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### Viewing cable 07MANAGUA669, THE FIRST 60 DAYS - ORTEGA PRESSURES MEDIA

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07MANAGUA669 | 2007-03-12 23:00 | 2011-06-21 08:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Managua

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHMU #0669/01 0712300
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 122300Z MAR 07
    FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9443
    INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000669

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR WHA/CEN

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2017
    TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL PINR
    SUBJECT: THE FIRST 60 DAYS - ORTEGA PRESSURES MEDIA

    REF: A. MANAGUA 241
         ¶B. MANAGUA 466
         ¶C. MANAGUA 585

    Classified By: Ambassador P. Trivelli for reason 1.4b

    ¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  President Ortega's attitude and actions
    towards the mainstream media in the first 60 days of his
    administration have raised doubts about his commitment to
    freedom of expression.  Sounding more like an attack plan
    than a government communications strategy, First Lady Rosario
    Murillo's Communication Strategy labels the mainstream media
    as "hostile" and warns that it will "mount a misinformation
    campaign" against the Sandinistas that must be "confronted."
    Her strategy reveals her intention to use only
    Sandinista-friendly media to ensure her messages are
    "published in an uncontaminated and direct manner."  In one
    of her first public moves as Coordinator of the Counsel for
    Communications and Citizenry, Murillo centralized control of
    all ministry media budgets and announced spending will be
    reduced by 50 percent as an "austerity measure."  Ortega's
    mounting verbal attacks and maneuvers against the media all
    suggest he is executing Murillo's plan.  Ortega's promise to
    dedicate 20 percent of each Sandinista National Liberation
    Front (FSLN) deputy's discretionary social program budget to
    support journalists has further divided the National
    Journalist's Association via debate over the ethics of such a
    move.  Journalists fear that Ortega's recent hostility
    towards the media may harden anti-press attitudes and trigger
    more direct threats or violence, and recent criminal code
    reforms contain vague language about penalizing
    "unauthorized" use of "private" information.  On the bright
    side, Ortega's aggression towards the media may be helping to
    unify the liberal opposition forces who are keenly aware of
    the potential danger posed by restricting freedom of the
    press.  END SUMMARY.

    Murillo's Media Strategy - Message Branding & Control
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶2.  (SBU) Shortly after the January 10 inauguration, the
    Ortega administration introduced a revised national seal
    (escudo) -- designed by the First Lady -- and mandated that
    all official government correspondence and communication,
    including government projects and job announcements published
    in the daily periodicals, use this new seal.  Based on the
    triangular form of the official seal, the added campaign
    slogans and pastel pink and blue colors gave the revised seal
    the unmistakable stamp of the FSLN.  Political opposition
    leaders immediately condemned, and eventually blocked,
    official use of the seal as unconstitutional, but many viewed
    it as a harbinger of things to come.  Within days of taking
    office, Ortega was already attempting to blur the lines
    between party and State, essentially "re-branding" the State
    as the FSLN.  Many government entities are continuing to use
    the Murillo seal despite the legislative ban, but the
    government appears to be taking care to use the official
    national seal on documents that involve legal or official
    matters tht could be challenged in the courts.

    ¶3.  (SBU) On February 1, Murillo, the Coordinator of the
    newly formed Counsel of Communication and Citizenry,
    circulated, strictly for internal use only, a copy of her
    Communication Strategy to other members of the Counsel
    (septel).  In the rambling seventeen-page document, eerily
    reminiscent of Ortega's presidential campaign strategy of
    Peace and Reconciliation, Murillo labels the larger media
    organizations as "rightist" and "hostile" to the Sandinistas
    and emphasizes the need to control national and international
    public perceptions by controlling published images and
    messages.  Murillo states that "there will be strong
    opposition to our project from the media of the right" and
    that "they will mount a misinformation campaign against it"
    which the Sandinistas must "predict in order to successfully
    confront."  To control the government's messages, Murillo
    writes that "we will use our media so that our messages are
    published in an uncontaminated and direct manner, as we did
    during the campaign."

    ¶4.  (SBU) The leaked sQtegy elicited consternation and
    criticism from main stream media organizations such as
    Channel 2 TV, La Prensa newspaper, and even the left-leaning
    El Nuevo Diario newspaper, all who fear that Murillo's direct
    references to "our media" and the "hostile right" betray an
    underlying media prejudice that could polarize the media
    environment.  Following the leak, Murillo publicly stated
    that the media's right is to obtain information related to
    the government's activities, but warned that the government's
    right is to see the "truth respected and the truth published"
    and that the media "must correct its mistakes."

    ¶5.  (C) COMMENT:  From the tone and wording in Murillo's
    Communications Strategy, there seems to be little doubt that
    she regards the established mainstream media as a threat to
    Ortega that should be controlled.  Ortega and Murillo's
    actions leading up to, and following, the internal release of
    the Strategy would indicate that it is being implemented.
    This cable attempts to identify and outline what we believe
    are some of the Strategy's implementation mechanisms during
    the first 60 days of the Ortega administration.  END COMMENT.

    Phase I - Exclude the Opposition Media
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶6.  (C) During Ortega's campaign - managed by Murillo - media
    access was tightly controlled, and FSLN-affiliated media were
    granted preferential access to Ortega.  Right-leaning media,
    such as La Prensa and Channel 2, were often excluded or had
    to rely on Sandinista journalists for information or
    instructions.  Since Ortega took office in early January,
    these journalists have repeatedly complained to Public
    Affairs officers that they are being excluded from official
    information and events, and that potential government sources
    are specifically being instructed not to talk to them.
    Embassy press officers have directly witnessed Murillo using
    Sandinista-affiliated media as interlocutors with other media
    at events and employing Sandinista news outlets as "official
    press" for the administration, especially before the
    inauguration and during the first few weeks of the new
    administration.

    ¶7.  (U) In an open letter from La Prensa to President Ortega
    published on March 2, highlighting the newspaper's growing
    concern about Ortega's attitude towards the media, La Prensa
    points out that Ortega signed the 2001 Declaration of
    Chapultepec which prohibits restrictions to freedom of the
    press.  Chapter five of the agreement states "Censoring in
    advance, restrictions on the circulation of the media or
    their divulging of information, the arbitrary imposition of
    information, the creation of obstacles to the free-flow of
    information, and limitations to the free exercising and
    mobility of the press are in direct opposition to the freedom
    of the press."

    Phase Two - Control the Purse Strings
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶8.  (U) At the behest of Murillo, on January 29, Treasury
    Minister Alberto Guevara, circulated a confidential memo to
    all ministers, vice ministers and the presidents of the
    autonomous State agencies stating that Murillo's Counsel of
    Communication would henceforth coordinate and authorize all
    government publicity expenditures and travel, totaling just
    over 90 million Cordoba (US$ 5 million).  (NOTE:  Nearly all
    private media derive some percentage of their revenue from
    government-paid advertisements such as job announcements,
    calls for proposals, etc.  END NOTE.)  Murillo, angry that
    the memo was leaked, justified the decision as part of a
    government "austerity program" that would re-direct up to
    fifty percent of the publicity budget to schools, medicine,
    hospitals, low income housing and other programs to benefit
    the poor.  She emphasized that only necessary campaigns --
    such as those in environment and health -- would be financed.

    ¶9.  (U) Following the announcement, Ortega indirectly lashed
    out at La Prensa and Channel 2 by claiming that "eighty
    percent of the state's advertising budget is concentrated in
    the two big media (companies)."  In a more measured tone,
    Murillo indicated that she intended to "break the habit of
    financing the big communication media" which "respond to
    another vision of our country that does not benefit the
    majority" in favor of "communication from the people to the
    people" as articulated in Murillo's Communication Strategy.

    ¶10.  (U) Murillo's memo evoked an immediate reaction from
    both left and right-leaning independent press, who fear that
    Ortega and Murillo will use the budget as a tool to control
    the media.  In response to Ortega's "eighty percent" claim,
    La Prensa, in its Open Letter of March 2, declared that it
    received just 13 percent of the state's publicity budget in
    ¶2006.  Senior La Prensa and El Nuevo Diario managers publicly
    stated that their papers will not be seriously hurt by the
    potential cut-back, but stressed that smaller independent
    print and radio media, which are more dependent on
    government-sponsored advertising revenue, will be
    significantly affected.

    ¶11.  (SBU) The reaction by opposition forces in the National
    Assembly was equally strong.  Deputies and legal experts
    claim that Murillo's move violates Law 290, Law 438, and
    Article 130 of the Constitution.  According to Law 290,
    counsels created by the Executive cannot handle finances and
    cannot make decisions which belong to the ministries (ref.
    A).  Article 11 of Law 438, the law of probity, states that
    the spouse of a public servant -- in this case the President
    -- is not eligible to exercise public functions (Ref. C).
    Article 130 of the Constitution establishes that no one
    within the State powers can name functionaries who have close
    relationship to them.  Thus far, however, the National
    Assembly's protests and legislative maneuverings seem to have
    had little affect on the First Family.

    ¶12.  (C) Despite the direct impact on their public
    communications budgets and independence, the ministers have
    voiced little to no public opposition to the plan.  In
    private, National Assembly opposition leaders, including
    representatives froU#EDQ~irez Noguera -- who was seen
    as a moderate with independent ideas -- as Minister of the
    Family after only 21 days may serve as an example for other
    ministers contemplating ministerial independence.

    Phase Three - Damage the Media's Public Image
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶13.  (U) On February 20, during the closing ceremonies of a
    meeting with 615 members of the National Police, Ortega
    launched phase three of his attack on the media by implying
    that the media is robbing money from the State through tax
    exonerations.  Ortega labeled the media as "fat" and "getting
    fatter" and scoffed that the media are "enriching themselves
    doing business, not charity or cultural work."  Ortega very
    shrewdly linked his argument to public security by claiming
    that such exemptions take money from State coffers that would
    have otherwise been spent buying gas for the police.  Several
    times during his speech, Ortega called on the media to listen
    to their "consciences" and their "hearts" and to pay their
    taxes.

    ¶14.  (U) Since delivering his exoneration speech, Ortega has
    continued and broadened his attacks.  On February 22, Ortega
    directly criticized La Prensa for running a cartoon in
    reference to Ortega's appointment of Cardenal Miguel Obando
    as coordinator of the Counsel of Peace and Reconciliation,
    calling it "disrespectful" and "a dirty campaign."  On
    February 27, while announcing that he would ask the National
    Assembly to cancel exonerations for the media, banks, and
    social organizations, Ortega again singled out the media for
    attack -- especially La Prensa and Channel 2 -- when he asked
    how "in a country so small and with so much poverty" could
    "the two largest media receive US$ 22 million in exonerations
    in 2006?"

    ¶15.  (C) The media have attempted to counter Ortega's claims
    by publishing exoneration facts and figures and highlighting
    the legal precedent for exonerations.  In 2004, the most
    recent year for which official figures are available, the
    media sector accounted for only 1.6 percent of the State's
    total exonerations.  In clear contrast to Ortega's claim that
    La Prensa and Channel 2 received US$ 22 million in
    exonerations in 2006, budget experts estimated that total
    exonerations for the media sector ranged from 40-50 million
    Cordoba (US$ 2.2-2.7 million).  Both Article 68 of
    Nicaragua's Constitution and point 7 of the 2001 Declaration
    of Chapultepec, signed by Ortega, allow for the tax-free
    importation of certain materials used in print production
    such as ink, newsprint, machinery, and parts.  Using this
    legal basis, opposition leaders in the National Assembly have
    sharply criticized Ortega's demands to cancel the media's
    exoneration rights.  (NOTE: Ortega's argument, while
    dramatically over-stated, has a valid basis.  Media contacts
    have privately admitted to public affairs staff that all the
    major media do import "extra" supplies for their for-profit
    printing businesses. END NOTE).

    ¶16.  (C) COMMENT: As with Ortega's earlier claim that the two
    largest media received 80 percent of the government's
    advertising revenue, his exoneration claim is completely
    unfounded.  Ortega is attempting to polarize public opinion
    against Channel 2 and La Prensa -- the "belligerent right"
    referred to in Murillo's Communications Strategy -- by
    painting them as heartless, greedy businesses willing to
    sacrifice public safety and to keep Nicaragua poor in order
    to make a dollar.  It is unclear at this point if the media's
    counter-strategy of publishing objective facts and figures
    and explaining the legal basis for exoneration will defuse
    Ortega's attempt to rally public opinion against them.  The
    media is concerned that the public may view their
    counter-protests as the complaints of spoiled children being
    told "no" for the first time.  A review of over fifty reader
    comments on the recent articles related to Murillo's strategy
    document and the exoneration issue show roughly the same
    proportion of support for the Ortega/Murillo position as
    Ortega received in the presidential elections, indicating
    that his loyal Sandinista base is listening.  END COMMENT.

    Phase Four - Blur Lines Between Criminal and Journalist
    Activities
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    - -

    ¶17.  (U) With the publicity budget and exoneration issues
    still under heated discussion, Ortega has thrown an
    additional log on the fire - Penal Code reform.  Two articles
    of the proposed new code - Articles 194 and 197 -- have
    evoked strong reactions from ALN deputies in the National
    Assembly, the media, and human rights organizations, citing
    concerns over freedom of expression.  Article 194 establishes
    prison sentences of six months to two years for anyone
    intercepting, divulging, or distributing any communication
    deemed "private by judicial authorities."  Further, the
    article would penalize those who distribute or reveal
    "important information" with sentences of one to three years
    in prison.  Article 197 says that persons who find themselves
    in legitimate possession of private written or recorded
    communications would face 70-100 days in prison if they
    published such materials without authorization.  However, the
    article stipulates that this penalty would not apply to
    "matters in the public interest."

    ¶18.  (SBU) FSLN and Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC)
    deputies claimed that these two articles are part of the
    current Criminal Code and that journalistic sources would not
    be affected "as long as they don't pass information of a
    private character."  Further, these deputies insisted that
    the interception of telephone calls, telegraphs, or other
    forms of communication "have nothing to do with the
    activities of the media."  They also stated the belief that
    these articles would help curb the Nicaraguan press'
    proclivity for "red news" -- showing victims of violent
    accidents and crimes on television -- by requiring
    journalists to obtain permission from victims' families
    before publishing photographs or video.  (COMMENT: In this
    sense, the Nicaraguan media is its own worst enemy.  Because
    professional standards are low and there is a lot of
    overly-sensational and, at times, completely inaccurate
    reporting, the media has handed Ortega ammunition to use
    against it.  END COMMENT).

    ¶19.  (U) Despite such assurances, ALN deputies, media
    organizations, and civil society groups have expressed
    serious doubts about the reforms, stating that a law based on
    subjective or arbitrary determination of the private or
    public nature of information leaves the door wide open to
    corruption and political manipulation.  As such, there would
    be no guarantees of freedom of expression.

    Phase Five - Divide and Conquer
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶20.  (U) In the wake of the financial uncertainty created by
    Murillo's centralization of government publicity budgets and
    Ortega's goal to cancel exonerations, Ortega signed an accord
    on March 1, Nicaraguan National Media Day, with the
    Nicaraguan Journalists Association (CPN) promising upwards of
    3 million Cordoba (US$ 177,000) to journalists.  Under the
    12-point accord, each of the 38 Sandinista deputies would
    dedicate 20 percent of their 420,000 Cordoba (US$ 23,333)
    budget for scholarships and social programs to a fund for
    journalists administered through the CPN.  Because the CPN is
    comprised of two distinct journalist associations, however,
    the announcement of the accord triggered conflicting
    reactions.

    ¶21. (SBU) BACKGROUND NOTE: About 70 percent of CPN's members
    are from the Nicaraguan Journalists Union (UPN) and 30
    percent from the Association of Nicaraguan Journalists (APN).
     APN is generally associated with the political right.  While
    both the APN and UPN include journalists from all walks, many
    more employees of the large media organizations such as
    Channel 2 TV and La Prensa are APN-affiliated.  APN
    journalists tend to be better trained and have higher
    professional standards.  UPN is generally associated with the
    political left and includes a myriad of smaller news
    organizations which have historically been more flexible in
    the application of professional ethics.  END NOTE.

    ¶22.  (U) The APN journalists have criticized the accord on
    several grounds.  First, they see it as an attempt to
    legitimize the probably illegal appointment of Murillo as
    Coordinator of the Counsel for Communication and Citizenry by
    honoring her as a signatory to the document.  Second, because
    the funds would come exclusively from the FSLN deputies, they
    believe there is a serious risk to journalistic objectivity.
    Third, journalists could lose credibility with the public if
    they were perceived or proven to be beholden to one political
    party.  In contrast, the UPN -- the majority voice in the CPN
    -- supports the accord because it could offset the potential
    revenue loss caused by the consolidation and reduction of
    ministry publicity budgets.

    ¶23.  (C) COMMENT:  As witnessed in the political campaign,
    the Sandinistas' ability to keep the ALN and PLC divided was
    devastating to the Liberals.  With the CPN accord, Ortega may
    be attempting to divide the media to the same effect.
    Although the media has traditionally been sharply divided
    along political lines, this move is perhaps the most
    dangerous because it could change the nature of the division
    from political/ideological to personal if journalists in
    favor of the accord see those opposed to it as threatening
    their livelihood.  This perception could fuel further
    polarization among the media and erode professional standards
    as the market becomes more cut-throat.  A media so divided
    would be much easier to manipulate to both misinform and
    distract attention from key issues that require vigorous
    public debate and scrutiny.  Unfortunately, according to
    public affairs officers, there appears to be little appetite
    among media organizations to unify and work together despite
    clearly understanding the danger of remaining divided.  END
    COMMENT.

    Emboldening the Masses
    - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶24.  (U) According to media reports and public affairs
    contacts, since the start of Ortega's verbal attacks on the
    media, journalists have reported growing hostility and an
    increase in the number of personal threats.  There is concern
    that Ortega's overt verbal attacks on the media are perceived
    as tacit approval to carry out individual acts of violence
    and threats against journalists.  During the last week of
    February, Jaime Arellano from Channel 10 reported receiving
    death threats and discovered the lugnuts on his car had been
    loosened after making some hard-hitting comments against
    President Ortega, while journalist Moises Absalon from
    Channel 23 also reported loosened lugnuts.  Continued
    hostility towards mainstream media could also discourage
    advertisers from placing ads for fear of tarnishing their own
    images in the public eye, further hurting the mainstream
    media companies.

    ¶25.  (C) COMMENT:  By demonizing the mainstream media --
    linking "greed" to public safety problems and the country's
    poverty -- while promising to deliver "uncontaminated and
    direct" messages to the people, Ortega and Murillo may be
    attempting to foment public resentment towards and rejection
    of the mainstream media.  This focus could serve to both
    "soften up" the public, making it more receptive to Ortega's
    message, and create self-censorship among mainstream
    journalists worried about reprisals.  Further, attacking the
    media could fuel public perceptions that "controls" or
    "limits" on "irresponsible" media should be allowed.  END
    COMMENT.

    Silver Lining - Opposition Unifying in National Assembly
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶26.  (SBU) Through his use of a broad spectrum of measures to
    attack and potentially weaken the press, Ortega is providing
    opposition forces ample opportunity to unify.  Murillo's
    appointment as coordinator of the Counsel for Communication
    and Citizenry was roundly condemned by opposition members in
    the National Assembly who view her appointment as illegal.
    Although the ALN, MRS, and PLC caucuses are not unanimous in
    their disapproval of Ortega's tactics, all are cognizant of
    the potential danger posed by restricting press freedom.  The
    ALN and MRS have been in lock-step in opposing each step
    taken against the media with the exception of the accord
    signed between Ortega and the CPN, which MRS deputy Victor
    Hugo Tinoco characterized as having "positive value" while
    ALN deputies were sharply critical.  On the exoneration
    issue, PLC deputy Wilfredo Navarro and others joined the MRS
    and ALN in supporting exoneration for the media and
    questioning Ortega's intentions.  There is a growing
    realization among deputies that the National Assembly is the
    "Front Line" against Ortega (Ref B).
    TRIVELLI

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