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### Viewing cable 08BRASILIA246, BRAZIL'S DEFORESTATION CYCLE (PART 3 of 3): GOVERNMENT HAS

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08BRASILIA246 | 2008-02-24 13:03 | 2011-07-11 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Brasilia

`

    VZCZCXRO5757
    RR RUEHRG
    DE RUEHBR #0246/01 0551303
    ZNR UUUUU ZZH
    R 241303Z FEB 08
    FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1046
    INFO RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 1626
    RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 5808
    RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 7709
    RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC

` `

    UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BRASILIA 000246

    SIPDIS

    SENSITIVE

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR OES/PCI - L.SPERLING AND F.COLON
    DEPT FOR OES/ENCR - S.CASWELL AND C.KARR-COLQUE
    DEPT FOR OES/EGC - D.NELSON AND T.TALLEY
    DEPT FOR WHA/EPSC - L.KUBISKE

    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: SENV EAGR ENRG KSCA BR
    SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S DEFORESTATION CYCLE (PART 3 of 3): GOVERNMENT HAS
    LIMITED ABILITY TO BREAK THE CYCLE

    REF:  (A) BRASILIA 224, (B) BRASILIA 229

    ¶1.  (U) THIS CABLE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED AND NOT FOR
    INTERNET DISTRIBUTION.

    ¶2.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  The Government of Brazil (GOB) has a limited
    ability to use "sticks," various law enforcement measures to control
    deforestation.  Even if it could obtain the tools it currently lacks
    (sufficient law enforcement units, clear proof of violations, judges
    willing to penalize, etc.), a massive crackdown would border on
    political suicide.  Illegal deforestation has benefited many,
    possibly millions, in the Amazon; an estimated 80% of the
    approximately 730,000 square kilometers that has been cleared since
    the 1970's was done illegally.  The Congress would be up in arms
    with a serious campaign against illegal deforestation; 33% of the
    Senators and 18% of the Chamber of Deputies come from the Amazon.
    The federal government has not yet tried "carrots" to halt
    deforestation.  Meanwhile, the GOB has a variety of programs that
    result in clearing forests, even though that is not the intended
    goal of these measures (e.g., the constitutional requirement that an
    owner must make "productive" use of agricultural land).

    ¶3.  (SBU) This is the last cable in a three-part series on
    deforestation.  While we identify serious problems confronting the
    GOB's efforts to control deforestation, it does not follow that the
    situation is hopeless.  The GOB in fact has had a critical success
    with what sometimes is referred to as "constrangimento" or "guilty
    conscious" policy: raising environmental consciousness about
    deforestation in the political class.  Further, several policies and
    measures either have recently been introduced or are under
    consideration which could in the long run markedly help control
    deforestation: (a) improving forest management, especially with a
    new Forest Service law that established a system for granting forest
    concessions to responsible companies; (b) improving the land title
    registry system; and (c) lowering the Forest Code requirement that
    80% of forest on private property be conserved, which has been such
    a high standard that it has left most ranchers and farmers in the
    Amazon outside of the law.  END SUMMARY.

    ¶4.  (SBU) Government policies of establishing settlements in the
    Amazon alongside roads and soft agriculture credits contribute to
    deforestation, as do plans to construct additional highways and
    dams.  There are changes afoot that could lead to a permanent
    reduction in the deforestation rate.  The most important are:  land
    cadastrationor registry programs, new forest management regimes,
    improved monitoring and enforcement, and certification programs.
    Moreover, the Congress is considering modifying the Forest Code,
    which could transform vast numbers of ranchers and farmers into
    law-abiding citizens.  END SUMMARY.

    MODEST "STICKS" AND NO "CARROTS"

    ¶5.  (SBU) GOB officials have consistently spoken out against the
    illegal deforestation of the Amazon (which for this cable means the
    Legal Amazon, a region of nine states that encompasses about 60% of
    the country).  When a report was released at the end of January
    indicating a sharp rise in deforestation in the last five months of
    2007, President Lula called an emergency cabinet meeting to consider
    the problem.  To date, the GOB has not developed "carrots" to
    encourage the residents of the Amazon not to illegally clear the
    land.  In 2007, the isolated, northern State of Amazonas announced
    the "Sustainable Amazona" fund with R40 million (over US$20 million)
    to encourage residents of that state living on forest reserves (not
    private property) to not clear the land.  It is too early to say how
    effective it will be or whether it might be transferable to other
    states.  In short, at this time there are practically no "carrots"
    or positive incentives for residents of the Amazon not to deforest.

    ¶6.  (SBU) The January 24 emergency cabinet meeting adopted a number
    of "sticks" or punitive measures.  The GOB would send in about 800
    more Federal Police to combat environmental crimes, it would
    strengthen controls over the livestock and agriculture sectors
    (supposedly requiring proof that these agricultural goods were not
    the result of illegal deforestation), requiring re-registration of
    land titles and better monitoring at 36 municipalities with
    high-rates of deforestation, and helping state governments to
    monitor and combat deforestation.  President Lula recently
    acknowledged that the federal agency responsible for enforcing the
    environmental laws (IBAMA) might not be up to the task and said that
    "For this reason, I don't think IBAMA alone should be responsible
    for enforcement."  Thus, the Federal Police and to some extent the
    Brazilian Army are asked to assist.

    BRASILIA 00000246  002 OF 004

    ¶7.  (SBU) COMMENT. More federal agents on the ground is a step
    forward, however, there are weaknesses throughout the system - lack
    of judges, difficulties in proving violations, long appeals process,
    and then inability to collect fines.  Paulo Barreto, a senior
    researcher at the respected NGO IMAZON, estimated that only two to
    three percent of fines imposed on illegal loggers are ever
    collected.  It is commonly accepted that law enforcement until now
    has been practically non-existent.  All in all these new measures
    are more than symbolic, but not by much.  They are likely to end up
    as more proclamations from Brasilia without sustained, effective
    actions to back them up.  END COMMENT.

    ¶8.  (SBU) While the GOB decries deforestation, several of its
    policies do result inevitably in clearing forested land in the
    Amazon.  These policies include:

    - Improving roads and infrastructure projects pursuant to the GOB's
    Program for Acceleration of Growth (PAC).  For example, the PAC
    envisions building two hydroelectric plants on the Rio Madeira near
    Bolivia, which are estimated to bring in as many as 100,000 new
    settlers to that region.

    - Establishing new settlements by the National Institute for
    Colonization and Agriculture Reform's (INCRA) in the Amazon.  The
    GOB continues with its program of developing settlements for the
    poor and landless alongside of roads constructed in the Amazon.

    - Requiring an owner to make "productive" use of the land or risk
    losing it under Articles 184 and 185 of the Brazilian Constitution.
    The widely held view is that keeping a standing forest is not
    considered a productive use.

    - Providing soft agriculture credits even though the majority of
    agricultural land was illegally cleared.  The emergency cabinet
    meeting initially proposed cutting off credits to those who could
    not prove they had legally acquired their land.  Subsequently,
    President Lula exempted small farmers and ranchers and INCRA
    settlers from this measure.

    THE POLITICAL LIMITATIONS

    ¶9.  (SBU) Stark political realities limit what a government can do
    to control deforestation in the Amazon.  While there are no exact
    figures, it is commonly thought that at least 80% of the
    deforestation in the Amazon is illegal, which means at least 580,000
    square kilometers of the 730,000 square kilometers cleared since the
    1970's was done illegally.  Thus, a campaign against those involved
    or benefiting from illegal deforestation could affect huge numbers,
    possibly in the millions.  Furthermore, the Amazon has tremendous
    clout in the Congress.  Although only 13% of Brazilians live in the
    Amazon, the region has 33% of the Senators and 18% of the Deputies
    in the Chamber of Deputies.  COMMENT.  Since President Lula's Labor
    Party (PT) and allied parties have only a slim majority in the
    Senate, he cannot afford to have such a large block up in arms.
    Antagonizing the "Amazon block" by actions that threaten large
    numbers of their voters and important economic interests would also
    put into jeopardy other GOB priorities requiring legislative
    approval.  END COMMENT.

    THE SUCCESSFUL "CONSTRANGIMENTO" POLICY

    ¶10.  (SBU) The national governments since the return of democracy in
    1985 have accomplished a critical feat, without which the prospects
    for eventually controlling deforestation of the Amazon would be very
    bleak indeed.  President Lula's administration and those that
    preceded it have in one generation changed the view of the political
    elites about the value of the Amazon.  Previously, the political
    class considered the Amazon forest as a burden, something that had
    to be cleared to make it productive.  This view was held towards the
    Atlantic Forest, which has been reduced to just 7% of its original
    size, and many still hold it today towards the vast Cerrado (or
    savannah) region, where 40% has been cleared in just a matter of
    decades.  Although less than 20% of the Amazon has been cleared
    (REFTEL A), today politicians of all stripes pay homage - whether
    they believe it or not - to sustainable development and protecting
    the Amazon.

    ¶11.  (SBU) This consciousness raising was the work of years, but it
    has come to fruition under Lula.  Environment Minister Marina Silva
    refers to this as the "constrangimento" or "self-consciousness"
    policy, which causes people not to want to be seen as destroying the

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    forest (something akin to the efforts to shame those who litter in
    the United States).  The Governor of Mato Grosso and so-called "King
    of Soy", Blario Maggi, is a good example of the success of this
    policy.  His state has cleared more of the Amazon than any other.
    Still, Maggi is sensitive on this issue.  He was quick to deny that
    his state is responsible for the ongoing deforestation.  A
    generation ago you would expect to see him proudly being
    photographed next to a bulldozer.

    OTHER POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS

    ¶12.  (SBU) The GOB has a number of policies that are being
    introduced or under consideration that could significantly help to
    control illegal deforestation.  Three notable ones are:

    -- Improved forest management pursuant to the new Forest Service
    Law.  The GOB plans to award long-term concessions to logging
    companies that will take responsibility for managing and preserving
    the forest.  These concessions will allow harvesting of trees, but
    in a rationale, sustainable manner.  More importantly, these
    concessions should create entities that have an economic interest in
    protecting the forest and preventing illegal deforestation.  The
    first concession process is underway in the State of Rondonia, and
    others are scheduled to follow.

    -- Land Registry.  President Lula asserted last fall that the Amazon
    had an "owner", however, to this day the question of title to land
    in the Amazon is a murky subject.  Most of the land in the Amazon
    belongs to the national government, yet one often hears how ranchers
    and farmers end up - in some mysterious way - with papers that
    suggest they may have title.  There seems to be a greater focus by
    the GOB on clearing up title and land cadastration to determine what
    are the property boundaries.  Mark Lundell of the World Bank in
    Brazil views addressing the lack of clarity on land title as a top
    priority.  What is evident is that there has been no "owner"
    preventing illegal loggers, ranchers and farmers from logging,
    clearing and using vast swaths of the Amazon.

    - Revising the Forest Code to allow more productive use of land.  In
    1996, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso issued a "Provisory
    Measure" revising Article 44 of the Forest Code to require a
    landowner in the Amazon to preserve 80% of the land, versus the 50%
    requirement then in the law.  Knowing that the Congress with the
    large Amazon contingent would block enactment of the law, the
    Provisory Measure was reissued 67 times to keep it in effect, until
    2001 when the procedure was changed to require Congress to vote on
    any Provisory Measures.  This Provisory Measure was never brought up
    for a vote, however, the GOB has treated it as having legal effect.
    Now, the GOB is considering reducing the conservation requirement
    back to 50%.  If this were to happen, then it might be possible for
    large numbers of ranchers and farmers who are out of compliance with
    the 80% requirement to come in from the cold.  Such a move could
    make dealing with the past - and preventing future - deforestation
    on a more manageable scale.  Environmental groups in Brazil are
    divided on this step.  Greenpeace views it as a sell-out; Friends of
    the Earth consider it a pragmatic and constructive step.  The
    question of "amnesty" for deforesters continues to generate a heated
    debate within and outside government circles.

    ¶13.  (SBU) COMMENT. As with illegal immigration in the United
    States, illegal deforestation in the Amazon leaves the national
    government with two main problems to address - preventing future
    illegal activity and sorting out the status of those who acted
    illegally in the past.  At the same time, meeting the economic
    imperatives of Brazil ranging from reliable electricity supply to
    farmland to viable transport routes to enhance economic growth in an
    environmentally sustainable way remains a political and practical
    challenge for Brazil.  These are complex problems and there are
    powerful political constraints limiting the government's room for
    action.  Nonetheless, the GOB has scored a major success with its
    "constrangimento" or "guilty conscious" policy and has laid the
    ground for possible future actions that would seriously address
    these issues.  The GOB has some of the tools in hand already (such
    as land registry, modern forest management, and better law
    enforcement) and is considering others (such as modifying the land
    use rules).  If these measures were followed through, the rate of
    deforestation could come down significantly over the long-term.  The
    GOB is clearly under significant domestic (such as from Environment
    Minister Silva and the media) and international pressure to address
    deforestation in a serious manner.  However, it is too early to say
    whether this level of pressure is sufficient to persuade the GOB to
    use its limited political capital to take on this daunting task.

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    END COMMENT.

    SOBEL

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