Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden 00. Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Jordan Yemen Thailand

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05 2011/06 2011/07 2011/08
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04 2011/05/05 2011/05/06 2011/05/07 2011/05/08 2011/05/09 2011/05/10 2011/05/11 2011/05/12 2011/05/13 2011/05/14 2011/05/15 2011/05/16 2011/05/17 2011/05/18 2011/05/19 2011/05/20 2011/05/21 2011/05/22 2011/05/23 2011/05/24 2011/05/25 2011/05/26 2011/05/27 2011/05/28 2011/05/29 2011/05/30 2011/05/31
2011/06/01 2011/06/02 2011/06/03 2011/06/04 2011/06/05 2011/06/06 2011/06/07 2011/06/08 2011/06/09 2011/06/10 2011/06/11 2011/06/12 2011/06/13 2011/06/14 2011/06/15 2011/06/16 2011/06/17 2011/06/18 2011/06/19 2011/06/20 2011/06/21 2011/06/22 2011/06/23 2011/06/24 2011/06/25 2011/06/26 2011/06/27 2011/06/28 2011/06/29 2011/06/30
2011/07/01 2011/07/02 2011/07/04 2011/07/05 2011/07/06 2011/07/07 2011/07/08 2011/07/10 2011/07/11 2011/07/12 2011/07/13 2011/07/14 2011/07/15 2011/07/16 2011/07/17 2011/07/18 2011/07/19 2011/07/20 2011/07/21 2011/07/22 2011/07/23 2011/07/25 2011/07/27 2011/07/28 2011/07/29 2011/07/31
2011/08/01 2011/08/02 2011/08/03 2011/08/05 2011/08/06 2011/08/07 2011/08/08 2011/08/09 2011/08/10 2011/08/11 2011/08/12 2011/08/13 2011/08/15 2011/08/16 2011/08/17 2011/08/18 2011/08/19 2011/08/21 2011/08/22 2011/08/23 2011/08/24

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/03 1972/08
1973/04 1973/10
1975/03
1979/08
1985/01 1985/02 1985/03 1985/05 1985/06 1985/10
1986/02 1986/05 1986/08 1986/09 1986/11 1986/12
1987/04 1987/06 1987/09 1987/12
1988/01 1988/03 1988/04 1988/07 1988/08 1988/09 1988/10 1988/11 1988/12
1989/01 1989/03 1989/04 1989/06 1989/09 1989/11 1989/12
1990/01 1990/02 1990/03 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10 1990/11 1990/12
1991/01 1991/03 1991/05 1991/06 1991/07 1991/08 1991/09 1991/11
1992/01 1992/03 1992/06 1992/07 1992/09 1992/11 1992/12
1993/01 1993/02 1993/04 1993/07 1993/10 1993/12
1994/05 1994/06 1994/08 1994/11 1994/12
1995/01 1995/04 1995/06 1995/08 1995/09 1995/10 1995/11
1996/07 1996/08 1996/09 1996/11
1997/01 1997/02 1997/03 1997/05 1997/06 1997/08 1997/10 1997/11 1997/12
1998/02 1998/05 1998/07 1998/08 1998/11 1998/12
1999/01 1999/09 1999/10 1999/11 1999/12
2000/04 2000/05 2000/06 2000/07 2000/08 2000/09 2000/10 2000/11 2000/12
2001/01 2001/02 2001/03 2001/04 2001/05 2001/06 2001/07 2001/08 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11 2001/12
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/05 2002/06 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/10 2002/11 2002/12
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Antananarivo Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Alexandria Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Brazzaville Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangui Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Belfast Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chiang Mai Consulate Chennai Consulate Chengdu Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar DIR FSINFATC Consulate Dusseldorf Consulate Durban Consulate Dubai Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Freetown Consulate Fukuoka Consulate Frankfurt
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Grenada Embassy Georgetown Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guangzhou Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hong Kong Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Izmir Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Johannesburg Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kolonia Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Krakow Consulate Kolkata Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Lusaka Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Lome Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy Libreville Embassy La Paz Consulate Leipzig Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Mission Geneva Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Mogadishu Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maseru Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Merida Consulate Melbourne Consulate Matamoros Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Nuevo Laredo Consulate Naples Consulate Naha Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Praia Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Moresby Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Podgorica Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Mosul REO Kirkuk REO Hillah REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Surabaya Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sapporo Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy Tirana Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York USMISSION USTR GENEVA USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Mission CD Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary US Delegation FEST TWO UNVIE UN Rome Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vientiane Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde Consulate Yekaterinburg
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AMGT ASEC AEMR AR APECO AU AORC AS ADANA AJ AF AFIN AMED AM ABLD AFFAIRS AMB APER ACOA AG AA AE ABUD ARABL AO AND ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AID AL ASCH AADP AORD ADM AINF AINT ASEAN AORG AY ABT ARF AGOA AVIAN APEC ANET AGIT ASUP ATRN ASECVE ALOW AODE AGUILAR AN ADB ASIG ADPM AT ACABQ AGR ASPA AFSN AZ AC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AIAG AFSI ASCE ABMC ANTONIO AIDS ASEX ADIP ALJAZEERA AFGHANISTAN ASECARP AROC ASE ABDALLAH ADCO AMGMT AMCHAMS AGAO ACOTA ANARCHISTS AMEDCASCKFLO AK ARSO ARABBL ASO ANTITERRORISM AGRICULTURE AFINM AOCR ARR AFPK ASSEMBLY AORCYM AINR ACKM AGMT AEC APRC AIN AFPREL ASFC ASECTH AFSA ANTXON AFAF AFARI AX AMER ASECAF ASECAFIN AFZAL APCS AGUIRRE AIT ARCH AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL AOPC AMEX ARM ALI AQ ATFN AMBASSADOR AORCD AVIATION ARAS AINFCY ACBAQ AOPR AREP ALEXANDER AMTC AOIC ABLDG ASEK AER ALOUNI AMCT AVERY APR AMAT AEMRS AFU AMG ATPDEA ALL AORL ACS AECL AUC ACAO
BA BR BB BG BEXP BY BRUSSELS BU BD BTIO BK BL BO BE BMGT BM BN BWC BBSR BTT BX BC BH BEN BUSH BF BHUM BILAT BT BTC BMENA BBG BOND BAGHDAD BAIO BP BRPA BURNS BUT BGMT BCW BOEHNER BOL BASHAR BOU BIDEN BTRA BFIN BOIKO BZ BERARDUCCI BOUCHAIB BEXPC BTIU
CPAS CA CASC CS CBW CIDA CO CODEL CI CROS CU CH CWC CMGT CVIS CDG CTR CG CF CD CHIEF CJAN CBSA CE CY CB CW CM CDC COUNTRY CLEARANCE CHR CT COE CV COUNTER CN CPUOS CTERR CVR CVPR COUNTRYCLEARANCE CLOK CONS CITES COM CONTROLS CAN CACS CR CACM CVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGKIRF COMMERCE CAMBODIA CZ CJ CFIS CASCC COUNTERTERRORISM CAS CONDOLEEZZA CLINTON CTBT CEN CRISTINA CFED CARC CTM CARICOM CSW CICTE CJUS CYPRUS CNARC CBE CMGMT CARSON CWCM CIVS CENTCOM COPUOS CAPC CGEN CKGR CITEL CQ CITT CIC CARIB CVIC CAFTA CVISU CHRISTOPHER CDB CEDAW CNC COMMAND CENTER COL CAJC CUIS CONSULAR CLMT CBC CIA CIS CEUDA CHINA CAC CL
DR DJ DEMOCRATIC DEMARCHE DA DOMESTIC DISENGAGEMENT DRL DB DE DHS DAO DCM DHSX DARFUR DAVID DO DEAX DEFENSE DEA DTRO DPRK DARFR DOC DK DTRA DAC DOD DIEZ DMINE DRC DCG DPKO DOT DEPT DOE DS DKEM
ECON ETTC EFIS ETRD EC EMIN EAGR EAID EFIN EUN ECIN EG EWWT EINV ENRG ELAB EPET EIND EN EAIR EUMEM ECPS ES EI ELTN ET EZ EU ER EINT ENGR ECONOMIC ENIV EK EFTA ETRN EMS EPA ESTH ENRGMO EET EEB EXIM ECTRD ELNT ETRA ENV EAG EREL ENVIRONMENT ECA EAP ECONOMY EINDIR EDUARDO ETR EUREM ELECTIONS ETRC EICN EXPORT EMED EARG EGHG EINF ECIP EID ETRO EAIDHO EENV EURM EPEC ERNG ENERG EIAD EAGER EXBS ED ELAM EWT ENGRD ERIN ECO EDEV ECE ECPSN ENGY EL EXIMOPIC ETRDEC ECCT EINVECON EUR ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EFI ECOSOC EXTERNAL ESCAP EITC ETCC EENG ERA ENRD EBRD ENVR ETRAD EPIN ECONENRG EDRC ETMIN ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ELAP EPIT EDUC ESA EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC EIVN EBEXP ESTN EGOV ECOM EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ETRDGK ENVI ELN EPRT EPCS EPTED ERTD EUM EAIDS ETRB EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EDU EV EAIDAF EDA EINTECPS EGAD EPREL EINVEFIN ECLAC EUCOM ECCP ELDIN EIDN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ECPC ECONOMICS ENERGY EIAR EINDETRD ECONEFIN ECOWAS EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EFIM ETIO EATO EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS ENRGIZ EAC ESPINOSA EAIG ENTG EUC ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ESENV ECINECONCS ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN
FR FI FOREIGN FARM FAO FK FCSC FREEDOM FARC FAS FJ FIN FINANCE FAC FBI FTAA FM FCS FAA FETHI FRB FRANCISCO FORCE FTA FT FMGT FCSCEG FDA FERNANDO FINR FIR FDIC FOR FOI FKLU FO FMLN FISO
GM GERARD GT GA GG GR GTIP GB GH GZ GV GE GAZA GY GJ GEORGE GOI GCC GMUS GI GABY GLOBAL GUAM GC GOMEZ GUTIERREZ GL GOV GKGIC GF GU GWI GARCIA GTMO GANGS GIPNC GAERC GREGG GUILLERMO GASPAR
HA HYMPSK HO HK HUMAN HR HU HN HHS HIV HURI HDP HUD HUMRIT HSWG HUMANITARIAN HIGHLIGHTS HUM HUMANR HL HILLARY HSTC HCOPIL HADLEY HOURANI HARRIET HESHAM HI HNCHR HEBRON HUMOR
IZ IN IAEA IS IMO ILO IR IC IT ITU ID IV IMF IBRD IWC ICAO INF ICRC IO IPR IRAQI ISO IK ISRAELI IDB INFLUENZA IRAQ INL IQ ICES IRMO IRAN ISCON IGAD ITALY INTERNAL ILC ISSUES ICCAT IADB ICTY ICTR ITPGOV ITALIAN IQNV IRDB INMARSAT INCB INRB ICJ ISRAEL INR IFO ITRA IEA ISPA IOM ITRD IL IHO IFAD IPROP IDLI ISCA INV IBB ISPL INRA INTELSAT ISAF IRS IEF ITER ISAAC ICC INDO IIP IATTC IND INS IZPREL IAHRC IEFIN IACI INNP IA INTERPOL IFIN IRAJ IX IF ITPHUM ITA IP IZEAID IRPE IDA ISLAMISTS ITF INRO IBET IDP IRC
JA JM JO JCIC JKJUS JP JK JOSEPH JOSE JAPAN JOHN JE JS JUS JN JOHNNIE JKUS JAMES JML JAWAD JIMENEZ
KMDR KPAO KOMC KNNP KFLO KDEM KSUM KIPR KFLU KE KCRM KJUS KAWC KZ KSCA KDRG KCOR KGHG KPAL KTIP KMCA KCRS KPKO KOLY KRVC KVPR KG KWBG KTER KS KN KSPR KWMN KV KTFN KFRD KU KSTC KSTH KISL KGIC KAPO KSEP KDP KFIN KTEX KTIA KUNR KCMR KCIP KMOC KTDB KBIO KMPI KSAF KFEM KUNC KPRV KIRC KACT KRMS KNPT KMFO KHIV KHLS KPWR KCFE KREC KRIM KHDP KVIR KNNNP KCEM KIRF KGIT KLIG KNUP KSAC KNUC KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KTBT KSCI KIDE KPGOV KLPM KTDD KOCI KNNC KOMS KBCT KLFU KLAB KSEO KICC KJUST KUWAIT KSEC KUK KEDEM KJRE KMRS KSRE KREISLER KSCS KPIR KPOA KESS KCOM KWIR KIVP KRCM KGLB KPOW KPOL KSEAO KNAP KCUL KPREL KREF KPRP KICA KPMI KPRM KQ KPOP KFSC KPFO KPALAOIS KRM KBWG KCORR KVRC KR KFTN KTTB KNAR KINR KWN KCSY KIIP KPRO KREL KFPC KW KWM KRFD KFLOA KMCC KIND KNEP KHUM KSKN KT KOMO KDRL KTFIN KSOC KPO KGIV KSTCPL KSI KNNB KNDP KICCPUR KDMR KFCE KIMMITT KMNP KOMCSG KGCC KRAD KCRP KAUST KWAWC KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KMSG KTIAPARM KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KMIG KSEI KLSO KWNN KHSA KCRIM KNPP KPAONZ KWWW KGHA KY KCRCM KGCN KPLS KPAOY KRIF KTRD KTAO KJU KBTS KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KO KEMR KENV KEAI KWAC KFIU KWIC KNNO KPAI KTBD KILS KPA KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KERG KLTN KLIP KTLA KAWK KVRP KAID KX KWCI KNPR KCFC KNEI KFTFN KTFM KCERS KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KBTR KEDU KIRL KNNR KMPT KPDD KPIN KDEV KAKA KFRP KINL KWWMN KWBC KA KOM KWNM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KWMNCS KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KWMM
LY LE LABOR LH LN LO LAB LT LAURA LTTE LG LU LI LA LB LOTT LORAN LAW LVPR LARREA LEBIK LS LOVE LR LEON LAVIN LOG
MU MARR MX MASS MOPS MNUC MCAP MTCRE MRCRE MTRE MASC MY MK MDC MG MO MEPN MW MILI MCC MR MEDIA MZ MEPP MOPPS MA MAS MI MP MIL MV MC MD MCA MT MARITIME MOPSGRPARM MAAR MOROCCO MCAPS MOOPS ML MN MEPI MNUCPTEREZ MTCR MUNC MPOS MONUC MAR MGMT MENDIETA MARIA MONTENEGRO MURRAY MOTO MACP MINUSTAH MCCONNELL MGT MARQUEZ MANUEL MNUR MF MOHAMMAD MAPP MOHAMED MNU MFA MTS MLS MIAH MEETINGS MERCOSUR MED MARAD MNVC MINURSO MIK MARK MBM MILITARY MAPS MILA MACEDONIA MICHEL MASSMNUC MUCN MQADHAFI MPS MARRGH
NZ NATO NI NO NU NG NL NPT NS NP NA NASA NSF NTTC NAS NEA NANCY NSG NRR NATIONAL NKNNP NMNUC NSC NC NE NR NARC NGO NELSON NATEU NDP NIH NK NIPP NERG NSSP NSFO NATSIOS NFSO NTDB NT NCD NEGROPONTE NATOIRAQ NAR NZUS NCCC NH NAFTA NEW NRG NUIN NOVO NATOPREL NEY NV NICHOLAS NPA NW NORAD NPG NOAA
OPRC OPDC OTRA OECD OVIP OREP ODC OIIP OAS OSCE OPIC OMS OIC OFDA OEXC OFDP OPCW OCED OIE OSCI OM OPAD ODIP OPCD OCII ORUE ODPC OPPI ORA OCEA OREG OUALI OMIG ODAG OPREP OFFICIALS OSAC OEXP OPEC OFPD OMAR ORC OAU OPDP OIL OVIPPRELUNGANU OSHA OTRD OPCR OF OFDPQIS OSIC OHUM OTR OBSP OGAC OTRAORP OESC OVP ON OES OTAR OCS
PREL PGOV PARM PINR PHUM PM PREF PTER PK PINS PBIO PHSA PE PBTS PA PL POL PAK POV POLITICS POLICY PROP PRELTBIOBA PKO PO PIN PNAT PU PHAM PALESTINIAN PTERPGOV PGOVPREL PKPA PHYTRP PP PTEL PREC PENA PRM PELOSI PAS PRELAF PRE PUNE PSOE POLM PRELKPAO PIRF PGPV PARMP PRELL PVOV PROV POLUN PS PHUMPTER PROG PRELGOV PERSONS PERURENA PKK PRGOV PH POLITICAL PLAB PDEM PCI PRL PREM PINSO PEREZ PPAO PERM PETR PERL PBS PGOVZI PINT PARMS PCON PETERS PRELBR PMIL PSOCI PF PLO PNUM PTERM PJUS PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PAO PTBS PROTECTION PRELPK PGOVENRG PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PARTIES PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PAIGH PARK PETER PPREL PTERPREL PHUS PKPO PGOVECON POUS PMAR PWBG PAR PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PTE PY PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PGOVPM PRELEVU PGOR PRELKPAOIZ PBTSRU PGVO PHUMR PPD PGV PRAM PINL PSI PKPAL PPA PTERE PGOF PINO PREO PHAS PRHUM PHUMA PGO PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PEDRO PASS PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PHUMPREL PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOC PNR
QA QI QT QM QADRI
RS RP RU RW RFE RCMP RIGHTSPOLMIL REFORM RO REACTION REPORT ROW ROBERT REL RIGHTS RA RELATIONS REGION RAFAEL REGIONAL RAY ROBERTG RPREL RAMONTEIJELO RM RATIFICATION RREL RBI RICE ROOD RODENAS RUIZ RELFREE RODHAM RGY RUEHZO RELIGIOUS RODRIGUEZ RUEUN RELAM RSP RF REO ROSS RENE RUPREL RI REMON RPEL RSO
SCUL SENV SOCI SZ SNAR SO SP SU SY SMIG SYR SA SW SG SF SR SYRIA SNARM SPECIALIST START SNIG SCI SI SGWI SE SIPDIS SANC SADC SELAB SN SETTLEMENTS SENVENV SCIENCE SENS SPCE SENC SCOM SPAS SECURITY SL SOCIETY SOSI SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR SEN SPECI ST SENVCASCEAIDID SC SECRETARY STR SNA SOCIS SEP SK SHUM SYAI SMIL STEPHEN SNRV SKCA SENSITIVE SECI SCUD SCRM SGNV SECTOR SAARC SENVSXE SASIAIN SWMN STEINBERG SOPN SOCR SCRS SILVASANDE SWE SARS SNARIZ SUDAN SENVQGR SNARKTFN SAAD SD SAN SIPRNET SM STATE SFNV SSA SPCVIS SOFA SCULKPAOECONTU SPTER SKSAF SENVKGHG SHI SEVN SPSTATE SMITH SH SNARCS SNARN SIPRS
TBIO TW TRGY TSPA TU TPHY TI TX TH TIP TC TSPL TNGD TS TZ TP TK TURKEY TERRORISM TPSL TINT TRSY TERFIN TPP TT TF TECHNOLOGY TE TAGS TECH TRAFFICKING TN TJ TL TO TD TREATY TR TA TIO THPY TPSA TRAD TNDG TVBIO TWI TV TWL TWRO TAUSCHER TRBY TSPAM TREL TRT TNAR TFIN TPHYPA TWCH THOMMA THOMAS TERROR TRY TBID
UK UNESCO UNSC UNGA UN US UZ USEU UG UP UNAUS UNMIK USTR UY UNSCD USUN UV UNDC UNRWA UNPUOS USAID UNSCR UNODC UNHCR UNRCR UNDP UNCRIME UA UNHRC UNEP UNBRO UNCSD UNO UNCND UNCHR USTRUWR USAU UNICEF UNCC USPS UNOMIG UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV UNFICYP UR UNAMA UNCITRAL UNVIE USTDA USNC USTRPS USCC UNEF UNGAPL UNSCE USSC UEU UNMIC UNTAC USDA UNCLASSIFIED UNA UNCTAD UNMOVIC USGS UNFPA UNSE USOAS USG UE UAE UNWRA UNION UNCSW UNCHS UNDESCO UNC UB UNSCS UKXG UNGACG UNHR USPTO UNCHC UNFCYP UNIDROIT
VM VE VT VZ VN VEPREL VEN VTPREL VC VIP VTEG VOA VTEAID VTIZ VISIT VO VENZ VAT VI
WHTI WIPO WTRO WHO WI WFP WHA WTO WMO WEET WZ WBG WS WE WA WEF WAKI WILLIAM WHOA WSIS WCI WCL WMN WEBZ WW WWBG WMD WWT WWARD WITH WMDT WTRQ WCO WALTER WEU WB WBEG
XA XX XW XK XL XM XS XF XG XT XY XR XH XB XO XD XV XI XE XC XJ XU XZ XQ XP XFNEA XTAG
YM YI YE YMOEXC YL YMCS YOUSSEF
ZI ZU ZM ZK ZL ZP ZOELLICK ZF ZR ZA ZCTU ZO ZIM ZANU ZJ ZB ZN ZH ZT ZFR ZEALAND ZW ZXA

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 04HARARE1157, STAFFDEL VISIT ILLUMINATES ELECTION REFORMS,

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04HARARE1157.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
04HARARE1157 | 2004-07-15 05:13 | 2011-08-24 16:30 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Harare

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

    150513Z Jul 04

` `

    UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 HARARE 001157

    SIPDIS

    SENSITIVE

    NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVELLE, D. TEITELBAUM
    LONDON FOR C. GURNEY
    PARIS FOR C. NEARY
    NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER

    ¶E.  O.  12958: N/A
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ZI VIP
    SUBJECT: STAFFDEL VISIT ILLUMINATES ELECTION REFORMS,
    ATMOSPHERICS

    REF: (A) HARARE 1110 (B) HARARE 1067

    ¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: Staffdel comprised of Majority
    Professional Staffperson Joan Condon and Democratic Party
    Professional Staffperson Pearl-Alice Marsh of the House
    International Relations Committee and USAID Congressional
    Liaison Susan Williams met with a host of interlocutors
    during a June 29-July 5 visit to Zimbabwe.  GOZ officials
    charted parameters of recently proposed electoral reforms
    but were vague on how such reforms might address difficult
    issues such as politically motivated violence and access to
    media.  Opposition MDC leaders and representatives of civil
    society generally recognized that the proposed reforms
    offered some opportunity for positive change but were
    pessimistic on prospects for adjusting fundamental flaws in
    electoral environment and administration.  ACTION REQUEST
    follows in paragraph 32.  END SUMMARY.

    Election Commissioner: Unresolved Issues
    ----------------------------------------

    ¶2.  (SBU) In a meeting in his office June 30, Electoral
    Supervisory Commission (ESC) Chairman Sobuza Gula-Ndebele
    told the staffdel that he had yet to see a formal draft of
    the proposed electoral reforms reportedly approved by the
    ZANU-PF Central Committee June 25 (reftel).  However, he
    said that he had been told that the approved version adopted
    in most respects confidential recommendations made by the
    ESC.  The elements reported in the official press
    substantiated this.  He noted that his commission had
    recommended the Chief Election Officer be appointed by an
    independent body, not the president as reportedly designated
    in the reported reform package.  He predicted this would be
    the source of additional debate, and asserted that in any
    event the integrity of the appointment(s) could overcome the
    manner of selection if tenure and resources were secure.

    ¶3.  (SBU) Gula-Ndebele confirmed that the changes were
    expected to be implemented in time for parliamentary
    elections currently scheduled for March.  Timing would
    present a quandary, however - a constitutional amendment
    would be required in order to establish a truly independent
    commission with powers contemplated by the reported reforms.
    Passing the law and effecting a constitutional amendment in
    time to prepare for an election by March would be "a tall
    order" regardless of political will.  He was unaware of a
    set date for implementation but had heard it would be in
    August.  Difficulties might require postponement of the
    election by a few months, a delay to which the parties might
    agree.  He said study was being given to establishment of a
    new commission under existing law, but such an approach
    would be "untidy" and could yield a commission of inadequate
    authority and compromised independence.

    ¶4.  (SBU) The Chairman emphasized that sanction power
    reportedly being accorded the new commission would
    distinguish it positively from his ESC.  He said that the
    new commission could pursue complaints filed by any party or
    pursue matters on its own initiative.  The Chief Election
    Officer would have administrative authority but could not
    overturn any decision of the commission, which would report
    to the Parliament, not the President.  He expected that the
    new commission would be able to draw from a range of
    sanctions, including "deduction of votes" for violations by
    a party.  He said that announced electoral reforms did not
    explicitly address "environmental" issues such as
    suppression of political violence and access to media but
    asserted that the new commission would have authority to act
    on such issues.  The Chairman said he favored as inclusive
    an approach as possible with respect to international
    observers, although he conceded that others in the GOZ
    disagreed.  He noted that deep ruling party suspicion of
    donor-funded NGOs was driving efforts to consolidate voter
    education efforts under supervision by the ESC or a new
    commission.
    ¶5.  (SBU) According to Gula-Ndebele, the new commission
    would still have to rely on police to carry out some of its
    enforcement orders.  He expected that electoral courts
    mentioned in media reports would likely not be standing
    courts but would be composed of existing High Court and/or
    Supreme Court judges and sit on an ad hoc basis.  Commitment
    of adequate resources to support operation of the
    contemplated mechanisms would be a key test of the
    government's political will and central to their
    effectiveness.

    ¶6.  (SBU) Gula-Ndebele lamented Zimbabwe's highly polarized
    political climate, for which he asserted each party bore its
    share of blame.  He expressed hope that the parties, civil
    society and the international community would give the new
    commission a fair chance to gain the confidence of all.

    Mutasa: No American Observers (and an Aside on Food)
    --------------------------------------------- -------

    ¶7. (SBU) In a July 2 meeting in his office at ZANU-PF Party
    Headquarters (where he is Party Secretary for External
    Affairs) Minister for Anti-Corruption and Anti-Monopolies
    Didymus Mutasa underscored the great attention being given
    electoral reforms by the party leadership.  He did not
    elaborate on details of the reforms but advised that they
    would be consistent with African standards.

    ¶8.  (SBU) The Minister asserted that Zimbabwe was one of the
    most democratic of African nations by any standard and
    criticized the USG for applying a double standard against
    Zimbabwe.  He noted that the same day the USG condemned a
    Zimbabwean parliamentary by-election (Zengeza) during which
    one person was killed, it accepted the results of a Nigerian
    election in which more than two hundred reportedly were
    killed.  Mutasa said that Zimbabwean voters had "wised up"
    to the opposition's ineffectualness and subservience to the
    West and predicted a clean sweep for the ruling party in
    free and fair elections in March.

    ¶9.  (SBU) Mutasa reported that the GOZ no longer intended to
    submit its elections to Western scrutiny and would not
    include "British and Americans" among those invited to
    observe its March elections.  He proffered an article that
    reported U.S. senators calling for regime change in Zimbabwe
    as evidence of malign USG intentions.  When pressed by Marsh
    on the issue of American observers, he chuckled that he
    would make an exception only for her.

    ¶10.  (SBU) When questioned about Zimbabwe's food security,
    Mutasa said that the GOZ was confident it had enough
    production to meet domestic demand for food.  He conceded
    that estimates could prove wrong, however, and urged that
    the international community be prepared to respond quickly
    should the country later find itself unable to meet its food
    needs.

    The Speaker: Give New Commission a Chance
    -----------------------------------------

    ¶10.  (SBU) At a meeting July 5 in his office at ZANU-PF
    Headquarters (where he is Party Secretary for
    Administration), Speaker of the Parliament Emmerson
    Mnangagwa opened with a long and familiar exposition on the
    history of land reform and bilateral relations.  He
    acknowledged that "mistakes had been made" in the
    implementation of land reform but that the GOZ was working
    hard to redress injustices and maladministration identified
    by the Utete Commission report.  The country was not in the
    process of consolidating gains and focusing on restoring
    production levels through support to new farmers.

    ¶11. (SBU) Turning to elections, Mnangagwa emphasized that
    Zimbabwe had always conducted its elections in timely manner
    and accordance with the Constitution.  He conceded that the
    MDC had presented ZANU-PF with a serious challenge in the
    last national parliamentary elections but that the ruling
    party had responded well.  After recovering four
    parliamentary seats in by-elections since then, the party
    was confident it would do better this time.  Blair's
    statement on the floor of Parliament that exposed his
    government's collaboration with the MDC would hurt the
    opposition's prospects.  Mnangagwa asserted that reversal of
    the country's economic decline would further boost the
    ruling party's prospects.

    ¶12. (SBU) The Speaker briefly described anticipated
    electoral reforms that were consistent with the package
    described by Gula-Ndebele.  He said that the government had
    adopted the proposals, which would be forwarded to the
    appropriate parliamentary portfolio committee before being
    considered by the full legislature.  The committee would
    conduct public hearings on the proposals, on which all
    stakeholders would get an opportunity to offer input.

    ¶13.  (SBU) Mnangagwa conceded that there had been security
    problems in the conduct of some elections, particularly
    since the rise of the opposition in the late 1990's.  Even
    so, elections were much more peaceful than those in the
    early days of independence.  He expressed confidence that
    electoral reforms would address such problems.  The
    independent election commission would deal with
    environmental issues like media access and an election court
    would thresh out disputes fairly and quickly.  He urged that
    the new system be given a chance.  He observed that many
    Zimbabwean families had members from both major parties and
    predicted that Zimbabwe would eventually achieve a non-
    polarized polity like America's, given time.

    Opposition: Borrowed Election Reforms Inadequate
    --------------------------------------------- ---

    ¶14.  (SBU) In a July 1 meeting in the Ambassador's office,
    MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai and Deputy Secretary General
    Gift Chimanikire briefed the staffdel on the opposition's
    situation and posture with respect to elections.  Tsvangirai
    judged that the election's outcome was predetermined,
    regardless of reforms.  The imploding economy, a compromised
    judiciary, inadequate access to media, and a government
    defiant to national and international opinion stacked the
    deck against the MDC.

    ¶15.  (SBU) According to Tsvangirai, the government's
    announced electoral reforms were an admission that the
    existing framework was unfair.  He noted that many of the
    reforms were taken from the MDC's playbook.  Nonetheless,
    the proposals appeared not to address fully the five
    conditions laid out in the MDC "RESTORE" election demand
    document: rule of law (disbanding of militia, de-
    politicization of police); independent election commission;
    restoration of basic rights (repeal of AIPPA, POSA); popular
    confidence in system (adjustments to voting process; and
    integrity of voting secrecy.  The party would continue to
    mobilize domestic and international support for
    implementation of SADC standards.  Tsvangirai reiterated
    that participating in elections without the MDC's conditions
    being met would be futile, and the party would reserve
    decision on a potential boycott.  In the meantime, it would
    continue to collaborate on a platform with civil society,
    whose support he considered crucial.

    ¶16.  (SBU) Tsvangirai recognized the potentially important
    role of churches in effecting change.  He reported that the
    Mutare bishops troika had informed the party of ruling party
    plans on electoral reforms.  The troika had acted as a
    conduit in conveying to ZANU-PF the MDC's election demands
    as set out in RESTORE.

    ¶17.  (SBU) Chimanikire reported on a meeting the previous
    week in South Africa between MDC Secretary General Welshman
    Ncube, Vice President Gibson Sibanda, himself, and South
    African President Mbeki.  The MDC delegation told Mbeki that
    there had been no movement on talks with ZANU-PF.  They
    urged the need to have a joint parliamentary-presidential
    election and for Mugabe to commit to step down.  (Note: The
    next presidential election is slated for 2008.  End note.)
    Mbeki had told them he expected the ZANU-PF politburo by the
    end of June would authorize a negotiating delegation.

    ¶18.  Tsvangirai asserted that Mbeki remained potentially
    crucial but lamented that Mbeki never used the personal
    channel established between them.  He observed that Mbeki
    tended to use indirect means to communicate and had made
    misrepresentations in the past, leading to an "uneasiness"
    between them.  Tsvangirai noted that the party would
    continue to reach out to other African leaders, and that
    Sibanda was seeking meetings with the leaders of Senegal,
    Ghana, Kenya, and the AU.  He urged that the USG maintain
    pressure on Mbeki and others in the region, particularly
    with an eye to next month's scheduled SADC Summit in
    Mauritius.

    ¶19.  (SBU) In a July 3 meeting with the staffdel in his
    home, MDC MP and Secretary for Legal Affairs David Coltart
    elaborated further on election themes.  Some of the proposed
    election reforms would be helpful to the MDC but not
    decisively so.  The party was very cash-strapped and
    handicapped by the ruling party's exploitation of state
    machinery for campaign purposes.  Despite intimidation and
    other challenges, the MDC was remarkably healthy, albeit
    quiet for now.  It was mobilizing for elections, and he
    reported that he had received 100 percent support in a local
    caucus to confirm his candidacy in the upcoming election.

    ¶20.  (SBU) Coltart asserted that the ruling party had no
    intention of allowing the opposition to win more than a few
    token seats in March.  According to Coltart, ruling party
    fears of retribution over massacres during the 1980s and
    vested interests accumulated during the past four years of
    land reform squelched any hope that the party could reform
    itself.  He predicted that its pervasively oppressive
    character would not change regardless of the outcome of
    elections or the health of the opposition.  Even government
    institutions such as the legislature and judiciary would
    remain incapable of exerting independent checks and
    balances.  Only decisive internal and external pressure
    could force change.

    ¶21. (SBU) Coltart characterized ZANU-PF's election platform
    as built on four central lies: the economy was improving; a
    bumper harvest was in; the GOZ was attacking corruption; and
    the MDC was finished.  He claimed that much of the
    international community had bought into some or all of these
    lies.  He emphasized the importance of the international
    community remaining resolute in the face of growing stasis.
    Given the centrality of food manipulation to ruling party
    control of the populace, it was essential that donors
    planned an effective response to the inevitable GOZ plea for
    food aid once the elections were concluded to the ruling
    party's satisfaction.  In this vein, Coltart recognized that
    the truly needy had to be supported but urged that donors
    use their leverage to force the GOZ to open their books, de-
    politicize food, and establish more effective and
    transparent political and economic policies.  He noted that
    the generosity of countries like the United States had
    allowed the regime to survive to date.

    ¶22.  (SBU) In closing, Coltart urged the USG to use United
    Nations organs to press the GOZ.  He sought support for a
    "responsibility to protect" doctrine advocated by the
    Canadian Prime Minister at the most recent UNGA as a
    foundation for responsible humanitarian intervention.

    Civil Society: International Community Must Press
    --------------------------------------------- ----

    ¶23.  (SBU) At a lunch with the staffdel June 30 at USAID, a
    group of prominent NGO representatives offered perspectives
    on the upcoming elections.  Many cast outside engagement as
    potentially decisive in balancing the electoral playing
    field and some credited South African pressure with ZANU-
    PF's proposed reforms.  The upcoming SADC summit could prove
    pivotal to the ruling party's ability to sell its election
    to domestic and international audiences; as such,  it
    offered the international community a point of leverage that
    should be exploited.  Specifically, the USG should press
    individual SADC members to adopt meaningful standards in
    Mauritius.  Of central importance was going beyond election
    administration to address environmental issues like media
    access, freedom to campaign, and political violence.

    ¶24.  (SBU) One participant cited growing tensions within the
    party as contributing to some impetus for reform.  Old
    ideologues who were not genuine reformists were supporting
    reforms for short-term political gain within the context of
    internal personality-driven power struggles.  While Mugabe's
    supremacy was unchallenged, internal party elections and
    power shifts could have a tremendous impact on the conduct
    of future elections and the health of civil society.  That
    said, the ruling party lacked any genuine constituents for
    reform and the witch-hunt atmosphere prevailing under the
    party's counter-corruption efforts was chilling open
    discussion and fueling counter-productive posturing.

    ¶25.  (SBU) Echoing Gula-Ndebele, some noted potential
    constitutional complications associated with the reform
    proposals.  Postponement of elections until June - permitted
    by the Constitution and not without precedent - might be
    advisable.  Representatives recounted a familiar litany of
    problems in the election environment: a climate of impunity
    for violent ruling party supporters, opposition's
    inaccessibility to media outlets, contraction of the
    independent media, Tsvangirai's outstanding treason trial
    verdict, and abuse of food.  Placement of National Youth
    Service graduates ("Green Bombers") throughout the civil
    service and economy to spy on and intimidate the general
    populace was cited as a growing systemic problem.  Domestic
    politics in South Africa presented an additional
    complication: the land issue's continued importance there
    and the fact that many South Africans regarded Mugabe as a
    "messiah" had to weigh heavily in any South African
    politician's calculations on policy toward Zimbabwe.

    Bishops: Still Engaged
    ----------------------

    ¶26. At a dinner with the staffdel at the Ambassador's
    residence June 30, Bishops Trevor Manhanga and Patrick
    Mutume (Bishop Bakare, the troika's third pillar, was unable
    to attend) described their views on elections and related
    issues.  They advised that ZANU-PF Party Chairman John Nkomo
    outlined for them the previous week elements of planned
    electoral reform essentially consistent with reported
    versions.  They also met at length with ZANU-PF Information
    Secretary (and Mugabe confidant) Nathan Shamuyarira at

    SIPDIS
    length.  Nkomo had conceded the procedural and timing
    difficulties presented by the apparent need for a
    constitutional amendment in order to establish an
    independent election commission.  The bishops said any issue
    implicating a schedule for Mugabe's departure appeared
    problematic.

    ¶27. (SBU) The bishops concluded that the reforms were
    "serious" but said that Nkomo was unable to offer specifics
    on key issues, such as the commission's actual independence.
    "Chinamasa (Minister for Justice) is still working on them."
    The bishops were led to believe that current Registrar-
    General Mudede and Minister for Home Affairs Mohadi would
    have no meaningful role in implementing the reformed system.
    ¶28.  (SBU) The bishops advised that they would seek to meet
    with Mbeki and Tanzanian President Mkapa in an effort to
    stimulate more pressure on Mugabe within the SADC community.
    They characterized Mbeki as frustrated; he realized that
    Mugabe did not view him as a peer.  The bishops suggested
    that on a personal level, Mozambican President Chissano and
    Kenneth Kaunda would have better rapport with Mugabe.  Mbeki
    remained a potentially pivotal player, however, and had
    suggested earlier that Mugabe agreed to move a Presidential
    election up to 2005.

    ¶29.  (SBU) The bishops explained that the ruling party's
    proposed electoral reforms were intended principally for
    external consumption but could be complicated by succession
    politics within the ruling party.  ZANU-PF remained a united
    party to the outside world but conflicting aspirations to
    the presidency were fragmenting and paralyzing it within.

    Other Meetings
    --------------

    ¶30.  (SBU) During their visit here, the staffdel also met
    separately with Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono (ref A);
    local directors of from World Food Program, World Vision,
    CARE, and Catholic Relief Services; displaced farm workers;
    representatives of Justice for Agriculture; members of the
    Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN); and a bipartisan
    group of parliamentarians.  They also visited a number of
    USAID-funded projects, including business opportunity
    centers, a center to support AIDS orphans, and a clinic that
    promotes the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of
    HIV/AIDS.

    Comment
    -------

    ¶31.  (SBU) The staffdel visit presented a timely opportunity
    to canvass major players on proposed electoral reforms that
    occupy center political stage here.  The wide-ranging
    discussions confirmed our assessment that the government
    assembled its proposals without much formal input from the
    outside but drew significantly from outside ideas - indeed,
    the ESC, the MDC, and South Africa all appear to be in
    position to take some credit.  The opposition and civil
    society appear prepared to engage seriously on the issues
    but are not optimistic that the playing field will be
    leveled.

    ¶32.  (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: We share the view that the ruling
    party's efforts in this area are geared largely to a
    regional audience.  Treatment of election standards at the
    August SADC Summit in Mauritius appears to be a diplomatic
    priority for the GOZ and, as such, a potential point of
    leverage.  In that vein, we would urge renewed USG efforts
    to engage SADC members to have SADC endorse the so-called
    SADC-PF election norms and standards and, either
    individually or as a group, to undertake efforts to press
    the GOZ to address election environment issues (media
    access, freedom to campaign, political violence) beyond the
    proposed electoral reforms.

    ¶33.  (U) The staffdel did not have the opportunity to clear
    this message.

    SULLIVAN

`