Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 19726 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden 00. Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Jordan Yemen Thailand

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05 2011/06 2011/07 2011/08
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04 2011/05/05 2011/05/06 2011/05/07 2011/05/08 2011/05/09 2011/05/10 2011/05/11 2011/05/12 2011/05/13 2011/05/14 2011/05/15 2011/05/16 2011/05/17 2011/05/18 2011/05/19 2011/05/20 2011/05/21 2011/05/22 2011/05/23 2011/05/24 2011/05/25 2011/05/26 2011/05/27 2011/05/28 2011/05/29 2011/05/30 2011/05/31
2011/06/01 2011/06/02 2011/06/03 2011/06/04 2011/06/05 2011/06/06 2011/06/07 2011/06/08 2011/06/09 2011/06/10 2011/06/11 2011/06/12 2011/06/13 2011/06/14 2011/06/15 2011/06/16 2011/06/17 2011/06/18 2011/06/19 2011/06/20 2011/06/21 2011/06/22 2011/06/23 2011/06/24 2011/06/25 2011/06/26 2011/06/27 2011/06/28 2011/06/29 2011/06/30
2011/07/01 2011/07/02 2011/07/04 2011/07/05 2011/07/06 2011/07/07 2011/07/08 2011/07/10 2011/07/11 2011/07/12 2011/07/13 2011/07/14 2011/07/15 2011/07/16 2011/07/17 2011/07/18 2011/07/19 2011/07/20 2011/07/21 2011/07/22 2011/07/23 2011/07/25 2011/07/27 2011/07/28 2011/07/29 2011/07/31
2011/08/01 2011/08/02 2011/08/03 2011/08/05 2011/08/06 2011/08/07 2011/08/08 2011/08/09 2011/08/10 2011/08/11 2011/08/12

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/05 1985/06
1986/05 1986/08 1986/12
1987/06
1988/01 1988/03 1988/04 1988/07 1988/08 1988/12
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05 1991/07 1991/11
1992/01 1992/03 1992/06 1992/09 1992/11 1992/12
1993/01 1993/02 1993/10
1994/11 1994/12
1995/01 1995/04 1995/06 1995/11
1996/07 1996/09 1996/11
1997/02 1997/03 1997/05 1997/06 1997/08 1997/10 1997/12
1998/05 1998/12
1999/01 1999/09
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11 2000/12
2001/02 2001/03 2001/04 2001/05 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11 2001/12
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/06 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11 2002/12
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Belfast Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chiang Mai Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Freetown Consulate Fukuoka
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guangzhou Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hong Kong Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy Libreville Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Mission Geneva Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maseru Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne Consulate Matamoros
Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Nuevo Laredo Consulate Naples Consulate Naha Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sapporo Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE UN Rome Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vientiane Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ASEC AEMR AMGT AR APECO AU AORC AJ AF AFIN AS AM ABLD AFFAIRS AMB APER AA AE ATRN ADM ACOA AID AY AG ALOW AND ABUD AMED ASPA AL APEC ADPM ADANA AFSI ARABL ADCO ANARCHISTS AZ ANET AMEDCASCKFLO AADP AO AGRICULTURE ACABQ ASEAN ARF APRC AFSN AFSA AORG AINR AINF AODE APCS AROC ARCH AGAO ADB AX AMEX ASUP ARM AQ ATFN AMBASSADOR ARAS ACBAQ AC AOPR AREP ASIG ASEX AER AVERY ASCH AFU AMG ATPDEA ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AORL AN AIT AGMT ACS AGR AMCHAMS AECL AUC AFGHANISTAN ACAO
BR BB BG BEXP BY BA BRUSSELS BU BD BK BL BE BO BTIO BH BM BAIO BRPA BUSH BILAT BF BX BMGT BOL BC BIDEN BP BBG BBSR BT BWC BEXPC BN BTIU
CPAS CA CASC CS CBW CIDA CO CODEL CI CROS CU CH CWC CMGT CVIS CDG CG CF CHIEF CJAN CBSA CE CY CB CW CM CHR CD CT CDC CONS CAMBODIA CN CR COUNTRY CONDOLEEZZA CZ CARICOM COM CICTE CYPRUS CBE CACS COE CIVS CFED COUNTER COPUOS CARSON CAPC CTR CV CITES CKGR CVR CLINTON COUNTERTERRORISM CITEL CLEARANCE CIC CITT CSW CARIB CAFTA CACM CDB CJUS CTM CAN CAJC CONSULAR CLMT CBC CIA CNARC CIS CEUDA CHINA CAC CL
DR DJ DB DHS DAO DCM DO DEFENSE DA DK DOMESTIC DE DISENGAGEMENT DOD DOT DPRK DEPT DEA DOE DTRA DS DEAX
ECON ETTC EFIS ETRD EC EMIN EAGR EAID EU EFIN EUN ECIN EG EWWT EINV ENRG ELAB EPET EN EAIR EUMEM ECPS ELTN EIND EZ EI ER ET EINT ECONOMIC ENIV EFTA ES EET ECONOMY ENV EAG ELECTIONS ESTH ETRO ECIP EXIM EPEC ENERG ECCT EREL EK EDEV ERNG ENGY EPA ETRAD ELTNSNAR ENGR ETRC ELAP EUREM EEB EETC ECOSOC ENVI EXTERNAL ELN ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EAIDS EDU EPREL EINVEFIN ECA EFINECONCS EIDN EINVKSCA ETC ENVR EAP EINN EXBS ECONOMICS EIAR EINDETRD ECONEFIN EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EFIM EINVETC ECONCS EDRC ENRD EBRD ETRA ESA EAIG EUR EUC ERD ETRN EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ESENV ENNP ECINECONCS ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN
FI FR FOREIGN FAO FARC FREEDOM FAS FINANCE FBI FTAA FCS FAA FJ FTA FK FT FAC FDA FINR FM FOR FOI FO FMLN FISO
GM GERARD GT GA GG GR GTIP GE GH GY GB GLOBAL GEORGE GCC GC GV GAZA GL GOV GOI GF GTMO GANGS GAERC GZ GUILLERMO GASPAR
HR HA HYMPSK HO HK HUMAN HN HUD HU HURI HILLARY HI HUM HSTC HEBRON HUMOR
IZ IN IAEA IS IMO ILO IR IC IT ITU IV IMF IBRD IWC IPR IRAQI IDB ISRAELI ITALY ITPGOV ITALIAN IADB ID ICAO ICRC INR IO IFAD ICJ IRAQ INL INMARSAT INRA INTERNAL INTELSAT ILC INDO IRS IIP ITRA IQ IEFIN ICTY ISCON IAHRC IA INTERPOL IEA INRB ISRAEL IZPREL IRAJ IF ITPHUM IL IACI IDA ISLAMISTS IGAD ITF INRO IBET IDP ICTR IRC
JA JO JM JP JOHN JUS JAMES JOSEPH JOHNNIE JML JIMENEZ
KNNP KFLO KDEM KOMC KSUM KIPR KFLU KPAO KE KCRM KJUS KAWC KZ KSCA KDRG KCOR KGHG KPAL KTIP KMCA KCRS KPKO KOLY KRVC KVPR KG KWBG KMDR KTER KSPR KV KTFN KWMN KFRD KSTH KS KN KISL KGIC KSEP KFIN KTEX KTIA KUNR KCMR KMOC KCIP KTDB KBIO KSAF KU KHIV KNNNP KSTC KNUP KIRF KIRC KHLS KIDE KTDD KMPI KSEO KSCS KICC KCFE KNUC KGLB KIVP KPWR KR KCOM KESS KCSY KWN KRFD KREL KBCT KREC KICCPUR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KOCI KGIT KMCC KPRP KPRV KAUST KPAOPREL KCRIM KIRP KLAB KHSA KPAONZ KCRCM KICA KHDP KNAR KINR KGHA KPAOY KTRD KTAO KWAC KJUST KACT KSCI KNPP KMRS KHUM KTBT KNNPMNUC KBTS KERG KPIR KTLA KNDP KAID KAWK KFSC KO KX KVRP KENV KPOA KMFO KVIR KRCM KCFC KNEI KCHG KPLS KFTFN KTFM KLIG KDEMAF KRAD KBTR KGCC KSEC KPIN KDEV KWWMN KOM KWNM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KRGY KIFR KSAC KWMNCS KPAK KOMS KFPC KRIM KDDG KCGC KPAI KID KMIG KNSD KWMM
LY LE LABOR LH LAB LI LTTE LO LU LA LVPR LT LG LOG
MARR MX MASS MOPS MNUC MCAP MTCRE MRCRE MTRE MASC MY MK MCC MO MAS MZ MCA MIL MU ML MTCR MEPP MG MI MINUSTAH MP MA MD MAR MAPP MR MOPPS MTS MLS MILI MEPN MEPI MEETINGS MERCOSUR MW MT MIK MN MAPS MV MILITARY MARAD MDC MACEDONIA MASSMNUC MUCN MEDIA MQADHAFI MPOS MPS MC
NZ NI NATO NO NU NG NL NPT NS NSF NA NP NATIONAL NASA NDP NIH NC NIPP NSSP NEGROPONTE NK NAS NE NATOIRAQ NGO NR NAR NZUS NARC NH NSG NAFTA NEW NRR NT NOVO NATOPREL NEA NSC NV NPA NSFO NW NORAD NPG NOAA
OTRA OECD OVIP OREP OPRC ODC OIIP OPDC OAS OSCE OPIC OMS OEXC OPCW OIE OSCI OPAD ODIP OM OFDP OFFICIALS OEXP OPEC ODPC OVIPPRELUNGANU OSHA OSIC OHUM OTR OMIG OSAC OBSP OFDA OVP ON OCII OES OCS OIC
PGOV PREL PARM PINR PHUM PM PREF PTER PK PINS PBIO PHSA PE PBTS PL POL PAK POV POLITICS POLICY PA PNAT PALESTINIAN PCI PAS PO PROV PH PROP PERM PETR PRELBR POLITICAL PJUS PREZ PAO PRELPK PAIGH PROG PMAR PU PG PDOV PTE PGOVSOCI PMIL PY PGOR PBTSRU PRAM PARMS PGOF PREO PTERE PERL PINO PSI PPA PRGOV PORG PP PS PKFK PSOE PEPR PDEM PINT PRELP PREFA PNG PTBS PFOR PUNE PGOVLO PHUMBA POLINT PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PLN PHUH PEDRO PF PHUS PETER PARTIES PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PHUMPREL POGOV PEL PINL PBT PINF PRL PSEPC POSTS PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOC PNR
QA
RS RP RU RW RFE RCMP RIGHTSPOLMIL RO ROBERT RM ROOD RICE REGION RELAM RSP RF RELATIONS RIGHTS RUPREL REMON RPEL REACTION REPORT RSO
SZ SENV SOCI SNAR SY SO SP SU SI SMIG SYR SA SCUL SW SR SYRIA SNARM SPECIALIST SG SENS SF SEN SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR SN SC SNA SK SL SANC SMIL SCRM SENVSXE SAARC STEINBERG SCRS SARS SWE SENVQGR SNARIZ SAN ST SIPDIS SSA SPCVIS SOFA SENVKGHG SHI SEVN SHUM SH SNARCS SPCE SNARN SIPRS
TRGY TBIO TSPA TU TPHY TI TX TH TIP TSPL TNGD TS TW TRSY TZ TN TINT TC TR TIO TF TK TRAD TT TWI TD TERRORISM TL TV TP TO TURKEY TSPAM TREL TRT TFIN TAGS THPY TBID
UNSC UK UNGA UN US UZ USEU UG UP UNAUS UNMIK USTR UY UNSCR UNRCR UNESCO UNICEF USPS UNHCR UNHRC UNFICYP UNCSD UNEP USAID UV UNDP UNTAC USDA USUN UNMIC UNCHR UNCTAD UR USGS USNC USOAS UA UE UNVIE UAE UNO UNODC UNCHS UNDESCO UNC UNPUOS UNDC UNCHC UNFCYP UNIDROIT UNCND
VE VM VT VZ VEPREL VN VTEG VTIZ VTPREL VISIT VENZ VAT VC VI
WHTI WIPO WTRO WTO WHO WFP WS WA WZ WI WMD WBG WWARD WHA WITH WTRQ WEU WMO WB
XA XW XX XK XL XM XS XF XR XY XG XT XC XH XD XE XV XB XU XZ XQ XI XTAG
YI YM YE YL YMCS
ZU ZI ZOELLICK ZP ZR ZO ZK ZF ZL ZB ZN ZH ZT ZJ ZEALAND ZA ZANU

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 06SAOPAULO229, HOPES AND FEARS: BUSINESS COMMUNITY VIEWS OF BRAZIL'S

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06SAOPAULO229.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06SAOPAULO229 | 2006-03-03 12:29 | 2011-07-11 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED | Consulate Sao Paulo

`

    VZCZCXRO0555
    PP RUEHRG
    DE RUEHSO #0229/01 0621229
    ZNR UUUUU ZZH ZDK
    P 031229Z MAR 06
    FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4588
    INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 5741
    RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2061
    RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 2413
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0193
    RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 1829
    RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 2604
    RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1576
    RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6854
    RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 2729
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
    RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 2289

` `

    UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SAO PAULO 000229

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    NSC FOR SCRONIN
    STATE PASS USTR FOR SULLIVAN/LEZNY
    USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSEN/ADRISCOLL/MWAR D
    USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/EOLSON/DDEVITO/DANDERSON
    AID/W FOR LAC/AA

    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: ECON PGOV PINR ETRD BR
    SUBJECT: HOPES AND FEARS: BUSINESS COMMUNITY VIEWS OF BRAZIL'S
    UPCOMING ELECTIONS AND THE NEXT GOVERNMENT

    REF:  RECIFE 29

    SAO PAULO 00000229  001.4 OF 004

    ¶1.  Summary: An informal survey of business leaders from Sao Paulo
    shows support for Finance Minister Antonio Palocci's macroeconomic
    policies and a general sense of relief that Lula's presidency has
    not destroyed the economy as originally feared.  Although Lula is no
    longer seen as a threat to the economy, he still makes many
    businessmen nervous.  If re-elected, they believe he is unlikely to
    make significant changes to the direction of the economy, as he will
    have to govern in alliance with such centrist and center-right
    parties such as the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), the Liberal Party
    (PL), and the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB).  The
    private sector has developed an agenda of issues it would like the
    next government to address, including tax reform, labor reform,
    reduction of public expenditures, and simplification of the
    regulatory environment.  The business community would prefer to see
    a candidate from the opposition Brazilian Social Democracy Party
    (PSDB) elected in the October presidential election, and many favor
    Sao Paulo state Governor Geraldo Alckmin, believing that he would be
    more capable than Sao Paulo Mayor Jose Serra of advancing their
    economic agenda.  End summary.

    --------------------
    2006 ECONOMIC AGENDA
    --------------------

    ¶2.  The National Confederation of Industries (CNI), a business
    umbrella organization which represents state Federations of
    Industries (of which the most influential is the Sao Paulo State
    Federation of Industries - FIESP), is poised to publish its economic
    agenda for the post-election period, a guide for whomever is elected
    the next President.  The agenda reportedly has the concurrence of
    other business organizations.  Its main recommendations are:

    -- Cutting interest rates.  While business supports the Lula
    administration's macroeconomic policy, including its efforts to
    combat inflation, it believes that a speedier pace of interest rate
    reductions is possible.
    -- Control of public expenditures.  The Lula government has devoted
    more resources to social programs while withholding funds for
    investment.  The business community would like to see these
    priorities reversed.
    -- Greater public investment in infrastructure and implementation of
    public-private partnerships (PPPs).  The PPP idea was introduced
    during the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) to spur
    infrastructure investment.  Although the Lula government obtained
    Congressional approval of enabling legislation, currently the
    program exists mostly on paper.
    -- A clear regulatory framework for energy, telecommunications,
    transportation, and natural gas.
    -- A framework for environmental regulation that clearly defines the
    roles of responsible agencies in developing and enforcing the
    rules.
    -- Tax reform
    -- Labor law reform
    -- Public investment in technology (R&D)

    ¶3. Of the items listed above, investment in infrastructure is
    considered the most urgent by many in the business community.  As
    the economy grows, so does demand for energy, roads, railroads, and
    port facilities.  FIESP believes the country's infrastructure is in
    such a critical state of obsolescence that it is adversely affecting
    the efficiency and global competitiveness of Brazilian companies.

    ---------------------
    BUSINESS PERSPECTIVES
    ---------------------

    ¶4.  In 2002, Lula was generally seen by the private sector as a
    dangerous candidate.  With his labor union background and leftist
    orientation, he seemed to many to pose a threat to foreign
    investment and private enterprise in Brazil.  A turning point in his
    campaign was his "Letter to the Brazilians," in which he promised to

    SAO PAULO 00000229  002.3 OF 004

    respect international contracts and commitments and pay Brazil's
    debts, thus easing private sector fears.

    ¶5.  Four years later, his performance is viewed with amazement. The
    business community had such low expectations for his presidency that
    now, though it may not approve of some of his policies, it considers
    his performance surprisingly good.  Nonetheless, some are still
    nervous, noting that Lula has not been tested by an international
    crisis and it is impossible to know how he would react under such
    pressure.

    ¶6.  Another concern among business leaders is what Lula might do if
    it appears he might lose the election.  Would he undertake populist
    measures in an attempt to turn the tide? Would he be tempted to
    follow the example of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and stifle
    democratic opposition?  Would he abandon fiscal and monetary
    discipline, possibly re-igniting inflationary pressures?  No one is
    quite sure, which causes unease in the business community.

    ¶7.  Lula has some, albeit not many, supporters among businessmen.
    One is CNI president Armando Monteiro Neto, a PTB federal deputy
    from the northeastern state of Pernambuco.  Monteiro owns a sugar
    factory and is extremely dependent on government loans and benefits.
     Similarly, CNI and other such business organizations are highly
    dependent on the government for funding, which comes from business
    taxes paid by companies.  If the government were to suspend these
    mandatory contributions, it would force these organizations to find
    other sources of funds.

    ¶8.  Other business supporters of Lula include Antoninho Marmo
    Trevisan (Trevisan Auditores e Consultores), Oded Grajew (founder
    and former CEO of Troll, a toy company), and Laurence Phi (owner of
    a large wheat mill), all of whom are progressive businessmen
    strongly tied to social causes.  They believe Brazil is a country
    lacking in social justice and that Lula is going to change this.
    Another businessman, Vice-president Jose Alencar - owner of
    Coteminas, Brazil's largest textile firm - entered into an alliance
    with Lula more out of political opportunism than commitment to
    Lula's social agenda.  More generally, the banking sector has
    supported Lula and has contributed generously to the PT; recently
    released figures show the banks earning record profits.

    ¶9.  Although Lula has succeeded in obtaining the support of
    traditional elites that generally represent the Brazilian right, on
    many issues his government has not promoted the core interests of
    these constituencies.  These groups do not agree with the importance
    he accords to the landless movement and other social movements.
    They particularly deplore his administration's closeness to the
    Cuban, Venezuelan, and other left-leaning governments in Latin
    America, and a foreign policy which appears motivated more by
    ideology than by economic and commercial interests.  The left, for
    its part, is frustrated with the government's failure to deliver on
    its promise of new ideas.  Where they hoped to see more jobs and
    income for the poorest classes, Lula abandoned his party's platform
    to follow the pro-market economic policies of his predecessor.

    ¶10.  Ultimately, while Lula is not, and never will be, a favorite of
    the business community, he is no longer seen as the threat to
    economic stability that he once was. If his poll numbers continue to
    improve as the electoral season progresses, he will likely attract
    more business interests (and contributions) to his side.  The more
    likely it appears that he will win, the more companies will want to
    jump on his bandwagon, and the less onerous his fund-raising
    challenge will be.

    -----------------------------------
    EXPECTATIONS FOR A LULA SECOND TERM
    -----------------------------------

    ¶11.  During the last several months of 2005, polls showed that Lula
    could lose the election, and many speculated he might even decide
    not to run.  There was deep concern that, even if re-elected, he
    would face an extremely difficult second term.   His party was

    SAO PAULO 00000229  003.3 OF 004

    expected to be punished for corruption with a loss of Congressional
    seats, and there was general disillusion with his government.  More
    recent polls, however, show him recovering his popular support, and
    his government's approval ratings are returning to pre-scandal
    levels.  In part, this is due to recent positive economic figures.
    The GoB is also heavily investing in advertising: the President is
    announcing new social programs and investments (and trumpeting the
    success of existing ones) almost every day, and appearing on major
    network television every night (reftel).

    ¶12.  Expectations for a Lula second term, should he win one, depends
    how he wins the elections.  There are three scenarios:

    -- Lula could win but still find himself in a weak position, with no
    strong political allies and a small cadre of PT deputies and
    senators.  In addition, he would face many difficulties, with little
    maneuvering room in Congress and a hard time getting legislation
    passed.  He would be unable to attract high-quality people to his
    cabinet.  In such a situation, he could turn to the social movements
    for support and begin to employ leftist rhetoric and populist
    measures.  Although unlikely, this is considered the most dangerous
    scenario.

    -- Lula could win by a large margin, with a working majority in the
    Congress, mainly from centrist small parties and the large PMDB.
    Since the PT isn't expected to do well in the congressional
    elections, Lula would be dependent on other parties in his electoral
    alliance.  Still, the large margin could provide him with some
    political capital and an ability to set an agenda and press for some
    important reforms.  One result would be a more centrist economic
    policy, without large or disruptive changes.

    -- Finally, there is a middle scenario, in which Lula wins but
    without enough support to guarantee a comfortable majority in
    Congress.  In this case, his second term would be very similar to
    his first one.  Without a consistent majority, Lula would have to
    negotiate the vote for each piece of legislation sent to the
    Congress and deal with difficult deputies from his own party and
    allied groups.  Under this scenario, a change in economic course is
    unlikely, as is a reform agenda.  The business community fears this
    eventuality, as it could lead to drift, deadlock, and stagnation.
    Many observers believe this is the most likely scenario.

    ---------------------------------------------
    THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND THE OPPOSITION TO LULA
    ---------------------------------------------

    ¶13.  The majority of the private sector feels comfortable with the
    opposition PSDB because of its "neo-liberal" economic program.
    However, there is no consensus about which PSDB candidate should
    replace Lula.  Sao Paulo governor Geraldo Alckmin is by far the
    favorite among companies within the state.  One major supporter is
    Antonio Ermirio de Moraes, CEO of Votorantim Group, which owns
    banks, cement firms, and other enterprises.  FIESP President Paulo
    Skaf has also expressed support for Alckmin as the PSDB's "natural
    candidate."  During his administration, Alckmin has worked closely
    with the private sector and implemented some business-friendly
    policies, including tax cuts.  Accordingly, the local business
    community knows and trusts him.

    ¶14.  Sao Paulo Mayor Jose Serra, on the other hand, still carries
    the stigma of being considered unpredictable and strong-willed.  He
    made enemies in the private sector while Health Minister under FHC.
    Serra opened the market for generic medicines, harming traditional
    pharmaceutical companies, and asserted Brazil's right to break
    patents on some HIV medications.  He also fought the tobacco
    industry.

    ¶15.  In the economic arena, Serra seems to be more to the left than
    Alckmin - even more than Lula, say his opponents. During the FHC
    administration, Serra was part of the so- called "developmentalist"
    group of advisers in opposition to the "monetarist" group of Finance
    Minister Pedro Malan and Central Bank President Arminio Fraga.

    SAO PAULO 00000229  004.2 OF 004

    Thus, he faces some opposition from the financial sector and from
    some parts of industry, such as pharmaceuticals.  At the same time,
    he's considered very bright, well-educated, and determined.  What
    remains uncertain, and therefore a source of concern, is his
    economic management and the direction of his policies.

    -------------------------------
    THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND THE PMDB
    -------------------------------

    ¶16.  The centrist PMDB is well-connected to the private sector.
    Most of its members in Congress were elected with help from one or
    another industry.  With no strong ideology, the PMDB could provide
    the political balance for either Lula or Serra, if one of them were
    to prevail in October.

    ¶17.  The PMDB has two pre-candidates running for President - Anthony
    Garotinho, former Governor of Rio de Janeiro, and Germano Rigotto,
    Governor of Rio Grande do Sul.  Garotinho is considered by many
    business leaders to be a dangerous, populist candidate with strong
    ties to evangelical churches, and a relative newcomer to the PMDB.
    Rigotto is more mainstream but is unknown outside his own southern
    state.  However, if polls show Garotinho to be a viable candidate,
    Rigotto could become the party's alternative to the former Rio
    governor.  The PMDB is expected to participate in the next
    government one way or another, either with its own candidate or via
    an alliance with either the PT or the PSDB.  Even if the PMDB does
    not make an alliance to enter the next government, the party is
    expected to win enough seats in Congress to influence government
    policy through its parliamentary power.  Its presence in key Cabinet
    posts would give the private sector confidence that radical changes
    in financial and economic policy are unlikely.  Historically, the
    PMDB has kept the government in the center of the political
    spectrum, reassuring the economic players.  That's why both the PT
    and the PSDB are willing to negotiate alliances for the second round
    with the PMDB.

    -------
    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶18.  Though we are still seven months from the election, the
    campaign has in some respects already begun and is generating
    attention.  What is striking, however, is how little the opposition
    pre-candidates have talked about policy - economic or any other -
    and, when they do, how little their proposals differ from each
    other.  Everyone wants lower interest rates and more growth.  Since
    Lula's macroeconomic policy has been a continuation of FHC's
    policies, the PSDB candidates haven't explained how they would
    change or improve it, only that they would implement it better and
    do a better job of fighting corruption.  In the meantime, the PMDB,
    which hopes to offer the voters a third way, an alternative to the
    two main contending parties, has yet to say anything new.  While
    there is a consensus in the business community that the next
    government needs to tackle long-standing and vexing problems - tax,
    labor, and regulatory reform - there is little confidence in the
    private sector that any new government (PT or PSDB) will have the
    political will and clout to push through the necessary legislation.
    End comment.

    ¶19.  This cable was cleared/coordinated with Embassy Brasilia.

    McMullen

`