Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 19786 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden 00. Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Jordan Yemen Thailand

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05 2011/06 2011/07 2011/08
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04 2011/05/05 2011/05/06 2011/05/07 2011/05/08 2011/05/09 2011/05/10 2011/05/11 2011/05/12 2011/05/13 2011/05/14 2011/05/15 2011/05/16 2011/05/17 2011/05/18 2011/05/19 2011/05/20 2011/05/21 2011/05/22 2011/05/23 2011/05/24 2011/05/25 2011/05/26 2011/05/27 2011/05/28 2011/05/29 2011/05/30 2011/05/31
2011/06/01 2011/06/02 2011/06/03 2011/06/04 2011/06/05 2011/06/06 2011/06/07 2011/06/08 2011/06/09 2011/06/10 2011/06/11 2011/06/12 2011/06/13 2011/06/14 2011/06/15 2011/06/16 2011/06/17 2011/06/18 2011/06/19 2011/06/20 2011/06/21 2011/06/22 2011/06/23 2011/06/24 2011/06/25 2011/06/26 2011/06/27 2011/06/28 2011/06/29 2011/06/30
2011/07/01 2011/07/02 2011/07/04 2011/07/05 2011/07/06 2011/07/07 2011/07/08 2011/07/10 2011/07/11 2011/07/12 2011/07/13 2011/07/14 2011/07/15 2011/07/16 2011/07/17 2011/07/18 2011/07/19 2011/07/20 2011/07/21 2011/07/22 2011/07/23 2011/07/25 2011/07/27 2011/07/28 2011/07/29 2011/07/31
2011/08/01 2011/08/02 2011/08/03 2011/08/05 2011/08/06 2011/08/07 2011/08/08 2011/08/09 2011/08/10 2011/08/11 2011/08/12 2011/08/13 2011/08/15 2011/08/16 2011/08/17

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/05 1985/06
1986/05 1986/08 1986/12
1987/06
1988/01 1988/03 1988/04 1988/07 1988/08 1988/12
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05 1991/07 1991/11
1992/01 1992/03 1992/06 1992/09 1992/11 1992/12
1993/01 1993/02 1993/10
1994/11 1994/12
1995/01 1995/04 1995/06 1995/11
1996/07 1996/09 1996/11
1997/02 1997/03 1997/05 1997/06 1997/08 1997/10 1997/12
1998/05 1998/12
1999/01 1999/09
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11 2000/12
2001/02 2001/03 2001/04 2001/05 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11 2001/12
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/06 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11 2002/12
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Belfast Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chiang Mai Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Freetown Consulate Fukuoka
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guangzhou Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hong Kong Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy Libreville Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Mission Geneva Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maseru Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne Consulate Matamoros
Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Nuevo Laredo Consulate Naples Consulate Naha Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sapporo Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE UN Rome Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vientiane Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ASEC AEMR AMGT AR APECO AU AORC AJ AF AFIN AS AM ABLD AFFAIRS AMB APER AA AE ADM ATRN ACOA AID AY AG ALOW AND ABUD AMED ASPA AL APEC ADPM ADANA AFSI ARABL ADCO ANARCHISTS AZ ANET AMEDCASCKFLO AADP AO AGRICULTURE ACABQ ASEAN APRC ARF AFSN AFSA AORG AINR AINF AODE ARCH APCS AGAO AROC ASUP ADB AX AMEX ARM AQ ATFN AMBASSADOR ARAS ACBAQ AC AOPR AREP ASIG ASEX AER AVERY ASCH AFU AMG ATPDEA ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AORL AN AIT AGMT ACS AGR AMCHAMS AECL AUC AFGHANISTAN ACAO
BR BB BG BEXP BY BA BRUSSELS BU BD BK BL BE BO BTIO BM BH BAIO BRPA BUSH BILAT BF BX BMGT BOL BC BIDEN BP BBG BBSR BT BWC BEXPC BN BTIU
CPAS CA CASC CS CBW CIDA CO CODEL CI CROS CU CH CWC CMGT CVIS CDG CG CF CHIEF CJAN CBSA CE CY CB CW CM CHR CD CT CDC CONS CAMBODIA CN CR COUNTRY CONDOLEEZZA CZ CARICOM COM CICTE CYPRUS CACS CBE COE CIVS CFED COUNTER COPUOS CAPC CV CARSON CTR CITES CKGR CVR CLINTON COUNTERTERRORISM CITEL CLEARANCE CSW CIC CITT CARIB CAFTA CACM CDB CJUS CTM CAN CAJC CONSULAR CLMT CBC CIA CNARC CIS CEUDA CHINA CAC CL
DR DJ DB DHS DAO DCM DO DEFENSE DA DK DOMESTIC DISENGAGEMENT DOD DE DOT DPRK DEPT DEA DOE DTRA DS DEAX
ECON ETTC EFIS ETRD EC EMIN EAGR EAID EU EFIN EUN ECIN EG EWWT EINV ENRG ELAB EPET EN EAIR EUMEM ECPS ELTN EIND EZ EI ER ET EINT ECONOMIC ENIV EFTA ES EET ECONOMY ELECTIONS ENV EAG ESTH ETRO ECIP EPEC EXIM ENERG ECCT EREL EK EDEV ERNG ENGY EPA ETRAD ELTNSNAR ENGR ETRC ELAP EUREM EEB EETC ENVI ECOSOC EXTERNAL ELN ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EAIDS EDU EPREL EINVEFIN ECA EFINECONCS EIDN EINVKSCA ETC ENVR EAP EINN EXBS ECONOMICS EIAR EINDETRD ECONEFIN EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EFIM EINVETC ECONCS EDRC ENRD EBRD ETRA ESA EAIG EUR EUC ERD ETRN EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ESENV ENNP ECINECONCS ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN
FR FI FOREIGN FAO FARC FAS FINANCE FREEDOM FBI FTAA FCS FAA FJ FTA FK FT FAC FDA FINR FM FOR FOI FO FMLN FISO
GM GERARD GT GA GG GR GTIP GE GH GY GB GLOBAL GCC GEORGE GC GV GAZA GL GOV GOI GF GTMO GANGS GAERC GZ GUILLERMO GASPAR
HR HA HYMPSK HO HK HUMAN HN HUD HU HURI HILLARY HI HUM HSTC HEBRON HUMOR
IZ IN IAEA IS IMO ILO IR IC IT ITU IV IMF IBRD IWC IPR IDB ISRAELI IRAQI ITALY ITPGOV ITALIAN IADB ID ICAO ICRC INR ICJ IO IFAD IRAQ INL INMARSAT INRA INTERNAL INTELSAT ILC IRS INDO ITRA IIP IEFIN IQ ICTY ISCON IAHRC IA INTERPOL IEA INRB ISRAEL IZPREL IRAJ IF ITPHUM IL IACI IDA ISLAMISTS IGAD ITF INRO IBET IDP ICTR IRC
JA JO JM JP JOHN JUS JAMES JOSEPH JOHNNIE JML JIMENEZ
KOMC KNNP KFLO KDEM KSUM KIPR KFLU KPAO KE KCRM KJUS KAWC KZ KSCA KDRG KCOR KGHG KPAL KTIP KMCA KCRS KPKO KOLY KRVC KVPR KG KWBG KMDR KTER KSPR KV KTFN KWMN KFRD KSTH KS KN KISL KGIC KSEP KFIN KTEX KTIA KUNR KCMR KMOC KCIP KTDB KBIO KSAF KU KHIV KNNNP KSTC KNUP KIRF KIRC KNUC KHLS KIVP KTDD KMPI KIDE KSEO KSCS KICC KCFE KGLB KPWR KR KCOM KESS KREL KWN KCSY KRFD KPOL KBCT KREC KICCPUR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KOCI KGIT KMCC KPRP KPRV KAUST KPAOPREL KCRIM KIRP KLAB KHSA KPAONZ KCRCM KICA KHDP KNAR KINR KGHA KPAOY KTRD KTAO KWAC KJUST KACT KSCI KHUM KNPP KMRS KTBT KNNPMNUC KBTS KERG KPIR KTLA KAWK KNDP KVRP KAID KO KX KFSC KENV KPOA KMFO KVIR KRCM KCFC KNEI KCHG KPLS KFTFN KTFM KLIG KDEMAF KRAD KBTR KGCC KSEC KPIN KDEV KWWMN KOM KWNM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KRGY KIFR KSAC KWMNCS KPAK KOMS KFPC KRIM KDDG KCGC KPAI KID KMIG KNSD KWMM
LY LE LABOR LH LAB LI LTTE LO LU LA LVPR LT LG LOG
MARR MX MASS MOPS MNUC MCAP MTCRE MRCRE MTRE MASC MY MK MCC MO MAS MZ MCA MIL MU ML MTCR MEPP MG MI MINUSTAH MP MA MD MAPP MAR MR MOPPS MTS MLS MILI MEPN MEPI MEETINGS MERCOSUR MW MT MIK MN MAPS MV MILITARY MARAD MDC MACEDONIA MASSMNUC MUCN MEDIA MQADHAFI MPOS MPS MC
NZ NATO NI NO NU NG NL NPT NS NSF NA NP NATIONAL NASA NDP NIH NC NIPP NSSP NEGROPONTE NK NAS NE NATOIRAQ NAR NGO NR NZUS NARC NH NSG NAFTA NEW NRR NT NOVO NATOPREL NEA NSC NV NPA NSFO NW NORAD NPG NOAA
OTRA OECD OVIP OREP OPRC ODC OIIP OPDC OAS OSCE OPIC OMS OEXC OPCW OIE OSCI OPAD ODIP OFDP OM OFFICIALS OEXP OPEC OVIPPRELUNGANU ODPC OSHA OSIC OHUM OTR OMIG OSAC OBSP OFDA OVP ON OCII OES OCS OIC
PGOV PREL PARM PINR PHUM PM PREF PTER PK PINS PBIO PHSA PE PBTS PL POL PAK POV POLITICS POLICY PA PNAT PALESTINIAN PAS PCI PO PROV PH PERM PETR PRELBR PROP POLITICAL PJUS PREZ PAO PRELPK PAIGH PROG PMAR PU PG PTE PDOV PGOVSOCI PMIL PY PGOR PBTSRU PRAM PARMS PSI PPA PREO PGOF PTERE PERL PINO PRGOV PORG PP PS PKFK PSOE PEPR PDEM PINT PRELP PREFA PNG PTBS PFOR PUNE PGOVLO PHUMBA POLINT PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PLN PHUH PEDRO PF PHUS PETER PARTIES PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PHUMPREL POGOV PEL PINL PBT PINF PRL PSEPC POSTS PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOC PNR
QA
RS RP RU RW RFE RCMP RIGHTSPOLMIL RO ROBERT RM REGION ROOD RICE RELAM RSP RF RELATIONS RIGHTS RUPREL REMON RPEL REACTION REPORT RSO
SZ SENV SOCI SNAR SY SO SP SU SI SMIG SYR SA SCUL SW SR SYRIA SNARM SPECIALIST SG SENS SF SEN SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR SN SC SNA SK SL SANC SMIL SCRM SENVSXE SAARC STEINBERG SCRS SWE SARS SNARIZ SENVQGR SAN ST SM SIPDIS SSA SPCVIS SOFA SENVKGHG SHI SEVN SHUM SH SNARCS SPCE SNARN SIPRS
TRGY TBIO TSPA TU TPHY TI TX TH TIP TSPL TNGD TS TW TRSY TZ TN TINT TC TR TIO TF TK TRAD TT TWI TD TERRORISM TP TL TV TO TURKEY TSPAM TREL TRT TFIN TAGS THPY TBID
UK UNSC UNGA UN US UZ USEU UG UP UNAUS UNMIK USTR UY UNSCR UNRCR UNESCO UNICEF USPS UNHCR UNHRC UNFICYP UNCSD UNEP USAID UV UNDP UNTAC USDA USUN UNMIC UNCHR UR UNCTAD USGS USOAS USNC UA UE UNVIE UAE UNO UNODC UNCHS UNDESCO UNC UNPUOS UNDC UNCHC UNFCYP UNIDROIT UNCND
VE VM VT VZ VEPREL VN VTEG VTIZ VTPREL VISIT VENZ VAT VC VI
WHTI WIPO WTRO WTO WHO WFP WS WA WZ WI WMD WBG WWARD WHA WITH WTRQ WEU WMO WB
XA XW XX XK XL XM XS XF XR XY XG XT XC XH XD XE XV XB XU XZ XQ XI XTAG
YI YM YE YL YMCS
ZU ZI ZOELLICK ZP ZR ZO ZK ZF ZL ZB ZN ZH ZT ZJ ZEALAND ZA ZANU

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 07USUNNEWYORK1225, USUN VIEWS ON SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07USUNNEWYORK1225.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07USUNNEWYORK1225 | 2007-12-29 02:22 | 2011-07-11 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | USUN New York

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUCNDT #1225/01 3630222
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 290222Z DEC 07
    FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3473
    INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 0897
    RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 1996
    RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 8421
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 0912
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001225

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    FROM AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD FOR SECSTATE RICE, APNSA HADLEY,
    SECDEF GATES, AND VPOTUS CHENEY

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2017
    TAGS: PREL KUNR UNSC JA BR IN GE
    SUBJECT: USUN VIEWS ON SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

    REF: A. STATE 169809
         ¶B. USUN 1183

    Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay M. Khalilzad, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1. (C) Summary and comment.  With inter-governmental
    negotiations on Security Council reform set to begin in 2008,
    a serious debate has begun on Council expansion.  We are
    closer than we have been in several decades to the prospect
    that a formal proposal for expansion could be put to a vote.
    We do not know yet if any proposal could secure the needed
    two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, although this is
    possible.  In any scenario, the position of the African bloc
    will be critical.  Therefore, we believe it is time to
    seriously consider our response.  We have four options: (1)
    avoid engagement and rely on our veto in the ratification
    phase to preserve our interests; (2) delay engagement until
    African states begin to declare support for realistic
    proposals; (3) start to engage the key players with a view to
    shaping where they throw their votes; and (4) proactively
    articulate an American position and mobilize a coalition to
    support it.  We recommend that we begin to engage now to
    understand better the political terrain; to test reactions to
    certain principles, possible redlines, and other structural
    reforms we would seek as part of a comprehensive reform of
    the UN; and then to determine which option to pursue.  End
    summary and comment.

    The Political Landscape on UNSC Reform
    --------------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) Changes in the global distribution of power since
    1965, when the membership of the Council was last adjusted,
    underlie the political impetus for Security Council
    expansion.  Some states are perennial critics of the Council,
    although this is typically ideological in nature.  The real
    danger is that, as the membership of the Council has not been
    updated to reflect geopolitical realities, new rising powers
    as well as their friends and allies might come to view the
    Council,s role as illegitimate.  This, in turn, could
    undermine the willingness of countries to abide by its
    resolutions.

    ¶3. (C) The U.S. position is that we favor permanent
    membership for Japan, that other nations should be considered
    as well, and that changes in the Council should be part of a
    comprehensive package of structural reforms.  All significant
    proposals for Council reform, however, go beyond the position
    of favoring Japan alone for permanent membership.  Based on
    the President's speech to the UNGA and bilateral engagement
    with G-4 members, we are already viewed within the P-5 as
    more forward-leaning than Russia and China.  The British and
    French are publicly wedded to the G-4 approach, partly to
    deflect attention from questions about over-representation of
    Europe among the permanent members.

    ¶4. (C) According to the UNGA resolution adopted in September
    2007, member states are set to begin inter-governmental
    negotiations on Council reform before September 2008.  These
    negotiations could provide a vehicle for the G-4 model
    (permanent seats for Japan, Germany, India, Brazil, and two
    African countries, as well as four additional non-permanent
    seats) to be brought to a vote.  Because the G-4 proposal was
    not put to a vote in 2005 when it was first tabled, it is
    difficult to know exactly how much support it would have
    commanded.  We do not, however, believe that it enjoyed the
    support of the required two-thirds majority (128 countries)
    of member states.  But in the coming months, the G-4 will
    revise their proposal and could force many previously
    undecided countries as well as African Union members to show
    their cards and reveal how close to 128 votes Council
    expansion has now come.

    ¶5. (C) We believe expansion of the Council, along the lines
    of the models currently discussed, will dilute U.S. influence
    in the body.  USUN currently starts most discussions about
    important Council statements or resolutions with at least six
    votes (U.S., UK, France, and the three European delegations)
    and must secure three more to reach the required nine votes
    -- barring a P-5 veto -- for adoption.  To take just the G-4
    countries plus the yet-unidentified African state(s) that
    would join them in permanent membership, we are confident we

    could reliably count on Japan's support, and to a lesser
    degree, on Germany's.  However, on the most important issues
    of the day -- sanctions, human rights, the Middle East, etc.
    -- Brazil, India, and most African states are currently far
    less sympathetic to our views than our European allies.

    ¶6. (C) Due to the arithmetic of the UNGA, the African states
    will be critical in determining whether any Charter amendment
    reaches the two-thirds majority.  Based on public speeches
    and our own estimates, we assess that the G-4 model or some
    variant thereof currently enjoys the support of roughly 70-95
    member states.  The Uniting for Consensus (UFC) proposal (no
    additional permanent seats, but 10 additional non-permanent
    seats) enjoys support of no more than roughly 20-25 member
    states.  The African Union (AU) model (largely the same as
    the G-4 model but with veto rights for all new permanent
    members) counts about 40-50 adherents.  Out of a total of 192
    member states, these figures leave about 40 states without a
    clear position on UNSC reform.  Assuming these 40 states
    either split their support between the rival camps or abstain
    from voting, it is clear that the G-4 proposal or its
    successor will need the support of a sizable number of
    African states to reach the 128-vote threshold.

    Principles for Acceptable Council Expansion
    -------------------------------------------

    ¶7. (C) Regardless of how we play the situation tactically,
    our position should be based on a set of principles that
    define the parameters for acceptable Council expansion,
    including a group of structural UN reforms that would be
    acceptable trade-offs for our support for Council expansion:

    -- TAILORING COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP TO ADDRESS CRITICAL STRATEGIC
    CHALLENGES:  We should not think about Council expansion just
    in the abstract, but also as a way to fashion the Council to
    address the contemporary era's fundamental challenges,
    including instability and threats arising from the Middle
    East, the management of the rise of China, and proliferation.
     This would imply that countries to be added should align
    with our interests and views of these problems.

    -- PRESERVING U.S. INFLUENCE:  We should base our approach to
    Council expansion along the following lines in order to
    prevent significant erosion of our current level of
    influence:

    ¶1.  SMALLEST POSSIBLE EXPANSION: A dilemma of Council reform
    is that it is inevitably "additive" in nature because
    declining powers and regional blocs can prevent any
    diminution of their representation on the Council.  A modest
    expansion of two or three permanent members would best suit
    our interests, but the dynamics of securing the two-thirds
    majority for a particular proposal would create pressure to
    move to a significant expansion of five to seven new members.
     As it is, negotiating documents that require unanimity among
    fifteen members is already a long and difficult enough
    process.  We are also cognizant that this may not be the last
    call to expand the Council over the life of the United
    Nations.

    ¶2.  NO EXTENSION OF VETO:  Addition of new permanent members
    with veto rights would increase the risk to U.S. interests
    from Council expansion exponentially.  We should quietly
    allow discontent with P-5 veto prerogatives to ensure the
    veto is not extended to new members while joining Russia and
    China in stoutly defending existing P-5 vetoes.  Although G-4
    countries privately concede the veto, most AU states remain
    united behind the demand in the AU "Ezulwini Consensus" for
    two permanent seats for Africa with veto rights.  Cracks
    began to appear in the AU position, however, when ten African
    states joined India in September 2007 in tabling resolution
    L69 -- which did not make any stipulations regarding the
    right of veto.  USUN understands that an AU summit is planned
    for late January 2008, at which African supporters of L69
    (South Africa and Nigeria most prominently) will seek greater
    flexibility in the AU position.

    ¶3.  MAINTAINING OUR ARITHMETIC ADVANTAGE IN UNSC VOTING:
    According to the UN Charter, in order for the Council to
    adopt a resolution, nine of its fifteen members must vote in
    favor without any P-5 vetoes.  As described earlier, USUN

    currently starts most important debates with six typically
    sympathetic countries (P-3 plus European delegations) and
    must secure three more to reach the nine-vote threshold.  If
    the Council were expanded to 20 members but the minimum votes
    for adoption of UNSC resolutions were set at 11, USUN would
    start most debates with eight votes -- assuming Japan and
    Germany were among the new permanent members -- and still
    only have to seek three more for adoption.  Adjusting voting
    thresholds in an expanded Council could be an important
    vehicle to preserve our current arithmetic advantage in the
    UNSC.

    ¶4.  ENSURING PREDICTABILITY IN THE SELECTION OF NEW MEMBERS:
    While an amendment to the UN Charter to expand the Security
    Council would have to specify the names of the new permanent
    members, most UNSC proposals envision as a first step a
    framework resolution to set forth a mechanism to elect the
    new permanent members.  To maximize predictability, we should
    structure the framework agreement to require that candidate
    members receive broad support from the UNGA membership as a
    whole, not within regional blocs, and to limit the rounds of
    balloting on each seat.

    -- LINKAGE TO CRITICAL STRUCTURAL REFORMS:  Any change in the
    Council should only be made in exchange for significant
    structural reforms to revitalize the institution as a whole.
    The list below is illustrative of the trade-offs we should
    pursue.  It should be noted that all of these would be highly
    controversial at the UN and that many would threaten the
    current base of support for the G-4 or other UNSC expansion
    proposals.  Many of these reforms might also dissuade African
    states from supporting a "package" of UNSC expansion tied to
    structural UN reform.

    ¶1.  SHIFT TO VOLUNTARY FUNDING:  This reform would have the
    most dramatic impact on General Assembly decision-making, the
    U.S. financial contribution to the UN, and support for
    greater transparency and accountability within the UN system.
     Its viability as a reform tied to UNSC expansion depends on
    the willingness of aspirants for permanent Council seats to
    increase their contributions and/or pledge to cover any
    shortfall from a decrease in contributions by other states.
    African states, whose support would be crucial to successful
    UNSC expansion, would be particularly concerned about a drop
    in UN funding for development projects.

    ¶2.  WEIGHTED VOTING: Weighted voting could be based strictly
    on the assessment rate for contributions, a double majority
    voting system, or a bicameral UNGA in which representation in
    the second chamber is based on financial contributions and
    concurrence between the two chambers is necessary for all
    budgetary decisions.  Weighted voting is likely to be one of
    the most unpopular structural reforms for countries that do
    not attain permanent seats on the UNSC, including African
    states, because their influence in the UNGA and Fifth
    Committee would also be circumscribed.

    ¶3.  REDUCTION IN U.S. CONTRIBUTION:  The U.S. financial
    contribution to the UN would decline with either a floor or a
    cap on UNSC permanent member contributions.  If the floor
    were set at 5 percent of contributions (China currently pays
    2.6 percent, Russia 1.2 percent, Brazil 0.87 percent, and
    India 0.45 percent), and the G-4 countries plus an African
    state were to become permanent members, the U.S. contribution
    for non-peacekeeping assessments would decline to roughly 18
    percent.  The same floor/cap could be used to lower U.S.
    assessments to finance peacekeeping operations.  Such
    proposals would probably be most palatable to African and
    other developing countries, but they would have to overcome
    Russian and probably Chinese opposition.

    ¶4.  IMPROVING OVERSIGHT:  Some of the proposals to improve UN
    oversight include enshrining a "sunset clause" in the UN
    Charter, according to which all UNGA mandates would terminate
    after five years unless renewed by a two-thirds vote.  Other
    ways to ensure transparency and accountability include
    guaranteeing Office of Independent Oversight Services (OIOS)
    independence in the UN Charter and/or ensuring access to all
    internal UN audits by all member states.

    ¶5.  POLITICAL REFORMS:  States under UNSC sanctions could be
    barred from running for seats on any UN body.  This reform

    was proposed unsuccessfully in the run-up to the creation of
    the new Human Rights Council, as a considerable number of
    states complained of UNSC encroachment on the rights and
    prerogatives of other UN bodies.

    U.S. Options
    ------------

    ¶8. (C) With these principles in mind, we believe that the
    United States has four options to respond to the new round of
    activism on Council expansion:

    -- OPTION 1: Avoid engagement on Council expansion and rely
    on our veto in the ratification phase to preserve our
    interests.  Amendments to the UN Charter require the
    ratification of two-thirds of UNGA and must include the P-5.
    The United States could therefore remain disengaged from the
    process and determine its position in the ratification phase.
     The risk is that an expansion that threatens our interests
    could pass in the UNGA, that we would be isolated in
    rejecting ratification, and that this, in turn, would
    undermine the legitimacy of future Council actions.

    -- OPTION 2: Delay engagement until African states begin to
    declare support for realistic proposals.  When we get
    strategic warning that parts of this bloc are beginning to
    declare their intentions, we would engage with key players to
    shape the outcome, including potentially organizing a
    coalition to block proposals contrary to our interests.  The
    risk is that by waiting we will allow momentum to develop
    behind unfavorable proposals and come to the game too late to
    intervene successfully.

    -- OPTION 3: Engage the key players and undecided countries
    with a view to shaping where they throw their votes.  By
    articulating to these states the kind of expansion we could
    support, the United States could try to moderate their
    demands and mobilize their support behind our views.  The
    risk is that such engagement could accelerate the momentum
    behind Council expansion in ways that we could not ultimately
    control.

    -- OPTION 4: Proactively articulate an American position on
    Council expansion and mobilize a coalition to support it.
    Because of our vital interest in the legitimacy and
    effectiveness of the Council, the United States would engage
    the G-4 or some subset of the group to set forth its own
    proposal for Council expansion as part of a comprehensive
    package of structural reforms for the UN.  This would
    certainly accelerate the process of considering Council
    expansion, with the attendant risks, but we would be postured
    to shape a coalition in favor and against particular models.

    Recommendation
    --------------

    ¶9. (C) We recommend that we move forward in four steps.
    First, in order to collect sufficient information for a
    well-informed decision, USUN will in the next few months
    enter into discussions with other member states, with an eye
    to monitoring how close the G-4 or other models are to
    reaching the two-thirds majority, and carefully and
    selectively testing reactions to our principles in ways that
    do not accelerate movement toward Council expansion.  Second,
    we should assess and refine the principles described above
    for acceptable Council expansion.  Third, we should decide
    which specific structural reforms we should seek in exchange
    for our support to expand the Council, as any Security
    Council expansion has to be part of a comprehensive package
    of reform of the UN as a whole.  Fourth, we should decide
    which of the above-noted procedural options, or others that
    might later emerge, would best serve our interests.
    Khalilzad

`