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### Viewing cable 03BRASILIA3682, BRAZIL'S PROSPECTS FOR A RETURN TO ECONOMIC GROWTH

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
03BRASILIA3682 | 2003-11-18 13:44 | 2011-07-11 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Brasilia

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 BRASILIA 003682

    SIPDIS

    NSC FOR SHANNON
    TREASURY FOR OASIA/SEGAL
    PLS PASS FED BOARD OF GOVERNORS FOR WILSON, ROBATAILLE
    USDA FOR U/S PENN, FAS/FAA/TERPSTRA
    USDOC FOR 4322/ITA/IEP/WH/OLAC-SC

    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: ECON EFIN PGOV ELAB PHUM PREL EINV SOCI BR
    SUBJECT:  BRAZIL'S PROSPECTS FOR A RETURN TO ECONOMIC GROWTH

    REFS: A) SAO PAULO 1835
          B) BRASILIA 3405

    ¶1.  SUMMARY.  Brazil's government, economists and media all now
    voice expectation of forthcoming relative economic relief.
    Hardly anyone dissents from the forecast of 3/3.5% GDP growth
    in 2004.  Optimists suggest a parallel with 2000, when Brazil's
    GDP grew 4.4% after the previous year's 0.7%, despite the
    context of a cloudy world economy, as real interest rates fell
    from 9 to 6 percent.  The hopeful scenario today is for one or
    two quarters of upswing to be driven by consumer-credit
    expansion and long-deferred purchases of durable goods in
    response to the GoB's monetary easing since July, with the
    premise that this new consumption will induce fresh investment
    that would become Brazil's primary economic driver for the
    medium run, in turn spurring extra output, employment and
    consumer buying-power by 2005.  Some unexpectedly good recent
    data for industrial output and capital-goods sales are
    consistent with this picture.

    ¶2.  Market confidence in the GoB and in domestic political
    events seems quite sturdy.  Calls for the Central Bank to relax
    monetary policy still faster have come from some surprising new
    quarters.  But the GoB is plainly set on breaking Brazil's
    habit of bubble-and-inflationary-bust.  It wants multi-year
    sustainable growth (which coincides with Lula's re-election
    interests), and won't be rushed.  Investors view the status of
    Lula's pension and tax bills, however watered-down, as still
    adequate.  Greater doubt exists as to the GoB's future
    microeconomic/regulatory reforms, upon which by general
    agreement vital investment will hinge.  And Brazil's debt/GDP
    vulnerability remains on everyone's mind.  The main worry is of
    a too-early U.S. monetary tightening.  END SUMMARY.

    Consensus on Growth
    -------------------
    ¶3.  This cable reflects recent discussions in forty-plus
    meetings with GoB, market, and think-tank specialists in
    Brasilia, Rio and Sao Paulo during Treasury and EXIM visits.
    Interlocutors were drawn from a half-dozen foreign or
    domestic private banks, the Ministries of Planning, Finance
    and Trade, Treasury, multiple offices of the Central Bank,
    the Banco do Brasil, BNDES, Getulio Vargas Foundation,
    National Confederation of Industry, a major manufacturer, a
    top credit-rating agency, congress's tax committee, and
    elsewhere.

    ¶4.  Without exception, sources agreed that Brazil's economy
    should grow 3% to 3.5% in 2004.  All saw the ongoing drop in
    interest rates (with the benchmark SELIC down since June
    from 26.5% to an expected 18% on November 19) producing a
    marked, steady expansion of credit.  Bradesco chief
    economist Osmar Pinho expected easing credit terms, coupled
    with traditional end-of-year bonuses and negotiated salary
    increases taking effect in January, to spark a near-term
    consumption mini-boom.  Pinho thought a modest 20% increase
    in credit from its current depressed level sufficient to
    achieve the 2004 growth figure.  Longer-term, he expected
    new investment to assume the role of central economic
    driver, pointing to Brazil's need for electrical generation
    capacity and ongoing telecom investment projects.

    ¶5.  NOTE:  Brazil's credit stock totaled Reals 390 billion
    in September -- almost exactly 25% of GDP.  Hence, credit
    expansion of the order specified by Pinho would merely
    involve bringing the ratio back up to 30%.  That would still
    be appreciably below the 32% of early 2002, when Brazil's
    economy was already hard-hit by the contractionary effects
    of Argentina's collapse, Brazil's own energy crisis, and
    9/11.  END NOTE.

    ¶6.  CSFB's chief economist Rodrigo Azevedo likewise believed
    the monetary stimulus from falling interest rates and
    growing credit would carry the economy through the first two
    quarters of 2004 at a 3% rate.  After that, investment would
    be needed to extend growth.  Azevedo's counterpart at Banco
    Pactual, Guilherme Bacha, volunteered the view that the CB
    ought to be lowering interest rates still more aggressively,
    to better pump early consumption.  Bacha (who reportedly was
    offered the post of CB Chairman after Lula's election but
    turned it down in the belief that the GoB would accord him
    too little authority to ensure fiscal restraint),
    acknowledged with a grin that monetary loosening was the
    last recipe he would have prescribed in the PT government's
    first months, but explained that the GoB has so conclusively
    established its credibility that bolder cuts now would be
    risk-free.

    ¶7.  In a related vein, Central Bank (CB) Governor for
    Monetary Policy Bevilacqua noted to us that Brazil has a
    historical record of swift, strong reaction to the early
    stages of monetary easing.  Even with real interest rates
    (10-11%) still high by most standards, Brazilians have begun
    to make new buying decisions based on the CB's interest-rate
    cuts since June, averred Bevilacqua.  He was careful to
    state that the CB does not necessarily see the current 10%
    as the economy's "equilibrium" real-interest rate.  At the
    same time, he offered no hint of how fast or far the SELIC
    might fall in 2004.  Rather, he stressed the GoB's unaltered
    resolution to preempt any possible reversion to what he
    termed Brazil's past "go and stop" pattern:  too-carefree
    monetary easing fuelling good growth for a year or two, only
    to be followed by inflation's return and GDP slowdown.

    ¶8.  Ministry of Finance Economic Policy Secretary Lisboa
    echoed Bevilacqua's thesis that the Brazilian economy reacts
    unusually quickly to interest-rate decreases.  Separately,
    however, the IMF ResRep made plain to us his own disbelief
    that a sustained wave of consumption is on Brazil's near
    horizon.  Other specialists note the likelihood that
    Brazil's much-increased current tax burden and real-income
    constraints will inhibit renewed spending far more than
    during Brazil's past historical episodes of monetary easing.

    ¶9.  Nonetheless, some unexpectedly good recent statistics do
    accord with the GoB's optimism.  Industrial production this
    September grew nationally by 4.2%, and in Sao Paolo by 5.7%,
    compared to September 2002.  National vehicle sales in
    October were up by double-digit percentages for the second
    month in a row, admittedly helped by a recent GoB tax
    incentive.  Encouragingly for near-term investment
    implications, capital-goods sales and imports were also both
    up strongly, month-on-month.  Retail sales rose slightly in
    October, for the first time in fourteen months.  In what the
    GoB claims as further evidence of overall recovery, October
    tax revenues rose twenty percent over September's.  And Sao
    Paulo's industrial-sector employment surprised all observers
    by growing 0.5% (7,700 new jobs) in October, the best
    October result since 1994.

    ¶10.  All private-sector contacts lavished uniform praise on
    the Lula government's macroeconomic policies for restoring
    credibility and bringing Brazil Risk (the spread above U.S.
    treasuries that Brazil must pay to borrow on international
    markets) down from over 24% in October 2002 to its current
    level of under 5.5%.  A few acknowledged that part of this
    effect was simply because expectations for macroeconomic
    policy in a Lula government had started so low.

    Main Hazard -- External Interest Rates
    --------------------------------------

    ¶11.  CSFB's Azevedo and others warned that Brazil's
    financial stabilization has benefited from an unusually
    benign international environment, with developed-country
    interest rates at very low levels.  The flip side of the
    coin is that Brazil's debt-service burden (debt/GDP ratio
    still at 57%) leaves it prey to potential tightening of U.S.
    monetary policy.  That could re-ignite last year's vicious
    cycle of currency depreciation, causing foreign exchange to
    exit or avoid Brazil anew and upsetting the GOB's carefully
    balanced fiscal apple cart.  This risk may loom larger in
    light of the third-quarter U.S. growth figures.

    ¶12.  Banco Pactual's Bacha was particularly emphatic that
    the main threat to Brazil's economic prospects in 2004-2005
    would be a too-early initiation of U.S. Fed interest-rate
    hikes.  Yes, Bacha admitted, such hikes would presumably be
    correlated with strong U.S. growth, which should fuel
    Brazilian exports.  But, he said adamantly, the financial
    downside for Brazil would far outweigh any export-demand
    benefit.  Asked at what stage U.S. interest-rate movement
    might become critical for Brazil, Bacha declined to
    quantify, opining just that world-market atmosphere at the
    time would be decisive.

    ¶13.  In this context, minds are focused on the GoB's
    reduction of the dollar-indexed component of public debt.
    With the ongoing non-rollover of up to 12 billion dollars'
    worth of dollar-linked Brazilian domestic debt, that
    component may fall below 23% by year's end.  Continuing this
    progress through next year is essential to keeping the
    dollar-linked debt from exerting undue pressure on fiscal
    accounts when the inevitable developed-world monetary
    tightening begins.  As to overall debt-to-GDP ratio, GoB
    officials admitted that it will be marginally greater at the
    end of 2003 than a year earlier, but maintained that from
    2004 it will steadily fall.

    Reform Uncertainties
    --------------------

    ¶14.  The double-consensus of public and private sectors is
    that investment must carry growth in the longer term, and
    that that investment will hinge on macroeconomic and
    microeconomic/regulatory reforms.  The question then is how
    quickly Lula's structural reforms advance and begin to bear
    fruit.

    ¶15.  Given the delays, watering-down and remaining
    uncertainties of Lula's macroeconomic reforms -- i.e., the
    tax and pension bills -- we repeatedly asked if the market
    might at some point deem those reforms inadequate and react
    accordingly.  The consistent answer was negative.  Analysts
    explicitly said their companies are comfortable enough with
    the two bills' status.  They agreed that their legislative
    progress has been underwhelming, and that the fiscal effect
    of each has been diluted to unimpressive dimensions.  Few
    saw the pension-reform bill as doing much more than
    "stopping the fiscal bleeding."  Alvaro Freire of Unibanco
    warned that all such politically sensitive reforms would be
    an iterative process, requiring years and multiple re-
    visits.  But the simple fact that the PT had tackled pension
    and tax reform seriously remained positive and paramount.

    ¶16.  One GoB reform to be unconditionally applauded was the
    new bankruptcy law, recently passed and sent to the Senate
    by the lower Chamber.  Unibanco's Freire, among others,
    expected the bankruptcy law to have a fairly rapid effect in
    reducing banking spreads, although opinion was split on the
    size of that impact.  On the subject of Brazil's regulatory
    and microeconomic framework for future investment (Ref B),
    we heard a perhaps surprising lack of comment.  This applied
    most conspicuously to the future energy model and the reform
    of regulatory agencies' roles.

    Not Too Much of a Good Thing
    ----------------------------

    ¶17.  Several interlocutors noted that sustained growth above 4%
    would pose its own risks.  Ministry of Finance International
    Secretary Canuto asserted that there is sufficient slack

    SIPDIS
    capacity in the economy to accommodate growth on the order of
    3% to 3.5%.  Beyond that level, bottlenecks and inflation would
    rear their heads.  AmCham Economic Committee head Paulo
    Albuquerque raised a similar caveat.  GOB officials spoke of
    their aim to alleviate some of these constraints by attracting
    private investment in infrastructure through new Public Private
    Partnerships (PPP) projects.

    ¶18.  On the external-account side, renewed Brazilian growth
    could be expected to involve a return to current-account
    deficits, as imports rise from their currently depressed levels
    and with Brazil's exporters perhaps selling a greater share of
    output to a reviving domestic market.  The standard estimate
    for these deficits, from both private economists and GoB
    specialists, was five-to-six billion dollars for 2004, and six-
    to-eight billion for 2005.  Many observers noted the need for
    extra foreign investment to bridge these gaps.

    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶19.  To judge from these meetings, local prognoses for
    Brazil's economy are more homogeneously positive now than at
    any time in the last two years.  We have our reservations.
    First, even granted that consumption has begun to pick up
    pre-Xmas, it seems debatable that Brazil's population has
    the income or savings for sustained buying after six
    successive years of annual real-wage decline.  Second, the
    GoB's record to date in Congress has not been such as to
    inspire confidence in early achievement of the follow-on
    "microeconomic" reforms which by general account are a pre-
    condition for vital future investment (Septel).  Third, the
    GoB itself, as Finance Minister Palocci is making newly
    clear, sees 2004 as being perhaps its most austere yet for
    discretionary budget expenditures -- no pump-priming likely
    from that quarter.  Fourth, even 3.5% growth in 2004 would
    hardly begin to make up the ground lost in national income
    and employment in 2001-2003, with that period's annual
    growth rates of 1.8%, 1.5% and perhaps 0.6%, respectively.

    ¶20.  Even in the smoothest scenario, the timeframe for new
    jobs and income to reach the sectors of Brazil's population
    that need them most still looks far-off indeed.  It may look
    particularly so to PT party candidates and others planning
    to contest the October 2004 municipal elections.

    VIRDEN

`