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### Viewing cable 05NEWDELHI8034, INDO-PAK COUNTRY TEAMS DISCUSS HOW TO ENCOURAGE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
05NEWDELHI8034 | 2005-10-17 10:50 | 2011-05-30 02:00 | SECRET | Embassy New Delhi
Appears in these articles: http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/news/wikileaks-us-cables-expose-pak-f-16s-image-problem/201017 http://www.ndtv.com/article/wikileaks-revelations/us-cables-expose-pak-f-16s-image-problem-108985

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 008034

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2015
    TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV PINR ETRD EPET MASS KPAO IN PK INDO PAK
    SUBJECT: INDO-PAK COUNTRY TEAMS DISCUSS HOW TO ENCOURAGE
    BETTER BILATERAL RELATIONS

    Classified By: Charge Robert Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

    ¶1.  (C) Summary: Taking advantage of Ambassador Crocker's
    trip to India, New Delhi and Islamabad country teams on
    October 4 convened a round table discussion on Indo-Pak
    relations.  Both sides agreed that, although there are few
    feasible avenues for direct USG involvement in this sphere --
    and that direct US involvement risks poisoning the process --
    there are constructive avenues we can pursue to keep the two
    sides moving in the right direction.  In addition to
    Ambassador Crocker and DCM Blake, the POL, ECON, PA, DAO, and
    ORA sections of each Embassy participated in this exchange.
    End Summary.

    Opening Trade a Potential Boost to Improving Relations
    --------------------------------------------- ---------

    ¶2.  (C) All agreed that growing economic ties between India
    and Pakistan would improve overall relations.  India's larger
    and growing economy -- and the South Asia Free Trade
    Agreement, due to take off next year -- could help fuel
    growth throughout much of South Asia, but some businesspeople
    in Pakistan fear they would be displaced by bigger Indian
    firms.  Promoting cross-border investment would enlarge the
    already growing peace constituencies in both countries.

    ¶3.  (C) Businesspeople in both countries complain that the
    visa regimes -- which, among other restrictions, limit the
    number of cities a traveler can visit -- are the most
    significant hurdles to overcome; other key obstacles include
    limited travel and transport routes and restrictive shipping
    policies.  Many of these items are already on the New
    Delhi-Islamabad agenda under the auspices of the recently
    inaugurated Joint Commission.  To help accelerate trade and
    investment liberalization, the US-India and US-Pakistan
    Chambers of Commerce could consider coordinating their
    messages to New Delhi and Islamabad; business nationals could
    flex their leverage more effectively in this arena than any
    outsider.  One drag on using trade to foster goodwill,
    however is the pervasive GOP concern that too much progress
    on trade ties risks sidelining the Kashmir issue.

    Energy Cooperation: Most Prospects Have High Negatives
    --------------------------------------------- ---------

    ¶4.  (C) The Indian and Pakistani economies face tough
    challenges in securing increased domestic and imported energy
    supplies to sustain their rapid rates of economic growth.
    India has greater energy concerns, but Pakistan has fewer
    options to address their own declining resources.  The
    TAP/TAPI proposal for a natural gas pipeline from
    Turkmenistan via Afghanistan is stymied by Ashgabat's
    inability to authenticate  sufficient gas reserves needed for
    production levels above its export commitments to Russia and
    Ukraine --  a concern that the Asian Development Bank shared
    with Embassy Islamabad.  Proposed gas pipelines from
    Bangladesh or Burma only meet some of India's growing demand,
    and probably would not  traverse the country to supply
    Pakistan as well.  There is commercially-feasible  potential
    for connecting the Indian and Pakistani electrical grids in
    Punjab.  Prospects for Pakistani investment in, or purchases
    from, Indian hydro-electric projects in Jammu and Kashmir
    still face bilateral political hurdles.

    ¶5.  (C)  Another area for bilateral energy cooperation -- the
    proposed Iran-Pakistan-India natural gas pipeline now under
    negotiation -- faces questions of financial and commercial
    viability and both the GOI and GOP are concerned about
    running afoul of US ILSA sanctions. (NOTE: Each country team
    has heard the joke from its national contacts that New Delhi
    and Islamabad should consider a joint demarche to Washington
    on ILSA.  End Note.)  One promising avenue for cooperation
    would be to expand the growing US-India Energy Dialogue to
    include regional initiatives.

    Greater Transparency Can Increase Confidence
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶6.  (S) US officials have been unable so far to share some
    information with GOI/GOP interlocutors that could improve
    transparency and increase confidence between the two
    countries, due to regulations that govern intelligence
    sharing (i.e. the "friends on friends" policy).  For example,
    Indian confidence would increase if we could confirm to New
    Delhi actions Musharraf takes to check cross-border
    terrorism.  Similarly, especially in crisis situations prone
    to mutual misperception and conflicting signaling, our
    ability to reassure Islamabad that New Delhi does not plan to
    escalate could help restrain Musharraf from deciding to
    preempt.  We understand this is a complex topic with numerous
    equities at stake, but addressing this issue during a period
    of positive bilateral relations has the potential to reap
    exponential benefits in crisis prevention and crisis
    management at a later date.

    Balancing (But Not Hyphenating) Perceptions on F-16s
    --------------------------------------------- -------

    ¶7.  (C) Recent Pakistani public statements on upcoming F-16
    transfers have drawn little attention in India, but that may
    change as the details on the transfer firm up and are
    publicized. Ambassador Crocker noted that, contrary to Indian
    pundits who describe the F-16 as a purely nuclear platform,
    it has been employed by the Pakistani military to a limited
    degree in counter-terrorism operations, including in
    Waziristan this month and in Shkai in 2004.  It may allay
    some Indian concerns to describe the transfer as giving
    Pakistan a non-nuclear option rather than allow them to
    define it as a nuclear delivery system.

    ¶8.  (C) The Islamabad Country Team underlined the "mythic
    proportions" the F-16 has in the minds of many Pakistanis,
    which outstrip the platform's strategic value.  To withhold
    the F-16s, they judge, would harden the Pakistan Army against
    the US and the peace process: "It would be back to the
    bunkers."  Objectively, however, many Indian strategic
    analysts have acknowledged that the F-16 package would not
    tip the scales in Islamabad's favor.

    Political Trends: Auspicious Timing for Progress
    --------------------------------------------- ---

    ¶9.  (C) The assessment of Islamabad Country Team was that the
    best time for progress in Indo-Pak relations is between the
    present and the run-up to Pakistan's 2007 elections, when
    Musharraf as Army Chief can best sell the military on
    whatever deals emerge out of his dialogue with PM Singh.
    Similarly, New Delhi PolCouns noted that, in India, peace is
    currently a bigger vote-getter than anti-Pak demagoguery.

    ¶10.  (C) The problem, however, is that the two governments
    have yet to agree on what form "progress" will take.  Working
    under the boundaries of PM Singh's assertion that the borders
    in Kashmir cannot be redrawn and Musharraf's declaration that
    the LoC cannot be the solution, a number of plausible options
    emerged from discussion: limited autonomy, softening of the
    LoC to permit greater intra-Kashmir travel and trade, and a
    pan-Kashmir body that would exercise limited jurisdiction
    over the whole of (Pakistani and Indian) Kashmir are all
    constructs that would appear to be within the stated
    parameters.

    ¶11.  (C) PM Singh needs good behavior from Musharraf,
    especially against cross-border terrorism, so he can sell
    this kind of out-of-the-box thinking to the Army, his
    coalition partners, and the country (i.e. the electorate);
    India also needs to know that the USG is not giving Musharraf
    a free ride on terrorism, or the GOI will be more inclined to
    take matters into their own hands, with potentially
    disastrous results.  Musharraf needs to show some degree of
    progress on Kashmir and that the Pakistan Army's Kashmir
    policy was not an abject failure.  These are not mutually
    exclusive requirements, although they can be difficult to
    finesse.  Until a mutually agreeable end-game emerges, the
    best route is for both sides to keep moving the ball up the
    field.

    Countering Mutual Misperceptions
    --------------------------------

    ¶12.  (C) Most Indians and Pakistanis will say that they
    understand the people on the other side of the border, "After
    all, we are all from the same family."  This fallacy makes
    countering mutual misperceptions all the more difficult -- it
    would be more accurate to describe the Indian and Pakistani
    people as being from a family that suffered a painful divorce
    50 years ago, where many of the grandchildren only have a
    one-sided idea of what happened and why.  A staggering
    statistic PAO New Delhi offered was that out of less than
    8,000 foreign students in all of India, there are 750
    Americans, and only one Pakistani.  A number of USG and NGO
    programs bring together students and professionals from both
    sides of the border, but even these have to work against very
    large populations and the momentum of 50 years of distrust
    and ignorance, which has been reinforced over the years by
    books, films, and public discourse.

    ¶13.  (C) End-of-session brainstorming produced several ideas
    deemed worth exploring:

    -- Joint programs on how regional trade can be mutually
    beneficial, targeted to audiences other than the business
    community

    -- Assistance -- where politically acceptable -- on reforming
    textbooks that include intolerant and inflammatory language

    -- A program on how the media can help restrain and counter
    incitement during a crisis

    -- Facilitating exchanges and VCDs between private schools
    like Pakistan's Beacon House School and the Delhi Public
    Schools  (COMMENT: These private schools are owned and run by
    elites who are well known Embassy contacts, and would be
    easier to facilitate than working through state-owned
    schools.  End Comment.)

    What We Do (or Don't) is Less Important Than How We Do It
    --------------------------------------------- ------------
    ¶14.  (C) There are few areas where the USG can directly
    improve Indo-Pak relations during a non-crisis period, but
    there are many fruitful, indirect approaches that can help
    build confidence between the two countries without our taking
    a leadership role in their affairs.  There was general
    agreement between the two Country Teams, furthermore, that
    attempting to insert the USG directly into the process risks
    poisoning even the best ideas -- our most constructive
    location is on the margins offering support, not in the
    middle brokering deals.

    ¶15.  (U) Ambassador Crocker has cleared this message.

    ¶16.  (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website:
    (http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/)
    BLAKE

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