Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 25416 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden 00. Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Jordan Yemen Thailand

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05 2011/06 2011/07 2011/08
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04 2011/05/05 2011/05/06 2011/05/07 2011/05/08 2011/05/09 2011/05/10 2011/05/11 2011/05/12 2011/05/13 2011/05/14 2011/05/15 2011/05/16 2011/05/17 2011/05/18 2011/05/19 2011/05/20 2011/05/21 2011/05/22 2011/05/23 2011/05/24 2011/05/25 2011/05/26 2011/05/27 2011/05/28 2011/05/29 2011/05/30 2011/05/31
2011/06/01 2011/06/02 2011/06/03 2011/06/04 2011/06/05 2011/06/06 2011/06/07 2011/06/08 2011/06/09 2011/06/10 2011/06/11 2011/06/12 2011/06/13 2011/06/14 2011/06/15 2011/06/16 2011/06/17 2011/06/18 2011/06/19 2011/06/20 2011/06/21 2011/06/22 2011/06/23 2011/06/24 2011/06/25 2011/06/26 2011/06/27 2011/06/28 2011/06/29 2011/06/30
2011/07/01 2011/07/02 2011/07/04 2011/07/05 2011/07/06 2011/07/07 2011/07/08 2011/07/10 2011/07/11 2011/07/12 2011/07/13 2011/07/14 2011/07/15 2011/07/16 2011/07/17 2011/07/18 2011/07/19 2011/07/20 2011/07/21 2011/07/22 2011/07/23 2011/07/25 2011/07/27 2011/07/28 2011/07/29 2011/07/31
2011/08/01 2011/08/02 2011/08/03 2011/08/05 2011/08/06 2011/08/07 2011/08/08 2011/08/09 2011/08/10 2011/08/11 2011/08/12 2011/08/13 2011/08/15 2011/08/16 2011/08/17 2011/08/18 2011/08/19 2011/08/21 2011/08/22 2011/08/23

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/05 1985/06
1986/05 1986/08 1986/12
1987/06
1988/01 1988/03 1988/04 1988/07 1988/08 1988/09 1988/12
1989/01 1989/06 1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05 1991/06 1991/07 1991/11
1992/01 1992/03 1992/06 1992/09 1992/11 1992/12
1993/01 1993/02 1993/04 1993/10 1993/12
1994/05 1994/11 1994/12
1995/01 1995/04 1995/06 1995/11
1996/07 1996/08 1996/09 1996/11
1997/02 1997/03 1997/05 1997/06 1997/08 1997/10 1997/11 1997/12
1998/05 1998/12
1999/01 1999/09 1999/12
2000/04 2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11 2000/12
2001/02 2001/03 2001/04 2001/05 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11 2001/12
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/06 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11 2002/12
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Alexandria Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Belfast Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chiang Mai Consulate Chennai Consulate Chengdu Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Freetown Consulate Fukuoka
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guangzhou Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hong Kong Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Izmir Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy Libreville Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Mission Geneva Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maseru Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne Consulate Matamoros
Embassy Nouakchott Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Nuevo Laredo Consulate Naples Consulate Naha Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sapporo Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE UN Rome Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vientiane Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ASEC AEMR AMGT AR APECO AU AORC AJ AF AFIN AS AM ABLD AFFAIRS AMB APER AA AE ADM ACOA AID ASEAN AMED AORG APEC AY AL AGOA ATRN AG ALOW AND ADB ABUD ASPA ADPM ADANA AFSI ARABL ADCO AFSN ACABQ AO ANARCHISTS AZ ANET AMEDCASCKFLO AADP AGRICULTURE AINT ARR ARF AINF APRC AFSA AX AINR AODE APCS AROC AGAO ASUP AIT ARCH AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL AMEX ARM AQ ATFN AMBASSADOR ARAS ACBAQ AC AOPR AREP ASIG ASEX ASCE AER AGR AVERY ASCH AEMRS AFU AMG ATPDEA ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AORL AN AGMT ACS AMCHAMS AECL AUC AFGHANISTAN ACAO
BR BB BG BEXP BY BA BRUSSELS BU BD BK BL BE BMGT BO BTIO BX BC BH BM BN BAIO BUSH BRPA BILAT BF BOEHNER BOL BIDEN BP BURNS BBG BBSR BT BWC BEXPC BTIU
CPAS CA CASC CS CBW CIDA CO CODEL CI CROS CU CH CWC CMGT CVIS CDG CG CF CHIEF CJAN CBSA CE CY CB CW CM CHR CD CT CTERR CVR CDC CN CONS CR CAMBODIA CACS COUNTRY CFIS CONDOLEEZZA CEN CZ CLEARANCE CARICOM COM CICTE CYPRUS CITES CV CBE CMGMT COE CIVS CFED COUNTER CAPC COPUOS CARSON CTR CKGR CLINTON COUNTERTERRORISM CITEL CQ CSW CIC CITT CARIB CAFTA CACM CDB CJUS CTM CAN CAJC CONSULAR CLMT CBC CIA CNARC CIS CEUDA CHINA CAC CL
DR DJ DB DA DHS DAO DCM DO DEFENSE DK DOMESTIC DISENGAGEMENT DAC DOD DCG DE DOT DPRK DEPT DEA DOE DTRA DS DEAX
ECON ETTC EFIS ETRD EC EMIN EAGR EAID EFIN EUN ECIN EG EWWT EINV ENRG ELAB EPET EN EAIR EUMEM ECPS ES ELTN EIND EZ EU EI ER ET EINT ENGR ECONOMIC ENIV EFTA ESTH EET EUREM ENV EAG EAP ECONOMY ELECTIONS ETRO ECIP EPEC EXIM ERNG ENERG ED EREL ELAM EK EDEV ENGY ETRDEC ECCT EPA ENGRD ECLAC ETRAD ENVR ELTNSNAR ELAP ETRC EPIT EDUC EFI EEB EETC EIVN ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ETRDGK ENVI EXTERNAL ELN EAIDS ECOSOC EDU EPREL EINVEFIN EAGER ECA ETMIN EIDN EINVKSCA EFINECONCS ETC EINN EXBS ECONOMICS EIAR EINDETRD ECONEFIN EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EFIM EINVETC ECONCS EDRC ENRD EBRD ETRA ESA EAIG EUR EUC ERD ETRN EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ESENV ENNP ECINECONCS ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN
FR FI FOREIGN FAO FARM FARC FAS FJ FREEDOM FINANCE FBI FTAA FM FCS FAA FTA FK FT FAC FDA FINR FOR FOI FO FMLN FISO
GM GERARD GT GA GG GR GTIP GE GH GY GB GJ GLOBAL GEORGE GCC GC GV GAZA GL GOV GOI GF GTMO GANGS GAERC GZ GUILLERMO GASPAR
HR HA HYMPSK HO HK HUMAN HU HN HHS HUD HUMANR HSTC HURI HILLARY HI HUM HEBRON HUMOR
IZ IN IAEA IS IMO ILO IR IC IT ITU IV IMF IBRD IWC IPR IDB ID IRAQI ISRAELI ITALY ITPGOV ITALIAN IADB ICAO ICRC INR ICJ ICCAT IFAD IO ITRA INL IAHRC IRAQ INMARSAT INRA INTELSAT INTERNAL ILC IRS INDO IIP IND IEFIN IQ ISCON ICTY IA INTERPOL IEA INRB ISRAEL IZPREL IRAJ IF ITPHUM IL IACI IDA ISLAMISTS IGAD ITF INRO IBET IDP ICTR IRC
JA JO JM JP JOHN JUS JN JAMES JOSEPH JOHNNIE JML JIMENEZ
KMDR KPAO KOMC KNNP KFLO KDEM KSUM KIPR KFLU KE KCRM KJUS KAWC KZ KSCA KDRG KCOR KGHG KPAL KTIP KMCA KCRS KPKO KOLY KRVC KVPR KG KWBG KTER KS KN KSPR KWMN KV KTFN KFRD KSTH KISL KGIC KSEP KFIN KTEX KTIA KUNR KCMR KMOC KCIP KTDB KBIO KSAF KU KHIV KNNNP KSTC KNUP KIRF KIRC KNUC KHLS KTDD KMPI KIDE KMFO KSEO KJUST KPIR KIVP KICC KCFE KSCS KGLB KPWR KCUL KPOP KPALAOIS KR KTTB KCOM KESS KWN KCSY KREL KTBT KRFD KFLOA KPOL KIND KBCT KSKN KOCI KHUM KPRP KREC KICCPUR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KGIT KMCC KPRV KAUST KPAS KPAOPREL KIRP KLAB KHSA KPAONZ KICA KCRIM KHDP KNAR KSAC KCRCM KINR KGHA KIIP KPAOY KTRD KTAO KWAC KACT KSCI KNPP KMRS KNNPMNUC KBTS KERG KLTN KTLA KNDP KO KAWK KVRP KPOA KVIR KENV KAID KX KRCM KFSC KCFC KNEI KCHG KPLS KFTFN KTFM KLIG KDEMAF KRIM KRAD KBTR KGCC KPA KSEC KPIN KDEV KWWMN KOM KWNM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KRGY KIFR KWMNCS KFPC KPAK KOMS KDDG KCGC KPAI KID KMIG KNSD KWMM
LY LE LABOR LH LAB LTTE LT LO LI LU LA LVPR LG LR LOG
MARR MX MASS MOPS MNUC MCAP MTCRE MRCRE MTRE MASC MY MK MCC MO MAS MG MC MCA MZ MI MIL MU MR MT MTCR ML MN MURRAY MEPP MP MINUSTAH MA MD MAR MAPP MOPPS MTS MLS MILI MEPN MEPI MEETINGS MERCOSUR MW MIK MAPS MV MILITARY MARAD MDC MACEDONIA MASSMNUC MUCN MEDIA MQADHAFI MPOS MPS
NZ NATO NI NO NU NG NL NPT NS NSF NP NA NANCY NRR NATIONAL NASA NC NDP NIH NIPP NK NSSP NEGROPONTE NGO NAS NE NATOIRAQ NR NAR NZUS NARC NCCC NH NSG NAFTA NEW NT NUIN NOVO NATOPREL NEA NSC NV NPA NSFO NW NORAD NPG NOAA
OPRC OTRA OECD OVIP OREP ODC OIIP OPDC OAS OSCE OPIC OMS OEXC OPCW OIE OSCI OFDP OPAD ODPC OCEA ODIP OMIG OM OFFICIALS OEXP OPEC OVIPPRELUNGANU OSHA OSIC OHUM OTR OSAC OBSP OFDA OVP ON OCII OES OCS OIC
PGOV PREL PARM PINR PHUM PM PREF PTER PK PINS PBIO PHSA PE PBTS PA PL POL PAK POV POLITICS POLICY PKO PNAT PELOSI PP PRE PUNE PALESTINIAN PAS PO PROV PH PLAB PCI PERM PETR PRELBR PETERS PROP PBS POLITICAL PMIL PJUS PG PREZ PGIC PAO PRELPK PGOVENRG PATTY PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PAIGH PROG PMAR PU PTE PDOV PGOVSOCI PY PETER PGOR PBTSRU PRAM PARMS PINL PSI PPA PTERE PREO PERL PGOF PINO PRGOV PORG PS PGVO PKFK PSOE PEPR PDEM PINT PRELP PREFA PNG PTBS PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA POLINT PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PLN PHUH PEDRO PF PHUS PARTIES PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PHUMPREL POGOV PEL PBT PINF PRL PSEPC POSTS PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOC PNR
QA QI
RS RP RU RW RFE RCMP RIGHTSPOLMIL RO ROBERT RM ROOD RICE REGION RGY RELFREE RELAM RSP RF RELATIONS RIGHTS RUPREL REMON RPEL REACTION REPORT RSO
SZ SENV SOCI SNAR SO SP SU SY SI SMIG SYR SA SCUL SW SR SYRIA SNARM SPECIALIST SG SF SENS SEN SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR SN SC SECRETARY SNA ST SK SL SANC SMIL SCRM SENVSXE SE SAARC STEINBERG SCRS SWE SARS SENVQGR SNARIZ SUDAN SAN SM SIPDIS SFNV SSA SPCVIS SOFA SENVKGHG SHI SEVN SHUM SH SNARCS SPCE SNARN SIPRS
TW TRGY TBIO TSPA TU TPHY TI TX TH TIP TSPL TNGD TS TRSY TC TINT TZ TN TT TR TA TIO TF TK TRAD TNDG TWI TD TWL TERRORISM TL TV TP THPY TO TURKEY TSPAM TREL TRT TFIN TAGS TWCH TBID
UK UNSC UNGA UN US UZ USEU UG UP UNAUS UNMIK USTR UY UNSCR UNRCR UNESCO USAID UNHRC USAU UNICEF UV USPS UNFICYP UNDP UNCITRAL UNHCR UNCSD UNEP USCC UNMIC UNTAC USUN USDA UNCHR UR UNCTAD USGS UNFPA USOAS USNC UA UE UNVIE UAE UNO UNODC UNCHS UNDESCO UNC UNPUOS UNDC UNCHC UNFCYP UNIDROIT UNCND
VM VE VT VZ VEPREL VN VTEG VOA VTIZ VTPREL VISIT VENZ VAT VC VI
WHTI WIPO WTRO WTO WHO WEET WCL WFP WS WHA WA WZ WI WMD WBG WILLIAM WWARD WITH WTRQ WCO WEU WMO WB
XA XX XK XL XM XS XF XR XY XG XT XI XE XW XC XH XD XU XV XB XZ XQ XTAG
YI YM YE YL YMCS
ZU ZI ZOELLICK ZP ZR ZK ZA ZO ZF ZL ZB ZN ZH ZT ZJ ZEALAND ZANU

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM1337, DARFUR: USG CAN SET THE STAGE FOR SUCCESSFUL UN/AU

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07KHARTOUM1337.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07KHARTOUM1337 | 2007-08-23 13:44 | 2011-08-23 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Khartoum

`

    VZCZCXRO8075
    OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
    RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHKH #1337/01 2351344
    ZNR UUUUU ZZH
    O 231344Z AUG 07
    FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8304
    INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0217
    RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE

` `

    UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 001337

    SIPDIS

    SENSITIVE
    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS AND AF/SPG
    NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
    ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: PREL PGOV UN AU SU LY ER CD CH
    SUBJECT: DARFUR: USG CAN SET THE STAGE FOR SUCCESSFUL UN/AU
    PROCESS

    REF: A. KHARTOUM 00208

         ¶B. KHARTOUM 01043
         ¶C. KHARTOUM 01006
         ¶D. KHARTOUM 01230
         ¶E. KHARTOUM 01190
         ¶F. KHARTOUM 01181
         ¶G. KHARTOUM 01172
         ¶H. KHARTOUM 01187

    KHARTOUM 00001337  001.2 OF 004

    -------
    Summary
    -------

    ¶1. (SBU) The United Nations and African Union have developed
    a timetable for the Darfur political process that culminates
    in negotiations between the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA)
    non-signatories and the Sudanese Government in early October.
     However, unrealistic expectations of the outcome of these
    negotiations, enduring rivalries within the fractured rebel
    movements, and inadequate representation of the movements'
    armed wings in the peace process risk derailing the talks.
    UN and AU officials in Khartoum emphasize that the focus of
    the negotiations should be on addressing the reasonable
    grievances of the DPA non-signatories and brokering an
    agreement that will address the most pressing issue affecting
    Darfur: security.  While the negotiations are unlikely to
    lead to a definitive resolution of the Darfur conflict, an
    agreement that accounts for the core grievances of the DPA
    non-signatories and leads to a sustainable cessation of
    hostilities--guaranteed by the deployment of the UN/AU hybrid
    peacekeeping force--would pave the way for reconciliation in
    the long-term.  See para. 11 for specific actions that the
    USG can take to shore up the UN/AU peace process and lay the
    foundation for a successful outcome from the negotiations.
    End summary.

    ---------------------
    UN/AU's Fall Timeline
    ---------------------

    ¶2. (SBU) UN and AU officials have outlined a plan for the
    Darfur peace process for August and September, culminating in
    the start of negotiations in early October.  For the
    remainder of August, the UN/AU will concentrate on finalizing
    a date and venue for the talks.  After UN Secretary General
    Ban Ki Moon and AU Chairman Alpha Omar Konare issue the
    invitations in early September, the UN/AU will begin to
    "shuttle" between the Darfur rebel factions and the Sudanese
    government to narrow positions on the key issues outlined in
    the Arusha communique (power sharing, wealth sharing,
    security arrangements, land, and humanitarian issues).
    Simultaneously, the UN and AU will develop a precise agenda
    for the negotiations, define a timeframe to underscore the
    talks will not be open-ended, and articulate precise roles
    for the international community and regional governments
    (Chad, Libya, and Eritrea) in the negotiations.

    -------------------------
    Fractured Rebel Movements
    -------------------------

    ¶3. (SBU) Without an initial effort, led by the UN and AU, to
    consolidate some of the rebel factions and improve internal
    communication between the political leaders and the military
    commanders in the field, it is difficult to see how the UN
    and AU will facilitate a common negotiating platform among
    the rebels during September's "shuttle diplomacy"
    phase--particularly among the armed factions that effect the
    security situation.  Since early 2006, reports from Darfur
    indicate that the commanders of the armed movements--who,
    with the exception of the Sudanese government, have the
    greatest direct influence on the security environment in
    Darfur--are frustrated with the region's political leaders
    (Ref. A).  Since May, the USG has advocated for an effort to
    bring more cohesion among the rebel factions as a
    precondition for successful negotiations.  Participants at an
    AU-sponsored conference in late June--which included
    representatives from the National Congress Party (NCP), the
    Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), the Sudan
    Liberation Movement (SLM), the AU, the UN, the U.S., the UK,
    the Netherlands, and Canada--reiterated the necessity of
    repairing the breech between the political and military wings
    of the rebel movements (Ref. B).  Until recently, Pekka

    KHARTOUM 00001337  002.2 OF 004

    Haavisto, the Senior Advisor to UN Special Envoy Jan
    Eliasson, and Sam Ibok, AU co-chair of the Joint Mediation
    Support Team (JMST), identified the rift between the rebels'
    political leadership and the commanders in the field as an
    immediate priority (Ref. C).

    ¶4. (SBU) During an August 19 briefing for Western diplomats
    in Khartoum, Haavisto acknowledged rebel leaders contend that
    October negotiations are unfeasible and that they need time
    (and assistance) to foster unity and better internal
    organization within the movements.  Reversing his previous
    stance, however, Haavisto said that "we should not give them
    the luxury of time--they should come (to the negotiations) as
    they are."  By contrast, former SLM humanitarian coordinator
    Suleiman Jamous, a respected and unifying figure for many of
    the rebel factions, warned in a recent media interview that a
    lack of organization within the movements prior to
    negotiations could lead to further factionalism.  "It is
    better to work towards unity for the SLA at least before
    ending the peace talks with any sort of agreement," Jamous
    told Reuters in late July.

    --------------------------------------------- ---
    Rift Hinders Development of Negotiating Platform
    --------------------------------------------- ---

    ¶5. (SBU) During an August 7 briefing in Khartoum, Eliasson
    applauded the collegiality of the various factions throughout
    the Arusha discussions (Ref. D): "They are all cousins and
    schoolmates and were all one group comfortable together."  UN
    and AU officials in Khartoum admit, however, that the
    discussions were general and that the commanders around
    Abdullah Yehia--the only formidable armed faction
    represented--did not participate, in protest of Jamous'
    continued detention.  First-hand accounts of the Arusha
    meeting indicate that the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
    and the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA) led by Ahmed
    Ibrahim Diraige largely drove the agenda, with mixed buy-in
    from participants like Abdullah Yehia--who commands the
    largest, best-armed faction in Darfur.  While JEM and the
    SFDA remain the most sophisticated and well-prepared among
    the factions, it is less clear that they can change the
    security dynamic on the ground.  While Yehia and others may
    accede to general principles, such as those presented in the
    Arusha communique, such acquiescence will not be sustainable
    in the long-term without addressing the fundamental
    structural problems between the political and military wings
    of the movements.  Recent reports, corroborated by Ibok,
    indicate that even the traditionally cohesive JEM is on the
    verge of splintering.  Bahar Idriss Abu Gharda--who led the
    JEM delegation at Arusha--is now threatening to split from
    JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim and join a powerful JEM commander
    to form a new movement.

    ¶6. (SBU) While a positive first step, Ibok (please strictly
    protect) acknowledged in an August 21 conversation with
    Poloff that the most contentious issues were not included in
    the Arusha communique: self-determination and autonomy for
    Darfur outside the timeline set by the Comprehensive Peace
    Agreement (CPA) and retention of forces rather than
    re-integration into the national military.  According to
    Ibok, the movements do not consider Darfur as bound by the
    CPA or the National Interim Constitution and have little
    understanding that the end state of the current negotiations
    are only valid until 2009.  In addition, persisting rivalries
    among the rebels will cripple discussions on power sharing.

    ------------------------------------------
    IDPs, Civil Society Share Goal of Security
    ------------------------------------------

    ¶7. (SBU) The UN and AU continue to seek to involve civil
    society and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the
    negotiating process.  A common theme among these groups is
    the need for stability and freedom of movement (Ref. E).  Yet
    the situation on the ground remains complex, and the
    discussion lacks any comprehensive analysis.  Because IDPs
    perceive many traditional leaders as ineffectual, NGOs in the
    camps have organized groups of "new sheikhs" to coordinate
    assistance and provide organization (Ref. F), making it
    difficult to determine who represents which constituency.
    The Darfur Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) has
    completed a first round of consultations with IDPs in Darfur;

    KHARTOUM 00001337  003.2 OF 004

    the preliminary findings are being used to inform the UN/AU
    strategy for the negotiating process.  UN civil affairs
    efforts to produce "IDP profiles" also remain preliminary
    (Ref. F).  While many Darfur watchers note the absence of
    independent civil society organizations in the region,
    initiatives to involve civil society in a peace process
    abound, with little linkage to political developments at the
    national and international level (Ref. G).  During interviews
    with Emboff in late July, IDPs listed security, individual
    compensation, and reconstruction and development as their
    priorities, in descending order of importance (Ref. F).  In
    recent conversations with Poloff, both a senior AU official
    and a mid-level UN official in Khartoum underscored that the
    upcoming negotiations must focus on improving the security
    environment, which would then lay the foundation for
    addressing IDPs and civil society's other concerns.

    ----------------------------------
    Abdulwahid's Continued Obstruction
    ----------------------------------

    ¶8. (SBU) SLM leader Abdulwahid al Nur has been adept at
    capitalizing on the complex sentiments of the IDP camps.  In
    discussions with the UN and AU, Abdulwahid has proposed a
    series of meetings of his SLM faction that conflict with the
    UN/AU timeline.  According to a UN official in El Fasher,
    Abdulwahid is "bargaining with the misery of the IDPs" (Ref.
    H).  His support, however, may be more tenuous than is
    generally perceived.  During his mid-August visit to Sudan,
    Eliasson traveled to several IDP camps to highlight the
    consequences of Abdulwahid's continued absence from the UN/AU
    political process.  "Eliasson told them that if Abdulwahid is
    not at the talks, the camps' voices will not be heard," Ibok
    told Poloff on August 21.  According to a UN official, a
    panicked Abdulwahid called Eliasson a day after his visit to
    the camps and for the first time expressed an interest in
    participating in a UN/AU-sponsored meeting.  He later
    rescinded this offer, and the UN/AU plan to continue attemps
    to cut into Abdulwahid's base.  During his August 21-29 visit
    to Sudan, AU Special Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim plans to visit
    Zalingei, the locus of Abdulwahid' support, and deliver a
    message similar to Eliasson's.  The UN and AU have also
    encouraged Diraige and SLM faction leader Ahmed Abdulshafie
    to conduct their own outreach in the camps.

    ¶9. (SBU) The UN/AU continue to call on the international
    community to "turn up" the pressure on Abdulwahid, a request
    they have made for several months without proposing specific
    actions (Ref. C).  However, on August 18, a senior AU
    official provided Poloff with the most strident call yet: If
    Abdulwahid does not indicate his intention to attend the
    October negotiations, France should "kick him out," and he
    should not be allowed to seek refuge elsewhere in Europe.

    ---------------------------------
    Effective Contact Group Essential
    ---------------------------------

    ¶10. (SBU) While the UN and AU continue to consult the
    international community on the road ahead, foreign
    governments' most important role will be in exerting leverage
    on the parties to compromise once negotiations begin,
    according to representatives from both organizations.  Recent
    discussions with UN and AU officials in Khartoum underscore
    the necessity of an effective contact group that can target
    pressure on both the rebels and the Sudanese government to
    forge a peace agreement.  While the "Tripoli Format" (Chad,
    Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, China, France, Russia, UK, U.S.,
    Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, EU, and the Arab League)
    remains too unwieldy to be effective, a sub-group composed of
    members with leverage on the rebels, the Sudanese government,
    and regional actors could support the UN/AU mediators and
    back-brief the larger group throughout the negotiations.  The
    UN and AU concede that Chad, Libya, and Eritrea will play an
    influential role in the negotiating process.  A senior AU
    official suggested, however, that a contact group composed of
    the U.S., EU, France, and China might balance this influence.
     The U.S. is seen by most rebel groups and much of the
    international community as the guarantor of a final agreement
    (Ref. B), while the EU and France could exert necessary
    leverage on regional actors and rebel leaders with ties to
    Europe, such as Abdulwahid.  Given Beijing's oft-repeated
    emphasis on a political process to complement the UN/AU

    KHARTOUM 00001337  004.2 OF 004

    hybrid, China could be a moderating influence on the Sudanese
    government.  The senior AU official underlined the importance
    of U.S. leadership in forming such a contact group, noting
    the helpful role that S/E Natsios played during the Tripoli
    II summit in rallying countries behind the UN and AU.

    -------------------------------------
    USG Support for the Political Process
    -------------------------------------

    ¶11. (SBU) The USG can take several specific actions in the
    near future to shore-up the UN/AU peace process and lay the
    strongest foundation possible for the negotiations:

    -- Publicly outline realistic expectations for the outcome of
    the negotiations.  A U.S. statement--preferably with the
    explicit backing of several international partners--should
    call for an agreement that addresses the reasonable
    grievances of the DPA non-signatories and includes a
    cessation of hostilities.  In conjunction with the deployment
    of an effective UN/AU hybrid peace-keeping force, such an
    agreement would pave the way for a stable Darfur and provide
    an enabling environment for reconciliation, reconstruction,
    and development.

    -- Make a declaration of support for the CPA and its interim
    arrangements, with explicit reference to their relevance for
    Darfur.  Such a declaration would highlight our view that the
    CPA is the way forward for the whole of Sudan and would
    strengthen the UN/AU's hand with the rebel groups.

    -- Encourage the UN and AU to develop a strategy for
    repairing the rift between the political and military
    elements of the rebel movements.  Underscore that the
    development of rebel negotiating positions--including the
    input of armed factions with direct influence on the security
    environment--is predicated on greater cohesion and
    organization within the rebel factions.

    -- In consultation with the UN, AU, and European partners,
    develop a set of triggers for action against rebel groups
    that obstruct the peace process.  While the UN/AU have called
    for triggers in the past (Ref. C), we must bring specificity
    to this threat in order to make it credible.  The most
    obvious benchmark would be participation in the October
    negotiations.

    -- Build support among the governments of the "Tripoli
    Format" for an effective sub-group to target leverage on the
    rebel movements, the Sudanese government, and the regional
    actors during the negotiations and to monitor the
    implementation of the agreement.

    ¶12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
    POWERS

`