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# The Global Intelligence Files

On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.

## Re: [CT] FW: S-weekly for comments - the challenges of confidential informants

Released on 2012-08-22 00:00 GMT

Email-ID | 5345059
Date | 2009-08-18 21:37:42
From | Anya.Alfano@stratfor.com
To | ct@stratfor.com

Looks good. A few thoughts below in red.
scott stewart wrote:
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: analysts-bounces@stratfor.com
[mailto:analysts-bounces@stratfor.com] On Behalf Of scott stewart
Sent: Tuesday, August 18, 2009 3:11 PM
To: 'Analyst List'
Subject: S-weekly for comments - the challenges of confidential
informants
I hope this makes sense to other people. Please comment heavily.
The Challenges of Confidential Informants
Police in El Paso, Texas, announced Aug. 11 that they had arrested three
suspects in the May 15 shooting death of [link
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090817_mexico_security_memo_aug_17_2009
] Jose Daniel Gonzalez Galeana, a Juarez cartel lieutenant who had been
acting as an informant for the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) agency - an activity that prompted the Juarez cartel to put out a
hit on him. Gonzalez was shot multiple times outside his home in an
upscale El Paso neighborhood. A fourth suspect was arrested shortly
after the announcment. Among the suspects arrested in the killing was an
18-year-old U.S. Army soldier stationed at Fort Bliss, who the other
suspects said had been hired by one of the leaders of the group to pull
the trigger. Two other teenagers, a 17 year-old and a 16 year-old have
also been arrested and charged in the case.
The man who recruited the teenagers, Ruben Rodriguez Dorado, is an
interesting figure. After receiving orders from his superiors in the
Juarez cartel to kill Gonzalez, Rodriguez was able to freely enter the
US and conduct an extensive effort to locate Gonzalez - he reportedly
even paid Gonzalez' cell phone bill in an effort to obtain his address.
Armed with the address, he then conducted extensive surveillance of
Gonzalez and planned the assassination which was then carried out by the
young gunmen he had recruited. While the sophistication of Rodriguez'
investigative and surveillance efforts are impressive the Gonzalez
hit was not the first time he used them. According to an affidavit filed
in State court, Rodriguez told investigators that he also located and
surveilled targets for assassination in Mexico. Perhaps the most
intriguing aspect of this case is that the entire time Rodriguez was
plotting the Gonzalez assassination, he too was working as an informant
for ICE. Do we know if he or his family was given legal status in the
US in exchange for being an informant? Would be good to mention if he
was an Amcit or not, just for clarity.
While it is unclear at this point if ICE agents played any part in
assisting Rodriguez to find Gonzalez, at the very least, Rodriguez'
status as an ICE informant would certainly have been useful in
camouflaging his nefarious activities. Although Rodriguez was a legal
permanent resident of the U.S. having friends in ICE would allow him to
cross back and forth across the border without much scrutiny. or to
deflect suspicion if he was caught conducting surveillance.
It is also not clear if Rodriguez' work with ICE was sanctioned by the
Juarez cartel, or if he was merely playing both ends against the middle.
However, as STRATFOR has, previously discussed, when one examines the
reach, scope and sophistication of the Mexican cartels' intelligence
efforts, the cartels have demonstrated the ability to operate more like
a foreign intelligence service than a traditional criminal
organization. This means that it is highly possible that Rodriguez was
what we refer to in intelligence parlance as a double agent - someone
who pretends to spy on an organization but is in fact loyal to that
organization.
Whether Rodriguez was a double agent, or was just playing both ends
against the middle, this case provides a clear example of the problems
encountered when handling confidential informants - problems that become
even greater when the informant is associated with a sophisticated and
well financed organization.
Choir Boys Need Not Apply
While a conridential informant (CI) can be an incredibly valuable source
of information, even under the best of circumstances, running a CI is a
delicate operation that poses a wide array of potential problems and
pitfalls. The first, most obvious issue is that most people who have
access to the inner workings of a criminal organization, and therefore
the most valuable intelligence, are themselves criminals. Quite simply,
upstanding, honest citizens simply do not normally have access to the
plans of criminal gangs or understand their organizational hierarchy.
This means that authorities need to recruit or flip lower level
criminals in order to work their way up the food chain and go after
bigger targets. The fact that many CI's are criminals means that not
only do they frequently come with a heavy load of psychopathic and
sociopathic baggage, but in order to stay in good standing within their
organization, they often need to continue to commit illegal acts while
working for the government. Not infrequently these illegal acts can
come back to haunt the agency operating the CI.
CIs can also come with a host of motivations. While some informants are
motivated by money, or promises to have charges dropped or reduced,
other informants will provide information to the authorities in order to
further their own criminal schemes either by using law enforcement as a
way to take out rival gangs, or even a rival within their own
organization. Because of these varying motivations, it can be very
difficult to tell when a CI is fabricating information or when they are
trying to manipulate the authorities. In fact, it is not at all
uncommon for inexperienced or vulnerable handlers to lose control of a
CI. In extreme cases, it is even possible for a smooth and sophisticated
CI to end up controlling the person allegedly assigned to handle them,
rather than the other way around. And this is not just confined to small
town police departments; there have been instances of FBI and DEA agents
being manipulated and controlled by their CIs. Can you give an example
of what "losing control" of an agent looks like?
At the high end of the threat scale, there is also the possibility that
informants will be consciously sent to the authorities in order to serve
as double agents, or that the criminal organization they work for will
double them back once it is learned that they have decided to begin
cooperating with the authorities.
A double agent is particularly useful for the criminal organization
because they can intentionally feed very specific information to the
authorities in order to manipulate enforcement activities. For example,
in the case of the Juarez cartel, they could tip off authorities to a
small shipment of narcotics in one part of the sector in order to draw
attention away from a larger shipment moving through another part of the
sector. Of course the fact that the CI provided accurate information
pertaining to the smaller shipment also serves to increase his value to
the authorities. In the case of a double agent, almost everything he
provides will usually be accurate -- although this accurate information
is pretty much calculated to be harmless to the criminal organization
(though organizations have used double agents to pass on information to
the authorities that will allow them to take action against rival
criminal gangs). The outstanding accuracy of the intelligence reported
will cause the double agent to be trusted more than most regular CIs and
this makes double agents particularly difficult to uncover - they are
almost the polar opposite of a fabricator.
Not Typical Criminals
When considering the
[link http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081209_mexican_drug_cartels_government_progress_and_growing_violence ]
Mexican drug cartels, it is very important to remember that they are
not typical criminal gangs. Not only do the cartels have access to
billions of dollars, and large groups of heavily armed enforcers, but
many of the cartels have also invested the time and resources necessary
to develop a highly a sophisticated intelligence apparatus. As you
mention above, the cartles essentially have intelligence agents, like
Rodriguez, who are responsible for surveillance activities, in addition
to paying off officials etc.
[link
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090520_counterintelligence_approach_controlling_cartel_corruption
] This intelligence apparatus is perhaps best seen in the realm of
public corruption. Some of the Mexican cartels have a long history of
successfully corrupting public officials on both sides of the border.
Groups like the Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO) have successfully
recruited scores of intelligence assets and agents of influence at the
local, state and even federal levels of the Mexican government. They
even have enjoyed significant success in recruiting agents in elite
units such as the anti-organized crime unit (SIEDO) of the Office of the
Mexican Attorney General (PGR). The BLO even [link
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081124_mexico_security_memo_nov_24_2008
] allegedly recruited Mexico's former drug czar, Noe Ramirez Mandujano,
who reportedly was receiving $450,000 a month from the organization.
This recruitment also extends to all levels of the U.S.government.
Cartels have recruited local, state and federal officials.
Many of the assassination operations the cartels have launched against
one another and against [link
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexico_applying_protective_intelligence_lens_cartel_war_violence
] senior Mexican officials have also demonstrated the advanced
intelligence capabilities the Mexican cartels possess.
With the money to buy foreign expertise and equipment, the Mexican
cartels have been able to set up counterintelligence branches which can
administer polygraph examinations, signals intelligence branches which
can intercept the authorities' communications and even elaborate (and
well-funded) units designed to spot and bribe vulnerable public
officials. In light of this history of intelligence effort, it is quite
easily within the cartels' skill set to employ double agents.
Alphabet Soup
While there are a number of Mexican cartels who frequently compete with
each other over turf, sometimes work together in limited cases, or more
broadly in formal confederations, the number of cartels is dwarfed by
the myriad of agencies working against them on the US side of the
boarder. Between, local, state and federal agencies, there are some 92
different agencies with some sort of jurisdiction working against the
cartels in El Paso alone. The agencies include obvious ones such as the
DEA, Texas Rangers and El Paso police to the less obvious such as
the IRS, the Amtrak Police and the Army CID on Ft. Bliss.
This jumble of jurisdictions creates a very difficult environment for
working with CIs. Not only are agencies legitimately concerned about
protecting the identities of their CIs due to the possibility of
corruption in other agencies, but there is also the issue of
competition. Agencies are afraid of other, better funded agencies
stealing their informants. If a local police detective has developed a
very good dope source, the last thing in the world he wants is for the
ICE or DEA to take control of his source, which will in all likelihood
mean that he will lose all the information the CI was providing.
Likewise, if an ICE agent has developed a good Mexican cartel source,
the last thing he wants is for the DEA or FBI to take control of the
source.
In the human intelligence world, there is a lot of jealousy and
suspicion. This not only means that intelligence information is not
fully shared across agencies, but that agencies are very reluctant to
run checks on their CIs through other agencies for fear of dilvulging
their identities. This insulation results in some CIs double or even
triple dipping, that is, working with other agencies and providing the
same information in exchange for additional payments. This fragmentation
also results in the agency running the CI to not be able to learn of
critical information pertaining to the past (or even current) activities
of their CI. This also means that in some cases, the agency that
recruits the CI is simply not in the best position to take full
advantage of the information provided by the CI, or to protect the CI
when things turn bad, but competition and institutional rivalries
prevent the CI from being turned over to a more capable agency.
Certainly on its face, ICE would not be the best, most logical agency to
handle a source like Rodriguez, who was a lieutenant in the Juarez
cartel tasked with conducting assassination operations -- essentially
narco terrorism.
Nowhere to Hide
One last thing to consider in the Gonzalez assassination is that it
highlights the fact that even though targets will seek shelter inside
the US, Mexican drug cartels will follow them across the border in an
effort to kill them - [link
http://www.stratfor.com/mexicos_cartel_wars_threat_beyond_u_s_border ]
-- something we have discussed for several years now. Furthermore,
incidents like the Gonzalez hit will likely cause high-value cartel
targets to move even deeper into the United States to avoid attack
and their enemies' brazen and sophisticated assassins will likely
follow.
Rodriguez' use of teenaged assassins to kill Gonzalez is also in keeping
with a [link http://www.stratfor.com/mexico_security_memo_july_23_2007 ]
trend we have seen in Laredo and elsewhere of the cartels recruiting
young street gang members and training them to be assassins. The young
gunmen working for [link
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexico_dynamics_gun_trade ] Los Zetas in
Laredo, Houston, San Antonioand elsewhere have been given the nickname
"zetitas" (little zetas.) In is not surprising to see the Juarez cartel
also employing young gunmen. Not only are the young gunmen easily
influenced, fearless and hungry for money and respect, but the cartels
believe that the younger offenders are expendable if caught or killed,
and will also do less time than an adult if they are arrested and
convicted.
We anticipate that we will continue to see the expansion of cartel
violence inside the U.S. and that incidents such as the Gonzalez
assassination will soon seen farther from the southern border.
Scott Stewart
STRATFOR
Office: 814 967 4046
Cell: 814 573 8297
scott.stewart@stratfor.com
www.stratfor.com