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### Viewing cable 06TELAVIV2893, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE CHIEF: ISRAEL IS CHANGING

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06TELAVIV2893 | 2006-07-25 19:01 | 2011-03-15 18:00 | SECRET | Embassy Tel Aviv
Appears in these articles: not yet set

`

    null
    Carol X Weakley  07/27/2006 01:03:55 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Carol X Weakley

    Cable
    Text:

    S E C R E T        TEL AVIV 02893

    SIPDIS
    CXTelA:
        ACTION: POL
        INFO:   IPSC PD IMO RES ECON CONS DCM DAO AMB AID ADM
                RSO

    DISSEMINATION: POL
    CHARGE: PROG

    APPROVED: AMB:RHJONES
    DRAFTED: POL:BBERNSTEIN-ZABZA
    CLEARED: DATT:SBERKOWITZ

    VZCZCTVI995
    OO RUEHC
    DE RUEHTV #2893/01 2061901
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 251901Z JUL 06
    FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
    TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5172

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 002893

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2016
    TAGS: PREL PTER KWBG KPAL IS LE SY
    SUBJECT: DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE CHIEF: ISRAEL IS CHANGING
    BALANCE OF POWER IN LEBANON

    Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

    ¶1. (S) Summary: Chief of Defense Intelligence (CDI) MG Amos
    Yadlin told U.S. Representatives Peter Hoekstra, Jane Harman,
    Rick Renzi, and Darrell Issa, Chairman and members of the
    House Permanent Select committee on Intelligence,
    respectively, and the Ambassador July 22 that the GOI's
    military goals in Lebanon are: to teach Hizballah the proper
    "calculus" in its determining whether to engage Israel in the
    future; to weaken Hizballah militarily and as an
    organization; and, to change the security situation on the
    northern border in such a way as to diminish the likelihood
    of future attacks against Israel. He warned that long-range
    missile attacks on Tel Aviv are still possible. Yadlin
    asserted that Syria continues to supply missiles to Hizballah
    and confirmed that he had sent warnings to the SARG via his
    "channels". He explained that the initial conflict between
    two schools of thought within the GOI over whether to attack
    the GOL or Hizballah and the compromise that was reached to
    focus on Hizballah, but not to let it hide behind the
    civilians aiding it. End Summary.

    ---------------------------------
    GOI's Goals in Hizballah Conflict
    ---------------------------------

    ¶2. (S) Chief of Defense Intelligence MG Amos Yadlin
    emphasized to Codel Hoekstra July 22 that the situation with
    Hizballah is serious, but he made the point of referring to
    the conflict as a (large) military operation not a war.
    Yadlin said that Hizballah interpreted Israel's 2000
    withdrawal from Lebanon as weakness and has been trying to
    provoke Israel ever since then. He said that Israel had
    foiled three attacks by Hizballah in the north, including the
    failed attack in November 2005 on Ghajjar. The GOI's goal
    now, he said, is to change the "balance of deterrence" with
    Lebanon and Hizballah. Through its military campaign, Yadlin
    claimed, Israel had re-established its deterrence vis-a-vis
    Hizballah. Israel is now engaged in a conflict with a
    "circle of evil," he said, stretching from Beirut to
    Damascus, that uses terror and what he termed WMD to pursue
    its goals. Yadlin said that the GOI's current military goals
    are: to teach Hizballah the proper "calculus," meaning risk
    assessment, in planning any future attacks against Israel; to
    weaken Hizballah both militarily and as an organization; and,
    to change the security situation on the northern border in
    such a way as to diminish the likelihood of any future
    attacks against Israel.

    ¶3. (S) Yadlin stressed that the GOI also has the goal of
    eroding Hizballah leader Nasrallah's personal myths,
    including that he has defeated Israel and that he is
    Lebanon's protector. Nasrallah has failed to understand that
    the post-intifada Israeli public is less willing to yield to
    terrorists than before, Yadlin said. It is true, he said,
    that Israel does not want to return to Lebanon, but, he
    added, that if need be, Israel will break what he termed the
    myth that Israel will not return. Yadlin asserted Hizballah
    had "lied" by claiming that the IDF killed only seven of its
    fighters, when, according to Yadlin, the number is closer to
    70-100. Yadlin asserted that the IDF "could go to Beirut and
    drag Nasrallah out of his bunker, but we won't." He added
    that the IDF is weakening Hizballah as an organization at all
    levels. A weakened Hizballah, Yadlin said, will change the
    political balance of power within Lebanon and set the stage
    for renewed diplomacy under new rules of the game.

    ---------------------------
    Current Operational Context
    ---------------------------

    ¶4. (S) Hizballah had been planning for this operation for
    years, Yadlin asserted, adding that Hizballah has built
    bunkers, placed IED's and installed four tiers of missiles
    throughout South Lebanon. Yadlin said that in order of
    increasing range these tiers include: various types of
    Katyushas; Iranian Fajr 3 and 5 missiles, as well as similar
    302 mm rockets from Syria; Nazad 6 and 10 missiles from Iran;
    and Zelzal 1,2 and 3 missiles, and, perhaps, Fatah 110
    missiles, also from Iran. Israel has hit the longer-range
    missile tiers hard, he said, but added that Israel cannot
    guarantee that they have all been destroyed. He said that
    Hizballah missile launches against Tel Aviv and the Dan
    region of Israel are still possible. Any such attacks, he
    said, would lead to real pressure to attack Lebanon as a
    state. Yadlin noted that the IDF has been surprised that
    Hizballah has made so little use of the Fajr 3 missiles and
    not fired a Zelzal. He speculated that Hizballah has not
    done so due to the IDF's preemption efforts, or, perhaps,
    because Iran had not given them permission. He said he could
    not rule out future attacks. In response to a Codel query,
    Yadlin said that the Iranian missiles fall between the cracks
    of IDF's defensive system. He noted that they fly too low
    for the Arrow and the Patriot systems to attack them. He
    added that those missiles are also too large for a laser
    defense even if Israel had one. In this case, Yadlin
    remarked that "the best defense is a good offense."

    ¶5. (S) Yadlin said that thus far, the IDF had not really
    struck at Lebanon's infrastructure, e.g. electricity sources,
    fuel distribution, and transportation networks have been left
    untouched. He said that the IDF has only really hit bridges
    and the airport. He underlined that the IDF cannot rule out
    a more aggressive action, such as larger scale land
    operations, in the future. Yadlin explained that right after
    the July 12 Hizballah cross-border attack, the GOI considered
    two possible responses: (1) To attack Lebanon as a state for,
    what Yadlin termed, its failure to curb Hizballah. Yadlin
    noted that Hizballah had become a member of the government,
    and asserted that Lebanese PM Siniora had lost his earlier
    determination against Hizballah. (2) To attack Hizballah
    directly, which was much harder from a military perspective.
    Yadlin said that the GOI chose the second option, but, at the
    same time, it decided not to give Hizballah "immunity" when
    it sought to hide behind civilian shields. For example, he
    said, Minister of Defense Amir Peretz took the difficult
    decision to approve attacks on residences harboring Fajr
    missiles in villages throughout the south.

    ¶6. (S) The Codel conveyed U.S. congressional support for
    Israel in its conflict with Hizballah. In response to Codel
    questions, Yadlin said that the IDF had planned on its
    operation against Hizballah lasting about eight weeks. In
    response to the Codel's question as to whether the IDF would
    speed up the pace of its operations if it had a deadline,
    Yadlin said that the IDF is trying to minimize collateral
    damage, and that, in his view, the tempo of IDF operations
    could be increased and include more ground operations. The
    release of the two IDF soldiers kidnapped by Hizballah could
    hasten a ceasefire, Yadlin said. He added that the IDF is
    ahead of its schedule in some areas, but behind in others.
    Yadlin said that the IDF had made progress by re-establishing
    deterrence with Hizballah as well as weakening it. He said
    that the IDF is now in the process of clearing the perimeter
    of Israel's northern border. The IDF could stop now, Yadlin
    said, but, he added, that the longer the IDF continues its
    operations, the more progress against Hizballah it will make.

    -----------------------------
    Lebanese Civilian Involvement
    -----------------------------

    ¶7. (S) Responding to another Codel query, Yadlin said that
    after the April 26th Understanding of 1996, Hizballah
    realized that Lebanese villages were off-limits to IDF
    attacks and that it could store missiles in these sites
    safely. Yadlin said that Hizballah stored missiles in Shi'a
    villages only (not in Christian or even Sunni ones). This,
    Yadlin said, was part of the whole structure that Hizballah
    created in the South over the past ten years. In fact,
    Yadlin asserted, the IDF normally preferred to attack
    infrastructure, because this led to fewer civilian
    casualties. The compromise the IDF reached, according to
    Yadlin, was to attack targets that were the source of the
    threat, but warn the civilians to leave in advance. In
    response to CODEL's query, Yadlin said that the IDF was
    constrained in showing the public Hizballah's tunnels,
    bunkers and other infrastructure, as it does not want to
    compromise intelligence sources and had not yet secured
    enough "of the ground" where they were located. He said the
    IDF would do so, however, at the right time.

    ------------------------------
    Iranian and Syrian Involvement
    ------------------------------

    ¶8. (S) Yadlin asserted that Iran helped plan Hizballah's
    kidnapping of the two IDF soldiers as well as Hizballah's
    missile launches, especially the C-802 anti-ship cruise
    missile. According to Yadlin, Iran is Hizballah's main
    supporter, providing that group some USD 100 million
    annually, plus training and equipment. Iran trained
    Hizballah's strategic rocket teams in Iran, he said. Yadlin
    asserted that Iran wants to distract the world from its
    nuclear weapons program, adding that, "I can sleep at night
    with Hizballah having rockets, but I could never sleep with
    an Iranian nuclear bomb." He stressed the importance of
    distancing Iran from Israel's border. Syria, he added, is
    afraid that the "fire in Lebanon" will spread to its border.
    "We are seeing increasing military activity there," Yadlin
    said. Yadlin underscored that the GOI does not want to
    expand its operations to Syria. He said that Syria does not
    want a fight either, but, he added, a situation like this
    could lead to a miscalculation, such as that in 1967, when
    "Russia" gave Syria false intelligence. Hizballah wants to
    draw Syria in, Yadlin asserted, e.g., by using its
    Syrian-provided 220 mm rockets, such as the one that killed
    eight Israelis in Haifa. Yadlin said that such activity
    forces the GOI to ask itself whether it should hit convoys
    bringing weapons to Hizballah in Syria or wait until they
    enter Lebanon.
    ¶9. (S) The CODEL queried as to whether the GOI had
    communicated at all with Syria about this concern. Yadlin
    said that the GOI had sent a message through the UN Truce
    Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) and Yadlin added that he
    sent warnings through his own channels. Yadlin repeated
    that an immediate ceasefire depends on the release of the two
    IDF soldiers. He added that a ceasefire also needs a firm
    basis to endure and that implementation of UNSCR 1559 would
    provide such a basis. Yadlin also raised questions within
    this context including, whether a multinational force would
    be created to replace UNIFIL; whether the GOL would deploy
    its army to the South; what would be the rules of engagement
    in the South?; who would rebuild Lebanon? Yadlin expressed
    strong doubt whether Syria or Iran would be involved in any
    long-term solution to the conflict and noted his preference
    that Lebanon rather be isolated from Syrian and Iranian
    influence. In response to CODEL's query, Yadlin assessed
    that Syria would be an easy military target for the IDF, but
    that Iran would be a more "substantive challenge."
    ¶10. (U) CODEL Hoekstra did not have an opportunity to clear
    this message before departing post.

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