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### Viewing cable 05MADRID3260, SPAIN: AN ACTIVE FRONT IN THE WAR ON TERROR

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
05MADRID3260 | 2005-09-15 10:18 | 2010-12-17 12:00 | SECRET | Embassy Madrid

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 MADRID 003260

    SIPDIS

    EUR/PGI FOR REASOR AND WEINSTEIN
    XXXXXXXXXXXX
    DS/IP/EUR
    DS/ICI/PII
    DS/DSS/ITA

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2015
    TAGS: PTER PGOV SP
    SUBJECT: SPAIN: AN ACTIVE FRONT IN THE WAR ON TERROR

    REF: A. A) STATE 144222
    ¶B. B) COPENHAGEN 1220
    ¶C. C) MADRID 1349
    ¶D. D) MADRID 2223
    ¶E. E) MADRID 1809
    ¶F. F) MADRID 2082
    ¶G. G) MADRID 2537
    ¶H. H) MADRID 0645
    ¶I. I) 2004 MADRID 1142

    Classified By: Polcouns Kathy Fitzpatrick; reason 1.5 (B) and (D).

    ¶1. (C) Summary. Spain is both a significant target of
    Islamic terrorist groups and a major logistical hub for
    Islamic extremist groups operating across the globe. The
    March 11, 2004 train bombings made Madrid the site of the
    worst terrorist attack in the history of the EU and triggered
    the second major crackdown in three years against Spain-based
    Islamic terrorist groups. Historically, Spain-based
    extremists have tended to be older (30-40 years),
    first-generation immigrants with a history of militant
    activity in their home countries. The first Islamists did
    not establish themselves in Spain until the late 1980s and
    early 1990s, coming mainly from Syria and Algeria. The
    influx of large numbers of North African immigrants is
    changing the profile of Spain-based Islamic extremists,
    creating a large pool of young, alienated men available for
    recruitment.

    ¶2. (C) Extremist groups active in Spain tend to be
    decentralized, collaborating on an ad hoc basis and united
    more by friendships, family ties, and loyalty to the global
    jihadist cause than by membership in any given terrorist
    organization. While Spain-based groups at first focused on
    organizing themselves and providing logistical support to
    extremists in other countries, they became increasingly
    aggressive after the September 11 attacks and the subsequent
    GOS crackdown on Islamist terrorist cells in Spain. Spain's
    withdrawal of troops from Iraq does not appear to have
    reduced the desire of extremists to strike at Spanish targets
    and Spanish authorities, long focused on Basque terrorism,
    have shifted gears to deal with the growing threat posed by
    Islamic extremists. Police have disrupted multiple terrorist
    networks over the last year, including a group that funneled
    suicide bombers from Spain to Iraq, and are currently holding
    approximately 130 suspects in connection with Islamic
    terrorist activities. In July, the GOS concluded a four-year
    investigation and trial of 24 members of a local al-Qa'ida
    cell; the Court is expected to render a decision September
    ¶20. There are at least 300 suspected Islamist terrorists or
    logistical operatives in Spain and the Ministry of Interior's
    senior terrorism adviser believes there may be as many as
    1,000. Spain-based terrorists are believed to target local
    USG interests; for example, one of the Madrid train bombers
    was spotted conducting surveillance of the Embassy building
    one year prior to the train attacks. The rapid growth of the
    Moroccan immigrant community, combined with worrisome trends
    among Spain-based extremist groups, suggest that Spain is
    likely to remain an active front in the war on terror for
    many years to come. End Summary.

    //THE ISLAMIC COMMUNITY IN SPAIN//

    ¶3. (C) There are an estimated 600,000-800,000 Muslims in
    Spain, and possibly up to one million, the majority of them
    recent immigrants from Morocco. The recent upsurge in
    illegal immigration makes a more accurate figure difficult to
    establish. Not surprisingly, the growth of Spain's Islamic
    population has been especially robust in its North African
    enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, where a GOS report forecast
    that Muslims would become a majority within the next several
    years (and warned that only 40 percent of residents
    considered themselves "pro-Spanish.") Prior to the arrival
    of large numbers of North African immigrants in the late
    1990s, Spain's Muslim population was comprised of immigrants
    from Pakistan and the Middle East, as well as a growing
    number of Spanish-born converts to Islam. Spanish converts,
    numbering some 20,000, tend to gather and to worship at their
    own institutions. Converts are well represented in Spain's
    leading Islamic institutions including the Islamic Commision
    of Spain (CIE), which serves as the official interface
    between the Islamic community and the Spanish government.
    The CIE includes major organizations such as the Islamic
    Federation of Spain and the Union of Islamic Communities in
    Spain. Over 240 mosques and 64 religious communities are
    officially registered with the CIE; approximately 160 mosques
    in Spain do not belong to the CIE. Immigrants rights
    organization "ATIME" is not a religious group, but most of
    its members are Moroccan Muslims. ATIME recently angered CIE
    leaders by proposing the creation of a new Islamic council to
    incorporate the views of more recent arrivals in Spain and
    establish controls to monitor against the teaching of
    extremist ideologies by imams (implying that the CIE does not
    adequately represent the views of the growing Moroccan
    community or police its own members). Observers believe that
    no more than 15 percent of Spanish Muslims regularly attend
    religious services, though many likely attend services at
    informal houses of worship, known as "oratorios."

    ¶4. (S) Until now, the broader Muslim community in Spain has
    been of little importance to the activities of local
    extremist groups. During the 1990s, the vast majority of
    Spain-based Islamist radicals were recent immigrants with a
    history of militant activity in their home countries. Very
    few were second-generation immigrants or Spanish converts to
    Islam. Islamic extremists coalesced in Spanish mosques and
    continue to use them to distribute propaganda and scout for
    new recruits, but they have had only limited success in using
    mosques to tap into the broader Muslim community.
    Authorities believe Islamist radicals prefer informal
    religious instruction groups as a way to attract new members
    and maintain group cohesion rather than working in mosques
    where they are vulnerable to surveillance by police and other
    mosque members.

    ¶5. (S) Spain's largest mosque is co-located with the Islamic
    Cultural Center in Madrid and is popularly known as the "M-30
    Mosque" because of its proximity to the M-30 highway, a
    principal artery through Madrid. The M-30 Mosque is funded
    by the Government of Saudi Arabia. Though the imams at the
    M-30 Mosque are considered moderate by Spanish authorities,
    suspected extremists are known to attend services there.
    Prosecutors are investigating the former director of M-30
    Mosque for his alleged role in transferring funds to a
    suspicious NGO; the USG is assisting with this investigation.
    Separately, three imams from the Catalan region were the key
    figures in a network that facilitated the movement of
    jihadists from Spain to Iraq to undertake terrorist acts
    against Coalition and Iraqi Government targets. Their
    mosques served as recruitment and indoctrination centers for
    terrorist volunteers. This network was dismantled by police
    in June, 2005. In addition to recruiting through mosques,
    Islamist radicals distribute propaganda at Koranic schools,
    halal butcher shops, and Islamic centers.

    ¶6. (C) Islamic extremists are not connected to any political
    organization in Spain. There are no Islamist (or even
    Islamic) political parties that could be used as a cover for
    jihadist activities. This may begin to change as the
    burgeoning population of North African immigrants, especially
    Moroccans, begins to establish its own institutions in Spain.
    There are no significant Spain-based Islamic extremist
    publications, though many Spanish extremists have connections
    to publications elsewhere in Europe, such as London.

    //ISLAMIC TERRORISM - A RECENT ARRIVAL IN SPAIN//

    ¶7. (C) Though Spain was the site of several Islamic terrorist
    attacks during the 1980s, including a 1985 bombing by Islamic
    Jihad near Torrejon Air Base outside of Madrid that killed 18
    and wounded 82, there are few indications of extremist groups
    operating from Spain prior to the mid 1990s. The first
    Islamic terrorist organizations were formed by Syrian members
    of the Muslim Brotherhood who had fled repression by the Asad
    regime and settled in Spain in the late 1980s. Police
    believe Palestinian radical Anwar Adnan Mohamed Salah, AKA
    "Chej Salah," and Syrian al-Qa'ida member and propagandist
    Mustafa Setmarian, AKA "Abu Mus'ab al-Suri," played a
    critical role in organizing Syrian exiles in Spain to support
    the international jihadist movement. In 1994, Setmarian
    moved to London to work with the Algerian Armed Islamic Group
    (GIA) publication "al-Ansar" and Salah went to Pakistan to
    work with al-Qa'ida leader Abu Zubaydah in funneling recruits
    to terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. From 1995 until
    his 2001 arrest, Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas led the Syrian
    group in Spain, during which period this cell expanded its
    activities and aided the development of other Islamist
    extremist groups. Yarkas and many of the other Syrian
    extremists were relatively educated, prosperous, and
    projected the appearance of being well established in Spain.
    They reportedly raised terrorism funds by working with
    Moroccan criminals engaged in fraud, robbery, and theft of
    mobile phones.

    ¶8. (C) As Syrian extremists were becoming more organized to
    lend support to international jihadist movements, Algerian
    GIA members began arriving in Spain in significant numbers,
    fleeing capture by the Algerian authorities. GIA members
    settled in eastern Spain, mostly near Alicante and Valencia,
    which have ferry connections to Algerian ports. Many GIA
    members in Spain acted in a support capacity for GIA fighters
    in Algeria, though some moved on to work for international
    jihadist causes. The Salafist Group for Call and Combat
    (GSPC), which eclipsed the GIA in Spain as elsewhere, was
    detected by 2001 and in June of that year Spanish police
    arrested GSPC member Mohamed Benshakria, who had fled Germany
    to avoid arrest in connection with the "Meliani cell" that
    had planned terrorist attacks in Strasbourg.

    ¶9. (C) South Asian extremists also arrived in Spain, with
    most settling in the large Pakistani communities in
    Barcelona, Bibao, Santander, and Logrono. Pakistani Islamist
    radicals appear to play a mainly logistical role,
    particularly in providing false documents and in transferring
    funds. Spanish authorities are concerned that extremist
    elements may have insinuated themselves into Pakistani
    communities in the Catalan and La Rioja regions in order to
    provide support and raise funds for militant
    Pakistani/Kashmiri organizations such as Lashkar-i-Taiba,
    Harakat-ul Mujahideen, Jaish-e Mohammad, Lashkar-e Jangvi,
    and Jihad-e-Islami al-Alami. Recent reports indicate that
    Dubai is a key financial hub for Spain-based Pakistani hawala
    organizations, including those hawalas with links to crime
    and/or terrorism. Police arrested 10 Pakistani nationals on
    fraud charges in Barcelona in September 2004 and subsequently
    discovered indications that the group had apparently funneled
    money to senior al-Qa'ida figures in Pakistan and had made
    suspicious videos of Barcelona landmarks. The group remains
    in detention.

    //MOROCCANS ARRIVE//

    ¶10. (C) The most important recent development in the local
    Islamic extremist community has been the influx of Moroccan
    radicals. They arrived in the 1990s along with tens of
    thousands of Moroccan economic migrants, who have become by
    far the largest Muslim immigrant community in Spain (500,000
    Moroccans compared to approximately 40,000 Algerians, the
    next-largest group). While some of the more important
    Moroccan extremists matched their Syrian and Algerian
    counterparts in terms of first-hand experience operating
    against their government, many low-level supporters were only
    recruited after their arrival in Spain. Moroccan extremists
    tend to be less well off and most are involved in criminal
    activity, such as drug trafficking (primarily hashish) and/or
    fraud. Since the September 11 attacks in the U.S., the
    Casablanca bombings in Morocco, the interventions in
    Afghanistan and Iraq, and the dismantlement of the Barakat
    Yarkas network, Moroccan extremists appear to have moved to
    the forefront of the jihadist community in Spain, at least in
    numerical terms. The large and growing Moroccan community
    provides Islamic extremist recruiters in Spain with an ample
    supply of poor, alienated young men and access to funds from
    drug trafficking and other illegal activities.

    //TERRORIST GROUPS ACTIVE IN SPAIN//

    ¶11. (S) The extremist community in Spain is decentralized,
    with few national or institutional barriers and frequent ad
    hoc collaboration among radicals from different
    organizations. Few local organizations emphasize themselves
    as a unit and organization names appear to be unimportant.
    However, many extremists in Spain are affiliated to some
    degree with organized jihadist groups in other countries. In
    total, police believe there are at least 300 Islamic radicals
    active in Spain and Ministry of Interior Senior Adviser on
    Terrorism Professor Fernando Reinares estimates there may be
    as many as 1,000 such extremists. Islamic terrorist
    organizations with a presence in Spain include:

    -- al-Qa'ida: Barakat Yarkas and other members of the Syrian
    group had direct links to al-Qa'ida. Barakat Yarkas is
    charged with murder for allegedly organizing Mohamed Atta's
    crucial meeting with Ramzi Binalshibh during Atta's final
    preparations for the September 11 attacks. A decision is
    expected in his case on September 20. Other extremist
    organizations in Spain draw inspiration from al-Qa'ida, but
    there is no clear indication that they act under instruction
    from the leadership of the organization.

    -- Moroccan Islamic Combat Group (GICM): Police have drawn
    connections between terrorists involved in the Madrid train
    bombings and the GICM figures that carried out the 2003
    Casablanca attacks, but it appears that the Madrid bombings
    were organized and executed at the local level rather than
    under instruction from the GICM leadership. Senior GICM
    figure Hassan al-Haski was arrested in the Canary Islands in
    December 2004 for his alleged role in the March 11 train
    bombings.

    -- Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC): According to
    Spanish authorities, GSPC members in Spain appear to act with
    a high degree of autonomy from their leadership in Algeria.
    Many suspected GSPC members seem to be acting in support of
    local and global jihadist causes rather than being dedicated
    to the conflict in Algeria.

    -- Armed Islamic Group (GIA): GIA was an important force
    during the formative period of Islamist extremist groups in
    Spain in the early 1990s, but no longer maintains a
    significant presence in the country, since many GIA members
    have been arrested, abandoned the GIA to join the GSPC, or
    joined other local Islamist causes. March 11 train bombing
    suspect Allekema Lamari served five years in a Spanish prison
    on charges of being a GIA member.

    -- Ansar-al-Islam: Ansar-al-Islam does not have a formal
    presence in Spain, but a Spain-based organization affiliated
    with the group was responsible for recruiting suicide bombers
    to attack coalition forces in Iraq. Spanish authorities
    dismantled the cell in June, 2005, jailing eight and holding
    seven for deportation proceedings. Three of those detained
    were imams at Barcelona-area mosques. The cell reportedly
    succeeded in sending Mohamed Afalah, an extremist involved in
    the Madrid train bombings, to Iraq where he may have carried
    out a suicide attack against Iraqi government or Coalition
    forces in May, 2005.

    -- Salafiya Jihadiya: Formed in the early 1990s by Moroccan
    veterans of the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan, Salafiya
    Jihadiya supported or inspired many Moroccan jihadists,
    including several that worked with the organization in
    Morocco and later moved to Spain.

    -- Hizballah: Hizballah (which is not officially recognized
    as a terrorist organization by EU countries but is monitored
    by the Spanish security services) is believed to have a small
    presence in Spain in a fund-raising and logistical capacity.
    Spanish officials judge the risk of a Hizballah attack in
    Spain to be very low.

    //SHIFTING FACE OF EXTREMISM IN SPAIN//

    ¶12. (C) Nearly all known or suspected Islamic extremists in
    Spain are first-generation immigrants, most of whom have a
    history of religious fanaticism in their home countries or a
    close personal connection to a Muslim extremist. They are
    typically older than extremists in other countries, with the
    majority aged 30-40 and very few below the age of 25. As
    noted above, many of the first Islamists to take up
    activities in Spain had a good education and many had good
    jobs and were considered well integrated into Spanish
    society. That remains true for many among the second wave of
    Spain-based extremists, including Moroccans involved in the
    March 11 attacks. However, among North Africans suspected of
    involvement in terrorist activity there also many who are
    poor or unemployed and many have criminal records for drug
    trafficking, robbery, or fraud. The growing pool of
    disaffected young North Africans is likely to become the
    major recruiting pool for extremist organizers over the
    coming years.

    //IDEOLOGY ERASES ORGANIZATIONAL BOUNDARIES//

    ¶13. (C) Spain-based Islamist extremists are strongly
    influenced by the "Takfir Wal Hijra" doctrine, which
    justifies the use of illegal proceeds to fund jihadist
    operations and accepts non-Muslim practices such as drinking
    alcohol and drug trafficking as a cover for extremist
    activities. Several of the Madrid train bombers reportedly
    followed this doctrine, engaging in drug trafficking and
    other criminal activity to finance the March 11, 2004
    attacks. At an ideological level, the cells that carried out
    the train bombings and other groups seem driven by general
    support for the global jihadist cause and by their Salafist
    religious beliefs rather than focused on a particular theater
    of that struggle.

    ¶14. (C) Broad acceptance of these operational and
    ideological doctrines among Spain-based extremists promotes a
    high degree of cross-fertilization and ad hoc cooperation,
    with most organizational, ethnic, and regional differences
    subordinated to greater ideological objectives. Family
    relationships and friendships are key to recruitment efforts.
    Many senior extremist figures are also bound by shared
    experience in terrorist training camps in Afghanistan or
    elsewhere, or by shared association with highly-regarded
    jihadist veterans. Organization names appear unimportant,
    with shifting groups of Islamic extremist collaborators
    adopting different names for different projects. For
    example, members of Barakat Yarkas' Syrian network called
    themselves the "Islamic Alliance" and then "Soldiers of
    Allah," but never displayed much interest in a particular
    name.

    ¶15. (S) The decentralization of Spanish Islamic extremists
    was clearly seen in the network that carried out the Madrid
    train bombings. The group included mainly Moroccans, but
    also Algerians, Egyptians, Tunisians and other nationalities
    from a variety of extremist organizations. Police believe
    that at least three distinct groups came together to carry
    out the attacks. One group, based in the Madrid district of
    Lavapies, was led by Jamal Zougam, a Moroccan national
    resident in Spain and an associate of jailed al-Qa'ida figure
    Barakat Yarkas. A second group was directed by Moroccan
    national Jamal Ahmidan (AKA "El Chino") from Madrid's
    Villaverde district. The third group was led by Sarhane Ben
    Abdelmajid Fakhet (AKA Sarhane "The Tunisian") and contained
    members of various nationalities. Other actors included
    Barakat Yarkas associate Amer Azizi, who remains at large and
    is believed to have established the link between the Serhane
    and Zougam cells. The various conspirators were brought
    together by common associations with Islamic extremist
    organizers, intermarriage among their families, and worship
    at centers such as Madrid's Villaverde Mosque. The mix of
    associations has slowed the progress of the investigation
    into the train bombings. Despite having accumulated a mass
    of information regarding planning for the bombings, police
    remain unable to pinpoint precisely who led the attacks. It
    appears likely that there was no single leader, but a
    consortium of central actors who organized the plot and
    sought specialized assistance as required (for example, for
    manufacturing the bombs used in the attacks).

    //DRUG TRAFFICKING - LOW-TECH TERRORIST FINANCING//

    ¶16. (S) The March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings were
    financed with the proceeds from drug sales carried out by
    Jamal Ahmidan (El Chino) and others. Investigators found
    substantial quantities of drug money during searches of the
    properties of March 11 plotters and ample evidence linking
    low-level drug dealers to the cell that planned and executed
    the train bombings. The subsequent arrest of a separate
    extremist cell comprised primarily of Moroccans imprisoned on
    drug charges, as well as the substantial criminal records of
    North African immigrants detained in connection with yet
    another network that sent suicide bombers to Iraq, suggest
    that drug trafficking has become the primary financing
    vehicle for Spain-based jihadists. This trend substantially
    expands the pool of persons with possible involvement in
    support of Islamic extremist activities and diminishes the
    capacity of Spain's financial intelligence unit to use the
    formal banking system to track the activities of suspected
    jihadists. Mission elements are aware of this danger and
    work with police to track drug arrests of North African
    suspects. In just the period between April 1 and July 31 of
    2005, Spanish police reported 246 arrests of Moroccan
    nationals on drug charges, mostly hashish trafficking. Once
    in the Spanish prison system, these detainees become a
    priority target for Islamic extremist recruiters. With Spain
    as the major portal for cocaine and hashish bound for the
    Western European market, drug trafficking will likely remain
    a lucrative source of funds (and recruits) over the long term
    for terrorist groups operating in the country and/or
    supporting jihadist causes overseas.

    //THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS IN SPAIN//

    ¶17. (S) Spain-based Islamic terrorist groups target U.S.
    interests in the country, at least for surveillance purposes.
    The sizable extremist community and insular nature of large
    segments of the Muslim immigrant population make it difficult
    to monitor against such threats and/or detect them in the
    planning stages, but specific threats have been identified in
    recent years. Approximately one year before the 2004 Madrid
    train bombings, the RSO Surveillance Detection Team
    photographed an unidentified subject conducting surveillance
    of the Embassy (REF I). During the course of the train
    bombing investigation, RSO discovered that the subject
    photographed by the detection team was Said Berraj, a key
    planner of the train bombings who escaped the Spanish police
    sweep and remains at large. Separately, RSO blocked an
    attempt by Al-Jazeera journalist Taysir Alouny, who is on
    trial for alleged membership in the Barakat Yarkas al-Qa'ida
    cell, to enter the November 2004 Embassy election night party
    at a Madrid hotel, ostensibly to cover the event as a
    journalist. Alouny was out on bail at the time, but was
    subsequently re-arrested by Spanish authorities. Mission
    personnel believe that the U.S. Embassy likely is a prime
    target for Spain-based Islamic terrorists.

    //SPANISH RESPONSE TO ISLAMIC EXTREMISM//

    ¶18. (C) Despite Spain's long experience with radical Basque
    terrorism and years of monitoring and disrupting Islamic
    radical organizations, the March 11, 2004 Madrid train
    attacks came as a shock to Spanish security officials. The
    GOS has since tripled the number of officials charged with
    tracking Islamic extremist activity and ramped up police
    operations aimed at disrupting the operations of suspected
    terrorist cells. Successes in 2004/2005 include:

    -- "Operation NOVA," October 2004 - Police dismantled a
    terrorist ring that was planning to purchase explosives in
    order to attack Spain's High Court with a 500 kilogram bomb
    (specifically to kill anti-terrorism magistrates) and to bomb
    other Madrid landmarks. The group consisted mainly of
    Moroccans recruited in Spanish prisons by Algerian national
    Abderrahmane Tahiri (better known as "Mohamed Achraf").

    -- Continuing arrests related to the Madrid train bombings,
    such as the December 2004 detention of GICM figure Hassan el
    Haski and the June 2005 detention of five Moroccan nationals
    linked to train bombing conspirator Mohamed Afalah.

    -- "Operation Tigris," June 2005 - The National Police
    dismantled a jihadist facilitator network organized to funnel
    suicide bombers from Spain to Iraq to undertake actions
    against Coalition and Iraqi Government targets. Eight of the
    39 suspects detained during the operation were remanded to
    prison on terrorism charges, while seven others were
    processed for deportation to their countries of origin.

    -- Trial of 24 members of the Barakat Yarkas al-Qa'ida cell,
    Spring 2005. A verdict is expected September 20. Spanish
    media closely followed the three-month trial and GOS
    officials have cited the importance of the prosecution of so
    many suspected terrorists. Trial observers note that while
    prosecutors provided ample evidence that several of the cell
    members had participated in terrorist training activity, they
    did not clearly establish a link between the Barakat Yarkas
    cell and the 9/11 attacks, as alleged in the indictment.

    ¶19. (C) The GOS has worked closely with the USG in improving
    its ability to identify, arrest, and prosecute suspected
    Islamic extremists. Counterterrorism cooperation is one of
    the cornerstones of the bilateral relationship. Attorney
    General Gonzales and Justice Minister Aguilar announced the
    formation of a Counter Terrorism Experts Working Group in
    March 2005 comprised of USG and GOS security officials and
    prosecutors. The group met in Madrid in May and will meet in
    Washington in late October. Spain's highly-competent
    financial intelligence unit, SEPLAC, works very well with the
    USG at the bilateral and multilateral level.

    //LINGERING PROBLEMS HINDER CT EFFORTS//

    ¶20. (S) There are several continuing problems that undermine
    Spain's counterterrorism capabilities. The most troublesome
    impediment is strong inter-service rivalry, which blocks the
    free flow of information among the Civil Guard, the National
    Police (SNP), and the National Center for Intelligence (CNI),
    each of which plays a counterterrorism role. By all
    accounts, a national counterterrorism center created in 2004
    to improve coordination among the services has thus far
    failed to achieve its purpose. As a result, there does not
    appear to be a consolidated terrorist lookout list shared
    among the services. A related problem is the lack of an
    electronic namecheck system for customs/immigration officials
    to help them identify out persons of interest. Separately,
    recent press reports indicate internal frustration with the
    head of the SNP's intelligence branch, Telesforo Rubio, whose
    leadership style has allegedly led key figures in the SNP
    counterterrorism unit to retire or transfer to other units.

    ¶21. (C) There are also structural differences between the
    U.S. and Spanish legal systems that sometimes interfere with
    information sharing, though both sides continue working to
    minimize disruption to police investigations. In particular,
    the central role of investigating magistrates, such as
    Baltasar Garzon and Juan del Olmo, in the Spanish system and
    the lack of protections for intelligence information have
    complicated the USG's ability to share relevant information
    with Spanish authorities. For their part, Spanish
    magistrates have sometimes been loathe to share information
    controlled under strict judicial secrecy rules.

    //SPAIN FACING LONG STRUGGLE AGAINST ISLAMIC MILITANTS//

    ¶22. (C) The combination of an established and growing pool of
    extremist sympathizers and Spain's continued identification
    with "the West" on the part of those extremists makes it very
    likely that Spain will be the target of future terrorist
    attacks. The head of the MFA's Bureau of Analysis, Fidel
    Sendagorta, expressed concern in a recent article that such
    attacks would increase public rejection of North African
    immigrants and stir nativist sentiment, which could in turn
    alienate young Moroccan immigrants and make them easy targets
    for terrorist recruiters. Sendagorta pointed to the problems
    faced by the UK, France, and the Netherlands with Islamic
    radicalism in their large Muslim immigrant communities as
    forerunners of the problems Spain will face over the next ten
    to twenty years. Unfortunately, it appears that Spain will
    remain an active front in the War on Terror for some time to
    come.
    AGUIRRE

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