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### Viewing cable 05PARIS6580, MFA AND ELYSEE UPBEAT ON CORE GROUP MINISTERIAL,

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
05PARIS6580 | 2005-09-26 16:03 | 2011-07-21 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris

Appears in these articles:
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16545
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16461
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16545
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16546
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16605
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16606
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16703
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16793
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16794
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16636
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16635
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17148
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17149
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17150
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17152
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17155
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17156
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17157
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17158
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17159
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17160
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17161
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17163
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17164
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17165
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17166
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17167
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17169
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17170
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/17171
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16723
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16635
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16636
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16637
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16638
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16639
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16640
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16641
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16642
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16643
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16644
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16645

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006580

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2015
    TAGS: PREL LE SY PTER FR UNSC
    SUBJECT: MFA AND ELYSEE UPBEAT ON CORE GROUP MINISTERIAL,
    CAUTIOUS ON SYRIA REGIME STABILITY

    Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
    1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1. (C) Summary and comment: Elysee and MFA officials
    described the September 19 Lebanon Core Group ministerial as
    a success, and expressed relief that consideration of a draft
    UNSCR on arms transfers to Lebanon had been dropped from the
    agenda.  Gof officials expressed similar satisfaction that
    military cooperation had been kept off the Core Group agenda
    and confirmed that a third French military assessment mission
    will go to Lebanon in October. Elysee officials commended PM
    Siniora's performance in New York and the concurrent
    isolation of President Lahoud at UNGA, and stressed that the
    GoF has no preferred candidate to replace Lahoud.  The GoF
    maintains that any Lahoud successor should truly emanate from
    the Christian community and should be acceptable to Lebanon's
    Sunni community and regional countries, criteria which, in
    the French view, Aoun does not meet.  On Syrian regime
    stability, MFA contacts remain typically more cautious than
    Elysee counterparts, who speculate that direct implication of
    Syria in the Mehlis report could result in fall of the Asad
    regime to Alawite strongmen, a Sunni overthrow, or further
    consolidation of power by President Bashar al-Asad.  On the
    latter point, Elysee contacts speculate that Bashar could
    give up Rustom Ghazaleh and Ghazi Kanaan, but will draw the
    line at family members.  Elysee contacts described the visit
    of Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI) head Asif Shawkat to
    Paris as both unfortunate and part of regular bilateral
    consultations between security services; Elysee contacts
    claimed that the DST (internal security service) had not
    informed the Elysee in advance and that the DST chief was the
    only GoF official to receive Shawkat.  End summary and
    comment.

    LEBANON: CORE GROUP, UNSCR, LAHOUD SUCCESSOR,
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) We met with Presidential Technical Advisor on Middle
    East/Americas Dominique Boche September 22 and separately
    with MFA DAS-equivalent for Egypt/Levant Herve Besancenot
    September 20 to review Lebanon and Syria developments. Both
    Boche and Besancenot described the September 19 Core Group
    ministerial as a success, judging Arab and Russian
    participation to have been particularly important.  Boche
    described the Siniora's effective performance at the Core
    Group as an excellent complement to Lahoud's isolation at
    UNGA.

    ¶3. (C) While commending the Core Group success, both Boche
    and Besancenot referred to USG-GOF disagreements resolved
    prior to the September 19 meeting. Boche commended the U.S.
    for understanding that now was not the right moment for a
    draft UNSCR limiting arms transfers to state actors in
    Lebanon, noting that such a resolution would have undermined
    GOL cohesion as well as international consensus on Lebanon.
    Boche reiterated GoF reticence on sanctions in general, but
    conceded that the GoF was not closed to discussing possible
    Syria sanctions, particularly after issuance of the final
    Mehlis report. Besancenot was more negative on the draft
    UNSCR, noting GoF discomfort with the proposed mention of
    Iraq in the draft text, and reiterating that the Core Group
    should address Lebanon only.  He stressed that we needed to
    move sequentially and put priority on UNSCR 1595 over UNSCR
    1559; implementation of the former would help pave the way
    for the latter, with Hizballah gradually losing justification
    for maintaining its military capacity.

    ¶4.  (C) Boche and Besancenot expressed similar satisfaction
    that military cooperation was kept off the Core Group agenda.
     Boche noted that including military cooperation on the Core
    Group agenda would have given Hizballah a pretext to accuse
    the international community of interference and to separate
    from the GoL.  Boche confirmed that a third French military
    assessment mission would visit Lebanon in October, but did
    not provide a date.

    ¶5. (C)  On possible candidates to replace President Lahoud,
    Boche stressed that the GoF was remaining cautious and had no
    preferred candidates. Rather than focusing on personalities,
    the GoF had identified two criteria: 1) the candidate should
    truly emanate from the Christian community (i.e., not be
    picked by Sa'ad Hariri); and 2) the candidate should be
    acceptable to Lebanon's Muslim community and countries of the
    region.  The second requirement eliminated Michel Aoun as a
    valid contender, Boche concluded  He said he had no
    information about a possible Aoun visit to France, but
    confirmed that were the Free Patriotic Movement leader to
    visit, he would be received at the MFA only, as part of a
    deliberate GoF policy not to receive any presidential
    contenders at the Presidency.  Boche expressed concern that
    Sa'ad Hariri might be tempted to seek a weak, easy to manage,
    elder Christian politician to replace Lahoud, which would be
    a huge mistake.  Lebanon needed both the PM and President to
    play political roles; the President represented the
    aspirations, if not the existence, of the Maronite community
    and should not be reduced to a figurehead role.

    SYRIA: IMPACT OF MEHLIS REPORT ON STABILITY, SHAWKAT VISIT
    --------------------------------------------- -------------

    ¶6. (C) On Syrian regime stability, Boche reiterated that the
    content of the final Mehlis report would be decisive.  If the
    report established direct SARG responsibility for Hariri's
    assassination, Boche speculated that Bashar may give up
    second-tier officials up to the level of Interior Minister
    Ghazi Kanaan and former SMI Chief in Lebanon Rustom Ghazaleh,
    without touching brother-in law Asif Shawkat, in-laws the
    Makhlufs, or his brother Mahir.  Boche added that he could
    not exclude any possibilities for regime stability after the
    Mehlis report; there could be a "palace coup," with other
    powerful Alawis taking over; the Alawites could lose control
    to the Sunnis, who lack leaders; or Bashar could seize the
    moment to consolidate his authority and marginalize others,
    as he has started to do since the last Ba'th party congress.
    Besancenot was more cautious than Boche in reiterating to us
    that the GoF did not want a "total destabilization" in Syria,
    nor did the GoF want isolation of Syria to lead to it
    increasing its "nuisance capacity" in the region.

    ¶7. (C)  Boche stressed that Egypt and Saudi Arabia remained
    essential to the international effort to maintain the
    isolation of Syria.  Egypt wanted to play a role and be
    useful, and Mubarak had agreed to receive Terje Roed-Larsen
    in direct response to a phone call from Chirac. The September
    25 Bashar visit to Cairo would be another opportunity for
    Egypt to deliver a tough message to the Syrian leader.  The
    Saudis were "a bit behind," in Boche's view, as King Abdullah
    was closer personally to Syria via his tribal and family
    connections.  Boche described Saudi Arabia as not wanting to
    be seen as plotting against the Syrian regime, and therefore
    unwilling to receive Larsen in Riyadh.  Boche speculated,
    though, that, in the end, Saudi Arabia would not mind having
    a Sunni government in Damascus "break the Shi'a arc" between
    Lebanon and Iran.  Saudi ties to the Hariri family were also
    a positive factor; Saudi Arabia had been helpful at the time
    of the Syrian blockade of its border with Lebanon, offering
    use of the port of Yanbu for the transit of goods blocked at
    the border.

    ¶8. (C) Boche confirmed that SMI Chief Asif Shawkat had
    visited Paris and met with DST head Bosquet and no other GOF
    officials, before departing France.  Boche described
    Shawkat's visit as part of long-standing liaison relationship
    between French and Syrian security services, and noted
    Shawkat usually visited France twice a year.  Boche described
    timing for the visit as "unfortunate," and claimed that there
    was a lack of coordination within the GoF, with the Elysee
    learning of the visit only after Shawkat had arrived.  He
    added that Shawkat has a sick child, which could have been
    another reason for the visit.  Boche offered no details on
    the contents of Shawkat's discussions with the DST.

    ¶9. (C) COMMENT: The GoF appears satisfied with the Core Group
    ministerial, not only because it provided an opportunity to
    reaffirm international support for the GOL reform agenda, but
    because the GoF managed to keep a draft UNSCR and military
    cooperation off the agenda.  While the GoF mantra remains,
    "UNSCR 1595 before UNSCR 1559," it remains unclear what
    happens after the Mehlis report is issued, with the MFA
    expressing typically more caution than the Elysee on
    prospects for SARG destabilization.  End comment.
    Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
    STAPLETON

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