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### Viewing cable 05DUBLIN657, NORTHERN IRELAND: GOI WAITING FOR IRA RESPONSE AND

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
05DUBLIN657 | 2005-06-01 08:39 | 2011-07-22 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Dublin

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 DUBLIN 000657

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2015
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINS EI UK NIPP
    SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: GOI WAITING FOR IRA RESPONSE AND
    COMMITTED TO GFA

    REF: LONDON 4254

    Classified By: Ambassador James C. Kenny for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    -------
    SUMMARY
    -------

    ¶1. (C) During Special Envoy Mitchell Reiss' visit to Ireland
    May 19-22, the Irish government emphasized that the Good
    Friday Agreement and the December 8 joint communique must be
    the basis for forward movement in the peace process.  They
    anticipate an IRA response to Gerry Adams' call to leave the
    scene within 60 days; they believe the focus must be kept on
    the IRA but do not have a specific list of steps the IRA must
    take as pre-conditions to serious negotiations. They believe
    serious talks will begin in September, but it could take
    until early 2006 to put the pieces in place, especially since
    the DUP would require a long period to verify IRA good
    behavior.  GOI officials uniformly expressed concern that the
    UK's political interest in showing progress might lead the UK
    to be too soft on Sinn Fein.  Other issues raised include
    Irish unhappiness with the UK's inquiry into the Finucane
    murder; the importance of a non-violent marching season in
    Northern Ireland; and concerns about IRA criminality.  Reiss
    briefed on his meetings in London and Belfast and informed
    them of the USG's decision to refuse a visa to Sinn Fein
    member Rita O'Hare.

    ¶2. (U) Mitchell Reiss met with the Taoiseach, PM Bertie
    Ahern; Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern, Justice Minister
    Michael McDowell; Finance Minister Brian Cowen; and, UK
    Ambassador Eldon.  The Ambassador, DCM, POL/ECON Counselor,
    and S/P Special Assistant accompanied him to all meetings.
    Reiss and the Ambassador also had a private lunch with
    President and Dr. McAleese. END SUMMARY

    -------
    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶3.  (C) GOI concerns about UK "softness" represent a role
    reversal.  Usually, it is the UK that is concerned Ireland
    will be too accommodating to Sinn Fein.  The GOI's eventual
    position will depend on the Taoiseach.  He is generally
    considered "softer" on the provisional movement than either
    the Foreign Affairs or Justice Ministers.  However, he
    believes Sinn Fein leaders were aware of plans to rob the
    Northern Bank even as they negotiated with him last Fall.
    Publicly, he has been unprecedentedly critical of Sinn Fein
    and, until recently, greatly reduced private contacts as
    well.  We are told that Adams prefers to deal directly with
    the Taoiseach and not with cabinet ministers. In deciding how
    to move forward, the Taoiseach is likely to look carefully at
    the IRA's response to Gerry Adams, given strong public
    feelings against IRA crime and paramilitarism.  He is
    expected to call elections in 2007 or sooner.  Having a deal
    in place would serve his political interests best; however,
    more failed attempts to reach a deal would hurt him
    electorally, particularly if he were seen to have been played
    by Sinn Fein.  End Comment.

    --------------------------------------------
    TAOISEACH ADVISOR DESCRIBES GOI EXPECTATIONS
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶4. (C) Michael Collins, Second Secretary General in the
    Taoiseach's Office and senior foreign affairs advisor, opened
    the meeting with an update of GOI actions.  He said there had
    been very little GOI engagement with Sinn Fein since the
    talks broke down in December. He cited one meeting in
    January, one in March in Washington, and several private
    meetings between the Taoiseach and Gerry Adams.
    Significantly, he said the official feelings toward Sinn Fein
    had changed with all that has happened since December
    (Northern Bank robbery, money laundering, McCartney killing.)
     Collins said the GOI is interested in the Good Friday
    Agreement and not in any "lesser models or deals."  Following
    UK elections, the pace was picking up, he said, and he
    outlined a series of expected contacts with all parties. He
    said the GOI was pleased at PM Blair's re-election, and that
    Sinn Fein is aware that this is Blair's "last lap."  That, he
    said, plays both ways.  Sinn Fein knows that no successor is
    likely to be as engaged in the process as Blair, and that he
    represents their best hope of a deal.  On the other hand,
    Sinn Fein also believes they could take advantage of Blair's
    interest in getting a deal before leaving office.  Special
    Envoy Reiss, referring to his talks in London, said it is
    never good in a negotiation to appear more eager than the
    other side.  Collins said the UK had offered Sinn Fein a
    package following the December 8 breakdown, but withdrew it
    after the Northern Bank robbery.  (Note:  Sinn Fein has
    frequently expressed anger at the UK for "going back on its
    word." While never specifically mentioning a post-December 8
    package, during the negotiations, Sinn Fein seemed confident
    that the UK felt Sinn Fein's decommissioning offer was worth
    taking up even if a comprehensive deal with the DUP was not
    reached.)

    ...KEEP THE FOCUS ON THE IRA

    ¶5. (C) Collins indicated the focus must be kept on the IRA.
    The GOI, he said, hopes for decisive action, followed by a
    "proving period" and leading to talks that restore the
    executive.  He anticipated that it might take until late fall
    or early in 2006 to put all the pieces together; the IRA
    would need to do something definitive within two months, and
    the DUP would likely require a six-month testing period
    before agreeing to sit down with Sinn Fein.  Collins said
    there is little appetite within the GOI or the Irish public
    for going "round and round again." He said GOI will not go
    about talks in a "headline way."  The credibility of the
    process and the players is in question, he said, and this
    time, talks must work. A deal is possible, he said, but will
    take time.  Reiss responded by saying Gerry Adams had told
    him to expect an IRA response in a month, before the marching
    season.  Reiss said Adams had stated that "the IRA must be
    taken out of the equation."  Reiss noted that public
    tolerance of accepting things at face value is gone.  The IMC
    must confirm that the IRA takes any actions it promises.
    When the Taoiseach joined the meeting, he said that
    verification would have to include witnesses of decommissiong
    (probably clergy), in addition to the IICD, as layed out
    December 8.

    ...QUIET MARCHING SEASON NECESSARY

    ¶6. (C) Collins, Reiss and the Ambassador agreed that tensions
    were high as marching season approaches, and it is vitally
    important that violence is averted.  That message needs to be
    delivered to all parties.  The Ambassador asked who is
    engaging with the Parades Commission; Collins said there is a
    disconnect between the Parades Commission and the PSNI.  All
    agreed that a violent marching season could set back
    prospects for political progress.

    ...DUP FLEXING ITS MUSCLES, INCLUDING REGARDING POLICING BOARD

    ¶7. (C) Collins and Reiss exchanged views on the DUP,
    following their big win in UK elections.  The Ambassador
    noted that DUP is looking to flex its muscles, and should not
    be allowed to unwind existing mechanisms, such as the
    Policing Board, whose mandate expires October 18.  Collins
    agreed and said the GOI favors renewing the policing board in
    its current form.

    -------------------------------
    TAOISEACH DISCUSSES WAY FORWARD
    -------------------------------

    ¶8. (C) The Taoiseach joined the meeting, and layed out his
    vision of the way forward.  Like Collins, he felt any deal
    was many months away, with talks not starting until September
    and a deal not likely until January.  The Taoiseach then
    discussed what he felt was realistic to expect from the IRA.
    He said that no one can expect the IRA to agree to disband;
    rather, it could enter a new commemorative role.  His own
    father, he said, considered himself to be an IRA man to the
    day he died in the 1990's.  IRA members, he said, consider
    themselves to be soldiers and their IRA membership is the
    center of their lives.  They could, however, convert to a
    commemorative organization that visits graves and plans
    events to mark the anniversaries of atrocities.  The
    Taoiseach said he had explained this to DUP leader Ian
    Paisley.  By the same token, the Taoiseach said Sinn Fein
    knows that they have milked the process as much as they can.
    He said that "Gerry understands criminality must end", even
    if he will not say that the IRA has been involved in crime.

    ¶9. (C) Reiss described changes in perception within the
    Irish-American community.  Their conversations with the
    Taoiseach, and the IRA's words and actions following the
    McCartney murder were giving them a more realistic view of
    the IRA.  The Taoiseach agreed, but noted that it is still
    hard for much of Irish-America to accept that the IRA was
    involved in the murder.  Reiss then informed the Taoiseach
    that the US had refused Sinn Fein member Rita O'Hare's visa
    request.

    ...TAOISEACH RAISES FINUCANE

    ¶10.  (C) The Taoiseach raised the Finucane case, as did every
    other GOI official with whom Reiss met.  Reiss briefed him on
    his talks in London, including with the head of MI5, who
    committed to turning over all evidence her agency has to the
    inquiry, but she was adamant that the inquiry will proceed
    using the new legislation.  Reiss noted his concern that the
    Finucane case will become an irritant in Irish relations with
    the UK and get in the way of a deal.  The Taoiseach said that
    the entire parliament was united in opposition to the UK
    approach.  Parliament does not believe the UK will give all
    evidence because, in its view, the UK did not cooperate fully
    with the Barron commission's investigation into the 1974
    Dublin and Monaghan bombings.  The Taoiseach said that the
    GOI wants the UK to provide evidence acknowledging its
    involvement in Finucane's murder and it wants to know how
    high in the UK government collusion went.  He said if the UK
    were to provide the information, it would only grab the
    headlines for a few hours because "everyone knows the UK was
    involved." Other ministers made the same point and noted that
    the Taoiseach is particularly seized with the Finucane case
    and would have to personally approve any compromise to ease
    the dispute with the UK, such as Reiss' suggestion of putting
    an Irish judge in charge of the inquiry.

    --------------------------------------------- ---
    FM ECHOES PM ON IRA, GFA, CONCERN ABOUT FINUCANE
    AND MARCHING SEASON
    --------------------------------------------- ---

    ....IRA

    ¶11. (C) FM Ahern said he liked Reiss' public comments that
    the IRA should respond "sooner rather than later," and he
    agreed with Reiss that the IRA statement must be clean, with
    no ambiguity, and that the three governments need to agree on
    what they want from the IRA.  In the end, the DUP must also
    be on board in order for a deal to be struck.  FM Ahern was
    adamant that the Irish government was interested in a
    comprehensive deal only, and was concerned that the UK might
    be open to Sinn Fein's desire to cut a side deal with London.
     He said that such talks between the UK and IRA were underway
    in December between the breakdown of talks and the Northern
    Bank robbery.  Such a deal, he said, would have allowed Sinn
    Fein to barter decommissioning for concessions.  Moreover, he
    said, a bilateral deal between the UK and Sinn Fein would
    polarize the situation in Northern Ireland.

    ...Sinn Fein

    ¶12. (C) FM Ahern said that Sinn Fein knows serious
    negotiations cannot begin unless trust is re-established.  On
    the other hand, he said, maybe that's not what they want.
    (Note:  FM Ahern is here referencing the theory that Sinn
    Fein finds engaging in the peace process in its interest
    because it softens the image of the party and gives them
    photo opportunities with prime ministers. According to this
    theory, the process is in Sinn Fein's interest, but Sinn Fein
    is not actually interested in striking a deal.)  FM Ahern
    also touched on the balance the GOI tries to strike in
    talking about and to Sinn Fein.  He said PSNI and others told
    the GOI that its tough line on Sinn Fein since December had
    been helpful but no longer was, and they should "lighten up."
     On the other hand, the GOI also is asked why it talks to
    Sinn Fein at all, given that the International Monitoring
    Commission reports that they are continuining their
    activities.  He noted that it is difficult for the two prime
    ministers to say "no" when Gerry Adams asks for a meeting.
    He said Sinn Fein is insisting on working out details at the
    top level of government only. (COMMENT:  This is tactically
    smart of Gerry Adams, especially if he, like others, sees the
    Taoiseach as less tough on republicans than the outspoken
    Justice Minister or quieter but equally firm Foreign
    Minister.)

    ...Parade Season

    ¶13. (C) Adrian O'Neill, from DFA's Anglo-Irish office, said
    intelligence sources were worried that malcontents were
    planning to disrupt the marching season.  He noted that the
    DUP and Orange Order were "playing games" with the Parades
    Commission, and repeated the view that PSNI and the Parades
    Commission were not connecting well.  He said the GOI is
    particularly worried about the "walk back" -- after the
    parades and drinking, when marchers and hangers on walk back
    through republican areas.  Special Envoy Reiss said that a
    violent marching season would play into the hands of those
    who believe that only the IRA can protect Catholic
    communities.

    ...Finucane

    ¶14. (C) FM Ahern raised the Finucane case, saying
    categorically that the UK was not complying with its 2001
    Weston Park commitments.  He said the GOI has lived up to its
    obligations and begun investigations into several cases.
    O'Neill noted that the UK had pushed through its new
    Inquiries Act and that the Finucane family would not
    cooperate on that basis.
    ...Policing Board

    ¶15. (C) Special Envoy Reiss noted that the Policing Board was
    set to expire on October 18, and asked for Irish views,
    including on whether there were policy consequences of
    choosing to "continue" the board or to "reconstitute" it.  FM
    Ahern said he had spoken to Northern Ireland Secretary of
    State Peter Hain about the issue.  He said the GOI favors
    continuing the board, but the DUP wants to reconstitute it.
    He asserted that the DUP has no legal right to demand
    reconstitution on the basis of its electoral gains.  FM Ahern
    also said he had raised IRA crime with Peter Hain, especially
    in the context of cross border cooperation between the Irish
    Criminal Assets Bureau and the Northern Ireland equivalent.

    ...International Fund for Ireland (IFI)

    ¶16. (C) As he has done publicly, FM Ahern talked about the
    importance of continuing IFI activities and the need to
    maintain donations from other governments.  He said it is
    increasingly difficult to tap EU peace and reconciliation
    funds.  FM Ahern talked about the need to reorient the board
    toward reconciliation and policing, and noted the board was
    considering a five-year strategy, ending in closure.  He
    asked for U.S. views.  The Ambassador noted that supporters
    of Ireland in the U.S. understand that the Ireland's economic
    boom means that international contributions to IFI will end
    at some point.  One difficulty, he said, is that unionists
    only recently have taken part, and will insist on getting
    their fair share of grants.  Special Envoy Reiss said that
    the IFI's new ideas for policing are likely to be acceptable
    under U.S. law.

    --------------------------------------------
    Justice Minister McDowell focuses on the IRA
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶17. (C) Justice Minister McDowell, always the hardest hitting
    of the Irish cabinet, opened the meeting by saying that the
    Good Friday Agreement presumed the IRA would go out of
    business and it is still in business seven years later.  He
    said the provisional movement (as he refers to jointly to the
    IRA and Sinn Fein) regards its arms cache as an
    embarrassment.  Its semtex and kalishnakovs do not serve any
    useful purpose, he said, and the provisionals do not want to
    leave weapons in the hands of dissidents.  He said the
    provisionals consider their arms stash a political liability
    that undermines their claim to be pursuing their goals
    through peaceful means only.

    ¶18. (C) Minister McDowell believes the provisionals want to
    close down the hardware side of their operation but to stay
    in business to fund national and international programs.  He
    also said that the provisionals give no indication of
    loosening their grip on national areas in Northern Ireland
    where PSNI does not go.  For that reason, he noted, the
    provisionals want to hold on to personal weapons.

    ¶19. (C) McDowell said some lessons have been learned about
    how to deal with the provisional movement.  McDowell said
    that you only get concessions from the provisionals when you
    put your hand on their throat.  When you play their
    propaganda game, they press for concessions.  McDowell said
    he was "delighted" that Sinn Fein was not invited to the
    White House on March 17.  Looking forward, he said, the GOI
    was not in appeasement mode, and should offer a cold shoulder
    to the provisionals.  Sinn Fein, he said, is "asking for warm
    words" but governments should not offer them. He credited
    Sinn Fein with being "brilliant negotiators."  They create
    eagerness and a sense of partnership, as if to say, "let's
    get together to sort out Sinn Fein problems."  What they
    cannot stand, he said, is skepticism.  McDowell said he has
    warned Peter Hain against side deals with the provisionals,
    especially now that there is no center ground in Northern
    Ireland.

    ----------------------------
    Finance Minister Brian Cowen
    ----------------------------

    ¶20. (C) In pursuing a political solution for Northern
    Ireland, the British and Irish Governments needed to address
    the economic dimension to the peace process, Finance Minister
    Brian Cowen told Ambassador Reiss in a May 20 meeting.  Cowen
    cautioned against an approach that focused on establishing
    institutions of self-government, while neglecting equally
    urgent economic imperatives, such as improving social
    services and tacking unemployment.  He expressed concern that
    HMG might wish to disengage from these challenges after a
    solution was reached.  While the British Exchequer had made
    statements on the limits of UK financial support for the
    peace process, Cowen believed that HMG and the GOI could
    jointly foster a transition in Northern Ireland toward an
    economic system less dominated by the public sector.  This
    cooperation could take the form of coordinating Ireland's
    National Spatial Strategy with the North's development plans;
    there was also the possibility of harmonizing tax rates and
    key commodity prices to spur cross-border investment.
    Ambassador Reiss agreed that it was important to avoid
    scenarios where economic difficulties would continue to fuel
    social tensions even after a political resolution was in hand.

    ¶21. (U) This cable has been cleared by S/P.
    KENNY

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