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## Re: Fwd: [Africa] Fw: [OS] SOUTH AFRICA/CT- Wikileaks exposes SA spy boss

Released on 2012-02-28 15:00 GMT

Email-ID | 5114800
Date | 2011-01-25 21:20:16
From | mark.schroeder@stratfor.com
To | anya.alfano@stratfor.com

Ok I re-read the reference to Oct. 2009 and I may have read it wrong. It
could be read instead of cables from Oct., Shaik was appointed SASS head
then.
On 1/25/11 2:17 PM, Anya Alfano wrote:
Hey Mark,
No, I don't see anything from October 2009. I was looking back at the
article you posted below and I think the three cables I sent contain all
of the quotes listed, but so far, I don't see any cables released that
month.
Anya
On 1/25/11 3:10 PM, Mark Schroeder wrote:
Thanks, Anya.
Could you check again for any cable from Oct. 2009 in particular?
Thanks again.
On 1/25/11 2:05 PM, Anya Alfano wrote:
Found it -- more about Zuma than Shaik, though.
Confidential cable from the US Embassy Pretoria to the Secretary of
State Washington DC (and others), June 4 2009:
SUBJECT: ZUMA'S CABINET IS BRILLIANT POLITICALLY, BUT WILL IT BE
EFFECTIVE?
PRETORIA
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR RAYMOND L. BROWN FOR REASONS 1.4
(B) AND (D).
Summary
1. Newly elected President Jacob Zuma's Cabinet is settling in
following the swearing in ceremony on May 11.
Most political analysts and pundits have praised Zuma's selections
-- lauding some for their managerial skills, some for their
willingness to bring new ideas to government, and some for their
political power within the ruling tripartite alliance. Although the
Cabinet choices reflect a wide range of experiences and political
alignments, it remains to be seen whether some new ministerial teams
-- notably in education and home affairs -- will be effective in
addressing the country's biggest societal issues. End Summary.
ANC, Zuma Makes Their Moves
2. President Zuma announced his Cabinet selections last month
following lengthy consultations with the African National Congress
(ANC). Zuma's discussions with the ANC over Cabinet composition and
size suggest that the new President is being true to his word that
he will rely on as many players as possible when making decisions.
(Note: Some would argue that he was too true to his word, as Zuma
arrived at the press conference to announce the Cabinet thirty
minutes late.
His delay was reportedly because of last minute infighting within
the ANC and the tripartite alliance -- composed of the ANC, the
South African Communist Party (SACP) and the trade union federation
COSATU) -- over Cabinet choices. End Note.) The ANC and Zuma ensured
that the Cabinet is balanced between those generally seen as
populist and those generally described as pro-business. Moreover,
the party and Zuma made sure to accommodate some officials often
seen as close to former President Thabo Mbeki such as Charles
Nqakula and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.
However, this cabinet is very pro-Zuma, made up of some of his
closest political supporters and members of the alliance. The
message that Zuma reportedly sought to send is that there will be
general continuance of macro-policy structures (albeit with some
changes to the ministries' composition) with some changes to
micro-policy formulation and implementation.
Choices Draw Praise, But Questions Remain
3. (SBU) Reactions to Zuma's Cabinet selections have been largely
positive. Alec Russell, author of "South Africa After Mandela,"
noted that investors would breathe a sigh of relief and "say it
looks like he intends to keep macro-economic policies on the same
track." He stated, "It says, 'I'm not a scary populist who's going
to send policy sharply to the left.' It says, 'I listen to business
and I'm aware of their concerns.'" Political analyst William Gumede
noted that "he got it right on the economic cluster of ministries."
He further said, "It does say clearly that he wants to get the
economy right. That's where his priorities are." University of
Pretoria political scientist Roland Henwood noted that the Cabinet
selections were generally outstanding. However, he related that even
though Zuma's choices were brilliant politically, there are serious
questions about how effective the ministers will be at questions
about how effective the ministers will be at delivery. He quipped,
"(Basic Education Minister) Angie Motshekga and (Correctional
Services Minister) Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula are disastrous at
delivering quick results.
Also, I have serious questions about whether (International
Relations Minister) Maite Nkoana-Mashabane is up to the task of
leading a professional foreign policy." There are questions about
how effective Zuma's appointments would be in addressing social
issues. Gumede noted that while the appointments are impressive in
balancing party factions, they are less impressive in terms of
improving delivery. He stated, "People see the Home Affairs ministry
as absolute incompetence (at home) and abroad as well (sic). It's
just a lax department. Everything from passports to travel
documents, everything needs to be fixed. One would have expected
someone more inspiring (than Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma). We didn't get
that." (Note: It is noteworthy that one of Minister Dlamini-Zuma's
first statements about her new ministry was to clearly admit that it
was riddled with corruption that allowed its travel, identity and
other documents to be produced illegally. End Note.)
Cabinet Picks Highlight Key Trends
4. While some questions remain over whether the new Cabinet can
deliver, Zuma's selections demonstrate a number of important trends
worth watching during the next five years. Each of the trends below
will have implications both for the 2011 municipal election and the
2012 ruling party congress:
-- The presidency will be larger, more powerful, and will have more
formal advisers in the President's office than there were under
Mbeki. This will be a key development as businessmen, diplomats, and
statesmen seek to win access to work with the Zuma government. In
addition to Collins Chabane and Trevor Manuel, Zuma will look to
former Minister of Defense Nqakula on political matters, Mandisi
Mpahlwa on economic affairs, Lindiwe Zulu on international affairs,
Ayanda Dlodlo on affairs related to Parliament, and Bonisiwe Makhene
on legal issues. Under the Mbeki and Motlanthe administrations,
Nqakula served both as Minister of Safety and Security and Minister
of Defense. Mpahlwa served as Minister of Trade and Industry and
Deputy Minister of Finance in previous administrations. Zulu, a
member of the ANC's National Executive Committee, served as South
African Ambassador to Brazil until December 2008. Dlodlo is also a
member of the ANC's National Executive Committee and is the
Secretary General of the Military Affairs Association; she has close
ties to Lindiwe Sisulu. Makhene is currently deputy chief state law
adviser in the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development,
but will be seconded to the Presidency later this month. According
to informal Zuma adviser Mo Shaik, the informal advisers were
selected as concessions to "keep them quiet." The only person Shaik
considers close to Zuma is Zulu on international affairs.
-- Not only will there be more formal presidential advisers, there
also will be more ministers. The ANC expanded the Cabinet from 28 to
34 ministries. This will be an important trend to watch because it
could create a bureaucracy larger than anything that South Africa
has seen since 1994. Some political commentators, including Roland
Henwood, claim that Zuma has "Africanized the Cabinet." The argument
goes that Zuma increased the size of the Cabinet to accommodate his
allies, but in doing so has created what could be a potentially
unwieldy policy process similar to what has happened in other
African countries.
-- The ANC wants to retain Limpopo Province's loyalty. This will be
a key goal as the ruling party seeks to ward off opponents in the
2011 election and as the ANC prepares for its next party congress.
Several of the senior players in Zuma's government hail from
Limpopo, which is a strategically important province that helped
sway ANC members to Zuma at the December 2007 ruling party congress.
Limpopo also promises to be a key battleground province during the
2011 municipal elections. The Congress of the People has
consistently said Limpopo is a province it can win and can
consistently said Limpopo is a province it can win and can build the
local structures necessary to govern at the municipal level. Cabinet
players with connections to Limpopo include Chabane, Aaron
Motsoaledi, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, Richard Baloyi, Joe Phaahla, and
Rejoice Mabhudafhasi.
-- Zuma, under the auspices of the ANC, wants some KwaZulu Natal
allies kept close. This will be a key trend because there already
are questions over some of Zuma's business deals in the past, many
of which have dogged the President since the conviction of his
former business associate Schabir Shaik. Zuma's Cabinet includes
several leaders that he forged connections to during his time as a
premier in KwaZulu Natal. The ministerial team includes Ebrahim
Patel, Musa Nhlanhla Nene, Malusi Gigaba, Jeff Radebe, Nathi
Mthethwa, Roy Padayachie, Siyabonga Cwele, Sbusiso Ndebele, and
Noluthando Mayende-Sibiya.
-- The ANC is unafraid, at least for now, of competing centers of
power. This is perhaps the most important trend, but the one that
may change the most over time. The party will have ministers with
strong personalities in the Cabinet, such as Minister of Planning in
the Presidency Manuel and Minister of Home Affairs Dlamini-Zuma,
along with strong leaders from Luthuli House such as ANC Secretary
General Gwede Mantashe and ANC Treasurer Matthews Phosa. Although
the ANC seems satisfied with this arrangement, such a dynamic is
likely to be key in setting the stage for succession battles ahead
of the ANC's 2012 ruling party congress. If power in Luthuli House
outweighs power in government (as many political analysts predict),
Mantashe, Phosa, or Baleka Mbete may hold the inside track over
whether Zuma stays on as party leader or whether a new leader
emerges ahead of the next election. Both the Congress of South
African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party
(SACP) also seem unafraid of competing centers of power, but perhaps
less satisfied with the arrangement than the ANC. Some of the most
visible leaders from the tripartite alliance (Jeremy Cronin, Blade
Nzimande, and Rob Davies) will be serving in the Cabinet, but COSATU
Secretary General Zwelenzima Vavi has opted to remain outside the
government. Similarly, SACP plans to hold leadership discussions
about whether having Nzimande in the government will remain viable
for the communist party over the longer term.
Opportunities for Engagement
5. The new team offers the United States new opportunities for
continuing and future engagement. New Health Minister Aaron
Motsoaledi wants to continue work started by Barbara Hogan to
address the country's ongoing battle against HIV/AIDS, according to
most political analysts and leading South African commentators. The
new ministry of Basic Education wants to improve the quality of
South African primary education, and Zuma has said that he wants
that body to establish a "Head Start" program similar to the one in
place in the United States. Even though Motshekga is viewed as a
weak choice for heading the ministry, deputy Enver Surty and Gauteng
Minister in the Executive Committee Barbara Creecy are capable
bureaucrats and have experience working with international partners
to make progress on core policy goals. Also, the new Ministry of
Police intends to address crime and, specifically, crime prevention
ahead of the 2010 World Cup. Beyond these areas, there may be
avenues for greater cooperation in public enterprises,
transportation, and higher education.
Comment
6. Zuma and the ANC delivered a Cabinet that addresses the political
balance of power between the party and the government. Political
analysts say that Zuma's team has some solid managers who can bring
new ideas to government while at the same time keep the tripartite
alliance as close as it has been in years. Despite this optimism,
however, there are serious questions about whether the new team can
deliver better than the old one. In some areas, like Public
Enterprises under Barbara Hogan and Water and Environmental Affairs
under Patience Sonjica, there is reason for hope. In other areas,
however, like Basic Education, Correctional Services, and Home
Affairs, critics already are worried that QServices, and Home
Affairs, critics already are worried that little will change.
Perhaps the single greatest determinant for how well the Zuma
government functions -- and what happens in 2011, 2012, and beyond
-- will be whether the Cabinet and the ANC can work together without
one impeding or superseding the other.
LA LIME
On 1/25/11 1:35 PM, Mark Schroeder wrote:
Thanks, Anya -- though could you see if there are any cables from
the Oct. 2009 period? The news story mentioned some from that time
period also.
Thanks.
On 1/25/11 12:25 PM, Anya Alfano wrote:
Actually, one more --
Confidential cable from the US Embassy Pretoria to the Secretary
of State, Washington DC (and others), September 10 2008:
SUBJECT: ZUMA ADVISOR THREATENS TO EXPOSE POLITICAL SKELETONS
(C-AL8-01396)
Classified By: Political Counselor Raymond L. Brown. Reasons
1.4(b) an d (d).
1. On 28 August, Zuma advisor Mo Shaik told PolOff that Zuma's
legal team intends to subpoena "everyone" if Zuma loses his bid
to have his case reexamined. Shaik specifically named President
Mbeki, suspended National Police Chief Jackie Selebi, former and
Acting Head of National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP)
Vusi Pikoli and Mokotedi Mpshe, and former speaker of Parliament
Frene Ginwala as potential witnesses. Shaik complained that all
of these people know Zuma is innocent and that he does not
understand why they have not come to Zuma's defense before now.
2. Shaik also spoke at length about Zuma's current legal case,
complaining that the facts in Zuma's case have been gathered and
interpreted by National Prosecuting Authority only as a means of
obtaining a conviction and preventing Zuma from becoming
President, and not as a means of seeking the truth. Therefore,
he said, the question is not whether the rule of law should
prevail, but whether its abuse should continue. All Zuma is
asking is the chance to explain to the NPA the facts gathered
against him, he said. When PolOff asked if this wasn't what the
trial was for, he told her she was not listening. Then in a very
slow and patient tone, Shaik again "explained" that all the NPA
has to do is treat the Zuma case in an "impartial,
non-political, truth-seeking manner, then they (the NPA) will
come to understand Zuma is innocent." (NOTE: In a recent
newspaper editorial, Shaik argued a similar case but added that
his brother Schabir Shaik's financial contributions to Zuma were
given as a "comrade and friend," and not given with criminal
intentions.
The court's decision in May to have Shaik's assets forfeited in
light of the corrupt relationship with Zuma sharply contradicts
Shaik's reasoning. END NOTE)
3. NOTE: On 12 September, Zuma will learn whether or not the
state's decision to prosecute him without consulting him was
legal. If Zuma loses the case, his trial for corruption,
racketeering, tax evasion, and fraud will proceed, though a
court date has still not been agreed upon by the state and
defense. The thrust of Zuma's case rests on section 179(5)(d) of
the Constitution which states that the NDPP may review a
decision to prosecute after consulting with the relevant
director of public prosecutions (DPP) and after taking
representations from the accused. Shaik and Zuma's lawyers argue
the Constitution guarantees the right to make representation
when the NPA reverses a decision, and that Zuma was not given
the opportunity when NPA "reversed" its decision and decided to
recharge Zuma in December 2007. The state has argued that the
decision to recharge Zuma did not amount to a reversal and that
the law was not designed to protect the accused, but rather to
protect the rights of the DPPs having their decisions overturned
by the NDPP without consideration. END NOTE.
4. COMMENT: As usual, Shaik treated PolOff as a friend, a child,
a confident, and an adversary all in the same conversation. He
always shares insights into the motivations and strategies of
the Zuma camp, but also expects obvious respect and gratitude
for it. PolOff does not know if Shaik meets with other
diplomats, but presumes his contact within the diplomatic circle
is limited. The Australian High Commissioner mentioned he had
met Shaik once and Shaik QCommissioner mentioned he had met
Shaik once and Shaik admitted he spoke to the Norwegians but did
not say if this was on a regular or one-time basis. PolOff also
knows Shaik used to meet with the French, but cut them off after
a French diplomat insulted him immediately before the ANC
conference at Polokwane. The Irish Ambassador asked PolOff to
facilitate a meeting after seeing Shaik and PolOff together in a
restaurant, but Shaik refused, telling PolOff she should guard
her contacts more closely.
END COMMENT.
BOST
On 1/25/11 1:11 PM, Mark Schroeder wrote:
Hi Anya,
Is there any chance you would know where to look to find this
original cable? Thanks for any help.
--Mark
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: [Africa] Fw: [OS] SOUTH AFRICA/CT- Wikileaks exposes
SA spy boss
Date: Sun, 23 Jan 2011 16:53:10 +0000
From: Sean Noonan <sean.noonan@stratfor.com>
Reply-To: Africa AOR <africa@stratfor.com>
To: Africa AOR <africa@stratfor.com>
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Sean Noonan <sean.noonan@stratfor.com>
Sender: os-bounces@stratfor.com
Date: Sun, 23 Jan 2011 10:37:07 -0600
To: The OS List<os@stratfor.com>
ReplyTo: The OS List <os@stratfor.com>
Subject: [OS] SOUTH AFRICA/CT- Wikileaks exposes SA spy boss
Wikileaks exposes SA spy boss
2011-01-23 09:19
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Wikileaks-exposes-SA-spy-boss-20110123
Johannesburg - An explosive Wikileaks cable claims that spy
boss and President Jacob Zuma confidante Moe Shaik threatened
to expose the "political skeletons" of Zuma's enemies and
reveals that he was cultivated by the Americans as a key
informant within the Zuma camp.
The fresh revelations are likely to shake the Zuma
administration as they involve one of the president's key
allies and the man tasked with running the country's secret
service. They give new insight into the bitter battle which
took place between Zuma's allies and those aligned to former
President Thabo Mbeki prior to Mbeki's ousting.
The confidential US Embassy diplomatic cable - titled Zuma
advisor threatens to expose political skeletons- claims South
African Secret Service boss Shaik, brother of convicted
fraudster and Zuma funder Schabir, told the Americans that
Zuma's legal team would subpoena the country's most
influential figures if he lost a bid to have corruption
charges against him "re-examined".
The cable said he named Mbeki, the then suspended police
commissioner Jackie Selebi, former director of Public
Prosecutions Vusi Pikoli, then acting head of public
prosecutions Mokotedi Mpshe as well as former Speaker Frene
Ginwala as targets.
Shaik has refused to confirm or deny the claims.
The cable - one of 250 000 leaked to Whistleblower website
Wikileaks but obtained exclusively by Media24 Investigations -
also reveals that the US Embassy in Pretoria actively
cultivated Shaik as a key source of information on Zuma's
inner circle and the "motivations and strategies of the Zuma
camp".
Dated September 10 2008, two days before corruption charges
against Zuma were initially dismissed by Judge Chris
Nicholson, the cable was sent to the Secretary of State in
Washington DC and copied to US consuls in Durban and Cape
Town, the CIA, the US Defence Intelligence Agency and the
White House National Security Council.
It is one of a number of classified cables recording meetings
between Shaik - who was controversially appointed head of the
South African Secret Service (SASS), South Africa's foreign
intelligence wing, in October 2009 - and an unidentified US
embassy political officer.
"Shaik complained that all these people know Zuma is innocent
and that he does not understand why they have not come to
Zuma's defence before now," the cable noted.
Shared insights
The cable noted that "as usual" Shaik treated the political
officer or "PolOff" as "a friend, a child, a confidante, and
an adversary all in the same conversation".
"He always shares insights into the motivations and strategies
of the Zuma camp, but also expects obvious respect and
gratitude for it."
"PolOff does not know if Shaik meets with other diplomats, but
presumes his contact within the diplomatic circle is limited."
"The Australian High Commissioner mentioned he had met Shaik
once before...and Shaik admitted he spoke to the Norwegians
but did not say if this was on a regular or one-time basis."
The cable notes that Shaik "used to meet with the French, but
cut them off after a French diplomat insulted him immediately
before the ANC conference at Polokwane".
Ousting Mbeki
The political officer reported that the Irish ambassador had
approached her to arrange a meeting with Shaik after seeing
her and Shaik in a restaurant together, "but Shaik refused,
telling PolOff she should guard her contacts more closely".
A source familiar with Shaik's interaction with the US
diplomats claimed this week that Shaik had been tasked with
winning diplomats over to the idea of a Zuma presidency.
An earlier confidential cable, dated May 16 2008 speculated -
after a meeting with Shaik - that the "Zuma camp may be
looking to oust Mbeki".
In a cable, dated June 4 2009, that focused on President
Zuma's new cabinet, Shaik is said to have described the
appointments of various presidential advisers, among them
Collins Chabane - now minister in the presidency for
performance monitoring, Ayanda Dlodlo - now deputy minister of
public service and administration, Mandisi Mpahlwa - now envoy
to Moscow, Lindiwe Zulu, Zuma's international affairs advisor
and Bonisiwe Makhene as concessions to "keep them quiet".
No comment
Contacted this week, Shaik said: "I will neither confirm nor
deny that we had discussions with the Americans on these
matters and I will definitely make no comment about the
accuracy of those reports. The Americans must deal with
accuracy."
US embassy spokesperson Elizabeth Kennedy-Trudeau said the
embassy would not confirm or comment on the contents or
veracity of "stolen documents".
"The nature of cables in themselves is that these are one
person's interpretation of a meeting, not official US public
policy. The circumstances, because of the very nature of spot
reporting are open to interpretation."
- Rapport
--
Sean Noonan
Tactical Analyst
Office: +1 512-279-9479
Mobile: +1 512-758-5967
Strategic Forecasting, Inc.
www.stratfor.com