Alexeyeva are contemporaries of the=20
late Andrei Sakharov, the Soviet dissident for whom the prize is named.
The Sakharov Prize is considered the EU's top=20
rights award and comes with a C50,000 ($72,850) honorarium.
The prize has been awarded since 1988, and=20
previous winners include former South African=20
President Nelson Mandela, East Timorese leader=20
Xanana Gusmao and Cuban dissident Oswaldo Paya.
Often the prize has chilled relations with the=20
government of the recipient's country. Last year,=20
China's government reacted angrily when the=20
jailed dissident Hu Jia won. Beijing called him a=20
criminal and said the Sakharov award amounted to political interference.
*******
#13
Soviet Union Was Safer Than Putin=92s Russia, Dissidents Say
By Lucian Kim
Dec. 14 (Bloomberg) -- Former Soviet dissidents=20
criticized the condition of human rights in=20
Russia under Prime Minister Vladimir Putin,=20
saying their work is more dangerous than in the=20
final decades of the communist regime.
=93We live in the Soviet Union, only a modernized,=20
improved one,=94 Sergei Kovalyov, 79, said at a=20
conference in Moscow marking the 20th anniversary=20
of the death of dissident and Nobel Peace Prize winner Andrei Sakharov.
Human rights activists gathered to pay tribute to=20
Sakharov=92s legacy in a year when government=20
critics have increasingly become targets of=20
attack. The July murder of Natalya Estemirova, a=20
human rights worker in Chechnya, was the first in=20
a string of killings of activists in the North=20
Caucasus region, where the government is fighting an Islamic insurgency.
While Russians today enjoy many more freedoms,=20
there were =93much fewer=94 killings of dissidents=20
during the communist era, said Lyudmila=20
Alexeyeva, 82, who was forced to emigrate to the=20
U.S. in the 1970s because of her anti-Soviet views.
Kovalyov, Alexeyeva and Oleg Orlov, head of the=20
Memorial human rights group, will receive the=20
European Parliament=92s Sakharov Prize for Freedom=20
of Thought later this week in Strasbourg.=20
Estemirova was a member of Memorial, which=20
documents Soviet-era repression and human rights violations.
Orlov is appealing a Moscow court ruling ordering=20
him to retract a statement that Kremlin-backed=20
Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov was to blame for=20
Estemirova=92s death. Legal pressure on government=20
critics such as Orlov or billionaire Mikhail=20
Khodorkovsky, in jail for more than six years,=20
has replaced the Soviet gulag, said Kovalyov, who=20
served time in prison camps for his opposition to the Soviet regime.
=93The government of a country where political=20
murders take place is always guilty,=94 said=20
Kovalyov. =93It turns out =91criminals=92 are behind=20
the killings. Why do they always kill government=20
opponents? Why do they love the authorities so much?=94
Orlov criticized European and U.S. politicians,=20
whose statements on human rights in Russia are=20
turning into more and more of a =93ritual.=94
=93It=92s not that it=92s completely impossible to work=20
as a human rights defender,=94 Orlov said. =93It=92s=20
just that your life is under threat every single day.=94
While Alexeyeva said she found President Dmitry=20
Medvedev =93sympathetic=94 by comparison with Putin,=20
she faulted the 44- year-old lawyer for not=20
addressing concerns she brought up during two meetings with him.
Putin handpicked Medvedev to replace him as=20
president last year because of a constitutional=20
ban on running for a third term. Neither man has=20
ruled out running in the 2012 elections, raising=20
speculation of a split between Putin and his protege.
=93This is a fake debate. In any country, no=20
president can have real influence if the=20
political and legal institutions are not=20
functioning,=94 said Heidi Hautala, chair of the=20
European Parliament=92s subcommittee on human=20
rights. =93Here we come back to the issue of free=20
and fair elections. That could be the starting=20
point to putting in place functioning institutions.=94
********
#14
Russian Human Rights Commissioner Lukin on State of Democratic Institutions
Rossiyskaya Gazeta
December 15, 2009
Article by Vladimir Lukin, Russian Federation=20
Human Rights Commissioner: "Patient Freedom"
The Human Rights Movement in Today's Russia: Options and Problems
The anniversary of the adoption of the UN=20
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is being=20
commemorated throughout the world on 10 December=20
for the 61st time. It may not be a "round"=20
number, but that does not allow us to be=20
condescending about the problems it symbolizes.
Dispensing with all of the customary=20
grandiloquence, we must address one of the most=20
important problems in our country's advancement=20
toward a viable democratic state, living in=20
harmony with the society and respected by it. The=20
problem in question is the need for the=20
development of democratic institutions and the=20
establishment of a civil society in Russia.
The activity of non-governmental human rights=20
organizations (NGO's) represents one of the main=20
ways of attaining these objectives.
Generally staying out of the reversals of=20
political fortune, the NGO's defend the rights=20
and liberties of citizens, give them the=20
necessary legal assistance, and monitor the state of human rights.
The effective development and consolidation of a=20
rule-of-law state in Russia also depend to a=20
considerable extent on the willingness of=20
government agencies and the entire society to=20
interact with non-governmental human rights=20
organizations, to listen to their=20
recommendations, and to either accept them or=20
provide logical reasons for rejecting them. The=20
latter is also extremely important: Cogent=20
arguments for the rejection of the proposals of=20
the human rights community enrich the entire=20
Russian social community with new experience in=20
dialogue regarding human rights and liberties.=20
Informing the NGO's of the government's rejection=20
of a suggestion after the fact, on the other=20
hand, only underscores the omnipotence of "public=20
servants" and the inability of the society to control them.
In this context, we again have to report that the=20
constructive interaction of government agencies=20
and NGO's, which is characteristic of the=20
developed civil society, still does not exist=20
here. Mutual mistrust and even hostility still=20
exist and occasionally become intense.
On the one hand, the government and the society=20
as a whole still have not realized the highly=20
positive impact of the civil activity of the=20
NGO's. Attempts have been made to discredit some=20
of these organizations because they are funded=20
partly by foreign grants (although this is not=20
illegal in most cases and is in keeping with=20
world practice). In addition, government=20
institutions in Russia regularly provide reasons=20
for suspicions that the government is trying to=20
divide human rights advocates into "loyal" and=20
"disloyal" ones -- i.e., ones not deserving=20
support. This obviously cannot promote the=20
establishment of a truly mature civil society.
On the other hand, some NGO's occasionally go=20
against the common principles of human rights=20
advocacy by going too far in politicizing their=20
activity and their statements, deliberately=20
initiating confrontations with the government.=20
There have been cases in which various political=20
and other "special" interests have influenced the=20
activity of human rights organizations.
As a result, a large segment of the Russian=20
public displays the regrettably justified=20
suspicion that the subject matter of human rights=20
advocacy is biased and "selective." Human rights=20
advocates, according to those critics, declare=20
the universal nature of their activity, but=20
actually are quite selective in their defense,=20
protecting either "their own people" or the enemies of their opponents.
These critics have to realize, however, that=20
non-governmental human rights organizations,=20
along with other non-commercial organizations=20
(NCO's), are an integral element of civil society=20
in the fullest sense of the term. However=20
"inconvenient" this might be for various=20
government agencies or public groups, civil=20
society is not a community of compliant=20
individuals who agree on all things, but a united=20
group of diverse individuals who disagree.
It probably would be best for the human rights=20
community to draw the clearest distinctions=20
possible between organizations striving to=20
participate in politics in the classic sense of=20
the term -- the acquisition, exercise, and=20
retention of power -- and the ones engaged in=20
"professional human rights advocacy," such as the=20
fight against tyrannical behavior by specific=20
officials and agencies, torture in prisons,=20
political persecution, and so forth.
The human rights advocate is entitled and even=20
obligated to take an active part in processes=20
connected with the exercise of authority by the=20
government. Legal expertise and monitoring,=20
especially on the local level, work with the=20
media, and the organization of legal public=20
demonstrations against specific violations of=20
civil rights and liberties are inalienable=20
instruments used by human rights organizations.=20
Another major factor of human rights advocacy,=20
however, is the ability to initiate productive=20
dialogue with the government. This is not always=20
possible for the political opposition.
The organized drawing of these distinctions=20
probably should be the topic of widespread public=20
debate by all interested parties and=20
organizations. The ultimate goal of these changes=20
would be the precise institutional division (but=20
not the ideological division!) of Russian human=20
rights advocates into professional experts=20
monitoring the observance of laws and actual=20
opposition politicians, who are also necessary,=20
for that matter, for the comprehensive democratic process.
In any case, this kind of transformation is=20
objectively possible only under certain=20
conditions. In particular, this applies to the=20
speed and level of development of the rule-of-law=20
state in our country and the ability and=20
willingness of the human rights community to=20
evolve from the model of "moral opposition" to=20
the state into the mechanisms present in=20
countries of developed democracy for extensive,=20
daily, and "routine" civil oversight of government institutions.
In the tradition of the Soviet human rights=20
advocates, today's NGO's often go against the=20
priorities of state policy and the prevailing=20
attitudes in the society. Because of this, their=20
activity occasionally irritates not only=20
government agencies, but also some Russian=20
citizens. The loss of public trust, however,=20
leads directly to the marginalization of the human rights movement.
The somewhat unhealthy competition between NGO's=20
and the fundamental refusal of some of them to=20
cooperate with their colleagues in the human=20
rights community and with government agencies is indicative in this context.
The difficulty of securing funding for the=20
activities of human rights organizations is=20
another common problem in Russia. The provision=20
of non-governmental human rights organizations=20
with money from state or municipal sources or=20
from private Russian sponsors is more likely to=20
be the exception than the rule. As a result, they=20
often have to appeal to foreign sources for=20
funding, which is not prohibited in principle. In=20
other words, it is allowed by Russian law. The=20
only important thing is to ensure that the=20
acquisition of foreign grants does not become an=20
end in itself. Transparency in the acquisition=20
and use of foreign grants by NGO's and NCO's is=20
also a completely legal and understandable=20
requirement, but only if it does not degenerate=20
into attempts to subordinate the activities of=20
these organizations to "state" (meaning=20
bureaucratic) interests or other special interests.
Stability in the interrelations of the society=20
and state is one of the indisputable signs of=20
developed democracy. Within the framework of this=20
model, each member of society is fully aware of=20
his rights and liberties, including the right to=20
defend them, either alone or in a group, with=20
every means not prohibited by law. In turn, the=20
state cannot evade legal and sociopolitical=20
responsibility for the failure to fulfill its=20
obligations. These obligations are quite simple:=20
to uphold the law and to prevent interference in=20
the exercise of the liberties of each member of=20
society by passing and observing the pertinent laws and procedures.
In turn, the functions of human rights=20
organizations are focused mainly on the routine=20
oversight of the activities of government=20
agencies. As a rule, nothing else is required of=20
them: The two sides engage in strictly legal=20
dialogue, in accordance with established=20
procedures and without resorting to quasi-legal=20
methods. Furthermore, the two sides proceed from=20
the knowledge that a government agency's=20
acknowledgement of its violation of an=20
individual's rights and liberties strengthens the=20
government rather than weakening the state.
The situation is different in the countries of=20
developing democracy, including Russia, where the=20
functions of human rights organizations are much=20
more diverse -- not only because some of the laws=20
that are supposed to secure individual rights are=20
flawed, but also because the observance of others=20
often depends on current circumstances.
Many government agencies in Russia have displayed=20
obvious reluctance to work on their own errors,=20
and many Russian human rights advocates with=20
progressive views feel obliged to use every=20
possible legal means of correcting this state of=20
affairs. The constructive segment of the Russian=20
human rights community, meanwhile, is not=20
inclined to insist categorically that all of its=20
recommendations are right and usually is willing=20
to accept the substantive and persuasive=20
explanations of government agencies in response=20
to its inquiries. Willingness for dialogue,=20
however, does not mean willingness to accept form=20
letters, which are still plentiful among the=20
official responses of government agencies.
International experience is revealing that the=20
intensification of economic, social, and cultural=20
globalization is unavoidably chipping away at the=20
state's monopoly on power. The vacant political=20
space is being filled by various non-governmental=20
organizations, including large private economic=20
entities, as well as non-commercial organizations.
The most farsighted statesmen in the world's=20
leading countries already have an excellent=20
understanding of one of the main consequences of=20
globalization -- the diminished impact of=20
traditional approaches to the resolution of=20
social and economic problems. Challenges are=20
growing increasingly complex, and the search for=20
responses to them is combined with constantly increasing uncertainty.
The potential ability of civil society to act as=20
an effective counterbalance and maintain=20
stability under the conditions of the declining=20
influence of government institutions is becoming=20
the subject of more intense debate in this=20
context. In fact, however, there are now too few=20
organized structures capable of maintaining the=20
balance of public influence. As a result, the=20
world could face a growing "democracy deficit" in global administration.
On the other hand, statements about the=20
significant institutional constrains on the=20
capabilities of the non-governmental=20
organizations, especially in the sphere of human=20
rights, also seem valid. In particular, no one=20
has questioned the sovereign state monopoly on=20
the use of violence to maintain law and order.
Under these conditions, a synthesis of the energy=20
of civil action and the work of professional=20
experts seems to be the most promising way of=20
enhancing the effectiveness and strengthening the=20
influence of non-governmental organizations. The=20
activists of human rights movements and experts=20
in various legal fields should devise an=20
effective system of mutual cooperation. This kind=20
of alliance would promote more effective dialogue=20
by non-governmental organizations with government=20
and supra-national agencies in the planning and=20
subsequent implementation of political and legal=20
decisions of a general nature to improve the life of the average citizen.
It is also completely obvious that the term=20
"human rights and liberties" should be devoid of=20
political connotations in the future. All people=20
have equal rights and liberties, regardless of=20
their political views. That is why the fight for=20
human rights must not be a fight against any=20
existing government or against any opposition=20
group or party that seems particularly objectionable at the present time.
Government officials, in turn, must realize that=20
there is a significant difference between human=20
rights advocates and the political opposition=20
(which is a completely natural and necessary=20
element of the democratic system of government).=20
The real human rights advocates are not striving=20
to be government officials; they are striving for=20
legal, democratic, and just government officials.=20
Consequently, we have to avoid two equally=20
serious hazards: the excessive politicization of=20
human rights advocacy and intolerance for human=20
rights advocacy on the pretext of its excessive politicization.
If we are to avert a confrontation that will be=20
destructive for our country, the state and civil=20
society must be patient, wise, and courageous.=20
The Constitution of the Russian Federation, which=20
proclaims human rights and liberties as the=20
highest value of our state and society and which=20
defines the protection of these rights and=20
liberties as their chief obligation, must be=20
observed strictly everywhere, regardless of the=20
current state of political affairs. International=20
Human Rights Day is the best time to remind everyone of this.
*******
#15
Russia Now
http://www.washingtonpost.com/russianow
[A Paid Supplement to The Washington Post]
December 16, 2009
A Voice for Press Freedom in Russia
By Alexander Artyemiev
For the first time, Russia has nominated a=20
representative for press freedom to the=20
Organization for Economic Development and=20
Cooperation (OECD), and, more surprisingly, the=20
choice has rendered Kremlin critics speechless.
The Russian government chose Mikhail Fedotov, a=20
senior member of a liberal political party and a=20
fierce Kremlin critic. The candidacy of Fedotov =AD=20
a longtime crusader for media freedom=ADstunned=20
some members of the OECD. Can Fedotov influence=20
the dire media situation in his own country? What=20
does the Kremlin have to gain from his nomination?
Fedotov, 60, was expelled from Moscow State=20
University in 1968 for being a member of the=20
emerging human rights movement. Later, he wrote=20
Russia=92s first law on press freedom.
Here, Russia Now features Fedotov=92s interview=20
with the influential Gazeta.ru (incidentally, the=20
same resource President Dmitry Medvedev used to=20
pitch his =93Forward, Russia!=94 article). Fedotov=20
also writes about new agreements between Russian=20
and Georgian journalists conceived on the=20
anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall.
High Hopes for Russia=92s Media Crusader
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in=20
Europe is expected to choose a new special=20
representative for press freedom at its=20
Ministerial Council in Athens on December 1-2. Of=20
the six initial candidates, four remain: the=20
nominees of Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Great Britain and Russia.
Moscow has nominated Mikhail Fedotov, post-Soviet=20
Russia=92s first press minister and currently=20
secretary of the Russian Journalists=92 Union.
The Russian government=92s selection of Fedotov,=20
known for his liberal views, came as a surprise=20
to Kremlin critics. He was a senior member of the=20
liberal political party Union of Right Forces and=20
of the anti-Putin Committee 2008: Free Choice.
=93I see my chances as fairly modest,=94 said Fedotov=20
in a conversation with online publication=20
Gazeta.ru. =93My candidacy may not be supported by=20
countries that pay only lip service to freedom of=20
speech. But perhaps post-Soviet countries will=20
prefer me because I can talk to them in their own language.=94
Who will come out against you?
The countries of Eastern Europe won=92t likely want=20
to see a Russian in any important posts in=20
European organizations. But the EU countries, I=20
think, will vote as one, and they are well aware=20
that I not only represent Russia but oppose the=20
curtailment of mass media rights. My colleagues=20
should realize that I will likely be a stricter=20
critic of my own country and countries formerly in the socialist camp.
Are you a critic of the Russian government?
I am in favor of a working Constitution and the=20
commitments that Russia has assumed with respect=20
to the international community. I consider it=20
important that Russia respect and provide freedom=20
of speech, that it respect the rights of=20
journalists. For instance, when we refuse=20
journalists the right to enter Russia under a=20
false pretext, we are violating our international=20
commitments. When journalists are subjected to=20
absolutely incommensurate punitive measures, we=20
are also violating our commitments.
Were you told why you were nominated to the OECD?
The people sitting in the Kremlin decided that my=20
candidacy could serve as a signal that in Russia=20
there are forces that want our country to conduct=20
itself differently in the international arena and=20
to act not like an authoritarian state by=20
broadcasting the ideals of =93sovereign democracy,=94=20
but like a state striving to build a democratic=20
society that functions in accordance with the law.
Is it a signal to the West?
The signal is being transmitted not only abroad.=20
The powers that be must realize that I am a fully=20
formed person with fully formed views and do not=20
intend to act as anyone=92s PR man=85I will talk=20
about the censorship on Russian television as a=20
matter of principle, the way I do now. Of course,=20
official statements by the OSCE special=20
representative for freedom of the press carry=20
more weight that those of the secretary of the=20
Russian Journalists=92 Union, and to some degree=20
may influence the situation with freedom of the=20
press in Russia, and, say, in countries like Belarus or Kazakhstan.
Do you feel that your nomination is a way for=20
so-called Kremlin liberals to influence the=20
situation with freedom of speech in Russia by=20
involving a =93foreign specialist,=94 which you may=20
become, since they cannot act inside the system?
It may indeed be true that certain liberal forces=20
want to come in from the far side and give me a=20
chance to work not as a rank-and-file Russian=20
bureaucrat, but as an independent representative=20
of an international organization.
*******
#16
Pundit names Russian regions most dangerous for journalists
RIA-Novosti
December 15, 2009
Journalists working in Russia are running great=20
risks and undergoing huge pressure in the=20
republics of the North Caucasus, Tatarstan and=20
Bashkortostan, director of the centre for extreme=20
journalism Oleg Panfilov told RIA Novosti on 15 December.
Since 1993 more than 50 contract murders of=20
journalists related to their professional=20
activities have been committed, Panfilov said.=20
"None of these murders was investigated and=20
criminals have not been punished," he added. The=20
murders of journalists will not be stopped if a=20
thorough investigation into these murders is not=20
conducted while killers or contractors go unpunished, Panfilov said.
"Dagestan, Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabarda-Balkaria,=20
all the republics of the North Caucasus" are most=20
dangerous for journalists, Panfilov said.=20
"Certainly there are areas where journalists have=20
not been killed but they have a hard time working=20
there, as there is pressure from the authorities.=20
These (areas) are Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and=20
regions in Russia's south," he added.
Panfilov said that there are regions where=20
journalists are enjoying a considerable amount of=20
freedom but refused to name the territories=20
because the authorities will start thinking=20
whether they are loyal enough, he said. "There=20
are several regions in Siberia where journalists=20
are enjoying more or less freedom. There are a=20
couple of regions like this in the Urals and in central Russia," Panfilov s=
aid.
*******
#17
Muslim revival brings polygamy, camels to Chechnya
By Amie Ferris-Rotman
December 16, 2009
GROZNY, Russia (Reuters) - Adam, 52, keeps his=20
three wives in different towns to stop them=20
squabbling, but the white-bearded Chechen adds he might soon take a fourth.
"Chechnya is Muslim, so this is our right as men.=20
They (the wives) spend time together, but do not=20
always see eye to eye," said the soft-spoken=20
pensioner, who only gave his first name.
Hardline Kremlin-backed leader Ramzan Kadyrov is=20
vying with insurgents for authority in a land=20
ravaged by two secessionist wars with Moscow.=20
Each side is claiming Islam as its flag of=20
legitimacy, each reviles the other as criminal and blasphemous.
Wary of the dangers of separatism in a vast=20
country, Moscow watches uneasily as central power=20
yields to Islamic tenets. It must chose what it=20
might see as the lesser of two evils.
Though polygamy is illegal in Russia, the=20
southern Muslim region of Chechnya encourages the=20
practice, arguing it is allowed by sharia law and=20
the Koran, Islam's holiest book.
By Russian law, Adam is only married to his first=20
wife of 28 years, Zoya, the plump, blue-eyed=20
mother of his three children, with whom he shares=20
a home on the outskirts of the regional capital Grozny.
His "marriages" to the other two -- squirreled=20
away in villages nearby -- were carried out in=20
elaborate celebrations and are recognized by Chechen authorities.
The head of Chechnya's Center for Spiritual-Moral=20
Education, Vakha Khashkanov, set up by Kadyrov a=20
year ago, said Islam should take priority over=20
laws of the Russian constitution.
"If it is allowed in Islam, it is not up for=20
discussion," he told Reuters near Europe's=20
largest mosque, which glistens in central Grozny=20
atop the grounds where the Communist party had=20
its headquarters before the Soviet Union fell in 1991.
"As long as you can feed your wives, and there's=20
equality amongst them, then polygamy is allowed in Chechnya," he added.
Islam is flourishing in Chechnya which, along=20
with its neighbors Dagestan and Ingushetia, is=20
combating an Islamist insurgency which aims to=20
create a Muslim, sharia-based state separate from=20
Russia across the North Caucasus.
Though Islam first arrived in the North Caucasus=20
around 500 years ago, in Dagestan's ancient=20
walled city of Derbent on the Caspian Sea,=20
religion under Communism was strongly discouraged.
Kadyrov, like most of his region's one million=20
people, is Sufi, a mystical branch of Islam which=20
places a greater focus on prayer and recitation.
Political analysts say that in exchange for=20
successfully hunting out Islamist fighters, the=20
Kremlin turns a blind eye to Kadyrov's Muslim-inspired rules.
Today Grozny's cafes hold men sipping smuggled=20
beer out of teacups as alcohol has been all but=20
banned, single-sex schools and gyms are becoming=20
the norm and women must cover their heads in government buildings.
Clad in a tight hijab, Asya Malsagova, who=20
advises Kadyrov on human rights issues and heads=20
a state council dealing with the rights of=20
Chechen prisoners, told Reuters: "We believe=20
every woman should have a choice -- but we prefer she covers up."
Against the backdrop of a bubbling Islamist=20
insurgency, Islam's revival has also brought=20
violence against those who do not live by sharia=20
law in the North Caucasus -- a region the Kremlin=20
has described as its biggest political domestic problem.
Islamist militants, who label Kadyrov and other=20
regional bosses as "infidels" for siding with=20
Moscow, have been behind attacks on women they=20
say worked as prostitutes in Dagestan and murders=20
of alcohol-sellers in Ingushetia.
In Chechnya and Ingushetia, rebel fighters who=20
regularly carry out armed attacks on police are=20
celebrated as "martyrs" by Islamist news sites with links to the insurgency.
HOLY CAMELS
Dirt roads lead the way to Chechnya's first camel=20
farm, about 55 km (34 miles) northwest of Grozny,=20
where 46 of the two-humped creatures munch on=20
salt and grass while they are groomed to be gifts=20
for dowries and religious holidays.
Considered holy animals in Islam, they sell for=20
58,000 roubles ($1,886) each, said Umar Guchigov,=20
the director of the farm, which opened just over=20
a year ago under Kadyrov's command, and plans are=20
in place to build three more in Chechnya.
"So many people, simple people, congratulated us=20
for bringing back this ancient tradition," Guchigov said.
Animals are also being used to reintroduce Islam=20
at Chechnya's round-the-clock Muslim television=20
channel, where 60 young bearded men and=20
headscarved women create children's programs in=20
large studios adorned with photos of Mecca.
A bevy of bumble bees joyfully scream "Salam=20
Alaikum" (Peace be with you) upon entering the=20
studio of Ruslan Ismailov, who is making a=20
full-length cartoon on hi-tech Apple computers=20
for the channel, which is called "Put," meaning "The Way" in Russian.
"The bees appeal to children, and they will teach=20
them how to live properly by the Muslim faith," Ismailov said.
Set up two years ago by the state and broadcast=20
to thousands across the North Caucasus, instantly=20
becoming one of the top channels in the region,=20
it also features programs for women on how to=20
keep home and reading of the Koran throughout the night.
"It's no secret what Chechnya has been through,"=20
said the channel's general director Adam=20
Shakhidov, sporting a ginger beard and traditional black velvet cap.
"Two wars, the Soviet Union and today's Muslim=20
extremism... it's time to show the true beauty of=20
Sufism and install the basis for sharia," he said.
*******
#18
Russia's economy to reach pre-crisis level by late 2012
MOSCOW, December 16 (RIA Novosti)-Russia's=20
economy will reach its 2008 pre-crisis level by=20
the end of 2012, Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin said on Wednesday.
"We are planning to restore GDP to pre-crisis=20
levels in the fourth quarter of 2012," Kudrin said.
The finance minister also said the domestic=20
economy was expected to demonstrate growth on pre-crisis levels in 2013.
Kudrin said Russia would experience a difficult=20
next three years as it sought to resolve all the=20
problems accumulated during and after the global=20
economic downturn. He said the Russian economy=20
would demonstrate slower growth during this=20
period as compared with the pre-crisis level.
Kudrin signaled on Wednesday an end to recession,=20
announcing that the country's economy was=20
expected to grow more than 2% in October-December 2009.
"In the fourth quarter, we expect growth, and=20
even the [GDP] growth rates will slightly=20
increase and equal more than 2%. This means that=20
we have exited the recession and a reversal from=20
decline to growth has begun to be seen," Kudrin=20
told the lower house of Russia's parliament.
Kudrin said that as of November 1, 2009 the=20
government had spent 900 billion rubles ($30=20
billion) on anti-crisis measures out of 1.393=20
trillion rubles ($46 billion) earmarked for the purpose in the budget.
Meanwhile, Russia's Economic Development Ministry=20
said on Wednesday it had improved its economic=20
forecast for 2009, with the country's GDP=20
expected to decline 8.5% compared with the=20
previous figure of 8.5-8.7%, investment to fall=20
17.6% against the previous figure of 20% and=20
retail trade to shrink 5.7% compared with 6%.
Andrei Klepach, deputy economic development=20
minister, said the ministry had kept its 2009=20
forecast on industrial output decline at 11.5%=20
but said this decline could be smaller at 11%.
The ministry also lowered its inflation forecast=20
for 2010 from 9-10% to 6.5-7.5%. This year,=20
Russia's consumer prices are expected to grow 8.8-9%.
*******
#19
POLL-Russian equities set to continue rally in 2010
By John Bowker and Zlata Garasyuta
MOSCOW, Dec 16 (Reuters) - Russian stocks are set=20
to extend their rally in 2010 as market=20
strategists bet a strong rouble and high=20
commodities prices will sustain robust economic=20
growth, a Reuters poll showed on Wednesday.
Russia's RTS index has risen around 120 percent=20
so far this year after crashing spectacularly=20
during the financial crisis in 2008/09. The=20
median result of a poll of 13 strategists showed=20
another 22 percent rise next year to 1,700 points.
Analysts predicted an end 2009 RTS close of 1,375=20
points, a near 118 percent gain for the year,=20
upgraded from a 1,280 scoreline when last polled in September.
They listed a range of economic factors that=20
could support the rise -- although the forecast=20
would still leave the index some way short of the=20
2,290.5 reached at the end of 2007.
High oil prices will keep the rouble on a firm=20
footing and analysts expect the exchange rate to=20
be stable over coming months, although continued=20
steep interest rate cuts could potentially cause a rout in the currency.
Others looked further than traditional Russian=20
strongholds of oil and metals, predicting a rise=20
in consumer spending could accompany demand for resources.
"The main theme for the Russian stock market in=20
2010 will be the recovery of consumer demand --=20
that's why the cyclical sectors have the most=20
upside potential, such as banks, retail, telecoms=20
and property," said Vladimir Savov at Russian stock-broker Otkritie.
RTS is the dollar-denominated of the two=20
Moscow-based indexes, while the more liquid MICEX shows trade in roubles.
The poll results come amid signs of renewed=20
market confidence in Russia and the wider world=20
-- at least during the first quarter of next year.
Answering a separate question, 12 strategists=20
were unanimous in their belief that the global=20
market rally was set to continue in 2010,=20
although some predicted rockiness during the second and third quarters.
Should any unforeseen global event batter the oil=20
price, or the rouble unexpectedly struggle=20
against the dollar, Russian markets could face problems, some analysts said.
*******
#20
Russian nanotechnologies head Chubays launches Internet blog
ITAR-TASS
Moscow, 15 December: The head of Rosnano (Russian=20
state nanotechnologies corporation) Anatoliy=20
Chubays opened a LiveJournal blog today. In his=20
first posting on the virtual diary, he warned=20
honestly that he did not promise to answer all=20
comments and questions, but would try to read everything.
According to the former head of RAO UES (Unified=20
Energy System, Russian power-grid operator), he=20
decided to join the Internet community after long=20
consideration, however "experience tells you that=20
it is sometimes better to actually talk than,=20
let's say, not talk". "Criticism is welcomed on=20
the journal, but abuse is not tolerated," he=20
warned. "There are enough opportunities for=20
people who so wish to curse me". (Passage omitted)
Judging by the initial comments, Chubays will=20
have to talk in his blog not only as the "motor"=20
of the country's hi-tech transformation as head=20
of the Rosnano state corporation, but also as a=20
member of the Supreme Council of the Right Cause=20
party and informal leader of the Russian right.=20
He has already been advised to "give up=20
nanotechnologies and head up the right," so that=20
they do not definitively turn into "nanopoliticians".
On the first day, about 200 bloggers decided to=20
become friends with virtual Chubays, adding him as their "friend".
The fashion for blogs among representatives of=20
Russian officialdom started to snow-ball after=20
President Dmitriy Medvedev started an Internet=20
diary in October last year. By December this year over half of Russian
ministers and heads of other agencies, going as=20
far as the head of the Moscow City Internal=20
Affairs Directorate, Vladimir Kolokoltsev, are=20
among the army of bloggers-in-power.
********
#21
Moscow Times
December 16, 2009
Gas Forum to Focus On Gaining Clout
By Anatoly Medetsky
The fledging forum of gas exporting countries=20
will seek to expand membership and gain=20
international clout before it makes decisions on=20
investment and pipelines, newly elected chief=20
executive Leonid Bokhanovsky said Tuesday.
Russia, Qatar, Iran and eight other gas-rich=20
countries across the globe took another step in=20
consolidating their Gas Exporting Countries Forum=20
by electing Bokhanovsky as its secretary general=20
last week. Consumer countries are waiting to see=20
whether the group will try to fix prices like OPEC.
=93The goal of turning the organization into a gas=20
OPEC is off the agenda so far and will not be=20
considered in the near future,=94 Bokhanovsky said=20
at a news conference. =93First of all, we need =85=20
to define our place in the system of international economic relations.=94
The forum will represent the joint position of=20
its members, which now account for 44 percent of=20
global gas exports, on the current state and=20
prospects of the market, Bokhanovsky said. Its=20
influence could grow if potential talks to=20
include Australia and Canada are successful, he said.
Members may take concerted actions after the=20
forum takes its =93rightful=94 place on the=20
international scene and leading gas market=20
players agree to base their development policies=20
on the forum=92s forecasts and recommendations, Bokhanovsky said.
=93We are still too young,=94 he said. =93Over time, we=20
may work out a consolidated position on=20
investment projects, the most optimal routes for=20
laying pipelines and other issues.=94
Gazprom chief executive Alexei Miller was curt=20
Tuesday when asked about how the company could=20
benefit from the forum=92s activity. He said only=20
that the group would help the firm in terms of=20
forecasting the balance of supply and demand on the global market.
One year after the group passed a formal charter=20
last December, it has yet to make the document=20
public, raising concerns about the organization=92s=20
transparency. Bokhanovsky said Tuesday that it=20
would publish the charter =AD and summaries of future meetings =AD on its w=
eb site.
Bokhanovsky, an executive in charge of foreign=20
projects at engineering company Stroitransgaz,=20
ran for the new post against five other nominees=20
from Nigeria, Libya, Egypt, Iran and Trinidad and=20
Tobago. He won after some of the competitors=20
stepped down at a ministerial meeting in Qatar,=20
and his victory gave Russia the lead in shaping=20
up the group at its early stage, Energy Minister=20
Sergei Shmatko said at the same news conference.
=93The recognition of Russia as a leader of this process is inspiring,=94 h=
e said.
The group=92s other members are Algeria, Bolivia,=20
Equatorial Guinea and Venezuela. Kazakhstan, Norway and Holland are observe=
rs.
*******
#22
www.foreignpolicy.com
December 15, 2009
Paper Tiger
Russia's corporate giant Gazprom inspires anxiety=20
among those who suspect it of doing the Kremlin's=20
geopolitical dirty work. But changes in the=20
global economy are threatening to rob the company of its mojo.
By Christian Caryl
Christian Caryl is a contributing editor to=20
Foreign Policy. His column, Reality Check, appears weekly on ForeignPolicy.=
com.
Back in July 2008, the government of the Czech=20
Republic signed an agreement with Washington=20
allowing the construction of a U.S. radar station=20
on Czech territory, part of then-President George=20
W. Bush's missile-defense plans. The very next=20
day, the Russian energy giant Gazprom cut off=20
natural gas supplies to the Czechs, who depend on=20
Russia for 84 percent of their gas. The Kremlin=20
had already stated its opposition to U.S.=20
anti-missile installations in Central and Eastern=20
Europe in no uncertain terms, but Gazprom's move=20
put economic bite behind the bark.
It's stories like this one that have made many in=20
the West wary of Gazprom, the so-called "national=20
champion" of Russia's natural gas sector. Ever=20
since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the=20
Kremlin has increasingly relied on energy as a=20
card in its foreign-policy hand. You can hardly=20
blame it -- especially when it comes to gas.=20
Russia owns 25.2 percent of the world's proven=20
reserves, and virtually all of those resources=20
are concentrated under the aegis of Gazprom,=20
making it the world's largest producer of natural=20
gas. Although private shareholders own big chunks=20
of the company, the Russian state holds a=20
controlling stake of just over half the shares,=20
and no one has ever doubted that Gazprom's=20
managers are happy to follow government orders.=20
No less than Prime Minister Vladimir Putin argued=20
in his dissertation that state control of=20
natural-resource companies (if not necessarily=20
outright ownership) could be used to "restore=20
[Russia's] former might." When Gazprom execs=20
declare, as they've been known to do, that=20
"what's good for Gazprom is good for Russia,"=20
they aren't just blowing smoke. Gazprom is the=20
country's biggest taxpayer, accounting for a=20
quarter of Russia's national budget.
Western worries about Gazprom's political power=20
have been, ahem, fueled by the fact that the=20
corporation not only supplies the lion's share of=20
Europe's natural gas, but also controls the=20
all-important pipelines that bring the strategic=20
commodity to consumers. When Gazprom turns off=20
the spigot, entire countries go dark. That=20
happened to hapless Bulgaria, for example, during=20
one of Gazprom's recent pricing disputes with=20
Ukraine. (Bulgaria is 99 percent dependent on=20
Russia for natural gas, and inordinately=20
dependent on natural gas for home heating. When=20
the conflict between Kiev and Moscow shut down=20
the east-west pipeline to punish Ukraine, Bulgarians ended up freezing.)
And that was only logical, says Harvard=20
University professor and long-time Russia-watcher=20
Marshall Goldman: "Gas is not as fungible as oil.=20
With gas you're limited to the pipeline. And the=20
owner of the pipeline has a monopoly along the=20
route." In Central and Eastern Europe, more often=20
than not, the owner is Gazprom. The company=20
boasts a network of 95,000 miles of pipelines --=20
enough to circle the globe four times -- that it=20
runs from a huge control room in its headquarters in southwest Moscow.
Small wonder that, during the years of high=20
energy prices, Gazprom became a world-beater. In=20
2008, its market capitalization ballooned to $300=20
billion, making it the third-largest company on=20
the planet, bigger than Shell, Microsoft, or=20
General Electric. Gazprom used its economic=20
muscle and its control of Eastern European=20
pipeline networks to embark on a shopping spree,=20
snapping up chunks of energy companies around=20
Europe. Former German Chancellor Gerhard=20
Schroeder signed up to run a Gazprom-affiliated=20
company soon after leaving office. And Gazprom=20
execs touted grandiose plans to push into=20
far-away markets in the Americas and Southeast Asia.
What a difference a year makes. The global=20
economic downturn has hit Gazprom shockingly=20
hard. Not only did the worldwide demand for=20
energy crater, but doubts about market turbulence=20
in Russia also spooked investors. The two trends=20
have put the gazmeny in a bind. Whereas more=20
diversified energy corporations have managed to=20
weather the storm, Gazprom's market valuation=20
dropped to just $90 billion, and its global rank=20
in terms of size dropped from third to somewhere=20
in the low 30s. Some analysts compare its slide=20
to the popping of the dot-com bubble at the turn of the century.
Now, Gazprom has had to scale back some of its=20
more ambitious plans -- even as the company=20
acknowledges that it urgently needs to upgrade=20
aging infrastructure and develop new sources of=20
production. "At least until 2013 things are going=20
to be tough," says Jonathan Stern, a leading=20
Gazprom expert at the Oxford Institute for Energy=20
Studies. European demand has collapsed to such an=20
extent that some customers aren't even taking the=20
amounts stipulated in their contracts with the=20
Russians -- raising the prospect that Gazprom=20
might need to try to fine them for not filling=20
their orders. It has served as a salutary=20
reminder that Gazprom is just as dependent on=20
those pipelines as its customers are. In the=20
past, the company has depended on sales in=20
Western Europe for some 60 percent of its=20
revenues. Without them it suddenly doesn't look quite so strong.
One might reasonably object that Gazprom's=20
fortunes will revive once a global economic=20
recovery spurs renewed demand for energy. Yet=20
some experts argue that something fundamental has=20
changed. "[T]he global gas market has steadily=20
moved from a seller's to a buyer's market,"=20
writes analyst Roderick Kefferp=FCtz in a recent=20
report for the Centre for European Studies. The=20
pre-crisis era of high energy prices spurred a=20
worldwide investment boom in expensive liquefied=20
natural gas infrastructure, and in 2009, some=20
experts say, those investments helped create=20
something that didn't really exist before: a=20
truly global market for natural gas, independent of pipelines.
"Ten years ago no one could suggest that=20
Australia could sell gas to Europe or the United=20
States," says one analyst at a Western investment=20
bank whose company didn't authorize him to speak=20
on the record. "Back in 2000, gas was not a=20
globally traded commodity. This is the year that=20
changed." The trend has also been driven, he=20
says, by an enormous boom in the extraction of=20
natural gas from shale in the United States and=20
Canada. "Gazprom executives call shale gas=20
production a 'myth,'" the analyst says. "I don't=20
think they realize how dramatically the gas market has been transformed."
The result, as the International Energy Agency's=20
latest World Energy Outlook report puts it, is a=20
"looming gas glut" that "could have far-reaching=20
consequences for the structure of gas markets and=20
for the way gas is priced in Europe and=20
Asia-Pacific." Europe, meanwhile, has been=20
pushing ahead with the liberalization of its=20
energy markets, quietly providing for greater=20
competition in the once-stolid sector. The=20
Europeans have started building pipelines to=20
"energy island" countries, like Bulgaria and=20
Hungary, which were previously dependent solely=20
on Gazprom. The Europeans are also pushing ahead=20
with long-term plans for the Nabucco pipeline,=20
which aims to widen European market access to=20
suppliers in the Caspian Sea region (who=20
currently pay to use Gazprom's pipelines) and the=20
Middle East. That wouldn't obviate the need for=20
Russian gas, but would certainly help reduce the dependency.
None of this, of course, means that Gazprom is=20
sliding into insignificance. The sheer immensity=20
of its existing reserves will see to that. "If=20
you want to be a player in the gas business,=20
you'd better make sure you have some sort of=20
relationship with Gazprom," says Stern, who=20
remains decidedly bullish about the company's=20
medium- to long-term prospects. What it does=20
mean, though, is that Russia's national champion=20
will find itself facing an increasingly=20
unpredictable energy environment. Natalia=20
Milchakova, senior oil and gas analyst at the=20
Otkritie Financial Corporation, sees the biggest=20
risk for Gazprom in coming years in its own=20
domestic market, where government regulations=20
have long kept prices artificially low for=20
Russian consumers. Gazprom has been pushing for=20
years to have domestic prices raised to market=20
levels. But the Kremlin, clearly fearing the=20
likely effects on social stability, has kept=20
postponing the sort of major liberalization that=20
would really boost the company's bottom line.
In any case, the apparent trend toward a more=20
global market for natural gas should be good for=20
Gazprom. Over the long run, anything that gets=20
Gazprom behaving more like a normal, commercially=20
oriented energy company, and less like the=20
Kremlin's favorite political proxy, is probably=20
good news for Gazprom shareholders. And maybe,=20
just maybe, that wouldn't be so bad for Russia, either.
*******
#23
Russia-NATO relations enter new stage - Medvedev
MOSCOW, December 16 (RIA Novosti)-President=20
Dmitry Medvedev said on Wednesday that Russia's=20
relations with NATO are entering a new stage.
"Much depends on the level of Russia-NATO=20
relations," Medvedev said at a meeting with NATO=20
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen.
Rasmussen is on a three-day visit to Russia,=20
which was expected to focus on Afghanistan and=20
Russia's possible arms transportation assistance=20
to the international operations there.
Medvedev expressed the hope that as a result of=20
the visit by the NATO chief, "relations between=20
Russia and NATO will become more reliable and productive."
Relations between the military bloc and Moscow=20
have improved in recent months after being frozen=20
in the wake of the August 2008 Russia-Georgia=20
war. Rasmussen has been pushing for ties with=20
Russia to be normalized since he took office in August 2009.
Medvedev said that during their meeting Russia=20
and NATO could discuss all topical issues of=20
interaction, including joint measures to fight terrorism and common threats.
Medvedev also said that the parties would be able=20
to discuss Russia's initiative to draft a European security treaty.
In turn, Rasmussen said that strengthening=20
relations between NATO and Russia was a priority=20
for him in the post of the NATO chief.
"We may have our disagreements in some areas but=20
this should not overshadow the fact that we have=20
the same interests in many areas, because we face=20
the same security threats," Rasmussen said.
*******
#24
RFE/RL
December 16, 2009
NATO Chief Urges Russia To Do More In Afghanistan
NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has=20
called on Russia to cooperate more closely with=20
the Western military alliance in working to bring stability to Afghanistan.
He was speaking to reporters in Moscow today,=20
where he held talks at the Kremlin with Russian=20
President Dmitry Medvedev and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.
Rasmussen said it's in Russia's own interests to=20
contribute more actively to NATO's mission=20
against the Taliban in Afghanistan because=20
failure there could leave the door open to the=20
spread of Islamic extremism across Central Asia.
It is therefore "essential for Russia that we succeed in Afghanistan," he s=
aid.
Medvedev didn't comment on that, but he expressed=20
hope for stronger ties with the alliance.
"I hope your visit to Russia will help make=20
Russian-NATO relations stronger and more productive," Medvedev said.
NATO is seeking to gain broadened Russian=20
cooperation with the U.S. and NATO-led military=20
mission against Taliban insurgents. Before he=20
left Copenhagen on December 15, Rasmussen said he=20
would seek extra noncombat help from Moscow.
He suggested this could come in several forms,=20
including widening the categories of goods=20
allowed ground transit across Russian territory=20
to Afghanistan. At present only nonlethal NATO=20
goods are permitted ground transit, but NATO=20
would like to include military supplies.
Russian Assistance
NATO is coming to rely increasingly on its=20
transit routes through Central Asia and Russia,=20
as the shorter routes through Pakistan become=20
more subject to insurgent attacks.
Another possibility for extra cooperation lies in=20
Russia sending military and other security=20
personnel to Afghanistan to help train security forces there.
Rasmussen also suggested Russia could send=20
military equipment for the Afghan forces. Reuters=20
today quoted an unnamed NATO official as saying=20
that the alliance would like Moscow to supply=20
such equipment free, as a donation, rather than as an arms sale.
He mentioned helicopters, assault rifles, and=20
artillery as items needed by the Afghans.
Russia's ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, said=20
last week that Moscow is willing to do "anything"=20
except send troops to Afghanistan.
The Soviet Union fought a bloody 10-year war in=20
Afghanistan in the 1980s and sending Russian=20
combat troops back to Afghanistan is a political impossibility.
Thaw In Relations
In his remarks earlier today, Rasmussen said he=20
sees a "new beginning" in NATO's relations with Russia.
It was expected that he would also discuss the=20
aftermath of the war between Russia and Georgia=20
last year, which caused a temporary deep freeze=20
in relations after the West condemned Russia's military offensive in Georgi=
a.
Russia's proposal for a new security architecture=20
for Europe would also likely be discussed.
Rasmussen was scheduled to meet Russian Prime=20
Minister Vladimir Putin later today.
*******
#25
Moscow Times
December 16, 2009
Kremlin to Press NATO Chief on Security Pact
By Nikolaus von Twickel
NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen will=20
hold talks with President Dmitry Medvedev and=20
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on Wednesday in=20
what is seen as a key step toward rebuilding the=20
alliance=92s ties with Moscow after the chill that=20
followed last year=92s war in Georgia.
A potentially thorny issue will be Medvedev=92s=20
initiative for a broader European-Atlantic=20
security treaty, which is seen by many Western=20
governments as an attempt to restore Moscow=92s influence by undermining NA=
TO.
The Kremlin said in a statement Tuesday that it=20
would push to discuss the treaty with Rasmussen,=20
but a senior NATO official said the issue would=20
be better dealt with by the Organization for=20
Security and Cooperation in Europe, or the OSCE.
=93We are not dogmatic and do not have taboos, but=20
with all due respect we think that the OSCE is=20
the right place for this,=94 the official said,=20
requesting anonymity in line with NATO policy.
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov presented a draft=20
treaty at the NATO-Russia Council meeting on Dec.=20
4 in Brussels, the first meeting of the body=20
after a yearlong freeze following the Georgia=20
war. But in a sign that the path to a strategic=20
partnership is still rocky, Lavrov gave Rasmussen=20
a working paper at the meeting that suggests that=20
NATO should refrain from stationing substantial=20
troops or arms in its new member states in Eastern Europe.
The hitherto unpublished paper, a copy of which=20
was obtained by The Moscow Times, proposes that=20
both sides agree not to station military=20
infrastructure in another European country but=20
defines NATO in its membership of May 1997,=20
effectively banning the transfer of=20
infrastructure from existing members to former=20
Warsaw Pact or Soviet members, which all joined=20
later. The proposal is likely to anger members=20
like Poland and the Baltic states, which see NATO as protection against Rus=
sia.
Moscow has been irked by NATO=92s eastward=20
expansion into territories that it sees as its=20
traditional sphere of influence. NATO=92s proposed=20
inclusion of Georgia and Ukraine has been cited=20
as a prime factor behind the war over Georgia=92s rebel region of South Oss=
etia.
Dmitry Rogozin, Moscow=92s permanent representative=20
to NATO, confirmed the existence of the proposal=20
but refused to comment on its contents. =93This is=20
just a working paper not ready for publication,=94=20
he told The Moscow Times on Tuesday.
But both Rogozin and the NATO official were=20
adamant that improving ties was at the top of the agenda.
=93This is a very important visit because the=20
[NATO-Russia] relationship requires a lot of=20
political attention,=94 the NATO official said.
He noted that Rasmussen himself has called the=20
partnership with Russia a priority. =93And he means=20
that because it will require a lot of work,=94 he said.
Key areas of cooperation have been the war on=20
terror and NATO=92s campaign in Afghanistan, where=20
Moscow says it shares Western concerns about=20
Islamist militancy and narcotics and has allowed=20
the transit of NATO supplies over Russian soil.
Rasmussen told reporters in Copenhagen on Tuesday=20
that he would seek more help from Russia on=20
Afghanistan, including equipment and trainers for=20
Afghan forces, Reuters reported.
Rogozin said he was pinning his hopes on a=20
planned joint review of security threats.
He said he would discuss the country=92s new=20
military doctrine with the members of a NATO=20
expert group developing the alliance=92s next=20
strategy. The long-awaited military doctrine is=20
expected to be presented to Medvedev this month.
Security Council secretary Nikolai Patrushev, who=20
oversees its formulation, caused some=20
consternation in October when he said in an=20
interview that the doctrine would also assert the=20
country=92s right for a preventative nuclear strike in local wars.
Rasmussen is meeting with Patrushev on Thursday, the Kremlin said.
Putin=92s spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the prime=20
minister would discuss =93all aspects of the=20
country=92s cooperation with NATO.=94 He stressed=20
that the meeting would take place after talks=20
with Medvedev in the Kremlin and that the sole=20
reason for it was that Rasmussen had asked for=20
it. =93The prime minister received a request and=20
decided to meet the secretary-general,=94 he said.
*******
#26
Gazeta
December 16, 2009
RUSSIA TO COVER NATO'S BACK AREAS...in Afghanistan
Rasmussen of NATO is in Moscow discuss=20
cooperation between the Alliance and Russia
Author: Denis Telmanov
NATO SECRETARY GENERAL ANDERS FOGH RASMUSSEN CAME TO RUSSIA TO
SUGGEST ADVANCEMENT OF NATO-RUSSIAN COOPERATION IN AFGHANISTAN
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen came to Russia
on a working visit. Officially, Rasmussen is in Moscow to suggest
advancement of cooperation in Afghanistan. Not for protocol,
however, it is said that he is here to bring up the subject of
repairs of the ageing Soviet- and Russian-made merchandise wielded
by East European armies, try and secure Moscow's promise to help
NATO contingents in Afghanistan with logistics, and to listen to
Russian offers concerning the future European ballistic missile
defense framework.
Rasmussen is scheduled to meet with President Dmitry
Medvedev, Premier Vladimir Putin, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov,
Sergei Mironov of the Federation Council, and Boris Gryzlov of the
Duma.
Brussels-based sources told Gazeta that plans of military
cooperation with Russia would be endorsed by the meeting of NATO
chiefs-of-staff in January 2010. (Nikolai Makarov of Russia is
expected there too.) The sources suggested that the meeting would
discuss joint fight with piracy, international exercises, and
anti-trafficking activities.
Needless to say, it is Afghanistan that is mostly on NATO
functionaries' minds, these days.
"The current transit agreement might be expanded to include
transit by air and extend the list of permitted shipments," a
spokesman for the Alliance said.
Ruslan Pukhov, Director of the Center for Analysis of
Strategies and Techniques, commented that it was logistics that
NATO must be particularly interested in. "Nobody is talking about
the Alliance procuring weapons from Russia, of course. Still,
everything else from toilet paper to fresh vegetables might be
procured through NATO NAMSA (Maintenance and Supply Agency)
channels," Pukhov said. The expert suggested that NATO and the
Russian military were more likely to discuss maintenance of MI-8s,
MI-17s, and MI-24s wielded by Polish, Romanian, and Czech armies
and that financial equivalent of this cooperation was to be quite
modest.
Major General Laszlo Makk, the Head of the Military Liaison
Mission in Moscow, bore out Pukhov's assumptions. "Repairs and
maintenance are always important," he said. Makk suggested that
maintenance of helicopters had the potential of becoming the basis
of extensive NATO-Russian cooperation.
Russian Representative to NATO Dmitry Rogozin called
ballistic missile defense another central item on the Russian-NATO
agenda. Russian and NATO foreign ministers signed a program of
cooperation on December 4 that emphasized the necessity to resume
ABM contacts. A special working group was to be set up within the
framework of the Russian-NATO Council for the purpose. According
to Rogozin, it was mostly with the Americans that Russia was
discussing the matter nowadays.
Victor Yesin, former chief-of-staff of the Russian Strategic
Missile Forces, said that Moscow should reanimate the concept of
the European ballistic missile defense system George W. Bush had
nearly killed once with his insistence on the third position area
in East Europe. "Russia abandoned this idea then, but things are
different now," Yesin said.
According to Yesin, Russia needs to know where it stands in
the matter of ABM cooperation. "Offering the NATO the use of
radars in Gabala and Armavir, we need in return joint evaluation
of threats that will shape the future architecture of the
ballistic missile defense system... Along with everything else,
Russia will be better off with NATO ships carrying Standard-3M
missiles stationed in the White Sea rather than in the Baltic of
Black sea. If we are to participate in the program of European ABM
system development, we will want it against genuine missile
threats, with Russia's own interests taken into account."
*******
#27
U.S. shipping more to Afghanistan via Central Asia
December 15, 2009
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States has=20
greatly expanded the use of a new supply route=20
through Central Asia this year to send=20
nonmilitary cargo to its troops in Afghanistan, a=20
Defense Department official said on Tuesday.
In the past 11 months, the United States has=20
shipped almost 5,000 containers to its troops=20
along the Central Asian railway route, said=20
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense David=20
Sedney. The route runs across Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
"We will expand this number (of containers) in=20
2010 to meet the new demand" that will be created=20
by President Obama's decision to send 30,000 more=20
U.S. troops to Afghanistan, Sedney told a Senate=20
Foreign Relations subcommittee.
The supply route, known as the Northern=20
Distribution Network, is helping complement=20
heavily burdened supply lines that run through=20
Pakistan to U.S. troops in Afghanistan, Sedney said.
Washington has been working with Central Asian=20
governments to diversify supply routes for its=20
troops as militants in Pakistan sometimes attack convoys.
In addition to the Northern Distribution Network=20
on the ground, the Defense Department conducts=20
military overflights of most countries in Central Asia, Sedney said.
Not all of the ground cargo that goes through=20
Pakistan gets to U.S. troops, but the cargo moved=20
through the newer Central Asian route arrives all=20
the time. The cargo includes wood, nails and plastic sheeting for U.S. forc=
es.
Bottlenecks are created in Afghanistan because it=20
has no railroads, Sedney said. When the rail=20
cargo arrives there, it has to be loaded onto=20
trucks. A new railroad planned for Afghanistan=20
with the help of the Asian Development Bank will help remedy this, Sedney s=
aid.
Obama earlier this month announced plans to rush=20
30,000 more U.S. troops to Afghanistan next year=20
to join the roughly 68,000 already there fighting a war that began in 2001.
The troop hike means "a lot" more cargo will be=20
needed, Sedney told Reuters after the hearing.=20
But he declined to predict how much more would=20
need to be shipped along the Central Asian railway route.
"That will depend on the agreements with the=20
governments involved, and our ability to balance=20
all the factors. I wouldn't want to limit it by=20
saying double or tripling because it's possible=20
it would be more than that. And, it's possible it could be less," he said.
*******
#28
No plans to sign Russia nuclear deal this week: U.S.
By Jeff Mason and Conor Sweeney
December 15, 2009
WASHINGTON/MOSCOW (Reuters) - The White House on=20
Tuesday played down chances the United States and=20
Russia would sign an agreement to reduce their=20
nuclear arms stockpiles this week during the Copenhagen climate summit.
Robert Gibbs, President Barack Obama's spokesman,=20
said there were no plans for a signing ceremony=20
when Obama flies to Europe to attend the U.N. climate negotiations on Frida=
y.
Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev are=20
both expected to be in the Danish capital this=20
week and a Russian source familiar with the=20
summit said the two may sign an agreement there.
Washington and Moscow failed to reach agreement=20
on a successor to the 1991 Strategic Arms=20
Reduction Treaty (START), the biggest agreed=20
nuclear weapons cut in history, before December=20
5, when the pact had been due to expire. Both=20
sides agreed it should remain in force pending agreement on a successor.
"We are not planning currently for a signing=20
ceremony in Copenhagen, and we are not planning=20
to visit any nearby countries on that trip (to=20
sign) a new START treaty," Gibbs told a briefing at the White House.
"We certainly hope that we continue to make=20
progress on the negotiations, hopeful that it=20
gets done soon. I don't know if it gets done this week," he said.
Signing of the agreement would provide further=20
signals that previously tense relations between=20
the United States and Russia were easing.
Medvedev will be joined by his foreign minister,=20
Sergei Lavrov, as part of the presidential=20
delegation, the Russian source said, adding=20
Lavrov would not be going to Copenhagen unless=20
Russia believed the new treaty could be signed with Obama there.
Lavrov said last Wednesday that the treaty would=20
be signed soon, but declined to elaborate.
GETTING CLOSE
Earlier, the State Department said progress was=20
being made but that it was too early to say when=20
negotiators would cross the finish line.
"We think we're getting very close to an=20
agreement," said State Department spokesman P.J.=20
Crowley. "Our goal is to get this done by the end=20
of the year and we'll just continue to evaluate this on a day-to-day basis."
Negotiators in Geneva failed to meet the deadline=20
because they had only spent a few months in=20
talks, compared with years spent formulating=20
previous treaties, said Fyodor Lyukanov, the=20
editor of Russia in Global Affairs.
"I think it is widely anticipated and expected.=20
They didn't meet the desired deadline due to=20
technical details. But, it was sure they would do=20
it before the end of the year," he said.
"Copenhagen is a good opportunity for both=20
presidents to meet, show they are fighting=20
climate change and sign this document. It creates=20
a good atmosphere and is the first legal document=20
in many years signed by America and Russia=20
demonstrating they can do a deal together," he told Reuters.
The START-1 treaty, signed by then-U.S. President=20
George H.W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail=20
Gorbachev, took nearly a decade to achieve. Under=20
the deal, Russia more than halved its nuclear=20
arsenal, the Foreign Ministry has said.
Over the past decade, relations between Moscow=20
and Washington became strained over the Iraq war,=20
NATO's eastward expansion and last year's Georgia=20
war, but Obama pledged to improve ties when he became president.
Last July, Obama and Medvedev outlined a=20
framework for the new treaty, restricting=20
deployed strategic warheads to between 1,500 and=20
1,675 while limiting the number of delivery platforms to between 500 and 1,=
100.
The United States and Russia would still have=20
enough firepower to destroy the world several times over.
*******
#29
www.russiatoday.com
December 16, 2009
ROAR: =93New START will be more favorable to Russia=92s interests=94
Moscow and Washington will not sign a new START=20
treaty this week as some problems are still to be negotiated.
Many expected Obama and Medvedev to sign the=20
agreement this week. However, White House=20
Spokesman Robert Gibbs said on December 15 that=20
the US administration =93has no current plans to=20
sign a landmark nuclear arms reduction pact with Russia in Copenhagen.=94
The two countries have promised to sign the=20
agreement by the end of the year. The previous=20
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START 1) expired=20
on December 5. =93For the first time over the last=20
37 years, Moscow and Washington have remained=20
without a judicial act limiting their nuclear=20
potentials,=94 Kommersant daily said.
=93It seems that the White House has decided not to=20
be in a hurry and not to mix climatic problems=20
with disarmament issues,=94 Rossiyskaya Gazeta=20
daily said. =93Experts have agreed on most details,=20
but some small touches still remain, and the=20
presidents of Russia and the US should discuss=20
them during their personal meting,=94 the paper said.
=93It is the heads of state who will announce to=20
the world about the end of the work on the=20
document,=94 it added. =93It is possible that the=20
concrete date and the place of the signing of it=20
will be agreed in Copenhagen,=94 the paper noted.
Yevgeny Myasnikov, the leading researcher at the=20
Center for Disarmament, Energy and Ecology=20
Studies, believes that the pause after December 5=20
is not =93frightening.=94 It is important what=20
conditions the new treaty will contain.
=93However, the danger of joint notifications and=20
inspections that worked until recently will now=20
stop working,=94 he told Rosbalt news agency.=20
=93Suspicions will appear immediately, and it is=20
not ruled out that they will turn into inadequate=20
reaction of one of the sides,=94 he said.
Some analysts believe that the issues of the=20
control over mobile ground-based missile systems=20
and the limitation of a number of delivery=20
vehicles may become a stumbling block, the agency said.
But Aleksey Arbatov, head of the Center of=20
International Security at the Institute of World=20
Economy and International Relations, believes=20
that the main problem is inspections of both sides.
=93The US wants to continue inspections of the=20
plant in Votkinsk where missiles Topol-M,=20
Iskander and Bulava are produced, and Russia=92s=20
position is that it is unnecessary to inspect the=20
plant itself, and the places where ballistic=20
missiles are based are enough,=94 Arbatov told Rosbalt.
=93It is not a tragedy if the new treaty is not=20
signed by December 5,=94 he added. =93But it will be=20
a heavy blow if the new treaty is not signed by May next year,=94 he said.
The 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review=20
Conference is due to take place in New York in=20
May. =93All nuclear states are awaiting this treaty=20
that has been promised to them,=94 Arbatov said.
Aleksandr Konovalov, president of the Institute=20
for Strategic Assessment and Analysis, believes=20
that the timing of the new agreement is not so=20
important, =93more important is to think over all=20
the clauses of it.=94 The ideal outcome would be to=20
prolong the old agreement, he noted. The Russian=20
Foreign Ministry earlier said the prolongation could be one of the options.
At the same time, =93the Russian military are=20
hampering the prolongation of the START 1 because=20
this treaty bans the deployment of new ballistic=20
ground-based missiles with a separating warhead,=94=20
Konovalov told Gazeta daily. They want to replace=20
some old missiles with new ones by the end of the year, he said.
Russia will still replace the old missiles =93in=20
any case,=94 Konovalov said, stressing that Moscow=20
=93needs this treaty because we will have a=20
colossal disparity with Americans. And if the=20
presidents ordered to work out the text, I think=20
that in the end it will be written.=94
=93It is possible to live for two months without a=20
treaty,=94 Konovalov noted. "The main thing is not=20
to take decisions that contradict the essence of the agreement.=94
=93The new agreement is expected to be =93more=20
equitable to the interests of Russia than the=20
previous one,=94 Moskovsky Komsomolets daily said.=20
Most analysts believe that the START 1 =93was not=20
favorable for Russia and reflected the weakness=20
of the country in the 1990s,=94 the paper noted.=20
Moscow =93had to agree to unfavorable conditions=20
proposed by the Americans,=94 the daily added.
=93Now the situation has changed, and many things=20
in the START 1 are not acceptable for us, and=20
first of all the draconian measures of control,=94=20
the paper said. The new version of the agreement=20
does not provide for the possibility of=20
around-the-clock American inspections at a=20
Russian plant in the Republic of Udmurtia, according to the paper=92s sourc=
es.
In addition, telemetric data on test launches of=20
Russia=92s missiles will not be transferred to the=20
American side, the paper said. This demand was=20
=93absurd,=94 the paper said. =93We ourselves provided=20
the US with exact details of a missile=92s flight,=94=20
it said, adding that =93Americans could use the data for their missile defe=
nse.=94
The future agreement will not influence Russia=92s=20
plans =93to modernize its nuclear potential,=94 the=20
paper said. =93It will not limit the deployment of=20
a new RS-24 system with a separating warhead and=20
will not derail plans on the creation of a new heavy missile,=94 the paper =
said.
Despite =93a serious victory for Russia in the=20
dialogue on strategic arms,=94 Moscow had to make=20
some compromises, taking into account =93a number=20
of political factors,=94 the paper said.
The US may retain the ability to increase the=20
number of warheads on deployed delivery vehicles,=20
the daily said, adding that it is not clear if=20
this potential will be limited somehow, it added.
The new document may also leave 700-750 delivery=20
vehicles for each side, the paper=92s sources=20
added. These are =93not good figures=94 for Russia,=20
the paper said, because Moscow will have =93to=20
increase rather than decrease the production of=20
delivery vehicles=94 taking into account the need to replace old ones.
In this sense, =93it is possible that the new START=20
treaty will become not a plan of disarmament for=20
Russia, but the beginning of a new arms race,=94=20
the daily said, wondering if the country=92s economy will endure it.
Sergey Borisov, RT
********
#30
Russia Profile
December 15, 2009
Speed Bargaining
It Took Nine Years to Negotiate START I, But=20
Russian and American Negotiators Have Just Months to Come Up With a Replace=
ment
By Alexander Pikaev
Alexander Pikaev, Ph.D. in political science, is=20
the head of the disarmament and conflict=20
regulation division at the Institute of World=20
Economy and International Relations of the=20
Russian Academy of Sciences and the director of=20
the Russian program at the Center for=20
Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California.
The first Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START=20
I) expired on December 5 this year. And despite=20
pledges to continue =93in the spirit=94 of the=20
document, the fact is that until a replacement=20
treaty is negotiated, Russia and the United=20
States are without a bilateral regime ensuring=20
the limitation and transparency of their nuclear=20
arsenals. To make matters worse, the negotiators=20
face a tight deadline =AD the new treaty should be ready by May of 2010.
START I was signed by the Soviet Union and the=20
United States back in 1991. After the Soviet=20
Union fell apart, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and=20
Kazakhstan inherited this document. The latter=20
three simultaneously joined the Nuclear=20
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear=20
powers. The document took effect on December 5,=20
1994. It was meant to last for 15 years.
The START I treaty marked the peak of the=20
Soviet-American process of controlling strategic=20
armaments. It presupposed a reduction of=20
strategic offensive arms to 1,600 units, and a=20
reduction of nuclear warheads to 6,000 units on=20
each side. At that, the number of warheads=20
mounted on ballistic missiles was not to exceed=20
4,900. At the time of the treaty=92s signing, the=20
United States and the Soviet Union each possessed=20
some 10,000 to 11,000 strategic nuclear warheads.=20
Besides the significant reductions, the treaty=20
encompassed a very detailed and intrusive=20
verification procedure. All of the quantitative=20
limits that the document contained were=20
implemented within the stated timeframe.
The START I treaty contained a clause on the=20
sides=92 ability to extend it for five years.=20
However, a few procedures had to be followed in=20
order to achieve this: the decision should have=20
been made by the five-sided joint commission on=20
implementation and verification no later than a=20
year before the treaty expired. The committee did=20
meet in 2008, but did not make this decision, and=20
thus the opportunity to automatically extend the=20
terms of the treaty was missed.
On December 5, the presidents of the United=20
States and Russia announced their intent to keep=20
acting =93in the spirit=94 of the treaty. In other=20
words, they are no longer bound by the terms of=20
this document. For the first time in decades,=20
Moscow and Washington found themselves in a=20
situation where the bilateral regime that ensured=20
the limitation and transparency of their=20
strategic offensive arms arsenals was no longer functioning.
New Treaty American Style
In essence, the START I treaty was the only=20
international legal document that regulated the=20
verifiable reductions of strategic nuclear arms=20
in both countries and kept them at a level half=20
that which existed at the end of the Cold War.=20
Moreover, the verification regime that the=20
document established was instrumental for another=20
Russian-American document =ADthe Strategic=20
Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) which was=20
signed in 2002 and is in effect for ten years.=20
But without the START I treaty, SORT turns into=20
no more than a legally-binding declaration that cannot be enforced.
The previous American administration bears the=20
responsibility for this status quo. Between 2002=20
and 2007 it outright refused to discuss the=20
question of further reductions in strategic=20
offensive arsenals. Back in 2006, Russia appealed=20
to the United States with an offer to discuss the=20
issue of replacing START I. The American side=20
seemed uninterested in this offer, suggesting=20
simply preserving the protocol on implementation=20
and verification that was being used as the foundation for SORT.
In 2007 and 2008 the two sides consulted each=20
other on a new document, but failed to settle=20
their differences. In 2007, Moscow and Washington=20
agreed that START I should be replaced by a=20
legally binding document, but the George Bush=20
administration did not settle on a position that=20
would allow the new document to be filled with=20
concrete content. As a result a lot of time was=20
lost, and Moscow and Washington were unable to=20
lay the groundwork for rapid negotiations in 2009=20
before the change of administration in the White House.
Unlike the republicans, U.S. President Barack=20
Obama=92s administration chose a rather energetic=20
approach to settling on a new agreement. In April=20
of 2009, when he met Russian President Dmitry=20
Medvedev in London, they were able to agree on=20
resuming consultations so that a new treaty could=20
be prepared before START I expired. The chief=20
negotiator on the American side was Rose=20
Gottemoeller, an experienced politician who=20
headed the Moscow Carnegie Center for three years.
Following two months of intense negotiations, the=20
Russian and American diplomats agreed on the main=20
framework of the future agreement, fixed in a=20
memorandum of understanding signed after Obama=92s=20
visit to Russia in June 2009. The sides agreed=20
that the new document will contain a full-fledged=20
verification procedure as well as a clause on the=20
interdependency of strategic offensive and=20
defensive arms. The Russian side also asked for=20
quantitative limits to be placed on strategic=20
delivery vehicles and on the warheads associated=20
with them. The text of the mutual understanding=20
memorandum states that Russia and the United=20
States have set the ceiling for strategic=20
delivery vehicles at 500 to 1,100 units, and for=20
warheads at 1,500 to 1,675=ADless than the numbers=20
stated in the 2002 SORT treaty.
Nonetheless, despite Washington drastically=20
altering its position and both sides wanting to=20
make a new agreement as soon as possible, the=20
negotiations ran into a host of difficulties.=20
These were partly due to the transitions taking=20
place in the United States. As a rule, it takes a=20
few months to shape up a new administration, and=20
it takes time to appoint and approve officials=20
for key positions. For Obama=92s administration,=20
the appointment process ended in April to May of 2009.
This was followed by a review of policies=20
inherited from the previous president, and=20
setting of new priorities in the areas of=20
national security, defense and nuclear armament.=20
Obama=92s administration set out to conduct a=20
regular four-year review of defense programs and=20
an associated review of nuclear policy. However,=20
conducting these reviews has turned out to be a=20
rather complex task. Obama came to power with the=20
slogan of =93change=94 and declared his support for=20
the goal of a nuclear-free world, but it is=20
unlikely that the middle-range bureaucrats=20
involved in the review of the nuclear policy=20
would support these ideas. As a result, the=20
review was not finished by December 1 as planned.
Traditionally, the United States does not sign=20
agreements that limit the size of its arsenal or=20
narrow its choice of armaments without conducting=20
internal debates on the number and structure of=20
its strategic offensive arms, so it was always=20
unlikely that a new long-term treaty would be signed in 2009.
The negotiations are being held in a closed=20
format, and there is little information on either=20
of the sides=92 positions. But it can be safely=20
assumed that there are significant differences on=20
a number of key issues. For example, Russia and=20
the United States agreed in principle that the=20
verification procedure mentioned in START I=20
should be simplified. But this voluminous=20
protocol contains a large number of mutual=20
compromises on tens if not hundreds of very=20
complex technological issues. It took years to=20
put it together, and establishing a new array of=20
compromises may require lengthy meetings of=20
groups of technological experts, which have not been held.
Despite the agreement that the interdependence of=20
strategic offensive and defensive arms should be=20
mentioned in the treaty, settling on the concrete=20
text will inevitably be more difficult. Russia=20
will most likely try to make this clause stricter=20
in order to limit America=92s ability set up=20
anti-missile systems, while the United States=20
will not agree to more than a few vague lines.
Furthermore, Russia and the United States most=20
likely disagree over the means to be used when=20
reducing the number of armaments. Moscow is=20
primarily interested in their physical=20
destruction, as the previous treaties, including=20
START I, postulated. Washington, on the other=20
hand, prefers reductions by means of so-called=20
=93unloading,=94 when the missiles remain in position=20
while the =93extra=94 warheads are dismounted. The=20
warheads themselves are not destroyed, but stored=20
next to the strategic offensive armaments bases.=20
This allows for them to be quickly reinstalled=20
should the need arise. As such, the United States=20
would preserve a lot of its potential, which in=20
case of its withdrawal from the treaty would=20
allow it to quickly get the upper hand over Russia.
It should be noted that the American side=92s=20
unwillingness to significantly reduce its=20
strategic offensive armaments makes one question=20
the sincerity of the Obama administration=92s calls=20
for nuclear disarmament. Moreover, signing a=20
treaty that presupposes strategic nuclear arms=20
reductions by means of arithmetic and statistical=20
balancing can be subjected to serious criticism=20
and accusations of trying to trick the other=20
states and the international community at large.
Certainly, these contradictions can be overcome.=20
But it will take a long time to settle them in a=20
way that is acceptable to both sides, and time is=20
one thing the negotiators do not have. The real=20
negotiations started only in May of 2009. In=20
other words, the delegates were supposed to come=20
up with a new agreement in just seven months,=20
where as the negotiations on START I lasted for some nine years.
As far as we know, since the end of November the=20
United States and Russia have been in constant=20
consultations on a new agreement in Geneva. The=20
sides claim that they are nearly finished. From=20
diplomatic practice it is also known that when=20
running out of time, the negotiators try to=20
bargain for the best terms at the last minute.
Rumors had it that the new treaty could be signed=20
right after Barack Obama received his Nobel Peace=20
Prize in Oslo on December 10. It didn=92t happen.=20
At present, the last opportunity to sign a new=20
treaty this year is the climate change summit in=20
Copenhagen, where Barack Obama could potentially meet with Dmitry Medvedev.
If a new treaty is not signed at the Copenhagen=20
conference, its signing will most likely be=20
postponed until spring. The delegations will=20
leave Geneva for the Christmas and New Year=20
holidays. After that, some time will be needed in=20
a calm atmosphere to look over the results=20
achieved and agree on the time and place of the=20
next round of negotiations. The additional three=20
to four months would provide the opportunity to=20
better agree on a number of sensitive points, and=20
as a result to come up with a more detailed=20
document better suited to the interests of both sides.
The true deadline for signing the document is the=20
Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference, which=20
is supposed to take place in May of 2010 in New=20
York. At this conference, non-nuclear countries=20
will most likely broach the issue of the nuclear=20
powers=92 fulfilling their nuclear disarmament=20
responsibilities. Here, a new agreement would be quite appropriate.
********
#31
Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor
December 15, 2009
Yushchenko offers pro-western election campaign while trailing in polls
Viktor Yushchenko=92s Foreign Policy Agenda
By Taras Kuzio
Viktor Yushchenko has trailed badly in opinion=20
polls in the last year with ratings of less than=20
5 percent, but has benefitted from the collapse=20
of Arseniy Yatseniuk=92s election campaign=20
(rankings of candidates in 2008-2009:=20
www.uceps.org/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=3D91).=20
Yushchenko is now the main =93Orange=94 competitor to=20
Yulia Tymoshenko in Western Ukraine (EDM, October 16, November 3, 16, 20).
In foreign policy terms, Yushchenko is a=20
different candidate to five years ago, when he=20
presented himself as a centrist (patriotic)=20
politician to broaden the appeal of national=20
democrats like himself beyond their Western=20
Ukrainian heartland (Ukrayinska Pravda, November=20
24). This strategy won Yushchenko the crucial=20
swing region of central Ukraine and the=20
presidency. Yushchenko=92s move away from centrist=20
patriotism to nationalism in the 2010 elections=20
echoes the retreat of Our Ukraine from central=20
Ukraine, which won four Galician and=20
Trans-Carpathian oblasts in 2006 and only=20
Trans-Carpathia in 2007. Yushchenko=92s nationalist=20
platform is only a threat to Tymoshenko in the=20
three Galician, and to a lesser degree in the=20
four other Western Ukrainian oblasts. Yushchenko=20
will compete with the rising contender Serhiy=20
Tihipko, Viktor Yanukovych=92s election manager in=20
2004, for third and fourth place in round one.
In the 2004 elections, Yushchenko=92s =93Ten Steps to=20
the People=94 election program never mentioned=20
NATO, Trans-Atlantic integration or even the EU=20
(Our Ukraine has also not referred to NATO in any=20
of its election programs). The only mention of=20
foreign policy was a vague reference to Russia=20
and Belarus (but nothing on the CIS). This=20
unwillingness to highlight Yushchenko=92s=20
pro-Western orientation was an outcome of his=20
2004 centrist-patriotic platform that sought to=20
appeal beyond western Ukraine (www.president.gov.ua/docs/10krokiv.pdf).
Yushchenko=92s 2010 election program also makes no=20
reference to NATO but does, unlike in 2004,=20
state: =93Together with European neighbors, we will=20
strengthen the Euro-Atlantic system of collective=20
security=94 (www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2010/WP0011). On=20
the European Union, Yushchenko=92s 2010 election=20
program calls for a visa-free regime and=20
membership with the EU. The program overlooks the=20
Free Trade Zone between Ukraine and the EU that will be signed next year.
Yushchenko has at least supported Ukraine=92s=20
integration into NATO and the EU. Under the 1996=20
and 2006 constitutions, Yushchenko can appoint=20
the Foreign and Defense Ministers, National=20
Security and Defense Council (NRBO) secretary and=20
Security Service chairman providing him with=20
institutional control over Ukraine=92s security policy.
Four problems bedevil Yushchenko=92s foreign policy:
1. The translation of Kuchma-era rhetoric on=20
trans-Atlantic integration into action requires a=20
president to work together with a parliamentary=20
coalition and government of like mind. Addressing=20
Yushchenko at the recent EU-Ukraine summit,=20
European Commission President Jose Manuel=20
Barrosso said, =93I will speak honestly with you,=20
Mr. President. It often seems to us that=20
commitments on reform are only partly implemented=20
and words are not always accompanied by action.=20
Reforms are the only way to establish stability,=20
and build closer ties with the EU=94 (Ukrayinska Pravda, December 4).
During Yushchenko=92s five years in office there=20
have been four governments, three of which have=20
been =93Orange.=94 Yushchenko has only had good=20
relations with one of the four governments and=20
with only one of the three =93Orange=94 governments=20
led by Yuriy Yekhanurov in 2005-2006.
2. The successful implementation of=20
trans-Atlantic integration requires an=20
understanding of the inter-connection between=20
domestic and foreign policies, which Yushchenko=20
has never understood. The consequences have been=20
a domination of rhetoric over substance, as in the Kuchma era.
3. Yushchenko has taken one step backwards=20
compared to Kuchma with regard to his mis-use of=20
the NRBO, whose four secretaries were chosen not=20
for their experience in trans-Atlantic=20
integration, but for their value in battling=20
unfriendly governments. All four pale in=20
comparison with Kuchma=92s NRBO secretaries,=20
Volodymyr Horbulin and Yevhen Marchuk. The NRBO=20
under Yushchenko has been used not to coordinate=20
Ukrainian institutions on national security, but=20
as an alternative government to Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovych.
4. In 2005-2006 the EU failed to rise to=20
Ukraine=92s democratic breakthrough because of a=20
lack of strategic vision, enlargement fatigue and=20
constitutional chaos. The US and NATO did rise to=20
the occasion and a Membership Action Plan (MAP)=20
could have been offered to Ukraine in Riga in=20
November 2006. The US and other NATO members=20
sympathetic to Ukrainian membership pushed for an=20
=93Orange=94 coalition to be established quickly=20
after the March 2006 elections, which would have=20
been followed by President George W. Bush=92s visit=20
to Ukraine in June and a MAP in November.=20
Yushchenko=92s hostility to the return of=20
Tymoshenko as Prime Minister undermined this=20
plan, which was ultimately undone when an=20
=93anti-Orange=94 and anti-crisis coalition was=20
established in July. Prime Minister Yanukovych=20
told NATO in Brussels two months later that=20
Ukraine was not interested in receiving a MAP.=20
From 2007 onward Ukraine=92s trans-Atlantic=20
integration was hamstrung by a combination of=20
Ukraine and then Yushchenko-fatigue and Germany=92s=20
increasingly independent line in the EU and NATO=20
and Russia-first foreign policy.
Three Ukrainian factors led to skepticism in=20
Western Europe towards Yushchenko=92s rhetoric on=20
Trans-Atlantic integration. Frequent government=20
turnovers negatively impacted upon the ability of=20
three =93Orange=94 governments to launch information=20
campaigns in support of NATO membership which has=20
remained at 20 percent throughout Yushchenko=92s=20
presidency (polls conducted between 2002-2009:=20
www.uceps.org/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=3D46). Moreover,=20
political instability and elite in-fighting was=20
repeatedly raised by Germany as a concern. During=20
the election campaign Yushchenko continues to=20
hurl insults at Tymoshenko on a daily basis,=20
calling her =93homeless=94 and a =93bum.=94 Finally, the=20
Party of Regions alliance with Russian=20
nationalist-separatists in the For Yanukovych!=20
Bloc in the Crimean parliament led to the first=20
ever violent anti-American/NATO protests in the=20
Crimea. These de-railed joint military exercises=20
with NATO that had peacefully occurred for a decade under Kuchma.
Yushchenko=92s 2010 election program is more=20
pro-Western than in 2004, but following five=20
years of a widening gulf between rhetoric and=20
substance few Ukrainians believe in his ability=20
to deliver on foreign (or domestic) policies.=20
When giving their vote to Yushchenko, Galician=20
Ukrainians do so out of a misplaced fear that=20
Tymoshenko=92s mix of pragmatism and ideology means=20
she has sold out to Russia (www.day.kiev.ua,=20
November 12). In reaching this conclusion, they=20
forget that Tymoshenko=92s 2010 centrist-patriotic=20
election program is not fundamentally different=20
to the platform upon which Yushchenko won the presidency five years ago.
*******
#32
BBC Monitoring
Russian cartoon show mocks Ukrainian leaders, Hillary Clinton
Channel One TV
December 13, 2009
The latest edition of the cartoon show "Animated=20
Personalities" broadcast on Russian=20
state-controlled Channel One TV on 13 December=20
once again featured sketches mocking the leaders=20
of Ukraine and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
The first Ukrainian sketch showed the characters=20
of President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister=20
Yuliya Tymoshenko in a field by a gas pipeline.=20
"Tymoshenko" is knitting a stars-and-stripes=20
patterned scarf to present to US President Barack=20
Obama's children. When "Yushchenko", lolling in a=20
hammock, asks why she is only making one, she=20
explains that because the children will start=20
arguing over the scarf, Obama will have to invite=20
them to the White House again to bring more presents.
Next, "Yushchenko" suggests the two of them=20
should play a word game, but gets bored quickly=20
and suggests that they should steal some gas from=20
the pipeline instead - to which "Tymoshenko" eagerly agrees.
In the second Ukrainian sketch, the same two=20
characters are waiting for Obama in the Oval=20
Office, discussing how they would refurnish their=20
own presidential office. When "Obama" turns up=20
and asks them in surprise to what he owes the=20
honour, "Yushchenko" is too embarrassed to speak,=20
while "Tymoshenko", after many pleasantries, says=20
that they spent all their money on souvenirs and=20
need to borrow some for a flight home.
To the consternation of "Obama", she names the=20
sum of 5bn dollars, adding that he need not pay=20
it here and now; they would gladly take an IOU=20
instead. "Obama" writes the note and starts=20
throwing a ball into the basketball ring on his=20
office wall, while the other two fondly examine=20
the note, which has just two words on it: "Go=20
home". "Had we known he would agree so easily, we=20
should have asked for NATO membership, too," the Tymoshenko character muses.
Another sketch in the show continued the theme=20
introduced in the very first edition, the=20
unrequited love felt by "Hillary Clinton" towards=20
the character of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey=20
Lavrov. The scene begins with "Clinton",=20
"Lavrov", "Obama" and the characters of French=20
President Nicolas Sarkozy, Italian Prime Minister=20
Silvio Berlusconi and others sitting at a round=20
table, and "Lavrov" saying that they are here to=20
discuss ways out of the economic crisis.=20
"Clinton" immediately falls into a daydream, in=20
which she performs the well-known Russian song=20
"Call Me", with the lyrics changed to include=20
references to world leaders, and plenty of=20
innuendo. The figures of Obama, Sarkozy and=20
Berlusconi act as her stage dancers. As the song=20
ends, we see that "Clinton" has embarrassed=20
herself by actually climbing onto the table.=20
"Lavrov", sitting opposite, starts clapping slowly.
The only other politically significant figure=20
featured in the show was the tycoon Roman=20
Abramovich, seen imploring the manager of the=20
Russian national football team Guus Hiddink to do=20
some magic as his team is losing a World Cup=20
qualifier. The characters in all the other=20
sketches represented show business personalities.
*******
#33
Georgian Times
December 14, 2009
Georgian Journalists Meet Russian President
By Pridon Dochia
While political relations between Tbilisi and=20
Moscow hit an all-time low 12 Georgian=20
journalists participated in a high-profile=20
European and Asia Media Forum in Moscow. Their=20
visit provoked mixed reactions in Tbilisi.
The Georgian media representatives planned their=20
trip in Moscow in response to an aborted=20
roundtable in Georgia involving Russian=20
journalists. Maksim Shevchenko, anchor of ORT=92s=20
Sudite Sami programme and Vladimer Mamontov,=20
Izvestia=92s Editor-in-Chief, were denied entry=20
into Georgia on September 9. The two then=20
announced that although they were insulted by=20
Tbilisi=92s =93hostile attitude=94 they would invite=20
Georgian journalists to Moscow in an attempt to restore dialogue.
On December 8 twelve Georgian journalists checked=20
in at Tbilisi Airport. But going to Moscow when=20
Georgia and Russia do not have diplomatic=20
relations is a risky affair. GT talked to them in=20
the airport asking whether they were concerned=20
that they would probably be called KGB agents.
Nana Devdariani, Executive Director of the=20
Georgian Journalists=92 Union, said: =93I don=92t think=20
Medvedev is going to buy Georgia from us. We are=20
just 12 people. This is going to be an=20
opportunity to talk to them and this is not a bad thing.=94
Vaso Kapanadze, Director of International=20
Relations of the Rezonansi newspaper, said that=20
the presence of Georgian journalists at the forum=20
would be a demonstration of public diplomacy.=20
=93You have to negotiate with such a big country=20
like Russia =ADwhich has occupied one fifth of your=20
territory - as you cannot defeat it and no one=20
will go to war with Russia for your sake. But you=20
pursue national interests during these talks.=20
Certainly the view will be expressed that all=20
kind of contact with Moscow should be severed but this position is wrong.=
=94
Natia Mikiashvili from Maestro said she was going=20
to Moscow to learn what the chances of dialogue=20
are. =93I am not afraid of being called a spy. It=20
will be better if Government officials also go to=20
Russia frequently so that we have normal relations and do not see a new war=
.=94
Malkhaz Gulashvili, owner of The Georgian Times=20
Media Holding, said that the visit would be a=20
chance to discuss critical issues for Georgia:=20
lifting the ban on the sale of Georgian products=20
in Russia, restoring direct air communication and=20
the return of the displaced people to the=20
occupied territories. =93We are journalists and it=20
is our duty to be mediators at the most critical times,=94 he said.
The participants of the Forum were mostly from=20
post-Soviet countries. Malkhaz Gulashvili was one=20
of the seven member panel which gave questions to=20
President Medvedev and he gave his book Towards=20
Peaceful Caucasus to him. As he had promised he=20
asked when direct flights between Moscow and=20
Tbilisi would be restored and visa requirements=20
removed and whether Russia was going to open its market to Georgian product=
s.
=93Unfortunately, our political relations [with=20
Georgia] have been destroyed... Russia=92s position=20
and my personal position is that this happened=20
not through our fault," Medvedev said. =93I have=20
said time and again that I am not going to=20
contact the acting Georgian President and some=20
other [Georgian] leaders exactly because we have=20
parted ways, and our assessment of the events is=20
quite different,=94 he said. =93Saakashvili bears=20
personal judicial responsibility for the crimes committed,=94 Medvedev adde=
d.
However, the Russian leader said that this does=20
not mean that we should suspend all other kinds=20
of relations. Medvedev described relations=20
between Russia and Georgia as a =93centuries-old=20
friendship=94 saying: =93I am not going into obvious=20
events that took place when the Russian state=20
came to the aid of the Georgian state in the=20
past...Russia and Georgia must preserve the=20
positives that were accomplished,=94 he said.
=93All the problems you have mentioned, including=20
the possibility of direct flights and the opening=20
of the Upper Larsi checkpoint, are absolutely=20
normal topics to discuss. Seriously speaking, I=20
do not see any particular obstacles there,=94 Medvedev said.
Georgian politicians gave the cold shoulder to=20
Medvedev=92s statement. Goka Gabashvili, a member=20
of the ruling majority, said that relations=20
between Moscow and Tbilisi could be restored only=20
when Russian troops left Georgia. He said=20
Medvedev=92s statements were political PR.
Giga Bokeria, Deputy Foreign Minister, said=20
Medvedev=92s statements could not be assessed as a=20
breakthrough in Russian-Georgian relations: =93The=20
fundamental problem between Georgia and Russia is=20
that Russia is fighting against Georgia's=20
statehood. Georgian territory is still occupied=20
and until this problem is resolved, it is not=20
serious to package it differently.=94
PM Nika Gilauri said he would welcome Russia=20
lifting sanctions: =93The main obstacle remains the=20
occupation of Georgian territories. As for=20
loosening sanctions related to the visa regime,=20
direct flights and transit, Russia imposed all=20
these restrictions. If Russia follows up and=20
loosens sanctions, this will be good.=94
Some Georgian journalists who refused to=20
participate in the trip slammed their colleagues,=20
saying that the Georgians should have asked=20
Medvedev to pull his troops out of Georgian=20
territory. In his live broadcast from Moscow to=20
Rustavi 2 Malkhaz Gulashvili tried to answer this=20
criticism: =93It is important for me to achieve=20
some small success. I am not a politician. I am=20
not President of Georgia. I am President of The=20
Georgian Times and I try to resolve the issues I=20
can resolve. As soon as Medvedev left the media=20
forum he met the Minister of Transport and told=20
him to deal with the issue [of flights]=20
immediately, if the Georgian side agrees.
"While we were fighting on the front line in the=20
war my friends opened fire on my back.You know=20
that there is hysteria in Georgian society=20
related to Russia. How are you going to resolve=20
the issues, the Government or journalists? They=20
say. Hysteria, shouting, diplomacy are needed but=20
our diplomacy is below zero. These methods fail=20
to resolve issues. What is the important is that=20
those people who fly from Tbilisi to Moscow will=20
be thankful to us, and if Georgian goods are=20
restored to the Russian market this will help the economic crisis.
"Our two countries are at war and unless positive=20
steps are taken they will still be so but=20
deoccpation won=92t happen. The US and Europe are=20
insisiting on withdrawal but the Russians remain,=20
and moreover they are beefing up their presence,=94 said Malkhaz Gulashvili.
******
#34
Center for American Progress
www.americanprogress.org
December 15, 2009
Moldova at the Crossroads
The United States Can Help the Country Through This Difficult Period
By Samuel Charap and Yekaterina Chertova
Samuel Charap is a Fellow and Yekaterina Chertova=20
an intern at American Progress.
On December 7, the parliament of Moldova=ADa small,=20
impoverished former Soviet republic of roughly=20
4.5 million people nestled between Ukraine and=20
Romania=ADfailed once again to elect a president.=20
The minority Communist Party, or PCRM, which held=20
power from 2001 until September 2009, boycotted a=20
vote that would have given the presidency to=20
Marian Lupu, the candidate put forward by the=20
majority coalition that favors reform and=20
European integration. While U.S. policymakers=20
might be tempted to throw up their hands and give=20
up on Moldova=ADwhere political instability has=20
become a fact of life=ADit would be a profound=20
mistake to let a country so close to the heart of=20
Europe drift and potentially descend into chaos.=20
This is all the more true given the transnational=20
threats such as human trafficking that emanate=20
from Moldova and the presence of a =93frozen conflict=94 on its territory.
Eight years of Communist rule left Moldova in=20
shambles. Grinding poverty, porous borders,=20
corruption, and inadequate rule of law have=20
contributed to widespread human trafficking,=20
human rights abuses, and poor governance. These=20
problems were compounded by the =93frozen conflict=94=20
in Moldova, where the unrecognized=20
self-proclaimed pseudo-state of Transdniestria=20
straddles the country=92s eastern border with=20
Ukraine. Transdniestria is to Moldova as South=20
Ossetia and Abkhazia were to Georgia before its=20
August 2008 war with Russia=ADa separatist enclave=20
with Russian =93peacekeepers=94 stationed on its=20
territory that is sustained by financial support from Moscow.
Fortunately, the dispute over Transdniestria is=20
not presently fraught with the risk of violence=20
as South Ossetia and Abkhazia proved to be in=20
Georgia, but nonetheless 16 years of=20
international mediation efforts have largely=20
failed to produce progress. =93Frozen conflicts=94=20
such as Transnistria, which are only frozen in=20
the sense that they have not yet been resolved,=20
are inherently destabilizing and can erupt at any=20
time, as the war between Russia and Georgia=20
demonstrated. The possibility, however remote, of=20
comparable hostilities breaking out on Europe=92s=20
very borders represents a security concern for=20
the entire Euro-Atlantic community.
The breakaway region is also a notorious hub for=20
criminal activity, including narcotics and=20
gun-running. Moscow supports Transdniestria both=20
economically and politically and ensures its=20
security with its continuing military presence,=20
but it has not recognized the separatist=20
government. Progress on reintegrating=20
Transdniestria effectively stalled under the=20
PCRM, which failed to launch an effective=20
reconciliation process or work toward the withdrawal of Russian troops.
Moldova=92s current political drama began in April,=20
when the first round of parliamentary elections=20
took place. The country=92s convoluted constitution=20
calls for the election of a president by a=20
three-fifths majority of the 101-member=20
parliament. Once elected, the president appoints=20
a prime minister and assembles a cabinet, subject=20
to a parliamentary vote. The April elections saw=20
the PCRM win 60 of the 101 parliamentary seats.=20
Over the course of the following two days,=20
protests erupted in the capital of Chisinau and=20
quickly became violent, culminating in the=20
vandalism of both the parliament and the=20
presidential building. The protestors=ADmostly=20
young Moldovans fed up with years of corrupt rule=20
and economic mismanagement under the Communists=ADalleged fraud.
With only 60 MPs, one short of three-fifths, and=20
staunch opposition from their opponents, the PCRM=20
could not push its candidate through parliament=20
and the deadlock forced new elections at the end=20
of July. The second poll brought the pro-Western,=20
pro-reform Alliance for European Integration to=20
power, with a slim majority of 53 MPs. AEI formed=20
a government with Vlad Filat as prime minister.=20
Its platform calls for desperately needed=20
economic reforms, democratization, and greater engagement with the West.
The intervening period has been characterized by=20
political wrangling, with the AEI trying to=20
persuade eight Communist MPs to switch sides and=20
failing twice. The PCRM walkout on Monday was the second in two months.
The situation in Moldova now seems likely to take=20
one of three paths. First, legislative=20
elections=ADprobably sometime in the summer of=20
2010=ADmight take place as the constitution=20
demands. Second, the ruling coalition could=20
initiate a referendum to amend the constitution=20
to allow for direct presidential elections.=20
Third, the parliament could adopt legislation to=20
lower the number of MP votes needed to choose a=20
president to a simple majority of MPs.
The last two options might seem appropriate to=20
break the current stalemate. But Moldova should=20
resist the temptation to alter its constitution=20
simply to solve the crisis. Any changes to the=20
country=92s basic law should be taken in a=20
considered, well-thought-out manner=ADnot as a=20
one-off attempt to end a crisis. Doing so could=20
lead to false steps and unintended consequences,=20
as in Ukraine, where the poorly designed=20
constitutional changes implemented at the height=20
of the =93Orange Revolution=94 resulted in unending=20
political turmoil. The Obama administration=20
should communicate to the Moldovan leadership=20
that such a development would not serve the=20
long-term interests of their country.
Regardless of how the situation develops, the=20
administration should make clear that it is=20
prepared to strengthen the U.S. relationship with=20
Prime Minister Vlad Filat=92s legitimately elected=20
government. The administration has so far taken=20
steps in this direction: The U.S.=20
government-sponsored Millennium Challenge=20
Corporation has pledged $262 million for=20
Moldova=92s development and Filat will visit the=20
United States in January to meet with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
The United States should also push the Moldovan=20
government to pursue desperately needed economic=20
reforms, which are a condition for the=20
International Monetary Fund=92s $590 million=20
support program agreed to in October. The package=20
is vital to salvaging Moldova=92s economy, covering=20
the country=92s budget deficit=ADestimated at 9=20
percent of gross domestic product for this=20
year=ADand boosting its meager reserves. We should=20
encourage the European Union to join our efforts,=20
and the U.S. Agency for International Development=20
should also up its aid to local nongovernmental=20
organizations that work to improve living=20
conditions and good governance in Moldova.
Congress has a role to play, too. If the United=20
States is serious about supporting political=20
stability in the country, strong consideration=20
should be given to repealing the Jackson-Vanik=20
amendment for Moldova. This legislation was=20
originally intended to support freedom of=20
emigration from the Soviet Union and was an=20
important policy tool when it passed in 1975.=20
Traditionally Congress repeals the amendment when=20
one of the former Soviet republics=ADwhich were=20
subject to the amendment after the collapse of=20
the Soviet Union=ADbecomes a World Trade=20
Organization member, because keeping it on the=20
books would deny the United States certain trade advantages.
Although Moldova became a member of the WTO in=20
2001, Congress has yet to =93graduate=94 it from the=20
Jackson-Vanik provisions. Members have little=20
incentive to act given the tiny size of Moldova=92s=20
economy and the minimal impact of not having fully normalized trade relatio=
ns.
But repealing Jackson-Vanik now for Moldova would=20
have crucial symbolic importance. It would=20
demonstrate U.S. solidarity with the Filat=20
government in its drive to implement reforms and=20
steer the country toward Europe. And it would=20
cost nothing=ADin fact, it could provide some=20
benefit to the U.S. economy that come with=20
removing the amendment for WTO members.
Finally, greater engagement with Moldova could=20
provide an opportunity to improve ties with=20
Russia. Russian and Ukrainian mediators have been=20
working alongside U.S. and European diplomats on=20
resolving the Transdniestrian dispute. And=20
whereas Moscow was once a staunch ally of the=20
PCRM, it recently tried to push the Communists to=20
accept a Lupu presidency, indicating the possible=20
emergence of a more constructive approach. The=20
Kremlin might be coming to the conclusion that a=20
stable Moldova is more in its interest than=20
having the country under its control. Moldova=20
could become a testing ground for a new type of=20
U.S.-Russia interaction in the former Soviet=20
region, where the tradition has been zero-sum=20
games. Moscow and Washington could actually work=20
together to contribute to regional stability and prosperity.
Support from the West clearly cannot solve=20
Moldova's problems. Political bickering and=20
grandstanding, and the habits of cronyism,=20
corrupt rule, and weak governance must come to an=20
end if the country is to have any hope of=20
escaping from its current state. The parliament=92s=20
failure to elect a president last week was an=20
unfortunate development, but it should be the=20
cause for greater U.S. engagement, not neglect.
******
#35
The Washington Quarterly
www.twq.com
Resetting U.S.-Russian Relations: It Takes Two
By David J. Kramer
[DJ: Notes not here]
David J. Kramer is a senior transatlantic fellow=20
with the German Marshall Fund of the United=20
States. He served as the assistant secretary of=20
state for democracy, human rights and labor from=20
2008=AD2009 as well as deputy assistant secretary=20
of state responsible for Belarus, Moldova,=20
Russia, and Ukraine from 2005=AD2008. He can be reached at dkramer@gmfus.or=
g.
President Barack Obama deserves credit for his=20
initial efforts to reverse the deterioration in=20
relations between the United States and Russia.=20
The downward spiral in bilateral ties accelerated=20
by Russia=92s invasion of Georgia last year has=20
ended for now, but relations are not likely to=20
improve appreciably because of fundamental=20
differences in values, interests, and outlook=20
between the two countries=92 leaderships. In fact,=20
Russian leaders=92 actions and rhetoric continue to=20
raise serious doubts about their interest in=20
really resetting relations. The Obama=20
administration, much like the Bush administration=20
before it, is likely to find Moscow the source of=20
endless frustrations and headaches_and few solutions.
After meeting with President Dmitri Medvedev of=20
Russia in April 2009 in London, Obama went to=20
Moscow in July where he and Medvedev issued a=20
number of joint statements and understandings.=20
The most notable ones were on the transit of U.S.=20
equipment across Russian territory for forces=20
needed in Afghanistan and a framework for an arms=20
control treaty. Obama also sat down with Prime=20
Minister Vladimir Putin for the first time, met=20
with leading opposition figures and civil society=20
activists, and delivered a solid speech at the=20
New Economic School.1 Dismissing the notion that=20
Russia and the United States were destined to be=20
enemies, he demonstrated a desire to develop a=20
new tone in the bilateral dialogue and =91=91reset=92=92=20
relations with Russia. At the same time, in his=20
speech and meetings, Obama also indicated that=20
the United States will not abandon certain=20
fundamental positions that have been the source=20
of disagreement with the Russian leadership in=20
the past, such as recognizing no Russian sphere=20
of influence, maintaining an open-door policy for=20
aspiring members of NATO, and prioritizing human rights and democracy.
In controversial comments made as he was=20
returning from a July trip to Georgia and=20
Ukraine, Vice President Joseph R. Biden referred=20
to Russia=92s looming demographic crisis, its=20
=91=91withering economy,=92=92 and its difficulty in=20
adjusting to =91=91loss of empire.=92=92 He noted=20
Russia=92s interest in negotiating further cuts in=20
nuclear weapons because they cannot afford to=20
maintain even current levels, adding that it is=20
=91=91clinging to something in the past that is not=20
sustainable.=92=922 Though arguably indiscreet in his=20
comments, Biden nevertheless spoke the truth=20
about the problems facing Russia. His conclusion=20
that Russia=92s weakness and problems would induce=20
Moscow to be more in synch with U.S. interests=20
and likely to cooperate on issues such as Iran,=20
however, was widely off the mark.
The problems Biden identified, in fact, make=20
Russia=92s leaders less, not more, likely to work=20
with the United States on a whole host of issues.=20
They are apt to deflect their population=92s=20
attention from the growing number of difficulties=20
at home by shifting attention onto others, such=20
as neighboring Georgia or Ukraine, or to clamp=20
down even more against the slightest possible=20
threats to their control inside Russia. That kind=20
of Russia will be extremely difficult for the=20
Obama administration to work with on issues such=20
as Iran, missile defense, and the states along=20
Russia=92s borders. That kind of Russia will have=20
fewer interests in common with the United States=20
and expose a widening values gap between the two=20
countries. Since Obama=92s trip to Moscow,=20
provocative visits to Abkhazia and South Ossetia=20
by Medvedev and Putin respectively, Medvedev=92s=20
renewed threats to target Iskander missiles=20
against the Czech Republic and Poland if U.S.=20
missile defense plans move forward in those two=20
countries, and the murders of human rights=20
activists and charity heads in Chechnya have cast=20
a shadow over the relationship. At the end of the=20
day, Russia=92s current leadership_corrupt,=20
revisionist, and insecure as it is_will likely=20
decide that perpetuating the image of the United=20
States as a threat is more important to=20
maintaining the Kremlin=92s grip on power than a=20
new, more positive chapter in U.S.=ADRussia relations.
Four issues are likely to dominate the=20
relationship for the foreseeable future: policy=20
toward Russia=92s neighbors, missile defense,=20
strategic challenges such as Iran, and=20
developments inside Russia. Alas, none of these=20
issues offers much promise for building a strong=20
foundation for the bilateral relationship.
The Neighbors
More than any other issue, policy toward Belarus,=20
the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia),=20
Moldova, Ukraine, and the five Central Asian=20
states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,=20
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) will remain the=20
biggest bone of contention between Washington and=20
Moscow. Russian officials, in citing =91=91privileged=20
interests=92=92 with their neighbors and a sphere of=20
influence reflecting their zero-sum thinking,=20
view the expansion of U.S. as well as Western=20
interests and presence in the region as a threat.3
In his July 7, 2009 speech in Moscow, Obama=20
rejected a Russian sphere of influence along its=20
borders in crystal clear terms, arguing =91=91In=20
2009, a great power does not show strength by=20
dominating or demonizing other countries. The=20
days when empires could treat sovereign states as=20
pieces on a chess board are over. . . .The=20
pursuit of power is no longer a zero-sum game=AD=20
progress must be shared.=92=92 In that same speech,=20
Obama voiced support for Georgia and Ukraine=92s=20
prospects for NATO membership, if that is what their populations want:
"For any country to become a member of an=20
organization like NATO, for example, a majority=20
of its people must choose to; they must undertake=20
reforms; they must be able to contribute to the=20
Alliance=92s mission. And let me be clear: NATO=20
should be seeking collaboration with Russia, not confrontation."4
Biden=92s trip to Georgia and Ukraine two weeks=20
after Obama=92s visit to Moscow reaffirmed this=20
position: =91=91The United States also supports=20
Ukraine=92s deepening ties to NATO and to the=20
European Union. But again, we recognize they are=20
your decisions, your choices, not ours . . . .=92=925=20
In a speech the next day in Tbilisi, where=20
support for joining the alliance is much=20
stronger, Biden was more explicit: =91=91We=20
understand that Georgia aspires to join NATO. We=20
fully support that aspiration. And, members of=20
Parliament, we will work to help you meet the standards of NATO membership.=
=92=926
Neither Georgia nor Ukraine will join NATO any=20
time soon, but Obama=92s and Biden=92s comments made=20
clear that the United States remains supportive=20
of their eventual membership and of keeping an=20
open-door policy for NATO. Such a position is=20
consistent with the April 2008 NATO Summit=20
Declaration in which allies welcomed Georgia=92s=20
and Ukraine=92s aspirations for membership in NATO:=20
=91=91We agreed today that these countries will=20
become members of NATO.=92=927 Russia, which had=20
argued strongly last year against offers of a=20
NATO membership action plan (MAP) for Georgia and=20
Ukraine, is also firmly against either country=92s=20
joining the alliance as full members. In an=20
unprompted and disturbing letter to President=20
Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine, posted on the=20
Kremlin website on August 11, 2009, Medvedev=20
cited a litany of complaints against Yushchenko=92s=20
=91=91anti-Russian=92=92 policy, including the pursuit of=20
NATO membership: =91=91Ignoring the views of=20
Ukrainian citizens as well as Russia=92s well-known=20
position [emphasis added], the political leadership of Ukraine
stubbornly continues to pursue accession to=20
NATO.=92=928 Medvedev=92s claim that Russia should have=20
a veto over Ukraine=92s (and, by implication,=20
Georgia=92s) aspirations to deepen integration with=20
Euro=ADAtlantic institutions is likely to backfire=20
both inside Ukraine and in the West.
Despite increased Ukrainian=ADRussian tensions=20
caused by Russian gas cutoffs, disagreements over=20
the future of the Black Sea Fleet, and Medvedev=92s=20
August 11 letter, Georgia remains the country=20
where problems with Russia remain most worrisome.=20
Russia=92s April 30, 2009 decision to assume=20
responsibility for the de facto borders between=20
Abkhazia and South Ossetia with Georgia places=20
Russian and Georgian troops dangerously closer to=20
each other than they were before last August=92s=20
conflict. The exchange of threats involving=20
shipping along the Abkhaz part of the Georgian=20
coast adds to the volatility. Russia continues to=20
violate last year=92s ceasefire agreement brokered=20
by President Nicolas Sarkozy of France and has=20
announced plans to build up its military presence=20
in the breakaway regions in further defiance of=20
that accord. That Nicaragua and Russia (and more=20
recently Venezuela) remain the only countries to=20
have recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as=20
independent states represents an embarrassing=20
failure of Russian diplomacy; not even Belarus=20
(so far) has agreed to join them in recognition.=20
Notwithstanding the relatively quiet passing of=20
the anniversary of the August war, tensions=20
remain high as long as Mikheil Saakashvili=20
remains president of Georgia, given the Russian leadership=92s views toward=
him.9
Since its invasion of Georgia, Russia has=20
experienced a general decline in influence with=20
its neighbors and has found itself increasingly=20
isolated.10 Russian policy toward its neighbors=20
has been a failure, as these states increasingly=20
view Moscow as a threatening, unpredictable, and=20
unreliable bully. After Russia pressured=20
President Kurmanbek Bakiyev of Kyrgyzstan in=20
February to close the Manas air base, vital to=20
U.S. and NATO efforts for the campaign in=20
Afghanistan, Bakiyev reversed himself after=20
winning higher rent from Washington (and, some=20
suspect, U.S. silence over his crackdown against=20
the opposition and a flawed July 2009 election).=20
Russia responded by securing rights to a second=20
military facility in Kyrgyzstan, but this=20
decision generated a strongly negative reaction=20
from Uzbekistan (this second facility will=20
complement Russia=92s base near Manas and will be=20
located near the Kyrgyz=ADUzbek border in the=20
Fergana Valley).11 Turkmenistan is also=20
interested in opening up more to the West to=20
relieve the chokehold Russia has maintained over=20
its energy export routes. Even President=20
Aleksandr Lukashenka of Belarus has been looking=20
to improve ties with the West as his relations with Moscow have deteriorate=
d.12
Instead of looking in the mirror to see the cause=20
of their problems, Russian leaders see threats=20
everywhere. If it isn=92t the United States or NATO=20
posing threats in the region, it is the EU, which=20
came under attack for its innocuous Eastern=20
Partnership initiative unveiled in May 2009=20
involving Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,=20
Moldova, and Ukraine.13 The foreign ministry of=20
Russia, reflecting its zero-sum approach to the=20
region, criticized the Eastern Partnership, which=20
is designed to deepen the EU=92s relations with=20
these countries in areas of trade, travel, and=20
good governance,14 as an effort to lure these=20
countries away from Russia. Foreign Minister=20
Sergei Lavrov voiced his doubts about EU=20
intentions, asking during a visit to Brussels on=20
May 22, 2009: =91=91Is it about pulling countries=20
(away) from the decisions that they are supposed=20
to take freely?=92=9215 Pursuit of closer ties with=20
the West, in turn, will only reinforce Russian=20
paranoia, leading to a dangerous circular effect.=20
This will heighten the tensions not only between=20
Russia and the United States but also between Russia and its neighbors.
The Obama administration should continue to=20
deepen relations with Russia=92s (and the EU=92s)=20
neighbors and stand firm in rejecting any Russian=20
claims of sphere of influence or de facto vetoes.=20
It should maintain an open-door policy on these=20
states=92 interest in joining Euro=ADAtlantic=20
institutions, including NATO, while pursuing=20
bilateral relations with these states on their=20
own merits, not through a Russian prism. It=20
should also insist on Russian compliance with=20
existing security agreements, including the=20
Georgia six-point ceasefire and the Treaty on=20
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) as a=20
prerequisite for discussions on any new European=20
security architecture. Russia=92s failure to comply=20
with last year=92s ceasefire and with the 1999=20
Istanbul Commitments connected with the Adapted=20
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty has=20
undermined the trust needed for negotiations on=20
any new agreements. Restoring such trust is vital=20
for progress. Finally, the Obama administration=20
should continue to push for development of=20
multiple pipelines in the area, especially given=20
Russian supply cutoffs in the past which have fed=20
the image of Russia as an unreliable supplier.
Missile Defense and Arms Control
The decision by Obama to abandon the missile=20
defense plans of the Bush=20
administration_involving ten missile interceptors=20
in Poland and a radar site in the Czech=20
Republic_and replace them with a new missile=20
defense arrangement has generated considerable=20
controversy.16 The administration argues that its=20
new approach involving various phases that would=20
start with deployment of sea-based SM-3=20
interceptor missiles is more suitable for the=20
threat seen coming from Iran; a later phase by=20
2015 or so would entail upgraded SM-3s on the=20
ground in southern and central Europe (including possibly Poland).17
This is not the place to debate the technical=20
merits of the administration=92s decision or the=20
way it was rolled out (badly, given that it was=20
announced on the 70th anniversary of the Soviet=20
invasion of Poland and without prior consultation=20
with the Poles or the Czechs). Instead, of=20
interest here is the Russia factor. Obama=20
administration officials denied that Russia was a=20
factor in its decision. =91=91Russia=92s attitude and=20
possible reaction played no part in my=20
recommendation to the president on this issue,=92=92=20
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote. =91=91Of=20
course, considering Russia=92s past hostility=20
toward American missile defense in Europe, if=20
Russia=92s leaders embrace this plan, then that=20
will be an unexpected =AD and welcome =AD change of policy on their part.=
=92=9218
Obama similarly rejected a link to Russian=20
concerns. In an interview with CBS=92s Face the Nation, the president said:
"Russia had always been paranoid about this but=20
George Bush was right, this wasn=92t a threat to=20
them. And this program will not be a threat to=20
them. So my task here was not to negotiate with=20
the Russians. The Russians don=92t make=20
determinations about what our defense posture is=20
. . . . If the by-product of it is that the=20
Russians feel a little less paranoid and are now=20
willing to work more effectively with us to deal with
threats like ballistic missiles from Iran or=20
nuclear development in Iran [sic], you know, then that=92s a bonus."19
Those comments didn=92t sit too well with Russia=92s=20
ambassador to the UN, Vitaly Churkin, who=20
responded by saying, =91=91It shows to us that the=20
U.S. continues to be a rather difficult=20
negotiating partner, a partner who is loaded in=20
many wars by a Cold War mentality.=92=9220
Warsaw and Prague were disappointed by the=20
decision. In Moscow, by comparison,=20
notwithstanding Churkin=92s comment above, the=20
reaction was very positive, though that may=20
change if analysts in Russia start focusing on=20
the possibility that Poland will wind up hosting=20
the SM-3 land-based systems after all.=20
Nevertheless, both Medvedev and Putin praised=20
Obama=92s decision, with Putin calling it a =91=91very=20
right and brave decision.=92=9221 Russian officials=20
announced that they would no longer target=20
Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad against Poland=20
and the Czech Republic. But they also indicated=20
that further responses from Moscow in light of=20
Obama=92s decision would not be forthcoming. On the=20
contrary, Putin, after pocketing the missile=20
defense victory, wanted the U.S. to make further=20
concessions by lifting trade restrictions and moving forward on
Russia=92s World Trade Organization accession.
Russia had linked the possible deployment of=20
missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech=20
Republic to conclusion of a post-Strategic Arms=20
Reduction Treaty (START) arms control agreement.=20
From the vantage point of U.S. interests,=20
however, the two should be dealt with separately.=20
While the United States hasan interest in=20
finalizing a good deal, Russia has a much greater=20
need for a post-START arrangement, given that it=20
cannot afford to maintain its aging nuclear=20
weapons nor could it compete with the United=20
States in any new arms race. Russia=92s nuclear=20
arsenal is already within or moving toward the=20
range for both warheads (1500=AD1675 per side) and=20
delivery vehicles (500=AD1100) proposed in the=20
latest negotiations regardless of the levels of=20
U.S. forces. That would seem to provide the U.S.=20
side with more leverage, but the Obama=20
administration, viewing the December 5, 2009=20
expiration of the START as some fatal deadline,=20
has indicated its strong desire for an agreement=20
by the end of the year to demonstrate that=20
relations are back on track and that larger=20
efforts are being made to move toward global=20
nuclear disarmament. In the process, it has=20
created the impression that the United States is=20
the demandeur, forfeiting its leverage.
The Bush administration had rejected linkage=20
between missile defense plans and an arms control=20
agreement. The Obama administration had similarly=20
rejected such linkage but made the mistake of=20
agreeing in Moscow in July 2009 to a last-minute=20
joint statement on missile defense issues and to=20
language on the Joint Understanding on the START=20
Follow-On Treaty. In the latter, Point 5 of the=20
agreement notes: =91=91A provision on the=20
interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms.=92=
=9222
In the July 6, 2009 joint press conference with=20
Obama, Medvedev seized on what he perceived to be=20
U.S. acquiescence on this issue by saying, =91=91We=20
have agreed also that the offensive and defensive=20
systems of both countries should be considered=20
together. We have adopted a joint statement on=20
ABM.=92=92 In response to a question later in that=20
same press conference, Medvedev emphasized what=20
he saw as an opening in the U.S. position:
"In our mutual understanding that has just been=20
signed, we talk about the linkage between=20
offensive and defensive weapons, and this already=20
constitutes a step forward. Some time ago, on=20
this question, we had all =AD only differences. Now=20
this linkage is being stated and this opens up=20
the opportunity of bringing positions closer to each other."23
When Obama announced his decision on missile=20
defense, Russian leaders must have been very=20
pleased with their push to make this linkage.
Obama is battling the perception in some circles=20
that he caved on missile defense to placate the=20
Russians in order to secure a post-START=20
agreement, as well as to gain greater Russian=20
cooperation in dealing with Iran. Moreover, his=20
decision will also have a major effect on how the=20
United States is perceived in Central and Eastern=20
Europe. Already in an =91=91open letter=92=92 published=20
in July 2009, 22 leading figures from Central and=20
Eastern Europe claim that the region is =91=91no=20
longer at the heart of American foreign=20
policy.=92=9224 Obama=92s decision on missile defense has heightened those =
concerns.
When he entered office, Obama certainly seemed=20
less enamored of missile defense in the Czech=20
Republic and Poland than his predecessor. He=20
clarified his views somewhat in a speech in=20
Prague on April 5, 2009, staking out a position similar to that of Bush:
"So let me be clear: Iran=92s nuclear and ballistic=20
missile activity poses a real threat, not just to=20
the United States, but to Iran=92s neighbors and=20
our allies. The Czech Republic and Poland have=20
been courageous in agreeing to host a defense=20
against these missiles. As long as the threat=20
from Iran persists, we will go forward with a=20
missile defense system that is cost-effective and=20
proven. If the Iranian threat is eliminated, we=20
will have a stronger basis for security, and the=20
driving force for missile defense construction in Europe will be removed."25
This approach, as was the case in the Bush=20
administration, was predicated on the assumption=20
that Russia would have incentives to pressure the=20
Iranians to comply with UN resolutions, thus=20
making the missile defense sites in the Czech=20
Republic and Poland unnecessary. This approach,=20
however, has been consistently rejected by Russian officials.
The Obama administration should de-link a=20
post-START agreement from missile defense=20
(including a possible dispute with Russia over=20
the eventual landbased deployment of SM-3s). It=20
should pursue possible cooperation with Russia at=20
the Gabala radar facility in Azerbaijan and the=20
Armavir site in southern Russia, as proposed by=20
Putin in June 2007, but not in lieu of plans for=20
elsewhere in Europe, whether in the Czech=20
Republic, Poland, or another neighboring state.=20
If Russia is truly interested in an arms control=20
agreement, it should back down from the missile=20
defense linkage and from what has turned into a=20
dangerous game of chicken (in which critics of=20
Obama=92s decision would charge that the United States balked first).
Cooperation on Strategic Issues
Backing down on missile defense and focusing on=20
relations with Russia instead of its neighbors=20
are two key points at the heart of=20
recommendations from the so-called realist=20
camp.26 In exchange for this approach of=20
providing Russia with incentives, the realists=20
argue, the United States can secure Russian=20
cooperation on issues that truly matter such as=20
Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea. Central to=20
this argument is that Russia and the United=20
States have common national interests and can=20
reach common understandings of how to address=20
these challenges. The reality is that the current=20
Russian leadership does not, for the most part,=20
share U.S. interests or threat perceptions, to=20
say nothing of U.S. values. As long as that is=20
the case, extensive cooperation and significantly=20
improved relations will be difficult to achieve.
Following North Korea=92s test of a nuclear weapon=20
in late May 2009, Russia did not object to a UN=20
Security Council resolution condemning the=20
Pyongyang regime. When North Korea further defied=20
the international community again by test-firing=20
seven short and medium range missiles in early=20
July, Russia again joined the chorus condemning=20
Pyongyang=92s actions. For Russia, North Korea=20
means very little, as it has little trade and=20
economic interests at stake. North Korea is much=20
more important for China, and Russia is not=20
interested in competing with Beijing for=20
influence with Pyongyang. Going along with the=20
United States and the rest of the international=20
community comes at virtually no cost for Moscow,=20
and thus requires no incentive or compromise on other issues.
Iran is a different matter entirely. It is true=20
that Russia would prefer that Iran not become a=20
nuclear weapons state, but Moscow does not share=20
the U.S. threat assessment of Iran=92s potential=20
danger. Even with agreement in July in Moscow to=20
launch a joint threat assessment of the=20
=91=91ballistic missile challenges of the 21st=20
century, including those posed by Iran and North=20
Korea,=92=92 as Obama noted,27 one should not expect=20
a meeting of the minds between Russian and U.S.=20
officials. Moreover, Russian officials are not=20
interested in getting tougher toward Tehran (a=20
position they have stated publicly, and unhelpfully, on numerous occasions)
and would much prefer the United States to play=20
the role of bad guy. Russia has too much at stake=20
in its relationship with Iran_from maintaining=20
stability in its northern Caucasus to financial=20
interests from arms sales, nuclear reactors,=20
energy, and trade_to risk a tougher approach=20
itself.28 Comments by Medvedev at the UN General=20
Assembly meeting and after a meeting with Obama=20
on September 23, 2009 raised hopes that Russia=20
might join in sanctioning Iran, but the real test=20
will come when the resolution is drawn up and=20
voted on.29 Russia, after all, has supported=20
previous resolutions that were significantly watered down at Moscow=92s
insistence.
Andranik Migranyan, director of the Institute for=20
Democracy and Cooperation in New York (a=20
Kremlin-supported organization designed to=20
promote Russia=92s image and interests inside the United States) described =
the
possibility of Russian cooperation with the=20
United States in applying further sanctions=20
against Iran as =91=91highly unlikely.=92=92 According to=20
Migranyan, =91=91It is imperative that our U.S.=20
partners understand that maintaining friendly,=20
mutually advantageous relations with Iran meets=20
the strategic interests of the Russian state.=92=92=20
For Russia to go along with sanctions against Iran, Migranyan writes:
". . . it is no longer enough to give hollow=20
promises that there will be no NATO expansion to=20
the east, that missile-defense systems will not=20
be deployed in the Czech Republic and Poland,=20
that the Georgian army will not be rearmed, that=20
there will be no blunt and unceremonious=20
interference in the internal affairs of the=20
former Soviet republics, and that there will be=20
no support of political forces that are hostile to Russia."30
Russia would have to be =91=91duly compensated=92=92=20
_i.e., bribed.31 It is hard to see how such a=20
view represents a merging of national interests.
More cynically, Migranyan notes that Russia would=20
benefit from U.S. or Israeli military action=20
against Iran because =91=91Russia will come out on top=92=92:
"In this scenario, America would bypass the UN=20
Security Council and stir up the ire of the=20
entire Muslim world, which would force even=20
moderate Muslim countries to assume a tough=20
stance against the United States. Furthermore,=20
Iran can unleash large-scale terrorist activity=20
against America and its allies, which would=20
destabilize the situation in the Middle East and=20
cause an inevitable immediate upturn in oil=20
prices. The United States would be even more=20
heavily mired in the confrontation with the=20
Islamic world, robbing it of huge resources,=20
energy and opportunities. The upsurge in oil=20
prices would make Russia a major winner, giving=20
it the necessary financial resources to=20
restructure its economy and allow for further=20
economic development and increases in living standards."32
Migranyan=92s views are echoed by Dimitri Simes,=20
president of The Nixon Center, who writes that:=20
=91=91Although Russian officials strongly oppose any=20
military strike against Iran=92s nuclear=20
installations, they privately acknowledge that=20
such an attack could benefit Russia by increasing=20
energy prices and creating a global backlash=20
against the United States.=92=9233 If the Russian=20
leadership sees benefits from such a scenario, it=20
is hard to see what kind of cooperation can exist=20
between Russia and the United States.
Russian leaders could exacerbate the situation=20
themselves if they transfer sophisticated S-300=20
missiles to Iran. Several years ago, despite U.S.=20
and Israeli protests, Russia sold and transferred=20
to Iran the Tor-M1 surface-to-air missiles, which=20
are less advanced than the S-300 missiles, for a=20
reported $700 million. Given its current economic=20
crisis, Russia is in less of a position to turn=20
down the nearly one billion dollars the S-300=20
sale would produce. There is speculation that=20
should Russia transfer the superior S-300s, which=20
can shoot down cruise missiles and aircraft from=20
120 miles away, the Netanyahu government might strike Iran
before Tehran can acquire the protection these=20
missiles would provide. If Simes and Migranyan=20
are to be believed, that scenario may have=20
unintended benefits for Russia. President Shimon=20
Peres of Israel, after meeting with Medvedev in=20
mid-August, reported that Russia would reconsider=20
the deal. A Russian official quoted after the=20
same meeting, however, denied that discussion of=20
the S-300s even occurred.34 A mysterious visit by=20
Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu of Israel also=20
probably focused on this issue.
Even on Afghanistan, where Russian and Western=20
interests would logically seem to converge_a=20
stable Afghanistan is in Russia=92s interests,=20
after all_Moscow seemed more interested in=20
driving the United States out of neighboring=20
Kyrgyzstan and the important Manas airbase=20
through pressure on Bakiyev than in true=20
cooperation to stabilize the region. The=20
U.S.=ADRussia transit agreement signed in July is=20
important and will facilitate U.S. and NATO=20
efforts, but it is vital, especially after the=20
experience involving Manas, that allies keep=20
other options open so that Russian leaders can=20
not exploit dependence on routes which overfly=20
their territory. When it comes to cooperation on=20
the Middle East, Russia has yet to demonstrate=20
that it is willing to use its influence, to the=20
extent it exists, over certain countries in the=20
region to push for progress. Russia=92s role in the=20
peace process, for example, seems relatively limited.
The Obama administration should work with Russia=20
wherever it can on strategic issues, but it=20
should not expect much help, at least beyond=20
North Korea (where Russia will not necessarily be=20
helpful but at least will not get in the way).=20
Moreover, the administration should reject, in no=20
uncertain terms, suggestions that compromising on=20
other interests_missile defense, Russia=92s=20
neighbors_will influence Russia to be more in=20
line with our goals elsewhere. There simply is no=20
evidence to support such a theory. To the=20
contrary, Russia=92s leaders are much more=20
interested in driving wedges between and among=20
NATO and EU members, as well as between the=20
United States and Europe, than they are in real=20
cooperation with the United States. To the extent=20
that the Kremlin has a strategy (and the jury is=20
still out on that), it is a counter-, anti-, or negative
strategy. That, unfortunately, leaves little to=20
work with to build a strategic partnership.
Russia in Decline_and Increasingly Paranoid
In response to Biden=92s July 2009 comments,=20
describing Russia in serious decline, Secretary=20
of State Hillary Rodham Clinton described Russia=20
as a =91=91great power=92=92 and reiterated Obama=92s hope=20
to see a =91=91strong, peaceful, and prosperous=92=92=20
Russia.35 Russia, however, is not a great power;=20
it is a regional power, albeit one with a serious=20
nuclear weapons arsenal and capable of wreaking=20
havoc within its region and even beyond. Yes,=20
Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security=20
Council and a member of the G-8, but unlike=20
China, which is a rising power, Russia is a power=20
in decline for many of the reasons Biden cited in his interview
with the Wall Street Journal, and more.
Russia=92s economic troubles_the World Bank=20
predicts that gross domestic product will decline=20
7.9 percent this year,36 while unemployment was=20
measured at 6.2 million people or 8.1 percent of=20
the economically active population at the end of=20
August, according to official Russian=20
statistics37_are compounded by its continued=20
dependence on the export of raw materials, such=20
as energy and metals, leaving it vulnerable to=20
outside factors beyond its control. Medvedev has=20
criticized his government for this situation.38=20
In fact, the most damning indictments of Russia=92s=20
current state of affairs came from Medvedev=20
himself, in an article he wrote and posted on=20
Gazeta.ru website. =91=91So, an inefficient economy,=20
a semi-Soviet social sphere, an immature=20
democracy, negative demographic trends, an=20
unstable Caucasus,=92=92 Medvedev writes, =91=91These are very
big problems even for such a state as Russia.=92=9239
Over the past eight years, despite the bounty=20
from high oil prices, Russia=92s leaders failed to=20
diversify the economy or invest in its declining=20
infrastructure and energy sector, where=20
production has flattened out and is likely to=20
decline in the next several years. At the same=20
time, Russian corporate debt is estimated at $440=20
billion, some $130 billion of which is due this=20
year.40 The Russian state, meanwhile, has=20
announced plans to resume foreign borrowing next=20
year, a sign that it may be running through its=20
significant hard currency reserves at a faster clip than anticipated.41
Russia=92s population, meanwhile, has been=20
declining by an average of 700,000 per year. In=20
the worst case scenario, it may reach a low of=20
between 100 million and 110 million by 2050 from=20
roughly 142 million today.42 This will have=20
enormous implications for Russia=92s labor force,=20
its military, and its ability to control restive=20
regions such as the North Caucasus, one of the=20
few places where the population is growing.=20
Tragically, the North Caucasus is in crisis, with=20
murders, suicide bombings, and assassinations=20
occurring on a daily basis and no indication that=20
the situation will get better any time soon.=20
Russia, in other words, faces a very difficult=20
future, made worse by the government=92s failure to=20
address these challenges in a serious, sustainable manner.
This negligence in part is due to tremendous=20
corruption prevalent throughout the Russian=20
government, from the local levels to the highest=20
rungs of power inside the Kremlin and Russian=20
executive offices. Indeed, Russian decisionmaking=20
is heavily influenced by corrupt, personal=20
interests reflected in opaque, murky,=20
behind-the-scenes deals involving arms sales, the=20
energy sector, and doling out government-backed=20
loans to favored oligarchs.43 The doublehatting=20
of many Russian officials, who in addition to=20
their top government jobs also hold senior=20
positions in Russian companies, raises questions=20
about what motivates officials=92 decisions and=20
actions. The extent to which corruption plays a=20
role in Russian decisionmaking is hard to=20
quantify, but what seems clear is that the=20
Russian elite pursues its own individual=20
interests, including hanging onto power and the=20
perks that come with it, at almost any cost and=20
often to the detriment of the country=92s overall=20
national interests. This, in turn, leads to=20
neglect of the country=92s most pressing needs and=20
to an ungovernable situation for the country. The=20
August 17 accident at the giant=20
Sayano=ADShushenskaya hydroelectric plant in which=20
75 workers were killed was the latest example of=20
Russia=92s crumbling and neglected infrastructure.
Russia=92s sense of wounded pride and its=20
displacement from the world stage as a global=20
power, following the collapse of the Soviet=20
Union, the loss of the Warsaw Pact, and then the=20
chaos and weakness of the Yeltsin years, also=20
explain its leadership=92s behavior. At the same=20
time, the leadership often stimulates and=20
exploits this issue to distract attention from=20
real problems facing society. In April 2005,=20
Putin famously described the collapse of the=20
Soviet Union as the =91=91greatest geopolitical=20
catastrophe=92=92 of the twentieth century.44 During=20
his leadership, thanks mostly to the rising price=20
of oil, Russia was able to bounce back from the depths
reached in the 1990s, flex its muscles again, and=20
gain the respect of other countries around the=20
world. The crowning achievement marking Russia=92s=20
return was hosting the G-8 meeting in 2006 and=20
winning the right to host the 2014 Winter=20
Olympics in Sochi (though the corruption involved=20
in developing the necessary facilities in and=20
around Sochi may well become a source of real embarrassment).
The =91=91comeback=92=92 under Putin paradoxically has=20
been accompanied by a deteriorating domestic=20
situation that points to Russia=92s regression and=20
decline: growing lawlessness and the lack of=20
governability, mixed with a continuing crackdown=20
against regime opponents, human rights activists,=20
and journalists, many of whom face regular=20
harassment, attacks, and even murder. In the=20
North Caucasus, the few journalists and human=20
rights organizations that maintained a presence=20
there began pulling out this past summer.45=20
Meanwhile, murders of journalists, human rights=20
activists, and lawyers elsewhere in Russia,=20
including in Moscow, such as Paul Klebnikov, Anna=20
Politkovskaya, and Stanislav Markelov remain=20
unsolved. This lack of accountability creates an=20
environment in which criminals can literally get=20
away with murder. Even outside of Russia=92s=20
borders, critics of the leadership are killed,=20
such as Aleksandr Litvinenko who died from=20
polonium poisoning in London in November 2006.
All this has renewed a sense of fear inside the=20
country. Not even the authorities=92 control of=20
national television_and thus the flow of=20
information for the majority of Russians_can=20
change this perception. From the example made in=20
2003 of Russia=92s richest oligarch, Mikhail=20
Khodorkovsky, and elimination of gubernatorial=20
elections in 2004 to authorities=92 heavy-handed=20
response to any sources of opposition or=20
criticism and efforts to ensure a rubber-stamp=20
parliament, Russia=92s leadership is moving the=20
country away from the central elements of=20
democratic governance. The United States simply=20
cannot ignore these trends. As four
leading Russian liberals argued: =91=91[W]e do not=20
understand how one can hope for cooperation while=20
ignoring Russia=92s internal development and the=20
principles on which the state functions.=92=9246
Hopes that things would change for the better=20
under a Medvedev presidency have proven to be=20
wishful thinking. More than a year into the job=20
as president, Medvedev has acquired a reputation=20
in some circles as being more liberal than Putin,=20
partly because he is not from the KGB, unlike his=20
predecessor. He also likes to talk about his=20
background as a lawyer (Putin has a law degree as=20
well). At the same time, it is important to=20
remember that Medvedev has ridden on Putin=92s=20
coattails for nearly 18 years, served under him=20
in senior positions in the Kremlin, and=20
completely owes his current position as president to Putin=92s endorsement =
of
his candidacy in December 2007. (Had Putin=20
endorsed Sergei Ivanov that day, Ivanov would=20
likely be president of Russia today). Medvedev=20
was in the Kremlin and head of Gazprom while=20
Khodorkovsky was being persecuted and his Yukos=20
company was being dismantled and sold off, and=20
Russia=92s invasion of Georgia in August 2008=20
occurred with Medvedev in the president=92s seat=20
(with Putin arguably calling the shots). Even=20
Medvedev=92s September 10, 2009 critique in=20
Gazeta.ru of the handling of Russia=92s economic=20
policy over the years suffers from the fact that=20
Medvedev himself was in a senior position of power during that
time, not simply sitting on the sidelines or in the opposition.
Ahead of his July trip to Moscow, Obama appeared=20
to try to differentiate Medvedev from Putin,=20
suggesting that the latter had =91=91one foot in the=20
old ways of doing business and one foot in the=20
new.=92=92 Obama further stated that Putin needs to=20
understand that the =91=91old cold war approaches to=20
U.S.=ADRussian relations is outdated=AD that it=92s=20
time to move forward in a different=20
direction.=92=9247 Not surprisingly, such comments=20
did not go over well in Moscow and were likely=20
counterproductive in trying to create the=20
impression that Medvedev is more amenable to U.S.=20
interests than his predecessor. Medvedev=92s=20
threats against the Czech Republic and Poland=20
days after meeting Obama, and his visit to South=20
Ossetia a week after Obama=92s visit to Moscow,=20
should be read as a warning that the current=20
Russian president will be no pushover when it=20
comes to standing up to the United States.
The problem is that not only is Russia moving in=20
the wrong direction domestically, but it is=20
actively opposed to Western efforts to help its=20
neighbors democratize as well. Following the=20
tragedy at Beslan in September 2004, which killed=20
more than 300 people, Putin saw outside threats=20
looming. In a nationwide address days after the=20
failed rescue ended, he said: =91=91We showed=20
ourselves to be weak. And the weak get beaten.=20
Some would like to tear from us =91a juicy piece=92.=20
Others help them. They help, reasoning that=20
Russia still remains one of the world=92s major=20
nuclear powers, and as such still represents a=20
threat to them. And so they reason that this=20
threat should be removed.=92=9248 This paranoia was=20
only heightened by the =91=91color=92=92 revolutions in=20
Georgia and Ukraine. At Munich in 2007, Putin elaborated:
"One state and, of course, first and foremost the=20
United States, has overstepped its national=20
borders in every way. This is visible in the=20
economic, political, cultural and educational=20
policies it imposes on other nations . . . . It=20
results in the fact that no one feels safe. I=20
want to emphasize this =AD no one feels safe!=20
Because no one can feel that international law is=20
like a stone wall that will protect them. Of=20
course such a policy stimulates an arms race . .=20
. . I am convinced that we have reached that=20
decisive moment when we must seriously think=20
about the architecture of global security."49
The sentiments reflected in Putin=92s Beslan and=20
Munich speeches have not gone away in the minds=20
of today=92s Russian leaders, which of course still=20
includes Putin himself. Moreover, the existence=20
of such threats and enemies enables the=20
leadership to justify its anti-democratic=20
measures and to act aggressively against its=20
neighbors out of a sense of self-defense. The=20
West in general, and NATO and the United States=20
in particular, are seen as the greatest source of=20
threats. Medvedev cited the threat from NATO=20
enlargement, for example, when he unveiled his=20
plans for military modernization in March 2009.50
A Difficult Partner
A paranoid Russian leadership that sees threats=20
everywhere, but particularly from the United=20
States, makes for a very difficult partner for=20
the Obama administration. It does not mean that=20
there are no areas on which the United States and=20
Russia can cooperate (e.g., North Korea,=20
nonproliferation) or that the United States=20
should give up on the relationship. Until there=20
is real change in Russian behavior and policy,=20
both internally and in its foreign policy, the=20
Obama administration=92s efforts to reset relations=20
are not likely to be reciprocated. Administration=20
officials have said that they have no illusions=20
about the prospects for a real turnaround in=20
relations. Accordingly, they should stick with=20
the broad principle of working with Russia=20
wherever possible, while pushing back on Russian=20
misbehavior whenever necessary. They should also=20
coordinate very closely with allies so that=20
Russia hears the same message from Berlin,=20
London, and Paris as it does from Washington.=20
Finally, the Obama administration should never=20
surrender to Russian threats, whether on missile
defense or policy toward other states in the=20
region. Caving to Russian pressure will only feed=20
the bear=92s insatiable appetite.
Notes
[DJ: Not here]
*********
-------
David Johnson
phone: 301-942-9281
email: davidjohnson@starpower.net
fax: 1-202-478-1701 (Jfax; comes direct to email)
home address:
1647 Winding Waye Lane
Silver Spring MD 20902
Partial archive for Johnson's Russia List:
http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson
A project of the World Security Institute
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