The Global Intelligence Files,
files released so far...
2164
The Global Intelligence Files

### Index pages

List of Releases

### by Date of Document

unspecified
2001
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

### by Date of Release

2001-03-13
2010-03-10
2011-03-05
2011-03-15
2012-01-29
2012-02-27
2012-02-28
2012-02-29
2012-03-01
2012-03-02
2012-03-03
2012-03-04
2012-03-05
2012-03-06
2012-03-07
2012-03-08
2012-03-09
2012-03-10
2012-03-11
2012-03-12
2012-03-13
2012-03-14
2012-03-15
2012-03-16
2012-03-17
2012-03-19
2012-03-20
2012-03-23
2012-03-25
2012-03-26
2012-03-27
2012-04-01
2012-04-02
2012-04-24
2012-04-26
2012-04-30
2012-05-10
2012-06-18
2012-06-20
2012-07-01
2012-07-24
2012-07-28
2012-07-29
2012-07-30
2012-07-31
2012-08-01
2012-08-02
2012-08-05
2012-08-06
2012-08-07
2012-08-08
2012-08-09
2012-08-10
2012-08-11
2012-08-12
2012-08-13
2012-08-14
2012-08-15
2012-08-16
2012-08-17
2012-08-18
2012-08-19
2012-08-20
2012-08-21
2012-08-22
2012-08-23
2012-08-24
2012-08-25
2012-08-26
2012-08-27
2012-08-29

### Our Partners

ABC Color - Paraguay
Al Akhbar - Lebanon
Al Masry Al Youm - Egypt
Asia Sentinel - Hong Kong
Bivol - Bulgaria
Carta Capital - Brazil
CIPER - Chile
Dawn Media - Pakistan
L'Espresso - Italy
La Repubblica - Italy
La Jornada - Mexico
La Nacion - Costa Rica
Malaysia Today - Malaysia
McClatchy - United States
Nawaat - Tunisia
NDR/ARD - Germany
Owni - France
Pagina 12 - Argentina
Philip Dorling - Fairfax media contributor - Australia
Plaza Publica - Guatemala
Publica - Brazil
Publico.es - Spain
Rolling Stone - United States
Russian Reporter - Russia
Ta Nea - Greece
Taraf - Turkey
The Hindu - India
The Yes Men - Bhopal Activists
Sunday Star-Times - New Zealand

### Community resources

Supporters Support Wikileaks Follow us on Twitter Twitter this Follow us on Facebook

courage is contagious

# The Global Intelligence Files

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

## Previous STRATFOR information

Released on 2012-08-15 00:00 GMT

Email-ID | 38322
Date | 2011-01-10 00:13:08
To | sbraam@bztm.com, jbartko@bztm.com

Solomon Foshko
Global Intelligence
STRATFOR
T: 512.744.4089
F: 512.744.0239
Solomon.Foshko@stratfor.com
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 13, 2010 5:42:40 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Intelligence Guidance: Week of Dec. 12, 2010
Stratfor logo
Intelligence Guidance: Week of Dec. 12, 2010
December 13, 2010 | 1135 GMT
Intelligence Guidance: Week of Dec. 12, 2010
JONATHAN NACKSTRAND/AFP/Getty Images
Police in the Stockholm shopping district targeted by a suicide bomber
on Dec. 11
Editor*s Note: The following is an internal STRATFOR document produced
to provide high-level guidance to our analysts. This document is not a
forecast, but rather a series of guidelines for understanding and
evaluating events, as well as suggestions on areas for focus.
New Guidance
1. Sweden: The Dec. 11 suicide bombing in Stockholm was a tactical
failure * only two people were injured and the only person killed in
the attack was the suspected bomber. Yet there remains the potential
for accomplices and the evolution of the bomber*s radicalization still
needs to be examined. Sweden is considered one of the more liberal
countries toward immigrants, but well before this attack even it had
begun to feel the strain between European countries and their Muslim
populations. How will the incident impact the Swedish government, its
policies and attitudes of Swedes toward immigration? This attack may
ultimately prove to be as inconsequential as it was tactically
amateurish, but we cannot assume this and need to be thinking about
broader reverberations.
2. Iran: Despite low expectations, there was some measure of progress
in the nuclear talks during the week of Dec. 5 in Geneva. Though the
underlying issues remain unresolved, modest progress is itself
noteworthy. Meanwhile, in Baghdad a governing coalition is taking
shape. There are signs here that we need to understand and put into
context. Is there meaningful movement between Washington and Tehran?
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates recently met with Arab leaders
from Gulf states to discuss Iran, and Gulf Cooperation Council member
states held a summit in which, for the first time, they demanded a
seat at the table in Iran-related talks. We need to figure what really
happened in these talks and the back-channels to get a sense of where
things are headed.
3. China, India: Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao will visit India from Dec.
15-18. Wen will be accompanied by the biggest ever Chinese trade
delegation * more than 250 representatives from 100 Chinese companies,
in sectors ranging from manufacturing and banking to information
technology. We need to watch this trip closely, as it will afford a
host of opportunities for bilateral talks and sidelines discussions.
4. Japan: A new guiding document for the Japan Self-Defense Forces is
expected this week that will reorient the country*s military strategy
to specifically focus more on countering China. We need to examine
both the military specifics here as well as regional reactions to the
overt shift * particularly in Beijing and Pyongyang, as well as Seoul.
5. Belarus: Russia and Belarus have reached a deal on two oil tariffs
and a customs union that have been straining relations between Minsk
and Moscow, as Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko prepares for
a presidential election on Dec. 19 in which he is almost certain to be
re-elected. But Lukashenko has also been at the center of Russia*s
frustrations with Belarus. We need to watch Belarus closely. If the
Kremlin has come to an understanding with Lukashenko, that is
important. If it seeks to undermine his re-election, that is also
important. We need to know where matters stand between the two
countries.
Existing Guidance
1. Iraq: A governing coalition is taking form in Baghdad, albeit
slowly. We need to lean forward on this, looking at the final
breakdown of power and understanding that this will mean for Iraq, the
United States and the region. In just over one year, all U.S. forces
are slated to be withdrawn from the country, and with them an enormous
amount of American influence. Will this go through? With the governing
coalition issue settled, what are the key points of contention between
Washington and Tehran?
2. United States: U.S. State Department diplomatic cables continue to
trickle out of WikiLeaks. How are countries and their populations
reacting to the revelations made in the cables? What will be the
functional consequences for the practice of American diplomacy? Are
there any major rifts emerging? We need to keep track of the public
reaction and stay aware of any constraints domestic politics may place
on the countries in question. Though few radically new or unexpected
revelations have been unearthed, the release offers a remarkably broad
insight into the world of American foreign policy as it takes place
behind closed doors. How do the leaks either confirm or call into
question standing STRATFOR assessments?
3. Russia, U.S.: We are picking up on signs that the U.S.-Russia
*reset* in relations is beginning to break down. If U.S. President
Barack Obama fails to deliver on START, how and where will the
Russians respond? We are already hearing rumors of indirect U.S.
military assistance going to Georgia as well as Russian military
equipment being delivered to Iran. Ramp up intelligence collection to
figure out if there is any truth to the rumors, and if so, what the
significance of these military transfers may be and what other levers
each side might use in such a tit-for-tat campaign.
4. Afghanistan: The United States and its NATO allies have agreed on a
timetable that would transfer security responsibility to the Afghans
by 2014. The United States has affirmed that *combat* operations are
to cease by the deadline * note the parallel with Iraq, where 50,000
troops remain in an *advisory and assistance* role. This is an
explicit American commitment to the war effort for years to come. We
need to gauge the response of both the Taliban and Pakistan. At the
same time, what is the status of the reported and rumored talks
between the Taliban and U.S. and Afghan officials, and what is the
impact, if any, of the revelation that one of the so-called senior
Taliban leaders participating in the talks is an impostor?
Meanwhile, winter is approaching. Both sides face constraints due to
the weather, but both also have incentives and opportunities to gain
ground. Fighting in Sangin district in Helmand province remains
intense. We need to monitor both sides* operational efforts in the
months ahead. What impact will the weather have on the International
Security Assistance Force*s intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance capabilities?
5. Brazil: Brazilian security forces have seized Rio de Janeiro*s two
most violent and drug-ridden favelas, or shantytowns. We need to watch
this closely as the campaign progresses. Can Brasilia translate its
initial offensive into lasting success? Groups such as the First
Capital Command (PCC) and Amigos Dos Amigos are very powerful * and
brazen * and will not go down without a fight. Not only are key
individuals not being arrested, but the favelas are a symptom of deep,
intractable problems with crime, corruption, narcotics and poverty.
How are these underlying issues being addressed? We need to be wary of
Brazil*s embarking on an endeavor it cannot see through (Mexico*s drug
war comes to mind), and thus run the risk of ultimately making the
problem worse, rather than better.
Outgoing President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva*s recognition of
Palestinian statehood raises a number of questions. Brazil has been
dabbling more assertively in international affairs, and da Silva is in
the twilight of his presidency. But, we need to take a closer look at
Brazil*s rationale * why this, and why now? Will the backlash from the
United States and Israel be rhetorical or significant?
Related Special Topic Page
* Weekly Intelligence That Drives Our Analysis
EURASIA
* Dec. 13-16: North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Ui Chun*s visit to
Russia to discuss bilateral issues and security on the Korean
Peninsula with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will
continue.
* Dec. 13: The Hungarian parliament will hold a vote on a
controversial pension plan.
* Dec. 13: Argentine Economic Minister Amado Boudou will visit
France to discuss the repayment of debt owed to the Paris Club.
* Dec 13: Foreign ministers from the 27 EU member states will meet
with representatives from Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia,
Armenia and Azerbaijan in Brussels at an Eastern Partnership
Summit.
* Dec. 13-14: An EU foreign ministers* meeting will be held in
Brussels and will center on the Middle East, Iran, Sudan and
Somalia.
* Dec. 14: Former ETA members Arturo Cubillas Fontan and Jose Angel
Urtiaga will testify on the alleged links between ETA and the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.
* Dec. 14: A no-confidence vote will be held against Italian Prime
Minister Silvio Berlusconi*s government.
* Dec. 14: WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange will face a hearing on
extradition to Sweden in a London court.
* Dec. 14: Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban will meet with
Slovak Prime Minister Iveta Radicova to discuss cooperation and
minority issues.
* Dec. 14-27: The Bulgarian government will hold a public auction of
stakes in 31 companies in a major privatization bid.
* Dec. 15: Greek unions angered by austerity measures have called
for a Europe-wide day of strikes on this date.
* Dec. 15: Police and firefighters in Prague will go on strike.
* Dec. 15: A governmental coalition is scheduled to be formed in
Bosnia-Herzegovina by this date.
* Dec. 15-16: Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich will visit
Latvia to meet with Latvian President Valdis Zatlers to discuss
bilateral ties.
* Dec. 16: Geneva will host the 14th round of talks between Georgia,
Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia since the 2008 Russia-Georgia
war.
* Dec. 16-17: A summit of EU leaders will be held.
* Dec. 17: Russia will conduct a test launch of the Bulava
intercontinental ballistic missile from the Yuri Dolgorukiy
submarine, which will be operating in the White Sea.
* Dec. 18-22: The Greek parliament will debate the 2011 budget, with
a final decision to be made Dec. 22.
* Dec. 19: Presidential elections will be held in Belarus.
* Dec. 19: Poland*s Office of Competition and Consumer Protection
will announce its opinion on privatizing state utility Energa.
Polish Treasury Minister Aleksander Grad will decide whether the
company should be privatized.
* Dec. 19-20: Bavarian Prime Minister Horst Seehofer will meet with
Czech Prime Minister Petr Necas in Prague to discuss cooperation.
MIDDLE EAST/SOUTH ASIA
* Unspecified Date: U.S. Middle East envoy George Mitchell will
visit the region next week to hold direct talks with regional
leaders.
* Dec. 13-15: A Dutch business delegation will continue its
three-day visit to Turkey, during which the delegation will meet
with the Turkish ministries of health and national defense as well
as officials from Turkish companies.
* Dec. 13: The United States* new Afghanistan strategy will be
released.
* Dec. 13-14: The United Arab Emirates will host its first
conference on Border Control, Airport and Seaport Security
(BCASS).
* Dec. 13-14: Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister Taner
Yildiz will meet Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin to
discuss a nuclear power plant to be constructed in Turkey.
* Dec. 14: French Foreign and European Affairs Minister Michele
Alliot-Marie will meet Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Cooperation Taieb Fassi-Fihri, to discuss regional, political and
economic issues.
* Dec. 15-18: Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao will make a three-day visit
to New Delhi during which talks about border issues will be held.
* Dec. 16-17: Tajik President Emomali Rahmon will make a two-day
visit to Turkey to meet with Turkish President Abdullah Gul and to
sign a series of bilateral cooperation agreements and protocols.
* Dec. 19: The deadline for the Sudanese government and the Darfuri
rebel group, the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), to sign a
peace agreement in Doha, Qatar, will be reached.
EAST ASIA
* Dec. 13-14: Namibian Minister of Foreign Affairs Utoni Nujoma*s
visit to China to meet with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi
and discuss bilateral cooperation will continue.
* Dec. 13-17: Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen will meet with
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in China to discuss bilateral ties.
* Dec. 14: Legislators from the Cambodian opposition party, the Sam
Rainsy Party, will visit the Cambodia-Vietnam border to view a
controversial border post.
* Dec. 14: Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov will meet
with South Korean Foreign Minister Kim Sung Hwan to discuss
bilateral cooperation in Seoul.
* Dec. 14-17: U.S. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg will
head a delegation to Beijing to meet with Chinese officials
regarding regional security issues.
* Dec. 16: U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and
Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell will travel to Tokyo and special
envoy Sung Kim will travel to Seoul.
* Dec. 15: A session of the Melanesian Spearhead Group will be held
in the Solomon Islands. The group is comprised of Fiji, Papua New
Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and the Kanak and Socialist
National Liberation Front of New Caledonia.
* Dec. 15-16: A meeting of various foreign ministers, private sector
businesses and academics from 49 countries will take place in
Bangkok at the Asia-Middle East Dialogue.
* Dec. 16-18: Chiang Pin Kung of the Taiwanese Straits Exchange
Foundation and Chen Yunlin, president of the Beijing-based
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits will meet in
Taipei to hold cross-strait talks.
* Dec. 16-20: New Mexico*s governor, Bill Richardson, will visit
North Korea as a *private citizen* to ease tensions on the Korean
Peninsula.
* Dec. 16-Jan. 3: The Communist Party of the Philippines and the
Philippine government have agreed to a temporary cease-fire that
will span these dates.
* Dec. 17: The Kingdom of Tonga will hold a vote for prime minister.
* Dec. 18-19: South Korean President Lee Myung Bak will be in Japan
to meet with Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan to discuss
bilateral cooperation and to facilitate the return of historic
Korean artifacts.
* Dec. 19-21: Bangladeshi opposition leader and former Prime
Minister Khaleda Zia will visit meet with Communist Party of China
and government officials in China.
AMERICAS
* Next week: Israeli and Palestinian negotiators will visit
Washington to consult the Obama administration about Middle East
peace talks.
* Dec. 13: Venezuelan Foreign Minister Nicolas Maduro will meet
Ecuadorian Foreign Minister Ricardo Patino in Salinas, Ecuador.
* Dec. 13: Mexico*s Institutional Revolutionary Party is scheduled
to hold a session of its National Political Council in Pachuca,
Hidalgo state.
* Dec. 13: The Argentine foreign and labor ministers are scheduled
to meet with union members in Buenos Aires to discuss lifting a
strike that has blocked the entry of Paraguayan vessels into
Buenos Aires.
* Dec. 13: Mexican Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa will meet with
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Canadian Foreign
Minister Lawrence Cannon in Wakefield, Quebec.
* Dec. 14: Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa will visit Venezuela.
* Dec. 14-15: U.S. Commerce Secretary Gary Locke, U.S. Trade
Representative Ron Kirk and Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan of
the State Council will represent the United States and China at a
meeting of the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade in
Washington.
* Dec. 15: U.S. Vice President Joe Biden will chair a U.N. Security
Council meeting on the progress of Iraq*s government formation and
efforts to remove Iraq from Chapter 7 obligations.
* Dec. 15: Member states of the Common Market of the South
(Mercosur) and Syria are scheduled to sign an agreement to begin
trade negotiations during a Mercosur summit in Brazil.
* Dec. 15: Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is scheduled to meet
with Bolivian President Evo Morales in Cochabamba, Bolivia.
* Dec. 15: Central American foreign ministers will participate in a
meeting of the Central American Integration System in Belmopan,
Belize.
* Dec. 15: Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa will visit Colombia.
* Dec. 16: Former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra will speak
to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe in
Washington.
* Dec. 16: The Central American Integration System Presidents*
Summit is scheduled to be held in Belmopan, Belize.
* Dec. 17: The Mercosur Presidents* Summit is scheduled to be held
in Foz de Iguacu, Brazil.
AFRICA
* Dec. 13-15: Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos will travel
to South Africa for an official state visit.
* Dec. 14: Nigeria*s ruling People*s Democratic Party will hold its
National Executive Committee meeting.
* Dec. 14: Southern Sudan*s ruling Sudan People*s Liberation
Movement party will host a meeting of Southern Sudanese political
parties to discuss the Jan. 9, 2011, independence referendum.
* Dec. 14: Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan will submit the 2011
budget estimate to the National Assembly.
* Dec. 15: The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region*s
Special Summit on Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources will
be held in the Zambian capital of Lusaka; Sudanese President Omar
al Bashir has been invited to attend.
* Dec. 15: Sudanese state-run oil company Sudapet and China National
Petroleum Company expect production results from a series of new
wells drilled in Block 6.
* Dec. 15: Exiled former Rwandan military officers Kayumba Nyamwasa
and Theogene Rudasingwa will face charges of forming a terrorist
group, ethnic divisionism and spreading harmful propaganda in
Rwanda.
* Dec. 15: Oil production is expected to commence at the Jubilee
field off Ghana*s southwest coast.
* Dec. 15-18: The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
party will hold its 11th National Conference to decide a party
candidate for potential June 2011 national elections.
* Dec. 17: International Criminal Court Chief Prosecutor Luis
Moreno-Ocampo will file cases against six Kenyan politicians
accused of involvement in 2008 post-election violence.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 13, 2010 9:39:24 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: The Iranian Foreign Minister's Firing and Nuclear Divisions?
Stratfor logo
The Iranian Foreign Minister's Firing and Nuclear Divisions?
December 13, 2010 | 1403 GMT
The Iranian Foreign Minister's Firing and Nuclear Divisions?
ATTA KENARE/AFP/Getty Images
Former Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki (L) and Atomic
Energy Organization of Iran chief Ali Akbar Salehi
Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki has been fired by
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has named the country*s nuclear
chief, Ali Akbar Salehi, as the interim foreign minister, Iranian
state media reported Dec. 13. Mottaki, who had held the post since
2005 when Ahmadinejad began his first term as president, was in
Senegal at the time his firing was announced, which suggests that he
was abruptly removed from the position.
It is no secret that Ahmadinejad and Mottaki disagreed on some policy
matters, as evidenced by numerous rumors throughout the years that
Mottaki had resigned or had been removed. His ouster comes shortly
after the Dec. 6-7 meeting between Iran and the P-5+1 nations over
Tehran*s controversial nuclear program. While both sides agreed that
further talks will be held next month in Istanbul, and while Iranian
officials from across the political establishment in Tehran have
hailed the talks as a success for the regime, Mottaki*s removal and
subsequent replacement (albeit temporary) by the country*s nuclear
chief underscores a rift within the ruling elite over the nuclear
issue.
Last year, when Ahmadinejad announced that his government was willing
to accept a uranium swapping deal, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei openly objected to the idea. It is possible that Mottaki was
aligned with Khamenei on this issue, and Ahmadinejad may have sacked
Mottaki to remove one of the most high-ranking Khamenei allies in his
Cabinet.
The complex Iranian political structure * involving multiple
institutions having a say in foreign affairs * has long hindered the
Islamic republic*s ability to craft foreign policy. It is too early to
say much on the exact impact Mottaki*s removal will have on the
foreign policy decision-making process, however. What is certain is
that the power struggle between the various factions within Iran*s
ruling elite is hampering that process, and that the old lines between
pragmatists and ideologues have become increasingly blurry.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 13, 2010 10:57:29 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Canada, U.S.: Defining a North American Defense Perimeter
Stratfor logo
Canada, U.S.: Defining a North American Defense Perimeter
December 13, 2010 | 1309 GMT
Canada, U.S.: Defining a North American Defense Perimeter
/AFP/Getty Images
A checkpoint on the U.S.-Canada border in Stanstead, Quebec
Summary
Canada and the United States are expected to enter a new phase of
border security negotiations in the coming months. Motivated by
economic need, the two countries have a long history of cooperating on
border-security issues, but in the post-9/11 world, expanding the
so-called *security perimeter* to the borders of North America raises
sovereignty concerns for Canada.
Analysis
Canadian Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon will meet with U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Dec. 13 just outside Ottawa to
discuss the formation of the *Beyond the Border Working Group,* which
would address U.S. perimeter security concerns in Canada. (Mexico has
its own security arrangements with the United States and Canada, and
while Mexican Foreign Secretary Patricia Espinosa will attend the Dec.
13 meeting, Mexico will not be involved in this particular working
group.) According to the Canadian TV network CTV, which has access to
a document outlining the proposal, the working group would discuss
cooperating on issues such as cargo security, border screening,
cross-border information sharing, improving the working relationship
between the militaries and preventing and recovering from
cyberattacks.
The planned meeting follows a report issued earlier this month by the
Canadian Chamber of Commerce that emphasizes the negative impact
discordance between U.S. and Canadian customs and security regulations
has on businesses that rely on cross-border trade. In the conclusion
of its report, the chamber says:
*Modern security challenges necessitate pushing back the border by
identifying threats long before they arrive. Such a perimeter
approach to security allows for the identification of threats long
before they reach North American shores.*
Confidence and trust that the United States and Canada might have in
each other to prevent major security threats from spilling over into
the other country is not a given. Ever since Canada ceased being a
strategic threat to the United States in the early 19th century, the
isolation of the North American continent was enough to allay
Washington*s security concerns. The 9/11 attacks fundamentally altered
that perception. From the American perspective, the attacks not only
highlighted weaknesses in American intelligence-sharing and security,
they also made it clear that geographic isolation alone cannot prevent
the United States and Canada from being directly attacked.
At the moment, security cooperation between the United States and
Canada is robust. The U.S. and Canadian militaries cooperate in
monitoring and guarding North American airspace through the North
American Aerospace Defense Command, and in October we saw a Canadian
air force jet escort a passenger aircraft into U.S. air space and hand
it off to U.S. fighter jets during the package-bomb scare targeting
UPS and FedEx. Another example of security cooperation was the arrest
of Abdirahman Ali Gaall, a Somali man en route from Paris to Mexico
City who had a U.S. warrant out for his arrest. Canadian authorities
forced the plane to make an unscheduled stop in Montreal in order to
take the man off the plane and detain him.
Despite the high level of security cooperation already in place, the
United States has been increasing security measures at all of its
ports of entry * including those along the Canadian border * since
9/11. By harmonizing their border-security policies, the United States
and Canada hope to exploit North America*s natural geographic
advantage of being flanked by two oceans and ensure that trade is not
impeded by enhanced U.S. security. If threats can be stopped in places
like airports and seaports, where security forces can be concentrated,
there is less of a need to spread them thin along a 5,000-mile border.
Canada, U.S.: Defining a North American Defense Perimeter
(click here to enlarge image)
According to a Dec. 10 report in the Vancouver Sun, extra U.S. border
security has cost Canadian manufacturers the equivalent of 2 percent
to 3 percent of total trade revenue, or about $400 million to $700
million (the United States received nearly 75 percent of Canada*s
exports in 2009, according to the U.S. Census Bureau). The Canadian
Chamber of Commerce report suggests that integrating U.S. and Canadian
security measures could relieve the financial stress enhanced U.S.
security has placed on Canadian manufacturers.
This is where cross-border relations, along with the job of the Beyond
the Border Working Group, get more complicated. The U.S.-Canadian
relationship is not an equal one. Unlike the European Union, which has
close border collaboration within the Schengen zone, the disparity in
power between Canada and the United States is immense. Canadians are
concerned that extending the security perimeter around all of North
America will erode Canada*s sovereignty. The United States will
essentially have veto power on border legislation and could in the
future raise concerns about visa regulations as well as immigration.
Considering that border management is one of the pillars of modern
nation-state sovereignty, it is not surprising that many Canadians are
worried about American pressure to cooperate on security policy.
However, with so much of the Canadian economy dependent on trade with
the United States * Canadian exports to America make up nearly 17
percent of Canada*s gross domestic product * Canadians also realize
they have very little room for maneuver.
The issue is further complicated by the current government in Ottawa.
Stephen Harper is considered one of the most pro-U.S. prime ministers
in recent memory. However, he has also campaigned on the principle of
extending Canada*s sovereignty into the Arctic. On the issue of a
joint U.S.-Canadian security perimeter, his emphasis on Canadian
sovereignty could become an issue with both supporters and detractors.
Ultimately, Canada*s choices are constrained by U.S. security
concerns. As the United States remains wary of goods and people coming
over its borders and as Canada tries to maintain dominion over its
territory, both countries will have to carefully balance the critical
issues of defense, trade and sovereignty.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 13, 2010 3:34:06 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Dispatch: Intersection of Iranian Domestic and Foreign Policies
Stratfor logo
Dispatch: Intersection of Iranian Domestic and Foreign Policies
December 13, 2010 | 2124 GMT
Click on image below to watch video:
[IMG]
Analyst Kamran Bokhari discusses the firing of Iran*s foreign minister
and how the move illustrates the Iranian president*s ability to steer
through domestic opposition and push his foreign policy agenda.
Editor*s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition
technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete
accuracy.
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad fired his foreign minister,
Manouchehr Mottaki, at a time when Iran is engaged with intense
nuclear negotiations. The firing of the foreign minister is evidence
of a simmering internal power struggle that has the ability to impact
the Islamic republic*s negotiations with the West.
Mottaki was actually abroad in Senegal when he was fired by the
president, and that*s very significant in that it tells us that not
only is this the result of an internal power struggle, but it*s also a
very abrupt measure. And we know that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been
engaged in trying to bypass the foreign ministry by appointing key
people in advisory positions and making use of the National Security
Council to make foreign policy. Ahmadinejad faces opposition from
across the entire political establishment in Tehran. There are people
in various institutions within various factions that support the
president, and then there are people in those same institutions and
same factions that oppose the president. This makes the president*s
job of policymaking and governance very difficult. It constrains him
far beyond what a normal Iranian president would face from the
byzantine structure that is the Islamic republic. So therefore,
Ahmadinejad has had to navigate through this complex swamp in a very
skillful way to not only maintain power, but also to push ahead his
policy agenda.
That the firing of the foreign minister comes within days of the
nuclear talks between the West and Iran suggests that there is some
significant tension within the establishment. We know that over the
past year, the supreme leader and Ahmadinejad have been at odds over
the proposed uranium swapping deal that the West has been offering
Iran. Ahmadinejad accepted it in the talks that were held over a year
ago last October in 2009. Shortly thereafter, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
came out and rejected it very publicly. So if we go by that and we
look at the way the foreign minister has been removed, it appears as
though Ahmadinejad was facing a lot of opposition to any negotiation
that he was conducting with the West from certain very powerful
quarters, and in order to bypass those quarters, he went ahead and
removed the foreign minister. If you look at the person who has
replaced him, he is, or at least was until today, the head of the
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and someone who has worked closely
with the president in recent years.
Today*s move to oust a foreign minister who has been in his Cabinet
since day one speaks volumes about how Ahmadinejad is willing to take
risks to push his agenda and to be able to navigate and maintain his
position as president and head of state. Will he be successful? It*s
too early to say. The game is not over, in fact, I think the game has
just begun.
Click for more videos
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with
attribution to www.stratfor.com
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 13, 2010 4:17:23 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Another Shift in Egypt's Presidential Succession Plan
Stratfor logo
Another Shift in Egypt's Presidential Succession Plan
December 13, 2010 | 2111 GMT
Another Shift in Egypt's Presidential Succession Plan
KHALED DESOUKI/AFP/Getty Images
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak at a summit in Sirte, Libya, on Oct.
10, 2010
Summary
A new consensus presidential candidate is emerging in Egypt as a
possible successor to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Mubarak*s
plans to transfer power to his son, Gamal, have run into stiff
resistance from the old guard in the military and the ruling National
Democratic Party. In this latest variation to the succession plan,
former air force chief and current minister of civil aviation Ahmed
Shafiq is being presented as a potential bridge between Egypt*s old
and new guard.
Analysis
A STRATFOR source in Egypt*s diplomatic corps has reported a recent
shift in Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak*s plan to eventually have
his son, Gamal, succeed him, a plan that is intended to bridge a
growing chasm between the old and new guard elite in Egypt.
Indeed, the Nov. 28 and Dec. 5 parliamentary elections brought to
light deepening fissures within Egypt*s ruling circle over Mubarak*s
succession strategy. The ruling National Democratic Party (NDP)
trounced the opposition as expected, but the elections put the NDP in
the uncomfortable position of trying to legitimize an election that
was widely believed to have been marred with irregularities and
designed to keep a tight lid on opposition contenders, such as those
from the Muslim Brotherhood or Mohamed ElBaradei*s National Assembly
for Change. After the elections, prominent members of the old guard,
led by NDP Secretary-General Safwat al-Sharif, publicly criticized the
manner in which the elections were conducted and warned that such
irregularities would adversely affect Egypt*s foreign relations. The
criticism does not stem from any newfound desire on the part of the
old guard to develop a more pluralistic political system; rather, it
was a tool used to publicly voice opposition to Mubarak*s plans for
the new government and to demonstrate the growing rift within the
ruling elite. The implicit warning was that the longer the president
allows these divisions to simmer, the more opposition groups will be
galvanized to exploit these rifts and stage a meaningful challenge to
the president in a tense election year.
Mubarak is 82 years old and facing health complications. As such, he
has long been trying to shape a plan to have his son Gamal eventually
assume control of the presidency. This plan encountered resistance
during the past year, as stalwart members of Egypt*s old guard in the
military and the NDP made clear that they disapproved of the new
guard*s call for a more liberal economic model and would not support
Gamal becoming president. Mubarak then adjusted his plans to have his
closest adviser and Egypt*s intelligence chief, Omar Suleiman, become
vice president and then succeed Mubarak when he is no longer able to
rule. According to this plan, Suleiman was expected to remain
president for roughly one year before passing power to Gamal. To
further ease the transition, Mubarak then publicly indicated that he
himself would run for re-election in the summer of 2011 while making
arrangements for Suleiman to take over should he become incapacitated.
However, this plan has also proven unsatisfactory to the military
elite.
Though Suleiman is a powerful figure in Egypt and has long been
thought of as the most likely consensus candidate to succeed Mubarak,
concerns persist among the old guard that Suleiman*s tenure would be
short-lived given his old age and alleged health problems. These old
guard members would prefer one of their own from the military to
succeed Mubarak, one who would have the staying power to stave off a
transition to Gamal. Mubarak*s replacement candidate for Suleiman (at
least for now) appears to be former air force chief and current
minister of civil aviation Ahmed Shafiq. Shafiq has a close
relationship with the president (he worked under Mubarak*s command
when Mubarak led the Egyptian air force in the 1970s). According to a
STRATFOR source, Mubarak*s decision to appoint Shafiq as the minister
of civil aviation in 2002 was a sign that Shafiq was being groomed for
a more serious position, as most Egyptian generals do not typically
get the opportunity to acquire civilian experience in the government.
Such civilian experience enhances the credibility of a retired general
if and when he is appointed to a more senior political office. As The
Wall Street Journal reported in a Dec. 10 article citing diplomatic
sources, a column by the editor-in-chief of state-owned Mussawar
magazine highlighting Shafiq*s credentials was a good indication that
conditions are being prepped for Shafiq to enter the political
limelight.
As the past several months have shown, Egypt*s succession plans are
subject to frequent modifications. Amidst all the adjustments, though,
a single trend is becoming more apparent: The old guard,
well-represented in the military, is becoming increasingly influential
in political civilian matters as Mubarak nears the end of his
presidency.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 13, 2010 5:06:30 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Mexico Security Memo: Dec. 13, 2010
Stratfor logo
Mexico Security Memo: Dec. 13, 2010
December 13, 2010 | 2150 GMT
Mexico Security Memo: Dec. 13, 2010
A Near Miss for El Chapo?
Mexican media reported Dec. 13 that Sinaloa Federation leader Joaquin
*El Chapo* Guzman Loera may have narrowly escaped a Mexican army raid
on a party the night of Dec. 10-11 in the Campestre neighborhood of
Delicias, Chihuahua state. El Diario cites unofficial, unidentified
sources as saying Guzman was attending the party, and El Digital
reports the operation was targeting him but that units from the 5th
military zone that first arrived on the scene were ordered to wait for
backup from the 42nd military zone before they could initiate the
raid.
This hesitation may have allowed Guzman to flee, though there also is
no confirmation, only statements by unnamed sources, that he was even
present at the party. The El Digital sources said the order to wait
was given so the 42nd zone could share credit for the capture, which
indicates that the hesitation was not due to lack of firepower *
making it an unusual order, given the target*s value.
The raid did lead to the wounding and capture of Enrique *El Cumbias*
Lopez Acosta, the head of Sinaloa*s Gente Nueva enforcement arm, who
has been heavily involved in Sinaloa*s battles against the Juarez
cartel*s La Linea group. After the raid, Lopez was taken to a Delicias
hospital, which military forces locked down during his treatment (all
patients were temporarily denied access to the hospital, and Rio
Conchos Avenue was closed down), a standard procedure for Mexican
security forces attempting to prevent counterattacks by
drug-trafficking enforcement arms. He was released from the hospital
later the same day and taken to a prison in Delicias.
Mexican authorities have had few opportunities to apprehend Guzman
since he escaped from prison in 2001. This lack of security attention,
coupled with comparatively debilitating government pressure on other
drug-trafficking organizations such as Los Zetas and the Gulf Cartel,
has led to the theory that the Mexican government has chosen the
Sinaloa Federation as the base for an alliance of cartels with which
it can negotiate.
If Guzman*s presence at the party is confirmed, the assessment of this
theorized tacit agreement with Sinaloa could come into question.
Conversely, if the report of the military*s being forced to wait
before conducting the raid is true, it could provide evidence of such
favoritism.
Another Blow to La Familia Michoacana
Mexican national security spokesman Alejandro Poire confirmed Dec. 10
that the spiritual leader of La Familia Michoacana (LFM), Nazario *El
Chayo* Moreno Gonzalez, was killed in a Dec. 9 clash with security
forces in Apatzingan, Michoacan state. Moreno*s death came amid a
two-daylong firefight that began Dec. 8 when Mexican security forces
began moving into the city. At least two to three civilians were
reported killed in gun battles on the night of Dec. 8-9, and one of
these battles is believed to have killed Moreno. LFM retaliated Dec. 9
by closing five roads in the state*s capital, Morelia. Mexican
security operations continued Dec. 10, with authorities announcing
that five members of its security forces had been killed.
Following the announcement of Moreno*s death, the government of
Apatzingan called for its citizens to march for peace and protest
against the presence of federal forces in the area. The march
essentially turned into a rally in support of Moreno, complete with
pro-Moreno signs, banners and chants. The marches continued into the
evening of Dec. 12. Mexican authorities have previously * and
apparently erroneously * reported Moreno*s capture, in both 2008 and
2009, but the public response to this most recent operation suggests
that this time Mexican security officials got their target.
Moreno*s purported death is yet another blow to the struggling LFM.
Between government security operations targeting its leaders and
attacks from rival cartels such as Los Zetas, LFM has seen its power
wane over the past year.
Mexico Security Memo: Dec. 13, 2010
(click here to view interactive map)
Dec. 6
* Police in Tepeji del Rio, Hidalgo state, seized a suspected
methamphetamine lab and arrested six suspects.
* The dismembered body of a woman was discovered in the Valle de Los
Reyes neighborhood of Los Reyes de la Paz, Mexico state. The
victim*s body was discovered in several plastic bags and a box.
* Unidentified gunmen shot and killed two people in the Burocratas
Municipales neighborhood of Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state. A third
person was injured in the attack.
Dec. 7
* A decapitated body bearing a message from an unidentified criminal
group was discovered in Nezahualcoyotl, Mexico state.
* Soldiers arrested three suspected criminals during a patrol in
Sabinas Hidalgo, Nuevo Leon state.
* Soldiers arrested two police officers in Tepoztlan, Morelos state,
for allegedly spying on military activities at the behest of
drug-trafficking cartels. The two officers were later freed.
Dec. 8
* Soldiers arrested eight suspected members of Los Zetas at an
unspecified location in San Luis Potosi state.
* Two people, including an infant, were killed in a firefight
between police and suspected gunmen from LFM in Apatzingan,
Michoacan state.
Dec. 9
* Unidentified gunmen set a truck on fire near a military garrison
in Zitacuaro, Michoacan state.
* Police seized 97 kilograms (about 210 pounds) of marijuana from a
packing firm in the municipality of Zapopan, Jalisco state.
* The body of an unidentified man was discovered in Ecatepec, Mexico
state. The victim had been shot in the head and chest, and his
hands and feet were bound.
* Unidentified attackers set a gas station on fire in the
Manantiales neighborhood of Morelia, Michoacan state.
Dec. 10
* Unidentified gunmen kidnapped a teacher from his house in Sonoyta,
Sonora state.
* Soldiers seized approximately 1.2 tons of marijuana from a
residence in Tijuana, Baja California state.
* Thirteen people were killed and approximately 30 were injured
during a firefight between two groups of suspected criminals in
Tecalitlan, Jalisco state.
Dec. 11
* Unidentified gunmen shot and killed a policeman as he drove a
patrol car in San Nicolas de los Garza, Nuevo Leon state.
* Security forces searching for a kidnap victim in Sonoyta, Sonora
state, discovered five bodies.
* Authorities announced the arrest of Rene Aranda Reynol Rodriguez,
the chief of Los Zetas for the municipality of Guadalupe, Nuevo
Leon state. The suspect was arrested at a residence along with
eight suspected associates. Four kidnap victims were freed in the
operation.
Dec. 12
* The decapitated and dismembered bodies of three men were hung from
a bridge in Tunzingo, Guerrero state. The victims* arms and the
skin from their faces were discovered on the roadway of the
bridge.
* Two men were shot and injured by an unidentified gunman at a bar
in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state.
* The bodies of four men were found along a road in the municipality
of Tepecoacuilco, Guerrero state. The victims had been shot to
death.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 13, 2010 5:47:24 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: A New South African Ambassador to Angola?
Stratfor logo
A New South African Ambassador to Angola?
December 13, 2010 | 2339 GMT
A New South African Ambassador to Angola?
MANPREET ROMANA/AFP/Getty Images
South African National Defense Forces chief Gen. Godfrey Ngwenya (L)
visits Indian Naval Staff chief Adm. Arun Prakash in New Delhi in 2006
A STRATFOR source in South Africa has reported that President Jacob
Zuma is on the verge of appointing Gen. Godfrey Ngwenya, chief of the
South African National Defense Force (SANDF), as Pretoria*s new
permanent ambassador to Angola. Ngwenya has been employed with the
SANDF since its creation in 1994 and has been leading it since taking
over for Siphiwe Nyanda in 2005. South African media reported that he
was due to retire from the SANDF in April but stayed on through the
year. While there has been no public announcement that Ngwenya is on
the verge of leaving, the source says he is already being briefed for
his new ambassadorial position at the Department of International
Relations and Cooperation. The SANDF*s current Chief of Joint
Operations, Lt. Gen. T.T. Mantanzima, is expected to take Ngwenya*s
place.
Ngwenya is no stranger to Angola. He spent 10 years there during the
struggle against apartheid, harbored by Angola*s ruling Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) from 1979-88, working for
the armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC), Umkhonto we
Sizwe (MK), under the code name of Timothy Mkoena. By 1984, he was
commander of all MK forces in Angola, but he was forced to relinquish
his post three years later after being wounded by rebels from the
National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA).
South Africa has not had a permanent ambassador in place in Angola
since December 2009, only a charge d*affaires, so Ngwenya*s
appointment is significant. The fact that South Africa lacks an
ambassador in Luanda is not necessarily indicative of any strains in
the two countries* relationship; both have maintained high-level
contacts since Zuma*s ascension to power in April 2009. Zuma chose
Angola as the location for his first state visit as president, and has
repeatedly dispatched top personal envoys when he has needed to
negotiate or discuss issues of importance with Luanda. State Security
Minister Siyabonga Cwele, Energy Minister Dipuo Peters and South
Africa*s head of defense intelligence, Lt. Gen. Abel Mxolisi
Shilubane, have all made visits to Angola, for example. Beginning Dec.
14, Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos will make his first-ever
state visit to South Africa, in a rare foreign trip for a leader not
fond of leaving the confines of Luanda.
In selecting a military man like Ngwenya, who has likely maintained
close personal links to several high-ranking MPLA military officials
in the years since he left Angola, the Zuma government is displaying
that it ascribes a high value to its building its economic, political
and military relations with a country the previous apartheid regime
tried to invade multiple times in the 1970s and 1980s. Zuma also is
sending an individual he most likely trusts personally, as the two
probably crossed paths during their time in exile (Zuma, who was head
of ANC intelligence during the struggle, also spent years in Angola,
though he is reticent to divulge many details about his time there).
The fact that Luanda also probably has a fair amount of trust in
Ngwenya, thanks to his days as an MK regional leader, helps his resume
as well.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 14, 2010 4:04:02 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Geopolitical Weekly : Taking Stock of WikiLeaks
Stratfor logo
Taking Stock of WikiLeaks
December 14, 2010
Germany and the Failure of Multiculturalism
By George Friedman
Julian Assange has declared that geopolitics will be separated into
pre-*Cablegate* and post-*Cablegate* eras. That was a bold claim.
However, given the intense interest that the leaks produced, it is a
claim that ought to be carefully considered. Several weeks have passed
since the first of the diplomatic cables were released, and it is time
now to address the following questions: First, how significant were
the leaks? Second, how could they have happened? Third, was their
release a crime? Fourth, what were their consequences? Finally, and
most important, is the WikiLeaks premise that releasing government
secrets is a healthy and appropriate act a tenable position?
Let*s begin by recalling that the U.S. State Department documents
constituted the third wave of leaks. The first two consisted of
battlefield reports from Iraq and Afghanistan. Looking back on those
as a benchmark, it is difficult to argue that they revealed
information that ran counter to informed opinion. I use the term
*informed opinion* deliberately. For someone who was watching Iraq and
Afghanistan with some care over the previous years, the leaks might
have provided interesting details but they would not have provided any
startling distinction between the reality that was known and what was
revealed. If, on the other hand, you weren*t paying close attention,
and WikiLeaks provided your first and only view of the battlefields in
any detail, you might have been surprised.
Let*s consider the most controversial revelation, one of the tens of
thousands of reports released on Iraq and Afghanistan and one in which
a video indicated that civilians were deliberately targeted by U.S.
troops. The first point, of course, is that the insurgents, in
violation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, did not go into combat
wearing armbands or other distinctive clothing to distinguish
themselves from non-combatants. The Geneva Conventions have always
been adamant on this requirement because they regarded combatants
operating under the cover of civilians as being responsible for
putting those civilians in harm*s way, not the uniformed troops who
were forced to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants when
the combatants deliberately chose to act in violation of the Geneva
Conventions.
It follows from this that such actions against civilians are
inevitable in the kind of war Iraqi insurgents chose to wage.
Obviously, this particular event has to be carefully analyzed, but in
a war in which combatants blend with non-combatants, civilian
casualties will occur, and so will criminal actions by uniformed
troops. Hundreds of thousands of troops have fought in Iraq, and the
idea that criminal acts would be absent is absurd. What is most
startling is not the presence of potentially criminal actions but
their scarcity. Anyone who has been close to combat or who has read
histories of World War II would be struck not by the presence of war
crimes but by the fact that in all the WikiLeaks files so few
potential cases are found. War is controlled violence, and when
controls fail * as they inevitably do * uncontrolled and potentially
criminal violence occurs. However, the case cited by WikiLeaks with
much fanfare did not clearly show criminal actions on the part of
American troops as much as it did the consequences of the insurgents
violating the Geneva Conventions.
Only those who were not paying attention to the fact that there was a
war going on, or who had no understanding of war, or who wanted to
pretend to be shocked for political reasons, missed two crucial
points: It was the insurgents who would be held responsible for
criminal acts under the Geneva Conventions for posing as
non-combatants, and there were extraordinarily few cases of potential
war crimes that were contained in the leaks.
The diplomatic leaks are similar. There is precious little that was
revealed that was unknown to the informed observer. For example,
anyone reading STRATFOR knows we have argued that it was not only the
Israelis but also the Saudis that were most concerned about Iranian
power and most insistent that the United States do something about it.
While the media treated this as a significant revelation, it required
a profound lack of understanding of the geopolitics of the Persian
Gulf to regard U.S. diplomatic cables on the subject as surprising.
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates* statement in the leaks that the
Saudis were always prepared to fight to the last American was
embarrassing, in the sense that Gates would have to meet with Saudi
leaders in the future and would do so with them knowing what he thinks
of them. Of course, the Saudis are canny politicians and diplomats and
they already knew how the American leadership regarded their demands.
There were other embarrassments also known by the informed observer.
Almost anyone who worries about such things is aware that Italian
Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi is close to the Russians and likes to
party with young women. The latest batch of leaks revealed that the
American diplomatic service was also aware of this. And now Berlusconi
is aware that they know of these things, which will make it hard for
diplomats to pretend that they don*t know of these things. Of course,
Berlusconi was aware that everyone knew of these things and clearly
didn*t care, since the charges were all over Italian media.
I am not cherry-picking the Saudi or Italian memos. The consistent
reality of the leaks is that they do not reveal anything new to the
informed but do provide some amusement over certain comments, such as
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitri Medvedev
being called *Batman and Robin.* That*s amusing, but it isn*t
significant. Amusing and interesting but almost never significant is
what I come away with having read through all three waves of leaks.
Obviously, the leaks are being used by foreign politicians to their
own advantage. For example, the Russians feigned shock that NATO would
be reassuring the Balts about defense against a potential Russian
invasion or the Poles using the leaks to claim that solid U.S.-Polish
relations are an illusion. The Russians know well of NATO plans for
defending the Baltic states against a hypothetical Russian invasion,
and the Poles know equally well that U.S.-Polish relations are complex
but far from illusory. The leaks provide an opportunity for feigning
shock and anger and extracting possible minor concessions or
controlling atmospherics. They do not, however, change the structure
of geopolitics.
Indeed, U.S. diplomats come away looking sharp, insightful and decent.
While their public statements after a conference may be vacuous, it is
encouraging to see that their read of the situation and of foreign
leaders is unsentimental and astute. Everything from memos on senior
leaders to anonymous snippets from apparently junior diplomats not
only are on target (in the sense that STRATFOR agrees with them) but
are also well-written and clear. I would argue that the leaks paint a
flattering picture overall of the intellect of U.S. officials without
revealing, for the most part, anything particularly embarrassing.
At the same time, there were snarky and foolish remarks in some of the
leaks, particularly personal comments about leaders and sometimes
their families that were unnecessarily offensive. Some of these will
damage diplomatic careers, most generated a good deal of personal
tension and none of their authors will likely return to the countries
in which they served. Much was indeed unprofessional, but the task of
a diplomat is to provide a sense of place in its smallest details, and
none expect their observations ever to be seen by the wrong people.
Nor do nations ever shift geopolitical course over such insults, not
in the long run. These personal insults were by far the most
significant embarrassments to be found in the latest release. Personal
tension is not, however, international tension.
This raises the question of why diplomats can*t always simply state
their minds rather than publicly mouth preposterous platitudes. It
could be as simple as this: My son was a terrible pianist. He
completely lacked talent. After his recitals at age 10, I would
pretend to be enthralled. He knew he was awful and he knew I knew he
was awful, but it was appropriate that I not admit what I knew. It is
called politeness and sometimes affection. There is rarely affection
among nations, but politeness calls for behaving differently when a
person is in the company of certain other people than when that person
is with colleagues talking about those people. This is the simplest of
human rules. Not admitting what you know about others is the
foundation of civilization. The same is true among diplomats and
nations.
And in the end, this is all I found in the latest WikiLeaks release: a
great deal of information about people who aren*t American that others
certainly knew and were aware that the Americans knew, and now they
have all seen it in writing. It would take someone who truly doesn*t
understand how geopolitics really works to think that this would make
a difference. Some diplomats may wind up in other postings, and
perhaps some careers will be ended. But the idea that this would
somehow change the geopolitics of our time is really hard to fathom. I
have yet to see Assange point to something so significant that that it
would justify his claim. It may well be that the United States is
hiding secrets that would reveal it to be monstrous. If so, it is not
to be found in what has been released so far.
There is, of course, the question of whether states should hold
secrets, which is at the root of the WikiLeaks issue. Assange claims
that by revealing these secrets WikiLeaks is doing a service. His
ultimate maxim, as he has said on several occasions, is that if money
and resources are being spent on keeping something secret, then the
reasons must be insidious. Nations have secrets for many reasons, from
protecting a military or intelligence advantage to seeking some
advantage in negotiations to, at times, hiding nefarious plans. But it
is difficult to imagine a state * or a business or a church * acting
without confidentiality. Imagine that everything you wrote and said in
an attempt to figure out a problem was made public? Every stupid idea
that you discarded or clueless comment you expressed would now be
pinned on you. But more than that, when you argue that nations should
engage in diplomacy rather than war, taking away privacy makes
diplomacy impossible. If what you really think of the guy on the other
side of the table is made public, how can diplomacy work?
This is the contradiction at the heart of the WikiLeaks project. Given
what I have read Assange saying, he seems to me to be an opponent of
war and a supporter of peace. Yet what he did in leaking these
documents, if the leaking did anything at all, is make diplomacy more
difficult. It is not that it will lead to war by any means; it is
simply that one cannot advocate negotiations and then demand that
negotiators be denied confidentiality in which to conduct their
negotiations. No business could do that, nor could any other
institution. Note how vigorously WikiLeaks hides the inner workings of
its own organization, from how it is funded to the people it employs.
Assange*s claims are made even more interesting in terms of his
*thermonuclear* threat. Apparently there are massive files that will
be revealed if any harm comes to him. Implicit is the idea that they
will not be revealed if he is unharmed * otherwise the threat makes no
sense. So, Assange*s position is that he has secrets and will keep
them secret if he is not harmed. I regard this as a perfectly
reasonable and plausible position. One of the best uses for secrets is
to control what the other side does to you. So Assange is absolutely
committed to revealing the truth unless it serves his interests not
to, in which case the public has no need to know.
It is difficult to see what harm the leaks have done, beyond
embarrassment. It is also difficult to understand why WikiLeaks thinks
it has changed history or why Assange lacks a sufficient sense of
irony not to see the contradiction between his position on openness
and his willingness to keep secrets when they benefit him. But there
is also something important here, which is how this all was leaked in
the first place.
To begin that explanation, we have to go back to 9/11 and the feeling
in its aftermath that the failure of various government entities to
share information contributed to the disaster. The answer was to share
information so that intelligence analysts could draw intelligence from
all sources in order to connect the dots. Intelligence organizations
hate sharing information because it makes vast amounts of information
vulnerable. Compartmentalization makes it hard to connect dots, but it
also makes it harder to have a WikiLeaks release. The tension between
intelligence and security is eternal, and there will never be a clear
solution.
The real issue is who had access to this mass of files and what
controls were put on them. Did the IT department track all external
drives or e-mails? One of the reasons to be casual is that this was
information that was classified secret and below, with the vast
majority being at the confidential, no-foreign-distribution level.
This information was not considered highly sensitive by the U.S.
government. Based on the latest trove, it is hard to figure out how
the U.S. government decides to classify material. But it has to be
remembered that given their level of classification these files did
not have the highest security around them because they were not seen
as highly sensitive.
Still, a crime occurred. According to the case of Daniel Ellsberg, who
gave a copy of the Pentagon Papers on Vietnam to a New York Times
reporter, it is a crime for someone with a security clearance to
provide classified material for publication but not a crime for a
publisher to publish it, or so it has become practice since the
Ellsberg case. Legal experts can debate the nuances, but this has been
the practice for almost 40 years. The bright line is whether the
publisher in any way encouraged or participated in either the theft of
the information or in having it passed on to him. In the Ellsberg
case, he handed it to reporters without them even knowing what it was.
Assange has been insisting that he was the passive recipient of
information that he had nothing to do with securing.
Now it is interesting whether the sheer existence of WikiLeaks
constituted encouragement or conspiracy with anyone willing to pass on
classified information to him. But more interesting by far is the
sequence of events that led a U.S. Army private first class not only
to secure the material but to know where to send it and how to get it
there. If Pfc. Bradley Manning conceived and executed the theft by
himself, and gave the information to WikiLeaks unprompted, Assange is
clear. But anyone who assisted Manning or encouraged him is probably
guilty of conspiracy, and if Assange knew what was being done, he is
probably guilty, too. There was talk about some people at MIT helping
Manning. Unscrambling the sequence is what the Justice Department is
undoubtedly doing now. Assange cannot be guilty of treason, since he
isn*t a U.S. citizen. But he could be guilty of espionage. His best
defense will be that he can*t be guilty of espionage because the
material that was stolen was so trivial.
I have no idea whether or when he got involved in the acquisition of
the material. I do know * given the material leaked so far * that
there is little beyond minor embarrassments contained within it.
Therefore, Assange*s claim that geopolitics has changed is as false as
it is bold. Whether he committed any crime, including rape, is
something I have no idea about. What he is clearly guilty of is
hyperbole. But contrary to what he intended, he did do a service to
the United States. New controls will be placed on the kind of
low-grade material he published. Secretary of Defense Gates made the
following point on this:
*Now, I*ve heard the impact of these releases on our foreign policy
described as a meltdown, as a game-changer, and so on. I think those
descriptions are fairly significantly overwrought. The fact is,
governments deal with the United States because it*s in their
interest, not because they like us, not because they trust us, and
not because they believe we can keep secrets. Many governments *
some governments * deal with us because they fear us, some because
they respect us, most because they need us. We are still
essentially, as has been said before, the indispensable nation.*
*Is this embarrassing? Yes. Is it awkward? Yes. Consequences for
U.S. foreign policy? I think fairly modest.*
I don*t like to give anyone else the final word, but in this case
Robert Gates* view is definitive. One can pretend that WikiLeaks has
redefined geopolitics, but it hasn*t come close.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Reprinting or republication of this report on websites is authorized
by prominently displaying the following sentence at the beginning or
end of the report, including the hyperlink to STRATFOR:
"This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR"
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 14, 2010 5:41:20 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Iran Tries to Balance Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy
[IMG]
Monday, December 13, 2010 [IMG] STRATFOR.COM [IMG] Diary Archives
Iran Tries to Balance Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy
Monday was clearly an Iran day. It began with President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad firing the country*s foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki,
who has served as Tehran*s top diplomat since Ahmadinejad began his
first term more than five years ago. As STRATFOR was trying to make
sense of Ahmadinejad*s seemingly abrupt decision to fire Mottaki, U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton issued a statement saying that the
nuclear negotiations between the Islamic republic and the P-5+1 Group,
which resumed (after more than a year*s gap) in Geneva last week, were
off to a *good start* and that the sacking of Mottaki was unlikely to
hamper progress in these talks. These two developments point to
interesting trends on Iran*s domestic political front, and more
importantly, its foreign policy arena, especially the Islamic
republic*s complex diplomacy with the United States.
On the domestic front, conventional wisdom has long sought to describe
the conflict as between reformists on one hand and hard-line
ideologues on the other. Since Ahmadinejad*s rise to power, however,
the ground reality has increasingly become much more messy *
Ahmadinejad faces opposition from rival (pragmatic) conservative
opponents as well as from ultraconservative allies.
**It is not clear that Ahmadinejad can ultimately balance pragmatism
on the foreign policy front with the need to placate powerful
stakeholders at home who are trying to place limits on his ability to
maneuver.*
Tehran*s dealings with Washington have become a key battleground where
this intra-elite power struggle is being played out. His pragmatic
opponents have tried to paint Ahmadinejad as engaged in bellicose
foreign policy moves that could lead the country to a ruinous war. At
the same time, and paradoxically, the president*s ultraconservative
allies have been concerned that the Iranian president is compromising
on the country*s strategic interests in trying to steer the country*s
negotiations on the nuclear issue.
It is this latter view that is of more significance, especially if the
United States is saying that negotiations are headed in the right
direction. The fact that a power-sharing formula in Iraq is on the
verge of being finalized attests to such a prospect.
Obviously, nothing is final on either end * Iraq or on the nuclear
issue. With regard to the latter, there is supposed to be a follow-up
meeting in January in Istanbul, when the nature of a compromise
solution that is acceptable to both sides is expected to become
clearer. In terms of the former, the thorny subject of the extent of
the Sunnis* share of power in Baghdad is still being worked out.
Thus far, the key obstacle to the two sides reaching a compromise
solution has come to light in terms of Iranian intransigence. In light
of the latest developments, however, it appears that, in addition to
Tehran wanting to drive a hard bargain, growing domestic schisms will
also greatly determine the outcome. Despite his ability to maintain
the upper hand at home * especially in the face of so many different
types of challenges * it is not clear that Ahmadinejad can ultimately
balance pragmatism on the foreign policy front with the need to
placate powerful stakeholders at home who are trying to place limits
on his ability to maneuver.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 14, 2010 7:40:09 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: The Paradox of the EU Eastern Partnership
Stratfor logo
The Paradox of the EU Eastern Partnership
December 14, 2010 | 1309 GMT
The Paradox of the EU Eastern Partnership
GEORGES GOBET/AFP/Getty Images
European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton (L) and Swedish
Foreign Minister Carl Bildt talk on Dec. 13
Summary
Brussels hosted a foreign minister-level summit of the European
Union*s Eastern Partnership on Dec. 13. The program, designed to
strengthen the union*s ties to former Soviet states on its periphery *
particularly Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova * was started by Sweden and
Poland. It will need support from the European Union*s powerhouses,
particularly Germany, in order to fulfill its purpose effectively.
However, support from those powers could change the nature of the
program.
Analysis
The European Union*s Eastern Partnership (EP) held a foreign
minister-level summit in Brussels on Dec. 13. Representatives from the
27 EU member states, the EU Commission, and the target countries of
Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan attended.
This summit follows a recent push by the two countries that initiated
the EP * Poland and Sweden * to reinvigorate the program. The final
communique issued at the summit stated that the EP*s future would be a
matter of *strategic debate* and that the program*s importance would
be emphasized ahead of the EP heads of state summit in Budapest in May
2011.
The EP*s purpose is to strengthen the European Union*s ties to the
former Soviet states on its periphery (particularly Belarus, Ukraine
and Moldova), where Russia*s influence has strengthened in recent
years, via soft power. During their EU presidencies in 2011, Hungary
and Poland intend to place EP high on their agendas. But there is a
paradox to the EP. For it to fulfill its purpose effectively, it must
transcend Sweden and Central Europe and receive support from EU
heavyweights like France and especially Germany. However, given Paris
and Berlin*s warming relations with Moscow, this would make the EP a
very different project from what Russia-skeptic Sweden and Poland want
it to be. Resolving this incongruity will be the EP*s key challenge in
2011.
The Eastern Partnership Thus Far
Since its inception in May 2009, the EP has been slow to get off the
ground and has not met the expectations of those countries who were
members at its debut. This is largely because Poland and Sweden were
consumed with their domestic political situations throughout much of
2009 and 2010 and had little energy and attention to devote to the
initiative. In the meantime, Russia * not the EU * has resurged in the
target countries, as seen in Belarus* inclusion in a customs union
with Russia and Kazakhstan and in pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovich*s
victory in Ukraine*s presidential election.
While the EP so far has had little measurable effect, it is important
not to underestimate the purpose of the program. It is no secret that
the European Union simply cannot compete with Russia*s hard power in
these countries. Russia*s military is stationed in Ukraine*s Crimea
peninsula and Moldova*s breakaway republic of Transdniestria, while it
cooperates extremely closely with Belarus and has the right to deploy
its troops in the country under the guidelines of the Collective
Security Treaty Organization, which is essentially Russia*s
present-day answer to NATO. Additionally, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine
have no desire or intention (excluding some of Moldova*s staunchest
pro-European factions) to integrate more closely to Europe militarily.
However, issues like visa liberalization and economic aid are
important to Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, and these essentially are
what the EP offers. Easing travel restrictions and boosting economic
investment and aid * not to mention offering association agreements as
precursors to potential EU membership * lays the groundwork for a
larger EU presence in these countries. The European Union
fundamentally operates under the assumption that making small
bureaucratic and legislative decisions can snowball into a greater
momentum. A coal-and-steel community evolved for 50 years until it
became the European Union. Similarly, working on synchronizing
Ukrainian and Moldovan laws with the bloc*s may seem paltry compared
to Russia*s military presence in these countries, but in the long-term
the EU hopes it will have a significant effect.
The Swedish-Polish Push
Over the past couple of months, there has been a renewed push for the
EP, especially from Poland and Sweden, to emphasize the program*s
benefits. Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt and Polish Foreign
Minister Radoslaw Sikorski recently visited Ukraine and Moldova to
emphasize that the program will be of utmost importance in the near
future. Also, Sikorski and German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle
traveled to Belarus to meet with President Aleksandr Lukashenko and
opposition leaders just ahead of the country*s crucial presidential
election scheduled for Dec. 19. Compared to the underwhelming launch
of the EP, this recent flurry of visits has certainly caught Moscow*s
attention.
For the EP to be effective as a tool to expand EU cooperation with the
likes of Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, and to loosen Russia*s grip on
these countries, the economic projects put forth by the EP need to be
expanded considerably. When Hungary and Poland will hold the rotating
EU presidency in 2011, there is a chance for this to occur. Both want
to make expanding the program a top priority, and German Chancellor
Angela Merkel has told Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk that Germany
stands behind Poland*s efforts.
Germany*s Role
But this leads to another potential impediment for the EP. At its
core, the EP is an EU initiative. For the EP to succeed in building
ties to the target countries it must go beyond what Sweden and Poland
have to offer; it must have the financial and economic resources of
the European Union*s larger members, such as Italy, France and
especially Germany, to be truly effective. But along with German
financing and business acumen comes the German political heft that has
come to define the EU. And since Berlin-Moscow relations have been
strengthening and Germany*s view of Russia is fundamentally different
from Poland and Sweden*s, the EP would become less effective in its
purpose of challenging Russia*s influence in the target countries.
Germany*s role is therefore both necessary and problematic. From
Germany*s perspective, the EP is an irksome initiative that could
provoke Russia, a valued partner. Germany has no intentions of
allowing Ukraine, Moldova or Belarus into the EU any time soon
(meaning roughly the next two decades). Berlin wants the EU to
concentrate on internal reforms, rather than on enlargement.
But at the same time, Germany sees the benefit in having an initiative
such as the EP as a potential lever to use against Russia. German
participation in the EP can therefore be a signal to Moscow both that
Berlin has Russian interests in mind, but that Berlin could encourage
bolder EP initiatives if Moscow does not have Berlin*s interests in
mind on other matters, such as the energy and economic cooperation
that Berlin holds dear. From the perspective of Sweden and Poland,
such participation would not really be welcome. A Germany that counts
the EP as a tool to use in the overarching German-Russian relationship
would serve Berlin*s strategic interests, not Warsaw and Stockholm*s.
In essence, the EP has to grow beyond Poland and Sweden to be
effective. The Polish government said as much when it announced that
the EP would top the agenda of both the Visegrad Group and the Weimar
Triangle. But as it becomes more of an EU-wide initiative, more
capitals * particularly Berlin * will start deciding what happens with
the EP, and the program would lose the focus that Poland and Sweden
provide. This is why Merkel*s offer of support to Poland is really a
double-edged sword, and why the true test of the EP in 2011 will be
the German-Russian relationship.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 14, 2010 10:52:25 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Europe's Financial Troubles Spread to Belgium, Austria
Stratfor logo
Europe's Financial Troubles Spread to Belgium, Austria
December 14, 2010 | 1451 GMT
Belgium Joins the PIIGS
NICOLAS MAETERLINCK/AFP/Getty Images
National Bank of Belgium Gov. Guy Quaden at a meeting discussing the
country*s economic situation in Brussels on Dec. 6
Summary
Standard & Poor*s said Dec. 14 that it likely will downgrade Belgium*s
credit rating due to the size of the country*s government debt and
budget deficit, along with its inability to form a stable government.
The announcement indicates that Europe*s financial woes are spreading
from the PIIGS * Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain * to more
established economies, particularly Belgium and Austria.
Analysis
Related Links
* The Recession in Central Europe, Part 1: Armageddon Averted?
* U.S.: Redesigning the Bank Bailout
Standard & Poor*s warned Dec. 14 that Belgium*s mix of high government
debt, a high budget deficit and the chronic inability to form a stable
government would likely force the ratings agency to downgrade the
country*s credit rating (currently at AA+), possibly within six
months. Such an event is not yet inevitable, but the mere announcement
of the *negative watch* heralds the spread of Europe*s ongoing
financial troubles to Europe*s more established states.
Until now nearly all concern for the financial stability of eurozone
states has focused on the PIIGS, an acronym investors created to refer
to Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain. These states share
certain characteristics that include large * and in many cases, popped
* bubbles in real estate and finance, high budget deficit and debt
levels, and political difficulty in addressing the problems.
To this list of states in distress, STRATFOR would like to add two
more developed Western European countries: Austria and Belgium, both
of which share key negative characteristics of the PIIGS.
Belgium is certainly the worse off of the two. It suffers from a
residential real estate bubble roughly as bad as Spain*s, roughly half
again as bad in relative terms as the U.S. subprime crisis. Belgium*s
2009 headline government debt level clocked in at 96 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP), 20 percentage points worse than Portugal * the
next PIIGS state that STRATFOR expects will need a bailout. But
perhaps most important is that modern Belgium cannot seem to hold a
government together. Since the last elections in April 2007 it has had
three separate governments, and that does not include the 18 months of
interim governments required to hash out coalition deals that were
complex and unstable in equal measure. The soon-to-be-mounting
obsession among investors is that such political dysfunction will make
the austerity required to fix the budget next to impossible.
Austria is better off than Belgium by all of these measures. Its debt
and deficit are both considerably lower (68 percent of GDP versus 96
percent of GDP and 3.5 percent of GDP versus 6 percent of GDP,
respectively), its political system is more or less in order, and its
housing sector * nearly alone within Europe * was never overbuilt.
Austria*s biggest outlier is that its banks are listing badly, due to
their overexuberance in lending into the now-popped credit bubble that
plagues Central Europe.
Europe's Financial Troubles Spread to Belgium, Austria
(click here to enlarge image)
The point that Austria and Belgium have most in common, however, is
one they share with the weaker states of the PIIGS grouping: They are
largely dependent upon external financing to manage their sovereign
debt loads. Austria, Belgium, Greece and Ireland are all relatively
small states with limited indigenous financial resources. When a state
faces financial duress, the first thing the government does is hash
out a deal * often forcefully * with its own financial sector,
applying those resources to the problem. Such is standard fare in
major states such as Germany and Italy. Smaller states often lack such
options, forcing the governments to turn to international investors
for cash. In good times this is irrelevant, but when money gets tight
and investors get scared, an investor stampede can crush a state*s
finances overnight. Such a calamity was precisely what forced the
Greek and Irish breakdowns and bailouts. The exposure of all four of
these states to such outsiders is more than 50 percent of GDP, which
as Greece and Ireland have already demonstrated so vividly, is an
amount that simply cannot be coped with in a panic.
Austria and Belgium are advanced, technocratic economies with
sophisticated financial sectors. Any financial contagion that breaks
into the developed states of Western Europe via these two countries
would terrify investors who have been fairly convinced that the euro*s
problems were safely sequestered in the somewhat manageable states of
the PIIGS grouping. Should Austria or Belgium go the way of Greece,
all bets will be off in Europe.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 14, 2010 1:25:28 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: A Week in the War: Afghanistan, Dec. 8-14, 2010
Stratfor logo
A Week in the War: Afghanistan, Dec. 8-14, 2010
December 14, 2010 | 1914 GMT
A Week in the War: Afghanistan, July 7-13, 2010
STRATFOR
STRATFOR BOOK
* Afghanistan at the Crossroads: Insights on the Conflict
Related Special Topic Page
* The War in Afghanistan
Related Links
* A Week in the War: Afghanistan, Dec. 1-7, 2010
* Afghanistan: The Intelligence War
* Afghanistan: Another Round in the IED Game
White House Review
The review of the counterinsurgency-focused strategy being pursued in
Afghanistan is expected to be formally completed this week, with U.S.
President Barack Obama scheduled to issue his assessment of the
strategy on Dec. 16, only days after the Dec. 13 death of the top U.S.
diplomat to the country, Richard Holbrooke. Though whatever
information released to the public on the review will be worth
examining, its broader strokes seem all but preordained at this point.
At the November NATO summit in Lisbon, Obama pledged to hand over
responsibility for the overall security situation in the country by
2014 * which means U.S. and allied combat forces will be engaged in
the country for years to come. In addition, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen announced Dec. 13 during a trip to
Afghanistan that he did not foresee any big reductions in American
forces, though a modest withdrawal was still slated to begin in line
with the previously announced July 2011 deadline.
Indeed, virtually every statement on the subject from senior White
House and Pentagon officials sounds the same refrain: Progress is in
fact being made, the momentum of the Taliban is being reversed, but it
is a delicate, decisive time and there will only be modest troop
reductions starting in July 2011. There has been no indication that
the forthcoming report will deviate substantively from this position.
On his visit to Afghanistan last week, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert
Gates declared the strategy to be working, a strong indication of what
the tone of the upcoming report will be.
A Week in the War: Afghanistan, Dec. 8-14, 2010
(click here to enlarge image)
Nawa and Marjah
At the heart of what the military * particularly the U.S. Marines and
British forces in Helmand province * considers a sign of progress is
the village of Nawa-i-Barakzayi, commonly shortened to *Nawa.* The
area, south of the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah in the Helmand
River valley, has been a focus of operations since the middle of 2009,
when a Marine battalion was deployed there. Today, military leaders
walk the busy central bazaar without body armor and students are
attending school, which was barred when Nawa and other parts of
Helmand were under Taliban control. This progress is being touted as
evidence that the current strategy can work. Indeed, a paved road is
being built (the first in the central Helmand River valley that is
U.S. Marine Regimental Combat Team-1*s area of operations) to connect
Nawa to Lashkar Gah. In other words, finding ways to link and speed
Nawa*s economic development and interconnectedness with the capital,
which itself is connected by road to Kandahar and the Ring Road, is
seen as central to entrenching recent gains and establishing a more
sustainable opposition to the Taliban.
To the west lies the farming community of Marjah * a proof-of-concept
operation itself that saw some initial disappointments on the pace of
progress. On Dec. 7, U.S. Marine Maj. Gen. Richard Mills, Commanding
General, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward), declared that the
battle in Marjah is over, and while this may be a questionable
assertion regarding areas on the outskirts of the community, it is
certainly a credible argument for the more populous central areas.
Patrols in those areas have become much less kinetic and faced a lower
threat from improvised explosive devices than they did in the spring
and summer (a pattern consistent with Nawa, where the Marine battalion
boasts not having fired a shot on patrol in months). Meanwhile, a
local community police initiative in Marjah has also proven successful
there.
The Lisbon commitment of combat forces until 2014 provides time to
consolidate what are thus far fragile gains in the heart of Taliban
territory. Mills also reiterated plans for an aggressive winter
campaign to *continue to press extraordinarily hard on all fronts* in
an attempt to fundamentally change the dynamics of the conflict in
Helmand by the spring thaw. Helmand is not as rugged as other Afghan
provinces, though the wet and cold weather still impacts operational
mobility and the rudimentary and unimproved infrastructure.
Nevertheless, the Taliban will be feeling the pressure this winter,
and the strategy is not without its logic * Mills claimed that his
Taliban *counterpart* had left for Pakistan for the winter dressed as
a woman.
Attack in Zhari
Despite progress in areas like Nawa, the Taliban have not and will not
let up completely. On Dec. 12, a large vehicle-borne improvised
explosive device (VBIED) * a small minivan * was detonated next to a
small, recently established joint outpost in Sangsar in Zhari district
west of Kandahar city. Six U.S. soldiers were killed, and a dozen more
American and Afghan troops were wounded.
Though it is difficult to provide a full tactical account of the
attack at this point, a road appears to have run along the compound*s
outer wall, which appears to have served as a structural wall for a
building inside the compound (casualties were also reportedly related
to the roof collapsing). The mud brick walls of Afghan compounds are
often considered sufficient for forming portions of the perimeter of
U.S. bases in Helmand and can admittedly absorb some punishment. But
they are not blast walls, and it is difficult to defend against large
VBIEDs (the Dec. 12 VBIED was reportedly heard from eight miles away)
without some stand-off distance. While finding a location that
provides stand-off distance is ideal, there are many considerations
that go into the selection of a position, including access to main
roads able to sustain large, heavy Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected
All-Terrain Vehicles that provide supplies and support. The entire
purpose of the patrol base is often to establish a presence on a key
supply route or intersection.
While a post-attack analysis will undoubtedly find some failing with
the selection or preparation of the position, underlying realities
make it nearly impossible to find a location that is both extremely
secure and useful to the war effort. In a counterinsurgency-focused
effort, being out among the population * and not aloof in large,
imposing armored vehicles or behind layers and layers of protection *
has played an important role in the successes achieved in places like
Nawa, Marjah and elsewhere.
Furthermore, while forces have been deliberately massed in Helmand and
Kandahar provinces, they are still spread extremely thin, a challenge
that will only deepen as they expand their area of operations, for
example, to Sangin district farther north in Helmand and along the
Arghandab River valley in Kandahar. By the time forces are dispersed
to a small position, there is not always a great deal of manpower for
even basic tasks. Being accessible * focused on relations with the
local population * and being focused on security are goals often in
tension with one another, and an effective counterinsurgency strategy
necessarily includes vulnerability. Military commanders strolling down
the street in an Afghan bazaar without body armor do not do so because
it is safe (their protective details dread it) but because it is an
enormously important gesture.
If the Taliban can force the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) to hunker down on larger, better-defended forward operating
bases, never go out on smaller patrols and not hold isolated
positions, they will have achieved an important end: undermining the
counterinsurgency effort. The momentum of the surge of Western forces
into Afghanistan and ongoing offensive efforts are not likely to be
reversed any time soon. But how the ISAF balances counterinsurgency
and force protection will remain an important element of the war
effort moving forward * as will the Taliban*s ability to continue to
inflict casualties over the winter in the face of a concerted campaign
to drive them from their home territory.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 14, 2010 4:27:02 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Dispatch: Tracking Egypt's Presidential Succession Plan
Stratfor logo
Dispatch: Tracking Egypt's Presidential Succession Plan
December 14, 2010 | 2154 GMT
Click on image below to watch video:
[IMG]
Analyst Reva Bhalla examines the evolving dynamics of Egypt*s
presidential succession plan and the possibility for increased
military influence in Cairo*s political affairs.
Editor*s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition
technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete
accuracy.
In facing growing pressure from the military over his succession
planning, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak now seems to be leaning
toward the idea of handing power over to his former air force chief
instead of his son, Gamal. One thing that*s becoming clear is that the
military is having an increasing say over the political affairs of the
Egyptian state as the sustainability of the regime post-Mubarak comes
into question.
Mubarak told an Egyptian newspaper today that he wishes that the
opposition hadn*t wasted its efforts over first arguing over a boycott
in the recent parliamentary elections, then participating, and then
dropping out after they saw the results. Now, the Egyptian regime is
clearly on the defensive after these elections because the ruling
National Democratic Party expectedly trounced the opposition, which is
composed mainly of the Muslim Brotherhood and Mohamed ElBaradei*s
National Assembly for Change. Those elections are also being
criticized widely for alleged vote-rigging that left the Muslim
Brotherhood with zero seats in the parliament despite its considerable
popular support in the country. Mubarak*s government is understandably
on the defensive in the wake of these elections which explains
Mubarak*s comment on how the opposition is the one to blame for its
losses but it*s becoming increasingly difficult for the Egyptian
government to conceal a growing dispute in the upper ranks of the
regime over the succession strategy.
The Mubarak succession strategy has taken on a lot of variations.
First, Mubarak had a plan to somehow transfer power to his son, Gamal,
when he becomes incapacitated. The problem is that the old guard of
the regime both in the ruling party and the military are not
comfortable with the idea of the younger and inexperienced Gamal
taking over, especially in light of his more reform-minded ideas on
the economy. To try to stave off the crisis, Mubarak had planned to
have his powerful intelligence chief, Omar Suleiman, become vice
president and then eventually take over as president for Mubarak when
Mubarak becomes incapacitated, and Suleiman was expected to hold that
position for at least a year before handing the reins down to Gamal.
Now in recent months, members of the old guard made clear to Mubarak
they were not happy with a succession plan that involves Gamal. They
highly respect Suleiman but they are worried that Suleiman*s advanced
age and his health issues may lead to a quicker transition to Gamal
altogether.
In the meantime Mubarak seems to be leaning toward an idea to have his
former air force chief, Ahmed Shafiq, take over eventually for him, as
someone from the old guard, someone that*s well-respected, and someone
that doesn*t have the advanced age and health issues as Mubarak and
Suleiman. One thing that makes Suleiman uniquely qualified for this
position is that not only does he have the military credentials as the
former air force chief, but he also has civilian credentials in his
position currently as the minister for civil aviation. So what we*ve
seen eventually play out over the past several months is how the
military has gained an increasing say over the political affairs of
the state, specifically right now the succession issue, but that
influence is likely to expand and as the opposition becomes louder and
as the Muslim Brotherhood tries to exploit the succession process, the
military*s ability to justify it stronger hand at the helm also
increases.
Click for more videos
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with
attribution to www.stratfor.com
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 14, 2010 5:00:55 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Russian Authorities Prepare for Violence
Stratfor logo
Russian Authorities Prepare for Violence
December 14, 2010 | 2245 GMT
Calling for Russia to be for Russians
ANDREY SMIRNOV/AFP/Getty Images
Russian soccer fans clash with riot police in central Moscow on Dec.
11
Summary
Over the past decade, the Kremlin has organized and funded a Russian
nationalist movement that it hopes will consolidate the government*s
power over the country following the fall of the Soviet Union. Now a
force of its own, the movement began clashing with Russian Muslims
following the death of a young Russian during a soccer riot Dec. 5.
Preparing for more violence at a planned anti-Muslim rally in Moscow
on Dec. 15, the Kremlin must prove that it can control and rein in the
nationalists as well as other disruptive elements when needed.
Analysis
Russian authorities are preparing for a new eruption of violence in
Moscow on Dec. 15, when a planned anti-Muslim rally is supposed to
take place at Kievsky Railway Station. The protest would come after
more than a week of violence and tension between Russian Muslims and
Russian nationalists in Moscow, and it would serve as a crucial test
for Russia to prove it has the ability to rein in disruptive elements.
The violence started on Dec. 5 after riots broke out following a
soccer match. Soccer riots are common in Russia and tend to break up
overnight. But this riot resulted in the death of a Russian youth, who
reportedly was killed by Muslims from the Caucasus and Central Asia
(with most reports citing mainly Dagestanis and possibly an Uzbek as
being among the perpetrators). Those responsible were arrested, but by
the time they made bail a massive group of Russian nationalists had
gathered outside the police station and were protesting their release.
Within just a few hours of the death of the young Russian, the Russian
Internet was bombarded with Russian nationalist calls for the deaths
of Russian Muslims and a rise against Russian Muslims in Moscow. This
shows how the ability of Russian nationalists to quickly organize
online and then take to the streets with banners has contributed
significantly to the overall rise of nationalism in the country.
On Dec. 6, Russian nationalists reportedly killed a Kyrgyz man in
Moscow in retaliation for the young Russian*s death. Then on Dec. 11,
Russian nationalists held a 5,000-strong rally outside the Kremlin,
shouting the slogan, *Russia for the Russians.* Following the rally, a
few of the nationalists reportedly took to the streets and critically
injured more than 30 Russian Muslims from the Caucasus (most were
stabbed and at least two were shot).
As night fell in Russia on Dec. 14, reports started to surface that
Russian Muslim websites * mainly those based out of the Russian
Caucasus * have started to buzz with calls for the Muslims to unite
and retaliate against the nationalists. There have been a few reports
of Muslims traveling from the Caucasus to Moscow via bus or train.
Russian authorities have already locked down all bus and train
terminals, trying to prevent any Muslim extremists from entering the
city. Such extremists have been able to pull off major attacks over
the past year, including the Moscow subway bombing in April.
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitri Medvedev
have publicly called for peace and sharply warned both sides of the
consequences of violence. According to STRATFOR sources, the
orchestrator of the Kremlin*s nationalist movement, Vladislav Surkov,
has also been in meetings with far-right extremist groups and the
Kremlin*s own nationalist youth party, Nashi, warning them all to not
take part in the Dec. 15 rally.
By nightfall on Dec. 14, Russian authorities had already deployed riot
police, militia and interior troops to the streets of Moscow in
preparation of the protest and possible clashes. Ironically, it is the
Kremlin that has organized, funded and ramped up the nationalist
movement in Russia over the past decade, using it to consolidate the
government*s power over the country after the fall of the Soviet
Union. Now, this nationalist movement has become a force of its own
and something the Kremlin must prove that it can still control and
rein in when needed.
The same holds true for the Kremlin*s control of Muslim groups in the
country. The government declared in 2009 that it had ended its war in
the Russian Caucasus, though instability persists. The Kremlin has
attempted to assure the public that, despite various attacks outside
of the Caucasus by Muslim militants, it can still prevent most of the
instability in the Russian Muslim Caucasus from spreading north and
keep it far from the capital.
As it happens, this test comes at a time when the international
community is closely watching Russian security. Russia has been
awarded both the winter Olympics in 2014 (in Sochi, just outside of
the Muslim regions in the Caucasus) and the World Cup in 2018 (in
which soccer-related unrest is expected). The last thing the Kremlin
wants right now is a massive outbreak of violence related to Russian
nationalists and Muslims and originating from a soccer riot.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 15, 2010 5:49:20 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Next Steps for Iraq and Afghanistan
[IMG]
Wednesday, December 15, 2010 [IMG] STRATFOR.COM [IMG] Diary Archives
Next Steps for Iraq and Afghanistan
With Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and al-Iraqiya List leader
Iyad Allawi meeting in Baghdad Tuesday night, a governing coalition
appears near. And with a review of the efficacy of the
counterinsurgency-focused strategy in Afghanistan due to the White
House before the end of the week, the Iraqi question appears to be
settling out while Afghanistan remains as unsettled as ever. But in
looking at the months ahead, the reverse is also true: While
Afghanistan is likely to continue along its current path, the fate of
Iraq hangs in the balance.
In the case of Afghanistan, the war still rages. But the review of the
strategy has been under way for months, and U.S. President Barack
Obama*s formal announcement of the commitment of American combat
forces to Afghanistan until 2014 at the NATO summit in Lisbon in
November was undoubtedly informed by a familiarity with the broad
strokes * if not the finer points * of the forthcoming report. Senior
Pentagon officials and U.S. commanders in Afghanistan have cautiously
noted signs of progress and insisted that while a drawdown will begin
on schedule in July 2011, it will be modest. In practical terms, this
means the troops committed to the war in Afghanistan and the strategy
that guides their deployment do not appear set to shift meaningfully
in the year ahead.
Were the report to provide the pivot for a meaningful change in
strategy, the Pentagon, and certainly the White House, would already
know that by now, and we would have in all likelihood seen some
preparation for that shift. So, while there may be course corrections
and tactical shifts * and the review itself may provide new insight
into the war effort * the Afghan war is increasingly looking like a
known quantity, even if it is an active war zone.
*At stake are the delicate balance of power and the fragile stability
that have been so hard won in Iraq*yet, while the war rages in
Afghanistan, the players and the stakes appear set. *
And so we turn to the country that previously overshadowed Afghanistan
in this regard: Iraq. Allawi*s al-Iraqiya coalition, for which many
Iraqi Sunnis voted, won the March elections by a sliver but was
outmaneuvered by Shiite factions, which were aided by the Iranians.
Allawi*s decision to agree to join a government led by al-Maliki, who
will remain prime minister, is significant far beyond simply the
formation of a government in Baghdad. At stake is the enfranchisement
or disenfranchisement of the Sunni, who voted en masse for the first
time in March (they largely boycotted the 2005 election). Allawi*s
rejection of the coalition taking shape under al-Maliki could have led
to a rapid destabilization of the still-fragile security situation in
Iraq.
But progress does not mean that the issue is settled. There has begun
to be broad acceptance of the distribution of ministries and Cabinet
positions. Allawi himself will be placed at the head of a newly
created council to oversee security and foreign policy issues * the
National Council for Strategic Policies (NCSP). This means that he has
agreed to command an entity that itself is an unknown quantity. Not
only its shape, but its influence and authority remain to be seen. And
the question for the Sunni is not one of mere title, but of the
practical mechanisms through which they command and exercise their
modest share of political power.
Post-Baathist Iraq is a young entity and its governmental institutions
are new and still taking shape. But the long-standing and enduring
reality in Iraq is the struggle between the Sunnis and the Shia (with
Iraqi Kurds guarding their own interests as best they can). Progress
has been made in shoehorning much of this struggle into the political
realm, though political power is still being abused for sectarian
purposes. In a very real sense, this centuries-old ethno-sectarian
struggle is barely contained inside political process. The struggle
has not gone away; it has merely moved from one arena * the formation
of a coalition and the distribution of power, ministry by ministry *
to another: the powers that are and are not assigned to the NCSP, and
the means provided to the NCSP to wield and protect those powers. At
stake are the delicate balance of power and the fragile stability that
have been so hard won in Iraq. At play are powerful and deep
ethno-sectarian tensions that remain capable of dragging the country
back into civil bloodshed.
While the war rages in Afghanistan, meanwhile, the players and the
stakes appear set. This next year will be telling, but the fighting
will continue. In Iraq, despite the outward appearance of peace, the
country remains on the brink. And to understand that, the two issues
at the forefront of our mind are 1) the mechanisms that the Sunni will
accept as sufficient to wield and defend their share of the political
pie, and 2) the understandings * or lack thereof *between Washington
and Tehran about what happens next in Baghdad.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 15, 2010 7:57:26 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: EU Leaders to Establish Eurozone's Permanent Rescue Fund
Stratfor logo
EU Leaders to Establish Eurozone's Permanent Rescue Fund
December 15, 2010 | 1326 GMT
EU Leaders to Set up Eurozone's Permanent Rescue Fund
GEORGES GOBET/AFP/Getty Images
German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble before a meeting in
Brussels on Dec. 6
Summary
Ahead of the EU leaders* summit, slated for Dec. 16-17, news has
emerged that the European Union intends to change the Lisbon Treaty
and create a permanent rescue fund for the eurozone. The fund will
replace the current European Financial Stability Facility, which
expires in 2013. Germany is spearheading the move * part of Berlin*s
redesign of the European Union. However, the change is not a sure
thing, as it must receive approval from the European Parliament and
all 27 EU member states. Furthermore, other related financial issues
need to be addressed at the upcoming summit.
Analysis
News emerged days before the EU leaders* Dec. 16-17 summit that the
European Union has already agreed on revising the Lisbon Treaty to
establish a permanent rescue fund that will replace the current
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) once it expires in 2013.
According to the Irish Times and the EUobserver, the two-sentence
paragraph to be inserted in the Lisbon Treaty will read:
Member states whose currency is the euro may establish amongst
themselves a stability mechanism to safeguard the stability of the
euro area as a whole. The granting of financial assistance under the
mechanism will be made subject to strict conditions.
Amending the Lisbon Treaty in order to establish a permanent rescue
mechanism will complete Berlin*s first phase of redesigning the
European Union. However, several issues remain to be discussed at the
upcoming summit, starting with the enforcement of the union*s fiscal
rules meant to keep member states from needing to access the future
permanent rescue facility. Germany had to compromise on some issues *
such as making penalties against states that fail to follow EU fiscal
rules *automatic* * but overall it has thus far received what it
wanted. The new rules on the permanent rescue fund will be enshrined
in the EU Constitution and will be dominated by Berlin, since the EFSF
(and its likely permanent successor) is an institution independent of
the EU bureaucracy and thus ultimately under German control.
Possible Constraints to the Treaty Change
To make the amendment establishing the permanent rescue fund, EU
leaders will use a new procedure implemented by the Lisbon Treaty in
late 2009 that allows for limited treaty change without a laborious
constitutional convention. However, the change will still require
approval from the European Parliament and the legislatures of all 27
EU member states. It is not clear whether this will trigger any
national referendums * something that has stalled nearly every modern
EU treaty revision, most recently with the Irish voters* rejection of
the Lisbon Treaty.
The decision made at the Dec. 16-17 EU summit therefore might not be
the final say for individual EU member states on the matter of new
fiscal rules and the permanent mechanism. Also, because the eurozone
is still part of the European Union, potential Euroskeptics like the
United Kingdom, Denmark and the Czech Republic will have a say in the
matter even though they are not eurozone members.
The Irish government has said that it would not need a referendum * a
position that may change if the current government is replaced in
early 2011 * but other countries may decide differently. British Prime
Minister David Cameron campaigned in early 2010 that he would require
popular referendums on future EU treaty revisions, although there has
been no indication from London thus far on how it would respond to the
latest revision. Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou said Dec. 10
that he would call a referendum in Greece if the new enforcement
mechanisms included the loss of voting powers for member states found
to be in violation of EU fiscal rules. Germany may try to avoid these
delays by purely subjecting the permanent rescue mechanism to treaty
revision, leaving the enforcement mechanisms to a non-treaty revision
procedure.
Beyond the Rescue Fund and Toward a *Fiscal Union*
Aside from the permanent rescue fund * essentially an extension of the
440 billion euro ($588.9 billion) EFSF that was recently tapped to
bail out Ireland * and the new fiscal rules enforcement mechanisms,
the Dec. 16-17 summit will also address several proposals. The first
two, which Berlin opposes, are the eurobond * a joint eurozone-wide
financial instrument that spreads the risk across the euro region *
and enlarging the EFSF to account for the potential bailouts of Spain
and Portugal in 2011. Germany opposes the eurobond, essentially a bond
any eurozone state can use to raise funding at a joint interest rate,
because it would give peripheral member states access to low-cost
financing, which would take away their incentive to cut spending as
ordered by Berlin. The eurobond would also necessitate Germany*s
participation; without Germany, the eurobond would not bring costs of
borrowing down for other member states. But from Berlin*s perspective,
the eurobond would only lower everyone else*s borrowing costs at the
expense of Germany*s rates, which would rise to compensate for the
eurobond*s greater risk compared to the German bund.
Berlin*s problem with increasing the size of the EFSF is that after
Portugal and Spain, the next three countries most likely to need a
bailout are Belgium, Italy and France. Increasing the EFSF to account
for Belgium would not be significant enough to make a difference in
the markets, but increasing it to account for Italy or France would be
practically impossible due to the size of the two economies. Instead,
German officials have floated the idea of allowing the European
Central Bank (ECB) to increase the capital base of the Eurozone, thus
giving the ECB the ability to buy up more government bonds of
embattled Eurozone states.
Ahead of the leaders* summit, there has also been significant chatter
in Europe about Berlin*s apparent shift in position toward the idea of
a *fiscal union,* or *economic governance,* as French President
Nicolas Sarkozy initially called it during the 2008 crisis. In a
fiscal union, the eurozone would cease to be merely a monetary union
using the same currency and ruled by a single central bank. It would
evolve to also include synchronization of tax, labor law and budget
policies. The crux of the idea, however, is that member states would
lose a degree of sovereignty over taxation and spending * probably the
most important policies for a sovereign modern nation-state.
STRATFOR noted that Germany was shifting its position on the issue as
early as May 2010, immediately after the establishment of the EFSF.
More recently, on Dec. 10, Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel
spoke in favor of coordinating tax and labor policies. German Finance
Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble also directly referred to the concept,
saying in an interview with Bild am Sonntag on Dec. 11 that he could
see a fiscal union emerging within 10.
Germany*s shift on the idea might seem like a dramatic policy change
for Berlin. In fact, many commentators in Germany*s media have
suggested that it is more a product of a disagreement between Merkel
and Schaeuble * with latter pushing for it and the former resisting it
* then an actual policy shift.
However, there are two reasons to look at the issue from a different
perspective. First, Germany is willing to entertain the idea of fiscal
union with the rest of the eurozone as long as it is clear that Berlin
is in charge of that union. Control of the rescue mechanism certainly
gives Berlin the upper hand over its fellow member states. Second,
Germany is willing to consider a fiscal union * which would supposedly
also mean some level of fiscal transfers from Germany to the poorer
states * as a long-term complement to short-term austerity measures
and fiscal rules. But it expects the short-term issues to be resolved
first and will hold its fellow EU member states to enforcement
mechanism reforms at the EU leaders* summit.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 15, 2010 8:09:32 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Russia's Position in North Korean Negotiations
Stratfor logo
Russia's Position in North Korean Negotiations
December 15, 2010 | 1328 GMT
Russia's Position in North Korean Negotiations
NA SON NGUYEN/AFP/Getty Images
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov at a July 23 summit in Hanoi,
Vietnam
Summary
Russia on Dec. 13 issued a third condemnation of North Korea over the
Nov. 23 attack on Yeonpyeong Island. This condemnation comes in stark
contrast to Moscow*s response to the ChonAn incident, where it largely
tried to shield Pyongyang from criticism, and could be an indication
that Russia is weighing its economic relationship with South Korea
more carefully this time. That said, Moscow has little interest in
siding fully with Seoul, viewing North Korea as a useful tool against
the United States.
Analysis
Related Links
* Russia, North Korea, South Korea: Hurdles to a Strategic Rail
Project
* How Korea*s New Railroad Will Change Northeast Asia
* Shifting Diplomatic Lines on the Korean Peninsula Crisis?
Russia issued its third condemnation of North Korea for its Nov. 23
attack on South Korean-controlled Yeonpyeong Island on Dec. 13, the
same day as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov hosted his North
Korean counterpart, Pak Ui Chun, for a third day of talks. The
condemnation comes amid frantic diplomatic efforts over both the
Yeonpyeong incident and North Korea*s newly revealed uranium
enrichment activities. South Korean nuclear envoy Wi Sung Lac is also
in Russia for discussions Dec. 15, U.S. negotiators are in Beijing,
China continues calling for a resumption of six-party talks and
Pyongyang claims it will not meet conditions imposed by Washington and
its allies as a prerequisite to talks.
Russia*s response to the Yeonpyeong attack starkly contrasts with its
response to the March sinking of the South Korean naval corvette
ChonAn, indicating that while it may not have changed its stance on
relations on the Korean Peninsula, it is weighing its lucrative
economic relationship with South Korea more carefully this time.
Moscow*s Responses to Pyongyang
Russia twice before condemned the Yeonpyeong attack, the first coming
immediately after the incident. In this third condemnation, Moscow
demanded Pyongyang cease provocations, comply with U.N. Security
Council (UNSC) resolutions and rejoin six-way talks. Though Russia has
always lent verbal support for denuclearization and has supported UNSC
sanctions against the North, these condemnations differ from its
response to the ChonAn incident, where Moscow joined Beijing in
shielding Pyongyang from criticism and conducted its own
investigation, ultimately ruling against a North Korean torpedo
attack.
Russia has little interest in siding entirely with the South Koreans,
which would mean siding with the Americans, against the North and
China. Russia continues to criticize U.S. and South Korean military
exercises as driving up tensions in the region. From Moscow*s point of
view, the Yeonpyeong incident, which North Korea blames on South
Korean exercises taking place at the time of the attack, vindicated
Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin*s public warning in
September that high tensions on the peninsula, fueled by such
exercises, could erupt into conflict in the near future.
The Russo-Korean Economic Relationship
But there are economic factors for Moscow to consider. South Korea
remains a consumer of Russian oil and natural gas and a major investor
in Russia*s economy ($1.3 billion in 2009), offering exactly what
Moscow is looking for to facilitate its economic modernization and
privatization: capital, high technology, expertise and infrastructure.
South Korean shipbuilders have become the chief players in renovating
Russia*s shipbuilding sector, which will help supply vessels and
equipment for its expanding oil and natural gas trade in the Asia
Pacific region. South Korea is still the largest shipbuilder in the
world, builds the world*s biggest ships and leads the world in
technology and efficiency when it comes to shipyards and shipbuilding,
so it is uniquely attractive to Moscow. Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine
Equipment is currently expanding and modernizing Russia*s outdated
Zvezda military shipyard near Vladivostok by 2012, and Samsung and
Hyundai are pursuing similar shipbuilding contracts. The Koreans would
help Russia build icebreakers, oil-drilling platforms, tankers and
potentially even high-tech icebreakers to carry liquefied natural gas
(LNG). Seoul is also a top candidate for building an LNG export
terminal in Vladivostok and investing in further expansions to
Sakhalin Island energy projects and infrastructure, where it has
already invested $1.5 billion, according to Sakhalin Governor
Aleksandr Khoroshavin. There are several other deals, blueprints and
possibilities for cooperation in other sectors, taking as a model
successes like Hyundai*s recently-opened $500 million car-making plant
in St. Petersburg.
Because the Yeonpyeong attack was North Korea*s second extraordinary
provocation this year and resulted in civilian casualties, Moscow
would have faced a much higher risk of harming relations with Seoul
had it not shown more sensitivity and support this time than after the
ChonAn incident.
Of course, as Moscow knows, the South Koreans need Russia too. Seoul
did not downgrade relations with Russia over its unsympathetic
response to the ChonAn incident. On the contrary, during the high tide
of the ChonAn controversy the two sides continued striking major
deals. Seoul wants to get into the Russian market and privatization
and modernization processes as it attempts to boost exports of major
industrial and infrastructural goods. The Korean industrial giants
feel Chinese competition rising and want to maintain the edge in a
market as big as Russia. In addition the Korea Times reported in
October that South Korea hopes to convince Russia to transfer more
high-tech arms, such as long-range radars and systems resistant to
electromagnetic pulse attack, as a means of paying off its debts to
the South. In fact, Seoul has shown willingness to make sacrifices to
avoid angering Russia in its sphere of influence * the South Koreans
pulled out of a bid in early December to help construct a nuclear
plant in Lithuania, most likely due to Russian requests.
While Russia may have struck a harsher tone after the North*s latest
attack, and will from time to time support international attempts to
pressure North Korea through statements or sanctions, it will not
shift wholly to a disapproving stance toward the North. Russia wants
to see what it can get from South Korea while keeping some ability to
use North Korea as a lever against the South or other interested
parties like China and especially the United States. Russia shares a
border with the North and has growing economic interests in the
region, and it does not want universal pressure to force a North
Korean collapse. North Korean normalization or even eventual
reunification could bring opportunities (such as a natural gas
pipeline, railway or electricity line connecting Russia and the
Koreas), but unification would also pose the threat of having a U.S.
ally on Russia*s border, less than 100 kilometers away from
Vladivostok.
Hence, Russia will always seek to maintain its leverage over
peninsular affairs so as to maintain the status quo or exert influence
over any changes that take place. In fact, Russia was once much more
active as one of the North*s patrons, and with North Korea seeking
ways to reduce its dependence on China, there is always the
possibility that it could reach out to Russia more. For the Kremlin,
North Korea, similarly to Iran, remains a lever that could come in
handy. This will change only if the South Koreans are willing to pay
Russia*s price. In the meantime, the two sides seem to have found a
modus vivendi.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 15, 2010 9:33:03 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Above the Tearline: Investigating an Iranian Murder Plot in the
U.S.
Stratfor logo
Above the Tearline: Investigating an Iranian Murder Plot in the U.S.
December 14, 2010 | 2221 GMT
Click on image below to watch video:
[IMG]
VP of Intelligence Fred Burton examines an attempt by Iranian
intelligence to murder an individual on U.S. soil and how such cases
are usually investigated.
Editor*s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition
technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete
accuracy.
Hi, I*m Fred Burton with STRATFOR. In this week*s Above the Tearline,
we*re going to look at one WikiLeaks cable * just one * and explain
how this is a unique window into how terrorism information is
disseminated and how intelligence goes from information to an arrest.
What you have in this case is a very sophisticated Iranian
intelligence service operation used to put together an assassination
plan to target a Voice of American broadcaster in London, as well as
an opposition broadcaster in Los Angeles. Specifically, Iran appears
to have contracted out surveillance of the victim inside the United
States for the purposes of an assassination on U.S. soil. The FBI
swoops in and thwarts the plot, arrests the bad guy. The individual
served a year in jail and was placed on probation. While on probation,
a judge allowed him to go back to Iran. It*s our understanding that,
as a result, he has chosen not to appear back in the United States and
therefore remains a fugitive inside of Iran.
If you look at this case in the concept of how a counterterrorism
investigation is conducted, this is a boiler-plate example of what
occurs. You have a source that comes to the attention of a U.S.
Embassy abroad * in this case, London. He brings to the embassy
information involving a sophisticated Iranian assassination plot. The
Embassy takes that material and disseminates it to Washington.
Washington comes back to London, lets them know that the FBI was aware
of a plot and had been working the case in California. It sends out
leads to the respective joint-terrorism task forces (in this case, it
appears to be Los Angeles and Ann Arbor, Mich.) in a very highly
compartmented manner and substantiates the information, resulting in
the arrest of a hitman. The plot is thwarted, and the bad guy leaves
the country and is now safe-havened in Iran.
The Above the Tearline aspect of this case is how, everyday, the U.S.
counterterrorism community is dealing with the investigation of highly
complex intelligence operations that originate in intelligence
information, which can be parsed off and used for criminal
investigation and prosecution inside the United States, as well as for
the neutralization of murder plots.
Click for more videos
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 15, 2010 3:20:53 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: U.S. Naval Update Map: Dec. 15, 2010
Stratfor logo
U.S. Naval Update Map: Dec. 15, 2010
December 15, 2010 | 2052 GMT
The Naval Update Map shows an approximation of the current locations
of U.S. Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) and Amphibious Ready Groups
(ARGs), the keys to U.S. dominance of the world*s oceans. A CSG is
centered on an aircraft carrier, which projects U.S. naval and air
power and supports a carrier air wing (CVW). The CSG includes
significant offensive strike capability. An ARG is centered on three
amphibious warfare ships, with a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)
embarked. An MEU is built around a heavily reinforced and mobile
battalion of Marines.
U.S. Naval Update Map: Dec. 15, 2010
(click here to enlarge image)
Carrier Strike Groups
* The USS Enterprise returned to its home port after completing a
joint task force exercise as part of its preparation for its
upcoming deployment.
* The USS Harry S. Truman CSG with CVW 3 embarked is under way in
the Atlantic Ocean, returning from its deployment in the 5th and
6th Fleet areas of responsibility (AORs).
* The USS Nimitz is at Naval Base Kitsap-Bremerton, Wash., preparing
for a yearlong docking planned incremental availability (DPIA) at
the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance
Facility.
* The USS Carl Vinson with CVW 17 embarked is under way for a
three-week composite training unit exercise followed by a
scheduled deployment to the western Pacific Ocean.
* The USS Abraham Lincoln CSG with CVW 2 embarked is on a scheduled
deployment in the 5th Fleet AOR conducting maritime security
operations and theater security cooperation efforts.
* The USS George Washington returned to its home port after
participating in exercises with naval units from Japan and South
Korea.
Amphibious Ready Groups/Marine Expeditionary Units
* The USS Peleliu ARG with the 15th MEU embarked is under way in the
Pacific Ocean transiting to its home port after deployment.
* The USS Essex ARG with the 31st MEU returned to its home port
after participating in exercises with naval units from Japan and
South Korea.
* The USS Kearsarge ARG with the 26th MEU embarked is under way
supporting maritime security operations and theater security
cooperation efforts in the U.S. 5th Fleet AOR.
* The USS Boxer is under way conducting operations in the Pacific
Ocean.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 15, 2010 3:51:47 PM CST
To: "michael.cashel@fmr.com" <service@stratfor.com>
Subject: RECEIPT of GIFT PURCHASE
Stratfor logo
Welcome to STRATFOR!
We*re glad you joined our membership community. Save this email for
your records.
Your Account Information:
Username: michael.cashel@fmr.com
Membership type: 0 Day Placeholder
Payment: $99
Purchase date: December 15, 2010
Memberships are renewed automatically to avoid any interruption to
your service.
Important Settings:
* Add noreply@stratfor.com to your address book so that STRATFOR
email doesn*t end up in your spam/junk folder. Also be sure to
enable images as the maps and other graphics we include are a
critical piece of our intelligence.
* If you lose your password, you can request a new password here.
* Configure your email delivery and account settings here. You can
choose the topics and types of intelligence emails you would like
to receive, along with the time you would like them delivered.
This section also includes access to our RSS feeds.
Click here for detailed descriptions of our various reports.
Thank you for becoming a STRATFOR member!
[IMG]
STRATFOR
221 W. 6th Street, Suite 400
Austin, TX 78701
(512) 744-4300
http://www.stratfor.com/
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 15, 2010 4:35:03 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Dispatch: Presidential Elections in Belarus
Stratfor logo
Dispatch: Presidential Elections in Belarus
December 15, 2010 | 2226 GMT
Click on image below to watch video:
[IMG]
Regardless of whether incumbent and likely winner Aleksandr Lukashenko
emerges victorious from Belarus* upcoming presidential election,
Analyst Eugene Chausovsky says Belarus will remain under Moscow*s
thumb.
Editor*s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition
technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete
accuracy.
Belarus will hold presidential elections on Dec. 19. The outcome of
the elections is likely to give the victory to the incumbent,
President Aleksandr Lukashenko. But in a strategic sense, it doesn*t
really matter who wins. However, the elections give STRATFOR an
opportunity to examine the state of relations among Belarus, Russia
and the West.
Belarus is important for several reasons, not least of which is
geography. Belarus is located on the Northern European Plain, which is
historically the traditional invasion route of Western European powers
into Russia. Therefore, Belarus serves as an important defense partner
who, if allied with Russia, can serve as a bulwark against any Western
or, in modern day, NATO expansion into Russia*s periphery. Belarus is
also important to Russia for an economic reason. Because of its
location, it serves as a transit point for roughly 20 percent of
Russia*s energy supplies to Europe. Because Belarus is a nearby
European state, the European Union * and especially the Central
European states, like Poland * have an important stake in Belarus as
well. This can be for economic ties but also, and more importantly, as
a buffer against Russian designs in the region.
In the past year, we have seen many interesting developments happen in
Belarus as these two players * Russia and Europe * vie for influence
there. Russian started 2010 by joining into a customs union Belarus
(along with Kazakhstan), which essentially eliminates many economic
and political barriers among the three countries. While this was meant
to strengthen Russia*s relationship with Belarus, it actually opened
many rifts with Belarus instead. This happened because the two
countries joined into the customs union for different reasons. From
Belarus* perspective, they thought being in a customs union with
Russia would grant it favor with Moscow and give it perks and
concessions from Russia, such as cheaper energy prices for natural gas
and oil, or the abolition of customs duties on the oil and natural gas
that Belarus transits into Europe. From Russia*s perspective, it
wasn*t willing to give such concessions to Belarus because Russia
essentially thought of the customs union as a way to dominate Belarus
and Kazakhstan economically; it was not willing to play such games
with Minsk.
These two different perspectives actually resulted in serious rifts
between the two countries. Lukashenko publicly attacked Russia*s
leadership, and Russia responded by cutting off natural gas exports to
Belarus. This caused Belarus to seek energy diversification away from
Russia, and Minsk signed oil deals with Venezuela. These tensions that
we saw between Belarus and Russia were not so much a true rupture but
rather Belarus trying to get bargaining chips in order to get a better
deal with Russia. We actually saw such a deal take place last week
when both countries agreed on their customs union spat, and Russia
gave in slightly to Belarus* demands (though not completely on the
energy export tariffs).
It is also worth noting that throughout all of these rifts that we saw
in 2010, the security relationship between the two countries only
strengthened. There were never any sort of rifts; Belarus never talked
about joining NATO; and the countries signed multiple deals through
the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and through
bilateral military agreements. Fundamentally, Belarus is truly
integrated into Russia from an economic standpoint, but even more so
from a military standpoint. And this is something that the elections
we are going to see this weekend will not change.
Click for more videos
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with
attribution to www.stratfor.com
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 15, 2010 5:06:08 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: German Domestic Politics and the Eurozone Crisis
Stratfor logo
German Domestic Politics and the Eurozone Crisis
December 15, 2010 | 2143 GMT
German Domestic Politics and the Eurozone Crisis
ODD ANDERSEN/AFP/Getty Images
German Chancellor Angela Merkel at the Chancellery in Berlin on Dec.
15
Summary
Germany*s Lander of Hamburg will hold an election Feb. 20, 2011, after
a political crisis led to the dissolution of its parliament. The next
month, three other Landers will hold elections. The domestic political
situation will distract Berlin from other matters, particularly as
German Chancellor Angela Merkel*s Christian Democratic Union is
attempting to hold on to coalition governments in three of the four
Landers holding elections. With Germany bogged down in domestic
political campaigning, Merkel may be less able to focus on managing
the eurozone crisis.
Analysis
A political crisis in the German Lander of Hamburg (the city has the
status of a Lander, or state) led the Lander*s legislature to dissolve
itself after the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)-Green party
coalition collapsed. New elections are scheduled for Feb. 20, 2011,
approximately a month before three other Landers hold elections.
The elections raise the likelihood that Germany will be embroiled in
domestic political campaigning from now until April. This will make it
more difficult for German Chancellor Angela Merkel to focus solely on
managing the eurozone crisis, as illustrated by the elections held in
North Rhine-Westphalia in May amid the Greek sovereign debt crisis.
Germany*s Lander Elections
German Landers are politically some of the most powerful federal
entities in a major Western democracy. The Lander legislatures are
directly represented in the Bundesrat * colloquially referred to as
Germany*s upper house * by representatives whose voting powers are
based on their Lander*s population. The political balance in the
Bundesrat therefore directly depends on the makeup of the Lander
legislatures, giving both the legislatures and Lander prime ministers
considerable federal influence. The Landers are also in charge of a
substantial portion of the German budget * the central government only
accounts for around 30 percent of total government revenue * as well
as how EU funds are distributed in the country.
Hamburg*s election takes place not long before regularly scheduled
elections in the Landers of Saxony-Anhalt (March 20),
Baden-Wurttemberg (March 27) and Rhineland-Palatinate (March 27).
Merkel*s CDU is in a coalition government in both Saxony-Anhalt and
Baden-Wurttemberg, as well as in Hamburg. The CDU-Green coalition in
Hamburg was in fact considered the test case for a potential national
coalition between the two parties at some point in the future. That it
prematurely failed illustrates the fundamental differences between the
two parties. The CDU*s only partners at the federal level are its
Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union, and the Free
Democratic Party (FDP).
The Lander elections are important because they will force Merkel to
concentrate on campaigning instead of on managing the ongoing eurozone
crisis. The last time the German chancellor did that * in early 2010,
ahead of the May 9 elections in North Rhine-Westphalia, which the CDU
lost * she was forced to talk tough on the possibility of a Greek
bailout. Voters of the center-right CDU are traditionally more
skeptical of Germany*s leadership role in the European Union if that
role means signing checks for the rest of Europe. Merkel was therefore
caught having to speak to two audiences, as a high-ranking German
diplomat recently told STRATFOR * having to reassure investors and
fellow EU countries that Germany would stand by the euro while
reassuring CDU voters that Berlin would not spend a pfennig on bailing
out the Greeks. It is not surprising that the European Union finalized
the Greek bailout on May 10, the day after the CDU lost the North
Rhine-Westphalia elections. The Greek crisis, however, started in
January, and the extra four months probably raised the price of the
eventual bailout.
Following two bailouts and the setting up of the 440 billion euro
($580 billion) European Financial Stability Facility, it is not clear
that the electorate will force Merkel to take as tough of a stance
this time around. However, the situation in the eurozone is still
unclear. Following the Irish bailout, the financial situations in
Portugal, Spain and increasingly Belgium are coming into focus. Every
small issue seems to make investors nervous, and the euro is in the
focus daily. Berlin*s leadership is therefore still needed, and the
prospect of Merkel*s having to deal with two audiences again * even if
the rhetoric is not as sharp as before the Greek bailout * is not
reassuring.
Problems for Merkel*s Party
Causing further concern is the CDU*s unpopularity in polls despite its
considerable domestic economic successes. The latest nationwide
figures show the center-left Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the
Green party together ahead of the CDU and its partner, the FDP. The
latter is threatened with not even crossing the 5 percent
parliamentary threshold and is facing a leadership crisis, with calls
within the FDP for the incumbent, German Foreign Minister Guido
Westerwelle, to resign. Meanwhile, Germany*s economy is expected to
grow around 3.6 percent in 2010, a number that far outpaces the rest
of the developing countries, especially in Europe. Furthermore,
unemployment in Germany has actually reduced since the economic
recession, down from 8.4 percent in 2007 to 7.1 percent in 2010 *
compare that with the United States, which has seen unemployment grow
from 4.6 percent in 2007 to 9.7 percent in 2010. The positive
unemployment figure is largely the function of the short-shift scheme
implemented by the CDU-FDP federal government, which allowed employers
to keep on their labor force due to government support. Most Western
politicians would feel secure in their position with that kind of
economic performance amid uncertain economic times.
Considering the German economy*s performance, the CDU*s poor poll
numbers suggest that one of the reasons its voters are losing patience
is Merkel*s performance on the European stage, particularly the
extension of two bailouts to peripheral states. A June poll in Germany
supports this claim, with as much as 50 percent of the population in
favor of going back to the deutsche mark, despite the benefits the
euro has afforded the German economy. The danger for Europe is that
Merkel and the CDU will attempt to compensate for the poor national
polling by campaigning hard to their voters in the upcoming four
Lander elections * the same strategy employed for the North
Rhine-Westphalia elections * to the extent that the CDU-FDP government
will remain committed to not extending a blank check to fellow
eurozone countries.
An even greater destabilizing move would be if Merkel feels compelled
to call early federal elections if the CDU performs poorly again in
the Lander elections * her predecessor, Gerhard Schroeder, did the
same after his SDP lost the North Rhine-Westphalia elections in 2005.
This is not expected; early elections are frowned upon in Germany, and
governments are expected to last their entire term. However, were it
to happen, it would launch Germany into a period of introspection and
limit its ability to put out fires on the Continent.
German politics could therefore add another variable to the already
long list of potential issues for the eurozone in 2011.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 15, 2010 5:19:47 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: China Security Memo: Dec. 15, 2010
Stratfor logo
China Security Memo: Dec. 15, 2010
December 15, 2010 | 2256 GMT
China Security Memo: Dec. 15, 2010
IED Gang Arrested
A group of nine people suspected of building and detonating small
improvised explosives devices (IEDs) in Wuhan, Hubei province, was
arrested on Dec. 5 and 6, local media reported Dec. 10. The intentions
of the group are still unclear, but it appears Wuhan police were
successful in stopping them before they killed or injured anyone.
Naturally, all governments view the construction or deployment of IEDs
within their territory as a potential threat. But the threat is
particularly pronounced in a country * like China * concerned that
dissident groups, such as ethnic minorities like the Uighurs, may use
these weapons to voice their grievances through violence. While IEDs
are not common in China, a number of recent incidents have been
reported.
A small explosive device was set off in Hankou district in the center
of Wuhan on Nov. 26. The explosion broke nearby windows, including
those of a passing car, but caused no injuries. Two similar explosions
occurred in Qiaokou and Zongguan districts later that day. Again, no
one was hurt, and police began to suspect the same group was
responsible.
A team of 60 Wuhan police officers were involved in the investigation.
They first began examining taxi records and closed-circuit
surveillance cameras. By Dec. 5 they tracked down two suspects, who
were found with homemade explosives and a radio in their vehicle.
Likely using information gathered from the first two suspects
arrested, police located six more individuals the next day, who were
found with homemade explosives, a bow and arrows, knives, and other
items. Soon after, they arrested the final suspect who was found with
homemade explosives and a pistol with five rounds of ammunition.
The police claim that the suspects confessed to building the IEDs from
fireworks and gunpowder (though it may have been powder from the
fireworks, not black powder) and said they were testing the devices
for use in larger crimes. Police did not detail the group*s plans, but
given the contraband reportedly found in their possession, they were
most likely involved in organized crime. The nine suspects are all
migrants from other areas of China; however, they are also all Han
Chinese * the dominant ethnic group in China * and thus not likely
motivated by ethnic grievances.
Another small device was found in Liberation Park in Wuhan on Nov. 30,
and police have not said whether they believe the group was
responsible for the device, though the suspects were not detained at
the time. It should be noted that two of the most widely publicized
explosions in recent months * one at a tax office in the nearby city
of Changsha and the probable accidental explosion in a Guizhou
Internet cafe * have not been linked to the group.
The individuals arrested appeared to have been testing different
methods for constructing IEDs * a common phase for any militant group,
as well as organized criminal gangs, who use explosive devices as a
threat. However, they do not appear to have developed any serious
capabilities, and the fact that they were quickly caught means they
did not practice careful countersurveillance tradecraft. While the
abilities of this group appear to have been limited * and while the
group*s were arrested relatively soon after they began setting off
explosives * the attention the case received from Chinese media and
police highlights the government*s concerns of the risks homemade
explosive devices pose.
Mentally Disabled Slave Labor
Authorities shut down a factory for using slave labor in Toksun
county, near Turpan, Xinjiang Autonomous Region, on Dec. 14. Eleven
workers, eight of whom were mentally disabled, had been working for up
to four years in harsh conditions without pay. The discovery
underscores the ability of employers to skirt business regulations,
especially because the rights of the mentally disabled are often
ignored in China.
The Jiaersi Green Construction Material Chemical Factory produces
talcum powder and quartz sand in an isolated village in Xinjiang for
construction projects. The factory owner, Li Xinglin, claimed he
signed a contract with an aid agency that runs a shelter based in
Sichuan province. He paid the shelter 9,000 yuan (about $1,350) to
deliver five mentally disabled workers, and paid an additional 300
yuan per worker each month. After the factory was exposed Dec. 12, its
owner and employees attempted to flee. Li was arrested Dec. 14 at 8:30
p.m. along with his son, Li Chenglong, in Chengdu, Sichuan province,
with a separate group of mentally disabled workers. The night before,
the shelter owner, Zeng Lingquan, was also arrested in Quxian county,
Sichuan province, for not properly registering with the Civil Affairs
Bureau. The incident was exposed after reporters from Xinjiang
Metropolis News received a tip about the factory and went to
investigate. They claimed they were investigating pollution in order
to gain entry into the factory and observe its workers. Following
their reports, police were sent in and the factory was shut down.
China has long ignored the problems facing its mentally disabled
citizens, which makes it easier for employers to exploit them by
circumventing labor regulations. As this case demonstrates, slave
labor still exists in isolated pockets across China. This should not
be a major concern for those doing business in China, as the practice
is not common and the major factories, especially in coastal
provinces, are inspected. However, when partnering with a Chinese
factory, foreign businesses and factory management should develop
internal inspection procedures to ensure that oversights (or bribes to
ensure oversights) of Chinese government inspectors are not missed.
China Security Memo: Dec. 15, 2010
(click here to view interactive map)
Dec. 9
* A group led by an American citizen was convicted of selling
counterfeit pharmaceuticals across China. The American (presumably
of Chinese descent) was sentenced in Hangzhou, Zhejiang province,
to 10 years in prison and fined 84 million yuan (about $12.6
million). Three other individuals found guilty were sentenced to
between five and six years in prison and fined between 50,000 and
250,000 yuan. They used the Internet to market the drugs they
produced in Zhejiang.
* Beijing police arrested eight foreign prostitutes, their foreign
pimp and twelve Chinese citizens involved in advertising their
services. The group was housed in a rented apartment in Chaoyang
district and met customers at hotels across the city. Police said
the prostitutes and their pimp were from Europe, but gave no
further details.
* Police arrested 68 people in a nine-month counternarcotics
operation centered in Meishan, Sichuan province. Four different
distribution rings were busted that had produced 40.35 kilograms
(about 90 pounds) of methamphetamine and 3.5 metric tons of
ephedrine. Police seized six guns and froze bank accounts holding
11.2 million yuan.
* Qin Yongming, one of the founders of the Democratic Party of
China, was summoned to a police station in Wuhan, Hubei province,
the Apple Daily of Hong Kong reported. The summons likely relates
to his criticism of China*s treatment of 2010 Nobel Peace Prize
winner Liu Xiaobo.
Dec. 10
* A former member of Tianjin*s Standing Committee was sentenced to
death for accepting bribes. Between 1995 and 2005, Pi Qiansheng
held various management positions in Tianjin and its New Economic
Zones. He accepted 7 million yuan from Wu Xiaohua to use Tianjin*s
resources to buy shares in Wu*s company, which had no assets.
* Forty members of an organized crime group led by brothers named
Que were found guilty of gang-related crimes in Chongqing. The
brothers were sentenced to death, and the rest of the group awaits
sentencing. They opened an illegal gambling house and were
involved in violent crimes.
Dec. 13
* The wife and child of a well-known dissident from Inner Mongolia
may have been arrested. Hohhot police detained the wife and son of
Hada, a ethnic Mongol activist in Inner Mongolia, just before he
was due to be released Dec. 9 after 15 years in prison for
espionage and separatism, according the U.S.-based Southern
Mongolian Human Rights Information Center. (It is unclear whether
Hada had already been released and was re-arrested with his
family, or whether he remained jailed the entire time.) An
anonymous user of the foreign-based website Boxun.com posted a
picture of Hada with his family members dated Dec. 10. Their
whereabouts are currently unknown, and they have not been heard
from by friends or family.
* A former director of the Public Security Bureau of Ma*anshan,
Anhui province, was sentenced to 16 years in jail for accepting
bribes and holding property of unknown origin. He was convicted of
accepting bribes of more than 5 million yuan in return for helping
others* business operations.
* Guangxi province border police based in Chongzuo arrested four
suspects and seized 15 kilograms of heroin. The case is under
investigation.
* A cinema employee was convicted in Beijing of illegally selling
vouchers redeemable for movie tickets and sentenced to seven years
in jail. The man sold vouchers for a 450,000-yuan profit in June
and July of 2009.
* Three drug traffickers were arrested in a raid in Shanghai in
which 2 kilograms of narcotics were seized. Police also seized
180,000 yuan in cash.
Dec. 14
* A former party secretary of Dao county, Hunan province, was
convicted of illegal land acquisition and bribery. The man
illegally approved the land acquisition of a company in which he
held stock and accepted 15 million yuan in bribes. He will be
sentenced at a later date.
* The Ministry of Public Security announced a crackdown on
counterfeit documents sold over the Internet. It asked e-commerce
websites, online forums, and search engines to delete all postings
that involve counterfeit documents. It also promised to increase
government supervision. Counterfeit documents are used for many
purposes * recently some were used by workers get out of work in
order to watch the 2010 World Cup.
* A former head of the sales department of Guangxi*s Tobacco
Monopoly Bureau was sentenced to 13 years in prison in Nanning,
Guangxi province, after being convicted of bribery. The evidence
at his trial was based on his diaries detailing bribes and love
affairs that were posted online earlier this year. He was found
guilty of accepting 695,000 yuan and an apartment in bribes.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 15, 2010 6:09:35 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Russia, Turkey Keep Ambitious Energy Projects Alive
Stratfor logo
Russia, Turkey Keep Ambitious Energy Projects Alive
December 16, 2010 | 0000 GMT
Russia and Turkey Keep 2 Ambitious Energy Projects Alive
MUSTAFA OZER/AFP/Getty Images
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin (L) and Turkish Energy
Minister Taner Yildiz at a press conference Dec. 15
Summary
Russia*s energy minister and a deputy prime minister traveled to
Istanbul on Dec. 15 to meet with the Turkish energy minister and
representatives of Turkish energy firms. On the agenda is a proposed
$20 billion, 4.8-gigawatt nuclear power plant in Turkey and an oil
pipeline that would connect Turkey*s Samsun and Ceyhan ports from
north to south. Political motivations are driving Russia and Turkey to
keep the plans alive and begin negotiating ownership rights, but
STRATFOR remains deeply skeptical of the projects* financial
viability.
Analysis
An energy summit took place Dec. 15 in Istanbul involving Russian
Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor
Sechin, Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz and representatives of
Turkish energy firms. The meetings centered on ownership rights for
two ambitious energy projects * a massive $20 billion, 4.8-gigawatt
nuclear power plant in southern Turkey and a 1 million barrel-per-day
oil pipeline connecting Turkey*s Black Sea port of Samsun to its
Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.
Both projects face glaring obstacles. One has to do with cost. At $20
billion, the nuclear power plant would be the largest and most
expensive ever constructed. Russia does not have a reputation for
actually putting up the cash to fund such mega-projects. To put this
in perspective, the possible $20 billion cost is close to what Russia
intends to spend on a massive economic modernization program at home.
Not only is the modernization drive taking place on Russian soil, it
also serves a critical geopolitical interest to revitalize
long-neglected sectors of the Russian economy. Spending billions of
dollars on a nuclear power plant for another country, particularly a
historical rival like Turkey, would mark an unprecedented display of
Russian generosity.
There are no indications that Turkey will be willing or able to cover
the costs of these projects, either. Though Turkey has talked more
seriously in recent years about incorporating nuclear energy into its
energy security strategy, there is no real urgency to see these plans
through. Turkey already transits more than three times the amount of
oil it uses, even without Iraq*s oil industry running at full
capacity. Turkey*s largest energy project to date, the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) crude-oil pipeline, took more than a decade
to negotiate and construct and cost $3.9 billion, the bulk of which
was financed by the International Finance Corporation, the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development and a number of export credit
agencies.
Still, both countries are highlighting these energy projects as proof
that their relationship is strong. Doing so allows Turkey to play its
regional balancing act, serving as an energy hub for Europe to
diversify its energy sources away from Russia while using its own
energy ties with Russia to avoid a broader confrontation with the
Kremlin. Meanwhile, Russia does not want to give Turkey a reason to
entertain other projects like the BTC pipeline that would further
undermine Moscow*s energy stranglehold over Europe.
Mega-energy projects with Turkey, or at least talks about them, allow
Russia to maintain a close relationship with Turkey while keeping
Turkey dependent on Russia for energy. Turkey currently relies on
Russia for 60 percent of its energy needs and, while it may seem that
Turkey could lessen that dependency through the development of nuclear
power, Russia is ensuring that Turkey will need to rely on Russia for
the technology and maintenance of the theoretical nuclear power plant.
For now, such significant complications are being put aside. The
discussions in Istanbul on Dec. 15 focused on ownership rights, with
various energy firms wrangling for a stake in the two projects. Under
the terms of the nuclear agreement, a Turkish firm will have no more
than a 49 percent stake, which STRATFOR sources in Turkey*s energy
industry claim will be slightly above 30 percent. As far as the
Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline project is concerned, negotiations continue
between Turkish Calik Energy, Russian Transneft and Italian ENI.
Questions remain over the ownership and financial aspects of the
pipeline project, but STRATFOR has received indications that both
Calik and Transneft are currently trying to gain the upper hand by
getting a majority of the shares and leaving ENI with a smaller piece
in case the project becomes more viable.
Negotiations will drag on mainly for political reasons, and STRATFOR
will be watching to see if the economics surrounding these deals
eventually trump the politics behind them.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 16, 2010 3:55:54 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Security Weekly : Mexico and the Cartel Wars in 2010
Stratfor logo
Mexico and the Cartel Wars in 2010
December 16, 2010
China and its Double-edged Cyber-sword
Editor*s Note: This week*s Security Weekly is a heavily abridged
version of STRATFOR*s annual report on Mexico*s drug cartels. The full
report, which includes far more detail and diagrams depicting the
leadership of each cartel along with our updated cartel map, will be
available to our members on Dec. 20.
By Scott Stewart
Related Link
* Mexican Drug Cartels: Two Wars and a Look Southward
Related Special Topic Page
* Tracking Mexico*s Drug Cartels
In our 2010 annual report on Mexico*s drug cartels, we assess the most
significant developments of the past year and provide an updated
description of the dynamics among the country*s powerful
drug-trafficking organizations, along with an account of the
government*s effort to combat the cartels and a forecast of the battle
in 2011. The annual cartel report is a product of the coverage
STRATFOR maintains on a weekly basis through our Mexico Security Memo
as well as other analyses we produce throughout the year. In response
to customer requests for more and deeper coverage of Mexico, STRATFOR
will also introduce a new product in 2011 designed to provide an
enhanced level of reporting and analysis.
In 2010, the cartel wars in Mexico have produced unprecedented levels
of violence throughout the country. No longer concentrated in just a
few states, the violence has spread all across the northern tier of
border states and along much of both the east and west coasts of
Mexico. This year*s drug-related homicides have surpassed 11,000, an
increase of more than 4,400 deaths from 2009 and more than double the
death toll in 2008.
Mexico and the Cartel Wars in 2010
Cartel Dynamics
The high levels of violence seen in 2010 have been caused not only by
long-term struggles such as the fight between the Sinaloa Federation
and the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes Organization (also known as the
Juarez cartel) for control of the Juarez smuggling corridor but also
from the outbreak of new conflicts among various players in the cartel
landscape. For example, simmering tensions between Los Zetas and their
former partners in the Gulf cartel finally boiled over and quickly
escalated into a bloody turf war along the U.S.-Tamaulipas state
border. The conflict has even spread to states like Nuevo Leon,
Hidalgo and Tabasco and has given birth to an alliance between the
Sinaloa Federation, the Gulf cartel and La Familia Michoacana (LFM)
called the New Federation.
Last December, it appeared that Los Zetas were poised to make a move
to assume control over much, if not all, of the Gulf cartel*s
territory. The Gulf cartel knew it could not take on Los Zetas alone
with its current capabilities so in desperation it reached out to its
main rivals in Mexico * the Sinaloa Federation and LFM * for help,
thus forming the New Federation. With the added resources from the New
Federation, the Gulf cartel was able to take the fight to Los Zetas
and actually forced its former partners out of one of their
traditional strongholds in Reynosa. The New Federation also expanded
its offensive operations to other regions traditionally held by Los
Zetas, namely the city of Monterrey and the states of Nuevo Leon,
Hidalgo and Veracruz.
This resulted in Los Zetas being pushed back on their heels throughout
the country, and by June it looked as if Los Zetas* days might be
numbered. However, a chain of events that began with the July 28 death
of Sinaloa Federation No. 3 Ignacio *El Nacho* Coronel served to
weaken the alliance and forced the Sinaloa and LFM to direct attention
and resources to other parts of the country, thus giving Los Zetas
some room to regroup. The situation along the border in eastern Mexico
is still very fluid and the contest between the Gulf cartel and Los
Zetas for control of the region will continue in 2011.
Mexico and the Cartel Wars in 2010
(click here to enlarge image)
The death of Arturo Beltran Leyva in December 2009 in a Mexican marine
raid led to a vicious battle between factions of the Beltran Leyva
Organization (BLO) for control of the group, pitting Arturo*s brother,
Hector Beltran Leyva, against Arturo*s right-hand man, Edgar *La
Barbie* Valdez Villarreal. The war between the two BLO factions ended
with the arrests of the leadership of the Valdez Villarreal faction,
including La Barbie himself on Aug. 30, and this faction has been
heavily damaged if not completely dissolved. Hector*s BLO faction
adopted the name Cartel Pacifico Sur (CPS), or the South Pacific
Cartel, to distance itself from the elements associated with Valdez
that still clung to the BLO moniker. The CPS has aligned itself with
Los Zetas against Sinaloa and LFM and has actively fought to stake a
claim to the Colima and Manzanillo regions in addition to making
inroads in Michoacan.
After being named the most violent organized-crime group in Mexico by
former Mexican Attorney General Eduardo Medina Mora in 2009, LFM has
been largely a background player in 2010 and was active on two main
fronts: the offensive against Los Zetas as part of the New Federation
in northeastern Mexico and the fight against elements of the CPS and
Los Zetas in southern Michoacan and Guerrero states, particularly
around the resort area of Acapulco. LFM and CPS have been locked in a
heated battle for supremacy in the Acapulco region for the past two
years and this conflict shows no signs of stopping, especially since
the CPS appears to have recently launched a new offensive against LFM
in the southern regions of Michoacan. Additionally, after the death of
Sinaloa leader El Nacho Coronel in July and the subsequent
dismantlement of his network, LFM attempted to take over the Jalisco
and Colima trafficking corridors, reportedly straining relations
between the Sinaloa Federation and LFM.
LFM has been hard hit in the latter months of 2010, its losses on the
battlefield amplified by the arrest of several senior operatives in
early December. The Dec. 10 death of LFM spiritual leader Nazario *El
Mas Loco* Moreno Gonzalez will further challenge the organization, and
STRATFOR will be carefully watching LFM over the next several weeks
for additional signs that it is collapsing.
Two former heavyweights on the Mexican drug-trafficking scene have
continued a declining trajectory in 2010: the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes
Organization/Juarez cartel (VCF) and the Arellano Felix
Organization/Tijuana cartel (AFO). The VCF continues to lose ground to
the Sinaloa Federation throughout Chihuahua state, most notably in the
Ciudad Juarez area. The VCF*s influence has largely been confined to
the urban areas of the state, Juarez and Chihuahua, though it appears
that its influence is waning even in its traditional strongholds
(Sinaloa now appears to be moving narcotics through the Juarez
smuggling corridor). Following a bitter war between two factions of
the AFO, the organization is a shell of its former self. While the AFO
faction under the leadership of Fernando *El Ingeniero* Sanchez
Arellano emerged victorious over the faction led by Eduardo *El Teo*
Garcia Simental, who was a Sinaloa Federation proxy, it appears that
Sanchez Arellano has reached an agreement with Sinaloa and is allowing
it to move narcotics through Tijuana.
In the past, these sorts of agreements have proved to be temporary *
one need only look at recent history in Juarez and the cooperation
between Sinaloa and the VCF. Because of this, it is likely at some
point that the Sinaloa Federation will begin to refuse to pay taxes to
the AFO. When that happens, it will be important to see if the AFO has
the capability to do anything about it.
The death of El Nacho Coronel and the damage-control efforts
associated with the dismantlement of his network, along with the
continued focus on the conflict in Juarez, forced the Sinaloa
Federation to pull back from other commitments, such as its operations
against Los Zetas as part of the New Federation. On the
business-operations side, Sinaloa has made inroads in other regions
and other continents. As noted above, the organization also has
reportedly made progress in extending its control over the lucrative
Tijuana smuggling corridor and is making significant progress in
asserting control over the Juarez corridor.
Over the past few years, Sinaloa has gained control of, or access to,
smuggling corridors all along Mexico*s northern border from Tijuana to
Juarez. This means that Sinaloa appears to be the group that has fared
the best over the past few years amid the intensifying violence. This
would apply more specifically to Joaquin *El Chapo* Guzman Loera and
his faction of the Sinaloa Federation, which has benefited greatly by
events since 2006. In addition to the fall of external foes like the
AFO and Juarez cartels, he has seen the downfall of strong Sinaloa
personalities who could have risen up to contest his leadership, men
like Alfredo Beltran Leyva and El Nacho Coronel. Sinaloa members who
attract a lot of adverse publicity for the federation, such as Enrique
*El Cumbais* Lopez Acosta also seem to run into bad luck with some
frequency. Additionally, STRATFOR sources continue to report a
sustained effort by the Sinaloa Federation to expand its logistical
network farther into Europe and its influence deeper into Central
America and South America.
Escalation
Some of the groups that have borne the brunt of the cartel wars, such
as Los Zetas, the AFO and the VCF, have seen a decrease in their
ability to move narcotics. This has forced them to look for other
sources of income, which typically means diversifying into other
criminal enterprises. A steady stream of income is important for the
cartels because it takes a lot of money to hire and equip armed
enforcer units required to guard against incursions from rival cartels
and the Mexican government. It also takes money to purchase narcotics
and to maintain the networks required to smuggle them from South
America into the United States. This reliance on other criminal
enterprises to generate income is not a new development for cartel
groups. Los Zetas have long been active in human smuggling, oil theft,
extortion and contract enforcement, while the VCF and AFO have
traditionally been involved in extortion and kidnap-for-ransom
operations. However, as these groups found themselves with their backs
against the wall in 2010, they began to escalate their criminal
fundraising operations. This increase in extortion and kidnapping has
had a noticeable effect on businesses and wealthy families in several
cities, including Monterrey, Mexico*s industrial capital. The wave of
kidnapping in Monterrey even led to the U.S. Consulate in Monterrey
ordering the departure of all minor dependents of U.S. government
personnel beginning in September.
Some of the more desperate cartel groups also began to employ
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in 2010. The VCF has made no
secret about its belief that the Federal Police are working for and
protecting the Sinaloa Federation in Juarez. Following the July 15
arrest of a high-ranking VCF lieutenant, VCF enforcers from La Linea
conducted a fairly sophisticated ambush directed against the Federal
Police using a small IED hidden inside a car containing a cadaver that
the attackers called in to police. The blast killed two Federal Police
agents and injured several more at the scene. La Linea attempted to
deploy another IED under similar circumstances Sept. 10 in Juarez, but
Federal Police agents were able to identify the IED and call in the
Mexican military to defuse the device. La Linea has threatened to use
more and larger IEDs but has yet to follow through on those threats.
There were also three small IEDs deployed in Ciudad Victoria,
Tamaulipas state, in August. On Aug. 5, a substation housing the rural
patrol element of the Municipal Transit Police was attacked with a
small IED concealed inside a vehicle. Then on Aug. 27, two other IEDs
placed in cars successfully detonated outside Televisa studios and a
Municipal Transit Police station in Ciudad Victoria. The Ciudad
Victoria IED attacks were never claimed, but Los Zetas are thought to
be the culprits. The geographic and cartel-territorial disparity
between Ciudad Victoria and Juarez makes it unlikely that the same
bombmaker is responsible for all the devices encountered in Mexico
this year.
To date, the explosive devices deployed by cartel groups in Mexico
have been small, and La Linea and the Ciudad Victoria bomber did show
some discretion by not intentionally targeting large groups of
civilians in their attacks. However, should cartel groups continue to
deploy IEDs, the imprecise nature of such devices will increase the
risk of innocent civilians becoming collateral damage. This will be
especially true if the size of the devices is increased, as La Linea
has threatened to do. The cartels clearly have the skills required to
build and deploy larger devices should they so choose, and explosives
are plentiful and easy to obtain in Mexico.
Outlook
The administration of Mexican President Felipe Calderon has dismantled
several cartel networks and captured or killed their leaders in 2010,
most notably Sinaloa No. 3 Ignacio *El Nacho* Coronel Villarreal and
Edgar *La Barbie* Valdez Villarreal. While such operations have
succeeded in eliminating several very dangerous people and disrupting
their organizations, however, they have also served to further upset
the balance of power among Mexico*s criminal organizations. This
imbalance has increased the volatility of the country*s security
environment by creating a sort of vicious feeding frenzy among the
various organizations as they seek to preserve their own turf or seize
territory from rival organizations.
Calderon has also taken steps to shift the focus from the
controversial strategy of using the Mexican military as the primary
tool to wage war against the cartels to using the newly reformed
Federal Police. While the military still remains the most reliable
security tool available to the Mexican government, the Federal Police
have been given more responsibility in Juarez and northeast Mexico,
the nation*s most contentious hot spots. Calderon has also planted the
seeds to reform the states* security organizations with a unified
command in hopes of professionalizing each state*s security force to
the point where the states do not have to rely on the federal
government to combat organized crime. Meanwhile, the Mexican Congress
has take steps to curb the ability of the president to deploy the
military domestically by proposing a National Security Act that would
require a state governor or legislature to first request the
deployment of the military rather than permitting the federal
government to act unilaterally.
The successes that the Calderon administration has scored against some
major cartel figures such as La Barbie and El Nacho in 2010 have
helped foster some public confidence in the war against the cartels,
but disruptions to the balance of power among the cartels have added
to the violence, which is clearly evidenced by the steep climb in the
death toll. As long as the cartel landscape remains fluid, with the
balance of power between the cartels and the government in a constant
state of flux, the violence is unlikely to end or even recede.
This means that Calderon is at a crossroads. The increasing level of
violence is seen as unacceptable by the public and the government*s
resources are stretched to the limit. Unless all the cartel groups can
be decapitated and brought under control * something that is highly
unlikely given the government*s limitations * the only way to reduce
the violence is to restore the balance of power among the cartels.
This balance can be achieved if a small number of cartels come to
dominate the cartel landscape and are able to conduct business as
usual rather than fight continually for turf and survival. Calderon
must take steps to restore this balance in the next year if he hopes
to quell the violence and give his National Action Party a chance to
maintain power in the 2012 Mexican presidential elections. In Mexico,
2011 promises to be an interesting year indeed.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Reprinting or republication of this report on websites is authorized
by prominently displaying the following sentence at the beginning or
end of the report, including the hyperlink to STRATFOR:
"This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR"
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 16, 2010 5:53:21 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: China and India: Dragon vs. Elephant
[IMG]
Thursday, December 16, 2010 [IMG] STRATFOR.COM [IMG] Diary Archives
China and India: Dragon vs. Elephant
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, a massive diplomatic entourage and a
business delegation representing 100 firms arrived in India on
Wednesday for a three-day visit. Wen began the visit by addressing
concerns over the growing Sino-Indian rivalry, proclaiming that there
need be no essential conflict between the Dragon and the Elephant and
that Asia has room enough for both of them. After meeting with Indian
Premier Manmohan Singh, Wen will travel to Pakistan, a staunch Chinese
ally and Indian arch-foe, to emphasize where his deepest commitments
lie.
Wen*s visit comes at a time of revived mutual suspicion. Two major
incidents in particular have aggravated sore spots in the
relationship. Riots in Lhasa, Tibet, in 2008 caused Beijing to worry
more about breakaway tendencies in its far western province, whose
exiled government is supported by New Delhi. Meanwhile, Pakistan*s
continued support of various militant proxies has put the
Sino-Pakistani alliance into renewed focus for New Delhi, especially
in light of the November 2008 Mumbai attacks.
But alongside these signal events, Beijing*s growing economic clout
has led it to expand infrastructure and military installations across
its western regions in an attempt to bolster its territorial claims
and secure its far-flung provinces from separatist or militant
influences. India has bulked up its border infrastructure and security
in response. And, perhaps most novel, Beijing*s growing dependency on
overseas oil and raw materials has driven it to seek land and sea
pathways to the Indian Ocean through closer relations with South Asian
states generally and port agreements with Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Bangladesh and Myanmar, leading India to worry it will be encircled
and someday threatened by China*s navy.
Economic growth is one of the primary reasons world powers have
courted India this year, with U.S. President Barack Obama and French
President Nicolas Sarkozy already having visited. Wen*s trip is no
different, and already the two sides claim to have signed nearly 50
deals worth an estimated $16 billion if actualized. But deepening
economic relations have not eased tensions, especially given the
growing Indian trade deficit with China (from a surplus of $832
million in 2005 to a deficit of nearly $16 billion in 2009), which Wen
acknowledged on the first day of his visit needed to be improved while
simultaneously asking for greater market access for Chinese exporters.
*Beijing has its mind set on gaining control of land and sea routes to
the Indian Ocean and needs internal mobility in its far west to
prevent separatism and fortify its borders, and these policies are
driving tensions with India higher.*
While India is keen on displaying its relationship with China as far
more cooperative than confrontational, a serious self-critique is
developing within New Delhi over its slow reaction to Chinese moves in
the Indian periphery. China*s presence may be much more visible now in
places like Kashmir, Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka, but
that presence was built up methodically over several years. India,
with no shortage of issues to keep itself occupied at home, is now
finding that it is years behind China in countries that New Delhi
would like to believe sit firmly within its sphere of influence.
In the past. India could rely on its influence in Tibet to send a
warning to China. In fact, External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna
aired this threat in a meeting with his Chinese counterpart in
November when he said that just as India has been sensitive to Chinese
concerns over Tibet and Taiwan, Beijing too should be mindful of
Indian sensitivities on Jammu and Kashmir. The problem India has now
is that this warning simply does not carry as much weight as it did.
China has made considerable progress in building up the necessary
political, economic and military linkages into Tibet to deny the
Indians opportunities to needle Beijing in critical buffer territory.
Moreover, India has not been able to invest the necessary time and
effort into strengthening competitive relationships in more distant
places like Southeast Asia and Taiwan * and has only begun with Japan
* that would deeply unsettle Beijing. In fact, a discussion is taking
place within some military circles in India over how China may be
deliberately playing up issues on its land borders in Kashmir and
Arunachal Pradesh to divert India*s attention northward while China
pursues its objectives in the Indian Ocean basin, something that
STRATFOR alluded to when the stapled visa issue flared up in the
summer.
Yet India is not alone in its alarm. The world is increasingly looking
at China not only as a source of growth, but as an independent-minded
and potentially unpredictable variable in the international system.
Beijing*s increasing boldness has become one of the chief talking
points in foreign policy circles, extending beyond international hard
bargaining over resources and into China*s conduct around its entire
periphery and in international organizations. When India openly
worries about China*s intentions in exercising its newly found
strengths, it is joined by the likes of Japan, South Korea, Australia,
a number of China*s Southeast Asian neighbors and, most important, the
United States.
The problem for Beijing is that it is ultimately outnumbered, and
overpowered, but its attempts to prepare against threats make it
appear more threatening. Beijing sees the international coalition
forming against it, and in particular fears U.S. attention will soon
come to rest squarely on it and that a strategic relationship with
India is part of American designs. Hence, Wen has reason to play nice
with India, if only to make China appear a more benign player and not
hasten India*s moves to counteract it. Nevertheless, Beijing has its
mind set on gaining control of land and sea routes to the Indian Ocean
and needs internal mobility in its far west to prevent separatism and
fortify its borders, and these policies are driving the tensions with
India higher. Thus, while India senses Chinese encirclement in South
Asia, Beijing senses American encirclement, of which India is only one
part. Even with modern technology, the Himalayas remain a gigantic
divider. But these two states have fought a border war in the
Himalayas before, so the risks are real. Regardless of growing
economic cooperation, both sense a growing security threat from the
other that cannot be easily allayed.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 16, 2010 12:00:27 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Mexico's Cautious Economic Approach
Stratfor logo
Mexico's Cautious Economic Approach
December 16, 2010 | 1728 GMT
Mexico's Cautious Economic Approach
STEPHEN JAFFE/AFP/Getty Images
Mexican Central Bank Gov. Agustin Carstens (L), World Bank President
Robert Zoellick and International Monetary Fund chief Dominique
Strauss-Kahn in Istanbul on Oct. 5, 2009
Summary
Mexico has asked the IMF to expand and extend its flexible credit
line. Mexico*s economy is faring well enough that its request probably
represents an abundance of caution. The request does, however, reflect
ongoing concerns about the global economy. It also reflects Mexican
domestic politics.
Analysis
Mexican President Felipe Calderon announced Dec. 14 that Mexico has
asked the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to expand the country*s
flexible credit line arrangement from $48 billion to $73 billion and
to extend it for two more years.
Though expanding or extending the existing program would be
precautionary, Mexico*s request and the IMF*s receptiveness implicitly
acknowledge lingering concerns about the global economy. Should those
fears become reality, Mexico would probably lack the capacity to deal
with the fallout on its own, and hence its request to the IMF. At the
same time, the request also reflects domestic politicking ahead of a
busy electoral calendar.
Introduced in 2009, the IMF*s flexible credit lines (FCL) were
designed to assist countries with sound economic fundamentals and
strong policy frameworks in preventing crises. FCLs do not represent a
restitution program. Establishing a flexible credit line essentially
means that the IMF, the keeper of economic orthodoxy, broadly agrees
with the qualifying member country*s handling of its economy and
macroeconomic policy. The idea is that the IMF*s vote of confidence
coupled with available funds should help assuage financing concerns,
perhaps preventing the need to actually tap the credit line. Mexico,
Poland and Colombia are the only countries with FCLs, none of which
has drawn on them. Even so, circumstances beyond a country*s control
could endanger that economy*s proper functioning, however
well-intentioned its economic policy might be. FCLs thus serve the
added benefit of being an (essentially free) insurance policy against
those risks.
Mexico first established an FCL with the IMF in March. Though Mexico
was emerging from the global economic crisis with relatively solid
fundamentals, uncertainty over the global economic outlook and the
fallout from the financial crisis made it vulnerable to the risks
associated with rising investor caution. Depressed economic output in
Mexico and the reversal of the typical U.S.-to-Mexico cross-border
financial flows, upon which Mexico is highly dependent, meant
headaches for Latin America*s second-largest economy. These two issues
prompted Mexico to request the expanded and extended FCL, but since
then, global risks have evolved.
Currently, the three main risks to global economic recovery are the
sustainability of the fragile U.S. recovery, the fallout from the
ongoing European sovereign debt crisis, and the chance China might
experience a hard landing. If any one of these risks were to
materialize, global economic growth would likely slow and
risk-aversion would consequently rise. As Mexico*s economy is
capital-poor and export-oriented, any meaningful slowdown in external
demand or financing would complicate Mexico*s economic recovery, if
not hamstring it.
Complicating matters further, all three of these risks exist in an
environment where fiscal and monetary stimulus, which did all of the
heavy lifting during the crisis, are now ostensibly being withdrawn
and phased out. The negative effects on foreign demand and financing
of cutting stimulus are the same that would emerge if any of the three
main risks to global economic recovery materialized. But while the
adverse effects of withdrawing stimulus may * in a vacuum * be less
harmful than a derailed U.S. recovery, continued European economic
malaise or a Chinese bust, the real concern is that the withdrawal of
fiscal and monetary stimulus could set any of those three scenarios in
motion.
For the time being, the three main external risks to Mexican economic
recovery appear relatively contained. The U.S. government has said it
will stand by to support the economy, Europe is (albeit grudgingly and
haltingly) taking steps to address government over-indebtedness, and
the Chinese apparently are not aiming for a slowdown, decreasing the
chances of a hard landing. Moreover, the Mexican government expects
economic growth of 5 percent in 2011. Taken together, Mexico*s effort
to expand and lengthen its credit line might appear overly cautious.
The decision, however, is not purely economic: Domestic political
considerations are in play, too.
Mexico is heading into busy election season, with gubernatorial
elections in 2011 and presidential elections in 2012. Politicians,
therefore, have every motivation to showcase how well Mexico is doing
despite the cartel-related violence that blights some regions. As
stated above, expanding and lengthening the FCL shows IMF approval of
how Mexico has handled its economy. And that matters not just to
international investors, but in the domestic arena. Calderon and other
politicians from his ruling National Action Party (PAN) have an
obvious interest in showing government strides in improving social and
economic conditions in the country and in ensuring the recovery*s
sustainability. PAN can use the flexible credit line as evidence their
policies are working, and perhaps parlay this into electoral victories
in 2011 and 2012.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 16, 2010 2:57:23 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: The Continuing Political Crisis in Cote d'Ivoire
Stratfor logo
The Continuing Political Crisis in Cote d'Ivoire
December 16, 2010 | 2014 GMT
The Continuing Political Crisis in Cote d'Ivoire
ISSOUF SANOGO/AFP/Getty Images
Ivorian police square off with protesters in Abidjan on Dec. 16
Summary
Two weeks after Cote d*Ivoire*s disputed presidential runoff election,
protests and clashes occurred throughout the country Dec. 15-16.
Supporters of opposition candidate Alassane Ouattara are trying to
strike at incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo*s regime. However,
without substantial support from outside the country, including a
willingness to use direct force, Ouattara has little chance of
instigating regime change in Abidjan.
Analysis
Two weeks after a disputed presidential runoff election led incumbent
Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo to have himself sworn in for a new
term, the political crisis in Cote d*Ivoire continues, with protests
occurring Dec. 15-16 in various parts of the country. Though seemingly
the entire international community is pressuring Gbagbo to step down,
he maintains control of the Ivorian security forces, and by extension,
the heart of the Ivorian economy, making it unlikely that he will give
up power any time soon. There is no indication that Alassane Ouattara,
widely believed to have defeated Gbagbo in the runoff, will be able to
unseat him under the current conditions. With no foreign actors
willing to use force to assist Ouattara, it will be up to his own
supporters * aided greatly by the pro-Ouattara northern rebel group
New Forces * to instigate regime change in Cote d*Ivoire.
As the response to the Dec. 15-16 protests have shown, Gbagbo and the
Ivorian security forces currently hold the upper hand. Ouattara is not
ready to back down though, and the result will be several weeks, if
not months, of political limbo in the world*s largest cocoa-producing
nation.
Protests and Clashes
Hundreds of Ouattara supporters marched Dec. 15 in the official
capital of Yamoussoukro. A police officer allegedly killed one
protester, and soldiers reportedly injured four others. The next day,
protests and clashes occurred between New Forces soldiers and Ivorian
troops in the Lacs regional town of Tiebissou and, more prominently,
between government security forces and both protesters and New Forces
troops in several districts in Abidjan, Cote d*Ivoire*s largest city
and economic capital. Three deaths were reported in the working-class
district of Adjame, one in Koumassi and three more in Abobo, and riot
police fired tear gas at 500 protesters in Treichville. There were
also reports of firefights and exchanges of heavy artillery in the
area surrounding the Golf Hotel, located in the residential district
of Riviera, and where Ouattara*s self-proclaimed Cabinet has been
holed up for the past two weeks. U.N. peacekeepers have maintained an
armed perimeter around the hotel throughout the political crisis, but
actions by New Forces troops at the hotel triggered an engagement with
the Ivorian military, which lasted 30-45 minutes. This was likely the
cause of the errant rocket-propelled grenade that struck the outer
perimeter wall of the U.S. Embassy located nearby; no injuries came of
this incident, however, and a State Department spokesman in Washington
stated that it was believed to have been unintentional.
The Continuing Political Crisis in Cote d'Ivoire
(click here to enlarge image)
The aim of the Dec. 16 protests in Abidjan was to reach the
headquarters of Ivorian state television channel Radiodiffusion
Television Ivoirienne (RTI), located in the upscale Cocody district.
There, Ouattara had pledged to install his own RTI director. (Gbagbo
has a monopoly on state media, and with the building housing the only
two stations currently broadcasting in the country, the target is both
strategic and symbolic.) Security forces responded by parking two
armored personnel carriers nearby and erecting makeshift barricades
made of benches and tables along the street in front of the building.
In addition to establishing a static line of defense in front of the
RTI headquarters, riot police and Ivorian soldiers were ordered to
spread their forces out across Abidjan in an effort to disperse the
protesters before they could amass into a significant force.
The security forces* strategy was successful; no protesters came close
to the Cocody district. Gbagbo and the Ivorian security forces proved
again Dec. 16 that they are willing to use deadly force against
protesters seeking to overthrow the regime, as more than 18 deaths and
90 injuries were reported at the time of this writing (though this
number is unconfirmed and came from Ouattara ally Amadou Coulibaly).
Riot police and government troops are accused of being responsible for
all the deaths so far.
While the U.N. Operation in Cote d*Ivoire (UNOCI) has provided
perimeter security at the Golf Hotel for the past two weeks, the
peacekeeping force refused to provide security for Ouattara*s
supporters in the Dec. 16 march. UNOCI spokesman Hamadoun Toure said
he *did not know that it was [UNOCI*s] responsibility to secure a
street demonstration,* illustrating that while the United Nations *
and the international community as a whole * may still favor Ouattara
over Gbagbo, it is not prepared to go too far to see him take power.
Ouattara*s Disadvantage
As in almost any African country where the incumbent does not want to
leave office, elections, international support and even the backing of
a large segment of the country*s own population can only take an
opposition politician so far in trying to unseat the regime. Cote
d*Ivoire is proving once again just how valuable it is for an
incumbent to maintain the loyalty of the armed forces. Gbagbo has
this, and Ouattara does not * aside from the New Forces troops, which
are no match for the forces at Gbagbo*s disposal.
Another march is currently planned in Abidjan for Dec. 17. This time
the target will be the government buildings and presidential palace
located in Le Plateau district, which will be even more heavily
guarded than the RTI building was Dec. 16. More bloodshed will ensue
if the march is not called off, and as of now, there has been no sign
that Ouattara*s camp will cancel it. Ouattara*s prime minister,
Guillame Soro, who is also the New Forces secretary-general, called
for a general *mobilization* of their supporters following the events
of Dec. 16, and Ouattara spokesman Patrick Achi vowed that their
people would try to seize the RTI headquarters again Dec. 17.
Additional bloodshed will trigger even more widespread international
criticism of the Gbagbo regime. Nonetheless, Ouattara will remain
unlikely to achieve his objectives by waiting on the French or
Americans or the countries in the region that have pledged their
support to forcibly remove Gbagbo.
No foreign parties are considering the use of direct force in support
of Ouattara. The European Union has levied limited sanctions, and the
United States has threatened to follow suit. The African Union (AU)
and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have
already suspended Cote d*Ivoire. And there has been a move to pressure
the Central Bank of West African States * the regional central bank
for the eight member states of the West African Economic and Monetary
Union, to which Cote d*Ivoire belongs * to stop doing business with
the Gbagbo government as well, though the organization*s charter
appears to prohibit any action from taking place without a unanimous
vote, in which case clearly nothing could get past the Ivorian
contingent. But even if it did, the prospect of convincing
international cocoa dealers to stop doing business in Ivorian *blood
cocoa* is slim to none. As it stands, cocoa prices have risen to
four-month highs in the past week, but business is still going on at
Ivorian ports, despite minor disruptions.
The likely result is that Ouattara will grudgingly resort to
negotiations, despite widespread evidence that he was the actual
winner of the runoff. Ouattara can then seek to implement a limited
power-sharing deal akin to the one that ended similar crises in Kenya
and Zimbabwe in 2008 * something ECOWAS and the AU have said would be
an unacceptable solution. Civil war is of course always an option in
situations such as these, but it is never the first choice. Ouattara*s
options are limited without the prospect of tangible foreign support,
and he may be left with no other choice than to concede.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 16, 2010 3:34:03 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Dispatch: Venezuelan Presidental Powers Expand
Stratfor logo
Dispatch: Venezuelan Presidental Powers Expand
December 16, 2010 | 2126 GMT
Click on image below to watch video:
[IMG]
Analyst Reva Bhalla examines Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez*s
growing vulnerabilities at home and abroad in light of a new law that
will give him expansive executive power.
Editor*s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition
technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete
accuracy.
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is pushing through a series of
legislation this week all designed to enhance his presidential powers
while neutralizing the opposition. This is going to be a rough year
for the Venezuelan government and Chavez does not seem to be taking
any chances.
The current session of Venezuela*s National Assembly was set to expire
Dec. 15, but the ruling party is pushing through the end of the week
in order to cram in as much legislation as possible before the
opposition comes in a dilutes the ruling party*s majority in the
coming new year. What all of these laws have in common is they are all
intended to enhance the powers of the executive branch while trying to
meaningfully neutralize the opposition as much as possible.
A really interesting law that came up this past week is and was kind
of snuck in at the last minute is an Enabling Law for the president to
rule by executive decree for up to one year. The law basically allows
Chavez to pass whatever he wants as long as it fits into the very
ambiguous categories of national security, defense, land use,
transport, the financial sector, the housing sector among others.
Evidently, the Venezuelan government is expecting a rough year ahead,
and for a good reason.
The economic decay in Venezuela is becoming increasingly visible, with
ongoing money-laundering rackets, exacerbating its already critical
conditions of state sectors across the country. But what is being paid
less attention to are the vulnerabilities of the Venezuelan regime
abroad, particularly concerning its allies in countries like Cuba,
China, Iran and Russia. The Cubans can be seen in pretty much any
corridor of Venezuelan power. Critically, they have immense leverage
over the Venezuelan security apparatus. What that essentially means is
that the Cubans are in charge of notifying the president whenever a
coup threat arises (and we*ve already rumblings of this in recent
weeks).
The Chinese, meanwhile, are pouring billions of dollars of investment
into to Venezuelan economy. They*re taking advantage of the Venezuelan
government*s vulnerability right now to get extremely favorable terms
on a variety of investment deals, most notably in the energy sector.
The Iranians have extensive financial links to Venezuela, which allows
them to circumvent sanctions. This is an issue that is increasingly
attracting the attention of the United States. Critically, there are
also signs that the United States is paying more attention to the
deepening military linkages between Venezuela and Iran. The Russians
maintain a tight defense relationship with the Venezuelans, and they
also hold important economic assets in the country. But they know when
to keep their distance when they need to.
The biggest problem confronting Chavez right now is that each of these
allies has varying interests and varying involvement in Venezuela. At
a certain point, those interests could collide, because as the
Venezuelan government becomes more vulnerable, those allies are going
to be demanding much more of Venezuela and could push things too far.
This is something we are starting to see develop, particularly with
the Venezuelan relationship with Iran. The Venezuelans also have a
considerable reason to worry about Cuba, a country that, strapped for
cash, is asking Venezuela for sizable loans that it may not even be
able to deliver on. When you consider that Cuba has immense leverage
over the Venezuelan security apparatus, and when you consider that
threats within the regime are rising, the Cuban factor becomes
absolutely critical for the president.
Chavez may have a lot of friends right now in his time of need; his
problem is that the interests of those friends could eventually
collide. And in the grand scheme of things, each of these friends
could consider Venezuela a dispensable ally.
Click for more videos
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with
attribution to www.stratfor.com
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 16, 2010 4:27:28 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Review Reveals a Sustained U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan
Stratfor logo
Review Reveals a Sustained U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan
December 16, 2010 | 1853 GMT
Review Reveals a Sustained U.S. Strategy in the Afghan War Effort
STRATFOR
Summary
The White House released an overview Dec. 16 of the review on the
strategy in Afghanistan. Not surprisingly, it appears consistent with
a decision announced at the November NATO summit in Lisbon to commit
U.S. and allied forces to Afghanistan through 2014 and beyond. While
the overview did not disclose any information that would suggest a
departure from the current U.S. strategy, the question of Pakistan
appears to be a point of contention between government expectations
and the intelligence community*s predictions.
Analysis
An overview of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual Review ordered by
U.S. President Barack Obama last year as a National Security Staff
(NSS)-led assessment of the war effort was released early Dec. 16,
with the White House to receive the full report later that day.
As expected, the overview does not mark a major shift in the
counterinsurgency-focused U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. Rather, it
indicates that the review would be consistent with the decision
announced by Obama at the NATO summit in Lisbon in November that would
commit American combat forces to Afghanistan through 2014.
Notably, the overview suggests that the review will open with, and
place a great deal of emphasis on, al Qaeda prime, despite the
long-standing devolution of the organization and the erosion of the
old senior leadership*s operational significance, rather than the
Taliban, which is consistent with language from previous presidential
statements about the war. While it is a rationale for the war that may
resonate better with the American public, some special operations
forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan will continue to be devoted to the
ongoing hunt for the group that precipitated the U.S. invasion of
Afghanistan in the first place.
The overview concludes with the main effort in Afghanistan: the
counterinsurgency against the Taliban. Prevalent throughout the
document is the oft-repeated rhetoric of *progress,* *halting and
reversing momentum,* and *fragile and reversible* gains, and its
release concurrent with a New York Times story touting recent
successes against the Taliban in the Afghan southwest is probably not
a coincidence. For now, it is simply too early to tell whether
progress is actually being made. The surge of forces into Afghanistan
has only just been completed, and real progress takes time, as
investments in places like Nawa in Helmand have demonstrated).
Review Reveals a Sustained U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan
One point of interest, though, is Pakistan. Leaked earlier this week
was the existence of a pair of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs)
on Afghanistan and Pakistan that represent the American intelligence
community*s consensus. Though public copies do not appear to be
available * and the only details are those that sources have chosen to
leak * the two NIEs reportedly take a different position on the war
effort than that of the Obama administration. The White House review
concedes that problems and challenges remain, but cites progress and
calls for a more coherent strategy on Pakistan. The information that
can be garnered from articles in the media indicate the NIEs seem to
consider Pakistan an overwhelming and insurmountable problem, at least
in regard to the current counterinsurgency-focused strategy.
No one disputes the challenges and issues involved in dealing with
Pakistan. Any assistance it can contribute would be beneficial to the
U.S. war effort. On the other hand, its inability or unwillingness to
work with the United States or others would be enormously detrimental
to American efforts in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, this is
not a new or revelatory diagnosis * it has characterized the
U.S.-Pakistani relationship in the entire post-9/11 era. But the
distinction between the review and the NIEs is more than a simple
matter of emphasis. For the Pentagon and the NSS, the military-led
effort in Afghanistan appears to have achievable goals. The
intelligence community seems to disagree.
What has been clear since Obama*s announcement in Lisbon was that the
review would be consistent with a continuation of the current
strategy. A review of the war effort in December 2011 will be
interesting, but for the short term, despite being in an active war
zone, the United States, for now at least, has already decided its
course of action.
Indeed, 2011 will not be about whether a certain strategy should be
pursued, but giving the forces committed the time to execute the
chosen strategy. Pakistan is * and always has been * both central and
problematic to U.S. objectives in Afghanistan, a fact that will be as
true as ever in 2011. But for now, whatever the new NIEs might argue,
the White House appears committed to seeing the current strategy
through.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 16, 2010 5:33:28 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Jordanian Accused in Yemen Attack
Stratfor logo
Jordanian Accused in Yemen Attack
December 16, 2010 | 2327 GMT
Yemen
KHALED FAZAA/AFP/Getty Images
A picture taken on June 11, 2001 shows the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa
Summary
A Jordanian man is accused of throwing an improvised explosive device
at an armored truck carrying four employees of the U.S. Embassy in
Sanaa on Dec. 15, an attack with several indications of involvement by
Yemen*s al Qaeda franchise, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
While the attack was a failure * no injuries were reported * the
attempt is significant in that the main suspect is Jordanian, an
indicator that foreigners are becoming more involved in AQAP
operations.
Analysis
A truck belonging to staff of the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa was damaged in
an apparent improvised explosive device (IED) attack Dec. 15. No
injuries were reported in the attack despite the employees being in
the armored Toyota Hilux pickup at the time. A 28-year-old Jordanian
man was arrested shortly after the attack by security personnel near
the scene. The man is accused of throwing a satchel containing an IED
(though some reports say it was a grenade) either under the truck or
in the truck*s bed around 8:30 p.m. local time as the embassy
employees visited a restaurant on Hadda Street.
While Hadda Street is on the opposite end of Sanaa from the embassy,
the restaurant was near a compound where many American diplomats live.
The embassy had been taking precautions by directing Westerners not to
frequent restaurants on Hadda Street, specifically mentioning the
restaurant the employees were in as one to avoid. The location, target
and method of the attack all indicate that al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) was involved.
This attack falls in line with what STRATFOR terms Kramer-type
attacks, in which an individual has the desire to carry out an attack
but lacks the tradecraft to do so effectively. Authorities arresting
the Jordanian man reportedly found four different identification
cards, a gun and other explosives, but not a detonator for the
exploded device. The attack failed to cause any injuries, though this
may be attributed to the vehicle*s armor. In addition, if the
Jordanian had wanted to kill more individuals he could have used the
gun in his possession or thrown the device inside the restaurant to
increase casualties. The assailant did not penetrate any secure areas,
instead taking advantage of the soft target presented by U.S. Embassy
employees breaking with guidance and going into a more dangerous area.
However, the attack*s ineffectiveness indicates the operative lacked
significant tradecraft.
Jihadists in Yemen have had difficulty in carrying out a successful
attack in Sanaa. In March 2008, a mortar attack on the U.S. Embassy
failed to hit inside the compound, instead hitting a school next to
the embassy. In April 2008, militants fired mortars at an embassy
compound but only caused minor damage. In September 2008, AQAP
forerunner Islamic Jihad in Yemen carried out a suicide vehicle-borne
IED attack outside the embassy, killing 16 people, all of whom were
civilians or local police officers outside the embassy walls. The
attack marked an increase in Yemeni jihadists* operational
capabilities but still failed in its objective of entering the embassy
compound before detonating the device. In April 2009, AQAP targeted
the South Korean ambassador in an attack that failed to harm any of
the intended targets. During this past year, attacks have taken place
on the motorcades of the British ambassador and the deputy British
ambassador, both of which failed to either kill a high-value target or
inflict large numbers of casualties.
Outside of Yemen, AQAP has shown a similar record of failure in its
attacks * most recently, the October 2010 attempt to detonate IEDs on
cargo planes bound for the United States. These international attacks,
while more elaborate than those carried out inside Yemen, still have
failed to cause significant damage.
However, this attack was significant in that the person accused of
being responsible for it is a Jordanian citizen. This is the first
time that STRATFOR is aware of a Jordanian conducting an attack in
Yemen since AQAP*s formation in 2009. This may indicate that AQAP*s
recent attacks and publications such as Inspire magazine have raised
the group*s profile to the point where it is becoming a destination
for aspiring militants.
The country of Yemen itself may also be starting to hold appeal for
jihadists. Radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who seems to be leading the
jihad against the West, is based there. Also, recent pressure on
jihadist groups in Iraq and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area may
have jihadists looking for areas such as Yemen that lack government
oversight and the political will to pursue Islamist militants. The
country*s appeal to militants from across the region has been well
known for some time, but this most recent attack could signal the
operational inclusion of foreigners into AQAP attacks.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 17, 2010 7:32:29 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: The Pakistani View of the U.S. Strategy on Afghanistan
[IMG]
Thursday, December 16, 2010 [IMG] STRATFOR.COM [IMG] Diary Archives
The Pakistani View of the U.S. Strategy on Afghanistan
The White House on Thursday released an overview of the much awaited
Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual Review ordered by U.S. President
Barack Obama last year as a National Security Staff (NSS)-led
assessment of the war effort. Perhaps the most significant (and
expected) aspect of the report is the extent to which the success of
the American strategy relies on cooperation from Pakistan. The report
acknowledges recent improvement in U.S.-Pakistani coordination in the
efforts to bring closure to the longest war in U.S. history, but also
points out there is a lot of room for improvement in terms of
Pakistani assistance.
Indeed, this is an issue that has been at the heart of the tensions
between the two allies since the beginning of the war. However, the
United States * now more than ever before * needs Pakistan to offer
its best, given that Washington has deployed the maximum amount of
human and material resources to the war effort that it can feasibly
allocate. To what extent such assistance will be forthcoming is a
function of how Islamabad is looking at the war.
From the Pakistani point of view, this war has been extremely
disastrous. The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001 to deny al
Qaeda its main sanctuary led to the spillover of the war into
Pakistan. Al Qaeda*s relocation east of the Durand Line forced
Islamabad to side with Washington against the Afghan Taliban and laid
the foundation for the Talibanization of Pakistan.
*What the Pakistanis hope for is some form of negotiated settlement
that will help restore some semblance of security on their western
periphery and allow for some measure of influence in a post-NATO
Afghanistan.*
Any Pakistani effort to effectively counter this threat is dependent
upon the U.S. strategy on the other side of the border. Just as the
United States is dealing with a very difficult situation where it has
no good options, Pakistan is also caught in a dilemma. There are two
broad and opposing views among the Pakistani stakeholders in regard to
what the United States should do that, in turn, would also serve
Pakistani interests.
On one hand are those who argue that the longer U.S. and NATO forces
remain in Pakistan*s western neighbor the longer the wars will
continue to rage on both sides of the border. The thinking is that
since there is no military solution, Western forces should seek a
negotiated settlement and exit as soon as possible. Once a settlement
takes place in Afghanistan, Pakistan will be in a better position to
neutralize its own Taliban rebellion and restore security on its side
of the border.
Yet there are those who * while they accept that a continued presence
of foreign occupation forces in Afghanistan will continue to fuel the
jihadist fire * are more concerned about the ramifications of a
premature withdrawal of Western forces. The fear is that a Taliban
comeback in Afghanistan will only galvanize jihadists on the Pakistani
side. At a time when it is struggling to re-establish its writ on its
side of the border, Islamabad is certainly not in a position to exert
the kind of influence in Afghanistan it once was able to in the
pre-9/11 years.
In other words, an exit of foreign forces from Afghanistan will not
restore the old arrangement. Islamabad is therefore in uncharted
waters. What the Pakistanis hope for is some form of negotiated
settlement that will help restore some semblance of security on their
western periphery and allow for some measure of influence in a
post-NATO Afghanistan. How to get from the current situation to that
endgame state is quite opaque and what lies beyond is fraught with
uncertainty, given the destabilization that has taken place in the
last five years. What makes this situation even more problematic for
the Pakistanis is that they feel that they are not the only ones who
are without options. Their benefactor, the United States, is in the
same boat.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 17, 2010 8:55:26 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Venezuela's Chavez Pushes Last-Minute Legislation
Stratfor logo
Venezuela's Chavez Pushes Last-Minute Legislation
December 17, 2010 | 1300 GMT
Venezuela's Chavez Pushes Last-Minute Legislation
YURI CORTEZ/AFP/Getty Images
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez waves upon his arrival to the
Conference Center to take part in the Union of South American Nations
(UNASUR) summit on Nov. 26
Summary
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez this week is pushing a series of
bills through the National Assembly designed to enhance his executive
powers while marginalizing his opposition. As pressures continue to
pile on the government, these moves are critical to the president*s
preparation for what is shaping up to be a troubled year ahead.
Analysis
Venezuela*s National Assembly, set to adjourn Dec. 15, will hold its
second extra session Dec. 17 as the ruling Partido Socialista Unido de
Venezuela (PSUV) tries to push through as much legislation as it can
before its majority is diluted when the assembly reconvenes in 2011.
The bulk of the legislation, including one law that will allow
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez to rule by executive decree for the
next year, is designed to enhance the authority of the executive and
undercut Chavez*s opposition.
Though PSUV will still have 98 seats (compared to its previous 137
seats) in the 165-seat National Assembly, Chavez appears to be doing
everything he can to concentrate power in his hands while he still has
the political means to do so. The urgency in pushing through this
legislation can be understood in light of rising pressures on the
regime stemming from the country*s economic decay, internal political
struggles, the Walid Makled threat and growing demands of Venezuela*s
allies, most notably Cuba, Iran and China.
The following is a summary of the most critical legislation under
review.
Enabling Law for Special Presidential Powers
Summary: This law will provide the president with the power to pass
laws by executive decree for a period of up to 12 months. Discussion
of this law was mostly kept quiet for the past few months, likely out
of a desire by the president to deny his opposition the time to
mobilize against it. Under the law, the president would be able to
unilaterally issue legislation that falls under the ambiguous
categories of national security and defense, national emergencies,
natural disaster relief, the use and development of urban and rural
land, territorial organization, citizen and judicial security,
infrastructure, public transport and services, and financial and
housing sectors, among other areas. Since taking office in February
1999, Chavez has held special presidential powers on three occasions.
The first time was in April 1999 for six months, then in November
2001, and most recently in February 2007 for 18 months when he began a
campaign of nationalizations.
Status: Approved in first discussion, pending second discussion set
for Dec. 17.
Communal Economic System Law
Summary: This law is part of a package of *People Power* legislation
designed to empower thousands of local communes comprised of mostly
PSUV sympathizers. By devolving power to the local level and
increasing local funding at the expense of state governors and
municipal officials, Chavez aims to undercut his opposition and widen
the number of Venezuelans dependent on him for their livelihood. This
law details how the executive authority will be able to transfer funds
directly to the communes for local projects. It also attempts to stem
rampant money-laundering rackets that have debilitated state firms by
promoting non-monetary trading through an exchange, which allows for
the bartering of goods. However, such a system is unlikely to resolve
Venezuela*s corruption ailments.
Status: Passed Dec. 13, the last piece of People Power legislation to
be approved.
Law on Political Parties, Public Meetings and Demonstrations
Summary: This law threatens punishment for politicians that:
* Vote against the platform they have presented to voters
* Ally themselves with political positions or platforms opposed to
what they have presented to voters or the National Electoral
Council
* Enter alliances with parties opposed to what has been presented to
voters or the National Electoral Council as their platform
* Attempt to defect from their party
This appears to be an attempt by the PSUV to prevent large-scale
defections, like the one earlier in the year when Lara State governor
Henri Falcon left the PSUV to form the Patria Para Todos (PTT) in the
opposition.
Status: Approved in first debate, awaiting second debate.
Reforms to the Law of Social Responsibility in Radio and Television
(colloquially known as Ley RESORTE) and Organic Telecommunications
Law
Summary: These laws aim to expand the state*s authority over
Venezuelan media. Many of the new regulations extend current
censorship to Internet service providers and electronic media and
specify punishment for media outlets that *disrespect or delegitimize
public power and institutions.* The telecommunications law would
create a single Internet access point for the state to regulate
content. Though the state says this will allow for faster Internet
access, critics fear it will expand the state*s monitoring authority
over Internet-based communications. The law also prohibits owners of
radio and television stations from owning shares in more than one
media outlet, a reform that follows the government*s decision in early
December to acquire a 20 percent stake in Globovision, the last local
television station in Venezuela that presents news critical of the
Chavez government.
Status: Approved in first discussion, pending second discussion.
Oil Service Company Regulation Law
Summary: This law would enable the government to bypass parliament
when it wishes to nationalize the assets of oil and natural gas firms.
According to the draft text, ** oil and gas operation assets can be
subjected to measures of protection, insurance, requisition and
expropriation when the continuity of work is affected ** The law would
allow the government to set tariffs for companies, prohibit the
relocation of assets outside the country without state permission and
prevent recourse to international arbitration in disputes. The law
also requires workers at oil facilities to receive permission from the
Venezuelan Ministry of Energy to strike and forbids local, state or
regional governments from issuing permits for protests within 10
kilometers of oil installations, thereby mitigating the threat of
disruption to oil production. Such measures are becoming critical for
the Venezuelan government to maintain its oil revenues as PDVSA is
finding it increasingly difficult to pay the salaries of contract
workers who would be prone to striking and halting oil production
altogether.
Status: Under debate.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 17, 2010 9:06:24 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Hezbollah Searches for an Alternative Explosive
Stratfor logo
Hezbollah Searches for an Alternative Explosive
December 17, 2010 | 1300 GMT
Hezbollah Searches for an Alternative Explosive
DAVID BUIMOVITCH/AFP/Getty Images
Hezbollah grenades and landmines captured by the Israeli military in
November 2009
A STRATFOR source in Lebanon has reported that Hezbollah is having
difficulty obtaining military-grade explosives such as C4 and RDX from
foreign sources, forcing it into greater reliance on external supplies
of ammonium nitrate (found in common fertilizer). The source says the
sealing of the Lebanese coastline by the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon
and Syria*s increasing efforts to cut off Hezbollah*s supply of these
explosives in a bid to rein in the organization explain the shortage.
Hezbollah*s stockpiling does not necessarily portend widespread
violence in Lebanon, however.
Hezbollah*s Explosive Purchases
According to the source, Hezbollah pays Syria twice the market price
for fertilizer * a common ingredient in ammonium nitrate-based
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) * and has bought up to 15,000 tons
of fertilizer from Syria*s main petrochemical facility in Homs. Syria
then takes the profits and buys cheaper fertilizer from Eastern Europe
for its domestic needs.
This reportedly explains Hezbollah*s insistence that one of its
members be agriculture minister when Lebanese Prime Minister Saad
al-Hariri was forming his Cabinet in 2009. Agriculture Minister
Hussein Hajj Hassan allegedly sells fertilizer shipments from Syria to
Hezbollah agents, who in turn forward them to Hezbollah warehouses.
Hezbollah has matured into a well-organized movement with a proven
ability to exploit Lebanon*s political fractures to advance its
interests. Its ability to find a substitute for military-grade
explosives * and its apparent foresight in doing so more than a year
ago * demonstrates its sophistication.
While tensions in Lebanon have escalated over the U.N. Special
Tribunal for Lebanon investigation into the assassination of former
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, a number of factors constrain
Hezbollah from following through with its threat to destabilize
Lebanon should its members face indictment. The same STRATFOR source
explained that the fertilizer-based explosives are being used to build
tunnels in mountainous areas and held in reserve for possible use
against Israeli tanks should the need arise. The current stockpiling
thus comprises contingency planning, as neither Hezbollah nor Israel
wants a conflict at this time.
The Pros and Cons of Fertilizer-based IEDs
Building fertilizer-based IEDs poses challenges that using
military-grade explosive IEDs do not. Fertilizer-based IEDs require a
balanced mixture with fuel, such as diesel, to create ANFO, an
ammonium nitrate/fuel oil mixture that can be the basis for deadly
explosive devices. Devices with ANFO as the main charge also require a
primary charge to initiate detonation * typically consisting of small
amounts of military- or commercial-grade explosives. Using ANFO, then,
is a way to multiply the effectiveness of small reserves of military-
or commercial-grade explosives.
Given the number of combat veterans of places like Iraq floating
around the Middle East, finding someone able to build fertilizer-based
IEDs should not be hugely difficult. Failing that, Hezbollah has a
wide array of artillery shells, anti-tank rockets and medium-range
rockets that could make up for what fertilizer-based IEDs lack.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 17, 2010 12:38:26 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Live-fire Exercises and New Tensions on the Korean Peninsula
Stratfor logo
Live-fire Exercises and New Tensions on the Korean Peninsula
December 17, 2010 | 1743 GMT
Live-Fire Exercises and New Tensions on the Korean Peninsula
KIM JAE-HWAN/AFP/Getty Images
South Korean marines patrol Dec. 17 on Yeonpyeong Island
Summary
North Korea is demanding that South Korea cancel a planned day of
live-fire exercises on Yeonpyeong Island between Dec. 18-21 and has
threatened to launch another strike against the south. Russia has
summoned its U.S. and South Korean ambassadors to request a
cancellation of the drills. A response from North Korea could lead to
an escalation that might be hard to stop. However, there are signs
that North Korea will not strike, particularly since Pyongyang relies
on surprise in its attacks.
Analysis
The South Korean military is planning to conduct one day of live-fire
exercises on Yeonpyeong Island between Dec. 18-21, with
representatives of the U.N. Command in attendance. This is the island
that North Korea barraged on Nov. 23, killing four South Koreans and
leading to a high point in inter-Korean tensions. There is a military
installation on the island that is regularly used for live-fire
exercises, which are not at all abnormal, but the timing and
circumstances are highly significant.
Pyongyang has demanded that South Korea cancel the exercises, and
official North Korean news agency KCNA warned that if Seoul proceeds,
the north will strike again with greater strength and scope, resulting
in a *more serious situation* than the previous incident. The Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has summoned U.S. Ambassador John Beyrle
and South Korean Ambassador Lee Yoon Ho to meet with Deputy Foreign
Minister Alexei Borodavkin, asking explicitly for the drill to be
called off, and a Russian official spoke with North Korean ambassador
Kim Yong Jae to urge his country to show maximum restraint.
China has repeatedly blamed U.S.-South Korean exercises for
heightening risks of conflict, and China*s top foreign policy expert,
State Councilor Dai Bingguo, repeated a similar warning to U.S. Deputy
Secretary of State James Steinberg on Dec. 17. Even the U.S. Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. James Cartwright, has said
that although the drills are being handled in a routine and
transparent way, there is a risk that a negative reaction by North
Korea could lead the states to *lose control of the escalation.*
Cartwright did not imply that the South Koreans should stop the drill,
however.
Certainly, North Korea has the option of firing on South Korea, as it
has in the past. North Korea blames the Nov. 23 barrage on South
Korean exercises being conducted at the time, a stance China and
Russia have recognized. The potential for escalation is higher than
normal, given South Korean pledges to retaliate, probably through air
power, and a weakening of the restraint that kept the south from
retaliating meaningfully in the recent past. It is hard to see where
the two states would draw the line to limit their responses and
counter-responses in the event that the north strikes.
However, there are also indications that the north will not attack.
First, Pyongyang is aware of the south*s threat to strike back, which
is clearly intended to have a deterrent effect, though it is not clear
whether it will work. It is hard to say because both sides are expert
in crisis management in both escalation and de-escalation. For
instance, after the Nov. 23 shelling the North Koreans withdrew
artillery rocket batteries from the region that had been moved there
specifically for the Nov. 23 shelling, though they could move them
back. Second, the North Koreans tend to act by surprise, as with the
ChonAn incident and the Yeonpyeong attack. The South Koreans have
publicized the upcoming drills for weeks, tensions are already at a
high point and the world is watching * all of which may discourage the
north from doing anything beyond symbolic expressions of displeasure.
Third, diplomatic visits are well under way for what is shaping up to
be an eventual resumption of six-way international negotiations. New
Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson is in Pyongyang for talks; the top U.S.
envoy on the Korean nuclear situation, Sung Kim, is in Seoul;
Steinberg is in China; and a number of other meetings have taken place
between the other players in the past few weeks. The movement toward
international talks suggests that these parties at least think the
north has backed down from provocations enough for negotiations to
have a chance. If they were expecting another attack, it would be
enough to wreck this process; the United States and allies refuse to
hold talks until the north demonstrates some form of sincerity.
Still, North Korea*s entire method is unpredictability and is meant to
create the impression that it is irrational and destructive. The
decision to move launch systems into place and fire on South Korea is
one that can be made and executed in short time and known only within
the chain of command in North Korea. Like others, sometimes all
STRATFOR can do is watch and wait.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 19, 2010 8:32:29 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Mexico Adopts a New Security Strategy in Juarez
Stratfor logo
Mexico Adopts a New Security Strategy in Juarez
December 17, 2010 | 1921 GMT
Mexico Adopts a New Security Strategy in Juarez
JESUS ALCAZAR/AFP/Getty Images
Mexican Federal Police in Ciudad Juarez on Dec. 8
Summary
Mexico*s Federal Police have secured the neighborhood of Americas in
Ciudad Juarez using a strategy they plan to expand throughout the
violence-plagued city. Lasting effects on the overall security
situation in Juarez will take time, assuming they emerge at all. Even
so, the strategy has shown that it is possible to create an
environment where normal life can resume. The resources required to
expand this type of security to the entire city of Juarez, however,
will be considerable.
Analysis
In the past few weeks the Federal Police have managed to create a
secure zone in the Americas neighborhood of Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua
state, just south of the Cordova International Bridge (or Bridge of
the Americas) connecting Juarez to El Paso, Texas.
While by itself the achievement may appear insignificant, it
highlights part of a broader security strategy authorities plan to
expand throughout the Juarez metro area. A permanent effect from this
strategy on the security environment in Juarez will take time,
however, if it happens at all.
Since taking over the central government*s security operations in
Ciudad Juarez in January, the Mexican Federal Police have struggled to
establish any secure zones in the city. Three distinct layers of
conflict in the city prevented Mexican security forces from
controlling any territory beyond the ground they were standing on.
This changed with the securing of Americas, though the neighborhood
was by no means Juarez*s toughest area to secure.
However, the neighborhood is one of several of Juarez*s key economic
corridors. Located just south of one of four international bridges, it
receives a high volume of traffic, especially along the main avenues,
De Las Americas and Lincoln. The area is home to numerous shops,
restaurants, hotels and office complexes, as well as a hospital.
Several of the small businesses that operated in the area had closed
recently due to lack of customers and the degrading security
environment. The push by the Federal Police to secure the neighborhood
reportedly has seen some of the businesses reopen.
The Federal Police were able to secure the area by using overwhelming
force, carrying out multiple simultaneous patrols in relatively small
areas at different times of day. Conducting random patrols in force
prevents criminal and cartel elements from planning their own
movements in the area.
Federal Police agents also have established an unknown number of
permanent checkpoints on the main thoroughfares in the neighborhood
and several rotating checkpoints near rotaries, S-curves, channels and
other strategic chokepoints surrounding the permanent ones. The
rotating checkpoints disrupt alternative routes cartel members or
common criminals might take to avoid the permanent ones.
Checkpoints at strategic chokepoints subject all vehicles traveling a
given route to inspection, and any attempt to avoid the checkpoint
will be immediately noticed by agents. They also prevent criminal
elements from using the same chokepoints for their own attacks or for
surveillance, forcing them onto less strategic ground.
Each checkpoint is manned by at least 12 federal agents armed with at
least a carbine rifle and a handgun with at least four marked Ford
F-150 trucks. The first two trucks are positioned to channel traffic
through a designated traffic lane, where each vehicle is either waved
through or signaled to pull over for further inspection. The other two
trucks are positioned behind the first two at a 45-degree angle with
an M249 light machinegun on each hood to provide cover fire should a
conflict erupt and so the agents operating the M249 can take cover
behind the truck*s engine block. Vehicles flagged for further
inspection are directed to an inspection area behind the last two
trucks, where the driver and/or passengers are questioned further, and
if necessary, the vehicle is inspected.
The strategy*s goal is to build upon these security accomplishments by
gradually expanding outward from already-secure areas in concentric
rings. The strategy will likely experience varying degrees of success.
Different neighborhoods will offer differing levels of resistance to
the gradual push by the Federal Police. Lasting effects on the overall
security situation in Juarez will take time, assuming they emerge at
all. Even so, the strategy has shown that it is possible to create an
environment (no matter how small) where business and life in general
can operate unimpeded by the violence that has plagued the region for
the past three years. But the resources required to expand this type
of security to the entire city of Juarez will be considerable.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 19, 2010 7:22:28 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Post-Election Clashes in Belarus
Stratfor logo
Post-Election Clashes in Belarus
December 20, 2010 | 0055 GMT
Post-Election Clashes in Belarus
VIKTOR DRACHEV/AFP/Getty Images
Protesters clash with riot police during an opposition rally in Minsk
on Dec. 20
Violent clashes between protesters and state police erupted in Minsk
following the announcement that long-time Belarusian President
Aleksandr Lukashenko had won the Dec. 19 presidential election with an
estimated 72.2 percent of the vote. Protests following elections in
Belarus are nothing new * around 10,000 took to the streets following
the 2006 election * and state security forces and police appear to
have been well-prepared for the conflict; some reports said hundreds
of security agents posed as protesters before the crackdown, and
police waited in buildings around the streets leading to the main
squares in order to sweep into the protesters.
However, these protests are reported to have involved 25,000-40,000
people in the streets * a far higher number than of those in 2006.
While the numbers are currently highly disputed in the media (it is
difficult to distinguish between those rallying after the election and
those actually protesting the outcome), a significantly larger turnout
raises the question of whether the country*s opposition had been aided
in any way by outside forces.
In the past, it has been difficult for the opposition to stage such
organized protests of the size seen following the Dec. 19 election,
though the opposition had been preparing for Lukashenko*s re-election
for months (his victory is widely believed to have been rigged, as his
popularity is estimated to be below 45 percent). There is no shortage
of outside forces that would have an interest in aiding the
opposition*s demonstration against Lukashenko. Minsk has had a series
of disputes recently with Moscow, a power that has shown the ability
to organize unrest in its former Soviet states in the past . But
Lukashenko has a hostile relationship with the West as well, and there
are a number of pro-Western powers (particularly Poland) that would
have an interest in helping the opposition, even if the only real
result of the protests was a public demonstration of the heavy-handed
and violent reaction of Lukashenko*s government. Both sides have tried
in the past to undermine Lukashenko*s legitimacy, though it is unclear
at this time if they (or any other outside force) aided in the mass
uprising.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 20, 2010 6:34:37 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Intelligence Guidance: Week of Dec. 19, 2010
Stratfor logo
Intelligence Guidance: Week of Dec. 19, 2010
December 20, 2010 | 1224 GMT
Intelligence Guidance: Week of Dec. 19, 2010
YASSER AL-ZAYYAT/AFP/Getty Images
Former Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki at a press
conference Dec. 1
Editor*s Note: The following is an internal STRATFOR document produced
to provide high-level guidance to our analysts. This document is not a
forecast, but rather a series of guidelines for understanding and
evaluating events, as well as suggestions on areas for focus.
New Guidance
1. Iran: We need to bring Tehran and the U.S.-Iranian dynamic back to
the forefront of our focus. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
fired Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki the week of Dec. 12 while he
was out of the country. Mottaki, with what may be some support from
Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani, does not appear to be accepting his
ousting quietly. This may be another indication that Ahmadinejad is
consolidating his power in Tehran, but we need to be watching this
closely and redoubling our efforts to understand the power dynamics in
the Iranian capital.
As we conclude our annual forecast for 2011, the status of the
political dynamic in Tehran and the U.S.-Iranian relationship are
important issues. Our existing guidance on examining whether progress
on Iran*s nuclear negotiations and the formation of a governing
coalition in Baghdad signifies some progress between the United States
and Iran * and whether Iran is feeling much pressure to negotiate at
all * remains central to this forecast.
2. Pakistan, Afghanistan: The U.S.-led International Security
Assistance Force has made some progress militarily in Afghanistan, but
the Taliban have now retaliated in Kabul. The war will not turn on
intermittent militant attacks, even in the capital. We need to be
examining how the Taliban view the American-led
counterinsurgency-focused strategy and how they may be consider
reacting to it. Inextricable from all this is Pakistan, where we need
to be looking at how the United States views the Afghan-Pakistani
relationship and what it will seek to get out of it in the year ahead.
3. Russia: Moscow has made some productive gestures in terms of
allowing the transit of U.S. and allied supplies for the war effort in
Afghanistan. But it is also warily monitoring both militant activity
and increased in violence and instability in Central Asia. We need to
examine the status and trajectory of U.S.-Russian relations, while
continuing to monitor the evolution of militant activity in Tajikistan
and the wider region.
4. South Korea, North Korea: South Korea is insisting on a live-fire
exercise on Yeonpyeong Island in the next two days (where there is
admittedly a military base, making this a routine matter, though with
recent tensions and North Korean attacks, both sides are fixated on
it). With the U.N. Security Council discussing the issue, we need to
keep one eye on the Korean Peninsula.
Existing Guidance
1. Iraq: A governing coalition is taking form in Baghdad, albeit
slowly. We need to lean forward on this, looking at the final
breakdown of power and understanding what this will mean for Iraq, the
United States and the region. In just over one year, all U.S. forces
are slated to be withdrawn from the country, and with them an enormous
amount of American influence. Will this go through? With the governing
coalition issue settled, what are the key points of contention between
Washington and Tehran?
2. Japan: A new guiding document for the Japan Self-Defense Forces is
expected this week that will reorient the country*s military strategy
to specifically focus more on countering China. We need to examine
both the military specifics here as well as regional reactions to this
overt shift * particularly in Beijing and Pyongyang, as well as Seoul.
3. Brazil: Brazilian security forces have seized Rio de Janeiro*s two
most violent and drug-ridden favelas, or shantytowns. We need to watch
this closely as the campaign progresses. Can Brasilia translate its
initial offensive into lasting success? Groups such as the First
Capital Command (PCC) and Amigos Dos Amigos are very powerful * and
brazen * and will not go down without a fight. Not only are key
individuals not being arrested, but the favelas are a symptom of deep,
intractable problems with crime, corruption, narcotics and poverty.
How are these underlying issues being addressed? We need to be wary of
Brazil*s embarking on an endeavor it cannot see through (Mexico*s drug
war comes to mind), and thus run the risk of ultimately making the
problem worse, rather than better.
Outgoing President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva*s recognition of
Palestinian statehood raises a number of questions. Brazil has been
dabbling more assertively in international affairs, and da Silva is in
the twilight of his presidency. But, we need to take a closer look at
Brazil*s rationale * why this, and why now? Will the backlash from the
United States and Israel be rhetorical or significant?
4. United States: U.S. State Department diplomatic cables continue to
trickle out of WikiLeaks. How are countries and their populations
reacting to the revelations made in the cables? What will be the
functional consequences for the practice of American diplomacy? Are
there any major rifts emerging? We need to keep track of the public
reaction and stay aware of any constraints domestic politics may place
on the countries in question. Though few radically new or unexpected
revelations have been unearthed, the release offers remarkably broad
insight into the world of American foreign policy as it takes place
behind closed doors. How do the leaks either confirm or call into
question standing STRATFOR assessments?
Related Special Topic Page
* Weekly Intelligence That Drives Our Analysis
EURASIA
* Dec. 20: Bavarian Prime Minister Horst Seehofer will conclude
meetings with Czech Prime Minister Petr Necas in Prague to discuss
cooperation.
* Dec. 20: Romania*s parliament will debate a no-confidence motion
regarding a salary law for which a confidence vote was called on
Dec. 14.
* Dec. 20: Slovenia will hold a parliamentary vote on a pension
reform bill that would raise the retirement age.
* Dec. 20: The International Monetary Fund will hold a meeting of
its directors to discuss Ukrainian compliance with guidelines and
future credit extensions to the country.
* Dec. 20-22: The Greek parliament will continue debating the 2011
budget, with a final decision to be made Dec. 22.
* Dec. 20-22: Malaysian Foreign Affairs Minister Anifah Aman will
continue his tour to Italy, Switzerland, Austria and Slovakia.
* Dec. 20-22: Latvian President Valdis Zatlers will continue a visit
to Russia to meet with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev. He will
be accompanied by a delegation of more than 100 businessmen, who
will be looking to increase the two countries* economic ties.
* Dec. 20-27: The Bulgarian government will continue holding a
public auction of stakes in 31 companies in a major privatization
bid.
* Dec. 21-23: A final round of talks will be held for the creation
of a free trade zone within the Commonwealth of Independent
States.
* Dec. 22: Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Armenian Prime
Minister Tigran Sarkisian will hold a meeting in Russia regarding
trade and economic ties.
* Dec. 23: A Polish court will decide whether to extradite Chechen
separatist leader Akhmed Zakayev to Russia.
* Dec. 26: London Underground drivers have scheduled a strike for
this date.
MIDDLE EAST/SOUTH ASIA
* Dec. 20-23: Indian army chief Gen. V.K. Singh will visit Nepal.
* Dec. 20-23: Iran will hold an international trading and investing
conference on the island of Kish.
* Dec. 21: The Arab League will hold a joint meeting for the
councils of Arab justice and interior ministers in Cairo to
discuss ways to enhance cooperation between the two councils and
sign five joint agreements on combating money laundering,
terrorism, corruption, organized crime and information technology
crimes.
* Dec. 21: Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his
Syrian counterpart, Mohammad Naji al-Otari, will co-chair the
second prime ministerial-level meeting of an intergovernmental
strategic council in Ankara.
* Dec. 21-22: Russian President Dmitri Medvedev will pay an official
visit to India.
* Dec. 22: Iranian Chief of Staff and special envoy to the Middle
East Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei will visit Yemen to deliver a letter
from Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on bilateral relations,
joint cooperation and issues of common concern in the region.
* Dec. 23: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his new acting
foreign minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, will attend the Economic
Cooperation Organization meeting in Turkey.
* Dec. 24: Turkish President Abdullah Gul will host a trilateral
meeting with Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Pakistani President
Asif Ali Zardari.
EAST ASIA
* Dec. 20: The governor of the U.S. state of New Mexico, Bill
Richardson, will conclude a visit to North Korea as a *private
citizen* to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
* Dec. 20: A reserve requirement increase set by the People*s Bank
of China will take effect.
* Dec. 20: A delegation from South Korea*s military will go to
Taiwan-administered Kinmen Island.
* Dec. 20-21: A delegation of four political parties from Uzbekistan
will continue visiting Beijing. The Uzbek delegation is headed by
Ulugbek Vafaev of the People*s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan.
* Dec. 20-21: The Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee will
continue to meet.
* Dec. 20-21: South Korea could hold one day of live fire artillery
drills on Yeonpyeong Island, which North Korea shelled Nov. 23.
The date will depend on the weather.
* Dec. 20-21: Bangladeshi opposition leader and former Prime
Minister Khaleda Zia will continue meeting with Communist Party of
China and government officials in China to talk about improving
relations between the two parties, issues of mutual interest and
security in South Asia.
* Dec. 20-21: People*s Consultative Assembly of Indonesia Chairman
Taufik Kiemas, will continue meeting with Nguyen Phu Trong,
chairman of the Vietnamese National Assembly, in Vietnam to
discuss bilateral ties.
* Dec. 20-22: The Chinese Association for Relations Across the
Taiwan Straits and the Taiwanese Straits Exchange Foundation will
meet in Taipei for the sixth round of cross-strait talks. An
agreement on health and medical cooperation is expected to be
signed. Talks will also focus on investment protection agreements.
* Dec. 20-Jan. 3: A temporary cease-fire between the Philippine
government and the Communist Party of the Philippines and its
armed wing, the New People*s Army, will continue.
* Dec. 21: A meeting of Thailand*s People*s Alliance for Democracy,
or Yellow Shirts, will be held in Phuket City, Thailand, to bring
attention to what the party believes are territorial concessions
made by the Thai government to Cambodia.
* Dec. 24: The Dung Quat Oil Refinery will be officially opened by
the Vietnam Oil and Gas Group. The refinery will have a capacity
of 140,000 barrels per day.
* Dec. 24: Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Koro Bessho will head a
delegation to China to hold high-level security talks.
AMERICAS
* Dec. 20-21: U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres
will continue a visit to Ecuador.
* Dec. 21: Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner is
scheduled to meet with members of the ruling party, Partido
Justicialista, in Buenos Aires.
AFRICA
* Dec. 20: A delegation of businessmen will accompany Turkish State
Minister for Foreign Trade Zafer Caglayan to Ethiopia at the end
of a nine-country tour.
* Dec. 20: The trial of two men accused of the attack on the
Togolese football team in the Angolan exclave of Cabinda during
the Africa Cup of Nations will resume.
* Dec. 20: Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Libyan leader
Moammar Gadhafi will attend a summit in the Sudanese capital of
Khartoum, hosted by Sudanese President Omar al Bashir and Southern
Sudanese President Salva Kiir, to discuss arrangements for after
the Jan. 9, 2011, independence referendum.
* Dec. 20-26: U.S. diplomat Robert Loftis will visit the Sudanese
capital of Khartoum and the Southern Sudanese capital of Juba to
follow the progress of the implementation of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement.
* Dec. 21: The trial of former Movement for the Emancipation of the
Niger Delta militant Charles Okah and three other defendants
allegedly involved in the Oct. 1 attacks in the Nigerian capital
of Abuja will resume.
* Dec. 22: Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan will visit Senegal.
* Dec. 23: Nigeria*s ruling People*s Democratic Party will screen
presidential aspirants ahead of primaries scheduled for January
2011.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 20, 2010 10:41:03 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date
Stratfor logo
Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date
December 20, 2010 | 1310 GMT
Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date
STRATFOR
PDF Version
* Click here to download a PDF of this report
Related Link
* Cartel Report 2009
Related Special Topic Page
* Tracking Mexico*s Drug Cartels
Editor*s Note: In this annual report on Mexico*s drug cartels, we
assess the most significant developments of 2010 and provide updated
profiles of the country*s powerful drug-trafficking organizations as
well as a forecast for 2011. The report is a product of the coverage
we maintain on a weekly basis through our Mexico Security Memo and
other analyses we produce throughout the year.
Summary
In 2010, Mexico*s cartel wars have produced unprecedented levels of
violence throughout the country. No longer concentrated in just a few
states, the violence has spread all across the northern tier of border
states and all along both the east and west coasts of Mexico. This
year*s drug-related homicides have passed the 11,000 mark, a 60 to 70
percent increase from 2009.
The high levels of violence in 2010 have been caused not only by
long-term struggles, such as the fight between the Sinaloa Federation
and the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes Organization (the VCF, or Juarez
cartel) for control of the Juarez smuggling corridor, but also by new
conflicts among various players in an increasingly fluid cartel
landscape. For example, simmering tensions between Los Zetas and their
former partners in the Gulf cartel finally boiled over and quickly
escalated into a bloody turf war in the Tamaulipas border region. The
conflict spread to states like Nuevo Leon, Hidalgo and Tabasco and
even gave birth to an alliance among the Sinaloa Federation, the Gulf
cartel and La Familia Michoacana (LFM).
Additionally, the death of Arturo Beltran Leyva in a December 2009
Mexican marine raid led to a vicious battle between factions of the
Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO) for control of the organization,
pitting Arturo*s brother, Hector Beltran Leyva, against Arturo*s
right-hand man, Edgar *La Barbie* Valdez Villarreal. New conflicts
this year have clearly added to the carnage from previous years*
battles, such as those pitting the Sinaloa Federation against the
Juarez cartel and LFM against the BLO.
The administration of Mexican President Felipe Calderon has also made
strides against these cartels, dismantling several cartel networks and
taking down their leaders over the course of 2010, most notably
Sinaloa No. 3 Ignacio *El Nacho* Coronel Villarreal and Valdez.
However, while such operations have succeeded in capturing or killing
several very dangerous people and disrupting their organizations, such
disruptions have also served to further upset the balance of power
among Mexico*s criminal organizations and increase the volatility of
the Mexican security environment. In effect, the imbalance has created
a sort of vicious feeding frenzy among the various organizations as
they seek to preserve their own turf and seize territory from rival
organizations.
Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date
(click here to enlarge image)
Calderon has also taken steps to shift the focus from the
controversial strategy of using the Mexican military as the primary
weapon in the conflict against the cartels to using the newly reformed
Federal Police. While the military still remains the most reliable
security tool available to the Mexican government, the Federal Police
have been given more responsibility in Juarez and northeastern Mexico,
the nation*s most contentious hot spots. Calderon has also planted the
seeds for reforming the states* security organizations with a unified
command in hopes of professionalizing each state*s security force to
the point where the states do not have to rely on the federal
government to combat organized crime. Additionally, the Mexican
Congress has taken steps to curb the president*s ability to deploy the
military domestically by proposing a National Security Act that would
require a state governor or legislature to first request the
deployment of the military rather than permitting the federal
government to act unilaterally. There is simply not enough federal
military manpower to respond to all requests and deploy to all trouble
spots, a position in which the federal government is increasingly
finding itself.
Cartel Membership and Organization
Los Zetas
Los Zetas are a relatively new power on the drug-trafficking scene,
having only recently become an independent organization. Although Los
Zetas were characterized as an aggressive and ascendant organization
in our 2009 cartel report, the group has experienced some major
setbacks in 2010. Los Zetas have had a roller-coaster year, beginning
with the severing of relations with their former parent organization,
the Gulf cartel, in January 2010. Though Los Zetas have been operating
more or less independent of the Gulf cartel for almost three years
now, things finally came to a head with the Jan. 18 death of one of
Los Zetas* top lieutenants, Sergio *El Concord 3* Mendoza Pena, at the
hands of Gulf men under cartel leader Eduardo *El Coss* Costillo
Sanchez. Mendoza was reported to be the right-hand man of Los Zetas
No. 2 Miguel *Z-40* Trevino Morales, and in response to his
associate*s death, Trevino demanded that Costillo hand over the men
responsible for Mendoza*s death. When Costillo refused, Trevino
ordered the kidnapping of 16 known Gulf cartel members. Tit-for-tat
operations escalated into all-out war between the two groups
throughout the spring. It is no secret that Los Zetas are
operationally superior to their former parent organization, which is
why, once the fighting escalated, the Gulf cartel reached out to the
Sinaloa Federation and LFM, two of their former rivals, for assistance
in fighting Los Zetas. This new alliance was called the New
Federation.
Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date
(click here to enlarge image)
Since the formation of the New Federation, Los Zetas have been on the
defensive, fighting both Gulf cartel advances on traditional Los Zetas
territory and the direct targeting of the group*s regional leadership
by Mexican security forces. Los Zetas were pushed out of their
traditional stronghold of Reynosa, Tamaulipas state, and were forced
to retreat to other strongholds such as Nuevo Laredo and Monterrey,
Nuevo Leon state (even so, both Monterrey and Nuevo Laredo have been
contested at various times during 2010). Despite losing key areas of
their home territory, Los Zetas have continued to expand their
operations throughout Mexico by working with other criminal
organizations, such as the Cartel Pacifico Sur (or CPS, which is
Hector Beltran Leyva*s faction of the BLO), and are penetrating deeper
into Central America, South America and Europe.
Los Zetas* top-tier leadership has remained unchanged, with Heriberto
*El Lazca* Lazcano Lazcano atop the organization followed by his No.
2, Trevino, but the regional leadership of the group below Lazcano and
Trevino has suffered tremendous setbacks in a number of locations,
none more pronounced than in the Monterrey metropolitan area. The June
9 apprehension of Hector *El Tori* Raul Luna Luna, Los Zetas*
Monterrey regional leader, in a Mexican military operation set in
motion a string of operations over the next three months that netted
at least five senior regional leaders of Los Zetas in Monterrey who
were designated as replacements for Luna. Additionally, regional Los
Zetas leaders have been apprehended in Hidalgo and Veracruz states,
and at least three leaders have been captured in Tabasco state.
However, events in the second half of 2010 have placed Los Zetas in a
position to possibly regain some of the territory lost to the Gulf
cartel and the New Federation earlier in the year. This opportunity
has been presented by the apparent weakening of the New Federation
alliance and the death of a key Gulf cartel leader. In response, Los
Zetas appear to be preparing for an assault to regain lost territory,
though a recent deployment of federal security forces to the region
may delay or alter their plans for an anticipated offensive.
Gulf Cartel
In the early half of the decade, the Gulf cartel was among the most
powerful criminal organizations in Mexico and served as an effective
counterbalance in the east to the Sinaloa Federation, which dominated
the western coast of Mexico. However, after the arrest of charismatic
Gulf leader Osiel Cardenas Guillen in 2003, the group found itself on
the decline while its enforcement wing, Los Zetas, gradually became
the dominant player in their relationship. During times of intense
conflict, the warriors in a criminal organization tend to rise above
the businessmen, and this dynamic was seen in Los Zetas* ascension.
Fissures began to emerge between Los Zetas and their Gulf cartel
masters in late 2008, when Los Zetas began contracting their
enforcement and tactical services out to other criminal organizations
such as the BLO and the VCF. These fractures were widened in 2009 when
Gulf cartel leaders Costillo and Eziquiel Antonio *Tony Tormenta*
Cardenas Guillen (Osiel*s brother) refused offers to be integrated
into the Los Zetas organization by its leader, Lazcano. The situation
finally boiled over into all-out war between the Gulf cartel and Los
Zetas in February 2010, after Costillo*s men killed the Los Zetas
lieutenant in January during a heated argument.
The Gulf cartel had relied on Los Zetas for its enforcement operations
for the past several years and knew exactly what Los Zetas were
capable of. Because of this, the Gulf cartel knew, with its current
capabilities, that it could not take on Los Zetas alone. So the cartel
reached out to its main rivals in Mexico: the Sinaloa Federation and
LFM. These organizations held an intense hatred for Los Zetas because
of their long-running battles with the group, a hatred that amounted,
in many ways, to a blood feud. With the added resources of the
so-called New Federation, the Gulf cartel was able to take the fight
to Los Zetas and actually force its former partners out of one of
their traditional strongholds in Reynosa and to take its offensive to
other regions traditionally held by Los Zetas, namely the city of
Monterrey and the states of Nuevo Leon, Hidalgo and Veracruz.
This resulted in Los Zetas being pushed back on their heels throughout
the country, and by June it looked as if the group*s days might be
numbered. However, events transpired outside of the New Federation-Los
Zetas conflict in July that weakened the alliance and forced the other
members to direct attention and resources to other parts of the
country, thus giving Los Zetas room to regroup. The lack of commitment
from the Sinaloa Federation and LFM left the Gulf cartel exposed to a
certain degree, exposure that was soon exacerbated when Mexican
security forces began dismantling the cells associated with Gulf
leader Antonio Cardenas Guillen in the Matamoros region beginning in
August. This operation culminated when Mexican marines launched an
assault to capture the Gulf leader on Nov. 5 that resulted in a
three-hour fire fight that killed Tony Tormenta and several of his top
lieutenants. While Antonio Cardenas Guillen was not the driving force
behind Gulf cartel operations, he did lead several of the
organization*s enforcement cells, and his absence from the Tamaulipas
border area prompted both Los Zetas and Mexican federal security
forces to make preparations to move into the region.
Sinaloa Federation
The Sinaloa Federation is, as its name implies, a true cartel
comprised of several different drug-trafficking organizations that all
report to the head of the federation, Joaquin *El Chapo* Guzman Loera,
who is the world*s second-most wanted man behind Osama bin Laden.
Guzman is flanked in leadership by Ismael *El Mayo* Zambada Garcia and
Juan *El Azul* Esparragoza Moreno, each having his own independent
trafficking network. The Sinaloa Federation has been an active
participant on nearly every front of the cartel wars in 2010,
including, with its involvement in the New Federation, the conflict in
northeastern Mexico. But perhaps its most notable (and to date
under-recognized) success has been in gaining a clear tactical
advantage in the battle for control of the Ciudad Juarez smuggling
corridor. An FBI intelligence memo revealed that a large majority of
the narcotics seized in the El Paso sector, directly across the border
from Juarez, belonged to the Sinaloa Federation. The FBI report also
noted that the Sinaloa Federation had gained control of key territory
in the region, giving the group clear business and tactical advantages
over the Juarez cartel. Still, the Sinaloa Federation remains focused
on the Juarez region as Sinaloa seeks to consolidate its position,
defend itself from Juarez cartel counterattacks and exert total
control over the smuggling corridor. This effort has demanded the vast
majority of the organization*s enforcement resources.
Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date
(click here to enlarge image)
The Calderon administration scored one of its greatest victories
against the drug cartels this year when members of the Mexican
military shot and killed Sinaloa Federation No. 3 Ignacio *El Nacho*
Coronel Villarreal on July 29 in his home in Guadalajara, Jalisco
state. Coronel oversaw the Sinaloa Federation*s operations along much
of the Central Pacific coast as well as the organization*s
methamphetamine production and trafficking, earning Coronel the
nickname *King of Ice* (the crystallized form of methamphetamine is
commonly referred to as *ice*). Intelligence gathered from the house
where Coronel was killed, along with other investigative work by
Mexican military intelligence, quickly led to the capture of nearly
all the leadership cadre of Coronel*s network in the Jalisco, Colima,
Nayarit and Michoacan areas.
The death of Coronel and the dismantlement of his network, along with
a continued focus on the conflict in Juarez, have forced the Sinaloa
Federation to pull back from other commitments, such as its operations
against Los Zetas as part of the New Federation. While it appears the
Sinaloa Federation has once again pulled its enforcers out of
northeastern Mexico * at least for now * the organization has made
inroads on the business operations-side in other regions and on other
continents. The Sinaloa Federation has apparently made progress toward
extending its control over the lucrative Tijuana, Baja California
region, and has established at least a temporary agreement with what
is left of the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO) to move loads of
narcotics through the area. Additionally, STRATFOR sources continue to
report a sustained effort by the Sinaloa Federation to expand its
logistical network farther into Europe and its influence deeper into
Central America and South America.
Even though the Sinaloa Federation has experienced a few setbacks,
such as the defection of the BLO and the loss of Coronel and his
network, the group has control of, or access to, smuggling corridors
all along Mexico*s northern border from Tijuana to Juarez. This means
that Sinaloa appears to be the group that has fared the best over the
past few increasingly violent years. This applies even more
specifically to Guzman and his faction of the federation. Indeed,
Guzman has benefited greatly from some events. In addition to the fall
of his external foes, such as the AFO, Gulf and Juarez cartels, he has
also seen the downfall of strong Sinaloa Federation personalities who
could have risen up to contest his leadership, men like Alfredo
Beltran Leyva and Coronel. Sinaloa members who attract a lot of
adverse publicity for the federation, such as Enrique *El Cumbias*
Lopez Acosta, also seem to run into bad luck with some frequency.
La Familia Michoacana
After being named the most violent organized-crime group in Mexico by
then-Mexican Attorney General Eduardo Medina Mora in 2009, LFM has
been largely a background player in 2010. The group holds to a strange
pseudo-religious ideology unique among Mexican drug cartels, and
though it is still based out of Michoacan state, it has a presence
and, in some cases, substantial influence in the neighboring states of
Guerrero, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Colima and Mexico. Until the Dec. 10
death of LFM spiritual leader Nazario *El Mas Loco* Moreno Gonzalez,
the group*s leadership had been shared by Moreno and Jose de Jesus *El
Chango* Mendez Vargas; Servando *La Tuta* Gomez Martinez, whose media
profile has greatly expanded in recent months, had held the No. 3 spot
in the organization. Just prior to Moreno*s death, several LFM
regional plaza bosses were captured in the sustained Federal Police
operation against the group.
Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date
(click here to enlarge image)
LFM has remained active on two main fronts in Mexico in 2010. One is
the offensive against Los Zetas as part of the New Federation with
Sinaloa and the Gulf cartel in northeastern Mexico, and the other is
the fight against the CPS and their Los Zetas allies in southern
Michoacan and Guerrero states, particularly around the resort area of
Acapulco. LFM and the CPS have been locked in a heated battle for
supremacy in the Acapulco region for the past two years, and this
conflict shows no signs of stopping, especially since the CPS appears
to have recently launched a new offensive against LFM in southern
Michoacan. Additionally, after the death of Coronel in July and the
subsequent dismantlement of his network, LFM attempted to take over
the Jalisco and Colima trafficking corridors, which reportedly
strained relations between the Sinaloa Federation and LFM.
In mid-November, LFM reportedly proposed a truce with the Mexican
government. In *narcomantas* banners hung throughout Michoacan
(narcomantas are messages from an organized criminal group, usually on
a poster in a public place), the group allegedly announced that it
would begin the truce the first week of December. That week was
dominated by the arrests of several LFM operatives, including Jose
Antonio *El Tonon* Arcos Martinez, a high-ranking lieutenant with a
$250,000 bounty on his head, and Morelia plaza boss Alfredo Landa
Torres. It is unclear whether LFM will stick to its truce or engage in
retaliatory attacks as it has done in the past when high-ranking
members have been arrested. It is equally unclear whether LFM still
has the ability to conduct high-profile attacks. LFM is a relatively
small and new organization compared to the older and more established
drug-trafficking groups that operate in Mexico, and while it remains a
potent organization in the greater Michoacan region, it appears the
group is becoming increasingly isolated. Its truce offer, if
legitimate, may be a sign that a combination of turf battles with
rival cartels and government pressure is more than the organization
can bear. Adding the death of the group*s spiritual leader to the
equation means that Mendez may be facing a great challenge in merely
keeping the group together. We will be watching LFM closely over the
next several weeks for signs of collapse.
Beltran Leyva Organization
Founded by the four Beltran Leyva brothers * Arturo, Alfredo, Carlos
and Hector * the BLO was originally part of the Sinaloa Federation.
After Alfredo was arrested in January 2008, the brothers accused
Sinaloa Federation leader Guzman of tipping off Mexican authorities to
Alfredo*s location, and they subsequently broke away from Sinaloa to
launch a bloody war against their former partners. The BLO even went
as far as to kill one of Guzman*s sons in a brazen assassination in
the parking lot of a grocery store in Culiacan, Sinaloa state, where
gunmen allegedly fired more than 200 rounds of ammunition and used
rocket-propelled grenades. The organization quickly aligned itself
with Los Zetas in an effort to gain military reinforcement. Their
combined resources and mutual hatred of Guzman and the Sinaloa
Federation helped the BLO and Los Zetas to become one of the most
formidable criminal organizations in Mexico. But their fast rise to
one of the top spots in 2008 was perhaps indicative of their volatile
existence and could help explain their rapid degradation in 2010.
Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date
(click here to enlarge image)
Indeed, the BLO has had perhaps its most tumultuous year since
STRATFOR began publishing its annual cartel report. On Dec. 16, 2009,
only a few days after our report was published last year, Mexican
marines stormed a luxury apartment complex in Cuernavaca, Morelos
state, and killed the BLO*s leader, Arturo Beltran Leyva, along with
several of his top bodyguards. It was very apparent in the following
weeks that Arturo was the glue that held the BLO together as a
functioning criminal organization. His death sent shockwaves
throughout the organization, causing a vicious blame-game for allowing
Arturo to be killed. His brother Carlos was arrested Dec. 30 in
Culiacan, leaving Hector as the only brother at large. Hector was the
obvious choice for succession, if the reins of the organization were
to stay within the founding Beltran Leyva family. However, many within
the BLO felt that control of the organization should be given to
Arturo*s right-hand man, Edgar *La Barbie* Valdez Villarreal. The BLO
was quickly divided into two factions: those who supported Hector to
lead the organization and those who supported Valdez.
Hector Beltran Leyva Faction/Cartel Pacifico Sur
It appears that most of the BLO operatives and networks sided with
Hector Beltran Leyva and his deputy and top enforcer, Sergio *El
Grande* Villarreal Barragan. The group renamed itself Cartel Pacifico
Sur (CPS), or the South Pacific Cartel, to distance itself from the
elements associated with Valdez that still clung to the BLO moniker.
The CPS remained allies with Los Zetas and continued to cultivate
their working relationship, largely due to the hatred between Valdez
and Los Zetas. The animosity between Valdez and Los Zetas dates back
to 2003, when the Sinaloa Federation dispatched BLO gunman to wage an
offensive in Nuevo Laredo against the Gulf cartel (and Los Zetas) in
an attempt to take control of the Nuevo Laredo smuggling corridor
following the arrest of Gulf cartel leader Osiel Cardenas Guillen.
Valdez, a U.S. citizen born in Laredo, Texas, was one of the leaders
of the BLO*s Los Negros enforcement unit.
The CPS heavily engaged the Valdez faction in the states of Guerrero,
Morelos and Mexico while maintaining control of the traditional BLO
territories in parts of Sinaloa and Sonora states. As the fighting
with the Valdez faction escalated, the two groups exchanged executions
and gruesome public displays of mutilated bodies. However, Mexican
authorities continued their pursuit of the BLO remnants and arrested
Villarreal on Sept. 12, 2010, without incident inside a luxury home in
Puebla, Puebla state. Several weeks later, Mexican federal authorities
believed they were close to capturing Hector Beltran Leyva as well.
They launched a few operations to nab the cartel leader but came up
empty-handed.
The CPS, with the help of Los Zetas, is currently engaged in an
offensive against LFM in the southern portions of Michoacan, as the
CPS attempts to push beyond its traditional operating territory in
Acapulco, Guerrero state, and farther up the west coast of Mexico
toward the port of Lazaro Cardenas. Additionally, the CPS and Los
Zetas have staked a claim to the Colima and Manzanillo regions
following the death of Sinaloa*s No. 3, Coronel, and after fending off
fairly weak advances by LFM and a lackluster attempt to maintain
control of the territory by the Sinaloa Federation.
Edgar Valdez Villarreal Faction
The Valdez faction found itself fighting an uphill battle for control
of the BLO after the death of Arturo Beltran Leyva in December 2009.
While the Valdez faction was very capable and quite potent, it simply
did not have the resources to mount a successful campaign to take over
the BLO. Valdez was supported by his top lieutenants, Gerardo *El
Indio* Alvarez Vasquez and his father-in-law, Carlos Montemayor, along
with their cells and networks of enforcers. The Valdez faction was
relatively isolated and confined to the states of Guerrero, Mexico and
Morelos, but even in those states its presence was contested by
Mexican security forces and, in southern Guerrero, by the CPS and LFM
as well.
Mexican security forces wasted no time in going after the leadership
of the Valdez faction. On April 21, Mexican military intelligence,
with the help of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, tracked
Alvarez to a safe-house in Huixquilucan, Mexico state. After a
several-hourlong firefight, military forces were able to surround the
area and capture Alvarez as he attempted to flee in a small car under
a volley of bullets. The safe-house provided Mexican officials with a
wealth of information about the group and jump-started the hunt for
Valdez.
The arrest of Valdez on Aug. 30 is enveloped by conflicting reports.
The Mexican government announced that a huge Federal Police operation
overwhelmed the kingpin at a rural vacation home in Mexico state and
that Valdez surrendered without a shot being fired. However, several
weeks later reports began emerging that Valdez had turned himself in
to authorities at a local municipal police checkpoint near his
vacation home, simply identifying himself and telling the local police
that he was there to surrender to them. The second scenario made much
more sense when it was revealed that Valdez had been an informant for
the Mexican government since 2008. He had reportedly been responsible
for the apprehension of many of his rivals and those who worked
closely with him, most notably Arturo Beltran Leyva. This possibility
was raised by some BLO members at the time of Arturo*s death when it
was reported that Valdez had been in the apartment mere minutes before
the Mexican marines launched the raid that killed Arturo.
After the arrest of Valdez, Montemayor took the reins of the Valdez
faction. One of his first moves was to order the kidnapping and
execution of 20 tourists from Michoacan in Acapulco, which garnered
headlines across Mexican and international media. Montemayor believed
that the tourists were actually LFM operatives who had been sent to
the Acapulco region to seize control of the lucrative port. A short
while later, on Nov. 24, Montemayor himself was arrested, essentially
decapitating the leadership of the Valdez faction. It is unclear who,
if anyone, has replaced Montemayor at the helm of the organization,
but given the blows the Valdez faction has suffered in 2010, it is
likely that the remaining operatives have either gone their own way or
now work for some other organization.
Arellano Felix Organization
The AFO, formerly known as the Tijuana cartel, is led by Fernando *El
Ingeniero* Sanchez Arellano, nephew of the founding Arellano Felix
brothers. This organization has experienced numerous setbacks in
recent years, including a major split and vicious factional
infighting, and is only a shell of its former self. These hindrances
have impacted not only the group*s leadership but also its operational
capability as a trafficking organization. The most significant loss
the AFO has experienced this year has been the disappearance of Jorge
*El Cholo* Briceno Lopez. Reports of both his death and his arrest
have swirled around the media this year, but we have been unable to
determine what exactly has happened to Briceno, other than the
apparent fact that he is no longer involved in the Tijuana
drug-trafficking scene. After fighting a brutal internal conflict with
the AFO*s Eduardo *El Teo* Garcia Simental faction (which had defected
to the Sinaloa Federation), and bearing the brunt of a Mexican
military-led operation, the AFO has only a few operational cells left,
most of which have kept an extremely low profile in 2010. After the
arrest of Garcia in January and the dismantlement of his organization
in the Baja Peninsula, violence subsided significantly in the Tijuana
region * a far cry from the upward of 100 murders per week that the
region experienced during one period in 2008.
Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date
The biggest threat the AFO has faced since its initial fall from power
in the early part of the decade has been the aggressive actions of the
Sinaloa Federation. For the past two years, the Garcia faction of the
AFO had been the Sinaloa proxy fighting for control of the Tijuana
smuggling corridor against the AFO faction led by Sanchez. In recent
months, however, there have been signs that the two long-time rivals
may have come to some form of a business agreement, allowing the
Sinaloa Federation to move large shipments of narcotics through AFO
territory. Generally, some sort of tax is levied upon these shipments,
and it is likely that the AFO is gaining some sort of monetary benefit
from the arrangement. Some sources are reporting that the AFO
continues to exist only because of the largesse of the Sinaloa
Federation and because the AFO is paying Sinaloa to allow the AFO to
operate in Tijuana. Either way, these sorts of agreements have proved
only temporary in the past. At the present time it is unclear if or
when the Sinaloa Federation will decide to resume the offensive
against the AFO and whether the AFO will be able to do anything about
it.
Vicente Carrillo Fuentes Organization/Juarez Cartel
The VCF, also known as the Juarez cartel, continued its downward
spiral from 2009 into 2010. The VCF continues to lose ground to the
Sinaloa Federation throughout Chihuahua state, most notably in the
Ciudad Juarez area. The VCF*s influence has largely been confined to
the urban areas of the state, Juarez and Chihuahua, though it appears
that its influence is waning even in traditional VCF strongholds. The
organization is headed by its namesake, Vicente Carrillo Fuentes, and
has remained functional largely because of the group*s operational
leader, Juan *El JL* Luis Ledezma, who also heads the VCF enforcement
wing, La Linea. The VCF has been able to remain relevant in the
greater Juarez area because of the relationship it has with the local
street gang Los Aztecas, led by Eduardo *Tablas* Ravelo. Los Aztecas
serve as the primary enforcers for the VCF on the streets of Juarez.
However, several Federal Police operations have netted some high-level
operatives for Los Aztecas and La Linea, particularly after a few
high-profile attacks conducted by the two groups.
Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date
With its sustained losses, the VCF has done what many other criminal
organizations in Mexico have done after falling on hard times * it has
expanded its tactics and diversified its criminal operations.
Extortion and kidnapping-for-ransom (KFR) operations have increased
dramatically in the greater Juarez area, largely because of activities
by Los Aztecas and La Linea. (More on the cartels* expanding tactics
below.) The March murders of U.S. consulate worker Leslie Enriquez and
her husband were ordered by La Linea lieutenants because she was
believed to have supplied visas to members of the Sinaloa Federation
while denying visas for people associated with VCF. And on July 15, La
Linea became the first modern-day Mexican criminal organization to
successfully deploy an improvised explosive device (IED). The blast
killed four people and wounded several more (all first-responders). It
appeared that the group confined its targeting only to
first-responders, namely Mexican security forces, and despite its very
public threats, La Linea has yet to deploy the tactic against innocent
civilians.
The fallout from both the assassination of a U.S. government employee
and the deployment of an IED has resulted in the loss of several
operatives and, in a few cases, senior leaders of La Linea and Los
Aztecas, in addition to increased scrutiny by Mexican security forces
and U.S. law enforcement on the other side of the border in El Paso,
Texas. These scenarios have only worked to further inhibit the VCF*s
ability to move narcotics and continue to remain relevant on the
Mexican drug-trafficking scene. It will remain the focus of intense
Sinaloa Federation and Mexican government operations in 2011, but it
can also be expected to continue its desperate fight for survival on
its home turf.
A Fluid Landscape and Hints of Success
Four years after President Calderon launched an offensive against the
country*s major drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) in December
2006, the security landscape in Mexico remains remarkably fluid. Not
everything has changed, however. The two main struggles in Mexico are
still among the cartels themselves * for lucrative turf * and between
the cartels and the Mexican government. Government offensives have
continued to weaken and fragment several of Mexico*s largest DTOs and
their splinter groups and are continuing to disrupt the power balance
throughout Mexico as DTOs try to seize control of key smuggling
corridors held by weakened rivals. There have also been hints of
success in Calderon*s countercartel strategy, with 2010 proving to be
one of the most productive years for the Calderon administration in
terms of toppling cartel leaders and dismantling their networks.
Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date
(click here to enlarge image)
To recap: In 2010 we saw tensions between the Gulf cartel and Los
Zetas boil over into open warfare throughout the eastern half of
Mexico, primarily in Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon states. The Gulf
cartel, knowing it could not sustain an effective campaign against Los
Zetas on its own, reached out to two of Los Zetas* main rivals * the
Sinaloa Federation and LFM * for support in fighting Los Zetas. For
much of the first half of 2010, this so-called New Federation
dominated the battlefield in northeastern Mexico, pushing Los Zetas
from their traditional stronghold of Reynosa and forcing the group to
retreat to Nuevo Laredo and Monterrey. However, alliances and
agreements such as the New Federation are often fleeting, especially
as the Mexican government continues to apply increasing pressure to
criminal organizations throughout the country.
While there was some indication of strained relations between New
Federation partners when LFM tried to move in on Coronel*s turf, the
alliance fell by the wayside when other situations made it no longer
beneficial for Sinaloa or LFM to contribute resources to the fight in
northeastern Mexico. The Sinaloa Federation lost control of one of its
most lucrative points of entry into Mexico and Colima states after the
death of Coronel and the dismantlement of his network in Colima,
Jalisco and Nayarit. Additionally, Sinaloa*s conflict with the VCF in
Juarez, despite having a tactical advantage throughout much of the
region, has dragged on and continues to drain a significant amount of
attention and resources from the organization. As for LFM, the
organization was facing the threat of an offensive on its core
territory in southern Michoacan by the CPS and Los Zetas, as well as a
business opportunity to fill a power vacuum in the methamphetamine
market in the neighboring region to the north in the wake of Coronel*s
death in July.
One way to look at all this is to consider that the group that
dominated the Mexican cartel scene for almost half of 2010, the New
Federation, was disrupted by the Mexican government in July, which
indirectly * and perhaps purposefully * made the cartel landscape very
fluid. It has been the mission of the Calderon administration to deny
any Mexican criminal organization an uncontested region of the country
in which to freely operate. Since the Mexican government has not ever
been able to fully control the territory outside the country*s
geographic core around Mexico City, disruption has been a key tactic
in Calderon*s war against the cartels. Several factions of many
different organizations have been hit tremendously hard in campaigns
by the Mexican military and the Federal Police. Here is a list of the
major cartel leaders and their networks brought down in 2010:
* Eziquiel Antonio *Tony Tormenta* Cardenas Guillen and several Gulf
cartel cells associated with him
* The Eduardo *El Teo* Garcia Simental faction of the AFO
* Sergio *El Grande* Villarreal Barragan
* The Edgar *La Barbie* Valdez Villarreal faction of the BLO
* Ignacio *El Nacho* Coronel Villarreal and his network
* Eight plaza bosses for Los Zetas (four of whom were in charge of
operations in Monterrey)
* Two plaza bosses for LFM
* Nazario *El Mas Loco* Moreno Gonzalez of LFM
Using disruption as a measure, 2010 has been a successful year for the
Calderon administration. However, despite some successful
countercartel operations, the country*s security situation continues
to degrade at a rapid rate and violence continues to rise to
unprecedented levels.
Expanding Tactics and Escalating Violence
At the time this report was being written, there had been 11,041
organized crime-related murders in Mexico in 2010, with nearly three
weeks left in the year. At the same time in 2009, the death toll for
the year had reached a new high, ranging from 6,900 to 8,000
(depending on the source and methodology used for tracking organized
crime-related murders). The degrading security environment in Mexico
has been exacerbated by the development of new conflicts in
Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, Morelos, Mexico, Colima and Jalisco states, as
well as by persisting conflicts in Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Durango,
Michoacan and Guerrero states. This geography of violence has changed
quite a bit since 2009, when the violence was concentrated mainly in
five states: Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Guerrero, Michoacan and Baja
California.
Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date
One reason for the tremendous increase in violence in 2010 is the
conflict between the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas. This conflict spread
violence throughout the eastern half of the country, common territory
where the two groups have significant influence given their past
relationship. And the conflict that stemmed from the BLO split has
become a new source of violence in the southern states of Morelos,
Mexico and Guerrero. All this, combined with the ongoing conflicts
between the VCF and the Sinaloa Federation in Chihuahua state; LFM and
the CPS in Michoacan and Guerrero states; and the persistent low-level
fighting between the CPS and the Sinaloa Federation in Sinaloa state,
has produced this year*s unprecedented death toll for the country as a
whole.
Groups that have borne the brunt of fighting, namely Los Zetas and the
VCF, have found it harder and harder to engage in their core business
of drug-trafficking and have been forced to diversify their income
streams, mainly from other criminal activities. Cash flow is important
for the cartels because it takes a lot of money to hire and equip
enforcer units to protect against incursions from rival cartels and
the Mexican government. It also takes money to purchase narcotics and
smuggle them from South America into the United States. A reliance on
other criminal enterprises to generate income is not a new development
for either Los Zetas or the VCF. Los Zetas have been active in human
smuggling, oil theft, extortion and contract enforcement, while the
VCF has engaged in extortion and kidnap-for-ransom operations. But in
2010, as these groups found themselves with their backs against the
wall and increasingly desperate, they began to further expand their
tactics.
Los Zetas found themselves in the crosshairs of Mexican military and
Federal Police operations in Monterrey beginning in June with the
arrest of Zeta leader Hector *El Tori* Raul Luna Luna in a Mexican
military operation. Less than a month later, on July 7, Hector*s
brother, Esteban *El Chachis* Luna Luna, who had taken over the
leadership position in Monterrey, was captured in yet another Mexican
military operation. A senior lieutenant in Los Zetas, known only as
*El Sonrics,* was chosen to be the third leader in Monterrey in as
many months after the arrest of Esteban Luna Luna. El Sonrics* tenure
lasted about as long as his predecessor*s, however. On Aug. 14 in
Monterrey, El Sonrics was killed in a firefight with members of the
Mexican military along with three Los Zetas bodyguards. A month and a
half later, on Oct. 6, Jose Raymundo Lopez Arellano was taken down in
San Nicolas de las Garza in yet another Mexican military operation. In
other operations in the Monterrey area during this period, Mexican
authorities also seized several large weapons caches belonging to Los
Zetas and killed and arrested numerous lower-level Los Zetas
operatives.
In their weakened state, Los Zetas began to increase the number of KFR
operations in the Monterrey area. Previously, KFR operations conducted
by Los Zetas typically targeted people who owed the organization
money, but as the group became increasingly pressured by Mexican
security forces and the New Federation, they began targeting
high-net-worth individuals for quick cash to supplement their income.
This wave of kidnappings in Monterrey led the U.S. consulate there to
order the departure of all minor dependents of U.S. government
personnel.
The VCF, which had already been engaged in large-scale extortion and
KFR operations, reverted to lashing out at perceived injustices in its
targeting and tactics, not for financial gain, but rather to gain room
to maneuver in the increasingly crowded Juarez metropolitan area.
Largely due to the continuing high levels of violence in the area,
Juarez boasts the highest concentration of federal Mexican security
forces in the country, with the Federal Police operating in the urban
areas and the Mexican military operating on the outskirts and in
surrounding rural areas. The VCF has made it no secret that it
believes the Federal Police are working for and protecting the Sinaloa
Federation in Juarez. The IED detonation on July 15 was in response to
the arrest of high-ranking VCF lieutenant Jesus *El 35* Armando Acosta
Guerrero. La Linea, the VCF enforcement arm, had killed a rival and
placed the corpse in a small car with the IED and phoned in a report
of a body in a car, knowing that the Federal Police would likely
respond. At about 7:30 p.m. local time, as paramedics and Federal
Police agents arrived on the scene, the IED was remotely detonated
inside the car using a cell phone. The blast killed two Federal Police
agents and two paramedics and injured several more first-responders.
The exact composition of the device is still unknown, but the
industrial water-gel explosive TOVEX was used as the main charge. In
the hours following the incident, a narcomanta appeared a few
kilometers from the crime scene stating that La Linea would continue
using car bombs.
La Linea tried to deploy another device under similar circumstances
Sept. 10 in Juarez, but Federal Police agents were able to identify
the IED and called in the Mexican military to defuse the device. There
were also three small IEDs deployed in Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas
state, in August. On Aug. 5, a substation housing the rural patrol
element of the Municipal Transit Police was attacked with a small IED
concealed inside a vehicle. Then on Aug. 27, two other IEDs placed in
cars were detonated outside Televisa studios and a Municipal Transit
Police station in Ciudad Victoria. The Ciudad Victoria IED attacks
were never claimed, but Los Zetas are thought to have been
responsible. The geographic and cartel-territorial disparity between
Ciudad Victoria and Juarez makes it unlikely that the same bombmaker
is responsible for all the devices encountered in Mexico this year.
Marking the first successful deployment of an IED by a Mexican
organized criminal group in the modern day, the July 15 incident in
Juarez was a clear escalation of cartel tactics. While the devices
successfully deployed so far in 2010 have been small in size, they did
show some degree of competency on the part of the bombmakers. The La
Linea and Ciudad Victoria bombers also showed some discretion in their
targeting by not detonating the devices among innocent civilians.
However, should these groups continue to deploy IEDs, the imprecise
nature of the tactic does increase the risk of innocent civilians
being killed or injured.
Rising levels of violence, combined with IEDs and the targeting of
people not involved in the drug war in extortion and
kidnapping-for-ransom operations, are taxing the civilian population.
The trends have also begun to affect business operations in parts of
Mexico*s industrial core, particularly Monterrey, where industrial
executives live in gated and fortified compounds, travel in armed
convoys and send their children to the United States or Europe to
escape the kidnapping threat. In many parts of Mexico, the threat of
violence has had an adverse impact on small businesses such as
restaurants, since people are afraid to go out at night. And those
business owners are impacted even more when they are forced to pay
protection money to cartel gunmen.
Changing Roles
The organized-crime problem in Mexico has always been perceived as a
domestic law-enforcement issue, but the country has always lacked a
competent and trustworthy law-enforcement apparatus. This is why
Calderon chose the Mexican military to tackle the country*s drug
cartels head on: It was simply the best tool available at the time.
The Mexican military has traditionally been perceived as the least
corrupt security institution in Mexico, and it possesses the firepower
and tactical know-how to go up against similarly armed organized
criminal groups. However, Calderon*s choice to deploy the Mexican
military to fight the drug cartels on Mexican soil has drawn fierce
criticism from rival politicians and human-rights activists, mainly
due to concerns that the military is not trained to handle the
civilian population.
To allay those concerns and create a more effective law-enforcement
apparatus, Calderon proposed a reform plan to the Mexican Congress in
September 2008 that would integrate the two existing federal law
enforcement agencies * the Federal Preventive Police and the Federal
Investigative Agency * into one organization, the Federal Police. The
plan called for existing agents and new recruits to undergo a much
more thorough vetting process and receive higher pay. The idea was to
build up a more professional force less vulnerable to corruption and
better able to fight the cartels. In implementation, however, the
reform process has faced several setbacks in weeding out corrupt
elements of the existing federal force. In October 2008, the
then-designated drug czar for Mexico, Noe Gonzalez, was found to be
receiving $450,000 a month from the BLO for information about the
Mexican government*s counternarcotics operations, just one indication
of how far corruption permeated law enforcement agencies.
In January 2010, nearly a year and a half after Calderon presented the
reform plan to the Mexican congress, Federal Police agents began to
take control of Joint Operation Chihuahua, which had been led by the
Mexican military with the Federal Police in a supporting role. On Jan.
13, the Mexican federal security forces mission in Chihuahua state was
officially renamed Coordinated Operation Chihuahua, to reflect the
official change in command as well as an influx of some 2,000 Federal
Police agents. Tactically, the change of command meant that the
Federal Police assumed all law-enforcement roles from the military in
the urban areas of northern Chihuahua, including police patrols,
investigations, intelligence operations, surveillance, first-response
and operation of the emergency 066 call center for Juarez (equivalent
to a 911 center in the United States). The Federal Police were tasked
with operating mainly in designated high-risk urban areas to locate
and dismantle existing cartel infrastructure using law-enforcement
methods rather than military methods. The military then assumed the
supporting role, charged with patrolling and monitoring the vast
desert expanses of the state*s rural areas and manning strategic
perimeter checkpoints to help stem the flow of narcotics through
remote border crossings. These changes in roles and areas of
operations were intended to better reflect the training and
capabilities of each force. While the enhanced Federal Police are
designed to operate in an urban environment and trained specifically
to interact with the civilian population, the Mexican military is
trained and equipped to engage in more kinetic operations in a rural
environment.
Coordinated Operation Chihuahua was the first big test of Calderon*s
Federal Police reforms. When he renamed the operation, Calderon said
the effectiveness of the change in strategy would be evaluated in
December 2010, but at the time this report was being written no
evaluation had been released to the public. There have been several
arrests of low-level operatives, and even a few high-ranking
lieutenants such, as VCF leader Acosta and Los Aztecas leader Arturo
Gallegos Castrellon, but Chihuahua state still leads the nation in the
number of drug-related murders this year with more than 3,000 * more
than the next two states, Sinaloa and Guerrero, combined. While the
security environment in Juarez remains tumultuous and unpredictable,
the Mexican government launched the Federal Police-led Coordinated
Operation Northeast in Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon states in the wake of
the death of Gulf cartel leader Tony Tormenta, in an attempt to
pre-empt any violence from a Los Zetas offensive in the region. The
roles of Federal Police agents and Mexican military personnel in the
operation are nearly identical to their roles in Coordinated Operation
Chihuahua, and the Northeast operation suggests the Calderon
administration considers the change in strategy in Chihuahua a
success.
National Security Act
While Calderon*s Federal Police reforms have begun to relieve the
Mexican military of domestic law-enforcement responsibilities, the
Mexican Congress has taken steps to limit the president*s ability to
deploy the military domestically at will. On April 28, the Mexican
Senate passed the National Security Act, a set of reforms that would
effectively redefine the role of the Mexican military in the cartel
wars, and while it is not yet law, it does indicate the country*s
attitude toward the domestic use of the military. The reforms range
from permitting only civilian law enforcement personnel to detain
suspects to repealing the ability of the president to declare a state
of emergency and suspend individual rights in cases involving
organized crime. While these reforms are notable, they would likely
have little effect at the operational level. This is because the armed
forces will likely remain the tip of the spear when it comes to
tactical operations against the cartels simply by having troops
accompanied by civilian police officers who conduct the actual
arrests. Representatives from Mexico*s Human Rights Commission would
also be present during these operations to address public grievances,
ensure no human-rights abuses have taken place and report them if they
have.
The most notable change in the proposed law is that the president
would no longer be able to deploy the armed forces whenever he wants
to. Individual state governors and legislatures would have to request
the deployment of troops to their regions once criminal activity has
gotten beyond the ability of state and local law-enforcement entities
to control. In practical terms this could prove difficult given the
limited size of the Mexican military. Many states, including
Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon, have previously requested significant
numbers of troops to augment the federal garrisons already there, only
to see their requests go unanswered due to a lack of available troops.
Limiting the executive branch*s power to deploy the military
domestically has already politicized the battlefield in Mexico, much
of which lies in the northern border region. This is where most of the
Mexican security forces are deployed, and these are also states that
are governed by Calderon*s political opponents, the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI). Friction has emerged between these states
and federal entities on how best to combat organized crime, most
notably from former Chihuahua state Gov. Jose Reyes Baeza of the PRI,
who complained that federal security forces were complicating the
situation in Juarez and Chihuahua state and that the problem was a
law-enforcement issue that should be left to the Juarez municipal
police and Chihuahua state police. As 2012 elections draw closer,
Calderon*s campaign against the cartels will likely become even more
politicized as the three main parties in Mexico * the PRI, Calderon*s
National Action Party (PAN) and the Revolutionary Democratic Party
(PRD) * jockey for the Mexican presidency.
So whether or not the new National Security Act will have an immediate
impact on the Mexican government*s countercartel campaign should it
become law, high levels of violence will continue to necessitate the
use of the Mexican armed forces, especially in regions where there is
not a reorganized and enhanced federal security operation in place.
State law enforcement has yet to demonstrate the ability to quell any
outbreak of violence, so even the political friction between the PRI
state governors and Calderon*s PAN administration will not preclude a
military role in counternarcotics efforts.
Unified State Police Command
One thing that has become obvious during the past three years of the
federal government*s offensive against the cartels is that government
resources are stretched thin * the Mexican government simply doesn*t
have the manpower to be everywhere federal security forces need to be.
One possible solution is to build up the capability of individual
states to handle many criminal matters on their own, without the aid
of federal security forces. On June 3, the Mexican National Public
Security Council approved a proposal by Calderon to establish a
commission charged with creating a new unified police force
nationwide. Under the plan, each state would have a new statewide
police force that would eventually replace all municipal-level law
enforcement entities. These new state police agencies would all report
to a single federal entity, the Unified State Police Command, in order
to ensure a unified strategy in combating drug-trafficking
organizations and other organized criminal elements.
The idea of replacing some 2,000 municipal police agencies with state
or federal law enforcement personnel has been floating around Mexican
political and security circles since about 2008, but certain obstacles
* mainly pervasive corruption * have prevented it from being realized.
Municipal-level law enforcement has traditionally been a thorn in the
side of the larger federal offensive against the cartels due to
incompetence, corruption and, in many cases, both. In some cases, the
Mexican military or Federal Police have been forced to completely take
over municipal police operations because the entire force was corrupt
or had resigned due to lack of pay or fear of cartel retribution. Lack
of funding for pay, training and equipment has led to many of the
problems at the local level, and under the new plan such funding would
come from larger state and federal budgets.
The plan will likely take up to three years to fully implement, some
state governors estimate, and not only because of logistical hurdles.
The federal government also wants to give current municipal-level
police officers time to find new jobs, retire or be absorbed into the
new law-enforcement entity.
The new force will likely go through a vetting and training process
similar to that seen in the 2008 Federal Police reforms, but the
process will not be a quick and easy solution to Mexico*s
law-enforcement woes. While the new police force will serve as a
continuation of Calderon*s strategy of vetting and consolidating
Mexico*s law-enforcement entities, stamping out endemic corruption and
ineptitude in Mexico is a difficult task. Consolidating police reforms
at the local level should not be expected to produce meaningful
results any more quickly than the Federal Police program has. It is
very difficult to reform institutions when they exist in a culture
that tolerates and even expects corruption. Without changes to the
underlying culture of graft and corruption to support the new
institutions (for example, paying police a living wage and cultivating
public respect for their authority), these reformed institutions can
be expected to become corrupt in short order.
In October, nine state governors from Chihuahua, Durango, Zacatecas,
Tamaulipas, Veracruz, Sinaloa, Oaxaca, Puebla and Hidalgo agreed to
begin the process and to have unified police commands within six
months.
Outlook for 2011
The successes that Calderon has scored against the cartels in 2010
have helped his administration regain some public confidence in its
war against the cartels. But by disrupting the balance of power among
the cartels, the effort has made the cartel landscape throughout the
country more fluid and volatile than it was a year ago. Violence has
continued to escalate unabated and has reached unprecedented levels,
and as long as the cartel balance of power remains in a state of flux,
the violence will show no signs of diminishing. While direct action by
the Mexican government has fractured certain organizations * the BLO,
for instance * the cartel environment in Mexico is stressful in its
own right, and organizations falling victim to infighting only
exacerbate this stress. Indeed, fissures that opened in 2010 will
likely continue in 2011, and new will ones will quite possibly appear.
Calderon*s current strategy appears to be inciting more violence as
the cartels try to seize upon their rivals* perceived weaknesses, and
the federal government simply does not have the resources to
effectively contain it. While plans are in place to free up certain
aspects of the federal security apparatus, namely the reformed and
still-maturing Federal Police and the Unified State Police Command,
they are still several years away from being capable of adequately
addressing the security issues that Mexico is dealing with today. With
the 2012 presidential election approaching, unprecedented levels of
violence are politically unacceptable for Calderon and the PAN,
especially since Calderon has made the security situation in Mexico
the focus of his presidency.
Calderon is at a crossroads. The levels of violence are considered
unacceptable by the public and the government*s resources are
stretched to their limit. Unless all the cartel groups can be
decapitated and brought under control * something that is highly
unlikely given the limits of the Mexican government * the only way to
bring the violence down will be to restore an equilibrium of power
among the cartels. Calderon will need to take steps toward restoring
this balance in the next year if he hopes to quell the violence ahead
of the 2012 election.
Calderon*s steps will likely go in one of two directions. The first
would be toward increased assistance and involvement from foreign
governments. With federal resources stretched to their limit, Calderon
and the Mexican government have nowhere else to look for legitimate
assistance in combating the violence. With foreign assistance, the
combined resources could effectively dismantle major cartel and other
criminal operations and restore security and control, particularly in
the northern tier of border states. Over the past several years there
has been an increase in the level of involvement of U.S. intelligence
in Mexican operations, and even members of the Mexican military
establishment have voiced their opinion that Mexico cannot continue
down its current path alone. The revelation of a joint U.S.-Mexican
intelligence center in the Mexican media in November is further
indication of the increased involvement of foreign agencies. However,
there was a tremendous political outcry by many in the PRD and PRI
after news of the joint intelligence center was made public. Mexican
social sensitivities to foreign forces operating on Mexican soil will
likely trigger an even bigger political backlash than what has already
been triggered by the violence, making foreign assistance the least
likely choice that Calderon will make.
The second direction is not a new option and has been discussed
quietly for several years. The Mexican federal government has never
been able to assert complete and total control over Mexican territory
very far outside of its central core region around Mexico City *
certainly not in its northern tier of border states. Going back to the
days of Pancho Villa in the early 1900s, the northern frontier of
Mexico has always been bandit country due to its inhospitable
environment and distance from the capital, and it remains so today.
Before the balance of cartel power was significantly disrupted by
Calderon in 2006, there were clear delineations of territory and rule
in the region, and while there was still occasional fighting between
cartels, the levels of violence were nowhere near what we are seeing
today. This was due in large part to the cartels* ability to
effectively police the region. It is in their interest to have
lower-level violence and other crimes, such as kidnapping, carjacking,
robberies, extortion and muggings, under control. Any sort of uptick
in criminal activity negatively affects their ability to traffic drugs
through their respective areas.
This second scenario involves a dominant entity purging or co-opting
its rivals and reducing the violence being practiced by the various
criminal groups. As this entity grows stronger it will be able to
direct more attention to controlling lower-level crimes so that DTOs
can carry out their business unimpeded. However, this situation would
not be able to play out without at least some degree of complicity
from elements of the Mexican government. While the Mexican government
has demonstrated the ability to significantly disrupt cartel
operations, it cannot control their territories, and it would need
some degree of compliance from the dominant cartel entity as well.
We began to see hints of such an arrangement in the first half of 2010
with the formation of the New Federation, but the organizations
involved were eventually forced to focus their attention elsewhere and
the goals of the alliance fell by the wayside. However, one key
element is still in play: the Sinaloa Federation. The Sinaloa
Federation has spread and increased its level of influence from
Tijuana to parts of the Rio Grande in Texas and has the most resources
at its disposal, making it the most capable of all the organizations
in Mexico today, and thus the most likely to lead an alliance that
could consolidate power in the volatile regions and keep them stable.
Sinaloa has remained remarkably intact throughout much of Calderon*s
offensive against the cartels, and it has even been accused by rival
cartels * most vocally by the VCF * of being favored by the Mexican
government. Over the course of the next year we will be watching for
indications that the Sinaloa Federation and any new friends it may
make along the way are becoming the dominant organized-crime entity
throughout Mexico.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 20, 2010 12:13:29 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Varied Reactions to Belarus' Election Crackdown
Stratfor logo
Varied Reactions to Belarus' Election Crackdown
December 20, 2010 | 1740 GMT
Varied Reactions to Belarus' Election Crackdown
ALEXANDER NATRUSKIN/AFP/Getty Images
Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko (L) with Russian President
Dmitri Medvedev on the sidelines of a customs union meeting Dec. 9
Summary
While Western countries widely criticized the results of the
Belarusian presidential election * and subsequent violent crackdown on
protests * Russia took a more supportive stance. This indicates that
despite disputes between Moscow and Minsk in the months before the
vote, Russia*s interests and influence in Belarus are firm, and the
two are likely to only increase their cooperation.
Analysis
Reactions to Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko*s widely
expected landslide re-election * and subsequent violent protests *
have been varied, with the West condemning the government*s
large-scale police crackdown on opposition forces and journalists
while Russia takes a more supportive stance. Particularly notable is
the Belarusian government*s accusation that the West aided these
protests.
The divergence of these reactions, especially Russia*s overwhelming
support for Lukashenko, indicates that tensions between Moscow and
Minsk over the past year have been more theatrical than substantive.
The two countries are likely to only strengthen ties.
When it became clear early in the election that Lukashenko would
receive another term, the opposition called the vote rigged and
rallied midday and throughout the evening Dec. 18 in Minsk*s central
square. More people than expected attended the rally * reports ranged
from 20,000-40,000 * with some participants scuffling with Belarusian
authorities. Plainclothes KGB forces cracked down heavily, arresting
more than 1,000 protesters after they attempted to storm a downtown
Minsk government building. By the morning of Dec. 20, seven of
Lukashenko*s nine opponents in the election were in custody, with one
of the leading candidates, Vladimir Neklajew, hospitalized after being
beaten by security forces.
Western governments widely condemned these actions, particularly
Poland, Sweden and Germany, which had offered Lukashenko financial aid
and cooperation if the vote was held freely and without intervention
by security forces. Both Poland*s and Sweden*s foreign ministries
expressed concern over the crackdowns and urged Belarus to reveal more
information behind the attacks on opposition forces, and Polish
President Bronislaw Komorowski called on the European Union to
re-examine its relationship via the Eastern Partnership toward
Belarus. German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle called the
crackdown *unacceptable* and said Germany would closely monitor the
results of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe*s
review of the election, which subsequently found the election to have
serious flaws. The U.S. Embassy in Minsk, meanwhile, said Washington
deplored the *extreme force* that was used by Belarusian authorities.
The Russian reaction to the election paints an entirely different
picture. Sergei Lebedev, mission chief for the Commonwealth of
Independent States* election-monitoring team, said the electoral
process was open, free and fair and that he had no doubt about the
legitimacy of the vote. Lebedev also said the subsequent unrest and
detention of opposition forces should not at all factor into the
monitoring team*s assessment. Meanwhile, State Secretary of the Union
State of Russia and Belarus Pavel Borodin accused the United States of
aiding in organizing the opposition, claiming, *Everything is coming
from beyond the ocean.* Borodin blamed the United States for providing
alcohol to protesters to fuel their fervor, a statement in line with
the Belarusian Interior Ministry*s claim that a majority of the
detained protesters were intoxicated. This supports STRATFOR*s
suspicion that Western, rather than simply local, forces would be
blamed by Belarusian authorities for inciting the riots.
Russia and Belarus had been engaged in a series of disputes in the
months preceding the election, prompting many to predict there was a
serious rupture impending between the two states. But just one week
before the election, the two countries reached a comprehensive customs
union and energy tariff deal, in a sign that relations had been
repaired between Minsk and Moscow * at least to the point of Russia
implicitly backing Lukashenko*s re-election. To the chagrin of the
West, Russia*s support of Lukashenko*s political legitimacy and
restraint from criticizing the security crackdowns indicates that
Russia and Belarus have not had a major falling out. While there is
sure to be more political theater and instances of confrontational
rhetoric between the two, Moscow*s interests and levers into Minsk are
firm, and cooperation will likely only increase between the states
into the future.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 20, 2010 12:49:22 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: North Korea's Restraint and Offers
Stratfor logo
North Korea's Restraint and Offers
December 20, 2010 | 1804 GMT
North Korea's Restraint and Offers
Korea Pool/Getty Images
South Korean marines patrolling Yeonpyeong Island on Dec. 20
The South Korean military ended a live-fire artillery exercise on
Yeonpyeong Island on Dec. 20 without incident. Such exercises
typically are routine, as South Korea has a military base on the
island. This time, however, North Korea had threatened to retaliate if
the drill went ahead, while China and Russia asked Seoul to cancel
given the escalated tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Despite its
previous warning, North Korea*s military did not retaliate. The firing
drill came just after longtime Korea mediator and outgoing governor of
New Mexico Bill Richardson finished a five-day visit to North Korea
that saw Pyongyang extend various olive branches.
Pyongyang*s restraint during the South Korean drill may bring the
offers made during Richardson*s trip to fruition. But the offers are
symbolic: None represents a move by the North toward denuclearization
or an end to other provocative actions against the South. They do,
however, represent a time-honored tactic by Pyongyang.
According to CNN, the North offered to admit International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors for the first time since they were
expelled in April 2009. It also offered to allow its 12,000 fuel rods,
which can be used to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons, to be
shipped abroad. The North also accepted a proposal to create a
trilateral military commission between the United States and the two
Koreas, and said it was open to a proposal to set up a military
hotline with the South. Finally, the North said it was willing to
repatriate the remains of several hundred U.S. servicemen killed
during Korean War.
The offer to allow IAEA inspectors to return follows the North*s
display of its uranium enrichment facility to a U.S expert in
November. The newly revealed facility gives Pyongyang another
bargaining chip for use during any resumption of multilateral talks.
While Washington and its allies have not agreed to China*s proposed
six-way emergency talks, the offer to readmit IAEA inspectors makes
such a resumption more likely. Nevertheless, without specifying which
facilities would be subject to inspection, or what would follow any
inspections, this gesture is probably not a significant step toward
denuclearization.
Meanwhile, agreeing to the military commission suits North Korea*s
long-held desire for direct dialogue with the United States. While the
function of the military commission remains unclear, the North hopes
that direct ties to the United States will improve its status
internationally.
Returning the remains of U.S. soldiers is another symbolic gesture
that might win the North concessions. Pyongyang previously agreed to
return six bodies in April 2007. In response to North Korea*s overall
more cooperative approach at the time, Washington unfroze North Korean
funds in Macau, eventually leading to the resumption of six-party
talks in September 2007 (the talks had started in March but halted
shortly thereafter).
Symbolic though they may be, Pyongyang*s offers are just enough to
enable the United States and its allies to say that their
prerequisites for new talks * chiefly that North Korea demonstrate
*sincerity* and cease provocations * have been at least partially met.
They also show that North Korea is operating via its old playbook,
building up tensions to gain negotiation leverage only to step back
and make sudden concessions to induce talks.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 20, 2010 2:00:25 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Possible Grenade Attack in the Kenyan Capital
Stratfor logo
Possible Grenade Attack in the Kenyan Capital
December 20, 2010 | 1911 GMT
Grenade Attack in the Kenyan Capital
STR/AFP/Getty Images
Kenyan police officers in Nairobi in November
Unidentified assailants attacked a Kampala-bound bus in Nairobi*s
central business district Dec. 20, injuring multiple people, Kenyan
media reported. A STRATFOR source in Nairobi has reported that the
blast may have killed as many as six people. There is little
information available at present, and Kenyan media reports have been
contradictory. One report indicated that there were up to four
attackers involved, and that multiple attackers were reportedly seen
throwing grenades onto the bus as passengers were boarding it ahead of
its departure for the Ugandan capital. Another report claimed a bag
exploded just before being loaded onto the bus. Casualty reports are
likewise sketchy, but the most recent report quotes Kenyan Police
Commissioner Mathew Iteere as saying one individual was killed and 26
others were wounded. Up to three of the attackers were reportedly shot
and killed by Kenyan police.
The attack comes the same day that Uganda*s police chief issued a
warning of impending terrorist attacks in Kampala. In a Dec. 20
interview with AFP, Inspector-General Kale Kayihura said that Ugandan
authorities had received *strong indications* that al Qaeda, Somali
jihadist group al Shabaab and Ugandan rebel group Allied Democratic
Forces (ADF) wished to conduct terrorist attacks during the holiday
season. Kayihura also said that Kampala had received specific
intelligence detailing such plots, and that Uganda was actively
working with neighboring countries, including Kenya, to combat the
threat. However, the threat described by Kayihura focused mainly on
the possibility of an attack inside Uganda specifically.
There have been no confirmations yet that this was a jihadist attack,
but the timing suggests that this may be the case. There have been
multiple grenade attacks in Nairobi in recent weeks, though none have
yet to be attributed to al Shabaab. Kampala has been in a continuous
state of heightened alert since the al Shabaab dual suicide bombings
there in July. The alerts in Uganda and the steps taken by authorities
there may have forced the attackers to strike in Kenya instead.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 20, 2010 2:42:28 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Obstacles to Improved Russian-Latvian Ties
Stratfor logo
Obstacles to Improved Russian-Latvian Ties
December 20, 2010 | 2036 GMT
Obstacles to Improved Russian-Latvian Ties
DMITRY KOSTYUKOV/AFP/Getty Images
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev (R) with Latvian President Valdis
Zatlers during a Dec. 20 meeting at the Kremlin
Summary
A Latvian delegation to Russia led by President Valdis Zatlers came
away with economic opportunities as well as favorable circumstances
for a political reconciliation between the two countries. This could
form the basis for thawing bilateral relations * Moscow wants to
consolidate its sphere of influence, and Riga is mired in a painful
economic crisis and looking for economic opportunities. However,
Latvia has borne the brunt of three centuries of Russian power, and
Riga will thus be wary of any Russian moves in Latvia.
Analysis
Latvian President Valdis Zatlers and a large Latvian business
delegation visited Russia on Dec. 20 to discuss relations and business
opportunities between Moscow and Riga. After meetings with the
delegation, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev announced the creation
of a joint commission to analyze contentious historical issues between
the two countries, and Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
President Yevgeny Primakov spoke of unused potential in bilateral
economic relations. Zatlers, for his part, threw Latvia*s support
behind Russia*s request for a European Union visa waiver.
Relations between Riga and Moscow have been tense for the past three
centuries, but this visit suggests a possible thaw in ties. However,
there are considerable impediments to a successful improvement of
relations, beginning with Riga*s suspicion of Moscow*s intentions.
As one of the three Baltic states, Latvia has historically felt the
full brunt of Russian power. Originally part of the Swedish and Polish
spheres of influence, Latvia came under direct Russian control in the
18th century as Moscow flexed its geopolitical muscles. Latvia briefly
regained its independence during the chaos of the Bolshevik Revolution
but lost it again in 1944 as the Red Army advanced toward Germany.
Then in 1991, Latvia used Moscow*s weakness, amid the collapse of the
Soviet Union, to declare independence, managing to get into both the
EU and NATO in 2004 before Russia was able to fully consolidate itself
as a regional power.
Obstacles to Improved Russian-Latvian Ties
Latvia is thus understandably sensitive to the ongoing Russian
resurgence. Furthermore, 25 to 30 percent of Latvia*s population is
Russian, a product of Moscow*s Soviet-era population movement plan to
*Russianize* the Baltic states. Riga*s main opposition party, the
Harmony Center alliance, appeals to that minority with an outwardly
pro-Russian stance * and had a solid performance in Latvia*s Oct. 2
parliamentary elections. * The simultaneous Russian resurgence and the
fraying of NATO and the EU has left Baltic states feeling isolated. As
such, Riga is probing whether Russian pressure can be abated with
compromise, political conversation and economic links. Latvia also
feels pinched by austerity measures and a severe recession in the
Baltic states and is therefore looking for new economic opportunities,
both in terms of opening new markets and getting fresh investments.
With Russian privatization and modernization ongoing, Riga is hoping
that increased trade and investments will lure Moscow to compromise
while giving Latvia*s struggling economy a new market opportunity.
Latvia*s offer of supporting Russia*s demand for the EU visa waiver is
part of that compromise. Moscow*s proposal to set up a commission on
difficult historical issues is the same strategy Russia used in
placating some of Poland*s concerns in Moscow*s ongoing charm
offensive toward Warsaw.
However, Poland and Latvia have different ways of interpreting
Russia*s moves. While Poland is certainly skeptical of Russian
intentions, it has a history of being a regional power itself. It is
also not clear that the historical issues of concern between Poland
and Latvia are truly comparable, particularly those of the Soviet era.
Riga is wholly defenseless without external aid * even more so than
Poland.
Furthermore, it is not clear if Latvia is truly comfortable with
enhancing economic links to Russia. Primakov directly alluded to the
use of Latvian ports for Russian economic * and thus strategic *
concerns as one of the avenues of Russian interest. With Russia,
economic and political interests are rarely separated. Therefore,
while the visit does illustrate that cooperation may be possible
between Russia and Latvia, it is not clear that Riga will be able to
maintain a sustained effort without reverting to its suspicions of
Moscow. If history is a guide, Russia*s mere presence will set off
alarm bells in Riga.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 20, 2010 4:29:28 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: An Alternative View on Iran's Subsidy Reforms
Stratfor logo
An Alternative View on Iran's Subsidy Reforms
December 20, 2010 | 2201 GMT
Iran Cuts its Gasoline Subsidies
ATTA KENARE/AFP/Getty Images
A gasoline station in Tehran
Summary
As Iran drastically cuts its subsidies on gasoline, many in the West
are viewing the move as evidence that the U.S.-backed sanctions regime
is working to drive Iran toward negotiations. However, a STRATFOR
source close to the Iranian government has shed light on the
unintended consequences of the sanctions regime and how the country*s
growing foreign exchange reserves are contributing to Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad*s confidence in the current spate of
nuclear negotiations.
Analysis
STRATFOR sources have reported a heavy security presence at critical
road junctures in major Iranian cities after Tehran moved to
dramatically cut gasoline subsidies Dec. 19, sending gasoline prices
soaring overnight from the heavily subsidized rate of 38 cents a
gallon to $1.44 a gallon. While Western media are characterizing the
subsidy cuts as undeniable proof of the success of a U.S.-led
sanctions campaign targeting Iran*s gasoline imports, a STRATFOR
Iranian source with connections to the regime has offered an
alternative interpretation, one that may give Iran much more room to
maneuver in upcoming nuclear negotiations than previously thought.
Sanctions and Side Effects
The source claims the administration of Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad seems pleased with the way the nuclear negotiations are
progressing. The source attributed Iran*s willingness to engage in the
next round of nuclear talks in late January primarily to Iran*s
current economic situation, which has seen both negative and positive
impacts from the U.S.-led sanctions campaign.
The latest round of international sanctions, which built up over this
past summer, pressured major banks to cut ties with Iran while also
making Tehran seek out gasoline supplies on the black market, forcing
it to pay an extremely high premium over the market rate. The
financial pressures combined to force Tehran to reduce its imports
overall and divert more of its petrochemical complexes toward
substandard gasoline production to compensate for shortfalls.
Iran made several moves to try and insulate itself from the sanctions,
several of which have apparently resulted in a significant increase in
the country*s foreign exchange (forex) reserves. According to Iran*s
central bank, foreign exchange reserves have reached the highest level
on record, at more than $100 billion. STRATFOR sources attributed the
increase to several factors including a strong increase in the value
of the 15 percent of Iran*s currency reserves held in gold and the
withdrawal of 4 billion euros (slightly more than $5 billion) from
European banks during the past year. One source said one of the
biggest reasons for the increase in reserves has been the U.S.-backed
sanctions regime, which has made it increasingly difficult for Iran to
buy imports, thus causing its forex balances to grow. In addition,
sanctions are reportedly hampering Iranian investors from moving
capital overseas, channeling those funds into government bonds.
In taking advantage of the sanctions regime, banks in Kuala Lumpur,
Yerevan and Dubai in particular have been charging the Iranians
exorbitant rates, sometimes exceeding 35 percent of the amount of the
transaction, making Iran increasingly reliant on its allies in
countries such as Venezuela for its financial transactions. In the
negotiations currently taking place over the stability of Lebanon,
Ahmadinejad is reportedly pushing Lebanese Prime Minister Saad
al-Hariri to assist Iran in circumventing financial sanctions through
Lebanese banks. Iranian officials are also encouraged by recent rumors
that several major European banks and firms are now privately
pressuring their host governments to relax sanctions against Iran,
using its willingness to engage in the upcoming nuclear negotiations
as justification to ease the existing business constraints.
A Calculated Risk with Subsidy Reforms
While the sanctions have undoubtedly made it more difficult for Iran
to conduct day-to-day business in the global market, they may have
also created appreciable political benefits for Ahmadinejad, both at
home and abroad. The Iranian government has been battling internally
over the timing of the subsidy phase-out, with many of Ahmadinejad*s
political rivals attempting to use the issue to undermine the
president*s popular support. While the gasoline subsidies are the most
discussed, they are only the first part of the Iranian government*s
long-anticipated * and much needed * economic reform package, which
aims to cut subsidies on other consumer necessities such as food,
health care and education as well.
To help mitigate public outrage over the plan, the government has
opened individual bank accounts for tens of millions of Iranians and
has begun depositing anywhere between $20 and $150 per month to defray
the cost-of-living increases that will ensue. Naturally, this will
undercut the expected economic benefits from the subsidy phase-out,
but politically, it allows the Iranian president to set up a more
direct line of support between him and his constituents. The shift in
economic dependency, so Ahmadinejad hopes, will translate into
political votes down the line.
Moreover, low inflation * for Iran * at about 10 percent, well below a
multidecade average of 20 percent, and ample forex reserves could
provide the confidence the administration needs to enact these
aggressive reforms. STRATFOR*s Iranian sources also appear to have
strong faith in the ability of the country*s security apparatus to
contain potential public disturbances, similar to those that occurred
in 2007 when the government implemented a gasoline rationing system.
Financial Cushion for Foreign Policy Moves?
The same source claims that the Iranian government feels it is now in
a position to calculate its next foreign policy moves on the basis of
the financial cushion provided by its forex reserves as opposed to
strictly its energy assets. This insight, if accurate, puts the next
round of nuclear negotiations, slated for late January in Istanbul, in
an interesting context. While Iran can quietly encourage the United
States to think that its sanctions regime is what is actually driving
Tehran to negotiate, Ahmadinejad can use this economic leeway to
engage in talks, buy more time and convey an altogether more
reasonable impression, eroding the argument of those calling for a
military strike against Iran*s nuclear facilities. Meanwhile, Iran has
reshaped the negotiating atmosphere through its success in involving
Turkey in the talks after much resistance from the United States, and
will attempt to extract concessions in these nuclear negotiations to
ease the sanctions.
While some posturing is expected as both sides attempt to shape
perceptions of the strength of their negotiating positions, a number
of signs have emerged that contradict the popular view that
Ahmadinejad has been backed against a wall by his political rivals and
is caving under sanctions. STRATFOR has maintained that while the
rumblings within the regime have grown louder since the June 2009
election, Ahmadinejad has been quite skillful in outmaneuvering his
political rivals. The recent sacking of Iranian Foreign Minister
Manouchehr Mottaki appears to be a case in point. Should the nuclear
negotiations go as planned, Ahmadinejad can then argue at home that
his policies are what rendered the sanctions impotent, while using the
compensation for the subsidy cuts to expand his political base.
STRATFOR is working to gain deeper insight into what the Ahmadinejad
government may be calculating going into the next round of nuclear
talks. Based on what we have learned thus far, the way these talks are
shaping up may be far more revealing of the unintended consequences of
the U.S.-led sanctions campaign against Iran than they are of its
success.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 20, 2010 5:54:29 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Mexico Security Memo: Dec. 20, 2010
Stratfor logo
Mexico Security Memo: Dec. 20, 2010
December 20, 2010 | 2338 GMT
Mexico Security Memo: April 26, 2010
IED attack on Police in Nuevo Leon
A small improvised explosive device (IED) detonated around 1 p.m. Dec.
17 inside a sport-utility vehicle outside the Zuazua Public Security
Secretariat offices (the equivalent of a municipal police station) in
Zuazua, Nuevo Leon state. In addition to destroying the vehicle, the
blast injured at least three people and damaged several surrounding
vehicles. A message attributed to the Sinaloa Federation and Gulf
cartel addressed to *Zeta Police* was found shortly thereafter near
the site of the explosion that read, *The state of Nuevo Leon does not
guarantee the security of its citizens in the state, and more than a
thousand kidnappings are not reported for fear of the authorities.
Eleven more car bombs are waiting to be detonated to bring justice for
the kidnapped, for the police and corrupt officials are aware.* Nuevo
Leon authorities have been quick to say the claim of 11 more IEDs is
false, but have offered little in the way of proof. Additionally,
authorities have not officially said whether they believe area
drug-trafficking organizations were involved in the attack, despite
the very public message.
This attack is the year*s fifth successful deployment of an IED
against a specified target in Mexico; one occurred in Ciudad Juarez,
Chihuahua state, and three occurred near Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas
state. While there has not been any indication as to the composition
or exact size of the device, photographic evidence of the blast scene
indicates that the device was relatively small and on the scale seen
with other devices deployed in the country this year.
The enforcement arm of the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes (VCF)
organization, La Linea, was responsible for the Juarez IED on July 15,
and the group indicated after the attack that it would continue its
*car bomb* campaign as long as the Federal Police continued to support
the Sinaloa Federation, which the VCF accuses the police of doing.
Despite these warnings, only one other IED was deployed in Juarez, a
few weeks later, and the Mexican military was able to render it safe
before it detonated. However, it appears from the message left near
the scene and the geographic disparity between Juarez and Nuevo Leon
that entirely different actors were responsible for the Dec. 17
incident.
The message falls in line with the strategy pursued by the New
Federation alliance. In the spring, elements of the New Federation
began taking the fight against Los Zetas to their stronghold in the
Monterrey metro region, targeting not only Los Zetas members and
operatives but also their support network in the region, including
local politicians and local and regional police.
It remains to be seen whether the Sinaloa Federation and the Gulf
cartel will actually follow through with a sustained bombing campaign
against law enforcement believed to be associated with Los Zetas. If
the groups do follow through with their pledge to deploy 11 more IEDs,
it would be a significant escalation in the tempo of these types of
attacks. While IED attacks in the country thus far have been
discriminating in their targeting, the imprecise nature of IEDs
greatly increases the risk of civilian casualties.
Nuevo Laredo Prison Break
A prison break the morning of Dec. 17 at the Center for Social
Readaptation (CERESO) in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas state, led to the
escape of between 141 and 192 prisoners (the latest figure reported
was 151). This is merely the latest in a string of prison breaks in
Tamaulipas since January; the total number of prisoners having escaped
in the state this year is more than 300.
In the Dec. 17 escape, the prisoners (reportedly both federal and
local), working with complicit guards, were able to exit the prison
facilities through a service entrance into waiting vehicles.
Additionally, the prison director was reported missing the morning of
Dec. 17. Multiple source reports indicate Los Zetas were the primary
orchestrators of the escape, with some STRATFOR sources saying Los
Zetas* motivation was to augment their forces in the region. The
prisoners were reportedly told that once released, they either must
work for Los Zetas or be killed. Additionally, STRATFOR sources said
the nephew of Los Zetas No. 2 Miguel *Z-40* Trevino Morales was one of
the escapees from the CERESO unit.
Los Zetas have experienced several setbacks throughout much of 2010,
with several regional plaza bosses and numerous operatives being
killed or apprehended. However, developments in the last few months
have weakened the Gulf cartel and the New Federation*s grip on
Tamaulipas border region, and Los Zetas appear to be poised to regain
some of their lost ground, particularly in the Reynosa and Matamoros
regions. If the reported ultimatum for the freed prisoners is correct,
this influx of forces for Los Zetas could provide the necessary
resources to begin a campaign to retake these lost areas. However, the
true number of prisoners that will actually go to work for Los Zetas
remains to be seen; some likely will renege on their promise and slip
back into Mexican society * only now with a bounty on their heads.
Mexico Security Memo: Dec. 20, 2010
(click here to view interactive map)
Dec. 13
* Unidentified gunmen shot a man to death during a suspected
kidnapping in the Jardines Universidad neighborhood of
Guadalajara, Jalisco state.
* The body of an unidentified person was discovered near Tlajomulco,
Jalisco state. The body was wrapped in a blanket tied together
with a string and had a bag over its head.
Dec. 14
* Four police officers were reportedly shot to death by a fellow
police officer in Cancun, Quintana Roo state. The attacker later
committed suicide.
* Police found a decapitated body in the trunk of a car in the
Ejidos de San Agustin neighborhood of Chimalhuacan, Mexico state.
The victim*s head had been placed on the trunk lid.
* Two decapitated bodies were found on a soccer field in
Huixquilucan, Mexico state.
Dec. 15
* In a recorded message released to a TV station, La Familia
Michoacana (LFM) leader Servando Gomez Martinez called on his
followers to continue fighting and called for more marches against
the federal government. Gomez Martinez also confirmed the death of
Nazario Gomez in Michoacan state during the week of Dec. 13.
* The dismembered body of a man was found in several bags in
Guadalajara, Jalisco state. A handwritten sign near the victim
attributed the crime to the Jalisco Cartel, New Generation.
* U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement announced the arrests of
eight suspected members of LFM in Georgia and North Carolina. One
of those arrested is believed to be the primary supplier of
illegal drugs for LFM in Washington.
* Unidentified gunmen shot and injured two police officers in
Allende, Nuevo Leon state.
* Authorities were alerted through an anonymous call about three
boxes allegedly containing explosives that were placed near
separate hospitals in Cuernavaca, Morelos state. The boxes
contained clocks inside and were designed to give the appearance
of being explosive devices.
Dec. 16
* Unidentified gunmen opened fire on a police guard post in the Roma
neighborhood of Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state, but did not cause any
injuries.
* One suspected cartel gunman was killed and two bystanders were
injured during a firefight between soldiers and gunmen in the La
Estanzuela neighborhood of Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state.
Dec. 17
* Unidentified gunmen kidnapped two employees from the nightclub
where they worked in Acapulco, Guerrero state. The victims were
later discovered shot to death.
* A decapitated head was discovered wrapped in cloth inside a bag
outside a bar near Texcoco, Mexico state.
* A car with explosives inside was detonated outside a police
station in Zuazua, Nuevo Leon state. Approximately 151 inmates
escaped from a prison in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas state. The
director of the prison was reported missing after the escape.
Dec. 18
* Federal security forces arrested four police officers suspected of
participating in an attack on other police forces in Guadalupe,
Nuevo Leon state on Dec. 16. Ten other officers had been arrested
Dec. 17 for their alleged participation in the attack.
* An e-mail sent to news outlets by a group calling itself the
*Ex-Mysterious Disappearers* announced that former legislator
Diego Fernandez de Cevallos will be freed soon by his kidnappers.
Dec. 19
* Unidentified gunmen forced security personnel to pull back from a
crime scene where a decapitated body was present in Juarez, Nuevo
Leon state. The gunmen reportedly arrived to recover the body.
* Military authorities announced the seizure of a suspected
methamphetamine lab in the municipality of Tuxpan, Jalisco state.
* Authorities announced the arrest of suspected Colombian drug
trafficker Jerson Enrique Camacho Cedeno in an unspecified part of
Mexico. Camacho Cedeno is allegedly linked to Los Zetas.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 20, 2010 6:25:26 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Ethnic Somali Behind Kenya Bus Blast
Stratfor logo
Ethnic Somali Behind Kenya Bus Blast
December 21, 2010 | 0017 GMT
Somali National Behind Kenya Bus Blast
TONY KARUMBA/AFP/Getty Images
Kenyan Police Commissioner Mathew Iteere speaks to the press near the
scene of an attack Dec. 20 in Nairobi
Summary
Uganda*s police chief announced that a *Somali national* was behind an
explosion on a bus in Nairobi destined for Kampala. The information
suggests the Somali jihadist group al Shabaab is to blame.
Analysis
Ugandan Inspector General of Police Kale Kayihura said late Dec. 20
that a *Somali national* was responsible for the explosion earlier
that night on a bus scheduled to depart Nairobi for Kampala. Kayihura
said his Kenyan counterparts informed him of the Somali connection,
though it is possible that it could have been in reference to an
ethnic Somali of a different nationality. Kayihura added that it was
unclear whether the explosion was due to an intentional attack
targeting the bus* passengers, the majority of whom were Ugandan, or
the result of an accidental premature *grenade* explosion. Regardless,
the fact that an ethnic Somali is being listed as the prime suspect
points to the likelihood that Somali jihadist group al Shabaab is to
blame.
As of this writing, the death toll in the explosion stands at three,
with upwards of 39 injured. Media accounts of the incident vary widely
due to confusion at the blast scene. According to some reports, a
struggle occurred at the bus* entrance beforehand, triggered by the
attempts of security officials to search the passengers* luggage and
pat them down as they loaded the bus. This version of events posits
that a box or some other form of luggage containing the explosive
device fell to the ground shortly before the blast, causing it to
detonate. Still others report that a bag was merely being inspected
when the bomb was detonated. Whether the explosion was caused by
accident or design is unknown, while earlier reports stating that four
attackers had thrown grenades onto the bus, with two of them
subsequently shot dead by police, now appear to have been inaccurate.
What is known is that the incident occurred while the bus was parked
in a lot near Nairobi*s Central Business District, waiting for
passengers to board; that multiple assailants were involved; and that
only one of the perpetrators died * the one last holding the package
or luggage that contained the explosive device. Photos of the blast
site seem to indicate that the device was smaller than those used in
the al Shabaab dual suicide bombings in Kampala last July.
The road from Nairobi to Kampala is a known transit point for al
Shabaab materiel, and security officials in both Kenya and Uganda have
operated with a heightened sense of awareness ever since the July
attacks. That security officials (whether they work for the bus
company, Kampala Coach, or the Kenyan government) were inspecting
luggage and searching passengers as they boarded is therefore
unsurprising. (This is not standard operating procedure for most bus
routes in Kenya.) Ten days before the explosion, Ugandan police
discovered a suspicious package containing bomb-making materiel on a
bus in Kampala from Kenya thanks to an advanced intelligence tip.
Kayihura had issued public warnings on both Dec. 15 and earlier Dec.
20 of the possibility that a terrorist attack was being planned in
Kampala, saying in the Dec. 20 interview that Uganda had received
*specific intelligence* about a plot to conduct a terrorist attack in
the country during the upcoming holiday season. He listed al Qaeda, al
Shabaab and Ugandan rebel group Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) as the
possible perpetrators. Just hours before the explosion, Kayihura said
that Ugandan security officials were working with other countries,
specifically Kenya, to combat the threat.
Uganda is the largest contributor to the African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping force stationed in Mogadishu. Kenya, on
the other hand, has not contributed any soldiers to the roughly
8,000-strong mission, and has no plans to do so. While Kenya shares a
border with Somalia and is home to a much larger ethnic Somali
population, Kampala is a bigger target than Nairobi in al Shabaab*s
eyes. This is not only because of its government*s support for AMISOM,
but also because of what the jihadist group would stand to lose by
triggering an immense crackdown by the Kenyan government in what is
known to be an important al Shabaab logistics and fundraising hub. If
this device was indeed intentionally detonated in Nairobi, it was most
likely the result of the attacker deciding at the last minute to do
so, after the struggle with the security officials had begun.
Kenyan authorities continue to work to identify the identities of the
suspects involved, and reportedly have arrested at least one person in
connection with the blast as he attempted to flee down a nearby
street. One piece of luggage linked to the group has been recovered.
As the bus company has a list of all the passenger names, it is likely
that the information will be revealed shortly, though there could be a
delay due to the possibility that the assailants used false
identification. As usual in Nairobi following any sort of violence
involving Somalis, a security crackdown in the ethnic Somali
neighborhood of Eastleigh will ensue. The Ugandans will also increase
security in Kampala for the duration of the holiday season.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 21, 2010 4:07:12 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Geopolitical Weekly : Europe: The New Plan
Stratfor logo
Europe: The New Plan
December 21, 2010
Taking Stock of WikiLeaks
By Peter Zeihan
Europe is on the cusp of change. An EU heads-of-state summit Dec. 16
launched a process aimed to save the common European currency. If
successful, this process would be the most significant step toward
creating a singular European power since the creation of the European
Union itself in 1992 * that is, if it doesn*t destroy the euro first.
Envisioned by the EU Treaty on Monetary Union, the common currency,
the euro, has suffered from two core problems during its decade-long
existence: the lack of a parallel political union and the issue of
debt. Many in the financial world believe that what is required for a
viable currency is a fiscal union that has taxation power * and that
is indeed needed. But that misses the larger point of who would be in
charge of the fiscal union. Taxation and appropriation * who pays how
much to whom * are essentially political acts. One cannot have a
centralized fiscal authority without first having a centralized
political/military authority capable of imposing and enforcing its
will. Greeks are not going to implement a German-designed tax and
appropriations system simply because Berlin thinks it*s a good idea.
As much as financiers might like to believe, the checkbook is not the
ultimate power in the galaxy. The ultimate power comes from the law
backed by a gun.
Europe*s Disparate Parts
This isn*t a revolutionary concept * in fact, it is one most people
know well at some level. Americans fought the bloodiest war in their
history from 1861 to 1865 over the issue of central power versus local
power. What emerged was a state capable of functioning at the
international level. It took three similar European wars * also in the
19th century * for the dozens of German principalities finally to
merge into what we now know as Germany.
Europe simply isn*t to the point of willing conglomeration just yet,
and we do not use the American Civil War or German unification wars as
comparisons lightly. STRATFOR sees the peacetime creation of a unified
European political authority as impossible, since Europe*s component
parts are far more varied than those of mid-19th century America or
Germany.
* Northern Europe is composed of advanced technocratic economies,
made possible by the capital-generating capacity of the
well-watered North European Plain and its many navigable rivers
(it is much cheaper to move goods via water than land, and this
advantage grants nations situated on such waterways a steady
supply of surplus capital). As a rule, northern Europe prefers a
strong currency in order to attract investment to underwrite the
high costs of advanced education, first-world infrastructure and a
highly technical industrial plant. Thus, northern European exports
* heavily value added * are not inhibited greatly by a strong
currency. One of the many outcomes of this development pattern is
a people that identifies with its brethren throughout the river
valleys and in other areas linked by what is typically omnipresent
infrastructure. This crafts a firm identity at the national level
rather than local level and assists with mass-mobilization
strategies. Consequently, size is everything.
* Southern Europe, in comparison, suffers from an arid, rugged
topography and lack of navigable rivers. This lack of rivers does
more than deny them a local capital base, it also inhibits
political unification; lacking clear core regions, most of these
states face the political problems of the European Union in
microcosm. Here, identity is more localized; southern Europeans
tend to be more concerned with family and town than nation, since
they do not benefit from easy transport options or the regular
contact that northern Europeans take for granted. Their economies
reflect this, with integration occurring only locally (there is
but one southern European equivalent of the great northern
industrial mega-regions such as the Rhine, Italy*s Po Valley).
Bereft of economies of scale, southern European economies are
highly dependent upon a weak currency to make their exports
competitive abroad and to make every incoming investment dollar or
deutschemark work to maximum effect.
* Central Europe * largely former Soviet territories * have yet
different rules of behavior. Some countries, like Poland, fit in
well with the northern Europeans, but they require outside defense
support in order to maintain their positions. The frigid weather
of the Baltics limits population sizes, demoting these countries
to being, at best, the economic satellites of larger powers
(they*re hoping for Sweden while fearing it will be Russia).
Bulgaria and Romania are a mix of north and south, sitting astride
Europe*s longest navigable river yet being so far removed from the
European core that their successful development may depend upon
events in Turkey, a state that is not even an EU member. While
states of this grouping often plan together for EU summits, in
reality the only thing they have in common is a half-century of
lost ground to recover, and they need as much capital as can be
made available. As such variation might suggest, some of these
states are in the eurozone, while others are unlikely to join
within the next decade.
And that doesn*t even begin to include the EU states that have
actively chosen to refuse the euro * Denmark, Sweden and the United
Kingdom * or consider the fact that the European Union is now made up
of 27 different nationalities that jealously guard their political
(and in most cases, fiscal) autonomy.
The point is this: With Europe having such varied geographies,
economies and political systems, any political and fiscal union would
be fraught with complications and policy mis-prescriptions from the
start. In short, this is a defect of the euro that is not going to be
corrected, and to be blunt, it isn*t one that the Europeans are trying
to fix right now.
The Debt Problem
If anything, they are attempting to craft a work-around by addressing
the second problem: debt. Monetary union means that all participating
states are subject to the dictates of a single central bank, in this
case the European Central Bank (ECB) headquartered in Frankfurt. The
ECB*s primary (and only partially stated) mission is to foster
long-term stable growth in the eurozone*s largest economy * Germany *
working from the theory that what is good for the continent*s economic
engine is good for Europe.
One impact of this commitment is that Germany*s low interest rates are
applied throughout the currency zone, even to states with mediocre
income levels, lower educational standards, poorer infrastructure and
little prospect for long-term growth. Following their entry into the
eurozone, capital-starved southern Europeans used to interest rates in
the 10-15 percent range found themselves in an environment of rates in
the 2-5 percent range (currently it is 1.0 percent). To translate that
into a readily identifiable benefit, that equates to a reduction in
monthly payments for a standard 30-year mortgage of more than 60
percent.
As the theory goes, the lower costs of capital will stimulate
development in the peripheral states and allow them to catch up to
Germany. But these countries traditionally suffer from higher interest
rates for good reasons. Smaller, poorer economies are more volatile,
since even tiny changes in the international environment can send them
through either the floor or the roof. Higher risks and volatility mean
higher capital costs. Their regionalization also engenders high
government spending as the central government attempts to curb the
propensity of the regions to spin away from the center (essentially,
the center bribes the regions to remain in the state).
This means that when the eurozone spread to these places, theory went
out the window. In practice, growth in the periphery did accelerate,
but that growth was neither smooth nor sustainable. The unification of
capital costs has proved more akin to giving an American Express black
card to a college freshman: Traditionally capital poor states (and
citizens) have a propensity to overspend in situations where borrowing
costs are low, due to a lack of a relevant frame of reference. The
result has been massive credit binging by corporations, consumers and
governments alike, inevitably leading to bubbles in a variety of
sectors. And just as these states soared high in the first decade
after the euro was introduced, they have crashed low in the past year.
The debt crises of 2010 * so far precipitating government debt
bailouts for Ireland and Greece and an unprecedented bank bailout in
Ireland * can be laid at the feet of this euro-instigated
over-exuberance.
It is this second, debt-driven shortcoming that European leaders
discussed Dec. 16. None of them want to do away with the euro at this
point, and it is easy to see why. While the common currency remains a
popular whipping boy in domestic politics, its benefits * mainly lower
transaction costs, higher purchasing power, unfettered market access
and cheaper and more abundant capital * are deeply valued by all
participating governments. The question is not *whither the euro* but
how to provide a safety net for the euro*s less desirable,
debt-related aftereffects. The agreed-upon path is to create a
mechanism that can manage a bailout even for the eurozone*s larger
economies when their debt mountains become too imposing. In theory,
this would contain the contradictory pressures the euro has created
while still providing to the entire zone the euro*s many benefits.
Obstacles to the Safety Net
Three complications exist, however. First, when a bailout is required,
it is clearly because something has gone terribly wrong. In Greece*s
case, it was out-of-control government spending with no thought to the
future; in essence, Athens took that black card and leapt straight
into the economic abyss. In Ireland*s case, it was private-sector
overindulgence, which bubbled the size of the financial sector to more
than four times the entire country*s gross domestic product. In both
cases, recovery was flat-out impossible without the countries*
eurozone partners stepping in and declaring some sort of debt holiday,
and the result was a complete funding of all Greek and Irish deficit
spending for three years while they get their houses in order.
*Houses in order* are the key words here. When the not-so-desperate
eurozone states step in with a few billion euros * 223 billion euros
so far, to be exact * they want not only their money back but also
some assurance that such overindulgences will not happen again. The
result is a deep series of policy requirements that must be adopted if
the bailout money is to be made available. Broadly known as austerity
measures, these requirements result in deep cuts to social services,
retirement benefits and salaries. They are not pleasant. Put simply:
Germany is attempting to trade financial benefits for the right to
make policy adjustments that normally would be handed by a political
union.
Europe: The New Plan
(click here to enlarge image)
It*s a pretty slick plan, but it is not happening in a vacuum.
Remember, there are two more complications. The second is that the
Dec. 16 agreement is only an agreement in principle. Before any
Champagne corks are popped, one should consider that the *details* of
the agreement raise a more than *simply* trillion-euro question.
STRATFOR guesses that to deliver on its promises, the permanent
bailout fund (right now there is a temporary fund with a *mere* 750
billion euros) probably would need upwards of three trillion euros.
Why so much? The debt bailouts for Greece and Ireland were designed to
completely sequester those states from debt markets by providing those
governments with all of the cash they would need to fund their budgets
for three years. This wise move has helped keep the contagion from
spreading to the rest of the eurozone. Making any fund credible means
applying that precedent to all the eurozone states facing high debt
pressures, and using the most current data available, that puts the
price tag at just under 2.2 trillion euros. Add in enough extra so
that the eurozone has sufficient ammo left to fight any contagion and
we*re looking at a cool 3 trillion euros. Anti-crisis measures to this
point have enjoyed the assistance of both the ECB and the
International Monetary Fund, but so far, the headline figures have
been rather restrained when compared to future needs. Needless to say,
the process of coming up with funds of that magnitude when it is
becoming obvious to the rest of Europe that this is, at its heart, a
German power play is apt to be contentious at best.
The third complication is that the bailout mechanism is actually only
half the plan. The other half is to allow states to at least partially
default on their debt (in EU diplomatic parlance, this is called the
*inclusion of private interests in funding the bailouts*). When the
investors who fund eurozone sovereign debt markets hear this, they
understandably shudder, since it means the European Union plans to
codify giving states permission to walk away from their debts *
sticking investors with the losses. This too is more than simply a
trillion-euro question. Private investors collectively own nearly all
of the eurozone*s 7.5 trillion euros in outstanding sovereign debt.
And in the case of Italy, Austria, Belgium, Portugal and Greece, debt
volumes worth half or more of GDP for each individual state are held
by foreigners.
Assuming investors decide it is worth the risk to keep purchasing
government debt, they have but one way to mitigate this risk: charge
higher premiums. The result will be higher debt financing costs for
all, doubly so for the eurozone*s more spendthrift and/or weaker
economies.
For most of the euro*s era, the interest rates on government bonds
have been the same throughout the eurozone, based on the inaccurate
belief that eurozone states would all be as fiscally conservative and
economically sound as Germany. That belief has now been shattered, and
the rate on Greek and Irish debt has now risen from 4.5 percent in
early 2008 to this week*s 11.9 percent and 8.6 percent, respectively.
With a formal default policy in the making, those rates are going to
go higher yet. In the era before monetary union became the Europeans*
goal, Greek and Irish government debt regularly went for 20 percent
and 10 percent, respectively. Continued euro membership may well put a
bit of downward pressure on these rates, but that will be more than
overwhelmed by the fact that both countries are, in essence, in
financial conservatorship.
Europe: The New Plan
(click here to enlarge image)
That is not just a problem for the post-2013 world, however. Because
investors now know the European Union intends to stick them with at
least part of the bill, they are going to demand higher returns as
details of the default plan are made known, both on any new debt and
on any pre-existing debt that comes up for refinancing. This means
that states that just squeaked by in 2010 must run a more difficult
gauntlet in 2011 * particularly if they depend heavily on foreign
investors for funding their budget deficits. All will face higher
financing and refinancing costs as investors react to the coming
European disclosures on just how much the private sector will be
expected to contribute.
Leaving out the two states that have already received bailouts (Greece
and Ireland), the four eurozone states STRATFOR figures face the most
trouble * Portugal, Belgium, Spain and Austria, in that order * plan
to raise or refinance a quarter trillion euros in 2011 alone. Italy
and France, two heavyweights not that far from the danger zone, plan
to raise another half-trillion euros between them. If the past is any
guide, the weaker members of this quartet could face financing costs
of double what they*ve faced as recently as early 2008. For some of
these states, such higher costs could be enough to push them into the
bailout bin even if there is no additional investor skittishness.
The existing bailout mechanism probably can handle the first four
states (just barely, and assuming it works as advertised), but beyond
that, the rest of the eurozone will have to come up with a
multitrillion-euro fund in an environment in which private investors
are likely to balk. Undoubtedly, the euro needs a new mechanism to
survive. But by coming up with one that scares those who make
government deficit-spending possible, the Europeans have all but
guaranteed that Europe*s financial crisis will get much worse before
it begins to improve.
But let*s assume for a moment that this all works out, that the euro
survives to the day that the new mechanism will be in place to support
it. Consider what such a 2013 eurozone would look like if the rough
design agreed to Dec. 16 becomes a reality. All of the states flirting
with bailouts as 2010 draws to a close expect to have even higher debt
loads two years from now. Hence, investors will have imposed punishing
financing costs on all of them. Alone among the major eurozone
countries not facing such costs will be Germany, the country that
wrote the bailout rules and is indirectly responsible for managing the
bailouts enacted to this point. Berlin will command the purse strings
and the financial rules, yet be unfettered by those rules or the
higher financing costs that go with them. Such control isn*t quite a
political union, but so long as the rest of the eurozone is willing to
trade financial sovereignty for the benefits of the euro, it is
certainly the next best thing.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Reprinting or republication of this report on websites is authorized
by prominently displaying the following sentence at the beginning or
end of the report, including the hyperlink to STRATFOR:
"This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR"
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 21, 2010 5:50:32 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: The Implications of Iranian Assertiveness Toward Pakistan
[IMG]
Tuesday, December 21, 2010 [IMG] STRATFOR.COM [IMG] Diary Archives
The Implications of Iranian Assertiveness Toward Pakistan
The Middle East and South Asia have no shortage of conflicts and on
any given day there are developments on multiple issues. Monday,
however, was different: Another fault line appeared to emerge. Iranian
leaders used some very stern language in demanding that Pakistan act
against the Sunni Baluchi Islamist militant group Jundallah, which
recently staged suicide attacks against Shiite religious gatherings in
the Iranian port city of Chahbahar.
The Islamic republic*s senior-most military leader, Chief of the Joint
Staff Command of Iran*s Armed Forces Maj. Gen. Hassan Firouzabadi,
threatened that Tehran would take unilateral action if Islamabad
failed to prevent cross-border terrorism. Separately, Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called his Pakistani counterpart, Asif
Ali Zardari, and demanded that Pakistani security forces apprehend
*known terrorists* and hand them over to Iranian authorities. This is
not the first time that Jundallah has become a source of tension
between the two neighbors. However, this time, the Iranian response
was different: The apex leadership of Iran threatened to take matters
into its own hands.
It*s even more interesting that the latest Jundallah attack was not
that significant, especially compared to the attack from a little more
a year ago when as many as half a dozen senior generals from the
ground forces of Iran*s elite military force, the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps, were killed in a Jundallah attack in the
border town of Pishin. At the time, however, Iran was much more mild
in terms of pressing Pakistan to take action against Jundallah. Over
the years, there has also been significant cooperation between Tehran
and Islamabad leading to arrests of the group*s leaders and main
operatives, including its founders.
*Tehran is likely concerned about how the deteriorating security
situation in Pakistan will impact its own security and sees a
situation in which it can enhance its influence in its southeastern
neighbor.*
Why is Iran now escalating matters with Pakistan? The answer likely
has to do with the Iranian government feeling confident in other
foreign policy areas. It has been successful in having a
Shiite-dominated government of its preference installed in Iraq. Also,
for the first time, it appears to be negotiating from a position of
relative strength on the nuclear issue.
Iran is also a major regional stakeholder in Afghanistan and a
competitor of Pakistan there. It is therefore likely that Iran is now
flexing its muscles on its eastern flank to showcase its regional
rise. The Iranians have also been watching the fairly rapid
destabilization that has taken place in Pakistan in recent years and
sense both a threat and an opportunity. Tehran is likely concerned
about how the deteriorating security situation in Pakistan will impact
its own security and sees a situation in which it can enhance its
influence in its southeastern neighbor.
It is too early to say anything about how Iran will go about
projecting power across its frontier with Pakistan. However, there are
geopolitical implications from this new Iranian assertiveness. The
most serious one is obviously for Pakistan, which already has to deal
with U.S. forces engaging in cross-border action along the country*s
northwestern border with Afghanistan. Islamabad can*t afford pressures
from Tehran on the southwestern extension of that border (an area
where Pakistan is dealing with its own Baluchi rebellion). Any such
move on the part of Iran could encourage India to increase pressure on
its border with Pakistan. After all, India is a much bigger target of
Pakistani-based militants than Iran, but has thus far not been able to
get Pakistan to yield to its demands on cracking down on anti-India
militants. New Delhi would love to take advantage of this new dynamic
developing between Islamabad and Tehran.
At the very least, Monday*s Iranian statements reinforce perceptions
that Pakistan is a state infested by Islamist militants of various
stripes that threaten pretty much every country that shares a border
with it (including Pakistan*s closest ally, China). Certainly,
Pakistan doesn*t want to see problems on a third border and will try
to address Iranian concerns. But the Pakistani situation is such that
it is unlikely that Islamabad will be able to placate Tehran.
In terms of ramifications, Monday*s developments are actually not
limited to only those countries that have a border with Pakistan.
Iranian demands on Pakistan have likely set off alarm bells in Saudi
Arabia, which is already terrified of Iran*s rise in the Persian Gulf
region and the Levant. Pakistan constitutes a major Saudi sphere of
influence and Riyadh is not about to let Tehran play in the South Asia
country. Pakistan has been a Saudi-Iranian proxy battleground since
the 1980s and the latest Iranian statements could intensify the
Sunni-Shiite sectarian conflict in the country.
Increased sectarian conflict in Pakistan will only exacerbate the
jihadist insurgency in the country, thereby further eroding internal
stability. Such a situation is extremely problematic for the United
States, which is already trying to contain a rising Iran and has a
complex love-hate relationship with Pakistan. There is also the
problem that the success of America*s Afghan strategy is contingent
upon Washington establishing a balance of power between Iran and
Pakistan in Afghanistan.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 21, 2010 8:17:30 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: A Pakistani Response to the U.S. Annual Review
Stratfor logo
A Pakistani Response to the U.S. Annual Review
December 21, 2010 | 1310 GMT
A Pakistani Response to the U.S. Annual Review
AAMIR QURESHI/AFP/Getty Images
Pakistani soldiers patrol near the Afghan border
Summary
The recently released overview of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual
Review found Pakistan essential to U.S. success in Afghanistan. Highly
placed Pakistani officials took issue with the criticism of Pakistan
found in the report, and instead put the blame for U.S. failures in
Afghanistan on Washington itself.
Analysis
The overview of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual Review ordered by
U.S. President Barack Obama and released early Dec. 16 is, for obvious
reasons, of great interest to Islamabad. The review reiterated that
the success of the U.S. strategy for Afghanistan is dependent upon
Islamabad taking action against Afghan Taliban forces based on
Pakistani soil.
Unsurprisingly, many in Pakistan took issue with criticism of Pakistan
found in the report.
Alongside the review, the three most senior officials in the U.S.
government, President Barack Obama, Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton, and Defense Secretary Roberts Gates, each issued separate
statements pressing Pakistan for cooperation on ending the militant
safe-havens in the country. Meanwhile, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen and commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan
Gen. David Petraeus were both in Pakistan last week on separate visits
to discuss the matter. Today, the head of U.S. Transportation Command,
Gen. Duncan McNabb, met with Pakistan*s army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani
to discuss the issue of the safety of supply routes, which Islamabad
recently shut down for ten days in retaliation for a Sept. 30 NATO
helicopter attack in Kurram agency of the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) that killed three Pakistani paramilitary soldiers.
Elsewhere, there appears to be a struggle of sorts going on between
U.S. and Pakistani intelligence agencies. The CIA station chief in
Islamabad was forced to leave the country after he was named in a
class-action lawsuit brought about by relatives of civilians killed
during one of the many UAV strikes that have taken place in recent
years in the Pakistani tribal badlands. This development follows
shortly after the head of Pakistan*s foreign intelligence service, the
Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja
Pasha, was accused of being involved in the 2008 attacks in Mumbai in
a civil lawsuit brought about by family members of the rabbi killed
alongside his wife by Pakistani-based Islamist militants.
In the light of these growing tensions between the two allies, it is
expected that Pakistan would respond to U.S. pressure. Senior and
well-placed sources in Islamabad tell STRATFOR that they have huge
disagreements with the conclusions of the strategy review report,
which the Pakistanis see more as an American effort to conceal its
failures in Afghanistan. (STRATFOR does not take these claims at face
value, as Pakistan has its own geopolitical reasons for supporting the
Afghan Taliban.)
According to these sources, Western military strategy in Afghanistan
has failed because of an inadequate political strategy. The failure to
give adequate representation to the Pashtuns, who make up the majority
of the Taliban, in the Afghan government has been as serious a problem
as the insurgents* refusal to engage in pitched battles (where Western
forces would enjoy an enormous advantage).
The sources also deny that Pakistan provides sanctuary for al Qaeda
and the Taliban while acknowledging the groups have some presence on
the border with Afghanistan. They point out the large number of
Pakistan military forces deployed along the border, around 140,000, is
not consistent with accusations of militant sanctuary. Moreover, they
argue that Pakistan has engaged in major military operations in six
out of seven Pakistani tribal subdivisions adjoining Afghanistan, with
significant deployments even in North Waziristan where operations in
areas like Shawal and Razmak are in process. The sources say that
North Waziristan is very much part of the country*s national
counterinsurgency strategy but Pakistan cannot, however, mount a
scorched-earth policy against its own population in the area*s major
cities like Mir Ali and Miranshah.
They also point to the 900 Pakistani military posts covering most
natural border crossings. Afghanistan, by contrast, has failed to stop
the cross-border movement of militants, with a mere 150 posts on the
Afghan side of the border that destabilizes adjoining areas in
Pakistan. Militants enjoy a haven even in the border regions of
Afghanistan under International Security Assistance Force control. For
example, after the Pakistan military*s operations in the FATA and the
greater Swat region in 2009, senior Pakistani Taliban rebel leaders
Maulvi Faqir, Qari Ziaur Rehman, Abdul Wali and Maulana Fazlullah were
able to take shelter in Afghanistan*s Kunar province. The sources
conclude that these militants are receiving money for arms in the form
of payoffs from drug dealers who operate in areas that should be
secure given the presence and operations of Western forces.
The sources questioned why those militants who do succeed in sneaking
into the Afghan side and need to travel more than 60 kilometers (about
37 miles) inside Afghanistan to reach their targets can cover the
distance despite satellite-based surveillance. The sources claimed
that this is evidence that ISAF forces do not have much control on the
Afghan side and that Pakistan therefore should not be singled out as
the factor behind the problems faced by coalition forces in
Afghanistan.
Essentially, the sources are trying to argue that Washington is trying
to hide its own failures with the report. This view from Islamabad *
at a time when the Americans need greater Pakistani cooperation * is
an indication that U.S.-Pakistani dealings on Afghanistan could likely
be plagued by significant problems in 2011, which will be a litmus
test to gauge the effectiveness of the American strategy for the
Afghan war.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 21, 2010 11:31:35 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: An Iraqi Government Under Construction
Stratfor logo
An Iraqi Government Under Construction
December 21, 2010 | 1643 GMT
An Iraqi Government Takes Shape
-/AFP/Getty Images
Iraqi Parliament Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi (L) and Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki in Baghdad on Dec. 20
Summary
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has been reappointed for a second
term, and his preliminary choices for Cabinet members were approved by
the Iraqi Parliament. While an important step, some of the key
ministries have yet to be filled. Even though the three main blocs in
the country * the Kurds, the Shiite-dominated National Alliance and
the Sunni-backed al-Iraqiya List * have reached an agreement in
principle on a new government, the role of the proposed National
Council for Strategic Policies, which aims to give Sunnis a greater
say in state affairs, could become a battleground both on how the
country divides its power among Iraqi ethno-sectarian groups and the
country*s role in the region.
Analysis
The Iraqi Parliament on Dec. 21 approved a second term for Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki and gave its endorsement to his preliminary
Cabinet lineup.
Baghdad has been without a government since the March 7 parliamentary
elections, and while al-Maliki securing a second term is an important
step, the work of forming a new government is not yet complete. A
number of key security portfolios * interior, defense and national
security * have not been filled, and until permanent ministers are
appointed to the three, the premier himself will run them. Nearly a
third of the Cabinet members are only interim appointees, and
jockeying to fill the positions permanently will continue for some
time.
Thus far, 29 Cabinet members have been approved for the 42 open
positions. Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, representing the Kurdish
bloc, retained his post. The Kurds have also reportedly received
assurances from al-Maliki on their demands to settle territorial
disputes in the north, the conflict over control of energy resources
and other matters related to consolidating Kurdish autonomy in the
north. These promises to the Kurds could create headaches for
al-Maliki later on, as stronger Kurdish authority in the north will
come at the expense of the Sunnis in the contested areas.
However, the Sunnis were also able to gain a more significant share of
the Cabinet. The Shia gave up the finance ministry to the Sunni-backed
al-Iraqiya List, with former Deputy Prime Minister Rafi al-Issawi
assuming the post. And Saleh al-Mutlaq, a key Sunni leader who until
recently was barred from politics over alleged Baathist ties, has
assumed the post of deputy prime minister.
The Shia retained the oil ministry, with Abdul Karim al-Luaibi
stepping into the post, and further enhanced their control over the
energy sector, with outgoing Oil Minister Hussein Shahristani to head
the newly created deputy prime ministry for energy affairs. Al-Maliki
could not reach an understanding with Shiite Islamist leader Muqtada
al-Sadr on which specific lawmakers from the Sadrite political party,
al-Ahrar, would take up the posts allocated to the movement. The
Sadrites are the single largest individual Shia bloc, controlling 40
of the 159 parliamentary seats held by the National Alliance, and
their failure to reach an agreement with al-Maliki on a role in
government indicates that intra-Shia issues remain despite the merger
that created the super-Shiite bloc.
The fact that al-Iraqiya List head Iyad Allawi issued a statement of
support for the new government indicates the three ethno-sectarian
groups have reached an agreement in principle on dividing the
government in a manner that will give the Sunnis a significant stake
in a state that has been dominated by the Shia and the Kurds since the
U.S. invasion in 2003. But because simply giving the Sunnis their
allotted share of ministries would not translate into much power (the
most important ministries, other than the finance ministry, have been
promised to Shiite and Kurdish parties so far), a new body aimed at
easing Sunni concerns is being formed called the National Council for
Strategic Policies (NCSP).
Allawi himself will head the NCSP, and its size, composition, scope
and powers relative to the rest of the government have yet to be
agreed upon. As the body has not yet even been formed yet, it will be
critical to watch what authority, or lack thereof, it is given over
state affairs. The eventual shape and influence of the NCSP may be an
indicator of the direction of the ethno-sectarian conflict within the
country and the wider U.S.-Iranian struggle over influence in the
region.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 21, 2010 4:20:31 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: A Week in the War: Afghanistan, Dec. 15-21, 2010
Stratfor logo
A Week in the War: Afghanistan, Dec. 15-21, 2010
December 21, 2010 | 2205 GMT
A Week in the War: Afghanistan, Dec. 8-14, 2010
STRATFOR
STRATFOR BOOK
* Afghanistan at the Crossroads: Insights on the Conflict
Related Special Topic Page
* The War in Afghanistan
U.S. Afghan Strategy Review
On Dec. 16, the United States released its long-anticipated
Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual Review, which * as expected * provided
grounds for continuing the counterinsurgency-focused strategy. The
review called for the handover of security to Afghans by 2014
(consistent with President Barack Obama*s announcement at the NATO
summit in Lisbon last month), repeated U.S. resolve to *disrupt,
dismantle and defeat* al Qaeda and declared that progress has been
made toward achieving these goals.
The review conceded that al Qaeda continues to conduct operations
against the United States and its allies and *inspire regional
affiliates* to do the same but noted the progress Pakistan has made in
operations along the Afghan-Pakistani border. The review also
acknowledged that the U.S. strategy needs to be adjusted to deny
*extremist safe-havens* in Pakistan and that greater cooperation from
Pakistan is necessary to achieve this end. Details of a new U.S.
National Intelligence Estimate on Afghanistan and Pakistan indicate
that the intelligence community takes a more negative view of
Pakistan*s intransigence and inability to cooperate. The annual
strategy review on Afghanistan and Pakistan mentioned that President
Obama and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari will exchange visits in
the coming year as a way to strengthen cooperation between the two
countries.
The past year has been a rocky one for the U.S.-Pakistani
relationship. Both countries have simultaneously criticized and
praised each other for their counterterrorism efforts along the
Afghan-Pakistani border. Pakistan was set back by devastating floods
in late summer that temporarily halted military advances intended to
deny militants the safe-havens mentioned in the review. Then, a series
of cross-border incidents led the Pakistani government to close the
border crossing at Torkham, which temporarily suspended the supply
line of critical materiel needed by troops in Afghanistan. While the
closing did not appear to impact operations of the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, it did emphasize the
important role that Pakistan must play if the Taliban are to be split
from al Qaeda and if al Qaeda is to be defeated in the border area.
Kabul and Kunduz Bombings
On the morning of Dec. 19, the Taliban carried out seemingly
coordinated attacks against Afghan army targets in Kunduz and Kabul.
At approximately 6:30 a.m. local time, a suicide bomber detonated a
device he was carrying at the entrance to an Afghan National Army
recruiting center in Kunduz. After the explosion, three more gunmen
dressed in Afghan army uniforms began firing on the compound.
Responding security forces eventually neutralized two of the gunmen,
but the third gained entry into the compound and caused fighting to go
on for most of the day. He finally detonated his suicide vest, ending
the assault. The Kunduz deputy police chief said that the attackers
killed four Afghan soldiers and four police constables.
A Week in the War: Afghanistan, Dec. 15-21, 2010
(click here to enlarge image)
At about the same time that morning, two suicide bombers attacked a
bus carrying Afghan army officers on the outskirts of Kabul. The two
assailants reportedly first opened fire on the bus as it was traveling
down Jalalabad Road toward the center of the city. One of the
assailants was able to detonate his suicide vest near the bus, while
the second man was shot by soldiers before he could detonate his vest.
The attack on the bus killed five Afghan officers and wounded nine
others. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid claimed responsibility
for both the attacks later in the day via telephone.
These were the first major attacks in Kunduz since July and in Kabul
since May. Both cities are prone to periodic Taliban raids, which are
thought to be orchestrated mainly by the Haqqani faction of Taliban
fighters that operates in northeastern Afghanistan. However, neither
of the two Dec. 19 attacks measures up to past Taliban assaults in the
two cities. In July, six suicide bombers attacked a USAID office in
Kunduz, killing four security personnel, including an American soldier
and a British soldier. In Kabul, a suicide bomber detonated a
vehicle-borne improvised explosive device targeting an ISAF convoy in
May, killing five U.S. soldiers and one Canadian soldier. Twelve other
Afghans were also killed in the blast.
The two attacks that we saw on Dec. 19, coming so soon after President
Obama affirmed the U.S. commitment to its year-old strategy in
Afghanistan, had some symbolic value, but they did not demonstrate any
new capability. Some level of violence is to be expected from time to
time in relatively secure areas like Kunduz and Kabul. The question is
the impact of occasional violence. The Afghan government can function
and the U.S.-led counterinsurgency can continue with a low level of
insurgent violence in key areas, but if the violence cannot be
contained and managed, and if it begins to negatively impact U.N.,
USAID and other international development efforts that are critical in
reshaping the economic and political dynamics in the country, then the
Taliban can significantly undermine the American strategy.
It is clear that Taliban activity is spreading northward as U.S.-led
efforts in the southwest intensify. As we have long argued, this is in
keeping with classic guerrilla strategy. But if the ISAF can dictate
terms in the southwest, in the Taliban*s home territory, until it
hands over power to the Afghans as planned in 2014, the movement could
be seriously weakened. So the Taliban must do two things: maintain
pressure on foreign troops to withdraw by inflicting casualties
wherever and whenever possible and do something dramatic to impact
ISAF operations in the southwest. What was achieved in Kunduz and
Kabul did neither. We will watch Taliban activity closely throughout
the winter and after the spring thaw to understand how the movement
will try to hasten a U.S. withdrawal and reclaim lost territory.
Afghan Security Adviser Stepping Down
The Afghan news outlet Hasht-e-Sobh reported Dec. 19 that Afghan
National Security Adviser Rangin Dadfar Spanta has told President
Hamid Karzai that he intends to resign his position. This follows
reports that President Karzai wanted to remove Spanta in early
November. Spanta is one of the last members of Karzai*s inner circle
who is anti-Pakistan, anti-Taliban and pro-Iran. As Karzai navigates
the negotiation process with the Taliban, Spanta*s pending departure
could open the way for a more pro-Pakistan, pro-Taliban replacement.
The move could also reflect a larger shift by the Karzai
administration toward cooperating with Pakistan and reconciling with
the Taliban.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 21, 2010 5:38:14 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Germany's Moldova Foray
Stratfor logo
Germany's Moldova Foray
December 21, 2010 | 2300 GMT
Germany's Moldova Foray Signals Russia
MICHAEL GOTTSCHALK/AFP/Getty Images
Moldovan Prime Minister Vladimir Filat (R) visits German Chancellor
Angela Merkel in Berlin in May
German Minister of State in the Foreign Ministry Werner Hoyer paid a
one-day visit to Moldova on Dec. 21, meeting with Moldovan Minister of
Foreign Affairs and European Integration Iurie Leanca.
The visit by Hoyer * an important figure in German government and a
mainstay for the last 20 years in foreign affairs of center-right
German governments * indicates Germany has real interests in Moldova.
It also suggests Berlin is not satisfied leaving the formation of a
pro-European government to just Poland and Sweden, whose foreign
ministers * Radislaw Sikorski and Carl Bildt, respectively * visited
Moldova on Dec. 8. Hoyer*s visit is also meant to signal Russia that
Germany has not forgotten about Moldova, and that Berlin can throw its
weight around in the strategic country, too.
Hoyer*s trip comes as Moldova continues the process of forming a
ruling coalition following contentious parliamentary elections in
November. The country remains split between the pro-Russian Communist
Party and an array of pro-Western, or opportunistic, parties that
formerly comprised the ruling Alliance for European Integration (AEI).
While the coalition wrangling continues, Russia has thrown its weight
behind a Communist/Democratic Party coalition, which would join former
President Vladimir Voronin with Marian Lupu, both of whom have shown
pro-Russian leanings. The Europeans, on the other hand, favor
excluding the Communists and retaining a pro-European coalition, a
message delivered during Sikorski and Bildt*s visit.
Germany's Moldova Foray
But Poland and Sweden, although leaders of the thus-far underwhelming
European Union Eastern Partnership policy, are not exactly European
geopolitical heavyweights. They cannot alone offer the financial and
political incentives for Moldova to align with the EU.
When deciding whether to align with Russia or Europe, Moldovan
politicians want to know that Europe is committed to a pro-European
Moldova at the highest echelon of power, which means Berlin. For
Berlin to dispatch a statesman of Hoyer*s heft thus can be taken as a
sign that Germany is getting involved in Moldova more directly and has
decided to proactively support the creation of a pro-European
coalition in Chisinau.
This is not Berlin*s first foray into the small, but strategic,
country. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has listed the breakaway
republic of Transdniestria as a key test to Russia*s cooperation with
Europe under the guise of a possible European Security Treaty. The
Moldova foray, however, represents Germany*s most direct move in the
region.
Actively supporting a pro-European government in Moldova as opposed to
leaving the matter to Poland and Sweden could signal Russia that
Germany has not forgotten about the contested former Soviet peripheral
region. While Berlin*s moves in this regard thus far have been subtle,
Germany could choose to become more active in the region * and the
Moldovan arena will be one of the most significant tests of the
ongoing German-Russian dynamic in the upcoming year.
The ultimate makeup of the Moldovan government is no longer just
significant in terms of who has more influence in Chisinau, Russia or
the Europeans, but as very concrete evidence of who has more power to
influence the affairs of states on the borderlands of Europe and
Russia in broader terms.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 21, 2010 6:54:27 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Somali Jihadist Groups Merge
Stratfor logo
Somali Jihadist Groups Merge
December 22, 2010 | 0045 GMT
Somali Jihadist Groups Merge
ABDURASHID ABDULLE ABIKAR/AFP/Getty Images
Hizbul Islam forces walk next to rubble while on patrol in a sector of
Mogadishu on Nov. 1
Summary
Somali jihadist group al Shabaab has absorbed rival group Hizbul Islam
after weeks of clashes in southwest Somalia. While one leading faction
of al Shabaab initially criticized the fighting, the disparate
elements of the group remained united in the end, indicating that
while jockeying among al Shabaab*s power players will continue, they
also understand they need one another to maximize their strength.
Analysis
A day after Somali Islamist militia Hizbul Islam announced that it was
joining rival group al Shabaab *politically and militarily,* STRATFOR
sources reported Dec. 21 that Hizbul Islam*s top leadership would be
given merely ceremonial positions in the newly enlarged jihadist
group. This announcement, which signifies the de facto end of the core
of Hizbul Islam, comes just months after reports that it had been
engaged in talks to form a new militant group with a would-be
breakaway faction of al Shabaab. Instead, al Shabaab*s overall leader,
Amhad Abdi Godane, aka Abu Zubayr, was able to consolidate his
position as the head of the group. Al Shabaab*s few thousand fighters,
who are by no means omnipresent in the core territory in which the
group operates, now face no significant armed opposition from the
Kenyan border to the outskirts of Mogadishu.
The events of the past three weeks may not have done anything to
change the fundamental balance of power in Somalia, but it has
temporarily dispelled talk that al Shabaab*s internal divisions have
the group on the verge of a breakdown. Both Abu Zubayr and al
Shabaab*s second most powerful man * Muktar Robow, aka Abu Mansur *
continue to have a greater interest in remaining united than in
separation.
Hizbul Islam*s Defeat
Hizbul Islam*s power reached its zenith in the spring of 2009 when it
teamed up with al Shabaab in a failed campaign against the Somali
capital. Since then, leader Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys has seen the
group*s fortunes decline in comparison to those of its erstwhile ally.
Aweys* militia began to genuinely disintegrate in October 2009 when al
Shabaab ejected Hizbul Islam from the lucrative port town of Kismayo,
after which several individual militias began to break away from the
umbrella group. Some declared independence from Aweys and the name
*Hizbul Islam,* while others joined al Shabaab, but the common effect
was a weakening of Hizbul Islam as a militant force. For al Shabaab,
this meant the removal of both a potential threat and a potential ally
in the fight against the Western-backed Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) and its armed guard, the African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping force, which control the most lucrative
areas of Mogadishu.
[IMG]
(click here to enlarge image)
Aweys has been in Somalia for a long time, however, and he did not
simply fade away in 2010. There was talk in October 2010 of
discussions between Aweys and Abu Mansur, leader of al Shabaab*s
*nationalist* faction (meaning the faction uninterested in
transnational jihad, as opposed to the stronger faction led by Abu
Zubayr, which is more influenced by foreign fighters). The two
reportedly were discussing the possibility of forming a new group
called al Islamiya Resistance Force, which would have resulted in al
Shabaab splitting internally, but those talks eventually came to
nothing. As happened during previous discussions over the possibility
of merging with al Shabaab, Aweys did not want to make too many
concessions to militant leaders he viewed as decades his junior and
lacking in his nationalist credentials. In the end, however, al
Shabaab*s overwhelming strength forced Aweys* hand, which led to the
recent announcement that he fully supported the decision to merge with
his more powerful rivals.
The first reports of renewed clashes between Aweys* forces and al
Shabaab in the town of Burhakaba * located just southeast of al
Shabaab stronghold Baidoa in Somalia*s southwestern Bay region *
emerged Dec. 1. Al Shabaab attacked first, quickly taking Burhakaba
and was able to repel subsequent attempts by Hizbul Islam to take it
back. Within two weeks, Hizbul Islam had deserted neighboring
population centers in the Lower Shabelle region, most notably
Torotorow, while al Shabaab*s forces marched toward Afgoye, Hizbul
Islam*s main base of operations, located on the outskirts of
Mogadishu.
Aweys and his top commanders vowed to defend Afgoye and their other
territories, including certain areas in Mogadishu*s Bakara Market, but
were unable to follow through. By Dec. 20, following a series of
meetings between members of each group*s leadership, Hizbul Islam had
agreed to join al Shabaab. Despite the public denial by Hizbul Islam*s
director of operations that any pressure had been exerted on the
group, al Shabaab had clearly delivered an ultimatum to Aweys and his
men: keep fighting (and likely die trying), or submit. STRATFOR
sources report that the new positions of leadership in al Shabaab
given to Aweys and his deputies are largely ceremonial, while Somali
media reports state that the group*s fighters have been sent for
retraining in al Shabaab*s method of combat operations.
Divisions in Al Shabaab
However, not all of al Shabaab initially welcomed the clashes with
Hizbul Islam. Abu Mansur*s spokesman, Fuad Shongole, publicly
condemned the actions taken by Abu Zubayr*s men during a public speech
at a mosque in the Bakara Market less than a week before the merger.
In the speech, he said the fighting in Burhakaba was *not jihad* and
said in reference to Abu Zubayr, *a leader is he who addresses his
people and leads his people toward all good things, but fighting
everyone is not part of the solution.* It was reportedly the first
time Shongole had publicly criticized Abu Zubayr in such a manner.
But within days, Shongole and Abu Mansur were acting as al Shabaab*s
emissaries in a meeting with Aweys and his top deputies in the town of
Ceelasha Biyaha, just outside of Mogadishu. This was where the final
agreement was made for Hizbul Islam to accept the terms of the merger.
Al Shabaab took control of Hizbul Islam*s final territories that day.
The fact that, as STRATFOR sources have reported, Abu Mansur*s camp
backtracked in his criticism of Abu Zubayr*s fight with Hizbul Islam
indicates that al Shabaab*s internal rivalries * though very real *
are not at the point where they are at risk of triggering a fracture
within al Shabaab. Though the group*s various power brokers are in
constant competition over power, resources and the direction of the
group, they also understand they need one another to maximize their
strength. Abu Mansur*s main problem is finances; Abu Zubayr is
believed to have greater control over the money supply. Abu Zubayr, in
turn, has an interest in tapping into Abu Mansur*s manpower. After
all, even when allied with Hizbul Islam in May 2009, they were unable
to oust the TFG and AMISOM from Mogadishu. Since then, the
peacekeeping force has doubled in size, and it is reportedly on the
verge of expanding by another 4,000 troops in the coming months. Al
Shabaab*s recent Ramadan Offensive, conducted without Hizbul Islam*s
support, had even less success * and it was the fallout from this
event that shed the most light on the divisions between Abu Mansur and
Abu Zubayr, and which directly resulted in AMISOM increasing its zone
of control in Mogadishu.
Aweys* men do not represent the fighting force they once did, which is
why the merger is unlikely to represent a strategic threat to the
TFG*s and AMISOM*s position in the capital. But it is the fact that
Abu Mansur so quickly agreed to adopt a unified stance with Abu Zubayr
over the issue of absorbing Aweys* group that interests STRATFOR the
most. Al Shabaab is far from unified, but there are constraints that
make a true internal fracture unlikely to occur at this time.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 22, 2010 10:14:00 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Above the Tearline: Mexican Cartels
Stratfor logo
Above the Tearline: Mexican Cartels
December 22, 2010 | 1533 GMT
Click on image below to watch video:
[IMG]
Vice President of Intelligence Fred Burton gives an overview of the
Mexican drug cartel activities in 2010 and what trends we are likely
to see in 2011.
Editor*s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition
technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete
accuracy.
Hi, I*m Fred Burton with STRATFOR. In this week*s Above the Tearline
we*re going to look at our 2010 cartel report with a forecast for
2011.
In our study we outlined three major trends that occurred 2010, in the
first being the Calderon government efforts to go to war with the
cartels was very effective in the elimination of many cartel
high-value targets this year, however it also led to an increase in
the body count from 6,000 to 11,000 in calendar year 2010.
The second interesting trend that we noted our study is the
introduction of the improvised explosive device in Mexico by the
cartels and fortunately these devices are very rudimentary and we
haven*t seen an actual vehicle-borne improvised explosive device.
However it*s a troubling trend that the cartels have moved into the
improvised explosive device in specific areas such as Juarez and
Ciudad Victoria. The learning curve to move into a sophisticated VBIED
or vehicle-borne improvised explosive device would take time and this
is one of the warning and indicators that we are on point looking for,
but we have not seen them move down that stage yet.
The third trend is the Mexican government deployment of federal
police, or the federal police takeover of certain areas inside of
Mexico and that has been done primarily in an effort to quell the
violence to put in a vetted and confident police force that can be
managed at the federal level. Salary is also important when you*re
looking at the federal police. In essence they can be paid more than a
local cop that would be easily corruptible. One of the aspects of
having federal control would be a higher quality recruit or police
agent that you could bring into the midst. You also have to capability
of running polygraphs and a much more thorough background check and
have better command-and-control over that entity and in essence,
provide better service to the community that the federal officers are
deployed in. From a forecasting perspective in 2011 Calderon is at a
crossroads, he*s in a very difficult position. He either has to accept
U.S. intervention to help combat the cartels, or he has to stand back
some of his pressure that he has placed upon the cartels in an effort
to reduce the body count. At this point we don*t know which direction
he*s going to take, but it*s going to be very interesting to see which
road we do go down.
The Above the Tearline aspects with the cartel study, in my
assessment, are two key issues. One, the detailed personality and link
analysis diagram we have of the various cartel players; their
hierarchy; the bosses, as well as those that were eliminated last
year. The second aspect is our map. You can look at the map and see
which cartel controls what geography inside of Mexico as well as which
cartel controls the plazas, the lucrative gateways into the United
States, as well as the spillover border violence into America.
Click for more videos
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 22, 2010 1:47:24 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: More Details on the Saudi-Syrian Initiative in Lebanon
Stratfor logo
More Details on the Saudi-Syrian Initiative in Lebanon
December 22, 2010 | 1921 GMT
Saudi-Syrian Dealings on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
BEHROUZ MEHRI/AFP/Getty Images
Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri in Tehran on Nov. 28
Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri on Dec. 22 denied a claim made
by pro-Syrian Lebanese newspaper Ad-Diyar that he would request that
the United Nations halt the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL)
investigating the 2005 assassination of his father, former Prime
Minister Rafik al-Hariri. Al-Hariri*s press office said the leaks were
disconnected from reality and reiterated the prime minister*s support
for the Saudi-Syrian initiative aimed at settling the STL affair and
stabilizing Lebanon.
Related Link
* Syria and Iran Come to a Temporary Understanding over Hezbollah
Syrian and Saudi officials have been busy dealing with the looming
consequences of the eventual STL indictments. While a broad agreement
aimed at neutralizing the STL issue appears to have been reached, some
indictments may still be issued. Lebanese Lt. Gen. Jamil al-Sayyid,
former head of the Lebanese general security apparatus, who was
released from prison in April 2009 with three other military officers,
could be one of those sacrificed. According to a Lebanese military
source, Hezbollah operative Abdulmajid Ghamloush * who mistakenly used
one of the eight mobile phones that enabled STL investigators to
directly link Hezbollah to the assassination * has been found dead in
Syria after earlier being subjected to a grueling interrogation by
Hezbollah. Ghamloush had been given asylum in Syria two years prior
and was living on the eastern slopes of the Anti-Lebanon Mountains
near the town of Zabadani in Rif Damascus. The source speculated that
he either committed suicide or was conveniently eliminated by Syrian
authorities with Hezbollah approval.
Al-Hariri is becoming more accepting of the fact that the STL will do
little to hold Hezbollah responsible for his father*s killing.
According to a Saudi diplomatic source involved in the Lebanon
proceedings, the Hezbollah-led opposition is demanding that al-Hariri
retire in exchange for the government*s choosing to not deal with the
issue of false witnesses (witnesses whom Hezbollah and Syria claim
delivered false testimony to the STL investigators). Given his
disillusionment with the STL, this remains quite possible.
Al-Hariri appears to be more interested in leaving politics for a
return to his business career until the balance of power in Lebanon
can shift against Hezbollah. In the meantime, he is bargaining to
ensure that his most trusted men in the Lebanese security forces will
not be purged should he resign. The Saudis and Syrians reportedly have
reaffirmed the position of Lt. Gen. Ashraf Rifi, commander of the
Lebanese internal security forces (ISF), and have agreed to formalize
the autonomy of the information section of the ISF led by Maj. Gen.
Wisam al-Hasan. These moves indicate that these two staunchly
pro-Hariri officers will keep their positions should al-Hariri exit
the political scene.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 22, 2010 3:47:25 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: U.S. Naval Update Map: Dec. 22, 2010
Stratfor logo
U.S. Naval Update Map: Dec. 22, 2010
December 22, 2010 | 2108 GMT
The Naval Update Map shows an approximation of the current locations
of U.S. Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) and Amphibious Ready Groups
(ARGs), the keys to U.S. dominance of the world*s oceans. A CSG is
centered on an aircraft carrier, which projects U.S. naval and air
power and supports a carrier air wing (CVW). The CSG includes
significant offensive strike capability. An ARG is centered on three
amphibious warfare ships, with a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)
embarked. An MEU is built around a heavily reinforced and mobile
battalion of Marines.
U.S. Naval Update Map: Dec. 22, 2010
(click here to enlarge image)
Carrier Strike Groups
* The USS Harry S. Truman CSG with CVW 3 embarked returned to Naval
Station Norfolk after a seven-month deployment in support of
maritime security operations and theater security cooperation
efforts in the U.S. 5th and 6th fleet areas of responsibility
(AORs).
* The USS Nimitz has moved to its dry dock at the Puget Sound Naval
Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility to begin its
Docking Planned Incremental Availability.
* The USS Carl Vinson with CVW 17 embarked is under way for a
three-week composite training unit exercise followed by a
scheduled deployment to the western Pacific Ocean.
* The USS Abraham Lincoln CSG with CVW 2 embarked is on a scheduled
deployment in the 5th Fleet AOR conducting maritime security
operations and theater security cooperation efforts.
* The USS John C. Stennis recently completed sea trials during the
final phase of its six-month planned incremental availability in
the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance
Facility.
Amphibious Ready Groups/Marine Expeditionary Units
* The USS Peleliu ARG with the 15th MEU embarked returned to its
home port after a seven-month deployment to the 7th and 5th fleet
AORs to conduct humanitarian relief in Pakistan and counterpiracy
operations off the Horn of Africa.
* The USS Kearsarge ARG with the 26th MEU embarked is on a port
visit to Salalah, Oman.
* The USS Boxer with the 13th MEU embarked completed its
certification exercise off the coast of Southern California.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 22, 2010 4:06:27 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: U.S. Senate Ratifies START Treaty
Stratfor logo
U.S. Senate Ratifies START Treaty
December 22, 2010 | 2145 GMT
START START START START START
Win McNamee/Getty Images
Sen. John Kerry (D-MA) (L) and Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN) speak with
reporters Dec. 21 in Washington
The U.S. Senate ratified the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(known as START) by a 71-26 vote Dec. 22. The agreement reduces the
deployed strategic warheads of each country to 1,550. The treaty has
received intense attention during the past week, as it was unclear if
the Senate could even get enough votes to discuss the issue * though
many Republicans in the U.S. government have blasted the agreement
since its arrangement between Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and
U.S. President Barack Obama in April.
The START Treaty has been a bellwether of relations between Moscow and
Washington. In the spring, it was a sign of warming sentiments between
the countries. Since then, Russia and the United States have struck a
slew of compromises on issues like sanctions against Iran and U.S.
investment in Russia*s modernization efforts. However, Moscow has
publicly stated over the past few months that if START was not signed
by the end of the year, it would consider relations between Russia and
the United States as cooling. Thus, Obama has been trying to pressure
those standing in the treaty*s way * mainly Republicans * to sign.
As Russia has watched the Senate debate the treaty, it has been most
concerned about the possible addition of amendments that would
increase U.S. inspections, lower the cap on nuclear weapons or even
add topics not really relevant to the treaty, like the U.S. moving
forward on ballistic missile defense. This last issue is the most
important to Russia, as it would most likely put U.S. defense on
Russia*s doorstep. On Dec. 21, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
warned that any such amendment would be a deal-breaker, since the
treaty cannot be opened up to new negotiations.
The treaty passed by the Senate does not have any of these non-binding
amendments, but it does have addendums regarding the Senate*s
concerns. The addendums have no bearing on the treaty itself, but the
question remains of how Russia will view the addendums. Since they are
not actual amendments to the treaty, Russia likely will sign START
within weeks, as the treaty has already been debated in the State
Duma. But the Russian Foreign Ministry has already announced that it
will have to take a fresh look at what the U.S. Senate actually
ratified.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 23, 2010 6:03:21 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: U.N. Extends AMISOM Mandate in Somalia
[IMG]
Thursday, December 23, 2010 [IMG] STRATFOR.COM [IMG] Diary Archives
U.N. Extends AMISOM Mandate in Somalia
The U.N. Security Council (UNSC) passed a unanimous resolution on
Wednesday to extend the mandate of the African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping force until Sept. 30, 2011, and
authorize a 50 percent increase in AMISOM*s overall force level. There
are about 8,000 troops in Somalia, all of which come from Uganda and
Burundi, and the new mandate will allow AMISOM to increase to 12,000.
The UNSC resolution did not say where the additional troops would come
from, though previous pledges by Uganda to provide them makes it
likely that the vast majority * if not all * will come from Kampala.
The U.N. resolution also failed to answer the problem of who will fund
the increase in AMISOM*s size, which explains the half-hearted
celebration from the Uganda*s U.N. ambassador.
The Ugandan military provides the bulk of AMISOM*s forces, and is
primarily responsible for maintaining security in the Somali
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) stronghold of Mogadishu. The
Ugandan military is the number one reason that al Shabaab has not
ejected the TFG from Mogadishu and taken the capital city over in the
past year. But AMISOM is handicapped by its small force levels, its
largely static defensive posture and relatively low funding levels,
meaning its best hope is to successfully defend government enclaves
within Mogadishu. Currently, it can hold portions of the capital (the
latest estimates are about half the city), but it cannot expand
outward and take the fight to the jihadists in the Somali countryside.
*The 12,000 peacekeepers will permit AMISOM to expand security
positions throughout the Somali capital, making it difficult, if not
impossible, for al Shabaab to achieve any more gains.*
Uganda has been pushing in earnest for an increase in AMISOM*s troop
levels since July, when its capital city of Kampala was struck by dual
suicide bomb attacks that killed at least 74. Al Shabaab carried out
the attack. It was al Shabaab*s first transnational attack, and the
group chose Uganda as its primary target for several reasons. First,
the Ugandan military is essentially synonymous with AMISOM, and by
extension, the West. Also, beyond the publicity that a transnational
attack would give al Shabaab (and that it would use to boost its
jihadist credentials), it was aimed at undermining the Ugandan
government and public support of AMISOM, thereby leading to a pullout
and eventual collapse of AMISOM.
Uganda was also the likely target this week during a grenade attack in
downtown Nairobi on a bus that was bound for Kampala. Ugandan
authorities have also recently warned about terrorist threats during
the Christmas holidays.
The Somali jihadists selected Uganda as a target because Kampala*s
capability to carry out a serious reprisal on al Shabaab was and is
less imminent than other prominent al Shabaab threats, specifically
Ethiopia and Kenya. An attack on Addis Ababa would quickly lead to
Ethiopian military forces intervening in Somalia not only in Mogadishu
but to overrun al Shabaab camps in southern and central regions. An
attack on Nairobi would lead to the Kenyan government disrupting al
Shabaab*s use of the city as a key logistical hub. While the Ugandans
are AMISOM*s dominant contingent, this is not to downplay other
countries* involvements, notably the Ethiopians. Addis Ababa possesses
the region*s strongest military force, which maintained a robust
intervention in Somalia from 2006 to 2009, but since then has been
less directly involved, preferring to backstop the Ugandans to deny to
the use of anti-Ethiopian propaganda as a rallying call by al Shabaab
and other Somali nationalists. But the Ethiopians are still heavily
involved behind the scenes in Somalia, through their support of a
proxy militia in central Somalia, called Ahlu Sunnah Waljamaah, as
well as their influence over TFG politicians.
Until the July bombings in Kampala, confronting al Shabaab had been a
challenge largely dealt with by the West (notably the United States)
and East Africans (with Ethiopia at the military forefront, and Kenya
engaged politically). The Kampala bombings created the possibility for
this to change. The event created an opportunity for a more
pan-African response that would take the lead in resolving this
inter-Africa security concern. But there was little likelihood that
others from outside East Africa * such as Nigeria, Rwanda or South
Africa * would materially support an intervention against the Somali
jihadists. African governments from other sub-regions of the continent
voiced lukewarm rhetorical support of AMISOM, but no material
commitments emerged, demonstrating they have no real interest in
involving themselves in what would be a deadly confrontation with al
Shabaab. These other African governments had no compelling reason, as
they faced no threat from the Somalis themselves, while at the same
time they had their own internal security or political concerns that
required them to safeguard scarce security resources closer to home.
The lack of a pan-African or broader, international response to al
Shabaab did not dissuade Uganda or the East Africans, and simply
confirmed that they would need to go it alone (or more specifically,
go it among the usual responders). The Museveni government in Kampala
didn*t drop its support of AMISOM after July 11, instead reaffirming
and expanding the number of peacekeepers deployed to Mogadishu. Now,
the Ugandans have pledged to again increase their force level in
Somalia, offering to provide the bulk of the 4,000 new peacekeepers
the UNSC just authorized, though wanting in return a stable and robust
financial commitment to underwrite the mission (underfunding of AMISOM
and general neglect of Somalia has been an issue the Museveni
government has long complained about). The United States will likely
mobilize a support base, including the European Union and individual
European donors, to financially underwrite the expanding AMISOM force.
It probably will not be the full amount or at a consistency the
Ugandans want (among other things, the Ugandans want to be paid at
U.N. peacekeeper levels while the United Nations has been paying them
at vastly less African Union levels), but it will be sufficient to
support 12,000 peacekeepers in Mogadishu.
The UNSC authorization to boost the peacekeeper level has been
expected * STRATFOR forecast this on Nov. 5. The new forces are not
likely to deploy outside Mogadishu. The 12,000 peacekeepers will
permit AMISOM to expand their security positions throughout the Somali
capital, making it difficult, if not impossible, for al Shabaab to
achieve any more gains (and the jihadists will likely be slowly pushed
out of Mogadishu), and permit the TFG to begin to deliver
socio-economic gains amid the enhanced security environment. But as al
Shabaab has taken steps to ensure its factions are internally
consolidated, the jihadists will remain a viable threat in Somalia
regardless of the expanded AMISOM.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 23, 2010 8:04:30 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: India between China and Russia
Stratfor logo
India between China and Russia
December 23, 2010 | 1313 GMT
India between China and Russia
RAVEENDRAN/AFP/Getty Images
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev (L) shakes hands with Indian Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh during a meeting in New Delhi on Dec. 21
Summary
Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao*s trip to India and Pakistan led to
several billion dollars* worth of deals with both countries. On the
surface, the $16 billion in agreements signed by China and India seem
like signs of booming bilateral ties, but China*s increasing support
for Pakistan has deepened New Delhi*s suspicion of Beijing*s strategic
intentions for the region. However, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev
also recently visited India, indicating that New Delhi still has
options.
Analysis
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao concluded a five-day trip to India and
Pakistan on Dec. 19. Now that the fanfare has died down it is time to
take stock of what exactly transpired. On the surface, Wen and his
hosts signed billions of dollars of deals of every kind, but on a
deeper level, Wen reinforced India*s impression that China*s support
for Pakistan is deepening to a degree commensurate with India*s
increasing suspicion of China*s strategic intentions in the region.
Though the press was rife with conflicting details, it appears Wen
agreed to $16 billion worth of deals while in India. This headline
figure, of course, will not be immediately actualized; it is simply
the estimated sum total of a series of deals regarding projects of
various types, at various stages of realization, and on various time
frames for completion. According to The Hindu and other Indian press
reports:
* China Development Bank signed an agreement to provide $4.63
billion worth of financing to Reliance Power Ltd., including $1.1
billion for the Sasan Ultra Mega Power Project, and a $400 million
credit facility to ICICI Bank (formerly Industrial Credit and
Investment Corporation of India).
* China Development Bank also signed a financing agreement worth $2
billion with Reliance Communications.
* Bank of China agreed to provide $1.2 billion worth of credit for
IDBI Bank (Industrial Development Bank of India).
* Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) agreed to provide a
$1 billion credit facility for ICICI Bank.
* Sepco and Shandong agreed to provide power equipment to the Adani
Group for $3.63 billion.
* Shandong and Tamil Nadu Power Corporation agreed to a purchase
contract of $800 million in equipment.
* China Aluminum agreed to $330 million in exports of metal products
for Vedanta.
* Dofang Electric agreed with Abhijeet Projects to a sale of power
equipment worth $2.5 billion.
The grand total of these deals is indeed around $16 billion, though
about $9 billion of that is in loans or other financial instruments.
Still the sum is larger than the nominal amounts agreed to when U.S.
President Barack Obama ($10 billion) and French President Nicolas
Sarkozy ($13 billion) visited India earlier this year on similar
trade-heavy tours. Furthermore, just before Wen*s trip, Chinese
telecommunications giant Huawei declared it would invest $2 billion in
creating a research and development site in Bangalore and a factory in
Chennai.
China*s Goals for Pakistan
Reports from Pakistan also featured the signing of several mega-deals.
The Associated Press of Pakistan reported that the two sides forged
agreements worth $10 billion for public-private partnerships and $5
billion for private sector-only partnerships, including $6.5 billion
for wind and solar power projects. Some reports even claimed the
totals were $20 billion and $15 billion, but as previously mentioned a
good portion of these deals remain theoretical. More concretely,
Beijing gave $229 million to help Pakistan recover from devastating
flooding this summer, a $400 million loan without a specific target
(one of the reasons countries like Pakistan love China), and $35
million to start a cultural center. The agreements focused on natural
resource extraction, oceanography, space, electronics and heavy
industry. Financial integration also progressed, with ICBC set to open
a branch in Islamabad and Karachi, while gaining agreement from the
Pakistani side to have a currency swap arrangement, part of Beijing*s
effort to gradually acquaint foreign states with holding the Chinese
yuan, in anticipation of eventual internationalization of the
currency.
But most interesting by far were reports that China would continue
helping Pakistan build infrastructure, including improving the
obstacle-prone Karakorum Highway that links Pakistan to China*s
restive Xinjiang region and helping to *operationalize* Pakistan*s
Gwadar port. The port was built by Chinese construction companies but
at present is still serviced by inadequate roads and no rail;
moreover, the Pakistanis have suggested that China could become the
operator after dissatisfaction over the current Singaporean operator.
Strategically, China*s goal is to have a pipeline and railroad linking
Gwadar, via the Karakorum route, to Kashgar in Xinjiang, with the
purpose of accessing the Indian Ocean by land and thus bypassing the
maritime bottlenecks of Southeast Asia. STRATFOR sources in Beijing
suggest that Chinese investments in Pakistani mineral extraction,
processing and distribution are more extensive than appears from these
prominent deals, and that Beijing continues to entrench itself deeper
into Pakistan*s production of precious metals and energy while
building extensive infrastructure with strategic value.
These projects are precisely what have caused India to become even
more uneasy about China*s deepening assistance for Pakistan. India
became exceedingly alarmed earlier this year when it learned that
Chinese People*s Liberation Army engineers and troops were assisting
and guarding over construction on the Chinese side of the Karakorum
Highway, with some allegedly working on the Pakistani side. China and
Pakistan are old allies, yet India*s primary security threat emanates
from Pakistan, including state-condoned militancy. In contrast to
widespread criticism, Wen explicitly praised Pakistan for its
successes in fighting militancy. Thus, India sees China*s support for
Pakistan as crucial in enabling unstable Pakistan to continue
threatening India. New Delhi likely sees analogy in the way that
China*s unconditional support for North Korea has emboldened it to act
more aggressively toward South Korea and fears something similar
taking place in its neighborhood. From the Chinese point of view,
needless to say, these projects are legitimate in themselves, and the
fact that they aim at connecting China to the Indian Ocean does not
mean they threaten India.
Thus while Wen*s trip created buzz about deepening economic relations
between China and India * and no doubt a number of big-ticket business
deals were signed * the real story here is the further entrenching of
Chinese economic influence in Pakistan and India*s growing insecurity.
India*s insecurity is compounded by its frustration that its major
counterweight to China is supposed to be the United States, and yet
the U.S. dependence on Pakistan for assistance in combating the
Taliban and al Qaeda has prevented it from exerting excessive pressure
on Pakistan in the way that India would prefer. Similarly, Washington
and Beijing have a relationship separate from India. Though China
harbors anxieties over the budding Indo-American strategic
partnership, India has pointed to difficulties in this arrangement and
frustration over what it fears may be empty American promises.
A Russian Counterbalance
Thus, India is interested in cultivating other options. It is no
coincidence that after a year of top-level delegations from the United
States, France, Britain and China seeking to invest in Indian growth,
Russia, too, would pay a visit. Russian President Dmitri Medvedev
arrived Dec. 20 to discuss the full spectrum of Russo-Indian ties.
These two states cooperated nicely throughout the Cold War and have
little cause for insecurity about each other. However, Russian
attention waned after the Soviet collapse and subsequent focus on
rebuilding influence in former Soviet territories over the past 10
years. Moscow has delayed delivering on major arms sales to India,
dampening optimism over the agreement that Medvedev and Indian Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh signed Dec. 21 to jointly develop a
fifth-generation stealth fighter jet and build 250-300 of them by
2030, a deal theoretically worth around $30 billion. The Russians have
also moved slowly in implementing agreements on assistance in civil
nuclear cooperation, such as making operational the nuclear power
plant at Kudankulam (the first of two units is set to begin running in
2011) and setting a price to build two more proposed units.
But none of this means the relationship has turned cold. Medvedev*s
trip showed the countries not only striking their own set of major
deals in several sectors but also showing Moscow reaffirm its support
of India*s stance on a number of international issues. Medvedev*s
sharply worded statements calling for the capture and extradition of
international terrorists was received as moral support for India in
its squabbles with Pakistan, and he spoke approvingly of India joining
the Nuclear Supplier*s Group and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
as a full member (rather than observer) and becoming a permanent
member in a reformed U.N. Security Council. These proposals do not sit
well with China, which would prefer not to dilute its power in these
organizations, especially for the sake of India gaining power in them.
Russia*s support for a broad-based regional solution in Afghanistan
also comes across as helpful from India*s point of view, lest the
United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan decide how the situation will
conclude without Indian input.
Though Russia has not yet lived up to some of its grander promises, it
potentially provides India with an option for counterbalancing China
without relying wholly on the United States. China cannot approve of
this, but it has found some common ground with Russia that it would
prefer to hold, making for an interesting dynamic between the three
and in the region.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 23, 2010 10:03:28 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Parcel Bombs Target Foreign Embassies in Italy
Stratfor logo
Parcel Bombs Target Foreign Embassies in Italy
December 23, 2010 | 1403 GMT
Parcel Bombs Target Foreign Embassies in Italy
FRANCO ORIGLIA/Getty Images
Italian Carabinieri special police outside the Swiss Embassy in Rome
on Dec. 23
Explosive devices concealed in packages targeted the Swiss and Chilean
embassies in Rome on Dec. 23. Two people who opened the packages were
injured, but the injuries do not appear to be life threatening.
However, that two embassies were targeted nearly simultaneously
indicates a high likelihood that there are similar packages destined
for additional targets in Rome and possibly throughout Europe.
The first package detonated at the Swiss Embassy at approximately noon
local time. The explosion seriously injured the hands of the mail room
employee handling the package. The second package detonated at the
Chilean Embassy at approximately 2:30 p.m. local time, injuring the
mail room employee handling it; the extent of his injuries is unclear.
At this point, the two incidents closely resemble the series of
explosions and attempted attacks at foreign embassies in Athens in
early November that also resulted from explosive devices concealed in
packages and mailed to the embassies. Those attacks were most likely
carried out by Greek anarchists and militants who have long protested
against foreign influence in Greece.
Investigations are only beginning in Rome to identify the culprits
behind the latest attacks, and some authorities are already
speculating that eco-terrorists or anarchists could be responsible.
Due to the similarities between the Rome and Athens attacks, there is
a strong likelihood that the Rome perpetrators were local anarchists
waging a copycat campaign.
Italian anarchists have a long history of employing letter bombs and
other small improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in their campaigns.
They conducted an anti-EU letter bomb campaign in December 2003. More
recently, in March 2010, a letter bomb addressed to the Italian
interior minister caught fire and injured a postal worker in a Milan
suburb. Past attacks are believed to have been the work of the
Informal Anarchist Federation, an Italian anarchist group that has
been involved in several attacks using small IEDs and parcel bombs. In
December 2009, the group placed a small IED at Milan University and
sent a letter bomb to an immigrant center in northeastern Italy. Due
to this history, they are the most likely suspects behind the Dec. 23
attacks.
Regardless of who is behind them, businesses and government offices in
Italy and throughout Europe will likely be increasing mail room
security measures. Now that Italian police are aware of the threat,
they can also be more proactive in scanning parcels currently in the
postal system for explosive devices in order to intercept them before
they make it to embassies or other targets in Rome or elsewhere in
Europe.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 24, 2010 9:22:24 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Chinese Microblogs and Government Spin
Stratfor logo
Chinese Microblogs and Government Spin
December 24, 2010 | 1514 GMT
Chinese Microblogs and Government Spin
China Photos/Getty Images
Users on the Internet at a cafe in Chongqing
Summary
The party secretary and top administrator in Chongqing, China*s
largest municipality, has called for a campaign reflecting Mao
Zedong*s revolutionary period that includes the use of an official
*microblog.* This is part of an emerging trend in Chinese governance
of using social networking to reach the masses. While appeasing the
popular demand for access to new media, so the theory goes, the
government can make it seem as if the people have the freedom to use
it while tightly controlling the communications for Beijing*s
purposes.
Analysis
Related Links
* China and its Double-edged Cyber-sword
* A Report on China*s Internet Traffic *Hijacking*
* Google*s Rocky Relationship With China
* China: Pushing Ahead of the Cyberwarfare Pack
* Iran: Twitter, Cyberwarfare and Opposition Movements
Chongqing*s sweeping *Red Culture* campaign * the promotion of
revolutionary images, songs and stories * reached a new level with the
recent launch of *Red Microblog* by the municipality*s propaganda
department. The microblog, sort of a Chinese version of Twitter, has a
dramatically growing user base even though the site is subject to
tight government censorship. For its part, Beijing is encouraging its
use as a platform for publicizing political affairs to create a
greater sense of government transparency.
The Red Microblog was established under the apparent direction of Bo
Xilai, Chongqing party secretary and top administrator of the
country*s largest municipality. (In China, a municipality is a city
under the direct jurisdiction of the central government.) Bo, a
popular and unorthodox member of China*s fifth generation of leaders,
has called for a retrospective campaign reflecting Mao Zedong*s
revolutionary period as part of his bid for membership in the
Communist Party of China*s (CPC) Politburo Standing Committee in 2012.
The use of a microblog in the Red Culture campaign also follows an
emerging trend in the central government of using social networking in
the conduct of political affairs. The idea is to appease the growing
number of Chinese who are demanding access to such new media and make
it seem as if they have the freedom to use it while tightly
controlling it for government purposes.
China*s first microblogs were established in August 2009 through
Sina.com, following Beijing*s decision to block Twitter, Facebook and
other social networking sites for fear they would be used by
dissidents inside or outside China to foment social unrest leading up
to the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square incident. Since then,
a number of domestic websites have established microblog services.
Unlike foreign-based networking sites like Twitter and Facebook,
microblogs in China operate under strict government censorship. Still,
they do provide the country*s Internet users with a new form of
communications and greatly expanded channels for accessing and
disseminating information in a faster and more comprehensive way. This
has enabled microblog servers to become a top choice for Internet
users in China, and the number of microblog registrants has soared
from just 8 million in 2009 to 75 million in 2010. The number is
expected to jump to 145 million in 2011.
Microblogs offer Internet users, above all, a more personalized medium
for communications by making it easier for users to interact and
communicate information that is unavailable from official or
traditional media. As such, microblogs also provide a space where
political rumors and sensitive information can be quickly made
available and easily spread, a situation Beijing is chronically
concerned about since it views social stability as a national
imperative. To ease this concern, the microblog servers all must
implement strict measures to censor information and quickly remove any
posts deemed inappropriate. Sina.com has reportedly established a team
of thousands of monitors to keep sensitive content to a minimum.
Recognizing the power of microblogs, Chinese authorities began using
the new media to gauge public opinion, publicize government activities
and promote communications with citizens. Beginning this year, many
government officials have created accounts on microblog servers,
including Chinese President Hu Jintao, whose account on a service run
by the state-owned People*s Daily was open only briefly in February
and drew 16,000 followers within 24 hours.
Li Changchun, the member in charge of propaganda within the country*s
powerful nine-person Politburo Standing Committee, wrote an article in
June calling on local authorities to embrace new media. The article,
which appeared in the CPC publication *Seek Truth,* inspired Bo Xilai
to incorporate a microblog into his Chongqing Red Campaign, though
Li*s article focused on microblogs as more of a propaganda tool than a
means of sharing important government information with the public.
Indeed, in a country where censorship is an art form, official
microblogs remain largely a medium for disseminating carefully
screened information and controlling sensitive news. Nevertheless,
they also create a new medium of national communications through which
certain political affairs previously unknown outside the corridors of
power can be made known to the public. This makes government more
receptive * or at least exposed * to public opinion and criticism,
which could encourage it to improve its performance. More openness
surrounding certain issues could also promote more grassroots
participation in Chinese political affairs.
While promoting government transparency and accountability, however,
microblogs also pose challenges in managing the flow of information
and maintaining social stability. As social media develop further in
China, authorities will have to stay ahead of the curve and adopt new
measures to pre-empt potential threats. The challenges posed by
fast-developing media are daunting as China approaches a generational
leadership transition in 2012, but these are challenges the current
government is no doubt determined to meet.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 25, 2010 9:09:32 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Mexico: Rebranding the Cartel Wars
Stratfor logo
Mexico: Rebranding the Cartel Wars
December 25, 2010 | 1502 GMT
Mexico: Rebranding the Cartel Wars
RONALDO SCHEMIDT/AFP/Getty Images
Alleged Sinaloa Federation cartel members in Federal Police custody in
Mexico City on Nov. 8
Summary
Mexican lawmakers recently approved reforms to the federal penal code
to punish terrorist acts. Significantly, the legislators acknowledged
that the definition of terrorism was written in such a way that
violent and extortionist acts of cartels could be classified as
terrorism. Fundamental differences between organized criminal and
terrorist groups exist, but politically characterizing certain cartel
acts as terrorism could develop into a more subtle attempt by the
Mexican government to dilute public tolerance for cartel activity. If
implemented against cartel members, the law could also carry
significant implications for U.S. involvement in the drug war.
Analysis
Related Video
* Dispatch: Organized Crime vs. Terrorism
Related Link
* Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date
Related Special Topic Page
* Tracking Mexico*s Drug Cartels
In a Dec. 15 plenary session of the Chamber of Deputies in Mexico
City, Mexican lawmakers approved reforms to the federal penal code to
punish terrorist acts with 10- to 50-year prison sentences. Under the
law, terrorism is defined as *the use of toxic substances, chemical or
biological weapons, radioactive materials, explosives or firearms,
arson, flooding, or any other means of violence against people,
assets, or public services, with the aim of causing alarm, fear, or
terror among the population or a sector of it, of attacking national
security or intimidating society, or of pressuring the authorities
into making a decision.* Though the reforms focused on specific
changes to the penal and financial code of the law, Mexican lawmakers
approving the text publicly acknowledged that violent and extortionist
acts of drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) could be characterized
as terrorism and could thus subject drug traffickers to extended
prison sentences.
The move is part of Mexican President Felipe Calderon*s attempt to
address the record drug violence of 2010 by reforming Mexico*s penal
system while cooperating closely with the United States in
extraditions of high-value cartel members. Yet as Mexico*s overcrowded
prisons and the most recent mass prison break on Dec. 17 in Nuevo
Laredo have demonstrated, the Mexican penal system is simply unable to
cope with the government*s offensive against the drug cartels. Given
the corrosive effect of corruption on Mexico*s courts and prisons,
these are not problems that are likely to see meaningful improvement
any time soon. Still, the political move to potentially redefine
organized criminal activities of drug cartels as terrorism could shed
light on a more subtle tactic by the government to dilute public
tolerance for cartel operations in Mexico.
Organized Crime vs. Terrorism
The goals of militant groups employing terrorism are often ideological
in nature, whereas the goals of organized criminal elements are
primarily economically-driven. Still, the activities undertaken by
both types of groups often overlap: militant groups that employ
terrorism can engage in organized criminal activity (think Hezbollah
and its heavy involvement in drug trafficking and illegal car sales)
and organized crime syndicates will sometimes, though more rarely,
adopt terrorism as a tactic. At the same time, due primarily to their
divergent aims, an organized crime group is placed under very
different constraints than a terrorist organization. Those differences
will dictate how each will operate, and also to what extent their
activities will be tolerated by the general populace.
The primary objective of an organized criminal group is to utilize its
core illicit business (in the case of Mexico, drug trafficking) to
make money. To protect that core, some territory is unofficially
brought under the group*s control and an extensive peripheral network,
typically composed of policemen, bankers, politicians, businessmen and
judges, is developed to provide an umbrella of protection within the
licit world. In building such a network, popular support is essential.
This does not always mean the population will condone an organized
crime group*s activities, but the populace could be effectively
intimidated * or rewarded * into tolerating its existence. Generally,
the better the organized crime syndicate is able to provide public
goods (be it protection, jobs or a portion of the trade revenue) the
better insulated the group and its activities will be.
By contrast, a militant group primarily employing terrorism is
pursuing a political goal, and the financial aspects of their
activities are merely a means to an end. Such a group will not need to
rely on as extensive a network to survive and thus faces fewer
constraints in dealing with public sensitivities. While the organized
crime syndicate will be more accommodating to the state to ensure
their business carries on as usual, the militant organization will be
focused on disruption. These groups could be more willing to incur the
cost of losing popular support in the targeting and scale of their
attacks as long as it attracts attention to their political cause (or
if they are motivated by a religious ideology that they believe
transcends the need for popular support). A militant group can attempt
to adopt the benefits of a peripheral network by free-riding off
insurgencies and organized crime syndicates, as al Qaeda has done with
the insurgent and criminal networks in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Maintaining such relationships, however, can be a very costly affair
and the interests of both actors run a high risk of colliding.
The Cost of Employing Terrorism
An interesting dynamic can occur when organized crime groups resort to
terrorist-style tactics, and they end up paying for it with an
irreparable loss in public support. This was the fate of Sicilian
mafia group La Cosa Nostra, whose decision to launch improvised
explosive device (IED) attacks in 1992 against magistrates Giovanni
Falcone and Paolo Borsellino unleashed a public outcry that catalyzed
the group*s decline. Similarly, Pablo Escobar and his Medellin cocaine
cartel saw their downfall following the murder of popular presidential
candidate Luis Carlos Galan, the bombing of Avianca Flight 203 and a
campaign of large vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks
across urban Colombia in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Once the
level of violence surpassed a certain threshold, the Colombian
government was able to gain enough traction with the public to obtain
the necessary intelligence to place the Medellin cartel on the
defensive. Critically, the government also had the public*s
endorsement in taking heavy-handed measures against the cartels,
something that the Mexican government today lacks.
In Mexico, cartels have gradually become bolder and more violent in
their tactics. Decapitations have become a favorite intimidation
tactic of the most prominent cartels, and in 2010 some organizations
began using IEDs in their campaign of violence. That said, those
cartel members conducting the IED attacks have refrained from
targeting crowds of civilians out of fear of losing their peripheral
networks. This sensitivity could be seen in the outrage that followed
the September 2008 Independence Day grenade attack in Morelia,
Michoacan state, which was the first clear case of indiscriminate
killing of civilians in the drug war. The Gulf cartel seized the
opportunity to join in the public demonstrations, hanging banners that
offered rewards for the perpetrators and labeling the attack as an act
of narco-terrorism. In the Mexican case, such *narco-terrorist*
tactics are more likely to be used by cartels to try to undercut their
cartel rivals, using public abhorrence toward terrorism to their
advantage while still maintaining a pool of support.
The cartels have in fact been more successful in raising the level of
violence to the point where the public itself is demanding an end to
the government offensive against the cartels, a dynamic that is
already very much in play in Mexico*s northern states on the
frontlines of the drug war. Some of these public demonstrations and
petitions by business firms are even directly organized and/or
facilitated by DTOs. But this is also a very delicate balance for the
DTOs to maintain. Should a line be crossed, the public tide could
swing against the cartels and the government could regain the
offensive and the popular support to pursue the cartels with an iron
fist. This is why the best long-term insurance policy for the cartels
is to expand their networks into the political, security and business
establishment to the furthest extent possible, making it all the more
likely that those simply wanting business to go on as usual will
outnumber those looking to sustain the fight.
The potential rebranding of cartel activities as terrorism could thus
be indicative of a more subtle approach by Mexican authorities to
undermine public tolerance for the cartels. The unsavory terrorist
label could have more impact than the classification of organized
crime that many in Mexico now consider a way of life. Even then, the
large number of Mexicans overwhelmed by all facets of the drug war
could write off such a classification as a mere public relations move.
Though Mexican lawmakers have yet to implement the reforms, rebranding
Mexican cartel members as terrorists could significantly heighten U.S.
involvement in the conflict and attract more funding and materiel for
fighting the cartels. Cartel members could also be subjected to more
stringent punishment outside Mexico if they are arrested or extradited
abroad and classified as terrorists under Mexican law. Still, this
move for now is strictly a political characterization, the effects of
which have yet to be seen. The Mexican government wants to keep a
close check on U.S. anti-cartel activity in Mexico, and would want to
avoid providing its northern neighbor with counterterrorism as a
rationale for unilateral military intervention on Mexican soil.
There are several fundamental differences between terrorist and
organized criminal groups that dictate how each will operate when
placed under certain constraints. The Mexican populace is by and large
fed up with the cartel violence, but the cartels have not resorted to
terrorist tactics and civilian targeting on a scale that would risk
the degradation of their peripheral networks. This is a line STRATFOR
expects Mexican DTOs to be mindful of, but is a situation that bears
close watching as the government searches for ways to drive the
cartels toward a breaking point.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 27, 2010 5:34:36 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Intelligence Guidance: Week of Dec. 26, 2010
Stratfor logo
Intelligence Guidance: Week of Dec. 26, 2010
December 27, 2010 | 1127 GMT
Intelligence Guidance: Week of Dec. 26, 2010
Win McNamee/Getty Images
U.S. Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass.) (L) with U.S. Sen. Richard Lugar
(R-Ind.) in Washington on Dec. 22 following the Senate ratification of
the new START treaty
Editor*s Note: The following is an internal STRATFOR document produced
to provide high-level guidance to our analysts. This document is not a
forecast, but rather a series of guidelines for understanding and
evaluating events, as well as suggestions on areas for focus.
New Guidance
1. Israel, Palestinian Territories: The Israeli-Palestinian situation
in Gaza appears to be heating up. Hamas has resumed low-level rocket
fire against Israeli settlements and the Israelis have intensified
airstrikes. A senior Israeli officer has said that the question is not
whether there would be a war, but when it would occur. The motivation
on the Palestinian side appears to be derailing any peace talks with
the Palestinian National Authority. The Israeli motivation appears to
be asserting its own freedom for maneuverability following the
pressure from the Americans and the breach with Turkey. The Israelis
have announced that they would not apologize to Turkey * after weeks
of rumors that they would. Taken together, both sides have a reason
for wanting a round of fighting. We need to look for whether there
will be an incident to ignite conflict.
2. Russia: Now that the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
has passed, we need to watch the Russians to determine what it will
mean. By itself, it is irrelevant. As a signal of changing relations,
it might have some meaning. One place to look is Belarus, where the
elections were followed by the arrests of some of the losing
candidates. Poland has been involved there, as have the Russians. If
there is going to be a new relationship, it should show itself there.
3. China: The Chinese have raised interest rates for the second time
in 10 weeks. We need to understand what this means, particularly for
small- and medium-sized export-oriented firms. Increased interest
rates drive up the cost of Chinese imports in the long run * if
interest rates actually go up. There is always a distance between
Chinese announcements and Chinese reality. We need to see if rising
rates are translated into actual bank-to-business lending, and figure
out what that means for the economy.
Existing Guidance
1. Iran: We need to bring Tehran and the U.S.-Iranian dynamic back to
the forefront of our focus. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
fired Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki the week of Dec. 12 while he
was out of the country. Mottaki, with what may be some support from
Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani, does not appear to be accepting his
ousting quietly. This may be another indication that Ahmadinejad is
consolidating his power in Tehran, but we need to watch this closely
and redouble our efforts to understand the power dynamics in the
Iranian capital.
2. Pakistan, Afghanistan: The U.S.-led International Security
Assistance Force has made progress militarily in Afghanistan, but the
Taliban have now retaliated in Kabul. The war will not turn on
intermittent militant attacks, even in the capital. We need to examine
how the Taliban view the American-led counterinsurgency-focused
strategy and how they consider reacting to it. Inextricable from all
this is Pakistan, where we need to look at how the United States views
the Afghan-Pakistani relationship and what it will seek to get out of
it in the year ahead.
3. Iraq: A governing coalition is taking form in Baghdad, albeit
slowly. We need to lean forward on this, looking at the final
breakdown of power and understanding what this will mean for Iraq, the
United States and the region. In just over one year, all U.S. forces
are slated to be withdrawn from the country, and with them an enormous
amount of American influence. Will this go through? With the governing
coalition issue settled, what are the key points of contention between
Washington and Tehran?
4. United States: U.S. State Department diplomatic cables continue to
trickle out of WikiLeaks. How are countries and their populations
reacting to the revelations made in the cables? What will be the
functional consequences for the practice of American diplomacy? Are
there any major rifts emerging? We need to keep track of the public
reaction and stay aware of any constraints domestic politics may place
on the countries in question. Though few radically new or unexpected
revelations have been unearthed, the release offers remarkably broad
insight into the world of American foreign policy as it takes place
behind closed doors. How do the leaks either confirm or call into
question standing STRATFOR assessments?
Related Special Topic Page
* Weekly Intelligence That Drives Our Analysis
EURASIA
* Dec. 27: Originally scheduled for Dec. 15, the verdict will be
given in the trial of former Yukos CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky.
* Dec. 27: A hearing will be held in Austria over the extradition of
former Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, who is under
investigation for abuse of power and for conspiracy to commit
crime.
* Dec. 28: Ukraine will hold a tender to sell state
telecommunications company Ukrtelecom for at least $1.3 billion.
Five companies are expected to compete in the tender.
* Dec. 28: Rail worker unions in Bosnia-Herzegovina will hold a
general strike.
* Dec. 30: The official results of the presidential election in
Belarus will be released.
* Dec. 31: Ukraine will adopt its national budget for 2011.
* Dec. 31: An opposition rally, held at the end of every month, will
take place in Moscow*s Triumfalnaya Square.
* Jan. 1: Hungary will assume the European Union*s rotating
presidency.
* Jan. 1: Estonia will join the eurozone as its 17th member.
* Jan. 1: Russia is scheduled to scrap oil export duties to Belarus.
* Jan. 1: France*s minimum wage is set to increase by between 1.6
and 1.7 percent.
MIDDLE EAST/SOUTH ASIA
* Dec. 28: An international convoy carrying humanitarian aid will
arrive in Gaza after travelling through Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt.
* Dec. 28: Kuwaiti Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser Muhammad al-Ahmad
al-Sabah will be questioned by the parliament over potential
constitutional amendments.
* Dec. 30 Turkish President Abdullah Gul is scheduled to visit
Diyarbakir for a two-day trip.
EAST ASIA
* Dec. 27-Jan. 3: A temporary cease-fire will continue between the
Communist Party of the Philippines (and its armed wing, the New
People*s Army) and the Philippine government.
* Dec. 27: The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) will hold a meeting
of party executives to decide on a course of action regarding
former DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawa*s campaign funding scandal.
* Dec. 27-28: Bangladeshi Foreign Minister Dipu Moni will lead a
delegation on an official visit to Cambodia.
* Dec. 27-29: Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi will pay an
official visit to Kazakhstan.
AMERICAS
* Dec. 27: The Venezuelan National Assembly is scheduled to restart
a special session to approve pending legislation.
* Dec. 27-Jan.1: Chinese State Councilor Liu Yandong will continue
her official visit to Ecuador, Colombia and Antigua and Barbuda
after concluding a trip to Chile. She is slated to meet with
Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa on Dec. 27.
AFRICA
* Dec. 30: The deadline will pass for receiving and settling
complaints regarding the electoral register for the Jan. 9, 2011,
Southern Sudanese independence referendum.
* Dec. 31: The final voter registration list for the Southern
Sudanese independence referendum will be ready.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 27, 2010 8:12:03 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 10 - Afghanistan Surge
Stratfor logo
Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 10 - Afghanistan Surge
December 27, 2010 | 1325 GMT
Choosing the 10 most important geopolitical events of the past decade
is a challenge. But STRATFOR analysts took on the task, and after a
robust debate, they produced our Top 10 Most Important Geopolitical
Events of the Decade. We have teamed up with our partner,
DigitalGlobe, the world*s leading commercial satellite imagery
company, to provide compelling images illustrating each of these key
events.
Join us as we count down the Top 10, unveiling an event daily starting
Dec. 27 and culminating Jan. 5, when we reveal our selection for the
single most important event of the decade.
Click the link below to see STRATFOR*s explanation of each event along
with a satellite image.
Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 10 - Afghanistan Surge
(click here to view interactive map)
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with
attribution to www.stratfor.com
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 27, 2010 12:30:25 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: A Political Scandal in Estonia and Russian influence in the
Baltics
Stratfor logo
A Political Scandal in Estonia and Russian influence in the Baltics
December 27, 2010 | 1709 GMT
A Political Scandal in Estonia and Russian influence in the Baltics
RAIGO PAJULA/AFP/Getty Images
Tallinn Mayor Edgar Savisaar in 2006
Summary
Prominent Estonian political leader Edgar Savisaar has come under fire
for accepting a grant from a Russian nongovernmental organization.
Since the story broke, Estonian politicians have been busy questioning
their peers* patriotism and involvement with the Russians. With
elections due in Estonia in March and citizens fixated on the
country*s economic and financial problems, this scandal demonstrates
Russia*s unique form of influence in the Baltic state.
Analysis
Estonia faced ongoing political controversy Dec. 27 as Tallinn mayor
and opposition Center Party leader Edgar Savisaar faced accusations by
opposing party members of pro-Russian leanings. The scandal stems from
a now-declassified report from Estonia*s intelligence agency,
Kaitsepolitsei (KaPo), labeling Savisaar an *agent of influence* of
Russia and a *security threat* due to his acquisition of 1.5 million
euros (about $2 million) from a Russian nongovernmental organization
(NGO).
The controversy began after Estonian newspaper Postimees reported Dec.
16 that KaPo had written the Estonian government describing Savisaar
as a national security threat. This was not the first time Savisaar*s
ties to Russia had been publicly aired, nor the first time that KaPo
had leveled criticism against him. The scandal undoubtedly will serve
as a leading issue in Estonian parliamentary elections set for March
2011. It also highlights the nuanced and subtle influence Russia
exercises in Estonia and the Baltic region in general * as well as
Moscow*s opportunity to expand its influence in the Baltic state.
Savisaar and Estonian Politics
Savisaar, an important figure within Estonian politics, has served as
prime minister, interior minister and economic Minister over the past
20 years. He now heads the leading opposition party in the Estonian
government, which draws a substantial portion of its support from the
country*s ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers, which comprise 25
percent of the total population. This composition means the Center
Party has a much more pro-Russian orientation than the rest of
Estonia*s political parties, most of which * like the main party, the
Estonian Reform Party * are firmly oriented toward the West,
particularly through institutions such as the European Union and NATO.
In 2004, Savisaar signed a cooperation agreement between the Center
Party and Russia*s pro-Kremlin United Russia party, now led by Russian
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Savisaar frequently has traveled to
Russia. KaPo described his latest visit to Russia in early 2010 as
*undermining* the country*s morale in a way not seen since post-Soviet
independence.
KaPo*s latest accusation alleges that Savisaar attained funding from a
Russian NGO called the Andrei Pervozvannoi Fund (APF), which offers
support to Russians in foreign countries for the construction and
restoration of Russian Orthodox churches.
Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip, who heads the Reform Party, has
said the information has not changed his attitude toward Savisaar,
which he called one of distrust. Ansip alluded to the possibility that
the investigation could be a clever media plan by the Center Party to
better argue for foreign monies by bolstering its support among
Russian-speakers, but he said it was the security service*s place to
decide what was really happening.
The Russian Connection
Intriguingly, APF is no ordinary charity. It is chaired by Vladimir
Yakunin, who heads state-owned Russian Railways and is one of the most
influential people in the Kremlin * according to STRATFOR sources, he
is in Putin*s innermost circle. Yakunin also allegedly is a former
first directorate KGB agent who served at the United Nations. Yakunin
has been responsible for Russian forays into Europe via financial and
business interests and has personal ties to Estonia, where he lived
and studied for many years.
A Political Scandal in Estonia and Russian influence in the Baltics
Savisaar has insisted that his relationship with APF is harmless. He
has acknowledged receiving 1.5 million euros from Yakunin but said
they are for the construction of a church rather than for the
advancement of his political party. He has pointed out that freedom of
religion is guaranteed in Estonia and said he has received funds from
several organizations to build other religious buildings, including
synagogues and Lutheran churches, none of which sparked KaPo probes.
Savisaar described the report as *inattentive.* While it asserted
Savisaar*s relationship with Yakunin only began in the past year, he
says that he had in fact known Yakunin for at least five years.
Savisaar also accused KaPo of working with Russian intelligence
against him and that KaPo had told him to make connections in Russia.
He said the release of the report was a politically motivated attempt
to discredit his Center Party, which has been gaining in popularity
due its populist and economic-focused agenda, ahead of March 2011
elections. Estonia was hit hard during the financial crisis, suffering
a contraction in gross domestic product of roughly 14 percent in 2009.
While the country has since returned to economic growth, inflation
remains high and unemployment has not fallen.
APF, meanwhile, has called KaPo*s allegations preposterous, and stated
that such accusations send a message to other political, NGO or
commercial organizations not to help Russians living in Estonia.
Russia*s Geopolitical Position in the Baltics
From a broader perspective, the scandal reveals Russia*s subtle form
of influence in the Baltics. Moscow is often painted as the villain
ahead of elections in the Baltics, where linking political opponents
with Russia is time-honored political tactic. Casting Russia in a
negative light is not terribly difficult, as Russia in fact engaged in
cyberattacks against Estonia in 2007, while the Russian community
protested the removal of a Soviet-era monument to World War II, when
Russia overran Estonia.
It also underscores the challenge Russia faces in expanding its
resurgence in the Baltic states. Unlike in other former Soviet states
like Belarus, Kazakhstan, or Ukraine, Russia*s projection of influence
must be subtle to succeed in the Baltics. Though these rumors began in
the Estonian government, Moscow tends to have a hand in the timing of
when these sorts of scandals break, revealing its nuanced approach.
Grassroots and cultural ties remain Moscow*s most effective levers
into the Baltics, particularly targeting Russian populations. In this
case, Moscow is not only using this fund to build influence through
cultural and religious means, but it is also playing up the attack by
Estonian security services and politicians on the pro-Russian Tallinn
mayor to smear Estonia*s parties, saying this is simply a pre-election
ploy.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 27, 2010 5:43:31 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Mexico Security Memo: Dec. 27, 2010
Stratfor logo
Mexico Security Memo: Dec. 27, 2010
December 27, 2010 | 2335 GMT
Mexico Security Memo: Dec. 20, 2010
Gulf Cartel Enforcer Arrested
On Dec. 22, Mexican Federal Police announced the arrest of Martin
Armando Briones Muniz, also known as *El Negro,* a suspected leader of
a group of cartel enforcers linked to the Gulf cartel. Briones Muniz
was arrested with two of his men in the Las Fuentes neighborhood of
Reynosa, Tamaulipas state. The Federal Police allege that Briones
Muniz was the leader of a Gulf cartel enforcer unit that had been
tasked with undertaking military operations against members of Los
Zetas cartel in Reynosa and Ciudad Mier.
The arrest of Briones Muniz comes only weeks after the death of Gulf
cartel leader Antonio Ezequiel *Tony Tormenta* Cardenas Guillen, who
was killed Nov. 5 in a raid by Mexican marines. Cardenas Guillen
oversaw the operations of Los Escorpiones enforcement group, an
organization that played a critical role in forcing Los Zetas out of
the Reynosa and Matamoros regions in the first half of 2010.
While Briones Muniz is certainly not as senior, or as important, to
the Gulf cartel as Cardenas Guillen, his loss will certainly be felt
as the Gulf cartel struggles to retain the territory it seized from
Los Zetas in 2010 * a struggle that will rely heavily on the ability
of enforcer units to counter Los Zetas* military might. With their
allies from the Sinaloa Federation occupied elsewhere, the Gulf cartel
might be in a difficult position when Los Zetas launch the anticipated
counteroffensive against their former Gulf cartel masters in the
coming weeks.
State of Siege Declared in Alta Verapaz, Guatemala
On Dec. 19, the government of Guatemala declared a *state of siege* in
Guatemala*s Alta Verapaz department in an effort to counter the
influence of Los Zetas along the Guatemala-Mexico border. The state of
siege has been authorized to last 30 days, but Guatemalan President
Alvaro Colom has told the press that the siege will last as long as is
required. Declaring a state of siege permits the military to assist
the Guatemalan National Police in conducting operations against the
Mexican cartel. It also permits the government to conduct warrantless
searches as well as detain suspects without warrants, and it prohibits
gun possession in public. To date, the Guatemalan government reports
that it has arrested nearly two dozen members of Los Zetas, including
one leader. They also claim to have seized more than 200 weapons,
several vehicles and five aircraft.
While both Los Zetas and the Sinaloa Federation maintain operations in
Guatemala, Los Zetas are particularly active in the country. Not only
do Los Zetas use Guatemala as a corridor for smuggling drugs into
Mexico, but they also use it as a place for recruiting and training
new gunmen and obtaining weapons.
Since at least 2006, Los Zetas have maintained a close working
relationship with former members of the Guatemalan special forces
called Kaibiles, named for Guatemala*s Kaibil Special Operations
Training Center, which is located in the dense jungle of Poptun, Peten
department. The Guatemalan government reports that the purported Zeta
leader arrested during this operation was a former Kaibil. Los Zetas
have also worked closely with the street gangs, such as Mara
Salvatrucha (MS-13), which wield a significant amount of influence in
Guatemala and effectively control significant portions of Guatemala
City.
It is quite interesting that the Guatemalan government declared the
state of siege in Alta Verapaz department and has focused its military
operations on the capital of that department, Coban. While Alta
Verapaz is in the north of the country, it does not have a direct
border with Mexico. Indeed Los Zetas are far more operationally
involved in the adjacent Peten and Quiche departments, which directly
border on Mexico. Los Zetas are also heavily involved in the
Huehuetenango department, where the Inter-American highway, CA-1, is
located. CA-1 is a major vehicular border crossing between Guatemala
and Mexico and is a critical point for both narcotics and human
trafficking.
While Alta Verapaz is not directly on the border, it is an important
department for both Los Zetas and the Guatemalan government because
the main surface transportation routes into both the western section
of the Peten department and northern section of Quiche department pass
through it. Holding Coban and a few other strategic road junctions and
checkpoints in Alta Verapaz can therefore allow the Guatemalan
government to make it more difficult for Los Zetas to smuggle
narcotics via road into the sections of Peten and northern Quiche
adjacent to the Mexican border. Establishing strategic roadblocks
would also make it more difficult for Los Zetas to get reinforcements
and fresh supplies to these areas. This pressure could spark
retaliatory strikes by Los Zetas against these checkpoints or other
government targets.
Skeptics have argued that the operation in Alta Verapaz is merely a
ploy by the Guatemalans to get more U.S. funding, since it does not
directly impact those areas of the country where Los Zetas are most
active. However, if the Guatemalans truly intend to take the fight to
Los Zetas in Peten and the northern sections of Quiche, clearing and
holding Coban and setting up roadblocks to curtail the ability of Los
Zetas to move men and materiel through Alta Verapaz is a logical
tactical step.
The Guatemalan government has publicly stated that it has ruled out
extending the state of siege to other parts of the country. If the
government does intend to put boots on the ground in areas where Los
Zetas have set up camps and airstrips in Peten and Quiche, they will
likely be able to conduct raids (most likely by air) in those very
isolated and remote sections of Peten and Quiche without declaring the
same type of state of siege they have in Alta Verapaz. If the
Guatemalan government launches such raids, it will be confirmation
that the operation in Alta Verapaz was a preparatory activity and not
merely lip service.
However, if the Guatemalan government is truly serious about
countering the influence of Los Zetas they cannot confine their
activities just to the remote areas of the Peten and Quiche
departments. They will also be compelled to undertake operations to
take control of the CA-1 corridor in Huehuetenango department. This
area (especially along CA-1) is far more heavily populated than the
border areas in Peten and Quiche and would likely require an operation
similar to that currently being conducted in Coban.
Dec. 20
* Guatemalan authorities said that four suspected members of Los
Zetas were arrested in the Guatemalan department of Alta Verapaz.
* The body of a local municipal employee was discovered in the
municipality of Tlajomulco de Zuniga, Jalisco state. The victim
had been kidnapped on Dec. 18 by several armed men.
* The body of a decapitated man was discovered in the municipality
of Tlalmanalco, Mexico state. A message attributing the crime to
drug-trafficking cartel La Familia Michoacana was discovered near
the body.
* Parts of the dismembered body of an unidentified man were found in
the municipalities of Los Reyes de la Paz and Nezahualcoyotl,
Mexico state.
Dec. 21
* Unidentified gunmen shot and killed four people on a soccer field
in the Riberas del Bravo neighborhood of Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua
state.
* Police announced the Dec. 19 arrest of a suspected member of Los
Zetas that led a group of kidnappers in the municipalities of Agua
Dulce and Las Choapas, Veracruz state. Seven other people were
arrested during the raid and four kidnap victims were freed.
* Unidentified gunmen shot and killed the military commander of a
Joint Operations Base in a restaurant in Uruapan, Michoacan state.
Dec. 22
* Three unidentified attackers set a house on fire in the San
Bernabe neighborhood of Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state. The
homeowners were not at the house during the attack.
* Police announced the arrest of Martin Armando Briones Muniz, a
suspected leader of a criminal group linked to the Gulf Cartel.
Briones Muniz was arrested in the Las Fuentes neighborhood of
Reynosa, Tamaulipas state.
* The body of an unidentified man with two gunshot wounds to the
head was discovered in Tlalnepantla, Mexico state.
* Unidentified attackers threw a grenade at the city hall in Ciudad
Victoria, Tamaulipas state, injuring a security guard.
Dec. 23
* Soldiers seized a suspected methamphetamine lab in the
municipality of Paracuaro, Michoacan state.
* One police officer was killed and two civilians were injured
during a grenade attack by unidentified attackers in Tampico,
Tamaulipas state.
* Police arrested former La Familia Michoacana member Alejandro
Yanez Hernandez in the municipality of Los Reyes de la Paz, Mexico
state. Yanez Hernandez is believed to be linked to at least 12
murders.
* Soldiers arrested Fabian Villarreal Valle, a suspected chief of
gunmen for La Familia Michoacana, in Tlatlaya, Mexico state. The
suspect was arrested at a road checkpoint, where 48.5 kilograms
(107 pounds) of marijuana were seized from his vehicle.
Dec. 24
* A banner attributing acts of violence to the Mexican Federal
Police was discovered hanging from a bridge in Zacapu, Michoacan
state. The banner said that the police committed acts of violence
to frame La Familia Michoacana.
* Dec. 25
* Two suspected members of street gang MS-13 were arrested in
Ixtepec, Oaxaca state. The suspects were arrested during
operations to discover the whereabouts of migrants allegedly
seized on Dec. 22.
* One policeman was killed and two gunmen were injured during a
firefight in the municipality of Union, Guerrero state. No arrests
were made after the attack.
Dec. 26
* A police officer was injured during an attack by unidentified
gunmen in Zihuatanejo, Guerrero state.
* Three boxes of dynamite detonators were discovered in an
irrigation canal in Atotonilco de Tula, Hidalgo state.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 28, 2010 4:02:58 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Geopolitical Weekly : Making Sense of the START Debate
Stratfor logo
Making Sense of the START Debate
December 28, 2010
Europe: The New Plan
By George Friedman
Last week, the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which had been signed in
April. The Russian legislature still has to provide final approval of
the treaty, but it is likely to do so, and therefore a New START is
set to go into force. That leaves two questions to discuss. First,
what exactly have the two sides agreed to and, second, what does it
mean? Let*s begin with the first.
The original START was signed July 31, 1991, and reductions were
completed in 2001. The treaty put a cap on the number of nuclear
warheads that could be deployed. In addition to limiting the number of
land- and submarine-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
and strategic bombers, it capped the number of warheads that were
available to launch at 6,000. The fact that this is a staggering
number of nuclear weapons should give you some idea of the staggering
number in existence prior to START. START I lapsed in 2009, and the
new treaty is essentially designed to reinstate it.
It is important to remember that Ronald Reagan first proposed START.
His initial proposal focused on reducing the number of ICBMs. Given
that the Soviets did not have an effective intercontinental bomber
force and the United States had a massive B-52 force and follow-on
bombers in the works, the treaty he proposed would have decreased the
Soviet quantitative advantage in missile-based systems without
meaningfully reducing the U.S. advantage in bombers. The Soviets, of
course, objected, and a more balanced treaty emerged.
What is striking is that START was signed just before the Soviet Union
collapsed and implemented long after it was gone. It derived from the
political realities that existed during the early 1980s. One of the
things the signers of both the original START and the New START have
ignored is that nuclear weapons by themselves are not the issue. The
issue is the geopolitical relationship between the two powers. The
number of weapons may affect budgetary considerations and theoretical
targeting metrics, but the danger of nuclear war does not derive from
the number of weapons but from the political relationship between
nations.
The Importance of the Political Relationship
I like to use this example. There are two countries that are
historical enemies. They have fought wars for centuries, and in many
ways, they still don*t like each other. Both are today, as they have
been for decades, significant nuclear powers. Yet neither side
maintains detection systems to protect against the other, and neither
has made plans for nuclear war with the other. This example is from
the real world; I am speaking of Britain and France. There are no
treaties between them regulating nuclear weapons in spite of the fact
that each has enough to devastate the other. This is because the
possession of nuclear weapons is not the issue. The political
relationship between Britain and France is the issue and, therefore,
the careful calibration of the Franco-British nuclear balance is
irrelevant and unnecessary.
The political relationship that existed between the United States and
the Soviet Union in the 1980s is not the same as the relationship that
exists today. Starting in the 1950s, the United States and Soviet
Union were in a state of near-war. The differences between them were
geopolitically profound. The United States was afraid that the Soviets
would seize Western Europe in an attack in order to change the global
balance of power. Given that the balance of power ran against the
Soviet Union, it was seen as possible that they would try to rectify
it by war.
Since the United States had guaranteed Europe*s security with troops
and the promise that it would use nuclear weapons against the Soviet
Union to block the conquest of Europe, it followed that the Soviet
Union would initiate war by attempting to neutralize the American
nuclear capability. This would require a surprise attack on the United
States with Soviet missiles. It also followed that the United States,
in order to protect Europe, might launch a pre-emptive strike against
the Soviet military capability in order to protect the United States
and the balance of power.
Until the 1960s, the United States had an overwhelming advantage. Its
bomber force gave it the ability to strike the Soviet Union from the
United States. The Soviets chose not to build a significant bomber
force, relying instead on a missile capability that really wasn*t in
place and reliable until the mid-1960s. The Cuban missile crisis
derived in part from this imbalance. The Soviets wanted Cuba because
they could place shorter-range missiles there, threatening the B-52
fleet by reducing warning time and threatening the American population
should the B-52s strike the Soviet Union.
A complex game emerged after Cuba. Both sides created reliable
missiles that could reach the other side, and both turned to a pure
counter-force strategy, designed to destroy not cities but enemy
missiles. The missiles were dispersed and placed in hardened silos.
Nuclear submarines, less accurate but holding cities hostage, were
deployed. Accuracy increased. From the mid-1960s on the nuclear
balance was seen as the foundation of the global balance of power.
The threat to global peace was that one side or the other would gain a
decisive advantage in the global balance. Knowledge of the imbalance
on both sides would enable the side with the advantage to impose its
political will on the other, which would be forced to capitulate in
any showdown.
The Russo-American Strategic Balance
Therefore, both sides were obsessed with preventing the other side
from gaining a nuclear advantage. This created the nuclear arms race.
The desire to end the race was not based on the fear that more nuclear
weapons were dangerous but on the fear that any disequilibrium in
weapons, or the perception of disequilibrium, might trigger a war.
Rather than a dynamic equilibrium, with both sides matching or
overmatching the other*s perceived capability, the concept of a
treaty-based solution emerged, in which the equilibrium became static.
This concept itself was dangerous because it depended on verification
of compliance with treaties and led to the development of space-based
reconnaissance systems.
The treaties did not eliminate anxiety. Both sides continued to
obsessively watch for a surprise attack, and both sides conducted
angry internal debates about whether the other side was violating the
treaties. Similarly, the deployment of new systems not covered by the
treaties created internal political struggles, particularly in the
West. When the Pershing II medium-range ballistic missiles were
deployed in Europe in the 1980s, major resistance to their deployment
from the European left emerged. The fear was that the new systems
would destabilize the nuclear balance, giving the United States an
advantage that might lead to nuclear war.
This was also the foundation for the Soviets* objection to the Reagan
administration*s Strategic Defense Initiative, dubbed *Star Wars.*
Although Star Wars seemed useful and harmless, the Soviets argued that
if the United States were able to defend itself against Soviet attack,
then this would give the United States an advantage in the nuclear
balance, allowing it to strike at the Soviet Union and giving it
massive political leverage. This has always been the official basis of
the Russian objection to ballistic-missile defense (BMD) * they said
it upset the nuclear balance.
The United States never wanted to include tactical nuclear weapons in
these treaties. The Soviet conventional force appeared substantially
greater than the American alliance*s, and tactical nuclear weapons
seemed the only way to defeat a Soviet force. The Soviets, for their
part, would never agree to a treaty limiting conventional forces. That
was their great advantage, and if they agreed to parity there it would
permanently remove the one lever they had. There was no agreement on
this until just before the Soviet Union collapsed, and then it no
longer mattered. Thus, while both powers wanted strategic stability,
the struggle continued on the tactical level. Treaties could not
contain the political tension between the United States and the Soviet
Union.
And now we get to the fundamental problem with the idea of a nuclear
balance. The threat of nuclear war derived not from some bloodthirsty
desire to annihilate humanity but from a profound geopolitical
competition by the two great powers following the collapse of European
power. The United States had contained the Soviet Union, and the
Soviet Union was desperately searching for a way out of its
encirclement, whether by subversion or war. The Soviet Union had a
much more substantial conventional military force than the United
States. The Americans compensated with nuclear weapons to block Soviet
moves. As the Soviets increased their strategic nuclear capability,
the American limit on their conventional forces decreased, compensated
for by sub-strategic nuclear forces.
But it was all about the geopolitical situation. With the fall of the
Soviet Union, the Soviets lost the Cold War. Military conquest was
neither an option nor a requirement. Therefore, the U.S.-Soviet
nuclear balance became meaningless. If the Russians attacked Georgia
the United States wasn*t about to launch a nuclear war. The Caucasus
is not Western Europe. START was not about reducing nuclear forces
alone. It was about reducing them in a carefully calibrated manner so
that no side gained a strategic and therefore political advantage.
New START is therefore as archaic as the Treaty of Versailles. It
neither increases nor decreases security. It addresses a security
issue that last had meaning more than 20 years ago in a different
geopolitical universe. If a case can be made for reducing nuclear
weapons, it must be made in the current geopolitical situation.
Arguing for strategic arms reduction may have merit, but trying to
express it in the context of an archaic treaty makes little sense.
New START*s Relevance
So why has this emerged? It is not because anyone is trying to
calibrate the American and Russian nuclear arsenals. Rather, it goes
back to the fiasco over the famous *reset button* that Hillary Clinton
brought to Moscow last March. Tensions over substantial but
sub-nuclear issues had damaged U.S.-Russian relations. The Russians
saw the Americans as wanting to create a new containment alliance
around the Russian Federation. The Americans saw the Russians as
trying to create a sphere of influence that would be the foundation of
a new Moscow-based regional system. Each side had a reasonable sense
of the other*s intentions. Clinton wanted to reset relations. The
Russians didn*t. They did not see the past as the model they wanted,
and they saw the American vision of a reset as a threat. The situation
grew worse, not better.
An idea emerged in Washington that there needed to be
confidence-building measures. One way to build confidence, so the
diplomats sometimes think, is to achieve small successes and build on
them. The New START was seen as such a small success, taking a
non-objectionable treaty of little relevance and effectively renewing
it. From here, other successes would follow. No one really thought
that this treaty mattered in its own right. But some thought that
building confidence right now sent the wrong signal to Moscow.
U.S. opposition was divided into two groups. One, particularly
Republicans, saw this as a political opportunity to embarrass the
president. Another argued, not particularly coherently, that using an
archaic issue as a foundation for building a relationship with Russia
allowed both sides to evade the serious issues dividing the two sides:
the role of Russia in the former Soviet Union, NATO and EU expansion,
Russia*s use of energy to dominate European neighbors, the future of
BMD against Iran, Russia*s role in the Middle East and so on.
Rather than building confidence between the two countries, a New START
would give the illusion of success while leaving fundamental issues to
fester. The counter-argument was that with this success others would
follow. The counter to that was that by spending energy on a New
START, the United States delayed and ignored more fundamental issues.
The debate is worth having, and both sides have a case, but the idea
that START in itself mattered is not part of that debate.
In the end, the issue boiled down to this. START was marginal at best.
But if President Barack Obama couldn*t deliver on START his
credibility with the Russians would collapse. It wasn*t so much that a
New START would build confidence as it was that a failure to pass a
New START would destroy confidence. It was on that basis that the U.S.
Senate approved the treaty. Its opponents argued that it left out
discussions of BMD and tactical nuclear weapons. Their more powerful
argument was that the United States just negotiated a slightly
modified version of a treaty that Ronald Reagan proposed a quarter
century ago and it had nothing to do with contemporary geopolitical
reality.
Passage allowed Obama to dodge a bullet, but it leaves open a question
that he does not want to answer: What is American strategy toward
Russia? He has mimicked American strategy from a quarter century ago,
not defined what it will be.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Reprinting or republication of this report on websites is authorized
by prominently displaying the following sentence at the beginning or
end of the report, including the hyperlink to STRATFOR:
"This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR"
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 28, 2010 5:36:19 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Iran's Challenge: Keeping Domestic Stability While Managing
International Pressures
[IMG]
Tuesday, December 28, 2010 [IMG] STRATFOR.COM [IMG] Diary Archives
Iran's Challenge: Keeping Domestic Stability While Managing
International Pressures
Iranian Deputy Minister of Economy Mohammad Reza Farzin said on Monday
that fuel consumption across the country had dropped since the
government began implementing its plan to cut subsidies. Speaking to
AFP, Farzin explained that after nine days, gasoline consumption
dropped from 13.2 million to 12.1 million gallons a day. *We are
spending $100 billion in subsidies every year from a gross domestic
product of $400 billion. We have realized that low energy prices
cannot deliver social welfare. It can*t reduce poverty. We are
determined to use the resources for managing prices more efficiently,*
the deputy economy minister stated.
It is not surprising that for decades, Iran has dedicated nearly a
quarter of its gross domestic product to subsidize essentials. For any
Tehran-based government to be able to maintain central rule over the
large mountainous country, it must establish a complex political and
security system. Thus, mass unrest has been contained through a
massive security apparatus and with an extensive subsidy program.
What renders the subsidy program even more critical is that Iran is a
chronically poor country with a significantly non-homogenous
population, and the country has been under international sanctions for
more than three decades. This would explain the high cost of
maintaining domestic social placidity. Policymakers of the Persian
Shiite polity, however, have long been divided over the merits of
thwarting internal chaos at such a high cost.
*The challenge for Iran is two-fold: decreasing foreign dependency on
gasoline imports * while containing a social backlash that could come
from slashing subsidies.*
Cutting subsidies has been on the policy agenda of successive
governments in the Islamic republic for at least two decades. Iran has
been dependent upon imports to meet 40 percent of its domestic
gasoline consumption needs. But it was not until last week that
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad*s administration embarked upon the
first-ever serious effort to address a key vulnerability in the
Iranian system.
Gasoline acquired at international market rates has been available to
the Iranian public for as low as 38 cents per gallon. The challenge
for Iran is two-fold: how to decrease dependency on gasoline imports,
especially in the wake of the latest round of sanctions, which have
made it more difficult to import fuel, while containing a social
backlash that could come from slashing subsidies. Ahmadinejad*s
government deals with this situation by increasing the price of
gasoline to curb domestic consumption while providing monthly cash
handouts as a way to avoid the domestic backlash.
The hope is that this complex economic reform package will allow the
state to deal with the growing challenges of securing much-needed fuel
imports, sustain social placidity and free up resources that can be
allocated to other areas. The past 10 days is not enough to gauge the
effectiveness of the strategy, and the lack of transparency raises
questions about the authenticity of the data made available by Iranian
authorities. For now, the key is that Iran has embarked upon a measure
that is a major break with its past behavior.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 28, 2010 8:16:31 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 9 - Russia Invades Georgia
Stratfor logo
Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 9 - Russia Invades Georgia
December 28, 2010 | 1322 GMT
Choosing the 10 most important geopolitical events of the past decade
is a challenge. But STRATFOR analysts took on the task, and after a
robust debate, they produced our Top 10 Most Important Geopolitical
Events of the Decade. We have teamed up with our partner,
DigitalGlobe, the world*s leading commercial satellite imagery
company, to provide compelling images illustrating each of these key
events.
Join us as we count down the Top 10, unveiling an event daily starting
Dec. 27 and culminating Jan. 5, when we reveal our selection for the
single most important event of the decade.
Click the link below to see STRATFOR*s explanation of each event along
with a satellite image.
Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 1 - The 9/11 Attacks
(click here to view interactive map)
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 29, 2010 5:40:20 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: The Continuing U.S.-Pakistani Disconnect Over the Afghan War
[IMG]
Wednesday, December 29, 2010 [IMG] STRATFOR.COM [IMG] Diary Archives
The Continuing U.S.-Pakistani Disconnect Over the Afghan War
A number of developments related to the complex dealings between the
United States and Pakistan over the war in Afghanistan took place
Tuesday. The day began with the head of the Pakistani army*s public
relations wing telling the Pakistani English daily Express Tribune
that the army*s preliminary plans to launch an offensive in a key
tribal region was delayed. The top Pakistani officer explained that
the delay of sending forces into North Waziristan was the consequence
of a resurgence of militant activity in other parts of the tribal
areas * the latest manifestation of two separate attacks over the
weekend in Mohmand and Bajaur agencies.
Since the recent strategy review by U.S. President Barack Obama*s
administration, Islamabad has come under increasing pressure from
Washington to expand the scope of its counterinsurgency offensive in
North Waziristan. It is the only agency (out of the seven that
constitute the Federally Administered Tribal Areas or FATA) that the
Pakistani government has not targeted as part of its 20-month-old
campaign against Taliban rebels and their transnational allies. North
Waziristan has also become the hub of jihadist forces of various
stripes, particularly Taliban forces engaged in the fight in
Afghanistan, especially so after the mid-2009 Pakistani-commenced
operations against militants in other parts of the FATA.
*Both the United States and Pakistan agree that there is to be a
negotiated settlement with the Afghan Taliban, but there is a huge
disagreement on how to go about getting to the negotiating table.*
In a separate Express Tribune report by Pakistan*s first
internationally affiliated daily * a partner of the International
Herald Tribune * unnamed military sources were quoted as saying that
senior military commanders decided to redeploy combat troops into the
Swat district of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province in the wake of a renewed
threat from Pakistani Taliban rebels. According to intelligence
reports, the Taliban rebel leaderships in Swat and the FATA, which had
escaped to Afghanistan*s eastern provinces of Kunar and Nuristan, were
now regrouping in Mohmand and Bajaur to stage a comeback in Swat.
This report provides a justification for the Pakistani argument that
it cannot expand its operations into North Waziristan * at least not
for a while. It also upends the American argument that Pakistani
territory along the Durand Line is a launch pad for Afghan Taliban
insurgents fighting Afghan and NATO troops in Afghanistan. In other
words, from the Pakistani view, while it is true that Pakistani soil
is being used by militants to stage attacks in Afghanistan, the
reverse is also true in that Taliban and al Qaeda forces waging war
against Islamabad enjoy safe havens in eastern Afghanistan.
Interestingly, on Tuesday, The New York Times published a story
quoting unnamed U.S. intelligence and military officials stating that
rival militant forces on both sides of the border had begun to
cooperate to enhance their respective cross-border operations.
On a related note, and in response to the U.S. strategy review,
Pakistan recently criticized the United States for demanding that
Islamabad prevent militants on its side of the border from staging
attacks in Afghanistan, while Washington-led forces with far more
superior capabilities were not able to seal the border from the Afghan
side. An American military commander responded Tuesday saying that it
was not possible for Western forces to seal the lengthy Afghan-border
and prevent militants from slipping in from the Pakistani side. Herein
lies the dilemma in that both the United States and Pakistan have
different priorities.
As far as Washington is concerned, Islamabad should not limit itself
to action against Islamist militants waging war on Pakistani soil.
Conversely, the Pakistanis want the Americans to realize that they
can*t risk exacerbating the war in their country by going after forces
that are not waging war against Pakistan. Ultimately, both sides agree
that there is to be a negotiated settlement with the Afghan Taliban,
but there is a huge disagreement on how to go about getting to the
negotiating table.
As this disagreement continues to play itself out, the idea of setting
up a Taliban office in Turkey surfaced last week around a summit-level
meeting in Istanbul involving the Turkish, Afghan and Pakistani
leaderships. While both Kabul and Islamabad welcomed the suggestion,
the United States is unlikely to seriously entertain the idea of talks
with the Taliban, at least not until after the end of 2011 due to the
U.S. surge campaign. That said, if there is to be a negotiated
settlement with the Taliban, the Afghan insurgent movement will need
to achieve international recognition as a legitimate Afghan national
political force and opening an office in a neutral country is a first
step in that direction. And until that happens, the U.S.-Pakistani
disconnect over the cross-border insurgency is likely to continue.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 29, 2010 8:18:28 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: A Week in the War: Afghanistan, Dec. 22-28, 2010
Stratfor logo
A Week in the War: Afghanistan, Dec. 22-28, 2010
December 29, 2010 | 1230 GMT
A Week in the War: Afghanistan, Dec. 22-28, 2010
STRATFOR
STRATFOR BOOK
* Afghanistan at the Crossroads: Insights on the Conflict
Related Special Topic Page
* The War in Afghanistan
Reflections on 2010
The U.S.-led surge of American and allied forces into Afghanistan was
completed late this year. With it has come an aggressive pursuit of
the counterinsurgency strategy, the massing of International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) troops in the Taliban*s heartland in the
southwest and an adjustment of the overall organization and
disposition of ISAF forces.
The commitment to strategy was emphasized when the commander of the
ISAF and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, was
relieved and replaced by his superior, Gen. David Petraeus, then head
of U.S. Central Command. Petraeus is perhaps the pre-eminent advocate
and a key architect of the counterinsurgency strategy, and his
appointment was no doubt intended in part to convey that the personnel
change did not signal a change in strategy.
While the Taliban have by no means been defeated, ISAF appears to have
a legitimate claim to some significant successes, at least in isolated
areas in Helmand and Kandahar provinces. The Taliban*s income from the
poppy crop appears to have been reduced and their ranks have taken a
hit from concerted targeting by special operations forces (though the
significance and impact of that hit remains a matter of debate).
Furthermore, areas like Nawa and Marjah are showing early if limited
signs of progress in terms of security and local support for the
Afghan government.
A Week in the War: Afghanistan, Dec. 22-28, 2010
(click here to enlarge image)
Still, questions of legitimacy and issues of corruption continue to
plague the Hamid Karzai regime. While eradicating corruption is not
realizable in Afghanistan in any sort of Western, developed-world
sense, Afghans continue to perceive the government as being
inordinately corrupt. Parliamentary elections this year did little to
allay concerns about the viability of Kabul as a U.S./NATO partner in
the counterinsurgency effort, much less as an entity capable of
effectively administering Afghanistan in the years ahead.
However, an Afghan High Council for Peace has been formed and both
Kabul and Washington appear to be getting behind it as the main effort
for orchestrating a negotiated settlement with the Taliban. While
little in the way of overt progress in negotiations was made this year
(there were indeed some embarrassments, such as when one negotiating
contact turned out to be an impostor), consolidating the process
behind a single entity can be thought of as an achievement of sorts.
After all, even now, with some 150,000 U.S. and allied troops in
country, neither the size nor the duration of the commitment of forces
is sufficient to actually defeat the Taliban. Any lasting solution
under the current strategy will ultimately require some form of
negotiated settlement with a significant portion of the Taliban.
No one on either side is under any illusion that the war will be over
in 2011, but an extended deadline is now implicit. At the NATO summit
in Lisbon in November, U.S. President Barack Obama formally announced
the commitment of U.S. and allied forces to Afghanistan until 2014. So
long as the White House sticks to the current strategy (as it appears
set to do in the coming year), hard fighting will continue.
The Campaign in 2011
In a way, 2010 can be seen as a year of preparing for 2011. The
position of America and its allies in Afghanistan will never be
stronger than in 2011, when the surge will be at full strength and
only minor reductions can be expected before the year is out.
Everything is now in place for those forces to pursue the
counterinsurgency strategy in earnest. Whether the strategy can
achieve its larger objectives in terms of the security environment and
political accommodation is a separate question. Further tactical gains
can be expected, and while those gains are unlikely to be decisive,
they may offer insight into the prospect of continued success in the
years ahead.
Indeed, both the ISAF and the Taliban claim to be sustaining combat
efforts, though the Taliban have gone so far (oddly) to admit that
their operations will ebb during the winter. This has always been the
case, but it is unusual for the Taliban to draw attention to it.
Indeed, STRATFOR doesn*t quite buy the Taliban quietude. Despite the
ISAF gains against the Taliban in 2010, it is hard to imagine that
such a strong and adept insurgency has been so rapidly reduced.
So in the coming year, as the spring thaw sets in, we will be watching
closely for a Taliban resurgence and a more concerted attempt to
reverse ISAF gains in 2010. At the same time, falling back in the face
of superior force is in keeping with classic guerrilla strategy, so
Taliban activity in areas where the ISAF presence is more limited and
areas where security is handed over to Afghan forces (likely to start
soon after the anticipated drawdown begins in July) will warrant close
scrutiny.
Related Links
* Obama*s Plan and the Key Battleground
* The Afghanistan Campaign, Part 1: The U.S. Strategy
* The Afghanistan Campaign, Part 2: The Taliban Strategy
* The Afghanistan Campaign, Part 3: The Pakistani Strategy
* The Afghanistan Campaign, Part 4: The View from Kabul
Meanwhile, ISAF pressure can be expected to remain in the Afghan
southwest. The question is how quickly gains there can be consolidated
and the extent to which temporary security can be translated into
lasting security provided by the Afghan government and ongoing
economic development provided by the United States and NATO.
Similarly, efforts at political accommodation and negotiation with the
Taliban are of central importance, especially in terms of an exit
strategy. It is hard to see a negotiated settlement being reached in
2011, but as with combat operations, the talks that take place in 2011
will likely offer considerable insight into prospects for success in
the years that follow.
In all of this, Pakistan remains a critical factor. Tensions between
Washington and Islamabad are to be expected, but the United States
cannot wage war in Afghanistan without Pakistan, so it will look to
avoid further confrontations like the September cross-border incident
that resulted in a temporary closure of the border crossing over the
Khyber Pass at Torkham. But insurgent sanctuaries across the border in
Pakistan continue to be a problem for the ISAF war effort in
Afghanistan, and they cannot simply be ignored. Confrontation over
this issue is not necessarily avoidable.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 29, 2010 8:28:03 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 8 - Iran Emerges
Stratfor logo
Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 8 - Iran Emerges
December 29, 2010 | 1324 GMT
Choosing the 10 most important geopolitical events of the past decade
is a challenge. But STRATFOR analysts took on the task, and after a
robust debate, they produced our Top 10 Most Important Geopolitical
Events of the Decade. We have teamed up with our partner,
DigitalGlobe, the world*s leading commercial satellite imagery
company, to provide compelling images illustrating each of these key
events.
Join us as we count down the Top 10, unveiling an event daily starting
Dec. 27 and culminating Jan. 5, when we reveal our selection for the
single most important event of the decade.
Click the link below to see STRATFOR*s explanation of each event along
with a satellite image.
Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 9 - Russia Invades Georgia
(click here to view interactive map)
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 29, 2010 1:28:25 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: U.S. Naval Update Map: Dec. 29, 2010
Stratfor logo
U.S. Naval Update Map: Dec. 29, 2010
December 29, 2010 | 1915 GMT
The Naval Update Map shows an approximation of the current locations
of U.S. Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) and Amphibious Ready Groups
(ARGs), the keys to U.S. dominance of the world*s oceans. A CSG is
centered on an aircraft carrier, which projects U.S. naval and air
power and supports a carrier air wing (CVW). The CSG includes
significant offensive strike capability. An ARG is centered on three
amphibious warfare ships, with a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)
embarked. An MEU is built around a heavily reinforced and mobile
battalion of Marines.
U.S. Naval Update Map: Dec. 29, 2010
(click here to enlarge image)
Carrier Strike Groups
* The USS Carl Vinson with CVW 17 embarked is under way on a
deployment to the U.S. 7th and 5th fleet areas of responsibility
(AOR).
* The USS Abraham Lincoln CSG with CVW 2 embarked is on a scheduled
deployment in the U.S. 5th Fleet AOR conducting maritime security
operations and theater security cooperation efforts.
* The USS John C. Stennis returned to its home port in Bremerton,
Wash., after completing sea trials as the final phase of a
six-month planned incremental availability in the Puget Sound
Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility.
Amphibious Ready Groups/Marine Expeditionary Units
* The USS Kearsarge ARG with the 26th MEU embarked is under way
supporting maritime security operations and theater security
cooperation efforts in the U.S. 5th Fleet AOR.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 29, 2010 2:48:29 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: China Security Memo: Dec. 29, 2010
Stratfor logo
China Security Memo: Dec. 29, 2010
December 29, 2010 | 1700 GMT
China Security Memo: Dec. 22, 2010
The Crossbow Bomber
Employees of a gasoline station on the outskirts of Beijing alerted
police at 9:57 a.m. local time about a man in a white pickup
threatening them with a crossbow and improvised explosive devices. The
man arrived at the Xinanzhen Service Area, about 100 kilometers (about
62 miles) east of Beijing on the Jingshen expressway, for gasoline,
but refused to pay 290 yuan (about $44) for his gas. He claimed to be
a petitioner with no money; presumably, he was on his way to
government offices in Beijing. Station employees removed the keys from
his truck and blocked his exit, after which he retrieved a crossbow
from his truck and fired at least one bolt at the employees. The staff
left the keys and hid inside a nearby convenience store.
The man then pulled a red package out of his vehicle and threatened to
blow up the station before driving off in the direction of Beijing.
When he arrived at the Bailu tollbooth just outside central Beijing,
he told the toll collector he had no money, apparently seeking
sympathy by claiming to have grievances with authorities. The suspect
then drove through the barrier with police in pursuit.
Police stopped him at the corner of Xidawang and Nanmofang roads in
Chaoyang district soon after he exited the expressway at about 11 a.m.
local time. A SWAT team also arrived, at which point a standoff began.
Police approached the vehicle, after which an officer broke one of its
windows with a hammer while two others pulled the suspect out of his
truck. Police reportedly seized two explosive devices, a crossbow and
several bolts.
An anonymous source told Beijing News that the man was fleeing Tianjin
after committing a robbery, a more plausible explanation than his
claims to have been a petitioner. Armed robberies using crossbows are
not uncommon in China, where firearms are illegal and difficult to
acquire. The quick police response prevented any casualties, though
his failure to detonate his explosives when police approached could
indicate he was bluffing. Alternatively, he might have planned to use
the explosives for some other purpose that did not include suicide.
Rewards for Internet Informants
Isolated instances of local police offering rewards online for tips to
solve cases have emerged of late. The rewards have comprised credits
for China*s premier instant messaging client, QQ, or an equivalent
amount of cash.
In November, police in Changzhou, Jiangsu province, offered 10,000
yuan or the equivalent in credits (QQ Coin) for information on an open
case. In December, police in Urumqi, Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous
Region, offered between 500 and 5,000 yuan for information on a case.
In the first instance, a netizen told police the suspect was his
friend, and later persuaded him to confess. (It is unclear if the man
accepted cash or QQ Coin.)
QQ is a very popular instant messaging program that claims to have
more than 100 million users online during peak periods. One yuan is
equivalent to one QQ Coin and can be spent on games, profile
enhancements, virtual gifts and mobile phone ringtones. But the
currency has expanded, and can now be used for real physical goods, as
well as for funding gambling and adult video chats, services that
would be illegal if using real currency. Speculators trade QQ Coin for
real money in fluctuating informal markets. The use of QQ Coin as a
reward underlines the role online currency now serves in Chinese
society beyond protecting online anonymity or being converted into
hard cash * instead, it is seen to have inherent value on its own.
The use of QQ Coin as a reward may prove to attract netizens and
encourage *human flesh search engines* to help police investigations.
Since there have only been two reported cases of these rewards, and
since there is not yet a national program, it is too early to judge
its effectiveness.
Chinese officials have faced longstanding criticism for their
inability to protect informants. In many cases, authorities do not
accept anonymous tips. Instead they expect informants to identify
themselves when they make their report, especially when rewards have
been involved. This has deterred potential whistleblowers from
informing against their superiors out of fears of retribution. In rare
cases, such retribution has consisted of groups of enforcers sent to
physically harm the informant.
Outside the realm of official investigations, China has a very active
Internet community that enforces social norms. Called the *human flesh
search engine,* Chinese Internet users have investigated corrupt
officials or individuals who are perceived as an affront to social or
national interests, posting their personal information online. The
combined power of thousands of individuals has proven quite effective
in this regard, raising the question of why China*s police have not
tapped into this potential resource for help on cases. The answer,
perhaps, is that posting personal information online is illegal, and
that authorities may fear tapping into the human flesh search engine
might promote vigilante justice.
China Security Memo: Dec. 29, 2010
(click here to view interactive map
Dec. 22
* Police and prosecutors in Guangzhou, Guangdong province, are
investigating a group of 12 individuals accused of a fraudulent
investment scheme involving gold. Beginning in 2004, the 12
reportedly set up a company in Guangdong province selling gold
investments. In 2007, they set up a second company in Inner
Mongolia. They promised returns of 8 percent to 30 percent to 978
investors since the company was established, defrauding victims of
140 million yuan (about $21.1 million). All 12 suspects have since
fled Guangzhou.
* A group of 103 people discovered that the airline tickets they
purchased from the Dunhua Branch of Baishan International Travel
Agency in Jilin province were fake. The group planned to fly to
Hong Kong on Dec. 22, when they found out the tickets were
invalid. The tickets reportedly came from a woman named Gao who
worked at the travel office; police reportedly are investigating.
* Guangxi police arrested 15 individuals involved in transporting
37.5 kilograms (82.7 pounds) of heroin to Nanning from Vietnam in
November. Police also seized 7 million yuan in cash, 10 cars and
19 properties. The leader of the group reportedly was wanted
already for trafficking more than 3 kilograms of heroin to
Shenzhen in 2005.
* A reporter based in Xinjiang Autonomous Region was nearly beaten
to death in Kuytun. Local police claimed the attack was the result
of a personal matter and not of his work as a journalist.
Reporters Without Borders, however, said his colleagues claimed he
was working on a sensitive story about housing demolition. Six
suspects have been detained in connection with the incident.
* Police in Guiyang, Guizhou province, announced they have rescued
151 children and 209 women from human-trafficking rings since
2008, breaking up 47 trafficking rings, punishing 450 people and
detaining another 81 suspects.
Dec. 23
* Wu Yaxian, a former member of the standing committee of Chinese
People*s Political Consultative Conference from Lianjiang,
Guangdong province, was sentenced to death for his involvement in
organized crime. He was convicted of murder, robbery, causing
public disturbance, fraud, illegal gun possession, and tax
evasion, all while leading an organized crime group. During the 10
years he led the gang, he reportedly made 300 million yuan.
Dec. 24
* A former mayor of Puyang, Henan province, was sentenced to 11
years in prison for accepting bribes. The woman accepted 1.7
million yuan in bribes between 2000 and 2008 when she held
positions that include director of the Finance Bureau, vice mayor
and mayor. She was given a light sentence because she returned the
money.
* A group of four individuals was sentenced to between five and none
years in jail for counterfeiting bankcards to steal 520,000 yuan
in Liuzhou, Guangxi province. The group installed ATM *skimmers*
to steal card information.
Dec. 26
* Six people were detained in Changli, Hebei province, after Chinese
authorities discovered wine produced with several chemical
additives. A state television investigation revealed that local
wineries were including sugar water, coloring agents and
artificial flavorings in their wine. They also falsely used famous
brand names. The chemicals could cause cardiac problems and
headaches and may be carcinogenic. Thirty wineries were also shut
down in connection with the investigation.
* Memetjan Abdulla, a journalist for China National Radio, was
sentenced to life in prison for broadcasting information about the
July 2009 Urumqi riots, according to the World Uighur Congress.
The exiled group claimed the sentencing occurred in April in a
closed-door trial. Abdulla was arrested after he translated a call
by the World Uighur Congress to protest beating deaths in Urumqi;
he was subsequently charged with inciting the riots.
* Beijing police blocked petitioners from reaching the Chairman Mao
Zedong Memorial Hall from the Beijing central train station on the
anniversary of Mao*s birthday. Riot police were used to prevent as
many as a thousand marchers from reaching Tiananmen Square.
Tourists and others were allowed to enter the Memorial Hall after
passing through security checkpoints.
Dec. 27
* Two drug traffickers were sentenced to death for smuggling 48.1
kilograms of methamphetamine from Hong Kong to Shenzhen, Guangdong
province.
* Between 15 and 30 guards were placed outside the residential
complex of Zhao Lianhai, the activist who exposed
melamine-contaminated milk products in 2008. Hong Kong deputies to
the National People*s Congress suggested he will be released soon
for medical reasons. Zhao was sentenced to two and a half years in
prison on Nov. 10 for *provoking quarrels and making trouble*
during his campaign for victims of the melamine scandal.
* A woman was arrested for inciting four men to steal more than 40
cars over the last three years in Chengdu, Sichuan province. All
four men had an affair with the woman, who planned the thefts for
fun. All five have been arrested.
Dec. 28
* Police from Beijing and Chongqing and Guangdong province, along
with counterparts from Taiwan and the Philippines, shut down a
criminal network based in Taiwan that operated a fraud scheme via
telephone. The suspects would call Chinese citizens from overseas
and ask them to open new bank accounts and deposit money into
them. Police arrested 178 suspects for stealing the deposits. They
froze 118 million yuan and seized more than 8,000 bankcards, four
guns, 43 computers, 200 phones and 11 cars.
* Zijin Mining Group apologized and donated 50 million yuan to
rebuild the area damaged by a dam breach on their property in
September in Xinyi, Jiangsu province.
* Authorities in Yueqing, Zhejiang province, issued a second press
statement saying that the death of a local village head, Qian
Yunhui, was due to a traffic accident. The village leader had been
leading complaints against a real estate redevelopment project
since 2004. A local power company acquired 150 hectares (about 370
acres) of land without compensating locals, according to local
bloggers. They believe Qian died after being forced under a truck
and repeatedly run over.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 29, 2010 3:39:04 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Dispatch: Suspected Terrorists Arrested in Denmark
Stratfor logo
Dispatch: Suspected Terrorists Arrested in Denmark
December 29, 2010 | 2130 GMT
Click on image below to watch video:
[IMG]
Vice President of Tactical Intelligence Scott Stewart explains why a
thwarted terrorism plot in Denmark * in which five suspected
terrorists were arrested * appears to be a more credible threat than
other recent terrorism plots.
Editor*s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition
technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete
accuracy.
Authorities in Denmark and Sweden arrested five men today in
connection with a plot to attack a Danish newspaper office in
Copenhagen that was involved in the Muhammad cartoon controversy.
Unlike some other recent cases in Europe involving the arrest of
terrorism suspects, this case appears to be the real deal.
Although we still have a lot of details unavailable to us concerning
this case, several of those that have surfaced so far indicate to us
that this cell was sincere, that it was dedicated and that is was the
real deal.
Probably the first indicator that leaps out to us is that this group
was looking at a reasonable and reachable target. They were going to
attack this newspaper office * it wasn*t the fact that they were
looking to attack every target in Copenhagen or Denmark, or even hard
targets that would be difficult to attack. Recently we saw a cell
taken down in the United Kingdom last week. That group of plotters was
looking to hit everything in London, including hard targets like the
U.S. Embassy. When we see plots like that, it indicates to us that
those conducting them are inexperienced, and they are more fanciful
than real threats. In addition to the fact that the target was
reasonable, the means of attack was also reasonable and achievable.
They weren*t looking at some grandiose plot involving nuclear weapons
or large explosive devices. They were going to conduct a simple armed
assault on the newspaper office with the intent of killing the largest
number of people possible.
Second, the cell in Denmark had already obtained weapons to conduct
their attack and had them in place, and three of the members had
traveled from Sweden to Denmark in pursuit of the plot. So, this plot
had gone beyond the theoretical stage, and the plotters had gotten to
the stage of executing it. We saw a plot last week in The Netherlands
where a group of Somalis was arrested, and that plot allegedly
involved the desire of the Somalis to shoot down Danish helicopters.
The only problem for them is that they didn*t have any missiles to
shoot down the helicopters. Again, the plot wasn*t very far along and
the people involved in it were more amateurish (whereas the group in
Denmark appears to have not only obtained the weapons, but
pre-positioned men to carry out the attack).
Third, like past cases, including the case involving American David
Headley, who went to Copenhagen to conduct surveillance of the
Jyllands-Posten office, and an attack last year in January in which a
Somali had attacked the home of Danish cartoonist Kurt Westergaard
armed with an axe and a knife, this case shows us that,
Jyllands-Posten office remains a very serious target of terrorists.
As al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula said in 2010, they were not going
to allow the dust to settle on the Muhammad cartoon controversy, and
that those involved in the cartoons were going to continue to be
targeted. This case is evidence that those threats were true.
Click for more videos
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with
attribution to www.stratfor.com
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 30, 2010 4:04:00 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Security Weekly : Separating Terror from Terrorism
Stratfor logo
Separating Terror from Terrorism
December 30, 2010
Mexico and the Cartel Wars in 2010
By Scott Stewart
On Dec. 15, the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sent
a joint bulletin to state and local law enforcement agencies
expressing their concern that terrorists may attack a large public
gathering in a major U.S. metropolitan area during the 2010 holiday
season. That concern was echoed by contacts at the FBI and elsewhere
who told STRATFOR they were almost certain there was going to be a
terrorist attack launched against the United States over Christmas.
Certainly, attacks during the December holiday season are not unusual.
There is a history of such attacks, from the bombing of Pan Am Flight
103 on Dec. 21, 1988, and the thwarted millennium attacks in December
1999 and January 2000 to the post-9/11 airliner attacks by shoe bomber
Richard Reid on Dec. 22, 2001, and by underwear bomber Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab on Dec. 25, 2009. Some of these plots have even stemmed
from the grassroots. In December 2006, Derrick Shareef was arrested
while planning an attack he hoped to launch against an Illinois
shopping mall on Dec. 22.
Mass gatherings in large metropolitan areas have also been repeatedly
targeted by jihadist groups and lone wolves. In addition to past
attacks and plots directed against the subway systems in major cities
such as Madrid, London, New York and Washington, 2010 saw failed
attacks against the crowds in New York*s Times Square on May 1 and in
Pioneer Courthouse Square in downtown Portland, Ore., on Nov. 26.
With this history, it is understandable that the FBI and the DHS would
be concerned about such an attack this year and issue a warning to
local and state law enforcement agencies in the United States. This
American warning also comes on the heels of similar alerts in Europe,
warnings punctuated by the Dec. 11 suicide attack in Stockholm.
So far, the 2010 holiday season has been free from terrorist attacks,
but as evidenced by all the warnings and concern, this season has not
been free from the fear of such attacks, the psychological impact
known as *terror.* In light of these recent developments, it seems
appropriate discuss the closely related phenomena of terrorism and
terror.
Propaganda of the Deed
Nineteenth-century anarchists promoted what they called the
*propaganda of the deed,* that is, the use of violence as a symbolic
action to make a larger point, such as inspiring the masses to
undertake revolutionary action. In the late 1960s and early 1970s,
modern terrorist organizations began to conduct operations designed to
serve as terrorist theater, an undertaking greatly aided by the advent
and spread of broadcast media. Examples of attacks designed to grab
international media attention are the September 1972 kidnapping and
murder of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics and the December
1975 raid on OPEC headquarters in Vienna. Aircraft hijackings followed
suit, changing from relatively brief endeavors to long, drawn-out and
dramatic media events often spanning multiple continents.
Today, the proliferation of 24-hour television news networks and the
Internet have allowed the media to broadcast such attacks live and in
their entirety. This development allowed vast numbers of people to
watch live as the World Trade Center towers collapsed on Sept. 11,
2001, and as teams of gunmen ran amok in Mumbai in November 2008.
This exposure not only allows people to be informed about unfolding
events, it also permits them to become secondary victims of the
violence they have watched unfold before them. As the word indicates,
the intent of *terrorism* is to create terror in a targeted audience,
and the media allow that audience to become far larger than just those
in the immediate vicinity of a terrorist attack. I am not a
psychologist, but even I can understand that on 9/11, watching the
second aircraft strike the South Tower, seeing people leap to their
deaths from the windows of the World Trade Center Towers in order to
escape the ensuing fire and then watching the towers collapse live on
television had a profound impact on many people. A large portion of
the United State was, in effect, victimized, as were a large number of
people living abroad, judging from the statements of foreign citizens
and leaders in the wake of 9/11 that *We are all Americans.*
During that time, people across the globe became fearful, and almost
everyone was certain that spectacular attacks beyond those involving
the four aircraft hijacked that morning were inevitable * clearly,
many people were shaken to their core by the attacks. A similar,
though smaller, impact was seen in the wake of the Mumbai attacks.
People across India were fearful of being attacked by teams of
Lashkar-e-Taiba gunmen, and concern spread around the world about
Mumbai-style terrorism. Indeed, this concern was so great that we felt
compelled to write an analysis emphasizing that the tactics employed
in Mumbai were not new and that, while such operations could kill
people, the approach would be less successful in the United States and
Europe than it was in Mumbai.
Terror Magnifiers
These theatrical attacks have a strange hold over the human
imagination and can create a unique sense of terror that dwarfs the
normal reaction to natural disasters that are many times greater in
magnitude. For example, in the 2004 Asian tsunami, more than 227,000
people died, while fewer than 3,000 people died on 9/11. Yet the 9/11
attacks produced not only a sense of terror but also a geopolitical
reaction that has exerted a profound and unparalleled impact upon
world events over the past decade. Terrorism clearly can have a
powerful impact on the human psyche * so much so that even the threat
of a potential attack can cause fear and apprehension, as seen by the
reaction to the recent spate of warnings about attacks occurring over
the holidays.
As noted above, the media serve as a magnifier of this anxiety and
terror. Television news, whether broadcast on the airwaves or over the
Internet, allows people to remotely and vicariously experience a
terrorist event, and this is reinforced by the print media. While part
of this magnification is due merely to the nature of television as a
medium and the 24-hour news cycle, bad reporting and misunderstanding
can also help build hype and terror. For example, when Mexican drug
cartels began placing small explosive devices in vehicles in Ciudad
Juarez and Ciudad Victoria this past year, the media hysterically
reported that the cartels were using car bombs. Clearly, the
journalists failed to appreciate the significant tactical and
operational differences between a small bomb placed in a car and the
far larger and more deadly vehicle-borne explosive device.
The traditional news media are not alone in the role of terror
magnifier. The Internet has also become an increasingly effective
conduit for panic and alarm. From breathless (and false) claims in
2005 that al Qaeda had pre-positioned nuclear weapons in the United
States and was preparing to attack nine U.S. cities and kill 4 million
Americans in an operation called *American Hiroshima* to claims in
2010 that Mexican drug cartels were still smuggling nuclear weapons
for Osama bin Laden, a great deal of fearmongering can spread over the
Internet. Website operators who earn advertising revenue based on the
number of unique visitors who read the stories featured on their sites
have an obvious financial incentive for publishing outlandish and
startling terrorism claims. The Internet also has produced a wide
array of other startling revelations, including the oft-recycled
e-mail chain stating that an Israeli counterterrorism expert has
predicted al Qaeda will attack six, seven or eight U.S. cities
simultaneously *within the next 90 days.* This e-mail was first
circulated in 2005 and has been periodically re-circulated over the
past five years. Although it is an old, false prediction, it still
creates fear every time it is circulated.
Sometimes a government can act as a terror magnifier. Whether it is
the American DHS raising the threat level to red or the head of the
French internal intelligence service stating that the threat of
terrorism in that country has never been higher, such warnings can
produce widespread public concern. As we*ve noted elsewhere, there are
a number of reasons for such warnings, from trying to pre-empt a
terrorist attack when there is incomplete intelligence to a genuine
concern for the safety of citizens in the face of a known threat to
less altruistic motives such as political gain or bureaucratic
maneuvering (when an agency wants to protect itself from blame in case
there is an attack). As seen by the public reaction to the many
warnings in the wake of 9/11, including recommendations that citizens
purchase plastic sheeting and duct tape to protect themselves from
chemical and biological attack, such warnings can produce immediate
panic, although, over time, as threats and warnings prove to be
unfounded, this panic can turn into threat fatigue.
Those seeking to terrorize can and do use these magnifiers to produce
terror without having to go to the trouble of conducting attacks. The
empty threats made by bin Laden and his inner circle that they were
preparing an attack larger than 9/11 * threats propagated by the
Internet, picked up by the media and then reacted to by governments *
are prime historical examples of this.
In recent weeks, we saw a case where panic was caused by a similar
confluence of events. In October, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP) issued the second edition of Inspire, its English-language
magazine. As we discussed in our analysis of the magazine, its Open
Source Jihad section pointed out a number of ways that attacks could
be conducted by grassroots jihadists living in the West. In addition
to the suggestion that an attacker could weld butcher knives onto the
bumper of a pickup truck and drive it through a crowd, or use a gun as
attackers did in Little Rock and at Fort Hood, another method briefly
mentioned was that grassroots operatives could use ricin or cyanide in
attacks. In response, the DHS decided to investigate further and even
went to the trouble of briefing corporate security officers from the
hotel and restaurant industries on the potential threat. CBS news
picked up the story and ran an exclusive report compete with a scary
poison logo superimposed over photos of a hotel, a dinner buffet and
an American flag. The report made no mention of the fact that the AQAP
article paid far less attention to the ricin and cyanide suggestion
than it did to what it called the *ultimate mowing machine,* the
pickup with butcher knives, or even the more practical * and far more
likely * armed assault.
This was a prime example of terror magnifiers working with AQAP to
produce fear.
Separation
Groups such as al Qaeda clearly recognize the difference between
terrorist attacks and terror. This is seen not only in the use of
empty threats to sow terror but also in the way terrorist groups claim
success for failed attacks. For example, AQAP declared the failed
Christmas Day 2009 *underwear* bombing to be a success due to the
effect it had on the air-transportation system. In a special edition
of Inspire magazine published in November following the failed attack
against cargo aircraft, AQAP trumpeted the operation as a success,
citing the fear, disruption and expense that resulted. AQAP claimed
the cargo bomb plot and the Christmas Day plot were part of what it
called *Operation Hemorrhage,* an effort to cause economic damage and
fear and not necessarily kill large numbers of people.
As we*ve noted before, practitioners of terrorism lose a great deal of
their ability to create terror if the people they are trying to
terrorize adopt the proper mindset. A critical part of this mindset is
placing terrorism in perspective. Terrorist attacks are going to
continue to happen because there are a wide variety of militant groups
and individuals who seek to use violence as a means of influencing a
government * either their own or someone else*s.
There have been several waves of terrorism over the past century, but
it has been a fairly constant phenomenon, especially over the past few
decades. While the flavors of terror may vary from Marxist and
nationalist strains to Shiite Islamist to jihadist, it is certain that
even if al Qaeda and its jihadist spawn were somehow magically
eradicated tomorrow, the problem of terrorism would persist.
Terrorist attacks are also relatively easy to conduct, especially if
the assailant is not concerned about escaping after the attack. As
AQAP has noted in its Inspire magazine, a determined person can
conduct attacks using a variety of simple weapons, from a pickup to a
knife, axe or gun. And while the authorities in the United States and
elsewhere have been quite successful in foiling attacks over the past
couple of years, there are a large number of vulnerable targets in the
open societies of the West, and Western governments simply do not have
the resources to protect everything * not even authoritarian police
states can protect everything. This all means that some terrorist
attacks will invariably succeed.
How the media, governments and populations respond to those successful
strikes will shape the way that the attackers gauge their success.
Obviously, the 9/11 attacks, which caused the United States to invade
Afghanistan (and arguably Iraq) were far more successful than bin
Laden and company could ever have hoped. The London bombings on July
7, 2005, where the British went back to work as unusual the next day,
were seen as less successful.
In the final analysis, the world is a dangerous place. Everyone is
going to die, and some people are certain to die in a manner that is
brutal or painful. In 2001, more than 42,000 people died from car
crashes in the United States and hundreds of thousands of Americans
died from heart disease and cancer. The 9/11 attacks were the
bloodiest terrorist attacks in world history, and yet even those
historic attacks resulted in the deaths of fewer than 3,000 people, a
number that pales in comparison to deaths by other causes. This is in
no way meant to trivialize those who died on 9/11, or the loss their
families suffered, but merely to point out that lots of people die
every day and that their families are affected, too.
If the public will take a cue from groups like AQAP, it too can
separate terrorism from terror. Recognizing that terrorist attacks,
like car crashes and cancer and natural disasters, are a part of the
human condition permits individuals and families to practice
situational awareness and take prudent measures to prepare for such
contingencies without becoming vicarious victims. This separation will
help deny the practitioners of terrorism and terror the ability to
magnify their reach and power.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Reprinting or republication of this report on websites is authorized
by prominently displaying the following sentence at the beginning or
end of the report, including the hyperlink to STRATFOR:
"This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR"
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 30, 2010 5:23:20 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Russian Influence and the Changing Baltic Winds
[IMG]
Wednesday, December 29, 2010 [IMG] STRATFOR.COM [IMG] Diary Archives
Russian Influence and the Changing Baltic Winds
When asked whether he preferred building a rail project westward to
Europe or eastward to Russia, Latvian Prime Minister Valdis
Dombrovskis on Wednesday said the latter option * a railroad to Moscow
* would be more justifiable to Latvia. Dombrovskis was careful to add
that the decision would be made based on which option was more
economically viable, but he said neither project * the high-speed rail
to Europe known as *Rail Baltica* or a high-speed rail from Riga to
Russia * would hold priority until a thorough economic analysis is
conducted. While it seems that the initial statement favoring Russia
is relatively mild and reasonable, it is a subtle yet indicative
representation of the changing winds in the Baltics.
The Baltic region, consisting of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, is
traditionally the most pro-Western and anti-Russian of the former
Soviet states. They were the most resistant to Russian rule during the
Soviet era, and * not surprisingly * the first of the republics to
declare independence from Moscow in the early 1990s. They are also the
only former Soviet republics that are officially part of the Western
alliance structure, holding membership into mainstay institutions like
NATO and the European Union, to which they acceded in 2004 at a low
point in Russia*s geopolitical power. This was a harsh blow to Moscow,
as it not only placed territory that is practically within earshot of
St. Petersburg into the political and economic system of the West, but
combined this with the military protection of the United States.
As such, over the past two decades, and especially since 2004, Russia
had taken an aggressive stance toward the three Baltic countries.
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania depend on Russia entirely for their
natural gas supplies, so Moscow would frequently cut off the pipeline
when it needed to prove a point. Russia also engaged in cyberattacks
in Estonia in 2007 and used its ethnic Russian populations,
particularly in Estonia and Latvia where this demographic represents
more than a quarter of each country*s population, to put pressure on
the respective governments whenever Moscow felt the need to do so.
Russia also simulated an invasion of the Baltics when it conducted the
Zapad military exercises with Belarus.
*The way that Russia interacts with and attempts to influence the
Baltic region has taken on a much more complex dynamic**
But Moscow has realized that its unilateral approach of hostility
toward the Baltics didn*t give Russia what it wanted * control.
Instead, it further increased the anti-Russian sentiments in these
states. In the past few months Russia has adopted a new, more
multi-dimensional approach toward the Baltic states.
Russia boosted ties to Latvia via the Harmony Center coalition, the
leading opposition group that finds its platform not only as a
pro-Russian party, but also * and perhaps even more so following the
global financial crisis that was felt particularly hard in the Baltics
* on economic issues. At the same time, Russia has struck various
economic deals with the old and new ruling coalitions in Latvia in
strategic sectors such as energy ports, railways and pipelines. This
seems to have softened Latvia*s typically negative reaction to all
things Russian, with Latvian Defense Minister Artis Pabriks recently
saying that France*s sale of Mistral warships to Russia does not
represent a real threat to national security. It isn*t that the
Latvian government is becoming pro-Russian, but rather that it has
realized that it is easier to cooperate with Russia than fight against
it.
While Russia has been successful in Latvia, its new strategy is just
starting to show its effects in Estonia. Estonia*s leading pro-Russian
political figure, Tallinn Mayor Edgar Savisaar, is embroiled in a
political controversy due to his allegedly being an *agent of
influence* of Russia, and this has had only a marginal effect on his
party*s popularity. Russia is also attempting to buy up economic
pieces in Estonia * though so far not as much as in Latvia.
The third Baltic state, Lithuania, which at one point was the most
relaxed Baltic nation toward Moscow due to the fact that it does not
share a border with Russia and had Estonia and Latvia as buffers,
seems to have flipped this position now that Riga, and to a lesser
extent Tallinn, have a thawing of sorts with Moscow. Lithuania has
spoken vociferously against the Mistral deal, has been blocking
Russia*s attempt to economically move in, and the Lithuanian
parliament has set up a working group to re-investigate Russian crimes
in Lithuania shortly after the latter declared independence in 1991.
But even as Russia attempts this new strategy, it is not only offering
carrots; Moscow continues to wield sticks, albeit indirectly. Russia
is moving 8,000 troops near St. Petersburg to the border with the
Baltics as a reminder that the Russian military remains a force to be
reckoned. Russia is also, in tandem with Germany, continuing to
construct the Nordstream pipeline, which circumvents Russia*s energy
supplies around the Baltics, a sign of growing political and economic
coordination between two powerful nations that flank the Baltic
countries.
So at this point, Russia*s relations with the Baltic states continue
to be a mixed bag. It isn*t that Russia is trying to control these
three states to pull them out of Western alliances and back into some
sort of new Soviet-like union. Russia is just attempting to make sure
that Western influence is easily containable and controllable in the
three states that are on Russia*s most vulnerable geographic border.
The way that Russia interacts with and attempts to influence this
region has taken on a much more complex dynamic that has created the
air of change in attitude in the Baltic states toward Moscow.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 30, 2010 7:31:03 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 7 - NATO Expands
Stratfor logo
Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 7 - NATO Expands
December 30, 2010 | 1320 GMT
Choosing the 10 most important geopolitical events of the past decade
is a challenge. But STRATFOR analysts took on the task, and after a
robust debate, they produced our Top 10 Most Important Geopolitical
Events of the Decade. We have teamed up with our partner,
DigitalGlobe, the world*s leading commercial satellite imagery
company, to provide compelling images illustrating each of these key
events.
Join us as we count down the Top 10, unveiling an event daily starting
Dec. 27 and culminating Jan. 5, when we reveal our selection for the
single most important event of the decade.
Click the link below to see STRATFOR*s explanation of each event along
with a satellite image.
Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 9 - Russia Invades Georgia
(click here to view interactive map)
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 30, 2010 8:05:49 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Southern Sudan's Referendum: Khartoum Changes its Tone
Stratfor logo
Southern Sudan's Referendum: Khartoum Changes its Tone
December 30, 2010 | 1223 GMT
Southern Sudan's Referendum: Khartoum Changes its Tone
ASHRAF SHAZLY/AFP/Getty Images
Sudanese President Omar al Bashir speaks in Khartoum in July
Summary
The tone of the Sudanese government*s rhetoric concerning Southern
Sudan*s upcoming referendum has shifted, indicating that Khartoum has
accepted the eventuality of Southern Sudanese independence. Though
most northerners do not want the south to secede, the north has begun
planning for southern independence * and, despite many outsiders*
expectations, war is not necessarily likely. Northern Sudanese
opposition parties are using the referendum as an opportunity to push
for the formation of a new interim government, a new constitution and
for fresh elections, but the ruling party intends to serve its full
term and maintain control for years to come.
Analysis
Sudan*s ruling National Congress Party (NCP) has demonstrated a
noticeable shift in rhetoric over how it intends to react should
Southern Sudan vote for independence in a referendum scheduled for
Jan. 9. No longer threatening to force a delay to the vote, or even to
refuse recognition of the results, Khartoum now appears resigned to
the inevitability of a new state arising in the south. This does not
mean that tensions between the north and south will dissipate
suddenly. The breakup of the country will not be smooth, and there
will likely be moments where it appears that war could erupt. But
Khartoum is not preparing for a fight as its first recourse; rather
its focus will be on achieving two main objectives in the months
ahead: ensuring it obtains a favorable new oil-revenue sharing
agreement with the south, and staving off a looming political crisis
in what will remain of Sudan.
Voting in the referendum will occur from Jan. 9-15, but independence
cannot legally become official until July, when the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement * the document that ended the latest civil war
(1983-2005) * expires. This is also when Sudan*s interim constitution
will have to be amended to account for the departure of the south,
assuming a majority of southerners vote to secede. Between the
referendum and July, the north and south will have to come to terms on
a new oil-revenue sharing agreement to replace the one that has been
in place since 2005, which gives Khartoum roughly half of all oil
revenues from crude pumped in Southern Sudan.
There is a natural inclination that the oil issue alone will lead to
war if Southern Sudan secedes, as most of Sudan*s oil comes from the
south. However, Sudan*s geography and the location of its oil
infrastructure give Khartoum enormous leverage. Southern Sudan is
landlocked, and the only export route for its crude oil is a pipeline
network that goes through the north. Discussions about building an
alternative network through Kenya have yet to lead to anything
tangible, and any real alternative is a minimum of three years off.
The south certainly maintains the option of trying to sabotage its own
production should the north refuse to substantially increase the share
of oil revenue that goes to Juba, but this would hurt them more than
the north. Khartoum is aware of all of this.
Southern Sudan's Referendum: Khartoum Changes its Tone
(click here to enlarge image)
Politically speaking, southern secession has been more difficult for
the north to accept, as is the case whenever any country loses a
significant portion of its territory. Khartoum has repeatedly
threatened war if issues such as border demarcations, citizenship,
international debt obligations and the status of the Abyei region are
not settled before the referendum, and also sought to find ways to
delay the Southern Sudanese vote. These issues remain unresolved, yet
there are now signs from several leading NCP figures that Khartoum has
accepted that not only will the vote take place on time, but also that
Southern Sudan will break away:
* On Dec. 16, state-run media quoted presidential adviser and NCP
Deputy Chairman Nafie Ali Nafie as acknowledging *the failure of
all the efforts to maintain the unity of Sudan.* Nafie reportedly
said, *We shall accept the reality and must not deceive ourselves
and stick to dreams.*
* Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Ahmed Karti said Dec. 23 that *even
if South Sudan votes for its independence in the referendum, we
are interested in creating two viable responsible states that
would honor their international obligations. We want cooperation
to develop between them and all of the issues to be resolved. We
do not want any conflict to exist between our two countries.*
* Sudanese President Omar al Bashir said Dec. 28 that he would be
*the first to recognize the south* if it chose independence,
referring to southerners repeatedly as brothers, and promising to
help them *build their state* regardless of the outcome of the
referendum.
Bashir has also specifically addressed the oil issue. During a Dec. 19
rally in al-Qadarif state, he said that Southern Sudan *is part of our
body, but (its secession) is not the end of the world.* He then
reminded the crowd that the Sudanese oil industry is still relatively
new (Sudan only began exporting crude in 1999), saying, *People said
that the south*s oil will go, [but] how many years has the south*s oil
been there? Before the oil, were we not living?* Furthermore, Bashir
emphasized the potential for the north to develop its own oil
industry, which is currently thought to produce between
100,000-115,000 barrels per day (bpd) out of Sudan*s total estimated
production of 475,000-500,000 bpd. Playing up the potential for
northern Sudanese oil production (Limited Open Access) has been a
recent strategy of Khartoum*s to allay public concerns that southern
secession would lead to economic catastrophe in Sudan.
The majority of Sudanese people do not want to see the south secede,
though, and so all of these statements are usually adjoined to
criticism of foreign influences for the south*s determination to leave
(a *Zionist conspiracy* is the most popular explanation).
The national elections held in Sudan last April left the NCP with a
solid mandate; it won just more than 72 percent of all the seats in
the national assembly, with 22.3 percent of the seats going to the
south*s leading party, the Sudan People*s Liberation Movement (SPLM).
The SPLM*s seats would become vacant if the independence referendum
passes, and this essentially would turn Sudan into a one-party state
run by the NCP. Bashir*s party is thus completely opposed to calls by
northern opposition parties (most of whom decided to boycott the April
elections) to voluntarily concede its power by forming a new
transitional government that would craft a new constitution before
calling for fresh elections.
Bashir and his allies see such demands by Sadiq al-Mahdi*s National
Umma Party and Hassan al-Turabi*s Popular Congress Party as an
invitation to create an unnecessary risk to its political power.
Al-Mahdi and al-Turabi, on the other hand, feel that the south*s
imminent exit from the government of national unity will provide a
rare opportunity to place significant pressure upon the NCP. Both
opposition party leaders know that once this window closes, it will be
extremely difficult to reopen. Thus, they fervently are pushing the
notion that southern secession * and the void it will leave in the
democratically elected government, not to mention the problems that
will arise with the interim constitution * will strip the NCP of its
political legitimacy. This, they argue, would require a reorganization
of Sudan*s political framework. Bashir is not budging, however. He has
vowed to merely amend (not discard) the interim constitution so as to
account for the south*s departure, and declared that he and the rest
of the government will remain in office for the remainder of their
five-year terms won in the recent elections. Anyone opposed to this,
Bashir said Dec. 28, can *lick his elbow.*
It is the fear that the opposition may seize on the NCP*s perceived
weakness in the wake of the referendum that explains Bashir*s recent
pledge to reinforce Sharia as the law of the land in Sudan after the
south secedes, with Islam as the national religion and Arabic as the
national language. Having lost the role of the protector of Sudan*s
unity, the NCP is seeking to return to its roots in a way, playing up
its Islamist credentials as a means of regaining whatever political
legitimacy it risks losing with the breakup of Sudan. While Khartoum
has decided that going to war with the south is not worth it (as long
as the SPLM does not try to overstep its bounds, say, in the
oil-revenue talks, or by increasing its support for Darfur rebels), it
will not be so compliant when it comes to how it intends to wield
control in what is left of Sudan.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 30, 2010 10:57:25 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: U.S. Employment Stabilizes
Stratfor logo
U.S. Employment Stabilizes
December 30, 2010 | 1541 GMT
U.S. Employment Stabilizes
SCOTT OLSON/Getty Images
A worker assembles a vehicle at a plant in Chicago
First-time U.S. unemployment claims are one of the key statistics
STRATFOR follows religiously. Unlike most statistics, they represent
something close to a hard-and-fast figure * X people applied for
unemployment assistance in the previous week * rather than an
estimate. It is dependent not on surveys but on how much money state
governments have to pay out to claimants. When one has to pay, one*s
numbers become devilishly accurate. This means the statistic is
largely immune to any political manipulation or misinterpretation.
In contrast, statistics such as the government*s headline unemployment
or job creation figures are based on dated surveys, which then wrestle
a complex matrix of data into a single * oversimplified * number.
First-time unemployment claims therefore are our preferred method for
monitoring the U.S. labor market overall, as the service-oriented
nature of the U.S. economy prevents the government from generating
useful data as regards actual job creation.
Unemployment claims were updated Dec. 30, and the new information
tells us three things.
U.S. Employment Stabilizes
First, unemployment claims are a current indicator that informs us of
the status of the labor market right now. In this case, claims have
dipped to 388,000 in the week ending Dec. 24 from 422,000 the week
before. The magic number here is 400,000 * that is the point that
separates a strengthening labor market from a weakening one. Past
performance indicates that anything above 400,000 means the economy is
destroying jobs faster than it is creating them. Conversely, anything
below 400,000 indicates an overall improvement in the jobs picture.
Second, unemployment claims are a lagging indicator that tells us the
general mindset of the business world. When businesses accelerate
layoffs, it is because they are in a situation where their
profitability is threatened. For most companies, staff represents a
high sunk cost in terms of training; letting go of staff is typically
the last * most desperate * thing they do to return to profitability.
Lower unemployment claims, therefore, indicate that businesses have
become relatively comfortable with the balance between staff costs and
profitability.
Third, unemployment claims are a leading indicator that informs us of
what consumer spending will look like in three to six months. Stronger
job creation means increased private income, which in turn means
increased private consumption. Roughly 70 percent of U.S. gross
domestic product is composed of private consumption, so lower
first-time claims tend to lead to a virtuous circle of higher
employment, higher income, higher consumption, higher manufacturing
orders, and back to higher employment to fill those orders.
Of course, this is simply one week*s statistic. For improvement to
occur, this statistic will need to hold * or ideally continue dropping
* for several months yet. But the fact remains that 400,000 tends to
be the inflection point between recessionary and/or tepid economic
performance and fast economic growth. For the first time since the
recession began in September 2008, the United States has edged back
into that zone.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 30, 2010 11:05:21 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Stratfor's World Snapshot
Stratfor logo December 30, 2010
Stratfor's World Snapshot
Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 7 - NATO Expands
STRATFOR
Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 7 - NATO Expands
December 30, 2010 1320 GMT
STRATFOR analysts provide an explanation of our Top Ten Most Important
Geopolitical Events of the decade. We've also teamed up with our
partner, DigitalGlobe, the world's leading commercial satellite
imagery company, to provide compelling images illustrating each of
these key events. (With STRATFOR interactive photo essay.) [more]
U.S. Employment Stabilizes
U.S. Employment Stabilizes
December 30, 2010 1541 GMT
U.S. employment levels have stabilized, leading the way to strong
growth. [more]
Southern Sudan's Referendum: Khartoum Changes its Tone
Southern Sudan's Referendum: Khartoum Changes its Tone
December 30, 2010 1223 GMT
The Sudanese government appears to have shifted its focus from
opposing Southern Sudanese independence to planning for a future
without the south. (With STRATFOR map) [more]
U.S. Naval Update Map: Dec. 29, 2010
U.S. Naval Update Map: Dec. 29, 2010
December 29, 2010 1915 GMT
A weekly approximation of the current locations of U.S. Carrier Strike
Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups, based on available open-source
information. (With STRATFOR map) [more]
More Analysis >>
Situation Reports
Afghanistan: Military Operation To Be Launched In West
December 30, 2010 1623 GMT
Afghan and foreign military forces will launch an operation against
the Taliban in the country's western provinces, Afghan Islamic Press
reported Dec. 30. The Afghan chief of army staff, Gen. Sher... [more]
Algeria: 50 Al Qaeda Suspects Killed In 3 Weeks - Report
December 30, 2010 1614 GMT
China: New Market Maker Guidelines Issued
December 30, 2010 1610 GMT
Belarus: Foreigners Backed Opposition Candidates
December 30, 2010 1609 GMT
More Situation Reports >>
Weekly Intelligence Reports
Separating Terror from Terrorism
Separating Terror from Terrorism
December 30, 2010 0955 GMT
A terrorist attack does not have to succeed to cause panic and alarm
as long as terror magnifiers react accordingly. [more]
Making Sense of the START Debate
Making Sense of the START Debate
December 28, 2010 0950 GMT
Europe: The New Plan
Europe: The New Plan
December 21, 2010 1000 GMT
Mexico and the Cartel Wars in 2010
Mexico and the Cartel Wars in 2010
December 16, 2010 0946 GMT
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 30, 2010 12:00:35 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Obstacles to Lifting Europe's Arms Embargo Against China
Stratfor logo
Obstacles to Lifting Europe's Arms Embargo Against China
December 30, 2010 | 1724 GMT
Obstacles to Lifting Europe's Arms Embargo Against China
FENG LI/AFP/Getty Images
The European Union*s foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton (3rd L),
talks to Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi (3rd R) during their
meeting in Beijing on Sept. 2
Summary
The European Union is considering lifting its arms embargo against
China, which has been in place since 1989. Several major European
states, including the United Kingdom and Germany, are rumored to be
against the embargo*s continuation. There are several obstacles,
however, including a general distrust of China. Even if that distrust
can be overcome, there remains the requirement of unanimity voting on
EU foreign policy decisions.
Analysis
French daily Le Figaro reported Dec. 30 that the European Union is
considering lifting its arms embargo against China, in place since the
1989 Tiananmen Square incident. A source close to EU foreign policy
chief Catherine Ashton told the newspaper that the lifting of the
embargo on all lethal weapons *could happen very quickly.* These
comments follow a Dec. 17 EU leaders summit at which a confidential
report claimed that the embargo was a major hurdle to EU-China foreign
policy and should be scrapped.
Despite these developments, the issue faces several potential
obstacles, not the least of which is the need for unanimity on EU
foreign policy decisions.
The European Union has considered lifting the embargo before * the
issue has received serious attention four times since 2001. Former
German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and former French President
Jacques Chirac were both opposed to the embargo. There is also
anecdotal evidence that the current German, British and Dutch
governments are all considering changing their stances. However, a
general degree of concern over China*s growing military power and
intentions could interfere with a deal that would give Beijing the
weapons technology it badly desires. This distrust was exemplified
recently when Germany announced the creation of a national cyber
defense center and explicitly mentioned the Chinese threat.
If the Europeans overcame their concerns, all 27 members of the union
would have to approve lifting the embargo. The European Union has
retained unanimity voting on foreign policy issues, despite a move
toward less unanimity voting in general in the Lisbon Treaty, the
union*s constitutional treaty in force since January 2010. The Lisbon
Treaty does have a provision by which member states can hand off a
foreign policy issue to the bloc*s foreign policy chief, after which
any proposal from Ashton would be voted on via a qualified majority
procedure. However, handing off the issue would still require
unanimity at the European Council level.
Of the European powers, France has been the most consistently opposed
to the embargo due to the prospect of lucrative arms deals with China.
However, the United States is still vehemently opposed to arms sales
to China that could bring it Western military technology. Although
Washington does not have a seat at the EU foreign policy table, it can
emphasize to its NATO allies the need for unity on the issue. And if
Washington*s lobbying efforts fall flat with Berlin, London and Paris,
it can always turn to smaller Central European allies that can veto
the issue.
Furthermore, it is not clear that the European governments have a free
pass from their constituents on the embargo. The issue of Chinese
human rights violations is even more important to the populace in
Europe than it is in the United States. Politicians can lose popular
support for appearing overly supportive of China*s military.
Furthermore, the European Parliament is vehemently opposed to lifting
the embargo, and while it does not have a say in the matter it could
further complicate the move with Europe*s constituents if the only
democratically elected EU institution is against it.
Whether there is a concrete push to lift the embargo will probably
become clearer when Chinese Vice Premier Li Keqiang visits Europe from
Jan. 4-12. For China, weapons and technology acquisitions are a high
priority, and China has repeatedly emphasized that the politically
thorny problem of its growing trade surpluses with the European Union
could be alleviated if the union would ease restrictions on exports on
key goods that China craves. Li is officially in charge of China*s
food security policy but is considered the heir apparent to current
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, making him the No. 2 in command in China
after the leadership change in 2012. Moreover, he is an economics
specialist, and STRATFOR sources have indicated that he leads China*s
economic policy when Wen specifically hands it over. Li*s trip
includes visits to Spain, Germany and the United Kingdom * and support
from the latter two states would be critical for the lifting of the
embargo. Berlin is the European Union*s political and economic
powerhouse, and London is Washington*s most committed ally in Europe.
However, even if Beijing succeeds in lobbying major European capitals,
the hurdle of unanimity remains.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 30, 2010 1:07:27 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Growing U.S.-Venezuelan Tensions
Stratfor logo
Growing U.S.-Venezuelan Tensions
December 30, 2010 | 1804 GMT
Growing U.S.-Venezuelan Tensions
BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI/Getty Images
The Venezuelan Embassy in Washington
Diplomatic tensions between the United States and Venezuela are rising
following the U.S. administration*s decision late Dec. 29 to revoke
the visa of Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States Bernardo
Alvarez Herrera.
The move was in response to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez*s
rejection of U.S. diplomat Larry Palmer as the new U.S. ambassador to
Venezuela. Palmer, who earlier made remarks on the Cubanization of the
Venezuelan armed forces, the low morale of the army and Venezuela*s
support for Colombian rebels, has been a target of sharp criticism by
the Venezuelan government in recent months.
But there are more critical issues simmering beneath the surface of
this diplomatic tit-for-tat between Caracas and Washington. One such
issue concerns the fate of alleged Venezuelan drug kingpin Walid
Makled, who was captured Aug. 19 (with the help of the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Agency) in Colombia. Makled is a valuable bargaining chip
for Colombia and the United States * and a critical threat to the
Venezuelan regime * due to the amount of evidence he is believed to
possess linking high-ranking Venezuelan officials to money-laundering,
drug-trafficking and possibly terrorism charges.
Chavez, in an attempt to insulate his government from Makled*s
testimony, has been demanding Makled*s extradition, a request that
Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos said in November he would
honor. At the time, the U.S. administration and the U.S. State
Department in particular were not interested in pushing for Makled*s
extradition to the United States, preferring instead to prevent a
crisis with Venezuela from erupting while holding onto any testimony
gleaned from interrogations the United States had been quietly
conducting with Makled since early December. The United States was not
keen on pushing this issue with Venezuela, but it was not going to
pass up the opportunity to obtain testimony for later use, should the
need arise.
According to a STRATFOR source, the United States may now be shifting
its position on the Makled extradition case. Recently, alleged
evidence of links (most likely tied primarily to drug trafficking)
between Hezbollah and Makled (as well as Venezuelan Minister of
Interior and Justice Tareck el Aissami) were brought to the attention
of the U.S. administration. Rumors are circulating in Washington that
based on these links the United States will revive its extradition
request for Makled * a move that will make Chavez extremely anxious.
There are a number of players with varying agendas attempting to build
up Venezuela*s links with Iran (through alleged banking transactions,
Hezbollah and Iranian Quds Force links, and even rumors of Iranian
missile parts being placed in Venezuela) as a way to direct the U.S.
administration*s attention on the Venezuelan government. Many of these
claims could be exaggerated, but raising the Iran banner is an
effective means of grabbing Washington*s attention. The United States
is still likely to exercise constraint in dealing with Venezuela, but
should it proceed in pushing its extradition demand for Makled,
U.S.-Venezuelan tensions will increase considerably.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 30, 2010 6:55:25 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Venezuela Ends Its Dual Exchange Rate
Stratfor logo
Venezuela Ends Its Dual Exchange Rate
December 31, 2010 | 0049 GMT
Venezuela Ends Its Dual Exchange Rate
JUAN BARRETO/AFP/Getty Images
A man tries to operate a cash dispenser of the Venezuelan Central Bank
in Caracas
Summary
Venezuela will end its subsidized exchange rate on Jan. 1, 2011. Until
then, the South American country has had two rates, one for essential
goods and one for non-essential goods. This two-tiered system created
a host of unintended consequences * consequences Caracas hopes end
come Jan. 1.
Analysis
The Venezuelan government announced Dec. 30 that it will eliminate the
subsidized exchange rate of 2.6 bolivars per dollar Jan. 1, 2011,
leaving only the official rate of 4.3 and ending a 12-month-old
dual-exchange rate system that generated massive corruption.
In January, the Venezuelan government officially devalued the bolivar
(VEF) from 2.15 per dollar to the subsidized rate of 2.6 per dollar
for essential goods, such as food and medical supplies, and to 4.3 per
dollar for all other goods, thus creating a dual exchange rate regime.
Though compelling political and economic aims may have been at the
heart of the January devaluation, fixing the unintended consequences
associated with that devaluation is behind Venezuela*s decision to
devalue again.
As the official rate of 2.15 bolivar per dollar was overvalued, the
government*s devaluing the bolivar to bring it more in line with its
fair value was in part aimed at preventing Venezuela*s non-commodity
tradable sector from continuing to buckle under high exchange rates.
As the effects of the devaluation would fall most heavily on those
with the least income, however, the government simultaneously
introduced the subsidized exchange rate to shield those individuals
from the consequent loss of purchasing power. In practice, this made
the cost of importing food and other essentials lower than the cost
for other imports. The subsidized rate also provided the government an
avenue through which to support select (state-owned) companies by
granting them access to the international system and the ability to
obtain essential goods at the subsidized rate.
The company that stood to gain the most from the devaluation was
state-owned oil company Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA). PDVSA controls
Venezuela*s energy sector and is the primary source for bringing
dollars into the economy. Whereas PDVSA used to receive just 2.15 VEF
per dollar, after the devaluation it could sell those dollars for 4.3
VEF, essentially doubling the domestic purchasing power of its dollar
revenue. PDVSA supplies more than half the country*s public funds,
both through the government*s budget and through PDVSA*s own social
programs, meaning what was good for PDVSA*s bottom line was also good
for the Venezuelan government.
However well-intentioned the dual exchange system may have been, it
nevertheless had a number of adverse political and economic
consequences * consequences that the Dec. 30 devaluation is intended
to stem. As access to the rates was strictly controlled under the dual
system, the already-robust black market was many Venezuelans* only
option for obtaining hard currency. This caused the black market rate
(or *parallel rate*) to diverge significantly from even the lower of
the two official parities, with the bolivar trading at one point
upwards of 8 VEF per dollar.
This made importing (any) goods significantly more expensive, stoking
Venezuela*s already-high inflation. If doing away with the dual
exchange rate translates into greater dollar availability at official
rates, this might therefore help reduce the need for dollars from the
black market. This could alleviate inflationary pressures on the
domestic economy, which could in turn also alleviate some pressure
from Venezuela*s foreign exchange reserve holdings. These had been
depleted by meeting demand for dollars at the subsidized rate, which
accounts for about 30 percent of all exchange transactions.
But a currency worth more or less depending on what it is used to buy
not only is inefficient and creates distortions, it breeds corruption.
The existence of the subsidized rate motivated exchange rate arbitrage
and the misclassification of transactions as essential; the
consequences of this became readily apparent in the warehouses of
rotting food and other essential equipment littering the country.
(Corrupt officials would import masses of *essential* goods only to
hoard them to maintain a shortage; they would then slowly sell those
goods for a hefty profit on the black market). Finding warehousing of
rotting food during an ostensible food shortage is definitely a big
political liability * one the government hopes will disappear along
with the subsidized rate.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 31, 2010 6:22:04 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 6 - EU Restructuring
Stratfor logo
Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 6 - EU Restructuring
December 31, 2010 | 1214 GMT
Choosing the 10 most important geopolitical events of the past decade
is a challenge. But STRATFOR analysts took on the task, and after a
robust debate, they produced our Top 10 Most Important Geopolitical
Events of the Decade. We have teamed up with our partner,
DigitalGlobe, the world*s leading commercial satellite imagery
company, to provide compelling images illustrating each of these key
events.
Join us as we count down the Top 10, unveiling an event daily starting
Dec. 27 and culminating Jan. 5, when we reveal our selection for the
single most important event of the decade.
Click the link below to see STRATFOR*s explanation of each event along
with a satellite image.
Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 7 - NATO Expands
(click here to view interactive map)
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 31, 2010 9:04:29 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: The Chinese President's Visit and Sino-U.S. Relations
Stratfor logo
The Chinese President's Visit and Sino-U.S. Relations
December 31, 2010 | 1457 GMT
The Chinese President's Visit and Sino-U.S. Relations
TIM SLOAN/AFP/Getty Images
U.S. President Barack Obama (L) shakes hands with Chinese President Hu
Jintao at a meeting in Seoul on Nov. 11
Summary
Chinese President Hu Jintao will visit the United States in January.
Economic and political issues * including tensions on the Korean
Peninsula * will be on the agenda. Hu*s visit, which comes even as
tensions between Washington and Beijing are on the rise, is seen as
the next major indicator of the direction Sino-U.S. relations will
take.
Analysis
China has fixed a date for President Hu Jintao*s long-anticipated
visit to the United States, which is slated to include a state dinner
with U.S. President Barack Obama at the White House on Jan. 19 and
possibly other events. As a corollary to the visit, U.S. Defense
Secretary Robert Gates will visit China from Jan. 9-12 to speak with
his counterpart, Liang Guanglie, and then will visit Japan from Jan.
13-14 to meet Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa.
Hu*s visit to the United States has attracted attention as the next
large signpost indicating the direction of China*s relations with the
United States. There will certainly be much pageantry, and the Chinese
are expected to bring a large business delegation and announce new
deals worth an estimated $10 billion. Chinese and U.S. companies have
sealed a number of major deals in 2010, and the two governments have
pledged cooperation on regulatory disputes, yet the Sino-U.S.
relationship is increasingly strained due to several economic and
strategic disagreements. Discussions about China*s currency, the
Korean Peninsula and other topics during Hu*s visit will indicate
whether rising tensions between Washington and Beijing can be managed
in 2011.
The status of the Korean Peninsula will be very much at issue.
Military tensions remain high, as South Korea proceeded with military
exercises aimed at intimidating the North * this time naval drills in
the Sea of Japan (East Sea) * while rumors suggested that Pyongyang
could test a third nuclear device to raise tensions further (something
which is by no means improbable). All sides are positioning themselves
for an eventual resumption of six-party negotiations to restore a
veneer of stability on the Korean Peninsula. The United States will
send negotiators to South Korea in early January, before Hu*s visit,
and Chinese and South Korean working-level defense talks will be held,
in addition to Gates* trip to China and Japan. The United States has
demanded that China take a more active role in restraining North
Korea, since Beijing has increased its influence over the North in
recent years to use it as a geopolitical lever against the United
States, and Washington suspects this emboldened Pyongyang to conduct
attacks. So far Beijing has not committed to concrete action but has
complained about the U.S. response. Currently the momentum for
resuming talks appears to be building, but the risk of another
incident remains high. The Obama-Hu meeting likely will indicate the
status of this dynamic.
Hu*s visit will be the next major opportunity to check the status of
the ongoing tug of war over China*s undervalued currency. Beijing has
allowed its currency to appreciate by not quite 3 percent since it
pledged to adopt a more flexible regime, and the United States will
demand more.
The yuan is a top concern, but there are several others. The United
States* primary concern remains persistent high unemployment levels,
and Washington is convinced that China*s pro-export and pro-domestic
policies are unfairly shielding China from global competition,
shutting out U.S. exports to China and undercutting U.S. manufacturers
whose goods compete with Chinese imports.
Furthermore, the United States last week called for dispute settlement
negotiations with China, under the World Trade Organization framework,
over China*s Special Fund for Wind Power Manufacturing, which gives
subsidies to Chinese suppliers of equipment and parts, shutting out
foreign contenders. Despite allegedly successful trade talks in
mid-December, mutual distrust in economic policy is motivating threats
of greater trade punishments between the two states. So far the United
States has avoided imposing sweeping barriers on Chinese imports, has
deferred U.S. Treasury reports that could cite China for currency
manipulation, and has avoided other opportunities to take an
aggressive approach, preferring instead negotiation and persuasion.
However, the American stance could shift in 2011 for two reasons.
First, Obama*s loss of power in the U.S. legislature will confound him
on many domestic issues, leaving foreign policy as the primary sphere
in which he can act. Any demonstration of strength would likely be
aimed at Iran or China. Second, there are signs that the incoming U.S.
Congress could have a protectionist streak that could lead to tougher
action on China as well, along the lines of the attempt in the
previous Congress to pass a bill that would nudge the administration
to count China*s undervalued currency as a subsidy and impose
countervailing duties in response.
Beijing is aware that the United States could become harder to work
with, especially toward the second half of 2011 when the 2012
elections become more pressing. But China*s problem is that
capitulation, on currency or industrial policy, poses risks for its
economic and social stability. For instance, with the outlook for
export growth weakening in 2011 (estimated at 10 percent, down from 30
percent in 2010), Beijing fears appreciating its currency too fast,
which could add further strain to the export sector and cause higher
unemployment. Similarly, Beijing is walking a fine line in attempting
to tighten monetary and credit controls to prevent overheating while
avoiding a deep economic slowdown that would upset society as a whole.
Since Beijing has a generational leadership transition in 2012, it is
not in a risk-taking mood and will resist U.S. pressure as much as it
can. The stage is therefore set for U.S.-China tensions to continue
rising in 2011, and the Hu-Obama meeting will be the first occasion to
see how handily the two sides will be able to cope.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: December 31, 2010 11:05:03 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Stratfor's World Snapshot
Stratfor logo December 31, 2010
Stratfor's World Snapshot
Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 6 - EU Restructuring
STRATFOR
Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 6 - EU Restructuring
December 31, 2010 1214 GMT
STRATFOR analysts provide an explanation of our Top Ten Most Important
Geopolitical Events of the decade. We've also teamed up with our
partner, DigitalGlobe, the world's leading commercial satellite
imagery company, to provide compelling images illustrating each of
these key events. (With STRATFOR interactive photo essay.) [more]
The Chinese President's Visit and Sino-U.S. Relations
The Chinese President's Visit and Sino-U.S. Relations
December 31, 2010 1457 GMT
Chinese President Hu Jintao's upcoming visit to the United States is
seen as a major indicator of the direction of U.S.-Chinese relations.
[more]
Venezuela Ends Its Dual Exchange Rate
Venezuela Ends Its Dual Exchange Rate
December 31, 2010 0049 GMT
Caracas' hopes the corruption spawned by its dual exchange rate ends
with the Jan. 1 termination of the rate itself. [more]
Growing U.S.-Venezuelan Tensions
Growing U.S.-Venezuelan Tensions
December 30, 2010 1804 GMT
Washington's move to revoke the Venezuelan ambassador's visa is just
the surface of a growing spat between the countries. [more]
More Analysis >>
Situation Reports
Cote d'Ivoire: West African Countries Prepared To Oust Gbagbo
December 31, 2010 1541 GMT
West African regional military leaders are prepared to oust Ivorian
President Laurent Gbagbo if negotiations fail, AFP reported Dec. 31.
At a meeting of the Economic Community of West African... [more]
Afghanistan: Taliban Leader Reportedly Killed
December 31, 2010 1536 GMT
Pakistan: Two Explosions Leave 1 Dead, 3 Wounded
December 31, 2010 1529 GMT
Pakistan: Taliban Release Tribesmen
December 31, 2010 1528 GMT
More Situation Reports >>
Weekly Intelligence Reports
Separating Terror from Terrorism
Separating Terror from Terrorism
December 30, 2010 0955 GMT
A terrorist attack does not have to succeed to cause panic and alarm
as long as terror magnifiers react accordingly. [more]
Making Sense of the START Debate
Making Sense of the START Debate
December 28, 2010 0950 GMT
Europe: The New Plan
Europe: The New Plan
December 21, 2010 1000 GMT
Mexico and the Cartel Wars in 2010
Mexico and the Cartel Wars in 2010
December 16, 2010 0946 GMT
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2010 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 1, 2011 6:30:04 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 5 - Russia Elects Putin
Stratfor logo
Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 5 - Russia Elects Putin
January 1, 2011 | 1222 GMT
Choosing the 10 most important geopolitical events of the past decade
is a challenge. But STRATFOR analysts took on the task, and after a
robust debate, they produced our Top 10 Most Important Geopolitical
Events of the Decade. We have teamed up with our partner,
DigitalGlobe, the world*s leading commercial satellite imagery
company, to provide compelling images illustrating each of these key
events.
Join us as we count down the Top 10, unveiling an event daily starting
Dec. 27 and culminating Jan. 5, when we reveal our selection for the
single most important event of the decade.
Click the link below to see STRATFOR*s explanation of each event along
with a satellite image.
[IMG]
(click here to view interactive map)
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 1, 2011 10:56:23 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Chinese Provincial Reshuffling and the 6th Generation of
Leadership
Stratfor logo
Chinese Provincial Reshuffling and the 6th Generation of Leadership
January 1, 2011 | 1647 GMT
Chinese Provincial Reshuffling and the 6th Generation of Leadership
STR/AFP/Getty Images
The capital of China*s Jillin province, Changchun, where Sun Zhengcai
was appointed as party secretary
Summary
As China nears a 2012 transition to its fifth generation of leaders,
the foundations are being built for the takeover of the sixth
generation in 2022. Chinese provincial leaders are generally the
strongest candidates for key national leadership positions, and 16
provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions have seen recent
leadership reshuffling that has revealed rising stars in the Chinese
political realm.
Analysis
With the Communist Party of China (CPC) approaching a generational
leadership transition in 2012, extensive appointments of provincial
leaders were made in 2010. The 2012 line-up is already relatively firm
(though China*s transitions work by precedent rather than hard and
fast rules). Meanwhile, the country is laying the groundwork for
additional leadership changes in 2017 and for the sixth generation of
leaders to take over in 2022.
At the provincial level, 16 provinces, municipalities and autonomous
regions saw a leadership reshuffle. China*s political system contains
two parallel tracks * the CPC and the Chinese state. On the provincial
or regional level, there are two parallel leaders, the party secretary
(the most powerful figure) and the governor (or *chairman* or *acting
governor,* depending on the province and circumstances). Newly
appointed to their posts were eight party secretaries, eight
governors/chairmen and four acting governors. Adding these changes to
the appointment of party secretaries in five other provinces in
November 2009, a total of 25 new faces are now displayed in the CPC*s
elite inner circle. Eight of these officials were transferred to their
new posts from another province, four were transferred from a central
government ministry or a centrally administrated bureau and 13 came
from the same region.
Ages of the new appointees range from 50 to 60, which means they will
be no more than 62 years old by 2012, when the CPC*s 18th National
Congress takes place. (Under the CPC*s unspoken age restrictions,
provincial-level leaders should retire before reaching 65 years of
age, and the cap for entering the CPC Central Committee and Politburo
is 67.) The congress will see the reshuffle of the 204-member CPC
Central Committee as well as the 25-member Politburo and, at the
highest level, the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee, which
comprises the country*s most powerful leaders.
In China, provincial leaders are the strongest candidates for key
positions of national leadership. Most politicians at the national
level have provincial experience, and former provincial leaders have
historically held many seats in the Central Committee. This phenomenon
has become more prominent in recent years due in part to Beijing*s
effort to promote policies that are better suited for the regions and
to strengthen regional loyalty toward the center. Beijing also is
encouraging cross-regional leadership exchange and is increasingly
putting officials in charge of provinces that are not their places of
origin. During the 2007 reshuffle, six provincial leaders (including
the party secretaries of Beijing, Xinjiang, Shanghai, Tianjin,
Chongqing and Guangdong) were elected to the Politburo and 41
provincial leaders became part of the Central Committee. It is
estimated that the percentage of Politburo members who had provincial
leadership experience increased from 50 percent in 1992 to 76 percent
in 2007. Provincial leadership has increasingly become a prerequisite
for key state posts.
Chinese Provincial Reshuffling and the 6th Generation of Leadership
(click here to enlarge image)
The 25 newly appointed provincial chiefs, as well as 17 current
provincial chiefs born after the 1950s (among a total of 62 provincial
chiefs), are well suited due to age and political status for promotion
during the fifth-generational leadership transition in 2012 and the
leadership reshuffle in 2017. Some will also be strong candidates for
the sixth-generational leadership transition expected to occur in
2022. While none of them is currently a member of the Politburo and
therefore would not likely be promoted to the Politburo Standing
Committee in 2012, their promotions or equivalent transfers to
provincial-level posts and their age advantage put them in a strong
position to compete for other key positions in 2012, when nearly 60
percent of Central Committee and Politburo members will be reshuffled.
This could further pave the way for them to join the Politburo or
Politburo Standing Committee in 2017. At that time, the
sixth-generational state leadership, including the president, chairman
of the National People*s Congress and premier, could emerge with a
view toward the 2022 transition.
Among these promising leaders, Hu Chunhua, Zhou Qiang and Sun Zhengcai
have attracted the most attention as the country*s anticipated sixth
generation of top leaders. All of them were born after 1960 and by
2022 will be no more than 62 years old, which would enable them to
serve another two terms if they are promoted to state leaders and rule
from 2022 to 2032. This is in line with the CPC*s preference to have
the country*s most important leaders serve two terms to sustain power
and policy. Meanwhile, both Zhou and Hu have strong backgrounds in the
China Communist Youth League (CCYL), a factional base that has close
ties to President Hu Jintao, who served as first secretary of the CCYL
in the 1980s. The CCYL has always been a power base for generating
prospective leaders, but Hu gave it even greater prominence after
becoming president by promoting a number of CCYL people, in part to
strengthen his power base. In fact, since many CCYL leaders are
currently assuming provincial positions, this clique is extremely
well-situated for the sixth-generational reshuffle.
Both emerging from the CCYL and having served as its first secretary,
Zhou Qiang and Hu Chunhua were promoted to provincial leaders at very
early ages. Zhou was made Hunan governor in 2007 at the age of 47,
making him the country*s youngest governor at that time. Hu Chunhua
has been working in Tibet for 23 years, partly coinciding with Hu
Jintao*s term as Tibetan party secretary, and therefore has close
personal ties with the president. Hu Chunhua was promoted to Hebei
governor in 2009 at the age of 46 and a year later became the party
secretary of Inner Mongolia. These officials have taken a classic path
from the CCYL to higher leadership, suggesting promising political
futures for both when the next generation assumes power in China.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 1, 2011 11:53:27 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Egypt: Jihadists Trying to Take Advantage of Transition?
Stratfor logo
Egypt: Jihadists Trying to Take Advantage of Transition?
January 1, 2011 | 1740 GMT
RED ALERT: U.S. Consulate Attacked In Pakistan
A bombing targeting a Coptic church in Egypt*s port city of Alexandria
on Jan 1 killed as many as 21 people and wounded an estimated 80
others. According to reports, the bomb went off outside the Church of
the Two Saints some 20 minutes after midnight when worshipers were
gathered for New Year*s mass. While preliminary reports said the
device was planted in a vehicle, Egyptian authorities said it was a
suicide attack.
Regardless of the type of IED involved, the target set and the timing
(on New Year*s) show that jihadists are likely behind this attack. The
attack follows a November Internet statement from the Iraqi node of al
Qaeda calling for attacks on Egyptian churches and specifically
mentioned the Church of the Two Saints. Though Egyptian officials are
claiming al Qaeda forces based outside of the country for the bombing,
it is very likely that jihadists elements based in Egypt are the
likely perpetrators.
In the aftermath of Egypt*s two main jihadist groups, Gamaah
al-Islamiyah and Tandheem al-Jihad * that were very active in the late
1990s * having renounced violence and openly criticized al Qaeda,
there have not been many jihadist attacks in the country. That said,
elements that broke off from these two groups and others that have
aligned with al Qaeda have been infrequently active in recent years
with the last attack taking place a little less than two years ago in
a commercial area of the capital that targeted foreigners, mainly
Europeans, and resulted in the death of one French woman.
The attack on the Church of the Two Saints comes at a time when Egypt
is in the middle of a succession process as the different camps within
the regime of the country*s 82-year old and ailing President Hosni
Mubarak are struggling with one another to find a successor who can
maintain the stability and political continuity. It is likely designed
to take advantage of the emerging uncertainty in the country and
create social unrest. The thing to watch for moving forward is whether
or not this attack marks the beginning of a new campaign of jihadist
attacks seeking to exploit a rare opportunity in attempts to undermine
the state, during the pending transition.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 2, 2011 8:53:03 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 4 - U.S. Invades Iraq
Stratfor logo
Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 4 - U.S. Invades Iraq
January 2, 2011 | 1444 GMT
Choosing the 10 most important geopolitical events of the past decade
is a challenge. But STRATFOR analysts took on the task, and after a
robust debate, they produced our Top 10 Most Important Geopolitical
Events of the Decade. We have teamed up with our partner,
DigitalGlobe, the world*s leading commercial satellite imagery
company, to provide compelling images illustrating each of these key
events.
Join us as we count down the Top 10, unveiling an event daily starting
Dec. 27 and culminating Jan. 5, when we reveal our selection for the
single most important event of the decade.
Click the link below to see STRATFOR*s explanation of each event along
with a satellite image.
[IMG]
(click here to view interactive map)
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 3, 2011 5:28:19 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Intelligence Guidance: Week of Jan. 2, 2011
Stratfor logo
Intelligence Guidance: Week of Jan. 2, 2011
January 3, 2011 | 1119 GMT
Intelligence Guidance: Week of Jan. 2, 2010
Egyptian riot police stand guard as Christians protest late Jan. 2
outside the Church of the Two Saints
Editor*s Note: The following is an internal STRATFOR document produced
to provide high-level guidance to our analysts. This document is not a
forecast, but rather a series of guidelines for understanding and
evaluating events, as well as suggestions on areas for focus.
New Guidance
1. Egypt: We need to look into what is going on beneath the surface in
Egypt. There have been attacks on Christian churches in Nigeria, Egypt
and Iraq that suggest some level of coordination. Egypt needs to be
the center of our focus on this one because of the potential
implications for President Hosni Mubarak*s regime and Egypt*s regional
significance. Mubarak*s regime is in transition, and there is a great
deal of incentive for long-suppressed Islamist groups to move now. The
attack outside a Coptic church in Alexandria may lead to heightened
tensions between Christians and Muslims, and Mubarak may use the
situation to crack down on Islamist groups. How strong might an
Islamist resurgence be and what are its implications for internal
stability in Egypt? We need to monitor how the Mubarak regime
responds.
2. Iran: Tehran appears to be facing a year of American weakness.
Washington appears set to continue to draw down its forces in Iraq in
2011, further weakening its hand there. Meanwhile, despite some
modicum of progress at the last round of nuclear talks, it is hard to
see Iran feeling real pressure that would force it to negotiate
meaningfully. What is Iran aiming for at this point? How aggressively
does it intend to push its position?
3. Iraq: Iraq, and the U.S. military presence there, is central to the
Iranian equation. How does Washington perceive the urgency of its
vulnerability there? Its options are limited. How will it seek to
rebalance its military and civilian presence in the country in 2011?
What sort of agreement will it seek with the new government in Baghdad
regarding the status of American forces beyond 2011, when all U.S.
military forces are currently slated to leave the country?
Existing Guidance
1. Israel, Palestinian territories: The Israeli-Palestinian situation
in Gaza appears to be heating up. Hamas has resumed low-level rocket
fire against Israeli settlements and the Israelis have intensified
airstrikes. A senior Israeli officer has said that the question is not
whether there would be a war, but when it would occur. The motivation
on the Palestinian side appears to be derailing any peace talks with
the Palestinian National Authority. The Israeli motivation appears to
be asserting its own freedom for maneuverability following the
pressure from the Americans and the breach with Turkey. The Israelis
have announced that they would not apologize to Turkey * after weeks
of rumors that they would. Taken together, both sides have a reason
for wanting a round of fighting. We need to look for whether there
will be an incident to ignite conflict.
2. Russia: Now that the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
has passed, we need to watch the Russians to determine what it will
mean. By itself, it is irrelevant. As a signal of changing relations,
it might have some meaning. One place to look is Belarus, where the
elections were followed by the arrests of some of the losing
candidates. Poland has been involved there, as have the Russians. If
there is going to be a new relationship, it should show itself there.
3. China: The Chinese have raised interest rates for the second time
in 10 weeks. We need to understand what this means, particularly for
small- and medium-sized export-oriented firms. Increased interest
rates drive up the cost of Chinese imports in the long run * if
interest rates actually go up. There is always a distance between
Chinese announcements and Chinese reality. We need to see if rising
rates are translated into actual bank-to-business lending, and figure
out what that means for the economy.
4. Pakistan, Afghanistan: The U.S.-led International Security
Assistance Force has made progress militarily in Afghanistan, but the
Taliban have now retaliated in Kabul. The war will not turn on
intermittent militant attacks, even in the capital. We need to examine
how the Taliban view the American-led counterinsurgency-focused
strategy and how they consider reacting to it. Inextricable from all
this is Pakistan, where we need to look at how the United States views
the Afghan-Pakistani relationship and what it will seek to get out of
it in the year ahead.
5. United States: U.S. State Department diplomatic cables continue to
trickle out of WikiLeaks. How are countries and their populations
reacting to the revelations made in the cables? What will be the
functional consequences for the practice of American diplomacy? Are
there any major rifts emerging? We need to keep track of the public
reaction and stay aware of any constraints domestic politics may place
on the countries in question. Though few radically new or unexpected
revelations have been unearthed, the release offers remarkably broad
insight into the world of American foreign policy as it takes place
behind closed doors. How do the leaks either confirm or call into
question standing STRATFOR assessments?
Related Special Topic Page
* Weekly Intelligence That Drives Our Analysis
EURASIA
* Jan. 4-12: Chinese Vice Premier Li Keqiang will travel to Spain,
Germany and the United Kingdom.
* Jan. 5: Portugal will issue its first treasury bill auction of the
year.
* Jan. 6: Belgium officially hands over the European Union*s
rotating presidency to Hungary.
* Jan. 7: Eastern Orthodox Christians celebrate Christmas Day.
* Jan. 10: More than 30,000 Romanian employees in the mining and
energy sectors have threatened to go on a full-blown strike on
this day if there are no negotiations to create new jobs and
prevent collective layoffs.
* Jan. 10: The breakaway Georgian republic of South Ossetia will
remove the Georgian lari currency from circulation in Leningorsk
district.
MIDDLE EAST/SOUTH ASIA
* Jan. 3-9: Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou will attend and
speak at the Turkish Foreign Ministry*s annual conference of
ambassadors in Ankara and the eastern province of Erzurum.
Papandreou will join the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and
Pakistan to address Turkey*s ambassadors.
* Jan. 5: The Kuwaiti parliament will hold a confidence vote on the
fate of Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser Muhammad al-Ahmad al-Sabah.
EAST ASIA
* Unspecified Date: United States Deputy Secretary of State James
Steinberg is reputed to be heading to South Korea in early January
to coordinate policy on North Korea ahead of Chinese President Hu
Jintao*s visit to the United States later in the month.
* Jan. 3: Singapore*s Tan York Chor will take office as ambassador
to France.
* Jan. 3: Indonesia will increase taxes in Jakarta on owners of
multiple automobiles.
AMERICAS
* Jan. 3: South Korean Prime Minister Kim Hwang Sik will meet with
Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo and hold talks with Vice
President Luis Franco on boosting bilateral economic and
diplomatic cooperation.
* Jan. 3-7: Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi will meet U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Washington.
* Jan. 4: South Korean Prime Minister Kim Hwang Sik will begin a
three-day visit to Uruguayan President Jose Mujica and hold talks
with Senate leader and Vice President Danilo Astori, according to
Kim*s office.
* Jan. 6-10: Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara will visit the
United States to hold talks with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton in Washington, possibly on Jan. 7, over tensions on the
Korean Peninsula and other issues. He will also visit Florida Gov.
Rick Scott to pitch Japan*s Shinkansen high-speed railway, which
the state is considering purchasing.
AFRICA
* Jan. 3: Nigeria*s ruling People*s Democratic Party will hold a
meeting between President Goodluck Jonathan and presidential
candidate Atiku Abubakar to work out issues concerning the
presidential screening process and presidential primary.
* Jan. 3: The three presidential delegates of the Economic Community
of West African States * Cape Verde*s Pedro Pires, Sierra Leone*s
Ernest Bai Koroma, and Benin*s Thomas Boni Yayi * are tentatively
scheduled to return to Cote d*Ivoire to continue negotiations with
incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo.
* Jan. 3: Nigeria*s ruling People*s Democratic Party will hold
primaries for candidates for the House of Representatives.
* Jan. 3: The Southern Sudan Referendum Commission will announce its
final verdict on all appeals presented to it during the voter
registration process.
* Jan. 4: Nigeria*s ruling People*s Democratic Party will hold
primaries for candidates to the Senate.
* Jan. 6-19 - Chinese Vice Premier Hui Liangyu will make an official
visit to Mauritius, Zambia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Cameroon and Senegal.
* Jan. 7: Media campaigns for the Jan. 9 Southern Sudanese
independence referendum will come to an end.
* Jan. 8: Voter registration is scheduled to begin in Nigeria for
national elections in April.
* Jan. 8: Southern Sudanese President Salva Kiir has called for a
meeting of Southern Sudanese political leaders in Juba to discuss
priority issues before the Jan. 9 referendum vote.
* Jan. 8: The Southern Sudan Referendum Commission will announce the
final voters* list for the Southern Sudanese independence
referendum.
* Jan. 9: Nigeria*s Senior Staff Association of Electricity and
Allied Companies and the National Union of Electricity Employees
have given the Federal Government and the Power Holding Company of
Nigeria an ultimatum to implement a collective bargaining
agreement by this date or face a labor stoppage.
* Jan. 9-15: Voting for the Southern Sudanese independence
referendum will occur.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 3, 2011 7:15:25 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Hungary's Turn as EU President
Stratfor logo
Hungary's Turn as EU President
January 3, 2011 | 1301 GMT
Hungary's Turn as EU President
GEORGES GOBET/AFP/Getty Images
EU Council President Herman Van Rompuy (R) shakes hands with Hungarian
Prime Minister Viktor Orban at EU headquarters Nov. 17
Summary
Hungary assumed the European Union*s six-month rotating presidency
Jan. 1. During its term, it will focus on reclaiming some visibility
for the EU member states* presidencies after Belgium*s turn at the
helm, which saw the country move into the background to allow its
former Prime Minister Herman Von Rompuy to establish himself as a
leader in the role of European Council president. Hungary*s agenda
will include many items of national and regional interest. It will
also have to handle the EU budgetary process for 2014-2020 * an issue
that is sure to be contentious.
Analysis
On Jan. 1, Hungary took over the six-month rotating EU presidency from
Belgium. Traditionally, the country that holds the presidency sets the
bloc*s agenda, mediates internal European disagreements and serves as
the main negotiator with other powers during its term. At least that
was the case before the appointment of former Belgian Prime Minister
Herman Von Rompuy as the permanent European Council president, a
position created with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in
January 2010. During Belgium*s EU presidency, the country moved into
the background, allowing its former prime minister to establish
himself as more of an authoritative figure within the EU
establishment. Since then, Van Rompuy has taken over intermediation
between member states and has played a leading role in implementing
German-imposed reforms to the EU economic rules.
Hungary, however, does not intend to continue the trend of diminishing
the visibility of the member state holding the rotating presidency.
This means the most important aspect of the Hungarian presidency will
be its attempt to reclaim the initiative for the EU member states.
Following the final EU summit hosted by the Belgian presidency,
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban said that EU member states
*should not be afraid of being good patriots. * The idea that
nationalism is a danger for Europe is an idea I cannot accept.*
Orban*s point was that member states should not be sidelined by EU
institutions that work for a few powerful states. This is a
perspective shared by many of Hungary*s Central European neighbors, as
well as by smaller member states, who do not consider themselves part
of the European elite. For Germany and France, Van Rompuy*s role is
convenient because it grants them unfettered access to the permanent
European Council president (and with that access, the ability to apply
pressure). But member states like Hungary view Van Rompuy*s role with
suspicion, an attempt by Berlin and Paris to streamline the
decision-making process, which inevitably means sidelining states like
Hungary.
The Wish List
Every member state that holds the EU presidency brings with it a list
of issues it wants to address during its six months at the helm. Many
of these are issues of regional interest or specific national
interest, and many receive no attention due to various events and
crises that the country ends up having to deal with during its
presidency.
Hungary's Turn as EU President
Hungary*s wish list includes several items intended to return Budapest
to a leadership role in Central and Eastern Europe. Hungary*s
governing center-right Fidesz party believes Hungary lost that
position during a decade of what it sees as political and economic
mismanagement at the hands of its political rivals. Budapest has
therefore outlined initiatives for hosting an Eastern Partnership
heads of state summit in May, pushing Croatia*s EU accession forward,
expanding the EU Schengen zone to include Bulgaria and Romania,
enhancing economic and environmental coordination of the Danube
region, starting the Serbia-Kosovo negotiations process, and
implementing an EU-wide Roma integration strategy.
While the optimistic list will give Hungary and its confident new
government (Fidesz is one of the few governments in recent European
memory to have two-thirds of the seats in its country*s parliament)
the visibility it craves on the European stage, it is not clear
whether these goals will be met. The Danube Strategy has no financial
support, France and Germany oppose Romania and Bulgaria*s Schengen
entry, the Eastern Partnership is a Polish-Swedish initiative of which
Hungary recently a part, and Croatian accession ultimately depends on
the effort Croatia puts into concluding the remaining (and thorny)
negotiating chapters with the European Union, rather than any decision
to be made by Budapest.
The *Huge Fight*
Beyond the expansive wish list, Budapest*s presidency can ultimately
be boiled down to a single item: the 2014-2020 EU budgetary period.
The European Union sets its budgets in six-year intervals, with
minimal modifications to the annual budgets possible once the numbers
for the interval are set. The United Kingdom wants to see the budget
reduced to reflect its own deep budget cuts at home. France and
Germany are largely in agreement with London, particularly because
they do not want to see the new member states in Central Europe
receive an increase in funding. Europe therefore can expect three very
contentious years of negotiations on the new budget.
For Hungary * and Poland, which will take over the rotating EU
presidency after Hungary * this is a key issue for 2011 and beyond.
With two Central European member states in charge in successive terms
for the first time, Budapest and Warsaw hope to set the stage for the
budget negotiations. Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Martonyi has
already said that *a huge fight* was brewing within the union over the
issue, with wealthier old member states on one end and poorer new
member states on the other.
However, in order for Hungary to create an effective change in policy
on the matter in the next six months, it will need to create a broader
coalition than just its fellow new member states. The coalition
Hungary and Poland will be able to gather comprises only 20 percent of
the EU population, and the idea of increasing the budget runs counter
to the interests of more than 50 percent * represented by Germany,
France, the United Kingdom and other fiscally conservative member
states, such as The Netherlands and those of Scandinavian. The chances
of success, therefore, are low.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 3, 2011 8:11:42 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 3 - Lehman Brothers Bankrupt
Stratfor logo
Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 3 - Lehman Brothers Bankrupt
January 3, 2011 | 1319 GMT
Choosing the 10 most important geopolitical events of the past decade
is a challenge. But STRATFOR analysts took on the task, and after a
robust debate, they produced our Top 10 Most Important Geopolitical
Events of the Decade. We have teamed up with our partner,
DigitalGlobe, the world*s leading commercial satellite imagery
company, to provide compelling images illustrating each of these key
events.
Join us as we count down the Top 10, unveiling an event daily starting
Dec. 27 and culminating Jan. 5, when we reveal our selection for the
single most important event of the decade.
Click the link below to see STRATFOR*s explanation of each event along
with a satellite image.
[IMG]
(click here to view interactive map)
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 3, 2011 11:05:04 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Stratfor's World Snapshot
Stratfor logo January 3, 2011
Stratfor's World Snapshot
Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 3 - Lehman Brothers Bankrupt
STRATFOR
Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 3 - Lehman Brothers Bankrupt
January 3, 2011 1319 GMT
STRATFOR analysts provide an explanation of our Top Ten Most Important
Geopolitical Events of the decade. We've also teamed up with our
partner, DigitalGlobe, the world's leading commercial satellite
imagery company, to provide compelling images illustrating each of
these key events. (With STRATFOR interactive photo essay.) [more]
Hungary's Turn as EU President
Hungary's Turn as EU President
January 3, 2011 1301 GMT
Hungary became president of the European Union on Jan. 1. Its agenda
will include issues of national and regional interests, as well as the
EU budgetary process for 2014-2020. [more]
Intelligence Guidance: Week of Jan. 2, 2011
Intelligence Guidance: Week of Jan. 2, 2011
January 3, 2011 1119 GMT
The following is an internal STRATFOR document produced to provide
high-level guidance to our analysts. [more]
Egypt: Jihadists Trying to Take Advantage of Transition?
Egypt: Jihadists Trying to Take Advantage of Transition?
January 1, 2011 1740 GMT
The Jan. 1 attack on the Church of the Two Saints comes at a time when
Egypt is in the middle of a succession process and may be the start of
a jihadist campaign seeking to undermine the state. [more]
More Analysis >>
Situation Reports
Venezuela: 6 Indicted For Misappropriating Funds
January 3, 2011 1651 GMT
The Venezuelan Attorney General's Office has indicted two active-duty
Venezuelan army captains, three bank employees and a private citizen
for allegedly misappropriating funds at state-run bank... [more]
Sudan: Darfuri Rebel Group Reaches Deal With Government
January 3, 2011 1625 GMT
Indonesia: China Interested In Building Papua Seaports, Airports
January 3, 2011 1611 GMT
Cuba: First VP Arrives In Venezuela
January 3, 2011 1603 GMT
More Situation Reports >>
Weekly Intelligence Reports
Separating Terror from Terrorism
Separating Terror from Terrorism
December 30, 2010 0955 GMT
A terrorist attack does not have to succeed to cause panic and alarm
as long as terror magnifiers react accordingly. [more]
Making Sense of the START Debate
Making Sense of the START Debate
December 28, 2010 0950 GMT
Europe: The New Plan
Europe: The New Plan
December 21, 2010 1000 GMT
Mexico and the Cartel Wars in 2010
Mexico and the Cartel Wars in 2010
December 16, 2010 0946 GMT
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 3, 2011 3:43:29 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Mexico Security Memo: Jan. 3, 2011
Stratfor logo
Mexico Security Memo: Jan. 3, 2011
January 3, 2011 | 2101 GMT
Mexico Security Memo: Dec. 27, 2010
La Familia Breakdown
Mexican Federal Police Regional Security Director Luis Cardenas
Palomino said La Familia Michoacana (LFM) has fallen into disarray and
been dismembered since the death of LFM leader Nazario *El Chayo*
Moreno Gonzalez in a Dec. 17 firefight with Federal Police. Palomino
made these statements at the Dec. 31 presentation in Morelia,
Michoacan state, of recently arrested LFM plaza boss Francisco *El
Bigotes* Lopez Villanueva, who reportedly led operations in La Mira
and Guacamayas.
Palomino did caveat his statement, however, saying a few LFM cells
continue to operate in certain areas of the state. He continued that
such cells were operating independently and were struggling *
resorting to conducting robberies to maintain a cash flow to the
remaining individuals * citing intelligence from the Federal Police
intelligence unit.
A letter reportedly from LFM began circulating in Michoacan on Jan. 2
saying the group would cease all criminal activities during January to
show the people of Michoacan that LFM was not responsible for the
robberies and other crimes they have been accused of by the Federal
Police. An unnamed official with the Michoacan attorney general*s
office said the authenticity of the letter has not yet been verified.
While the group has suffered tremendous setbacks in the latter half of
2010, its top-tier leadership and chain of command remain intact.
Lopez Villanueva reportedly revealed during his interrogation that he
continues to receive direct orders from LFM operational leader Jose de
Jesus Mendez Vargas and now-LFM No. 2 Servando *La Tuta* Gomez
Martinez.
LFM has faced both a joint Mexican government operation against it and
a sustained joint offensive by the Cartel Pacifico Sur (CPS) and Los
Zetas in both southern and northern Michoacan. Moreover, its former
partners in the Sinaloa Federation abandoned LFM after the latter
attempted to move into Sinaloa territory. This has significantly
disrupted LFM*s operational capability, but it has not caused the
complete dismemberment of LFM claimed by Palomino.
As we have frequently observed, whenever a Mexican drug trafficking
organization experiences a setback to its ability to traffic drugs,
they resort to other criminal activities to supplement their income.
For example, the Arellano Felix Organization resorted to kidnappings
and extortion in the early part of the last decade, while more
recently we have seen Los Zetas and the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes
organization resort to the same practices in Monterrey and Juarez,
respectively. The allegations that LFM cells have resorted to robbery
campaigns to supplement their lost cash flow from drug trafficking is
therefore not surprising. Also like other groups before it * such as
the Arellano Felix Organization in Tijuana, which kept a low profile
while it regrouped after several of its top leaders were either killed
or arrested * LFM appears to be lowering its profile (albeit
telegraphing its intentions with fliers and e-mails).
STRATFOR sources have reported that the group*s remaining leadership
is not located within LFM*s home territory for both security and
personal reasons, but mainly to ensure the continuity of the
organization. After being designated the most violent organized
criminal group in Mexico by former federal Attorney General Eduardo
Medina Mora in May 2009, the Mexican government has made LFM a top
target. But while the government has experienced significant successes
against the group, LFM*s deep networks in Michoacan and even in the
United States mean that the group is far from being completely
dismembered.
2010, a Record for Drug-Related Killings
Mexico witnessed 11,583 drug related murders in 2010, breaking the
previous record of 6,598 set in 2009. The development of new conflicts
in Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, Morelos, Mexico, Colima and Jalisco states,
as well as persisting conflicts in Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Durango,
Michoacan and Guerrero states worsened this already-tattered security
environment. This geography of violence has changed quite a bit since
2009, when the violence was concentrated mainly in five states:
Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Guerrero, Michoacan and Baja California.
One of the main reasons for the tremendous increase in violence in
2010 was the conflict between the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas, which
finally boiled over into all-out warfare in February 2010. This new
conflict between the two former partners spread violence throughout
much of the eastern half of the country, territory where the two
groups had significant influence (and common territory), and where
violence had remained at relatively low levels compared to other
regions of Mexico.
Another source of violence emerged from the rift in the Beltran Leyva
Organization between the faction loyal to Hector Beltran Leyva, now
known as the CPS, and the faction loyal to Edgar *La Barbie* Valdez
Villarreal. This has seen escalating conflict in the southern states
of Morelos, Mexico and Guerrero.
This plus the ongoing conflict between the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes
(VCF) organization and the Sinaloa Federation in Chihuahua state; LFM
and the CPS in Michoacan and Guerrero states; and the persistent
low-level fighting between the CPS and the Sinaloa Federation in
Sinaloa state yielded 2010*s unprecedented death toll.
According to several media reports and STRATFOR sources, the fighting
in Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon state has been more severe than reported
by the press and federal security forces in the region. This media
blackout in large part has been due to self-censorship because of the
omnipresent threat from Los Zetas and the Gulf cartel. State and city
officials simply do not acknowledge death tolls in the region, and
funeral homes have stopped tracking the number of corpses they process
for fear of retribution from one of the criminal organizations in the
region. Total 2010 drug-related deaths in Mexico thus actually may be
several hundred to several thousand higher than reported.
Mexico Security Memo: Jan. 3, 2010
(click here to view interactive graphic)
Dec. 27
* Unidentified gunmen opened fire on a police car in China, Nuevo
Leon state, kidnapping and later decapitating the officer driving
the vehicle. Two bystanders were injured during the attack.
* Police announced the liberation of 50 day laborers held by
suspected kidnappers in the municipality of Caborca, Sonora state.
Police arrested five suspects.
* Military authorities announced the seizure of 770 kilograms (about
1,700 pounds) of marijuana and approximately 130 firearms in
Tamazula, Durango state.
* Authorities discovered a dismembered body inside several plastic
bags in the Lomas de Medina neighborhood of Leon, Guanajuato
state.
Dec. 28
* Unidentified gunmen kidnapped a police officer in the Cortijo del
Rio neighborhood of southern Monterrey, Nuevo Leon state.
* Unidentified attackers detonated grenades outside a police
building in the municipality of San Francisco de los Romos,
Aguascalientes state, killing a suspect inside a police car and
injuring a police officer.
* Four people were killed and two were injured during a firefight
between police and suspected members of the La Linea criminal
group in the Cristobal Colon and Liberacion neighborhoods of
Durango, Durango state. Thirteen people were arrested.
Dec. 29
* Military authorities announced the arrests of 11 suspects in
Ciudad Obregon, Sonora state. Soldiers seized 12 firearms during
the raid.
* Four people were injured in a firefight between Federal Police and
state investigative agents near the Durango state attorney
general*s office in Durango, Durango state. The incident
reportedly began when a truck from the state investigative agency
failed to stop at a police checkpoint.
* Unidentified gunmen opened fire on a house in the Leyes de Reforma
neighborhood in Acapulco, Guerrero state, killing one man. The
attackers then used explosive devices to burn the house and three
nearby vehicles.
* Unidentified gunmen attacked a police station in Monterrey, Nuevo
Leon state, killing two police officers and a medic.
Dec. 30
* Authorities discovered the bodies of five shooting victims near a
road in Sainapuchi, Chihuahua state.
* Authorities discovered the severed head of an unidentified man in
Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua state. The victim*s body was found in a
nearby building under construction.
* Unidentified gunmen shot and killed two senior citizens in their
home in the municipality of Pedro Ascencio de Alquisiras, Guerrero
state.
* An unidentified gunman shot and killed the son of a U.S. Internal
Revenue Service agent at a restaurant in Culiacan, Sinaloa state.
Dec. 31
* Soldiers arrested 10 suspected kidnappers and freed two kidnapping
victims at a hotel in the San Bernabe neighborhood of Monterrey,
Nuevo Leon state.
* Soldiers arrested the suspected chief of La Familia Michoacana for
the towns of La Mira and Guacamaya, Michoacan state.
* Unidentified gunmen killed six people at a car wash in Mazatlan,
Sinaloa state.
* The body of a kidnapper seized from a prison transport by a group
of gunmen on Dec. 27 was found hanging from a bridge in Monterrey,
Nuevo Leon state.
Jan. 1
* Unidentified gunmen shot and killed an employee of the Mexican
consulate in Chicago in El Naranjo, Guerrero state.
* Four people were killed and five people were injured when gunmen
opened fire on a family in a house in Coyuca de Catalan, Guerrero
state.
Jan. 2
* Two police officers were arrested in Nezahualcoyotl, Mexico state,
for allegedly stealing a car.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 3, 2011 4:03:02 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Dispatch: China Considers Buying European Debt
Stratfor logo
Dispatch: China Considers Buying European Debt
January 3, 2011 | 2154 GMT
Click on image below to watch video:
[IMG]
Analyst Marko Papic examines speculation that China is considering
buying European outstanding debt as the Chinese vice premier prepares
to visit Europe.
Editor*s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition
technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete
accuracy.
Chinese Deputy Premier Li visits Spain, Germany and the United Kingdom
from Jan. 4 to 12. His visit is fueling speculation that China is
considering buying a considerable portion of European outstanding debt
in 2011.
Li*s visit to Europe is significant because he is somebody who is
speculated to be the successor to the current premier, Wen. Li*s visit
also comes as China continues to consider diversifying its purchases
of U.S. Treasury bills to other sovereign debt as well, and Europe
certainly has ample amount of sovereign debt. In terms of what China
actually gets out of buying European debt, there really are four
different issues. The first is of course the diversification argument,
which we already mentioned. The second is the idea that it could make
smaller deals with specific countries. Earlier in 2010, it says that
it would continue to purchase Greek debt and this led to successful
purchases of several assets in Greece that Beijing hopes will be
really a beachhead into Central and Eastern Europe. The third issue is
protectionism. The Chinese are hoping that their willingness to
consider purchasing some distressed debt in Europe will lead to a more
relaxed attitude by the Europeans when it comes to trade protectionist
attitudes. Only recently the Italian EU commissioner, Antonia Tajani,
said that he would like to see the EU set up something akin to the
U.S. Committee on Foreign Investments, an agency that would
essentially review whether or not a particular European asset should
be sold to a foreign bidder, and he specifically claimed that Chinese
purchases of various assets in Europe have to do with purchasing
essentially Europe*s technology at a low cost.
Finally, China would like to see the EU rescind its embargo on arms
trades with Beijing. This is something that a number of European
countries have wanted to see ended for while; the French of course
stand to gain considerably from potential arms sales to China.
However, the likelihood of anything really moving the Europeans in
that direction is very low. The U.S. pressure on its allies within the
European Union * such as the United Kingdom, but also other NATO
member states * would be extreme, and therefore it is quite unlikely
that the Europeans will be able to get the unanimity necessary to
overturn the embargo.
Thus far there is no evidence proving that the Chinese bought a
considerable amount of European debt in 2010 or that they*re willing
to purchase more in 2011 other than public statements. However, public
statements may be in the end all that the Europeans are looking for
from Beijing. Mere mention that the Chinese are thinking of putting
some portion * even a small portion * of their $2.7 trillion worth of
foreign exchange behind European debt is worrying for investors
thinking of shorting the euro in 2011, and it may stay the investors
at least for the first quarter of 2011 in terms of betting against the
euro. It will therefore be interesting to watch in the first quarter
of 2011 whether the Chinese public statements of support have any
measurable impact on interest rates during bond sales or whether there
is greater demand for European bonds, especially of distressed
countries like Spain and Italy. Furthermore, it will be interesting to
see whether Li*s visit actually brings any return on potential Chinese
investments.
Click for more videos
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with
attribution to www.stratfor.com
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 4, 2011 4:11:49 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Geopolitical Weekly : Egypt and the Destruction of Churches:
Strategic Implications
Stratfor logo
Egypt and the Destruction of Churches: Strategic Implications
January 4, 2011
Making Sense of the START Debate
By George Friedman
Over the past few days, Christian churches have been attacked in at
least two countries * Nigeria and Egypt * while small packages
containing improvised explosive devices were placed on the doorsteps
of Christian families in Iraq. Attacks against Christians are not
uncommon in the Islamic world, driven by local issues and groups, and
it is unclear whether these latest attacks were simply coincidental
and do not raise the threat to a new level or whether they indicate
the existence of a new, coordinated, international initiative. There
is a strong case to be made for the idea that there is nothing new in
all of this.
Yet I am struck by the close timing of events in three distant and
dispersed countries. Certainly, Egyptian intelligence services are
looking for any regional connections (e.g., whether Iraqi operatives
recruited the Egyptian bomber). While there have been previous
bombings in Egypt, they have focused on tourists, not churches. What
is important is this: If the recent attacks are not coincidental, then
a coordinated campaign is being conducted against Christian churches
that spans at least these countries. And it is a network that has
evaded detection by intelligence services.
Obviously, this is speculative. What is clear, however, is that the
attack on a church in one country * Egypt * is far from common and was
particularly destructive. Egypt has been relatively quiet in terms of
terrorism, and there have been few recent attacks on the large Coptic
Christian population. The Egyptian government has been effective in
ruthlessly suppressing Islamist extremists and has been active in
sharing intelligence on terrorism with American, Israeli and other
Muslim governments. Its intelligence apparatus has been one of the
mainstays of global efforts to limit terrorism as well as keep Egypt*s
domestic opposition in check.
Therefore, the attack in Egypt is significant for no other reason than
that it happened and represents a failure of Egyptian security. While
such failures are inevitable, what made this failure significant was
that it occurred in tight sequence with attacks on multiple Christian
targets in Iraq and Nigeria and after a threat al Qaeda made last
month against Egyptian Copts. This was a warning, which in my mind
increases the possibility of coordinated action, but the Egyptians
failed to block it.
Egypt*s Historical Significance
Egypt is the largest Arab country, with a population of about 80
million. Cairo is the historic center of Arab culture and served as
the engine shaping the Arab response to the collapse of the British
and French empires. Under Gamal Abdul Nasser, the political founder of
the Pan-Arab (as opposed to Pan-Islamic) movement. Egypt was a
radical, militarized engine in the region. When Egypt allied with the
Soviet Union in 1956, it redefined the geopolitics of the
Mediterranean region. When it switched alliances in the 1970s,
geopolitics changed as well. More than any other Arab country, Egypt
matters. When it is assertive, it frames regional politics. When it
withdraws into itself, the region becomes prey to outside forces,
Islamic and otherwise.
That last major move made by Egypt was signing a peace agreement with
Israel in 1979 that demilitarized the Sinai Peninsula and removed the
strategic threat to the Israel*s south. This in turn freed Israel to
focus its primary interests to the north and to develop its economy,
leaving Syria isolated and dependent on Iran. The consequences of the
treaty were enormous and have defined the geopolitics of the region
for a generation.
The death of President Anwar Sadat in 1982 and the subsequent
elevation of Hosni Mubarak to the position led to a period in which
Egyptian national strategy was frozen into place. Egypt*s core
relationship was with the United States. It was secure on all external
fronts. However, as Sadat*s death showed, the treaty with Israel
generated resistance inside Egypt. Whereas the Egyptian regime derived
from a secular Arabist point of view, for which the peace with Israel
posed ideological but not theological problems, the opposition, built
around the Muslim Brotherhood, was Islamist and therefore opposed to
the treaty on theological grounds.
The assassination of Sadat initiated a period of intense activity by
Egyptian security forces to destroy the assassins* organization as
well as Islamist forces in the country that opposed the regime and the
treaty with Israel. A combination of ruthless intelligence and
security services, disorganization among the Islamists and deep
divisions in Egyptian society reduced the Islamist threat to the
regime to a weak political force and terrorism to a fairly rare
occurrence.
It was this focus on internal security that froze Egyptian foreign
policy into place. First, the internal situation towered in
significance over foreign policy. Second, conducting a vigorous
foreign policy in the face of internal terrorism was dangerous, if not
impossible. Third, the fight against Islamic radicalism was an
intelligence war, and Egypt needed the intelligence cooperation of
other countries, particularly the United States and Israel. The
internal threat not only froze Egypt*s foreign policy but also
contributed to social and economic inequality.
As a result, Egypt appeared * from the outside at least * to have
disappeared from history. News from Cairo galvanized the world from
the 1950s to the 1970s, but by the 1980s, Egypt had ceased to be a
player in the region. Even after 2001, when all American allies were
mobilized in the war against militant Islam, Egypt*s role was to
control its own terrorist movement. It achieved that, which was an
enormous benefit to the United States. Had Egypt radicalized, it would
have been a profound strategic challenge to the United States. Far
from radicalizing, Egypt became the country neither the United States
nor the Israelis had to worry about.
Egypt*s Current Climate
Mubarak is old and, by some accounts, suffering from cancer. He had
hoped to have his son, Gamal, replace him, but this has run into
resistance from the political and military apparatus that supports him
and that derives from the regime Nasser founded. The regime has the
support of some of the population, particularly government workers who
make their living from it. At the same time, there are secularists who
want to see a more liberal, business-oriented regime. The argument
against them has been the threat of the Islamist radicals, who had
been seen as a spent force.
That*s one reason the attack on a church in Egypt is important. The
argument that the Islamist threat has been dealt with is challenged by
the attack, and with it the argument that the continued focus on a
security state is archaic. Should there be follow-on attacks,
Mubarak*s policies become re-legitimized, and can be passed on to
whoever follows him as Egypt*s leader.
And this brings us to the heart of the matter. It is unclear what is
stirring beneath the surface of Egypt. Whatever it might be is by
necessity cautious. But radical Islamism has caught the imagination of
people in other Muslim and Arab countries, and it is unreasonable to
assume that it has passed Egypt by. Indeed, it was very much there
until Mubarak suppressed it, and it is unlikely to have gone away.
The most vulnerable time in Egypt is the period before Mubarak leaves
the scene. No firm new government will be in place, no dynamic
leadership will be provided. If the radical Islamists assert
themselves now, they could well draw down the wrath of the security
services. In that case, they would be no worse off than they were
before. But if the impending succession crisis divides an already
sclerotic state, it might open the door to a resurgence of radical
Islamism.
Egypt*s Political Future
This, in turn, would introduce two possibilities. In one, Egypt enters
a period of internal strife and instability and the regime fails to
suppress the Islamists but the Islamists fail to take power. In the
other, a massive Islamist movement repudiates the Nasserite heritage
and establishes an Islamic republic in Egypt. There are many
countervailing forces to the second scenario, but it is not an
impossible scenario in the long run, even if instability is probably
the most Islamists can hope for. And there is, of course, a third
scenario * an orderly succession.
Let*s consider for a moment what an Islamist Egypt would mean. The
Mediterranean, which has been a strategically quiet region, would come
to life. The United States would have to reshape its strategy, and
Israel would have to refocus its strategic policy. Turkey*s
renaissance would have to take seriously a new Islamic power in the
Mediterranean. Most important, an Islamist Egypt would give dramatic
impetus to radical Islam throughout the Arab world. One of the
linchpins of American and European policy in the region would be gone
in a crucial part of the world. The transformation of Egypt into an
Islamist country would be the single most significant event we could
imagine in the Islamic world, beyond on Iranian bomb.
If this were happening in most other countries, it would be a matter
of relative unimportance. But Egypt used to be the dominant Arab
power, and the last 20 years have been, in my view, an abnormal
period. Egyptian inwardness has been driven by an effective effort to
repress radical Islamists. It has taken all of the regime*s energy.
But the internal dynamic in Egypt is certainly changing as the
succession approaches, and the recent church attack was a rare failure
of Egyptian security. If such failures were to continue, it would be
difficult to predict the outcome.
For a country as important as Egypt, it is a matter to be taken
seriously. It is certainly not clear how significant the attack on the
church was, whether it is the beginning of something bigger. At this
point, however, anything out of the ordinary in Egypt must be taken
seriously, if for no other reason than because this is Egypt, Egypt
matters more than most countries, and Egypt is changing.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Reprinting or republication of this report on websites is authorized
by prominently displaying the following sentence at the beginning or
end of the report, including the hyperlink to STRATFOR:
"This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR"
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 4, 2011 5:40:20 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Potential Significance of a Local Afghan Deal
[IMG]
Tuesday, January 4, 2011 [IMG] STRATFOR.COM [IMG] Diary Archives
Potential Significance of a Local Afghan Deal
A local peace deal may be emerging in one of the most violent corners
of Afghanistan. U.S. Maj. Gen. Robert Mills, commander of Regional
Command Southwest and commanding general of First Marine Expeditionary
Force (Forward), on Monday confirmed reports from the weekend that the
largest tribe in Sangin district in Helmand province has pledged to
end fighting and expel *foreign* fighters from the area. The Taliban,
for their part, remain silent on the issue. But according to reports,
the deal was struck with the Alikozai tribe in the Sarwan-Qalah area
of the Upper Sangin Valley (only a portion of Sangin district), which
controls some 30 villages. The agreement was made between tribal
elders and the provincial governor, though the U.S.-led International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was involved.
ISAF has neither the troops nor the staying power to actually defeat
the Taliban. While they may yet succeed in eroding the strength and
cohesion of the Taliban phenomenon, any lasting exit strategy would
require some sort of political accommodation. In a sense, this can be
compared to Iraq, where the 2007 surge of American combat forces *
while not without its impact * did not turn the tide in Mesopotamia so
much as play a supporting role in a political arrangement with Sunni
insurgents (in the previously restive Anbar province and beyond) to
not only cease supporting but to actively cooperate in the form of
both local militias and, critically, intelligence sharing, in the war
against the foreign jihadists that they had previously fought
alongside. While Iraqi and regional politics remain very much in flux,
this paved the way for a national-scale counter to the Sunni
insurgency and foreign jihadist threat.
*The history of insurgency provides little to suggest that recent
gains presage or herald an entity near defeat.*
Due to terrain and demography, power in Afghanistan * militarily and
politically * is far more localized. While a comprehensive deal with
the Pashtun, the ethnic group at the heart of the Taliban insurgency,
could yield considerable results, the Pashtun do not fear any other
ethnic group in the country as the Sunnis in Iraq feared the Shia. And
the nature of local and tribal loyalties * not to mention the now
cross-border and transnational Taliban phenomenon * makes settling on,
much less enforcing, a nationwide solution far more problematic.
Indeed, the Alikozai tribe speaks for only a small portion of Sangin
(not to mention the potential impact of tribal rivalries) while the
provincial government in Helmand has very little ability to impose or
enforce much of anything on its own.
But while this most recent development in Sangin does not mark the
beginning of a comprehensive solution, it remains noteworthy. Under
the American counterinsurgency-focused strategy, forces have been
massed in Helmand and neighboring Kandahar provinces * the heartland
and home turf of the Afghan Taliban. In places like Nawa and Marjah,
the sustained application of force has pushed the Taliban from
territory that they once held uncontested. And the ability to turn the
tide politically in former insurgent strongholds (as in Anbar
province) has the potential to have wider significance.
Yet, it is classic guerrilla strategy to fall back in the face of
concentrated conventional military force. STRATFOR does not trust the
recent quietude of the Taliban in Helmand and beyond. The history of
insurgency provides little to suggest that recent gains presage or
herald an entity near defeat. And while ISAF*s claims of progress in
terms of undermining Taliban funds and the capturing and killing of
its leadership do not appear to be without grounds (though the true
seniority of those killed and the operational impact of those losses
remain pivotal questions), that does not necessarily translate into a
more lasting political solution.
After all, while the United States succeeded in Iraq in extracting
itself from an internal counterinsurgency battle that it was losing,
the fate of the wider region is anything but settled. Transnational
and regional issues * as well as the larger American grand strategy *
will continue to loom long after American and allied forces begin to
leave Afghanistan. But finding a solution whereby ISAF can extract
itself from the day-to-day work of a difficult counterinsurgency where
foreign forces are at an inherent disadvantage is of central
importance to the current campaign in Afghanistan. And all caveats
aside, political accommodation in Sangin must be seen as a positive
development. Just how positive remains to be seen and will warrant
close scrutiny in the weeks and months ahead.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 4, 2011 7:24:13 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 2 - China Enters the WTO
Stratfor logo
Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 2 - China Enters the WTO
January 4, 2011 | 1316 GMT
Choosing the 10 most important geopolitical events of the past decade
is a challenge. But STRATFOR analysts took on the task, and after a
robust debate, they produced our Top 10 Most Important Geopolitical
Events of the Decade. We have teamed up with our partner,
DigitalGlobe, the world*s leading commercial satellite imagery
company, to provide compelling images illustrating each of these key
events.
Join us as we count down the Top 10, unveiling an event daily starting
Dec. 27 and culminating Jan. 5, when we reveal our selection for the
single most important event of the decade.
Click the link below to see STRATFOR*s explanation of each event along
with a satellite image.
[IMG]
(click here to view interactive map)
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 4, 2011 9:00:25 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Governor of Pakistan's Main Province Assassinated
Stratfor logo
Governor of Pakistan's Main Province Assassinated
January 4, 2011 | 1421 GMT
Punjab's Governor Slain in Pakistan
AAMIR QURESHI/AFP/Getty Images
Pakistani policemen secure the site of a fatal attack on Punjab Gov.
Salman Taseer on Jan. 4
The governor of Pakistan*s core province of Punjab, Salman Taseer, was
assassinated Jan. 4 by a member of his security detail in an upscale
marketplace in the country*s capital of Islamabad. According to
officials and witnesses, Taseer was shot nine times by a bodyguard as
he was leaving his car to enter the Kohsar shopping center. The
bodyguard, Mumtaz Qadri, a member of the Elite Force who had been
assigned to the governor*s security detail on half a dozen previous
occasions, then dropped his weapon and surrendered to police, boasting
he had shot Taseer because the governor had voiced opposition to
Pakistan*s controversial blasphemy laws. Given his position, Qadri
easily could have acted alone, but it remains to be seen if radical
Islamists might have been involved in recruiting him.
Taseer is the most senior figure in the ruling Pakistan People*s Party
* and the country overall * to be killed since the December 2007
assassination of the party*s central leader and two-term former Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto. In addition to being a prominent politician,
Taseer was a businessman and owner of a key liberal-leaning
English-language daily, Daily Times. Elected on a number of occasions
as a member of both the provincial and national legislatures and
serving as a federal minister in the past, Taseer had been appointed
governor of Punjab in May 2008 by former President Pervez Musharraf,
with whom he had close relations.
Under the Pakistani Constitution the chief minister, as opposed to the
governor, wields more power in a province, therefore Taseer*s death is
not a major blow to the government. However, the assassination of such
a high-ranking state official at the hands of one of his own security
guards over an argument on blasphemy laws underscores the nature of
religious-secular conflict in the country, which has already been
weakened due to a raging jihadist insurgency and a weak economy
sustained only by International Monetary Fund loans. The assassination
also comes at a time when the fragile coalition government that took
office in elections after the fall of Musharraf*s military regime
nearly three years ago has had a prominent party abandon it, raising
questions about its ability to hold onto power while the military has
its hands full with a major counterinsurgency campaign against
jihadists.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 4, 2011 11:05:20 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Stratfor's World Snapshot
Stratfor logo January 4, 2011
Stratfor's World Snapshot
Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 2 - China Enters the WTO
STRATFOR
Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 2 - China Enters the WTO
January 4, 2011 1316 GMT
STRATFOR analysts provide an explanation of our Top Ten Most Important
Geopolitical Events of the decade. We've also teamed up with our
partner, DigitalGlobe, the world's leading commercial satellite
imagery company, to provide compelling images illustrating each of
these key events. (With STRATFOR interactive photo essay.) [more]
Governor of Pakistan's Main Province Assassinated
Governor of Pakistan's Main Province Assassinated
January 4, 2011 1421 GMT
The governor of Pakistan's most significant province was reportedly
assassinated by a member of his security detail. [more]
Mexico Security Memo: Jan. 3, 2011
Mexico Security Memo: Jan. 3, 2011
January 3, 2011 2101 GMT
Even though La Familia is still reeling from major setbacks during
2010, the group is far from defanged. (With STRATFOR interactive map)
[more]
Hungary's Turn as EU President
Hungary's Turn as EU President
January 3, 2011 1301 GMT
Hungary became president of the European Union on Jan. 1. Its agenda
will include issues of national and regional interests, as well as the
EU budgetary process for 2014-2020. [more]
More Analysis >>
Situation Reports
China: GDP Grew About 10 Percent In 2010
January 4, 2011 1659 GMT
China's gross domestic product (GDP) grew about 10 percent in 2010,
AFP reported Jan. 4, citing a statement made by People's Bank of China
head Zhou Xiaochauan published on the bank's website. Zhou... [more]
Iran: New Customs Office Head Appointed
January 4, 2011 1636 GMT
Cote d'Ivoire: Gbagbo Agrees To Lift Blockade, Negotiate
January 4, 2011 1619 GMT
France: President To Visit U.S.
January 4, 2011 1615 GMT
More Situation Reports >>
Weekly Intelligence Reports
Egypt and the Destruction of Churches: Strategic Implications
Egypt and the Destruction of Churches: Strategic Implications
January 4, 2011 1003 GMT
The argument that the Islamist threat has been dealt with is
challenged by the attack, and with it the argument that the security
state has become archaic. [more]
Separating Terror from Terrorism
Separating Terror from Terrorism
December 30, 2010 0955 GMT
Making Sense of the START Debate
Making Sense of the START Debate
December 28, 2010 0950 GMT
Europe: The New Plan
Europe: The New Plan
December 21, 2010 1000 GMT
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 4, 2011 3:02:27 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Party Politics and the Isolation of a Nigerian Militant Group
Stratfor logo
Party Politics and the Isolation of a Nigerian Militant Group
January 4, 2011 | 2002 GMT
Party Politics and the Isolation of a Nigerian Militant Group
PIUS UTOMI EKPEI/AFP/Getty Images
Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan at a Dec. 7, 2010 press
conference
Summary
Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan will address a People*s
Democratic Party (PDP) campaign rally in Delta state on Jan. 4, where
he is expected to endorse incumbent Gov. Emmanuel Uduaghan for
re-election. The endorsement should help end PDP political infighting
and isolate militant activity in the oil-rich state. Jonathan has his
own political motivations for the move, however: The PDP candidate
that emerges from Nigeria*s presidential primary, scheduled for Jan.
13, will be a favorite to win the national election in April, and
stability in Delta state will certainly bolster Jonathan*s resume.
Analysis
Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan will address a campaign rally for
the ruling People*s Democratic Party (PDP) in Delta state Jan. 4 and
endorse incumbent Gov. Emmanuel Uduaghan for a second term. Not only
will Jonathan*s endorsement of Uduaghan end political fighting within
the PDP branch of the oil-producing state over its nominee for state
elections, but the move will also lead to the isolation of start-up
militant group Niger Delta Liberation Front (NDLF), led by John Togo,
a former Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)
commander. The move is not without political motivation for Jonathan,
however, as he gears up for the presidential election in April.
Delta state is one of the three leading oil-producing states in
Nigeria*s Niger Delta region (the two other leading states are Bayelsa
and Rivers), responsible for approximately 30 percent of the country*s
2 million barrel-per-day (bpd) output of crude oil. Oil production in
Delta state has not been without disruptions * the state has been home
to long-standing fractious political infighting, especially among
politicians representing the state*s two dominant tribes, the Ijaw and
the Itsekiri. The infighting has enabled the rise of militant gangs
operating within the state, who have attacked oil infrastructure sites
to demand attention and money for themselves and their patrons.
Party Politics and the Isolation of a Nigerian Militant Group
Such tensions within the state led to the creation of the Federated
Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC) militant group, which was a
leading wing of the another militant group operating in the region,
the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). However,
FNDIC leader Government Tompolo, formerly a top MEND commander, has
been cooperating with the Nigerian government since his participation
in Abuja*s militant amnesty program that began in late 2009, which
significantly curtailed his group*s attacks on the region*s oil
infrastructure.
Despite the reduction of FNDIC operations, the amnesty program did not
end militant activity in Delta state. Instead, the patronage Tompolo
received created dissent and jealousy within the militant group. For
example, in March 2010 a Tompolo-controlled company named KFT Kpudoh
was awarded a 1.8 billion naira ($12 million) contract for shoreline
protection and dredging in Delta state without any real expectation
that it would provide such services. This favoritism and patronage to
Tompolo led to the emergence of the NDLF, led by Togo, who previously
worked under Tompolo as a deputy in the FNDIC.
There is no evidence of Uduaghan providing patronage to the NDLF or to
Togo. Nevertheless, Togo has been able to operate his militant
start-up since the autumn of 2010, carrying out a number of pipeline
attacks despite Joint Task Force (JTF) military operations against his
camps, with the main camp located in the Ayakoromor village of the
Burutu local government area of Delta state.
Jonathan*s support of Uduaghan * who, because of PDP infighting within
the state, has never been able to be fully secure in his position as
governor, and even had his 2007 election annulled by a state court in
November 2010 * means Uduaghan will very likely be re-elected when
Delta state goes to the polls on Jan. 6. The support will assert
political stability in the state and establish a renewed political
hierarchy, extending from the Jonathan-led government in Abuja to
Uduaghan in Asaba (the state*s formal capital, though Warri is its
main city and economic hub) to local PDP chieftains throughout the
state*s local government areas.
In return for Jonathan*s patronage, Uduaghan will be expected to
comply with Abuja*s directives. This will require Delta state to
assert strict control over party officials and other authorities at
local levels in the state, specifically to ensure that neither the
NDLF nor any other militant group in the state receive political
support that would enable them to wage attacks capable of
significantly disrupting oil production. Jonathan*s support will
enable security and intelligence cooperation, suppressing militancy
rather than having a scenario in which local authorities turn a blind
eye to the NDLF.
Jonathan is not without an interest of his own in reining in Niger
Delta militancy. He is gearing up for the PDP presidential primary set
to take place Jan. 13, the winner of which is virtually certain to win
the country*s presidential election scheduled for April. Jonathan, who
is an ethnic Ijaw from Bayelsa state in the Niger Delta, has
campaigned on bringing peace and stability to the oil-producing
region. The ammunition his political enemies would use against him in
the event of widespread violence in his home region notwithstanding,
Jonathan needs the support of the country*s governors * and the
delegates they nominate to the PDP national convention * to secure his
candidacy. Supporting Uduaghan for his re-election is thus a quid pro
quo tactic in Nigeria*s upcoming national election.
The Togo-led NDLF may not be able to be wiped out completely (there
will be lower-ranking foot soldiers wanting patronage in their turn),
but with new political scrutiny and surveillance in the state, their
ability to maneuver, arm themselves and carry out a militant campaigns
will be constrained to infrequent and limited operations, especially
during the lead-up to the national elections in April.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 4, 2011 3:24:27 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: A Week in the War: Afghanistan, Dec. 29, 2010-Jan. 4, 2011
Stratfor logo
A Week in the War: Afghanistan, Dec. 29, 2010-Jan. 4, 2011
January 4, 2011 | 2014 GMT
A Week in the War: Afghanistan, Dec. 22-28, 2010
STRATFOR
STRATFOR Book
* Afghanistan at the Crossroads: Insights on the Conflict
A Deal in Sangin
The main tribe in a part of Sangin district has reportedly reached a
deal with the Helmand provincial government to stop fighting Afghan
and coalition forces. U.S. Maj. Gen. Robert Mills, commander of
Regional Command Southwest and commanding general of the First Marine
Expeditionary Force (Forward), confirmed Jan. 3 news that the Alikozai
tribe in the Sarwan Qala area of the Upper Sangin Valley had agreed to
a cease-fire. Affecting some 30 villages, the deal encompasses only a
portion of the restive district, which has been the center of some of
the deadliest fighting in Afghanistan in recent months. The strictly
verbal agreement was struck on Jan. 1 after nearly a month of
negotiations at a Shura in the district capital.
A Week in the War: Afghanistan, Dec. 29, 2010-Jan. 4, 2011
(click here to enlarge image)
The deal was reportedly made between Alikozai tribal elders and the
provincial government, though the U.S.-led International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) was also involved. The agreement calls for a
cease-fire, for locals to prevent non-locals (Afghans not native to
the district as well as foreign insurgents) from entering the area and
for area residents to renounce the Taliban. ISAF and Afghan security
forces are to be called in if outsiders enter the area, though whether
this will result in any actionable intelligence is unclear. Tribal
members also will be expected to help identify and clear improvised
explosive devices (IEDs). This stipulation could be quite important,
since local support or tolerance of IED campaigns contributes
significantly to their effectiveness. (There are also reports of
weapons* being surrendered as part of the deal, but individuals are
allowed to own small arms in Afghanistan.)
Taliban spokesman Qari Yousef Ahmadi has denied that any such
agreement has been reached or that any Taliban were represented in the
negotiations (he may have made the latter point to clear up inaccurate
reporting on the agreement, which appears to call for tribal elders to
renounce the Taliban). STRATFOR has noted that one of the challenges
for a *revolutionary* entity in a classic guerrilla scenario is
maintaining internal discipline when factions and localized elements
are targeted by the counterinsurgent force.
There have long been reports of reprisal attacks by the Taliban
against those who change sides, and Mills has indicated that such
efforts are under way against the Alikozai leadership. But the extent
to which these reprisals have inhibited defection and maintained
internal Taliban discipline is unclear. Equally unclear is the impact
of an extensive campaign by U.S. special operations forces to capture
and kill Taliban leaders to diminish the operational effectiveness and
internal cohesion of an already-diffuse grassroots movement.
Indeed, the durability of this preliminary arrangement with the
Alikozai in Sangin remains to be seen. The broader strokes of the
agreement will be tested in practice as the two sides reposition and
interact in a cease-fire environment. No one is certain of the tribe*s
sincerity, its internal unity on the issue or whether it can deliver
on its promises in the near term or over time.
But recent ISAF successes in Nawa and Marjah are now being
consolidated, and in these areas * at least temporarily * ISAF and
Afghan security forces have more room to maneuver militarily. And with
that comes more room for the ISAF and Afghan government to establish
new political and economic realities. Still, this is a very tentative
phase of the counterinsurgency-focused strategy. Continuing to hamper
the effort are issues of corruption, the challenges of integrating
local arrangements into the existing power structure emanating from
Kabul, and the government*s ability to deliver on promises of security
and development. In much of the countryside, particularly in places
like Sangin, the campaign is still mainly a military effort.
Related Links
* The Afghanistan Campaign, Part 2: The Taliban Strategy
* Military Doctrine, Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency
Related Special Topic Page
* The War in Afghanistan
Recent development cannot be written off, however. If Sangin begins to
come around as other places in Helmand already have, it could begin to
mark a positive trend across the province. It would hardly signal the
defeat of the Taliban, since it is perfectly in keeping with classic
guerrilla strategy to fall back in the face of concentrated
conventional force, but it would raise a question regarding internal
Taliban discipline. As a grassroots movement, the Taliban would view
the loss of tribal and local support in key areas from Nawa and Marjah
to Sarwan Qala as a very real problem. At the very least, it would
represent a reduction in financial resources and fighters over the
short term. If the Taliban have to temporarily surrender ground or
expend a great deal more resources to remain relevant in these areas,
the locals and the Afghan government, with the support of the ISAF,
could reach more lasting agreements and make progress in development
efforts. Then, by the time the Taliban do return, their severe,
hard-line Islamism may not resonate with nearly as many locals as it
once did * especially if Afghan security forces are running the show
and the *foreign occupier* has significantly reduced its presence.
That is precisely what the U.S.-led strategy is hoping to achieve:
push the Taliban to outlying areas and reshape the military, political
and economic reality before they return. A single tribal agreement in
Sangin hardly validates the concept, and there are many long-term
questions and potential problems. Indeed, traditional concepts of
momentum and initiative can be problematic in assessing the efficacy
of a counterinsurgency campaign. But we will be watching the evolution
of the Alikozai deal in Sangin, and any others that follow, with great
interest in the new year.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 4, 2011 4:28:02 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Dispatch: Economic Effects of Australian Flooding
Stratfor logo
Dispatch: Economic Effects of Australian Flooding
January 4, 2011 | 2214 GMT
Click on image below to watch video:
[IMG]
Analyst Matt Gertken examines how continued flooding in Australia will
affect coal supplies in the Asia Pacific region and globally.
Editor*s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition
technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete
accuracy.
Extensive flooding in Australia over recent weeks has hit the state of
Queensland particularly hard. That*s the home of Australia*s coal
sector and therefore will have major international impacts,
particularly in the Asia-Pacific region.
The flooding in Queensland has affected large swaths of Australia and
it*s definitely going to have an impact on domestic life and even on
government finance as the government attempts to reconstruct all of
the infrastructure that*s been damaged. If you look at Australia*s
coal sector you*ll see where the international impact will emanate
from. STRATFOR is most interested, of course, in how the flooding
impacts other countries. Australia provides about 54 percent of global
coking coal exports, but about 10 to 20 percent of its production is
expected to get hit from the floods. Stockpiles are already low in
Australia, and that*s going to get worse.
Prices have risen by about 10 percent on spot markets, so there*s
going to be an impact, and if you look at the countries that are most
reliant on Australian coal, you see where that would take place. First
of all, you have Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. These are all
countries that import about 100 percent of their goal and get a large
portion of it from Australia. But also India, for instance, gets about
37 percent of its coal from Australia. China also is one to take a
look at. China isn*t as dependent on imports *China*s production at
home amounts to most of its consumption * but there is a little bit of
coal that it*s had to import in the past five years or so. China*s
done that basically to alleviate some of the distribution problems it
has at home and to meet the really booming demand to as the economy
grows rapidly. With the prospect of coal shortages or supply tightness
from Australia, there could be real problems from the Australian
flooding.
Needless to say, to patch the gap left by Australian exports getting
curtailed, these states will be looking for other exporters. Some of
the major coal producers are Canada, United States, Russia and
Indonesia * these are states that can possibly provide more. In the
case of Russia, however, domestic consumption is close enough to its
production levels but there isn*t lot of leeway. So Canada and the
U.S. will be the best examples; Indonesia has indicated that it might
limit its exports this year.
Globally, with all the stimulus policies that have been enacted to
keep economies growing, there*s a lot of liquidity out there that has
been going into commodities on the basis that currencies like the U.S.
dollar weakening, and that investment is driving commodity prices up
aside from these supply disruptions. So if you add in a round of
supply disruptions, we could have some really sharp price spikes, and
that will indeed affect the countries that are major commodity
importers.
Click for more videos
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with
attribution to www.stratfor.com
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 5, 2011 5:34:20 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Pakistan's Deadly Struggles With Politics and Religion
[IMG]
Tuesday, January 4, 2011 [IMG] STRATFOR.COM [IMG] Diary Archives
Pakistan's Deadly Struggles With Politics and Religion
The governor of Pakistan*s largest province of Punjab, Salman Taseer,
was assassinated Tuesday by a member of his own security detail. Given
that the country is the world*s largest hub of disparate types of
Islamist militant actors * a large number of whom are waging war
against the Pakistani state * events like these are to be expected.
But this particular assassination offers key insight into the
deep-rooted problems plaguing Pakistan and the wider Islamic world.
The assassin, a security officer with the Elite Force (the
counterterrorism arm of the provincial police department also
responsible for VIP protection), surrendered after killing Taseer. He
also boasted about his deed, saying that he killed Taseer because of
the governor*s efforts to revamp the religious laws of the country.
The deceased official was known for his outspokenness against Islamist
extremism and terrorism and was personally involved in the efforts to
secure the pardoning of a Christian woman who had recently been
sentenced to death * in accordance with the country*s blasphemy laws *
after being accused of insulting the Prophet Mohammad.
*Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency measures are perceived as a
Western-led war against the faithful who are resisting a campaign to
tamper with their religion.*
For a member of a security entity designed to fight terrorism and
protect state figures to blatantly kill the official he is supposed to
protect speaks volumes about how Pakistan is increasingly becoming
polarized over the role of religion in public affairs. The historical
unresolved ambiguity over the nature of the republic, the Islamization
agenda of the military regime of Gen. Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88) and the
decades-long policy of cultivating Islamist militant groups as
instruments of foreign policy have created a situation where the
secular state and mainstream society are on the defensive. Those
opposing ultraconservative notions of religion are not just targets of
Islamist militancy, they are unable to compete intellectually.
Religious discourse is the monopoly of either medievalist theologians
or radical Islamists. Put differently, there are very few who possess
the knowledge to craft an interpretation of Islam that is both in
keeping with the here and now and is authentic and legitimate, as
well. The result is an environment in which extremism and terrorism
can more or less flourish.
Furthermore, the standard approaches of the state in seeking to
address this problem actually work to the advantage of radical and
militant Islamists. Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency measures on
the part of the state are perceived as a Western-led war against the
faithful who are resisting a campaign to tamper with their religion.
On the ideological level, fighting radical Islamism by promoting
secularism only further empowers the Islamist narrative.
Despite their overwhelming electoral victories in successive
elections, non-Islamist political forces (both on the right and left)
have been unsuccessful at efforts to reform Pakistan*s legal
environment primarily because at the public level, such moves are
viewed by many Pakistanis * and Muslims worldwide * as being
tantamount to tinkering with sacred religious principles. The word
reform in the context of Islam carries a negative connotation.
Likewise, secularism is popularly defined as *irreligiousity* as
opposed to religious neutrality.
What this means is that the only way for Pakistanis to effectively
combat extremism and terrorism is for Muslim scholars to create an
alternative religious thought that is perceived as authentic and
legitimate by a critical mass of the public to be rooted in Islamic
religious text and the original teachings of Prophet Mohammad. At this
stage there is very little work being done along these lines by the
relevant Pakistani authorities, and even if a concerted effort was
initiated, this is a generational process. Such efforts are important
not just in Pakistan, but in most of the Muslim world, though in the
case of Pakistan, the situation is even dire given the extent to which
the state has weakened.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 5, 2011 7:25:02 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 1 - The 9/11 Attacks
Stratfor logo
Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 1 - The 9/11 Attacks
January 5, 2011 | 1318 GMT
Choosing the 10 most important geopolitical events of the past decade
is a challenge. But STRATFOR analysts took on the task, and after a
robust debate, they produced our Top 10 Most Important Geopolitical
Events of the Decade. We have teamed up with our partner,
DigitalGlobe, the world*s leading commercial satellite imagery
company, to provide compelling images illustrating each of these key
events.
Join us as we count down the Top 10, unveiling an event daily starting
Dec. 27 and culminating Jan. 5, when we reveal our selection for the
single most important event of the decade.
Click the link below to see STRATFOR*s explanation of each event along
with a satellite image.
Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 3 - Lehman Brothers Bankrupt
(click here to view interactive map)
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 5, 2011 8:30:26 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: The International Impact of Australian Flooding
Stratfor logo
The International Impact of Australian Flooding
January 5, 2011 | 1312 GMT
The International Impact of Australian Flooding
TORSTEN BLACKWOOD/AFP/Getty Images
Police use a boat to patrol the streets of Rockhampton, Queensland, on
Jan. 4
Summary
Continued flooding in the Australian state of Queensland is severely
affecting the country*s booming coal industry, which exports about 54
percent of the world*s metallurgical coal. In response, metallurgical
coal spot prices have already risen by around 10 percent, threatening
major Australian metallurgical coal importers such as Japan, Taiwan,
South Korea and India. The United States and Canada would be the most
capable of meeting international coking coal demand, but a tight
global supply-and-demand equation does not give a lot of flexibility
in the event of a prolonged Australian shortage.
Analysis
Rain continued falling across eastern Australia on Jan. 5 amid
extensive flooding in the state of Queensland. The flooding, which has
affected about half of the state*s territory, has prompted emergency
relief efforts from Australian authorities and offers of assistance
from New Zealand and the United States. The Australian federal and
local governments have promised direct aid for families and
businesses, and some estimates say the total cost to the Australian
economy could amount to $9 billion. Roads, bridges, railroads and
mines have been shut down, and ports are congested.
[IMG]
(click here to enlarge image)
Aside from the devastating domestic effects, the Queensland floods
will have an international impact. In particular, Queensland is a
major contributor to Australia*s booming coal sector, which is mostly
geared toward exports. In 2009, Australia produced about 28 percent of
the world*s total traded coal and about 54 percent of metallurgical
coal exports (Australian estimates say 58 percent). Of this,
Queensland had about 38 percent of the country*s economically
demonstrable coal resources and 56 percent of production and
Queensland produces the vast majority of Australia*s metallurgical
coal exports.
Impact on Australian Coal Industry
Mines have been flooded from Emerald to Blackwater, and although some
coal mines have gradually resumed production in recent days, about
three-fourths of Queensland*s mines have been shuttered and are not
expected to return to normal activity for weeks or longer. Authorities
are predicting the loss of about 10-20 percent of coal production in
the affected mines, which belong to all the major Australian mining
companies including Rio Tinto, Xstrata and Wesfarmers, many of which
have declared force majeure at one or more of their mines, which means
they cannot fill their contracts.
[IMG]
(click here to enlarge image)
A number of railways are also down, preventing coal supplies from
moving regularly to ports. In the major coal-bearing Bowen Basin,
Blackwater rail is closed, and operations were expected to resume on
the Moura rail system on Jan. 4. Newlands rail system is
semi-operational. Rail movement into Gladstone port has been
obstructed, and rail heading south from Mackay port is also halted.
Goonyella claims to be operational but has seen disruptions of coal
supplies. STRATFOR sources expect at least two to three weeks of
delay, plus repairs and inspections before the lines can resume normal
operations.
Australia*s ports remain mostly functional, as they were not hit
directly by a tropical storm or cyclone, though they are still
experiencing difficulties. At Dalrymple, operations resumed on Jan. 1,
and coal shipments were arriving at the port, though approximately 50
ships were waiting offshore on Jan. 4 due to logistical problems and
congestion. Hay Point also reported about 23 empty bulk coal carriers
waiting to load, Mackay port is receiving coal supplies but is
constrained to the south by rail problems, and Gladstone port is
operating at reduced capacity, with its coal export terminal operating
far below capacity because coal being shipped from inland has stopped
arriving. Stockpiles are running low, with Gladstone Ports Corporation
having only 1 million metric tons of coal stockpiled, compared to 6
million metric tons of capacity.
International Coal Prices Rise
Under these circumstances, it should be no surprise that exports have
been curtailed and spot prices for metallurgical coal have risen by
around 10 percent in recent weeks nearing $250 per metric ton, and
some fear they could eventually rise to $300 depending on the
intensity of flooding and duration of the cutoffs, according to The
Australian newspaper. At present, the contract price is set at about
$225 per metric ton, but these prices are negotiated quarterly, and
the second-quarter price could rocket upward. The Newcastle Index for
6,000 kilocalorie thermal coal is standing at $128 free on board in
Newcastle, which is based on spot prices over the previous week for
the standard thermal product. This is a 10 percent increase from
earlier in December 2010, and though prices have risen by 10 percent
for each the past two months, their rise is expected to accelerate
further.
The question is how long the problems will continue. STRATFOR does not
predict weather patterns, but it is worth pointing out that more rain
is expected until late April when the wet season ends. Additional rain
will easily lead to more flooding with soils already saturated.
STRATFOR sources in Australia say the mining sector*s operations will
not return to normal until the second half of 2011. However, this
assumes that none of the mines are seriously damaged and shuttered for
longer * after the smaller-scale 2008 flooding in Queensland, which
cost mining companies around $3 billion total, one mine was not able
to resume full operations for 18 months. One of the biggest delays
will come from the short supply of the large pumps needed to de-water
flooded mines. In addition to de-watering the mines, coal stockpiles
have to be de-watered to meet industry standards; all of this will
take time.
[IMG]
(click here to enlarge image)
Several Asian states will suffer from Australian coal export
reductions. Japan and Taiwan are the most exposed, with each receiving
about 80 percent of its metallurgical coal supply from Australia,
followed by South Korea (63 percent) and India (37 percent). While
China*s domestic production currently covers most of its consumption,
its demand for coal is rapidly growing (at a rate of about 13 percent
in the first three quarters of 2010), and various distribution choke
points make parts of China increasingly dependent upon Australian coal
shipments. Moreover, China is struggling with maintaining stability
amid rapid economic growth and huge risks to that growth from
inflation in food and energy prices and shortages in a number of
categories. Coal shortages were already a risk to China before the
Australian flooding, and the result could put more pressure on China*s
massive steel manufacturing sector. All of these states will have to
look to their stockpiles or to other coal producers to plug the gap
left by disruptions to Australian exports (Japan, for instance, has
around three weeks* worth of stockpiles.)
Other major metallurgical coal exporters are Indonesia, Russia, the
United States and Canada. Among these, Russia*s domestic
supply-and-demand equation is much tighter, and Indonesia is expected
to limit its exports, so the United States and Canada are the most
capable of meeting global demand. Nevertheless, in 2009 global
production of metallurgical coal was 794 million metric tons, only
about 32.5 million metric tons more than global consumption, which
does not give a lot of flexibility in the event of large and prolonged
supply disruptions from Australia. Moreover, at a time when the world
is awash with liquidity from easy monetary policies of developed
economies seeking to fend off recession, commodity prices were already
facing the potential for sharp rises, and supply disruptions would
compound those upward pressures. This applies not only to Australian
coal but also to wheat and sugar production, which have suffered from
the flooding: Australia is the world*s third-largest wheat exporter,
and the quality of some wheat will be downgraded, affecting foreign
food producers that use high-quality wheat. It is too early to tell
the full extent of the damage or how badly exports will be affected,
but already it is clear the Queensland floods have created serious
risks for commodity importers.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 5, 2011 9:02:27 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Ukraine's Place in Russia's Evolving Foreign Policy
Stratfor logo
Ukraine's Place in Russia's Evolving Foreign Policy
January 5, 2011 | 1403 GMT
Ukraine's Place in Russia's Evolving Foreign Policy
SERGEI CHIRIKOV/AFP/Getty Images
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev (R) and Ukrainian President Viktor
Yanukovich during a Nov. 26, 2010, press conference
Summary
Russia has increased its leverage in its near abroad over the past few
years, allowing Moscow*s foreign policy to evolve into something more
flexible and nuanced, particularly in how it handles countries in its
periphery. Its relationship with Ukraine is a case in point. With a
pro-Russian government in power in Kiev, Russia no longer feels the
need to strong-arm Ukraine into cooperation. It has secured its
position in the strategic country while preventing the West from
gaining a foothold.
Analysis
Over the past few years, Russia has re-established its influence in
much of its former Soviet territory. Moscow gained strength in its
periphery through its military defeat of Georgia in August 2008, the
formation of a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan at the start
of 2010 and the April 2010 counterrevolution which brought a
pro-Russian government into power in Kyrgyzstan.
As a result, Moscow*s strategy has evolved. Rather than strong-arming
the states in its near abroad into submission, Russia has become more
nuanced and flexible in interacting with its periphery as well as the
wider world. One country that is a key component * and target * of
this evolved foreign policy is Ukraine.
Ukraine*s Importance to Russia
Russia considers Ukraine the most strategic former Soviet state for
several reasons. Ukrainian and Russian economic and industrial
heartlands are virtually integrated. Roughly 80 percent of Russia*s
natural gas exports to Europe transit through Ukraine, and Ukraine*s
Crimean Peninsula provides access to Russia*s strategic warm-water
port of Sevastopol in the Black Sea. Perhaps most important, Ukraine*s
geographical position (abutting Russia*s heartland) means that a
Ukraine that is adversarial to Russia or allied with Moscow*s enemies
is an existential threat to Russian national security. When Ukraine
was swept into the pro-Western camp in the 2004 Orange Revolution and
made EU and NATO membership a national strategy, it caused concern in
the Kremlin as only few other events could.
Immediately after Ukraine*s swing toward the West, Russia truly began
its geopolitical resurgence. In the 2010 presidential elections,
Russia managed to reverse the Orange Revolution when pro-Russian
candidate Viktor Yanukovich defeated the original Orangists, incumbent
President Viktor Yushchenko and then-Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko,
In the year since Yanukovich took office as president, Moscow has made
considerable gains in all matters most relevant to Russia*s strategic
interest. One of Yanukovich*s first acts as president was to outlaw
Ukraine*s entrance into any military alliance, including NATO. In
April 2010, Ukraine and Russia signed a landmark deal that extended
the latter*s lease of its Black Sea naval base by 25 years, in
exchange for a lower price for Russia*s natural gas exports to
Ukraine. There has been a reconciliation of Russia*s Federal Security
Services with the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), and the United
States has replaced Russia as the SBU*s primary target for
intelligence-gathering. The natural gas cutoffs which were a mainstay
of Russia*s policy toward Ukraine under Yushchenko have abated; in
fact, Ukraine was used as an alternative route to Europe when Russia
cut off natural gas to neighboring Belarus.
Russia*s Comfort Level and Ukrainian Policy
These gains have left Russia more comfortable with its position in
both Ukraine and the wider region. Russia no longer feels the need to
pressure Ukraine unilaterally and aggressively. The years of pressure
tactics and manipulation leading up to Yanukovich*s presidency have
allowed Russia to be more flexible toward Ukraine*s foreign and
domestic policies.
In foreign policy, Ukraine has continued its economic and political
cooperation with the European Union. Yanukovich has even said that
obtaining EU membership remains one of Ukraine*s leading priorities,
exemplified by Yanukovich making his first presidential visit to
Brussels rather than Moscow and Ukraine*s accession to the European
Energy Community in September 2010. Russian leadership has not spoken
nor acted against any of these moves. This is partly because Moscow
knows Kiev is not getting into the European Union anytime soon (if
ever), but also because a more relaxed role has many advantages for
Russia including economic benefits and improved relations with
important EU countries like Germany or Poland.
Russia has also been more pragmatic and cooperative with Ukraine in
terms of energy. In addition to Russia lowering the price it charged
Ukraine for natural gas from $350 per thousand cubic meters (tcm) to
$250 per tcm (saving Ukraine an estimated $4 billion per year), Moscow
and Kiev have agreed to several joint energy projects ranging from
nuclear production to electricity. However, Russia has also called for
a merger of Russian state energy behemoth Gazprom with Ukraine*s state
energy firm, Naftogaz. Ukraine has rejected such a deal up to this
point (knowing full well that it would essentially be Gazprom
swallowing up control and ownership of Naftogaz). While Russian Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin continues to publicly speak in favor of the
merger, many in Russia actually do not want to obtain direct ownership
of a company that is as financially and organizationally dysfunctional
as Naftogaz. It may actually be more beneficial for Russia to have
indirect control over the company.
Russia*s flexibility has also applied to Ukraine*s domestic politics.
Many Western-leaning former political leaders, energy officials and
oligarchs have been replaced with officials more loyal to Yanukovich.
More recently, high-profile figures have been either put on trial
(like Timoshenko and former Interior Minister Yuri Lutsenko) or
exposed for questionable activities (like one of Ukraine*s richest
oligarchs, Dmitri Firtash). From the West*s perspective, this has
moved Ukraine a step back from democratic reforms; indeed, the U.S.
government issued a rare direct statement on the *politically
motivated* prosecution of Yanukovich*s opponents. But these actions
have played into Moscow*s hands. Under Yushchenko*s administration,
Ukraine was constantly at odds with itself and difficult for Russia to
navigate as the Kremlin tried to exploit the political rivalries to
its own benefit. Now, Yanukovich has strengthened his control over the
country, which has created a more coherent and consolidated
leadership. Democratic questions aside, this unified authority makes
it easier for Ukraine to organize and proceed with reforms at home,
and makes it easier for Moscow to negotiate with Kiev.
Russia*s new, nuanced approach has also extended to Ukraine*s domestic
energy policy * traditionally the most important but most dangerous
policy area to navigate. Ukraine*s energy policy is treacherous
because the people in charge of Ukraine*s energy sector have made
moves for personal and financial gain rather than out of a sense of
state interest or strategic security. But beginning Jan. 1, Ukraine
cut off a small volume of energy supplies to Poland, following
legislation requiring the natural gas produced in Ukraine to only be
used for domestic needs. This is a logical business decision. It
accounts for domestic consumption before exports and increases the
cash flow for Russia (which will supply Poland with more natural gas)
and Ukraine (which will transit more supplies while consuming cheaper
domestic natural gas). For Ukraine to make this move, regardless of
its relatively small impact, is telling and could lead to more energy
stability between Russia and Europe.
Despite all of Russia*s successes, Yanukovich and the Ukrainian
government still do not see eye-to-eye with Moscow on all matters, and
Kiev has not handed over its sovereignty to the Kremlin. But complete
control of Ukraine is not Moscow*s goal; Russia has made all the
strategic gains it has needed to and has blocked the West from holding
a solid position in Ukraine. Moscow has become more nuanced and
multidimensional in how it handles its relationship with Kiev, just as
its approach to other countries in its periphery and around the world
has become more complex.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 5, 2011 10:22:03 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Above the Tearline: The Assassination of a Pakistani Governor
Stratfor logo
Above the Tearline: The Assassination of a Pakistani Governor
January 5, 2011 | 1512 GMT
Click on image below to watch video:
[IMG]
Vice President of Intelligence Fred Burton discusses the politics and
security failures leading up to the assassination of the governor of
Punjab province by a member of his security detail.
Editor*s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition
technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete
accuracy.
Hi, I*m Fred Burton with STRATFOR. In this week*s Above the Tearline,
we*re going to look at the January 4 assassination of the governor of
the Punjab province of Pakistan with an eye toward how the political
climate set the stage for a catastrophic protective security failure.
Salman Taseer was gunned down by a bodyguard that was assigned to
protect him as he arrived for a lunch meeting at a very upscale area
of Islamabad today. The assassination takes place on the heels of very
large-scale protests last week in Pakistan concerning the blasphemy
laws. The blasphemy laws were implemented by President Zia of Pakistan
in an effort to support Islam. The laws persecute Christians, and in
essence there is a movement inside of Pakistan to overturn those laws,
which has created a high degree of controversy inside the country. The
bodyguard claimed that his motivation for killing the governor was the
governor*s support of the overturn of the blasphemy laws.
Now that we*ve looked at the political climate of what has taken place
inside of Pakistan, I*d like to turn our attention to the catastrophic
protective security failure. When you*re looking to hire protective
security agents, typically there is a comprehensive background
investigation process that takes place and that includes many, many
steps. For example, you conduct a pre-employment screening, a
neighborhood canvass, you interview previous employers, you check
education records; in essence, you put that on top of a comprehensive
physical examination as well as a psychological profile of that person
in order to select the best candidate. Individuals that are hired for
protective security jobs typically come out of a career track where
they*ve spent time on the streets and they*ve been in a position that
could be thoroughly evaluated by coworkers as well as supervisors
before they*re selected for these elite positions. Clearly in this
case there was a failure of an update process to evaluate the
individual that was involved in the shooting.
One of the more interesting aspects as you examine this assassination
will be whether or not the individual acted alone, or was he part of a
larger group? The fact that the assassin was ideologically motivated
by his own admissions will lead the investigators down a path looking
toward evidence of a larger conspiracy at play to see who else could
be of a similar mindset that pose protective security risks as well.
Click for more videos
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 5, 2011 11:09:48 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Stratfor's World Snapshot
Stratfor logo January 5, 2011
Stratfor's World Snapshot
Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 1 - The 9/11 Attacks
STRATFOR
Top 10 Decade Countdown: No. 1 - The 9/11 Attacks
January 5, 2011 1318 GMT
STRATFOR analysts provide an explanation of our Top Ten Most Important
Geopolitical Events of the decade. We've also teamed up with our
partner, DigitalGlobe, the world's leading commercial satellite
imagery company, to provide compelling images illustrating each of
these key events. (With STRATFOR interactive photo essay.) [more]
Ukraine's Place in Russia's Evolving Foreign Policy
Ukraine's Place in Russia's Evolving Foreign Policy
January 5, 2011 1403 GMT
Having increased its influence in its near abroad, Russia is taking a
more nuanced approach to its foreign policy, particularly in Ukraine.
[more]
The International Impact of Australian Flooding
The International Impact of Australian Flooding
January 5, 2011 1312 GMT
The world's biggest metallurgical coal exporter is facing a severe hit
to its supply chain. (With STRATFOR graphics) [more]
A Week in the War: Afghanistan, Dec. 29, 2010-Jan. 4, 2011
A Week in the War: Afghanistan, Dec. 29, 2010-Jan. 4, 2011
January 4, 2011 2014 GMT
A single tribal agreement in Sangin hardly validates the U.S.-led
counterinsurgency strategy, but it shouldn't be written off. (With
STRATFOR map) [more]
More Analysis >>
Situation Reports
Greece: Rebel Group Claims Courthouse Attack
January 5, 2011 1649 GMT
A Greek rebel group, known as The Conspiracy of Fire Cells, has
claimed responsibility for the December attack on an Athens
courthouse, Reuters reported Jan. 5. The group, which also claimed
the... [more]
Sudan: Referendum Precursor To Good Relations - U.S. Senate Chairman
January 5, 2011 1649 GMT
Iraq: Allawi Asked For Iranian Support For PM Bid - Source
January 5, 2011 1644 GMT
India: Trade Deals With Japan, Malaysia Expected In February
January 5, 2011 1640 GMT
More Situation Reports >>
Weekly Intelligence Reports
Egypt and the Destruction of Churches: Strategic Implications
Egypt and the Destruction of Churches: Strategic Implications
January 4, 2011 1003 GMT
The argument that the Islamist threat has been dealt with is
challenged by the attack, and with it the argument that the security
state has become archaic. [more]
Separating Terror from Terrorism
Separating Terror from Terrorism
December 30, 2010 0955 GMT
Making Sense of the START Debate
Making Sense of the START Debate
December 28, 2010 0950 GMT
Europe: The New Plan
Europe: The New Plan
December 21, 2010 1000 GMT
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 5, 2011 1:02:36 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: U.S. Naval Update Map: Jan. 5, 2011
Stratfor logo
U.S. Naval Update Map: Jan. 5, 2011
January 5, 2011 | 1839 GMT
The Naval Update Map shows an approximation of the current locations
of U.S. Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) and Amphibious Ready Groups
(ARGs), the keys to U.S. dominance of the world*s oceans. A CSG is
centered on an aircraft carrier, which projects U.S. naval and air
power and supports a carrier air wing (CVW). The CSG includes
significant offensive strike capability. An ARG is centered on three
amphibious warfare ships, with a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)
embarked. An MEU is built around a heavily reinforced and mobile
battalion of Marines.
U.S. Naval Update Map: Jan. 5, 2011
(click here to enlarge image)
Carrier Strike Groups
* The USS Carl Vinson with CVW 17 embarked is under way on a
deployment to the U.S. 7th and 5th fleet areas of responsibility
(AORs).
* The USS Abraham Lincoln CSG with CVW 2 embarked is on a scheduled
deployment in the 5th Fleet AOR conducting maritime security
operations and theater security cooperation efforts.
* The USS Ronald Reagan is off the coast of southern California for
training and certification ahead of a scheduled deployment in
early 2011.
Amphibious Ready Groups/Marine Expeditionary Units
* The USS Kearsarge ARG with the 26th MEU embarked is under way
supporting maritime security operations and theater security
cooperation efforts in the U.S. 5th Fleet AOR.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 5, 2011 3:22:29 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: China Security Memo: Jan. 5, 2011
Stratfor logo
China Security Memo: Jan. 5, 2011
January 5, 2011 | 2012 GMT
China Security Memo: April 1, 2010
Zhaiqiao and Official Distrust
Authorities in Yueqing, Zhejiang province, issued a notice Jan. 3
demanding that residents of the nearby village of Zhaiqiao stop
spreading rumors about the recent death of former village head Qian
Yunhui. According to authorities, Qian was killed Dec. 25 when he was
accidentally run over by a large *construction truck.* Soon after his
death, a rumor began spreading online and within the village that he
was intentionally killed and the accident was staged as a cover-up.
Officials in Yueqing, the city that administratively oversees
Zhaiqiao, are threatening to punish anyone who fails to preserve order
in the village.
It is difficult to ascertain the accuracy of either story, but the
questioning of local authority, the growing public outcry and
widespread media coverage suggest a widening gap in trust between
Chinese citizens and their local officials.
Qian*s story goes back to 2004, when a power company expropriated 150
hectares of agricultural land owned communally by the village of
Zhaiqiao. In 2005, Qian became village director of Zhaiqiao and raised
his profile by challenging the land seizure and petitioning higher
authorities. He was jailed three times and spent three and a half of
the last five years behind bars for helping villagers petition the
government.
Land disputes are a hot topic in China, with local protests occurring
weekly and often leading to violence. But they usually remain local
issues, and rarely does an incident like Qian*s death generate
national interest. Media coverage has not been censored over the
incident, likely because most of the public anger is being directed at
local officials. It is difficult to judge the various claims
surrounding Qian*s death without an unencumbered investigation at the
scene, and so far all we have are media reports and Internet postings.
What we know now is that the truck allegedly hit Qian while he was
crossing a street holding an umbrella near his home in Zhaiqiao on the
morning of Dec. 25. The umbrella may have blocked his view of the
oncoming truck. Pictures from the scene show his body smashed under
the driver*s side front wheel of a large truck. It is not clear how
soon after the incident the photos were taken, though some were first
posted online within 20 minutes of the incident. The most suspicious
aspect of the scene as photographed is that the driver apparently left
the truck parked on top of his victim.
Yueqing police held a press conference Dec. 26 and announced that
Qian*s death was an accident. On Dec. 29, police from Wenzhou, a
larger city that has authority over both Yueqing and Zhaiqiao,
announced that further investigation revealed no evidence of murder.
There are a number of curious circumstances in the case. The truck hit
Qian on the left side of the road while it should have been traveling
on the right. Local police said the truck was going around cables left
on the right side of the road, but they failed to explain how the
driver was able to see the cables but not a pedestrian. The area was
also under surveillance by at least one closed-circuit television
(CCTV) camera, which are common at intersections in China, especially
in the southeast. But police say the camera had no record function and
thus they have no footage of the incident. Other reports claim that
CCTV cameras in the area were taken away the day before the incident.
Internet reports also claim that two witnesses saw three masked men
with white gloves force Qian*s head under the wheels of the truck that
morning, but these reports have not been verified. One of the
witnesses, Qian Chengyu, was arrested Jan. 2 for possessing drugs and
attacking police officers (it is unknown if he is related to the
victim). Qian Chengyu is reportedly being polygraphed regarding the
incident. The truck driver, Fei Liangyu, was arrested by Yueqing
police and is currently in custody. Authorities say he was unlicensed
and is mentally ill. Other supposed witnesses, protesters and
villagers were detained for questioning and many have been released.
The profile of the case has been growing each day since the incident
occurred, much of it fueled by online posts quick to dismiss the
authorities* version of events. Various online articles on major
Chinese news sites are getting as many as 100 million hits a day.
Prominent academics and activists have announced they will travel to
Zhaiqiao to conduct an independent investigation, including Yu
Jianrong from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China*s major
state-run think tank, and Xu Zhiyong, a legal scholar, activist and
the first independent politician (unaffiliated with the Communist
Party of China) elected to a local office. A spokesman for the Wenzhou
police said all were welcome to investigate the case. Xu*s report on
Dec. 31 said there was no evidence of murder, but he evidently has not
been able to meet with local authorities.
On Jan. 1, hundreds of local citizens gathered in Zhaiqiao to protest
the official response to Qian*s death. Some threw stones at police and
were arrested and all were clearly angry about the incident. Some
local residents have said he would have won the next village election.
But it is not just the locals who are unwilling to accept the official
story. Even more interesting is the automatic rejection by Chinese
*netizens* throughout China of the authorities* version of events.
Similar incidents have occurred in China in which individuals have
died suspiciously in police custody, but the assassination of a
re-emerging local leader would be a new development. This issue is not
going to die quickly, and STRATFOR will continue to monitor the media
and the actions of local officials to determine if the case could be a
cover-up.
China Security Memo: Jan. 5, 2011
(click here to view interactive map)
Dec. 29
* The State Administration for Industry and Commerce announced it
investigated 6,000 trademark-violation and counterfeit cases in
2010, worth 798 million yuan (about $121 million). It said 360,000
law enforcement officers had been involved in the investigations.
* Around 200 migrant workers attacked residents of a building in the
Yangpu district of Shanghai in order to force their removal. The
building is scheduled to be demolished, but some of the residents
have refused to move. The residents eventually repelled the
attackers.
Dec. 30
* A chemical explosion at a Quanxin Pharmaceutical Co. workshop in
Kunming, Yunnan province, killed five people and injured eight
others. The cause of the blast is unknown.
* Guangdong authorities announced that police in the province solved
717 bribery cases in the first 10 months of 2010, involving a
total of 300 million yuan.
* The Fujian Public Security Bureau announced it would begin
offering rewards up to 250,000 yuan for tips on drug-trafficking
cases, depending on the amount of drugs seized as a result of the
tip. The bureau also announced they solved 3,059 drug-related
cases in 2010.
* A man was arrested in Weihai, Shandong province, for selling trade
secrets. The man was an equipment supplier to Blue Star Glass Co.
and managed to acquire information on a new energy-saving method
for glass production. Blue Star discovered he had been selling the
patent on the Internet and profited 26 million yuan.
* Three people were sentenced to life in prison for producing fake
invoices in Tieling, Liaoning province. They established four
companies that produced a total of 7.5 million yuan in fake
invoices sold throughout China. Five others involved in their
scheme were sentenced to between two and 11 years in prison.
* Chinese authorities ordered criminals involved in human
trafficking to turn themselves in by March 31 in exchange for a
lighter sentence. The announcement threatened to severely punish
those who did not turn themselves in.
* A man was executed in Changsha, Hunan province, for setting fire
to a shuttle bus servicing Huanghua International Airport on July
21. The fire killed two people and injured 14 others.
* A former deputy party secretary of Chenzhou, Hunan province, was
executed for accepting bribes. Between 1997 and 2006, he accepted
31.5 million yuan in bribes and acquired property from an unknown
origin worth 9.5 million yuan. The official had been in charge of
approving license for coal mines, the owners of which likely
provided the bribes.
Dec. 31
* Chinese authorities announced they confiscated more than 44
million illegal publications in 2010. These included pornography,
pirated publications, and other illegal newspapers and magazines.
They also announced they shut down 60,000 pornographic websites in
2010.
* Liu Zhuiheng was sentenced to death for detonating an explosive
device at a tax office in Changsha, Hunan province, on July 30,
2010. He confessed to the crime and said he did it because he was
angry over his business losses. Two other men who helped him
purchase explosives and detonators were sentenced to seven years
in prison.
Jan. 1
* Three truck drivers were sentenced to up to two years in prison
for embezzling diesel fuel in Shanghai. They are the first of more
than 20 drivers from Yongxin Concrete Co. suspected of embezzling
diesel fuel. The drivers tampered with their truck*s odometers to
match the amount of fuel they claimed to put in their tanks and
sold the surplus. The company lost 500,000 yuan due to the fraud
in the first six months of 2010 and has not calculated the rest of
their losses.
* Police discovered fake receipts sold in an online auction for
6,500 Shanghai Metro tickets that had never been issued. It is
believed that someone produced the receipts so they could be used
to pad expense reports, though investigators have not found those
responsible for producing the fake receipts. Some Shanghai
residents claim it was a source working for Shanghai Shentong
Metro Group, the subway*s operator, but the group has denied the
allegations.
* Sixty gang members were sentenced to up to life in prison in
Tangshan, Hebei province, for crimes including murder, assault and
illegal gambling.
Jan. 4
* Four men who ran a business sending text message advertisements to
mobile phones were on trial in Beijing charged with *illegal
operation* for failing to acquire the correct license for their
company. Large-scale text messaging is very common in China, and
these four are the first to be prosecuted for it.
* Eight migrant laborers were arrested in Wuhan, Hubei province, for
robbery. They were caught after robbing a recycling center,
stealing 20,000 yuan and injuring two people at knifepoint.
* A former director of the Economic Commission in Nanjing, Jiangsu
province, was sentenced to five years in prison for involvement in
insider trading. He made 7 million yuan from buying and selling
stocks with insider information. He is the first government
official to be convicted of insider trading.
* The executive director and executive president of China Gas
Holdings have been detained since Dec. 18 in Shenzhen, Guangdong
province, on suspicion of embezzlement, the company announced.
Trading in the natural gas distributor*s stock on the Hong Kong
Stock Exchange has been suspended since Dec. 20.
* Four policemen and one auxiliary police officer were killed and
six others were wounded in a gunfight in Tai*an, Shandong
province. The police arrived at the home of a murder suspect*s
brother and were fired on by two gunmen who fled the scene. In the
ensuing chase and standoff, one of the gunmen shot himself and the
other was arrested.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 5, 2011 3:57:03 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Dispatch: Polish-Russian Relations and Implications for the
Baltic Region
Stratfor logo
Dispatch: Polish-Russian Relations and Implications for the Baltic
Region
January 5, 2011 | 2036 GMT
Click on image below to watch video:
[IMG]
Analyst Marko Papic uses recent developments in Poland, Sweden and
Russia to examine the evolving geopolitics of the Baltic region in
2011.
Editor*s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition
technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete
accuracy.
Only five days into 2011, events in Sweden, Poland and Russia indicate
that the geopolitics of the region are evolving. The area will be
critical for European security and political issues in 2011.
Polish ambassador to Russia Wojciech Zajaczkowski has called out the
Nordstream underwater pipeline between Russia and Germany as well as
the possibility of Russian tactical nukes being based in Kaliningrad
as being serious issues that Poland has problems with. Zajaczkowski
specifically said that Poland would look to diversify its energy
supplies away from Russian natural gas despite recently having signed
a new expansive deal with Russian Gazprom supplies of natural gas.
Zajaczkowski also took issue with Nordstream, which should come online
sometime this year, stating that it was unnecessary and a potential
environmental catastrophe waiting to happen
The statements from the Polish ambassador to Moscow come as news hits
the wires that a senior Polish diplomat who was in charge of the
Polish Embassy*s political section in Moscow has resigned from the
foreign ministry. Tomasz Turowski apparently lied at his lustracja
hearing about his role as a spy for the Soviet Union during the Cold
War.
The activities surrounding the Polish Embassy in Moscow come a time
when the Polish-Russian relationship has essentially seen one of its
apexes. Since the death of former Polish President Lech Kaczynski in
the Smolensk air disaster in April 2010, the Russian-Polish
relationship has improved. Kaczynski was essentially the last vestige
of an anti-Russian foreign policy within the Polish government. He was
replaced by Bronis?aw Komorowski, and Komorowski launched a new
relationship with Russia, calling Russia a potential strategic
partner.
However, the basis for the Warsaw-Moscow rapprochement is essentially
a set of constraints in Poland in terms of security. Poland, at this
point, feels relatively isolated on the northern European plain. The
U.S. is involved in the Middle East and is not refocusing on the
European continent. As such, Poland feels that it is essentially
without any concrete security alliances that would allow it to be far
more aggressive towards Russia. The statements from the Polish
ambassador to Moscow are therefore very telling because they
illustrate that the rapprochement could be a very temporary affair and
that underneath the good relations between Warsaw and Moscow Poland is
looking for alternatives and is not simply rolling over to Russia.
This is why news from Stockholm that the Swedish parliamentary defense
committee is reviewing the decision by France to sell Russia a
Mistral-class warship is also very interesting in the context of the
Baltic geopolitical field. The Swedish committee has forwarded Swedish
Foreign Minister Carl Bildt a written question as to whether the
Swedish government intends to respond to the sale of the Mistral ship
and also has suggested that a closer military alliance with Poland
maybe a way to go. Thus far, Sweden and Poland have had a close
diplomatic relationship in pushing on the Russian periphery but he has
never moved past diplomacy. A concrete military or security
arrangement between Poland and the most militarized non-NATO European
state would be a significant move in the Baltics.
Click for more videos
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with
attribution to www.stratfor.com
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 6, 2011 4:03:44 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Security Weekly : The Mohammed Cartoon Dust Has Not Settled
Stratfor logo
The Mohammed Cartoon Dust Has Not Settled
January 6, 2011
Separating Terror from Terrorism
By Scott Stewart
When one considers all of the people and places in the West targeted
by transnational jihadists over the past few years, iconic targets
such as New York*s Times Square, the London Metro and the Eiffel Tower
come to mind. There are also certain target sets such as airlines and
subways that jihadists focus on more than others. Upon careful
reflection, however, it is hard to find any target set that has been
more of a magnet for transnational jihadist ire over the past year
than the small group of cartoonists and newspapers involved in the
Mohammed cartoon controversy.
Every year STRATFOR publishes a forecast of the jihadist movement for
the coming year. As we were working on that project for this year, we
were struck by the number of plots in 2010 that involved the cartoon
controversy * and by the number of those plots that had transnational
dimensions, rather than plots that involved only local grassroots
operatives. (The 2011 jihadist forecast will be available to STRATFOR
members in the coming weeks.)
Groups such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have gone to
great lengths to keep the topic of the Mohammed cartoons burning in
the consciousness of radical Islamists, whether they are lone wolves
or part of an organized jihadist group, and those efforts are
obviously bearing fruit. Because of this, we anticipate that plots
against cartoon-related targets will continue into the foreseeable
future.
A Recent Plot
On Dec. 29, 2010, authorities in Denmark and Sweden arrested five men
they say were involved in planning an armed assault on the offices of
Jyllands-Posten in Copenhagen. Jyllands-Posten is the newspaper that
first published the cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed in September
2005. According to the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (known
by its Danish acronym PET), three of the arrested men, a 29-year-old
Swedish citizen born in Lebanon, a 44-year-old Tunisian and a
30-year-old Swedish citizen, lived in Sweden and had traveled to
Denmark to participate in the plot. The other two individuals arrested
were a 37-year-old Swedish citizen born in Tunisia who was detained in
a Stockholm suburb and a 26-year-old Iraqi asylum seeker who was
arrested in a Copenhagen suburb. The Iraqi has been released from
Danish custody.
According to the PET, one of the three men who had traveled to
Copenhagen, 29-year-old Swedish citizen Munir Awad, had been arrested
in Somalia in 2007 and in Pakistan in 2009 on suspicion of
participating in terrorist activity. When arrested in Pakistan, Awad
was allegedly traveling in the company of Mehdi Ghezali, a Swedish
citizen who had been released in 2004 after being held in U.S. custody
at Guantanamo Bay since 2002. Given Awad*s background, it is almost
certain that he had been placed under intensive surveillance by
Swedish authorities and it is likely this surveillance resulted in the
unraveling of the plot.
In addition to Awad*s background, there are several other indicators
that this latest plot against Jyllands-Posten was serious. First, the
attack plan was reasonable, practical and achievable. The plotters
sought to attack a specific target, the Jyllands-Posten offices, with
an armed assault. They were not seeking to execute some sort of
grandiose, fanciful attack using skills and weapons they did not
possess, or to conduct attacks against targets that were too difficult
to strike using their chosen method of attack. They appear to have
been aware of their own capabilities and limitations and planned their
attack accordingly.
This stands in stark contrast to plots like the one also thwarted in
December in the Netherlands, where a group of Somalis allegedly
plotted to shoot down a Dutch military helicopter but lacked even a
rudimentary weapon with which to mount such an attack, much less a
surface-to-air missile, the weapon of choice for anyone really wanting
to bring down a helicopter. In another recently thwarted plot in the
United Kingdom, the planners considered hitting pretty much every
conceivable target in London, including the U.S. Embassy, Parliament,
the London Stock Exchange and a host of religious and political
leaders. The Copenhagen plotters were far more focused.
The PET said the group arrested in Denmark had obtained a pistol and a
submachine gun equipped with a sound suppressor for use in its assault
on the newspaper offices. Reportedly, the plotters were also found to
possess flexible handcuffs, an indication that they may have been
seeking to take hostages and create a theatrical terrorist operation
to play to the world media.
In addition to conducting their preoperational surveillance, planning
their operation and obtaining weapons, the plotters had also brought
in a team of operatives from Sweden to assist them in implementing
their plan. This indicates that the operation was likely in the later
stages of the terrorist attack cycle and was close to being executed.
Even though it appears that Swedish and Danish authorities had the
plotters under close scrutiny, had the attack been launched against
unsuspecting security at the Jyllands-Posten offices, it would have
had a fairly good chance of creating considerable carnage and terror.
History of Plots
The cartoons received very little notice after their initial release
by Jyllands-Posten in September 2005. It was not until early 2006 that
a group of Muslim clerics traveling through the Middle East brought
attention to the issue in a deliberate effort to stir up emotions.
Those efforts were successful in fomenting a violent, if somewhat
belated, reaction. In early February 2006, Danish and Norwegian
embassies and consulates were attacked in Syria, Lebanon, Afghanistan,
Iran, Pakistan, Nigeria and Indonesia. In Damascus, rioters set fire
to the Danish and Norwegian missions, and in Beirut the Danish Embassy
was burned. At least nine people died when protesters tried to storm
an Italian Consulate in Libya while protesting the cartoons.
The furor diminished to a low boil but did not go away. In addition to
calls by Muslims to boycott Danish goods, a Swedish newspaper
published yet another cartoon of Mohammed, once again stoking the
fires. In September 2007, Omar al-Baghdadi, then leader of the Islamic
State of Iraq, offered a $100,000 reward for killing Lars Vilks, a
Swedish artist who drew the August 2007 cartoon in which the Prophet
Mohammed was portrayed as a dog. In a March 2008 audiotape, a speaker
purporting to be al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden threatened to conduct
attacks in Europe because of the drawings. According to bin Laden,
drawing cartoons of the Prophet was even more provocative than killing
Muslim civilians.
On June 2, 2008, the Danish Embassy in Islamabad was attacked in a
suicide vehicle bombing. Before the attack, the Danes had drawn down
their embassy staff in Islamabad and, recognizing that their embassy
was not very secure, had ordered the Danish staff remaining in
Islamabad to work out of hotels. This move undoubtedly saved lives, as
the bombing killed only a handful of people, mostly Pakistani Muslims.
But militants were clearly trying to take their retribution for the
cartoons to Denmark itself. Following the October 2009 arrest of U.S.
citizen David Headley, American officials learned that Headley, who
had conducted preoperational surveillance for the November 2008 Mumbai
attacks, had also been dispatched to conduct surveillance in Denmark.
According to a complaint filed in federal court, the U.S. government
determined that the Kashmiri militant group Harkat-ul-Jihad e-Islami
(HUJI) had ordered Headley to travel from Chicago to Copenhagen on two
occasions to plan attacks against Jyllands-Posten and cartoonist Kurt
Westergaard in what HUJI called *Operation Mickey Mouse.* Westergaard
is a Jyllands-Posten cartoonist who drew one of the original batch of
12 Mohammed cartoons in 2005. In Westergaard*s cartoon, the Prophet*s
turban was depicted as a bomb, which caused the drawing to elicit a
stronger reaction than the other cartoons. In January 2009, Headley
conducted surveillance of the Jyllands-Posten offices in Copenhagen
and Aarhus, Denmark. He then traveled to Pakistan, where he met with
his HUJI handlers to brief them on the findings of his surveillance
and to formulate an attack plan. Headley traveled back to Copenhagen
in August 2009 to conduct additional surveillance (presumably to
address issues that arose during the operational planning session in
Pakistan). During this second trip, Headley made some 13 additional
videos and took many photos of the potential targets and the areas
around them. It is suspected that some of the observations,
photographs and video recordings may have been used in planning some
of the subsequent attacks against Jyllands-Posten and Westergaard.
Plots pertaining to the cartoon controversy in 2010 include:
* On Jan. 1, a Somali man reportedly associated with the Somali
jihadist group al Shabaab broke into Westergaard*s home armed with
an axe and knife and allegedly tried to kill him. Westergaard
retreated to a safe room and the assailant was shot and wounded by
police.
* On March 9, seven people were arrested in Ireland in connection
with an alleged plot to kill cartoonist Lars Vilks. The group was
apparently implicated with American Colleen LaRose (aka Jihad
Jane) and included a second American woman, Jamie Paulin-Ramirez.
* On May 11, Lars Vilks was assaulted as he tried to give a
presentation at Uppsala University in Sweden. On May 14, Vilks*
home was the target of a failed arson attack.
* On Sept. 10, a Chechen man was injured when a letter bomb he was
assembling detonated prematurely inside a Copenhagen hotel
bathroom. The letter bomb, which featured a main charge comprised
of triacetone triperoxide and contained small steel pellets, was
intended for Jyllands-Posten.
* On Dec. 11, an Iraqi-born Swedish citizen detonated a poorly
constructed explosive device in his car and then detonated a
suicide vest, killing himself. The man had sent a warning email
expressing anger over the Lars Vilks cartoon as well as the
presence of Swedish soldiers in Afghanistan.
Cartoonists Remain in the Crosshairs
In July 2010, AQAP released the first edition of its English-language
magazine Inspire. One of the articles in that issue was written by the
American-born Yemeni cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who wrote, *If you have
the right to slander the Messenger of Allah, we have the right to
defend him. If it is part of your freedom of speech to defame Muhammad
it is part of our religion to fight you.* He added: *Assassinations,
bombings, and acts of arson are all legitimate forms of revenge
against a system that relishes the sacrilege of Islam in the name of
freedom.* Al-Awlaki also referred to a 2008 lecture he gave regarding
the cartoon issue titled *The Dust Will Never Settle Down* and noted
that, *Today, two years later, the dust still hasn*t settled down. In
fact the dust cloud is only getting bigger.*
The first edition of Inspire also featured a *hit list* that includes
the names of people like Westergaard and Vilks who were involved in
the cartoon controversy as well as other targets such as Dutch
politician Geert Wilders, who produced the controversial film Fitna in
2008; Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who wrote the screenplay for the movie
Submission (filmmaker Theo van Gogh, the director of Submission, was
murdered by a jihadist in November 2004); and Salman Rushdie, author
of the book The Satanic Verses.
The van Gogh murder demonstrated that such targets were vulnerable to
attack * and not just by highly skilled transnational operatives. They
were also potential victims of grassroots jihadists using readily
available weapons in relatively simple attacks. The January 2010
attack against Kurt Westergaard using an axe and knife underscored
this point. In light of the events of 2010, al-Awlaki*s boasts ring
true. The dust kicked up over the cartoon issue has not settled * and
there is no indication it will any time soon.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Reprinting or republication of this report on websites is authorized
by prominently displaying the following sentence at the beginning or
end of the report, including the hyperlink to STRATFOR:
"This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR"
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 6, 2011 5:43:20 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Russia and its Foreign Policy Dance
[IMG]
Wednesday, January 5, 2011 [IMG] STRATFOR.COM [IMG] Diary Archives
Russia and its Foreign Policy Dance
The Kremlin announced Wednesday that Russian President Dmitri Medvedev
is going to visit the Palestinian territories in a few weeks, just as
Medvedev*s trip to Israel has been canceled. Medvedev had planned to
go to Israel on Jan. 17-19, but his trip was postponed due to a strike
at the Israeli Foreign Ministry. While this may just seem like a
logistical and technical issue, there is a shifting Russian foreign
policy strategy, giving Moscow freer capability to act against the
Israelis and increase support for the Palestinians.
Russia and Israel have had ongoing tense and complex relations. After
a post-World War II alliance in the late 1940s, Soviet-era Moscow was
a patron of Israel*s enemies * Egypt and Syria. At the time, this was
not really about Russia siding against Israel as it was about
pressuring the United States* interests in the Middle East.
After the Cold War, Israeli and Russian relations were tolerable.
Moscow had to pull its support from the Middle East as its empire
crumbled and it fought to keep the Russian state together. All this
changed in the past decade when Russia began to consolidate, and
announced that Russia was on its way back and would soon return as a
major player on the international stage.
During this time, Moscow accused Israel of meddling in Russia*s
interests by financially and politically backing the anti-Kremlin
oligarchs, and militarily supporting Georgia and Russian Muslim
republics of Dagestan and Chechnya. Since then, it has been a
tit-for-tat between Russia and Israel with Moscow countering those
Israeli moves by supporting Iran and Syria in recent years.
**Russia is working with all players in the region * keeping everyone
dizzy and guessing what it will do next.*
This was part of Russia*s overall foreign policy at the time to
unilaterally retaliate for moves made against its interests. One of
the larger examples of this was the West*s recognition of an
independent Kosovo, followed by Russia*s recognition of independent
Abkhazia and South Ossetia * after its war with Georgia. But Russia*s
resurgence has now entered a new stage, in which Moscow feels
comfortable in its sphere of influence. Naturally, Moscow is still
mindful of foreign moves in its surrounding regions, but is confident
such moves do not threaten its overall control in the region. Moscow
is not only secure enough in its power over Georgia that the issue
isn*t a red line in Russian-Israeli relations; Moscow retains options
for escalation in Israel*s neighborhood that can deter Israeli actions
in Georgia.
This new shift has allowed Russia to be able to play more ambiguously
than unilaterally in all its foreign policy issues. With Russia in a
comfortable status, it feels it can make bolder moves outside of
Eurasia. Such alterations have been seen in Russia*s policies in the
Middle East, where Moscow has been striking military deals with anyone
it can * Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Israel.
This time, increased Russian activity around the world could go beyond
theatrics and translate into further support for the Palestinians.
There are rumors that Russia is considering actually recognizing an
independent Palestinian state. There has already been a change in some
weightier countries, like Brazil, supporting Palestine. The Russians
could be the next in line. The difference is the Russians have a
history of not just diplomatically supporting the Palestinians, but
through military, financial and intelligence support.
Moscow*s motivations behind supporting the Palestinians at this time
are not clear, since it has been making so many deals with so many
countries in the region. Russia could be attempting to make a show
against one of Washington*s closest allies * Israel * and the timing
of the cancellation of Medvedev*s trip to Israel is suspicious. Russia
could be choosing to make this move because of increased discussion of
Palestinian support in the European Union * and Russia is looking for
agenda issues in which to align. Russia could be in coordination with
Brazil, as both countries are strangely side-by-side on myriad foreign
policy issues. Additionally, it could be Russia simply wanting to make
a global statement that it isn*t worried about repercussions for
taking sides on such a controversial issue.
Even if Moscow*s reasoning or endgame is unknown at this time, it*s
plain that Russia is working with all players in the region * keeping
everyone dizzy and guessing what it will do next.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 6, 2011 7:53:27 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: An Alignment of Interests Between Poland and Sweden
Stratfor logo
An Alignment of Interests Between Poland and Sweden
January 6, 2011 | 1319 GMT
Poland's and Sweden's Aligning Interests
JOHN THYS/AFP/Getty Images
Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt at EU headquarters in December
2009
Summary
Poland and Sweden sent separate warnings to Russia on Jan. 5, Poland
in the form of critical comments on Warsaw*s energy dependence on
Moscow and Sweden on a possible response to Russia*s planned purchase
of French Mistral-class warships. As Russia attempts to consolidate
its influence in its Baltic Sea neighbors Latvia and Estonia,
conditions are ripe for Poland and Sweden to enhance their diplomatic
relationship to include military and security cooperation to counter
Moscow*s moves in the region.
Analysis
Two seemingly unrelated events on Jan. 5 suggest that Russia*s Baltic
Sea neighbors, Poland and Sweden, are sending a warning to Moscow.
First, Polish Ambassador to Russia Wojciech Zajaczkowski said in
interviews with Interfax that Warsaw is actively seeking to diversify
its gas supply away from Moscow. The comment followed Zajaczkowski*s
public statement Jan. 4 regarding Poland*s extremely critical view of
Russia*s potential basing of tactical nuclear weapons in its exclave
of Kaliningrad and the *futility* of the Russian-German Nordstream
pipeline, which the ambassador criticized on economic and
environmental grounds.
Meanwhile, on Jan. 5 the Swedish Parliamentary Defense Committee
forwarded a formal question to Foreign Minister Carl Bildt on how
Stockholm intends to respond to Russia*s planned purchase of two
French Mistral-class helicopter carriers. Russia signed an official
agreement with France to purchase the two carriers, with an option of
two more being built in Russia. The first hull is tentatively
scheduled for delivery this year and is officially supposed to be
based with the Pacific fleet. However, the second will most likely be
based in the Baltic Sea, which has irked Baltic states.
An Alignment of Interests Between Poland and Sweden
The timing of both events is notable. Though only recently finalized,
the Mistral purchase has been in the works for more than a year, and
Poland*s unease with dependency on Russian natural gas is certainly
not new. Therefore, both the Swedish parliament*s sudden interest in
the Russian-French military deal and the Polish ambassador*s generally
aggressive interview * which received considerable negative coverage
in Russia * should be considered in the context of the region*s
evolving geopolitics.
First, both statements closely follow Belarus* presidential elections,
the subsequent crackdown on opposition leaders during a rally to
protest President Aleksandr Lukashenko*s re-election and Moscow*s
support for the regime despite the clashes. Europe, led by the
Polish-Swedish Eastern Partnership initiative, has been hoping that it
could slowly erode Moscow*s grip on Belarus* geopolitical alignment.
However, the result of the presidential elections effectively ended
that.
The Polish-Swedish statements also follow recent successful moves by
Russia in the Baltic states to increase its influence beyond
traditional levers * such as influencing Russian minorities in Latvia
and Estonia * to increasing economic and political influence as well.
A December visit to Russia by Latvian President Valdis Zatlers
illustrated the increased economic links between Moscow and Riga, with
Russia becoming Latvia*s second-most-important investor after Sweden.
Russia also has effectively increased its influence in both Latvia and
Estonia through patronage of relatively pro-Russian political parties
(which are now emphasizing their broad appeal), Harmony Center and the
Center Party, respectively.
As such, Poland and Sweden * the other two historical powers in the
Baltic Sea region * are looking to counter or at least send a message
to Russia that they are watching Moscow*s moves carefully.
Zajaczkowski*s statements, in particular, should be carefully studied.
He was appointed to his post recently by new Polish President
Bronislaw Komorowski, who has said that the age of knee-jerk
anti-Russian policy in Poland is over. Zajaczkowski has also been a
close foreign policy adviser to Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who
has himself personally worked on improving Warsaw-Moscow relations. As
such, Zajaczkowski is not a vestige of the former anti-Russian Polish
policy and is very much a representative of the Tusk-Komorowski
tandem. If he criticizes Russia*s foreign policy, the highest echelons
of Polish leadership approve the statements.
Sweden, meanwhile, largely spent 2010 embroiled in a long election
season, one of the most contentious in the nation*s recent history.
The incumbent center-right government has now returned to power,
albeit in a minority. Now Prime Minister Erik Reinfeldt and Foreign
Minister Carl Bildt can begin concentrating on regional affairs. Bildt
has already made a joint visit with his Polish counterpart to advance
the Eastern Partnership program in Ukraine and Moldova * specifically
to try to increase the chances of a pro-European government in
Chisinau * and has hosted the Ukrainian foreign minister in Stockholm.
In other words, Sweden made it a point to announce its return to
regional politics in December.
The question, however, is whether Sweden and Poland are willing to
increase their own collaboration in the region beyond active
diplomacy. For the past two years, STRATFOR sources in Poland have
emphasized Warsaw*s willingness to enhance its relationship with
Sweden to include military and security cooperation. STRATFOR is now
also hearing similar thoughts emanating from Stockholm. With the
United States * Poland*s traditional post-Cold War security ally *
likely continuing to be embroiled in the Middle East for the
foreseeable future and refusing to offer Warsaw any robust security
reassurances, Poland will be looking for alternatives, at least in the
short term. Sweden has a traditionally defended its neutrality
aggressively and thus has a robust military and arms industry. Its
interests are also currently aligned with Warsaw as Moscow continues
to expand its influence in Eastern Europe, particularly in Latvia and
Estonia.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 6, 2011 11:05:20 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Stratfor's World Snapshot
Stratfor logo January 6, 2011
Stratfor's World Snapshot
An Alignment of Interests Between Poland and Sweden
JOHN THYS/AFP/Getty Images
Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt at EU headquarters in December
2009
An Alignment of Interests Between Poland and Sweden
January 6, 2011 1319 GMT
Conditions are ripe for Warsaw and Stockholm to enhance their
diplomatic relationship to include military and security cooperation
in the face of an emerging Russia. [more]
China Security Memo: Jan. 5, 2011
China Security Memo: Jan. 5, 2011
January 5, 2011 2012 GMT
The death of a re-emerging village leader has Chinese *netizens*
concerned about an official cover-up. (With STRATFOR interactive map)
[more]
U.S. Naval Update Map: Jan. 5, 2011
U.S. Naval Update Map: Jan. 5, 2011
January 5, 2011 1839 GMT
A weekly approximation of the current locations of U.S. Carrier Strike
Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups, based on available open-source
information. (With STRATFOR map) [more]
Ukraine's Place in Russia's Evolving Foreign Policy
Ukraine's Place in Russia's Evolving Foreign Policy
January 5, 2011 1403 GMT
Having increased its influence in its near abroad, Russia is taking a
more nuanced approach to its foreign policy, particularly in Ukraine.
[more]
More Analysis >>
Situation Reports
Latvia: State Of Emergency To Be Declared
January 6, 2011 1658 GMT
Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Dombrovskis said a nationwide state of
emergency will be declared the afternoon of Jan. 6 to facilitate the
restoration of electricity amid a blizzard, The Baltic... [more]
China: 2 Surveillance Patrol Ships Added
January 6, 2011 1640 GMT
Iran: U.S. Woman Not In Country
January 6, 2011 1632 GMT
Iran: President Appoints Palestinian Adviser
January 6, 2011 1625 GMT
More Situation Reports >>
Weekly Intelligence Reports
The Mohammed Cartoon Dust Has Not Settled
The Mohammed Cartoon Dust Has Not Settled
January 6, 2011 0955 GMT
Controversy stirred up over cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed in
2005 was still swirling in 2010 and is not likely to die down any time
soon. [more]
Egypt and the Destruction of Churches: Strategic Implications
Egypt and the Destruction of Churches: Strategic Implications
January 4, 2011 1003 GMT
Separating Terror from Terrorism
Separating Terror from Terrorism
December 30, 2010 0955 GMT
Making Sense of the START Debate
Making Sense of the START Debate
December 28, 2010 0950 GMT
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 6, 2011 1:23:14 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Afghanistan: More Marines Bound for the Taliban's Home Turf
Stratfor logo
Afghanistan: More Marines Bound for the Taliban's Home Turf
January 6, 2011 | 1842 GMT
Afghanistan: More Marines Bound for the Taliban's Home Turf
Nathan Hughes/STRATFOR
Marines on a patrol in southern Marjah
Summary
At least 1,400 additional U.S. Marines are being dispatched to
Afghanistan while more troops are being considered. The Pentagon is
also thinking about ways to rebalance the force in-country and adjust
scheduled unit rotations. While none of these changes amount to a
game-changer in Afghanistan (in a strategic sense, the troop increases
are modest), they will certainly have tactical utility. They may also
reflect some concern about the durability of gains achieved thus far.
Analysis
STRATFOR BOOK
* Afghanistan at the Crossroads: Insights on the Conflict
Related Special Topic Page
* The War in Afghanistan
Related Links
* A Week in the War: Afghanistan, Dec. 29, 2010-Jan. 4, 2011
* Afghanistan: Momentum and Initiative in Counterinsurgency
* Obama*s Plan and the Key Battleground
The United States will dispatch an additional Marine infantry
battalion to Afghanistan, set to arrive by the middle of January.
Totaling some 1,400 troops, the battalion is bound for the main effort
of the U.S.-led campaign, where forces have been massed in Helmand and
Kandahar provinces. The additional Marines are in addition to the
rotational deployments to sustain the surge level of U.S. and allied
troops (totaling nearly 150,000) meant to be maintained until July.
Some 1,600 additional combat troops are also under consideration, as
is a rebalancing of forces already committed to increase their combat
power and bandwidth. Other possible measures include delaying the
scheduled departure of units already in Afghanistan and accelerating
the deployment of those originally scheduled for April and May.
In accordance with its counterinsurgency-focused strategy, the
U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has singled
out most of Helmand and Kandahar provinces as *key terrain.* This is
the Taliban*s home turf, and most of the surge forces are being
concentrated here to deny the Taliban this center of gravity, from
which they have traditionally enjoyed considerable financial and
popular support.
However, despite the surging and massing of combat power here, the
area*s size and population distribution * as well as the timeline on
which the ISAF is trying to reshape military, political and economic
realities * mean that the force will remain thinly spread. Based on
its own metrics, the Pentagon was pushing at one point for as many as
40,000 U.S. troops for the surge announced just over a year ago,
rather than the 30,000 the White House eventually agreed to deploy. If
all the additional forces now being considered are deployed and the
adjustments made accordingly, the net effect could be an increase in
the number of U.S. troops in country from 30,000 to almost 40,000.
Afghanistan: More Marines Bound for the Taliban's Home Turf
(click here to enlarge image)
Recent months have shown some indications of progress, and the ISAF is
looking to push its advantage and use the traditional lull in fighting
over the winter months to further consolidate its tentative gains and
ensure as strong a position as possible ahead of the spring thaw, when
Taliban activity is expected to intensify. In other words, the
recently granted request for the additional Marine battalion was a
pre-emptive move, rather than a reactionary one, in a fluid
operational environment; requests for additional forces can be
expected in a war zone as dynamic as Afghanistan.
But even if the full allocation of 3,000 additional combat troops
under consideration is approved, this remains a request with tactical
and * at most * operational-level significance. These troops will not
represent a game-changer, and plans for their deployment appear to be
consistent with the current counterinsurgency-focused strategy. The
same challenges and questions surrounding the strategy remain, and the
year ahead will be a defining one for the campaign. The deployment of
an additional Marine battalion, along with the additional measures
being considered, reflects a clear awareness of how important this
year will be. In all likelihood, it also reflects some concern about
the reversibility of ISAF gains and the limitations of the current
timetable.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 6, 2011 3:05:47 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: China Eyes Spain to Expand its South American Reach
Stratfor logo
China Eyes Spain to Expand its South American Reach
January 6, 2011 | 1940 GMT
China Eyes Spain to Expand its South American Reach
DOMINIQUE FAGET/AFP/Getty Images
Spanish Industry Minister Miguel Sebastian Gascon (L) and Chinese Vice
Premier Li Keqiang in Madrid on Jan. 5
Summary
China*s vice premier completed his trip to Spain on Jan. 5, finalizing
16 business deals worth $7.5 billion. A large part of the deals is
expanded cooperation between Chinese state-run energy company Sinopec
and Spanish energy firm Repsol YPF. Madrid previously had been cool to
such offers, but its current economic doldrums and China*s offer to
buy more Spanish government debt and assist the country*s economy have
caused it to reverse its long-standing opposition to foreign ownership
in the strategic company.
Analysis
Chinese Vice Premier Li Keqiang wrapped up his trip to Spain on Jan.
5, concluding 16 business deals worth $7.5 billion, of which $7.1
billion derives from a deal struck in October for Chinese state energy
company Sinopec to take a 40 percent stake in Spanish energy firm
Repsol YPF*s Brazilian subsidiary. Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis
Rodriguez Zapatero pledged to continue economic cooperation between
China and Spain, specifically stressing Beijing*s desire to jointly
explore third-party markets.
Spain previously had been resistant to investment by state-linked
foreign companies, but China*s offers of economic assistance appear to
have prodded a shift. For its part, China hopes to use its investment
in the Repsol subsidiary to gain physical assets in Latin America as
well as draw upon the company*s wealth of experience in business
dealings in the region.
The warming relations between Beijing and Madrid come as Spain is
dealing with 19.8 percent unemployment, austerity measures, and a
potential return to recession in 2011 due to budgetary cuts and
general pessimism from markets * Madrid is attempting to raise 163.3
billion euros ($212.5 billion) to fund its deficit and refinance its
debts. China has maintained it will support the Spanish economy,
recently emphasizing that it would buy more Spanish government debt.
In return, Rodriguez Zapatero said Spain would support the European
Union*s recognition of China as a full market economy and the lifting
of the EU arms embargo against China, both issues that Beijing very
much wants addressed.
Spain, however, does not carry enough weight in the European Union to
move the political heavyweights on either of the two issues of Chinese
interest. And while Spain*s economy * the fourth-largest in the
eurozone, with 46 million people * is certainly an enticing market for
Chinese goods, Spain has never really been an avenue for greater
European economic penetration due to its geographic position on
Europe*s periphery. China*s larger interest * and the reason for its
offer of assistance to Madrid during the current economic duress * in
fact has very little to do with Spain or the wider European market,
but rather concerns Spanish energy assets in Latin America and
particularly Repsol*s presence on that continent. Following the visit,
Repsol chairman Antonio Brufau said there were *synergies between
Repsol and Sinopec* and that the companies would expand their
cooperation worldwide without stating where.
China Eyes Spain to Expand its South American Reach
(click here to enlarge image)
This is a change in tone from Repsol on Chinese investments. In fact,
until the October infusion of capital into Repsol*s Brazilian
subsidiary * Sinopec*s 40 percent stake * China had seen its overtures
mostly rejected by the company. Chinese state-owned energy companies
China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) and China National Petroleum
Corp. unsuccessfully tried to acquire a stake in Repsol*s Argentine
subsidiary in 2006 and 2007, followed by several failed attempts by
CNOOC and Sinopec to acquire a direct stake in Repsol. Finally, after
unsuccessfully bidding for a controlling stake in Repsol*s Argentine
subsidiary, CNOOC and Sinopec were directly rebuffed by Spanish
Industry Minister Miguel Sebastian Gascon when he said the Spanish
government was uninterested in strategic investments by Chinese
companies in sensitive sectors. (China has often been rejected on
strategic grounds in its increasingly aggressive foreign assets
acquisition spree, though it has still acquired a great number of
valuable assets over the years.)
Although now a fully privatized energy company, Repsol has long been
considered the jewel of the Spanish economy. It has more than 40,000
employees and its total revenue approached $50 billion in 2009. It is
not considered one of the global energy majors but is comparable in
terms of revenues to large energy companies such as Indonesia*s
Petronas, the United States* Marathon Oil or Russia*s LUKoil. Because
of its place in the Spanish economy, Madrid has rebuffed attempts by
state-owned companies in Russia * specifically Gazprom, but also
privately owned, Kremlin-linked LUKoil * and China to acquire the 20
percent stake in Repsol that was on the market in late 2008 and early
2009 as Spanish construction giant Sacyr Vallehermoso, which held the
stake, reeled from the economic crisis. For Madrid, handing over part
of such a prized possession to a state-run foreign entity was seen as
a national security concern.
The Russians and Chinese want Repsol because of its assets in Latin
America; China specifically wants its offshore producing assets and
any assets close to export infrastructure. However, it is not only
Repsol*s physical assets in the region that are lucrative * although
they would be the main target of Chinese investments * but also its
long tradition of operating on the continent, its understanding of the
culture and its general business acumen regarding the region. The
networks, business contacts and understanding of how to operate in
Latin America would all be beneficial for Chinese companies looking
for energy suppliers to satisfy China*s thirst for raw materials. Thus
far, the Chinese have relied on their political relationships with
various political leaders on the continent to penetrate into the
region. A relationship with Repsol would bolster this political acumen
with some much-needed business and technological expertise.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 6, 2011 3:55:02 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Dispatch: Shared Oil Interests in Sudan
Stratfor logo
Dispatch: Shared Oil Interests in Sudan
January 6, 2011 | 2145 GMT
Click on image below to watch video:
[IMG]
Analyst Mark Schroeder examines the upcoming Jan. 9 referendum on
Southern Sudanese independence and how shared oil interests with Sudan
will likely keep both countries from a return to civil war.
Editor*s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition
technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete
accuracy.
On Sunday, Jan. 9, Southern Sudan will hold a referendum vote on
independence. It is widely expected that that region, currently an
autonomous region of Sudan, will vote in favor of declaring itself to
be independent.
First what will happen is the referendum vote on Jan. 9 but
technically even if that vote goes in favor of declaring independence,
legally Southern Sudan cannot make that declaration of independence
until July. This is a legality enshrined in a peace agreement that was
negotiated as far back as 2005, and so what will happen in between the
Jan. 9 vote and July is a long-standing period of protracted, intense
negotiations over what the actual relations and means of cooperation
will be between that new state of Southern Sudan and the rest of
Sudan. The big topic, the big concern is whether this referendum vote
and possible declaration of independence will lead to a return of
civil war between the north and south in Sudan. But at STRATFOR we
don*t expect to see a return to civil war. There is one issue that
forces the two parts of that country to cooperate and that is crude
oil, and the crude oil found largely on that internal border between
north and south.
Now Sudan is not a major oil-producing state * Sudan*s output is about
500,000 barrels per day. The oil found in Sudan is the main resource
that both governments there rely on. For Juba in Southern Sudan, the
revenues they receive from oil production contribute probably about 95
percent of its budget. For Sudan similarly oil is the main part of its
domestic economy. It still has a small manufacturing base, and a small
but still significant agriculture sector in Sudan but the main
international commodity that Sudan brings to bear is that crude oil.
Even though the majority of crude oil fields are in southern Sudanese
territory, the only way to export that is through northern Sudanese
territory. And this brings us back to why these two actors and
territories must cooperate, they are mutually dependent on each other
for their economic well-being.
Click for more videos
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with
attribution to www.stratfor.com
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 7, 2011 6:07:21 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Beijing Tells the Provinces To Slow Down
[IMG]
Thursday, January 6, 2011 [IMG] STRATFOR.COM [IMG] Diary Archives
Beijing Tells the Provinces To Slow Down
Zhang Ping, director of China*s powerful National Development and
Reform Commission (NDRC) * the leading economic planner * called on
China*s provinces to slow down their economic growth targets for 2011
and take into consideration the effects of growth on *energy,
environment, water and land.* Zhang said only five or six provinces
have lowered their growth targets to 8 or 9 percent * 8 percent being
the Communist Party*s estimated rate of growth necessary to maintain
sufficient job creation. The others have targeted 10 percent growth
rates or higher, and some aim to double their total output in five
years.
Zhang*s comments point to the central government*s pragmatic desire
for the provincial growth targets to be consistent with the national
target. Beijing also does not want provinces to set themselves up for
a deadline-driven rush that will increase costs or intentionally use
fake numbers to please the central government. Beijing eventually
wants to reduce its emphasis on using economic indicators to judge
political performance, since it sets rapid growth as the sole good,
which has led to a variety of economic policy abuses and social
distortions. The government wants a more accurate picture, and is
urging the provinces to prepare for lower and * ideally * more
sustainable growth. It is also trying to alleviate the massive
pressure on China*s domestic resources and ability to acquire
sufficient resources from abroad.
*The provinces show no self-restraint because they are profiting from
the easy credit and endless economic boom and, on a deeper level,
because they fear a recession would create unemployment-charged
uprisings that would see them alone in their tower under siege.*
But Zhang*s comments are also emblematic of a deep tension in China*s
system. Struggles between the central political power and the
provincial powers define Chinese history. The country has three core
economic and population regions * the North China Plain and Yellow
River Delta (Beijing), the Yangtze Delta (Shanghai), and the Pearl
River Delta (Guangdong) * with mountains splitting the south from the
north. In addition, there are other populous enclaves like the
Northeast or Sichuan Basin, the far western deserts and wastelands,
and the breakaway province of Taiwan. The country is equally disposed
to division and warring kingdoms as it is to unity through rigidly
centralized bureaucracy. The center demands the regions adhere to its
edicts and remain unified to protect against foreign exploitation or
invasion; the regions amass wealth for themselves, compete with each
other, and ignore or resist the center.
The Communist Revolution marked a 30-year period of national
reformation and central consolidation. But eventually, China found it
needed economic growth, and the opening up of 1978 gave room for
special zones and eventually entire provinces to re-engage in market
activity. The result was an explosion of economic growth that
continues. Within this growth, the economy has waxed and waned,
primarily responding to the central government*s devolving power to
the provinces to allow them to race, and then struggling to tighten
the reins.
Now, China is manifestly nearing the peak of that super-cycle of
economic expansion. The failure of the growth model is particularly a
problem after the global crisis when exports collapsed. China poured
credit into the economy to skip over the recession, but at the expense
of rising costs for the natural resources necessary to maintain this
growth and deepening disparities in wealth and social frustrations.
Small steps to tighten growth in 2010 had limited effects, giving way
to a reassertion of the desire for growth. Thus, the top technicians
in control of the country*s financial system face the dilemma of
making forceful demands to slow the economy at the risk of driving it
into the ground * or continuing with small adjustments and thereby
revealing their weak will and emboldening the provincial warlords. The
provinces show no self-restraint because they are profiting from the
easy credit and endless economic boom and, on a deeper level, because
they fear a recession would create unemployment-charged uprisings that
would see them alone in their tower under siege.
Beijing has faced the dilemma before * notably in the late 1980s and
mid-1990s * but it is especially hesitant to force its way now because
of a monumental political change approaching. The older generation of
leaders is passing the torch in 2012-13, and power transitions cannot
yet be said to be a casual or comfortable affair in the People*s
Republic. So, a generational division overlays the central-provincial
divisions * some of the young leaders, finding support from the
central policy specialists, are more inclined to impose controls on
the economy and try to engineer a smooth descent, so that they do not
inherit an about-to-burst or already bursting bubble and instead have
the option of reaccelerating when they take power to benefit their
personal networks and consolidate power.
But some powerful voices in the older generation, aided by the
provincial warlords and their patrons, seem to lack the appetite for
risky policy moves. They are constrained by the niggling fear that
however well planned, an attempt to moderate growth now could trigger
an irreversible slowdown and the conclusion of the growth super-cycle
that has held for the past 30 years. An economic disjunction of that
magnitude could in turn precipitate the kind of totalizing
socio-political revolution that has occurred every 30 or 40 years in
China*s modern history. They are demanding a proud legacy when they
retire and the regime is demanding a smooth transition for its own
sake. But there is no guarantee they will get this, and, for now, the
policy tug-of-war intensifies.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 7, 2011 11:11:05 AM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Stratfor's World Snapshot
Stratfor logo January 7, 2011
Stratfor's World Snapshot
China Eyes Spain to Expand its South American Reach
DOMINIQUE FAGET/AFP/Getty Images
Spanish Industry Minister Miguel Sebastian Gascon (L) and Chinese Vice
Premier Li Keqiang in Madrid on Jan. 5
China Eyes Spain to Expand its South American Reach
January 6, 2011 1940 GMT
China is using Spain's dire economic condition to get Madrid to allow
joint ventures in Latin America with Spanish energy firm Repsol YPF,
expanding Beijing's economic reach and getting valuable experience in
the process. (With STRATFOR map) [more]
Afghanistan: More Marines Bound for the Taliban's Home Turf
Afghanistan: More Marines Bound for the Taliban's Home Turf
January 6, 2011 1842 GMT
Another U.S. Marine battalion ordered up for the Helmand-Kandahar area
is a tactical-scale increase in keeping with the counterinsurgency
strategy. [more]
An Alignment of Interests Between Poland and Sweden
An Alignment of Interests Between Poland and Sweden
January 6, 2011 1319 GMT
Conditions are ripe for Warsaw and Stockholm to enhance their
diplomatic relationship to include military and security cooperation
in the face of an emerging Russia. [more]
China Security Memo: Jan. 5, 2011
China Security Memo: Jan. 5, 2011
January 5, 2011 2012 GMT
The death of a re-emerging village leader has Chinese *netizens*
concerned about an official cover-up. (With STRATFOR interactive map)
[more]
More Analysis >>
Situation Reports
U.S.: Envoy Meets Pakistani Army Chief
January 7, 2011 1649 GMT
U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Frank
Ruggiero met with Pakistani Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ashfaq Kayani at
the army's General Headquarters on Jan. 7, according to a... [more]
Cuba: 75,000 Private-sector Work Permits Granted
January 7, 2011 1645 GMT
China, Germany: $8.7 Billion Worth Of Deals To Be Signed
January 7, 2011 1644 GMT
Cuba: $3.9 Billion Trade Surplus In 2010
January 7, 2011 1642 GMT
More Situation Reports >>
Weekly Intelligence Reports
The Mohammed Cartoon Dust Has Not Settled
The Mohammed Cartoon Dust Has Not Settled
January 6, 2011 0955 GMT
Controversy stirred up over cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed in
2005 was still swirling in 2010 and is not likely to die down any time
soon. [more]
Egypt and the Destruction of Churches: Strategic Implications
Egypt and the Destruction of Churches: Strategic Implications
January 4, 2011 1003 GMT
Separating Terror from Terrorism
Separating Terror from Terrorism
December 30, 2010 0955 GMT
Making Sense of the START Debate
Making Sense of the START Debate
December 28, 2010 0950 GMT
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 7, 2011 2:13:04 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Agenda: With George Friedman
Stratfor logo
Agenda: With George Friedman
January 7, 2011 | 2003 GMT
Click on image below to watch video:
[IMG]
STRATFOR founder George Friedman discusses the theme of his
forthcoming book, *The Next Decade,* and explains why the United
States has to change the way it deals with today*s world.
Editor*s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition
technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete
accuracy.
Colin: The United States has stumbled into empire and, like ancient
Rome, it faces the prospect that the empire will annihilate the
republic. That*s the thread in a new book I read over the holidays by
STRATFOR founder George Friedman. It*s a fascinating sequel to *The
Next 100 Years* that was published two years ago.
Welcome to the first Agenda of 2011. George, can you explain to me the
thrust of your new book?
Dr. Friedman: Well, it begins with the question of republic and
empire. We are a republic, we were founded as a republic; we*ve
become, unintentionally, an empire. The question is how these two
things coincide. I locate the solution * if there is a solution * in
the presidency, in the ability of a president to lead and reconcile
these things. Presidents like Reagan, Roosevelt and Lincoln did it,
presidents like Carter and Bush didn*t; how do we bring them all
together? And then I turn to the question of foreign policy very
concretely: Region by region, how should the American president in the
next decade and manage its foreign relations? I make the case that the
United States must become less active in the world, use the balance of
power more effectively, manipulate the other countries more
effectively because United States can*t become committed to any one
region or any one issue * it has a world to manage.
Colin: Of course, in the last 10 years * and particularly since 9/11 *
the United States has been hyperactive, particularly in the Middle
East. Will the Middle East still be the center of attention for the
next 10 years?
Dr. Friedman: The United States, in facing 9/11, had to make a
response. The response was to focus in obsessively on the question of
terrorism and therefore on this one region of the world. It is an
extraordinarily important region of the world, and terrorism is an
important matter, but it cannot be the only matter, and it can*t be
the only region the United States focuses on. The United States has to
rebalance his policies, not by trivializing this region but by being
present in the region in a somewhat different way. In other words, to
maintain the balance of power between India and Pakistan, to maintain
the balance of power between the Arabs and Israelis, to maintain the
balance of power between Turkey and Iraq. The United States can*t
simply commit its troops to one mission because that invites disaster
elsewhere.
The United States will either have to come to terms with Iran or go to
war with Iran. The problem is that in going to war in Iran there is
never the certainty of victory and is a very difficult mission. But if
the United States intends to withdraw from Iraq, we have to remember
that Iran is the most powerful conventional force in the region and
that that conventional force is there with or without nuclear weapons.
Withdrawal from Iraq either gives Iran tremendous power in Iraq and
the Persian Gulf or else requires some sort of settlement, some sort
of understanding between the United States and Iran. That sounds
preposterous and unthinkable but no more unthinkable than the
U.S.-Chinese relationship would*ve been in 1965 or a U.S.-Soviet
relationship would have been in 1930. History is full of the
improbable, and this will be one of them.
Colin: Go back to the millennium, 10 years ago, and few people would
have thought that Russia would have made such a recovery or that China
would make the progress that has.
Dr. Friedman: Well, STRATFOR did view Russia as re-emerging as a
power, and I would say that STRATFOR did view China as occupying the
place in the world that it does today, which is a growing economy in
an impoverished country with very little military global capability.
So it depends what we think they*ve achieved.
But I think when look forward to this, we see Russia having achieved a
kind of balance that secures its interests and shyness facing the
ongoing crisis of how to manage country in which 70 million people,
perhaps, live middle-class lives and over a billion people live in
extraordinary poverty. This is a political problem, it*s an economic
problem, and it*s a social problem.
Colin: What are the limits to Russian power?
Dr. Friedman: The limits to Russian power are more self-imposed. The
Russians no longer want to occupy Western Europe; they want to reach
accommodation with them. If they*re too aggressive, countries like
Germany won*t accommodate them. But Germany depends on Russian natural
gas Russia wants German capital and technology invested there. There
are synergies of interest between Russia and some of the European
countries. Russia now does not want to be a great imperial power; it
wants to be integrated into economic wealth, and it*s going to reach
out and try to do that.
Colin: That may be the situation, but the new relationship between
Moscow and Berlin is causing problems for a lot of people,
particularly Poles.
Dr. Friedman: Right now, the Poles don*t know quite what to do about
it; they*re hoping for a larger American commitment to them. But that
commitment can*t happen until things settle down a bit in the Middle
East; U.S. forces are committed there, and they*re not available
elsewhere. And therefore, I would argue that this is one of the
interconnectedness of the world * the U.S. rebalancing its position in
the Middle East releases forces to block this entente between Germany
and Russia getting out of hand.
Colin: George, we*ve only been able to skate over the surface of your
new book. When will we actually be able to read it?
Dr. Friedman: It*s published on Jan. 25. I can*t wait to see what*s in
it.
Colin: *The Next Decade,* by George Friedman, published by Doubleday,
that can be ordered online from STRATFOR. And watch for more
conversations I*ll have with George over the next couple of weeks on
some of the controversial conclusions about Israel, Iran, Pakistan,
China and Europe. From me, Colin Chapman, that*s Agenda for this week.
See you again next week.
Click for more videos
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 7, 2011 2:44:37 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: China May Scrap Lending Quota
Stratfor logo
China May Scrap Lending Quota
January 7, 2011 | 2022 GMT
China May Scrap Lending Quota
RAUL ARBOLEDA/AFP/Getty Images
Chinese Central Bank Governor Zhou Xiaochuan
A Shanghai Securities News report Jan. 6 citing an unnamed source
claimed the Chinese government will not set a formal lending target
for banks in 2011. Instead, the report said, it will guide the flow of
credit based on the broader economic situation, with inflation and
economic growth as the main indicators.
The quota and pace of Chinese loan issuance is an important indicator
for China*s economy, attracting much attention. China*s proactive
credit policy, implemented to cope with the global economic slowdown
that began in November 2008, has seen lending hit a record 9.59
trillion yuan ($1.45 billion) in 2009 and around 8 trillion yuan in
2010 (with off-the-books lending estimated to be another 4 trillion
yuan in 2010). The loan surge and excessive liquidity contributed to
exacerbated inflationary pressure in the second half of 2010, which
prompted wide speculation that Beijing would lower this year*s lending
target, likely to 6-7 trillion yuan.
China May Scrap Lending Quota
(click here to enlarge image)
However, multiple STRATFOR sources have indicated that 2011*s lending
target will remain at 2010*s target of 7.5 trillion yuan (though one
source indicated that 1 trillion of that would come from
off-balance-sheet lending from last year that would be moved into the
books, making for a de facto 6.5 trillion yuan quota). Should Beijing
fail to lower the quota, it would signify a continuation of loose
credit policy as a complement to the central government*s pledge to
maintain a proactive fiscal policy in 2011. In this context, the new
indication that Beijing will abandon the annual quota entirely is
intriguing. First, it indicates a lack of agreement over whether the
primary challenge for the country is excessive inflation or the risk
of slowdown. Second, removing a formal lending target suggests that
the government is not decisively lowering lending in 2011. Instead, it
may suggest the government*s concern about a potential economic
slowdown is greater than its concern about inflation driven by excess
lending.
By not setting a target, the central government may want greater
autonomy to adjust loan issuance * by not committing to a specified
quota, adjustments can be made later without risk to the central
bank*s credibility. Beijing may want to regulate banks on an
individual basis without setting concrete limitations, flexibly
adjusting lending to react to economic uncertainties. This way Beijing
can respond effectively if lending needs to be boosted or tightened
(for certain banks or across the entire banking sector).
The move may also help curb banks* behavior. High levels of lending
are normal for Chinese banks at the beginning of the year (a Jan. 6
report said lending may exceed 1 trillion yuan in January) as banks
hurry to lend before expected tightening announcements are made later
in the year. If Beijing does not set limits, banks could theoretically
see less reason to rush loan issuance at the beginning of the year.
However, the threat of tightening policy in the future, combined with
this lack of a quota, could drive banks to lend even more
aggressively.
China*s policy on new lending remains unclear, but the fact that
contradictory reports have emerged in recent months indicates intense
debate is under way in Beijing as the country faces greater economic
uncertainty (for instance, Chinese media reports suggest the Central
Bank and the National Development and Reform Commission have disagreed
on an exact loan quota). The possibility of no quota breaks with
tradition, suggesting a higher degree of disagreement than normal.
Combined with Beijing*s pledge to maintain a proactive fiscal policy
this year, concern over a possible economic downturn will remain a
priority for the government.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Stratfor <noreply@stratfor.com>
Date: January 7, 2011 4:51:26 PM CST
To: allstratfor <allstratfor@stratfor.com>
Subject: Al-Sadr's Return to Iraq and the U.S.-Iranian Entanglement
Stratfor logo
Al-Sadr's Return to Iraq and the U.S.-Iranian Entanglement
January 7, 2011 | 2223 GMT
Al-Sadr's Return to Iraq
QASSEM ZEIN/AFP/Getty Images
Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr arrives in Najaf, Iraq, on Jan. 5
Radical Iraqi Shiite Islamist leader Muqtada al-Sadr is expected to
make a major speech Jan. 8 in which he will spell out his movement*s
agenda. Al-Sadr, the leader of the single largest Shiite political
bloc in Iraq, returned Jan. 5 to Iraq from Iran, where he has spent
most of time over the past several years shoring up his credentials as
a bona fide cleric.
Contrary to widespread fears, he probably intends to engage not in
violence, but in politics. And this means intense U.S.-Iranian
negotiations will likely come before U.S. forces leave Iraq.
Al-Sadr*s return comes as his movement has secured eight Cabinet
portfolios in the emerging Iraqi government after winning 40 out of
the 159 seats controlled by the super-Shiite bloc known as the
National Alliance, the largest of all the Shiite factions. His
movement has long been evolving into a political force from its
initial status as one of the largest militias in Iraq. With his return
he aims to continue to consolidate his political power, not to launch
a new wave of militancy ahead of the scheduled withdrawal of the
remaining 50,000 U.S. troops in Iraq by Dec. 31. His return to Iraq
probably is not even permanent, as he most likely has not completed
the seminary studies needed to qualify as an ayatollah.
Al-Sadr arrived in Iraq the same day as a high-level Iranian
delegation led by new Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi. The Iranian
delegation held meetings with much of the Iraqi political elite and
with top Iraqi cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The Iranian
visit and al-Sadr*s return represent an Iranian move to consolidate
their grip over Iraq * and to remind Washington that the Iranians are
positioned to fill the vacuum U.S. forces will leave behind.
Contrary to popular belief, the main U.S. dilemma in the region is not
Iran*s attempts to develop nuclear weapons, but the fear that Iran
will become the most powerful conventional military force in the
Persian Gulf region after the U.S. withdrawal. This would allow Iran
to shape the behavior of the countries on the Arabian Peninsula,
something Washington cannot accept. To prevent this outcome,
Washington must either renegotiate the Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA) that mandates its withdrawal from Iraq or reach some sort of
understanding with Iran that would allow the Islamic republic to
enhance its footprint in Iraq without undermining U.S. interests in
the region.
Shortly after arriving in Iraq, the Iranian foreign minister called
for the removal of all foreign forces from Iraq, meaning Iran opposes
any changes to the current withdrawal timetable * also a key demand of
al-Sadr. The Sadrite movement*s well-entrenched position in the Iraqi
state is a key lever with which the Iranians hope to successfully
block a renegotiation of SOFA. This makes the second U.S. option more
likely * setting the stage for serious negotiations between Washington
and Tehran in the coming year.
Give us your thoughts Read comments on
on this report other reports
For Publication Reader Comments
Not For Publication
Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Contact Us
(c) Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.