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### Viewing cable 03ROME3567, GALILEO: AMBASSADOR ARAGONA ADVOCATES ADDITIONAL

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
03ROME3567 | 2003-08-06 15:23 | 2011-08-05 11:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Rome

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 003567

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR OES/SAT (BRAIBANTI, KARNER)
    DEFENSE FOR OASD/NII (STENBIT MANNO WORMSER SWIDER CHESKY)
    DEFENSE ALSO FOR OSD/P (TOWNSEND, NOVAK)
    JOINT STAFF FOR J5/J6

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2013
    T...

    SUBJECT: GALILEO: AMBASSADOR ARAGONA ADVOCATES ADDITIONAL
    TECHNICAL TALKS TO RESOLVE M-CODE OVERLAY ISSUE

    REF: USNATO 00777

    Classified By: A/ECMIN David W. Mulenex; reasons 1.5 B and D.

    ¶1.  (C)  Summary:  Italian MFA Political Director Gianfranco
    Aragona informed a U.S. delegation on July 16 that he still
    believes technical solutions exist to the U.S.-EU dispute
    over the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) signal
    overlay of the M-code.  Aragona recognized US security
    concerns regarding the overlay, but repeatedly insisted the
    EU must safeguard the "Integrity and operability" of Galileo.
     The U.S. delegation insisted that an overlay would harm U.S.
    and NATO NAVWAR capabilities and put lives at risk in the
    event of warfare.  Aragona did not completely reject the
    delegation's point that a political solution was necessary to
    avoid this outcome but made it clear he does not believe the
    dispute is ripe for high level political intervention.
    Aragona did agree that the delegation's suggestion to merge
    unclassified technical talks and plenary negotiations was a
    good idea and promised to convey the idea to the Commission.
    Aragona stated firmly that NATO would not be an acceptable
    venue for classified discussions.  He suggested they could
    take place at the US Mission to NATO, but insisted that he
    participants must be limited to the U.S. and the EC.  See
    Embassy comment para 16. End Summary.

    ¶2.  (U)  On July 16 a U.S. delegation met with Italian MFA
    Political Director Gianfranco Aragona to discuss the US-EC
    dispute over the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS)
    signal overlay of the GPS M-code.  The U.S. delegation was
    led by Ralph Braibanti, Director, Space and Advanced
    Technology, State Department Bureau of Oceans and
    International Environmental and Technical Affairs and
    included Mel Flack, Director, Communications Electronic
    Division, US Mission to NATO; Richard McKinney, Deputy
    Director Space Acquisition, US Air Force; Todd Wilson, EST
    Officer, US Mission to the EU; Marja Verloop EUR/ERA; and
    representatives from the political and science sections of
    Embassy Rome.  Those joining Aragona included Giovanni
    Brauzzi, Director, Office of NATO Affairs, MFA; Sandro
    Bernardin, European Correspondent, MFA; Mario Caporale,
    Navigation Office, Italian Space Agency; and Umberto
    Cantielli, Chief, Navigation Identification Office, Defense
    General Staff, Ministry of Defense.

    U.S. Delegation Insists Political Solution is needed

    ¶3.  (C)  Braibanti told Aragona that the U.S. believes it is
    important to hold informal consultations with key EU member
    States to advance U.S.-EC differences over Galileo towards a
    decision.  He recalled that the President raised M-Code
    overlay at the last U.S.- EU Summit.  In reviewing the USG
    position on Galileo, Braibanti explained that the U.S.
    accepts the EU satellite system as a reality, but the
    security implications of having the Galileo Public Regulated
    Service (PRS) overlay the GPS M-Code are unacceptable to both
    the U.S. and NATO.  so far, the U.S. has fought a defensive
    battle with the European Commission (EC).  Braibanti allowed
    that some progress has been made in convincing European
    officials that direct overlay of M-Code by the PRS is a bad
    idea.  However, consideration being given by the EC to use
    BOC 2.2 for Open Service (OS) also involves a partial overlay
    of M-Code, and damages navigational warfare capabilities.
    The U.S. will be unable to accept this outcome.

    ¶4.  (C)  Braibanti assured Aragona that the USG is committed
    to finding a solution, but cautioned that without some
    flexibility and compromise from the EC, progress will be
    difficult.  The U.S. has proposed several technical options
    for Galileo PRS and OS that our experts believe meet all
    stated technical and performance requirements for Galileo
    services.  Braibanti underscored that, given the EC's
    timetable for making design decisions on Galileo, member
    states may find that the Commission has locked in technical
    solutions that threaten U.S. and NATO capabilities to conduct
    navigational warfare.  To avoid this eventuality, which could
    put allied lives at risk, member states need to give clear
    political guidance now to the EC that the Galileo signal
    structure cannot undermine NAVWAR operations.

    But Aragona Puts Faith in Further Technical Talks

    ¶5.  (C)  Aragona, signaling his reluctance to take on U.S.
    concerns vis-a-vis Italy's EU partners, underscored that
    Galileo negotiations had been entrusted to the EC.  He
    assured the U.S. team that Italy recognized the security
    issues at stake.  "Given our NATO membership it would be
    crazy for us not to be sensitive to U.S. arguments," Aragona
    declared.  These concerns are shared by the EC, he claimed,
    but any solution must also safeguard the "integrity and
    operability of Galileo for it to be a commercially viable and
    reliable system (Note: Aragona came back repeatedly
    throughout the course of the consultations to this theme. End
    Note).

    ¶6.  (C)  Aragona pressed claims by EC experts that technical
    negotiations could lead to a solution to both protect the
    integrity and operability of Galileo and address US security
    concerns.  Referencing the U.S.-EU Summit, Aragona asserted
    that, as an "agreement" had been reached to proceed with
    technical talks, the pace of negotiations to try to reach a
    "technical solution" to the overlay conundrum should be
    intensified.   Italy and the EC are ready to take into
    account U.S. and NATO security concerns and believe that
    technical solutions, which protect them, are available.

    ¶7.  (C)  Aragona wanted to know when the U.S. would be ready
    to discuss the most recent EC proposals, which he understood
    included a certain "inventiveness" and were "not so stuck in
    the prejudices of the past."  The EC was ready to sit and
    discuss a mutually agreeable technical solution.  As for
    political input, Aragona said once more that the Commission
    is well aware that U.S. security concerns must be addressed
    while taking into account the "integrity" of the Galileo
    system.

    ¶8.  (C)  Braibanti countered that, with regard to EC
    technical proposals, he was aware of only two to which a
    formal reply had not been given: using filtering to mitigate
    the navigation warfare problems posed by overlaying BOC 2.2,
    and having the U.S. change the frequency for its military GPS
    signals.  In the spirit of cooperation, the U.S. had not
    rejected these ideas out of hand, but instead asked its
    technical experts to analyze them carefully.  Now that he had
    seen the results of this analysis, Braibanti could say with
    some certainty that it is highly unlikely that either of
    these options will work.  Summing up this portion of the
    discussion, Braibanti framed the state of play for Aragona:
    We may well reach a situation in September where we will have
    analyzed the EC's proposals and decided they can not provide
    a solution which protects U.S. and NATO capabilities to
    conduct NAVWAR.  Our concern is that if EC technical experts
    continue to operate within their current frame of reference,
    we will arrive at a technical impasse.  To avoid this
    impasse, the EC team needs clear political direction from
    member States that they should focus on options that do not
    negatively impact NAVWAR.  (Note: on the margins of the
    meeting, Braibanti told Aragona that the USG worries the EC
    negotiators may be positioning themselves to argue to the EU
    member states that they had made a good faith effort to reach
    a compromise, but the U.S. would not meet them halfway, so
    Galileo must move ahead without an agreement to cooperate
    with the U.S.  Aragona discounted this possibility,
    suggesting that the EC recognizes the need for Galileo-GPS
    interoperability.  (End Note)

    NATO a Non-Starter for Classified Talks

    ¶9.  (C)  Aragona said the U.S. and EU face a practical
    problem over where to hold classified discussions and that
    this problem should be easily resolvable.  Italy expects the
    U.S. to provide a formal answer to the letter EC negotiator
    Heinz Hillbrecht sent to Braibanti on July 2 (reftel).
    Aragona maintained that the EC wants further discussions in a
    classified setting, but that setting can not be NATO.  He
    underscored this point in uncharacteristically blunt
    language.  Aragona said holding the talks at the US Mission
    to NATO was perfectly acceptable as long as they were U.S.-EC
    rather than NATO-EC discussions.  The issue under discussion
    is between the U.S. and the EC, Aragona argued, and,
    moreover, there are several non-EU members of NATO.
    Braibanti took Aragona's points and assured him that the USG
    was considering the issue of additional classified
    discussions, including the modalities for such meetings.

    Some Agreement on Procedure, but....

    ¶10.  (C)  Braibanti, moving the discussion to how and when to
    hold the next plenary negotiating session, said the U.S. will
    work with the Commission on dates for a September meeting to
    review technical and trade issues  He suggested folding the
    technical discussions into the plenary negotiating session.
    This could help to ensure transparency and avoid
    misunderstanding among the political negotiators about the
    available technical options.  Aragona acknowledged that
    Braibanti's idea had merit and committed to "see what could
    be done" to make a political recommendation to the EC to
    proceed along these lines.

    Still Talking Past Each Other on substance

    ¶11.  (C)  The U.S. delegation raised concerns that France
    might be driving the EC toward a decision counter to the
    interests of other EU member states, the U.S. and NATO.  Mel
    Flack said it was difficult not to arrive at the conclusion
    that France was interested in an M-Code overlay so it could
    guarantee reliability for precision guided weaponry it might
    seek to sell to third countries.

    ¶12.  (C)  "I have objected to Europeans who say that U.S.
    actions demonstrate an intent to undermine Galileo," Aragona
    told the delegation.  "Likewise," he said, "I do not believe
    that there is any maliciousness on the part of a particular
    country or the EC."  Above all, he maintained, Galileo is a
    commercial undertaking; the system's signal structure was
    selected according to well established criteria based on the
    belief that it provided the most robust, reliable service.
    "I accept your arguments about the need to jam adversaries in
    a NAVWAR context," he said, but the U.S. "needs to keep in
    mind that Galileo service must be sold.  The problem of
    selective jamming is not just political; commercial aspects
    are also involved."  When Aragona stated it would not be
    acceptable to expect the EU to settle for alternate, less
    robust, signals, Braibanti countered it would be unacceptable
    for the U.S. and its allies to risk the lives of soldiers in
    order to allow the EU to have more robust signals for
    Galileo.

    ¶13.  (C)  Aragona acknowledged the point in passing, but
    moved quickly to close and summarize the conversation.  He
    suggested the next step would be to find a suitable venue to
    hold classified discussions.  He claimed there is flexibility
    and that the EU is aware of the need for a solution amenable
    to both sides.  Braibanti emphasized that after the September
    discussions the USG would like to hold another set of
    bilateral consultations with Italy.  Aragona was
    noncommittal, offering to share thoughts after the September
    plenary session and then decide on a way forward.  In terms
    of U.S.-Italian engagement, he said he hoped that discussions
    would not lead to the "extreme" situation in which the U.S.
    and EU would be negotiating on exclusively U.S. terms, by
    which he meant asking the EU to accept moving PRS to another
    frequency band and to only then negotiate a solution.  He
    noted in closing that Italy had its own technological and
    industrial interests to defend.

    Better Signals, Less Political Clout from Other GOI Ministries

    ¶14.  (C)  Braibanti, Flack and EST Couns met with Vice
    Minister for Research Guido Possa on July 15.  Possa is
    responsible for the Italian Space Agency and through it for
    Italian participation in ESA.  After a brief explanation of
    the overlay problem and its implications for NAVWAR, Possa
    immediately understood that a political, and not a technical
    approach was needed to resolve outstanding problems.  Possa
    suggested that the U.S. should work closely with the Germans,
    and in Italy with Minister of Defense Martino, whose
    commitment to NATO and to close cooperation with the U.S.
    were well known.  On the margins of a July 28
    representational event,  ESTCOUNS and A/POLMINCOUNS raised
    briefly the overlay problem with MINDEF Martino.  Martino
    said that, from his point of view, Galileo was unnecessary
    and a huge waste of money -- one GPS system was enough.  He
    was unaware that the USG now supported Galileo in principle.
    Martino was sensitive to our arguments on the security
    implications of the overlay, but observed that he was
    perceived within the GOI as too pro-American to be of much
    assistance.  He suggested that the Embassy's best bet for
    moving the GOI closer to the USG position would be to
    approach U/S to the PM Gianni Letta, who, we note, is PM
    Berlusconi's closest political advisor.

    ¶15.  (C)  ESTCOUNS, ECONCOUNS, AND USEU ECONCOUNS met July 18
    with Ministry of Transport Diplomatic Advisor Maraini to
    discuss the Aragona meetings and to seek the perspective of
    the Ministry on the decisions to be taken concerning Galileo
    at the December Transport Council.  Maraini told us that he
    believed that Galileo was now principally a political
    problem, and a problem beyond the competency of the Transport
    Ministry and Transport Council.  In a candid appraisal of
    Hillbrecht-whom Maraini admitted he did not know well--the
    Diplomatic Advisor said that the decision to be taken was
    beyond the competency of Hillbrecht's technical committee.
    Maraini understood and agreed with our assessment that very
    little time and scope remained for technical solutions, and
    that an impasse requiring a major political decision by the
    EU was likely.  Maraini is worried about the outcome.  He
    undertook to prepare a note for Minister Lunardi to be sent
    to the Prive Minister before the PM's departure for Crawford.

    ¶16.  (C)  Embassy Comment:  The U.S. delegation made the trip
    to Rome to follow up on indications from Aragona, made during
    his recent trip to Washington, that he may have been willing
    to carry some water for us with the EC and member states.  We
    were left with the impression that Italy's PolDir had instead
    decided to keep his EU hat firmly in place and stick to the
    script of the EC briefing book on Galileo.  Despite
    understanding within the functional ministries of the GOI,
    peeling Aragona, the MFA, and Italy away from the EC position
    will be difficult, judging from Aragona's assessment that
    "technical solutions" still offer a way forward.  He threw us
    a quarter of a bone by offering to help give political top
    cover to the expert level technical discussions.  However,
    Aragona's implicit insistence that Galileo's commercial
    viability may depend on at least a partial M-Code overlay to
    "guarantee" service is troubling for its resemblance to
    French arguments.

    ¶17.  (U)  This message has been cleared by OES/SAT Braibanti.
    Sembler

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