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### Viewing cable 08BRASILIA351, SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF MINISTER OF DEFENSE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08BRASILIA351 | 2008-03-13 16:57 | 2011-07-11 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Brasilia

`

    VZCZCXRO4281
    RR RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL
    RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
    DE RUEHBR #0351/01 0731657
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 131657Z MAR 08
    FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
    TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
    RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1212
    INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
    RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 7806
    RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 5916
    RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 1753
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
    RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//SCJ2-I/J5/HSE/DIA REP//
    RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHDC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000351

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR D, WHA AND PM

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2018
    TAGS: PREL MASC OVIP BR
    SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF MINISTER OF DEFENSE
    NELSON JOBIM TO WASHINGTON

    BRASILIA 00000351  001.2 OF 003

    Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel

    ¶1. (C) Minister of Defense Nelson Jobim will travel to
    Norfolk and Washington from March 18-22, 2008 on a
    counterpart visit.  He will meet with Secretary Gates in an
    office call on March 20 June.  Minister Jobim,s objectives
    for the visit are to enhance prospects for bilateral
    cooperation and explore possibilities for access to U.S.
    defense technology.

    ¶2.  (C) Summary:  Minister Jobim is the first strong Minister
    of Defense in Brazil.  He is working to centralize civilian
    oversight of the Brazilian military and hopes to learn from
    the U.S. military in this regard.  He has also clearly
    indicated a desire to pursue military cooperation agreements
    despite objections from the Ministry for External Affairs,
    such as in the case of concluding a SOFA with France.  He has
    also expressed his desire to pursue a Defense Cooperation
    Agreement with the U.S. and to have it approved directly by
    the President.  Jobim has also been helpful in making
    progress on a General Security of Information Agreement,
    which requires approval by Brazil,s Ministry of Interior and
    Office for Institutional Security.  Although the U.S. and
    Brazil share the basic goals of fostering hemispheric
    stability, preventing terrorist activity and strengthening
    international non-proliferation regimes, U.S.-Brazil
    cooperation is hindered by difficulties in completing a
    bilateral defense cooperation agreement, providing
    protections for U.S. personnel involved in training and joint
    exercises and taking proactive steps to address countries of
    proliferation concern such as Iran.  Brazil has maintained
    its leadership role in the Haiti peacekeeping force MINUSTAH
    under the active advocacy of the Foreign Ministry.  Jobim,s
    visit comes at an important time as Brazil is formulating a
    new National Defense Strategy and beginning to make decisions
    about acquisition of new military systems and technology.
    Other military issues of interest include service relations
    with the fledgling civilian defense ministry and the
    necessity of negotiating further agreements with the U.S. in
    order to enhance our already strong military-to-military
    relationship.  End Summary.

    --------------------------
    Politico-Economic Overview
    --------------------------

    ¶3.  (SBU) President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was elected in
    2002 in large part on promises of promoting an ambitious
    social agenda, including generous handouts to the poor.  On
    the strength of the popularity of these measures, he was
    re-elected in 2006, although with diminished support from the
    middle class.  The public's top concerns - crime and public
    security - have not improved under this administration. The
    Lula Administration has been beset by a grave political
    crisis as interlocking influence peddling/vote-buying
    scandals plagued elements of Lula's PT party, but the
    President,s personal popularity has not suffered, even after
    many of his closest associates have been caught in corrupt
    practices.  MOD Jobim is perhaps among the most trusted
    leaders in Brazil.  A former Supreme Court Justice, he
    maintains a strong reputation for integrity that is rare
    among Brazil,s leadership.

    --------------------------------------------- --
    Friendly Cooperation, But Not Strong Friendship
    --------------------------------------------- --

    ¶4.  (C) Brazil's democratic institutions are strong and
    stable after more than 20 years of civilian rule.  A return
    to military dictatorship is today unthinkable as Brazil's
    armed forces pursue a professional non-political identity.
    With steady export-led economic growth having become the norm
    in the recent past, Brazil has been a supporter of reasoned
    foreign policy goals and has been steadfast in its support of
    democracy in the hemisphere.  It has a strong interest in
    hemispheric security issues that largely mirrors our own, and
    actively cooperates with us on the operational level in the
    fight against terrorism.

    BRASILIA 00000351  002.2 OF 003

    ¶5. (C) While relations between the U.S. and Brazil are
    generally friendly, often the USG encounters major
    difficulties in gaining the cooperation of senior
    policymakers on issues of significant interest to the United
    States.  The difficulty is most apparent in the Ministry for
    External Affairs (MRE) which maintains an anti-American slant
    and has tried to block improved DoD-MOD relations.  In
    planning for Jobim,s visit, the MRE actively campaigned to
    limit Jobim,s time in Washington to one largely ceremonial
    day with little substance.

    ¶6.  (C) The current left-of-center administration has
    studiously avoided close cooperation on pol-mil issues
    important to us and has kept us at arms length on most
    security-related issues.  Specifically, the MRE has dragged
    its feet on completing a Defense Cooperation Agreement,
    General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA),
    Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) or Article
    98 agreement.  The GOB traditionally maintained that such
    agreements, particularly the SOFA, were against Brazilian
    law, but reversed itself (over MRE objections) and signed a
    SOFA with France earlier this year.  We are exploring the
    possibility of using the French SOFA as a starting place for
    a U.S.-Brazil agreement.

    ¶7.  (C) Brazil has stayed the course as leader of MINUSTAH in
    Haiti despite a lack of domestic support for the PKO.  The
    MRE has remained committed to the initiative because it
    believes that the operation serves FM Amorim's obsessive
    international goal of qualifying Brazil for a seat on the UN
    Security Council.  The Brazilian military remains committed
    as well, because the mission enhances its international
    prestige and provides training and operational opportunities.
     So far, President Lula has backed the Foreign Ministry's
    position, and Brazil will likely continue to provide
    leadership and troops to MINUSTAH for the conceivable future.
    Despite the success of the MINUSTAH deployment, Brazil has
    not shown any interest in undertaking further peacekeeping
    operations, although Brazilian contributions to UN operations
    in such places as Darfur have been requested.

    ------------------------
    CT and Non-Proliferation
    ------------------------

    ¶8.  (C) The desire not to be identified with the U.S. is
    borne out as well in the GOB's approach to counterterrorism.
    Cooperation remains excellent at the operational level,
    especially between law enforcement agencies.  However, the
    GOB political leadership has refused to endorse U.S.
    counterterrorism initiatives publicly and has insisted that
    official communiques of the 3 1 mechanism note that there is
    no evidence of terrorist operations in the Tri-Border area,
    where Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina meet.  Wary of its
    large, prosperous and influential Arab population, the GOB
    makes every effort to downplay in public even the possibility
    of terrorist fund-raising going on inside Brazil.

    ¶9.  (C) The GOB has a good record in non-proliferation
    efforts, but has been slow to join international consensus in
    favor of sanctions on Iran.  Brazil has also not yet signed
    the NPT Additional Protocol, although it has not ruled out
    signing it in the near future.

    ---------------
    Military Issues
    ---------------

    ¶10.  (C) Brazil established a Ministry of Defense (MoD) for
    the first time in June 1999, uniting the three services
    (Army, Navy, and Air Force) under a single minister.  Jobim
    became Minister last year when the disastrous crash of a
    Brazilian airliner highlighted weaknesses in the civil
    aviation system, which comes under MOD purview.
    Organizationally, the MOD still faces challenges managing the
    individual services. Each service is still fairly autonomous
    and controls its own budget and acquisition programs.  In
    addition, the Lula administration,s focus on social reforms

    BRASILIA 00000351  003.2 OF 003

    and programs has meant decreases for military budgets,
    leading to fewer training opportunities and equipment
    purchases.  This situation is changing as there is now near
    consensus among Brazil,s leadership that the military is
    under-resourced and under equipped to accomplish its missions.

    ¶11.  (C)  To address this situation, the Lula government has
    tasked a new National Defense strategy to be completed by
    this fall.  This paper will set the framework for military
    modernization and theoretically drive decisions on
    acquisition of new equipment.  In reality, such decisions
    will be made largely for political and economic reasons.
    Brazil,s defense industrial base has atrophied since the end
    of the Cold War, and it is a major objective of the
    government to reinvigorate it.  Decisions on major systems
    will be influenced much more by access to foreign technology
    and opportunities for Brazilian industry than by the
    capabilities such systems will add to Brazil,s military.

    ----------------------
    General Points to Make
    ----------------------

    ¶18.  (SBU) Our core message for Jobim's visit should be:

    --  Reinforcing and underscoring the importance of these
    agreements in support of Brazil,s interest to reequip and
    modernize its military with technology transfer is critically
    important.  It would also help to define how we, the anchor
    of the North America, and Brazil the anchor of South America,
    may be able to work more closely in the future to enhance
    hemispheric defense cooperation.

     We recommend SecDef also emphasize the following points in
    conversations with Minister Jobim:

    -- We want to continue improving our defense relationship.
    This is an imperative, given the difficult global security
    situation in which we live today, and the importance of
    Brazil,s role in the Americas.

    -- We are serious about our partnership in Brazil.  We see
    strong possibilities for joint research and production,
    exchanges of military personnel and training.

    -- As you make important decisions about the modernization of
    Brazil,s forces later this year, keep in mind that
    partnership with the U.S. can help both our countries realize
    our common goal of preserving stability in the Western
    Hemisphere.

    --  As we continue to develop our partnership, we need to
    have in place several standard documents to assure smooth
    cooperation.  The Defense Cooperation Agreement is the first
    of these.  We understand your Ministry has approved the
    current draft and hope the rest of your government will also.
     Next, we hope to complete an agreement on information
    security and a Status of Forces Agreement to protect the
    forces of both countries during joint exercises.

    -- The United States would like to congratulate Brazil for
    its efforts in Haiti.  The improving situation there is in no
    small measure due to the professionalism and dedication of
    Brazilian troops and leadership.  We hope Brazil is resolved
    to continue to contribute to the success of MINUSTAH.

    SOBEL

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