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### Viewing cable 06KABUL3934, PRT/KUNDUZ: BETTER THAN ITS REPUTATION

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06KABUL3934 | 2006-09-03 08:36 | 2010-12-02 21:30 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Kabul
Appears in these articles: www.spiegel.de

`

    VZCZCXRO3979
    PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
    DE RUEHBUL #3934/01 2460836
    ZNR UUUUU ZZH
    P 030836Z SEP 06
    FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2240
    INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
    RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
    RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
    RHMCSUU/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//JF/UNMA//
    RHMCSUU/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3//
    RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
    RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
    RHMFIUU/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
    RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2936
    RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6265
    RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1616

` `

    UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 003934

    SIPDIS

    SENSITIVE
    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR SA/FO, SA/A, S/CR, SA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM
    STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
    NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
    OSD FOR BREZINSKI
    CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

    E.O. 12958 N/A
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR AF
    SUBJECT:  PRT/KUNDUZ: BETTER THAN ITS REPUTATION

    ¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  The German-led PRT in Kunduz is
    one of the most maligned PRTs in Afghanistan, but
    many of the old myths, especially regarding the
    PRT's military effectiveness, no longer apply.  The
    Germans now patrol regularly throughout their area
    of responsibility (Kunduz and Takhar provinces),
    averaging 130 to 150 patrols per week, and routinely
    overnight outside the PRT compound in order to
    access the more remote districts.  In the face of a
    deteriorating security situation over the past few
    months, the Germans have shown no sign of wavering
    in their commitment to the mission.  The attitude of
    the PRT toward the U.S. Department of State (DOS)
    representative has improved significantly since the
    early days when Germany first took over the
    operation in Kunduz, and there has been no
    degradation in treatment even though DOS rep has not
    had any QIP funds to contribute to PRT projects
    since early 2006.  Meanwhile, the bifurcated command
    structure of the PRT, as well as the reluctance of
    the German development agencies to work closely with
    the military on projects, continue to hamper the
    PRT's performance.  Nonetheless, overall, the PRT is
    much improved.  END SUMMARY.

    SNAPSHOT OF PRT KUNDUZ
    ----------------------------------------
    ¶2. (SBU) Originally, PRT Kunduz's area of
    responsibility (AOR) included all four provinces of
    the northeast (Kunduz, Takhar, Baghlan and
    Badakhshan), but since the establishment of fully
    independent ISAF PRTs in Puli-Khumri (Netherlands)
    and Feyzabad (Germany) in late 2004 and 2005
    respectively, PRT Kunduz's AOR has encompassed just
    Kunduz and Takhar provinces.  The PRT is
    multinational, with troop contributions from six
    nations other than Germany (Switzerland, Romania,
    France, Netherlands, Belgium, and Hungary), but the
    total number of non-German troops constitute less
    than 10 percent of the total force of 450.  All the
    key leadership and staff positions at the PRT are
    held by Germans and the working language of the PRT
    is German.  (This is in contrast to the German-led
    PRT in Feyzabad, which is truly a multinational
    operation, with English as the working language and
    the Czechs and Danes contributing almost 100 of the
    330 troops and filling the deputy commander and J-3
    slots, respectively.)  There are nine staff in the
    civilian component of PRT Kunduz: three German
    diplomats (the most senior of whom is the civilian
    leader), three German police officers, two officials
    from the German Federal Intelligence Service, and
    the U.S. DOS rep.  The German civilians serve tours
    of varying lengths, from two months to two years.

    INTENSE SCRUTINY AS ISAF'S FIRST PRT
    ------------------------------------
    ¶3. (SBU) PRT Kunduz was one of the first PRTs
    established by the U.S.-led Coalition in late 2002.
    When NATO took command of ISAF in August 2003 and
    decided to expand beginning in the north, Kunduz
    became ISAF's first PRT.  This occurred in early
    January 2004, at the same time that leadership of
    the PRT was transferred from the U.S. to Germany.
    For several months, Kunduz was the only ISAF PRT.
    As a result, the German operation was under
    incredible scrutiny and comparisons (almost all
    unfavorable) were inevitably drawn between it and
    the OEF PRTs.  However, while much of the criticism
    was deserved early on when the PRT was first

    KABUL 00003934  002 OF 005

    established, it is probably unfair to continue to
    depict the German PRT in this way.

    THE TOP FIVE CRITICISMS
    -------------------------------------
    ¶4. (SBU) The early criticisms focused on five areas:

    -- a poor tooth-to-tail ratio at the PRT, where
    there are almost three times as many support troops
    as there are troops who work outside the PRT, and
    too much spent on building a new PRT compound.

    -- the lack of military effectiveness due to risk
    averseness, including restrictions on overnight and
    long-range patrolling and burdensome requirements
    for force protection and medical support.

    -- the lack of PRT cohesion due to the bifurcated
    command structure, in which the military and
    civilian components operate independently.

    -- the almost complete detachment of the PRT from
    the German development agencies, who live off the
    PRT compound and deliberately seek to limit their
    interaction with the military.

    -- the reluctance of the PRT command to embrace the
    U.S. reps as full-fledged members of the PRT team.

    YES IT'S BIG, BUT...
    --------------------
    ¶5. (SBU)  The German PRT is several times bigger
    than the U.S. contingent it replaced and the German
    tooth-to-tail ratio is not as favorable.  However,
    the Germans do not have an-in-country base like
    Bagram at which to centralize their combat support
    and combat service support assets.  These assets
    must be located at the PRTs themselves.  Plus, there
    are many facilities at PRT Kunduz -- most notably
    the role 2-plus hospital with a staff of 50 -- which
    serve German troops and other internationals and
    Afghans throughout the region.  During the first
    five months of this year, the hospital treated more
    than 2,200 people (both outpatients and inpatients)
    and performed some 35 operations.  One third of the
    patients and most of the serious cases (including
    those involving operations) were Afghans.

    ¶6.  (SBU) It must also be conceded that the Germans
    have spent a great deal on administrative costs,
    especially in building a brand-new PRT camp, which
    opened in May, on a plateau 15 kilometers south of
    Kunduz.  The 460-hectare camp (reportedly as large
    as the Vatican) has cost 35 million Euros so far
    (more than three times the original estimate) and is
    still not finished.  But this facility has been
    built to German standards and the Germans plan to
    turn it over to the Afghans when the ISAF mission
    ends.  The compound could eventually be used as a
    university campus, which would make it the first
    university in the northeast.  The new camp has also
    given a very positive signal to the Afghans about
    the commitment of the international community, and
    especially the Germans, to continue the ISAF mission
    as long as necessary.  The camp should also make it
    easier for the Bundeswehr to get soldiers to
    volunteer for second, third and fourth tours to
    Kunduz, which will be absolutely necessary to
    sustain a commitment over the long term.

    KABUL 00003934  003 OF 005

    BIG IMPROVEMENT ON MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS
    -----------------------------------------
    ¶7. (SBU)  When the Germans first arrived in Kunduz,
    they did have very restrictive rules of engagement.
    They did not do foot patrols, they did not stay
    outside the PRT overnight, they avoided patrolling
    during hours of darkness, they rarely ventured
    beyond a 40-kilometer radius of the PRT and they
    reacted to threats and attacks by retreating.
    However, the Germans have learned and adapted and
    become much more proactive.  The 10th German
    contingent, which served at Kunduz from March to
    July of this year, averaged between 130 and 150
    patrols a week, which included mounted patrols all
    night on the major roads. CIMIC (Civil Affairs),
    Psyops, and J-2 (Intelligence) teams traveled
    regularly to all 24 districts in the PRT's AOR.  The
    Germans have long had a safe house in Taloqan, the
    provincial capital of Takhar, but now they are
    procuring a bigger compound to increase their
    patrolling capabilities.

    ¶8. (SBU) The requirement to have a doctor and
    ambulance within an hour of any deployed unit still
    stands, but the PRT no longer restricts itself to
    using just the six-wheel Fuchs Armored Personnel
    Carrier (APC) as the ambulance, since the Fuchs
    cannot be used on narrow roads or small bridges.
    This means there is essentially no limit to where
    the PRT can go in its AOR.

    ¶9. (SBU) In the face of a deteriorating security
    situation over the past few months -- which has
    included an unprecedented suicide car bomb attack
    and two ambushes with rocket propelled grenade (RPG)
    launchers -- the Germans have shown no sign of
    wavering in their commitment to the mission.  The
    Germans have responded to each attack by immediately
    returning to the area and engaging with local
    officials and the population.  In the case of the
    two RPG ambushes, the patrols returned direct fire
    on the attackers and the PRT participated in joint
    operations with the local ANA battalion and U.S.
    Special Force mentors to find and arrest those
    responsible.

    CONTINUED LACK OF PRT COHESION
    ------------------------------
    ¶10. (SBU) One area where that has been no change is
    the PRT's dual command structure.  The PRT is still
    clearly divided into separate military and civilian
    components, with the PRT commander leading the
    former and the senior German diplomat leading the
    latter.  They have completely different chains of
    command, with the commander reporting to ISAF HQ
    through Regional Command (RC) North, and the
    civilian leader reporting to Berlin through the
    German embassy in Kabul.  The PRT commander and
    civilian leader are co-equals in theory, but in
    practice, the commander is the focus of attention
    because the PRT is a Bundeswehr facility and he
    controls almost all of its assets.  But even in
    meetings outside the PRT, where both the commander
    and civilian leader are represented, Afghan
    officials tend to gravitate toward the military
    commander rather than the civilian leader.  Most PRT
    Kunduz commanders have reinforced this tendency by
    not insisting that the Afghans deal with the
    civilian leader on an equal basis.

    KABUL 00003934  004 OF 005

    ¶11.  (SBU) There is no doubt that this bifurcated
    command system creates duplication of effort and a
    lack of cohesion within the PRT.  Under the 10th
    contingent, the civilian leader complained
    frequently about being marginalized and left out of
    the loop by the PRT commander.  It would be ideal if
    everyone operated under one chain of command, but it
    is unlikely that the either the Bundeswehr or MFA
    will ever agree to formally subordinate themselves
    to the other.  The best one can hope for is better
    information exchange and coordination.  There are
    already mechanisms to facilitate this, but there is
    clearly room for improvement.  The PRT has a common
    internal e-mail system and there are a thrice-weekly
    evening PRT staff meetings in which the civilian
    leader takes part, along with the representative of
    the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and
    Development (BMZ), the head of the German police
    project and the U.S. DOS rep.

    ¶13.  (SBU) In the past, the ISAF POLAD has
    complained that political situation reports coming
    from Kunduz through the military clearly have not
    had the input of the civilian component.  Although
    the civilian leader does not fall under ISAF's
    command, he should be able to share many of the
    reports he submits to the embassy and Berlin with
    ISAF.  The civilian leader rarely shares reports he
    generates with ISAF.

    GERMAN DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES STILL DETACHED
    ------------------------------------------
    ¶14.  (SBU) BMZ and the associated German development
    agencies -- the German Federal Credit Organization
    for Reconstruction (KfW), the German Development
    Service (DeD) and the German Society for Technical
    Cooperation (GTZ) -- are still located off the PRT
    in their own compound.  While the head of BMZ
    participates in PRT staff meetings and coordinates
    closely with the PRT, BMZ still operates
    independently from the PRT, believing that
    development is not the military's business.  If the
    security situation were ever to deteriorate to the
    point that BMZ and its associated agencies no longer
    felt safe operating in Kunduz, they are more likely
    to leave altogether than come to live at the PRT.

    ¶15.  (SBU) According to BMZ and MFA officials in
    Kunduz, Germany has a budget of about 80 million
    Euros per year for development projects in
    Afghanistan.  Another estimated 30 million Euros of
    German government money is funneled indirectly to
    Afghanistan each year through government-supported
    NGOs and research institutes (like the Konrad
    Adenauer Stiftung). BMZ controls about 50 million
    Euros of the Afghanistan development budget.  While
    the other 30 million Euros is nominally controlled
    by the MFA, much of it is reportedly earmarked for
    certain programs like the Disarmament of Illegal
    Armed Groups (DIAG) (1 million Euros) and the German
    police project (12 million Euros).  In addition, the
    MFA development rep at the PRT has about 60,000
    Euros per year that he or she can spend on small,
    quick-impact projects without prior approval from
    Berlin.  Finally, the PRT commander has access to a
    small amount of money (15,000 to 30,000 Euros) that
    he can use to address immediate needs.

    ¶16.  (SBU) Meanwhile, the PRT CIMIC (Civil Affairs)
    teams continue to travel throughout the AOR, meeting

    KABUL 00003934  005 OF 005

    local authorities and doing comprehensive
    assessments of each district.  However, CIMIC has
    only a bare-bones budget and cannot fund even a
    small percentage of all the worthwhile project
    proposals it develops.  BMZ does not see the CIMIC
    projects as fitting within its overall development
    plans, and therefore funds only about five percent
    of the proposals it receives from CIMIC.  The MFA
    development rep and the PRT commander fund some of
    the CIMIC proposals, but their own budgets are
    rather limited.  In the past, CIMIC counted on the
    DOS rep to help fund some of its projects with USAID
    QIP funds, but those funds have not been available
    since early 2006.  That has sent CIMIC scurrying to
    other NGOs to try to make up the difference.

    MUCH IMPROVED ATTITUDE TOWARD U.S. REP
    --------------------------------------
    ¶17. (SBU) The attitude of the PRT toward the U.S.
    DOS rep has improved significantly since the early
    days when Germany first took over the operation in
    Kunduz.  During the 10th contingent, the DOS rep was
    about as integrated into the PRT as he could be
    without compromising his ability for independent
    action.  He was included on the PRT Kunduz internal
    e-mail system and he had a seat at the table for the
    thrice-weekly PRT evening staff meetings.  While the
    commander did not seek out the DOS rep's political
    advice on issues, he was always open to input.

    ¶18.  (SBU) After insisting for years on an MOU to
    define the U.S. role at the PRT and seeking
    reimbursement for the U.S. share of PRT costs,
    Germany has apparently decided to drop these
    demands.  DOS rep was never approached on these
    issues during the 10th contingent.  At the new PRT
    compound, he was provided private living
    accommodations and separate office space sufficient
    for both himself and the political assistant.  The
    Germans have sought no payment or reimbursement.

    ¶19. (SBU)  Because of the generally permissive
    security environment in the northeast, the civilians
    at the PRT usually move on their own in armored
    vehicles without military force protection.
    Therefore, the DOS rep did not require much active
    support from the PRT to carry out his duties.  Had
    military force protection been routinely required,
    it is not clear that the PRT would have had the
    assets, or been willing, to provide the necessary
    support.

    COMMENT
    -------
    ¶20.  (SBU) While the German-led PRT in Kunduz is far
    from perfect, it is significantly better than it was
    at the start and is constantly improving, especially
    in terms of its approach to military operations and
    its engagement with the local populace. Fortunately,
    we have moved beyond the issues that previously
    caused irritation in the U.S.-German relationship at
    the PRT and have forged a strong partnership.

    NEUMANN

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