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### Viewing cable 06BRASILIA2314, The October 17 Meeting of the U.S.-Brazil Bilateral

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06BRASILIA2314 | 2006-11-05 12:29 | 2011-07-11 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Brasilia

`

    VZCZCXRO9865
    RR RUEHRG
    DE RUEHBR #2314/01 3091229
    ZNR UUUUU ZZH
    R 051229Z NOV 06
    FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7195
    INFO RUCPDO/USDOC WASHDC
    RUEHRC/USDA WASHDC
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
    RHEBAAA/USDOE WASHDC
    RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
    RUEAHLC/DHS WASHDC
    RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 8509
    RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 3250
    RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 5768
    RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 2031
    RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0590
    RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0231
    RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0136
    RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0061
    RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1502
    RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

` `

    UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 BRASILIA 002314

    SIPDIS

    STATE PASS USTR:EISSENSTAT/BROADBENT/SCRONIN
    USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/WH/SHUPKA
    USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSEN/ADRISCOLL/MWAR D
    USDOC ALSO FOR USPTO
    STATE PASS OPIC FOR MORONESE, RIVERA, MERVENNE
    STATE PASS EXIM FOR NATALIE WEISS, COCONNER
    STATE PASS USTDA FOR AMCKINNEY
    AID/W FOR LAC/AA
    TREASURY FOR OASIA - JHOEK
    DOE FOR GWARD/SLADISLAW
    DOJ FOR CMERRIAM
    DHS FOR CBP

    SENSITIVE
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: ETRD KIPR EINV ENRG WTRO BEXP BR
    SUBJECT: The October 17 Meeting of the U.S.-Brazil Bilateral
    Commercial Mechanism

    ¶1.  (SBU)  Summary and Introduction.   On October 17, a USG
    delegation met with the Brazilian interagency economic players in a
    session of the two countries' Bilateral Consultative Mechanism (BCM)
    meeting.  The wide-ranging agenda covered a variety of issues,
    including WTO matters (the Doha Round, current and potential future
    disputes, anti-dumping methodology, etc.), agriculture (subsidies,
    the Farm Bill), prospects for renewal of the USG's GSP program,
    possible cooperation on biofuels, current U.S. and GOB international
    trade negotiations, and intellectual property rights.  The USG
    delegation, chaired by A/USTR Everett Eissenstat emphasized that
    many of the items on the agenda were long-standing controversies and
    could not be resolved in a single meeting.  For its part, the GOB
    side, chaired by Acting Ministry of External Relations (MRE) U/S for
    Economic Affairs Roberto Azevedo, made the point that it was
    worthwhile taking stock where we were bilaterally.

    ¶2.  (SBU)  A/USTR Meredith Broadbent, USTR Southern Cone Director
    Sue Cronin, WHA/EPSC Economist Joseph Salazar, and Embassy/Sao Paulo
    Consulate officers rounded out the USG delegation.  Over 40
    officials attended for the GOB, including representatives from the
    MRE; the Ministry of Development, Industry, and Commerce; the
    Ministry of Agriculture; the Ministry of Finance; the Ministry of
    Health; the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of Culture; ANVISA
    (Brazil's FDA-equivalent); INPI (Brazil's Patent/Trademark agency),
    the Federal Police; and the Federal Highway Police.  End Summary and
    Introduction.

    Multilateral Trade Talks
    ------------------------
    ¶3.  (SBU)  In addition to the October 17 Bilateral Consultative
    Mechanism discussions with Azevedo et. al., Eissenstat, Broadbent,
    and Cronin met the previous day with the MRE's Chief of
    International Trade Negotiations, Amb. Regis Arslanian.  In the
    meeting Arslanian painted a positive picture of the Mercosul's
    ongoing trade talks.  Arslanian said that the Mercosul/Israel and
    Mercosul/South Africa Customs Union (SACU) negotiations were well
    advanced and that the final goods-only agreement would cover 100% of
    products traded. (Note: it is unclear whether Arslanian was
    including agriculture in his calculation of product coverage or
    not.)  With respect to talks with Mexico, he stated that discussions
    on a Mercosul-Mexico FTA were in the very preliminary stages and
    that, despite press reports to the contrary, Brazil had absolutely
    no intention of seeking a bilateral agreement with Mexico -- as
    opposed to the pact contemplated under the aegis of Mercosul.

    ¶4.  (SBU)  Arslanian was similarly hopeful regarding the Mercosul/EU
    FTA talks, stating that what was currently on the table reached 88%
    of goods traded.  (Excluded were machines, chemicals, electronics,
    and certain auto parts; agriculture was included in the 88% although
    the EU contemplated that sensitive products would be subject to
    quotas.)  Besides the phase-in period, where the EU sought 10 years
    and Brazil 18 years, the principal areas in contention, he said,
    were services (where Brazil was on the defensive) and agriculture
    (where the EU was on the defensive).  Brazil had offered 100%
    national treatment to the EU and, on investment, was willing to open
    almost all areas to the EU, including manufacturing and agriculture.
     Arslanian argued that the GOB was similarly forthcoming on
    services, although, in general, it much preferred mode 1 over mode
    ¶3.  If the EU could be more flexible on agriculture, Arslanian
    declared, the upcoming November 6-7 talks in Rio could bring an
    agreement within reach.  He cited the EU's offer on beef as an

    BRASILIA 00002314  002 OF 006

    example of its intransigence.  Currently, under an onerous 175%
    tariff Brazil exports 222,000 tons of beef per year to the EU.
    However, the EU's present offer would establish a quota system under
    which Brazil would only be able to export 116,000 tons per year.
    Indeed, Arslanian said, the EU would have to improve its offer on
    12-13 agricultural items, including sugar, poultry, wheat, ethanol
    and dairy.

    ¶5.  (SBU)  Finally, Arslanian expounded on Brazil's current
    situation regarding Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs).   While
    the GOB has signed 14 such agreements with countries such as
    Germany, Spain, Belgium, Italy, Chile, and Korea, the Brazilian
    Congress has either rejected them or put them on hold - principally
    because of provisions subjecting parastatals to binding
    international arbitration.  To get the investment agenda moving
    again, Arslanian reported that the GOB was now consulting with the
    legislature on a new model BIT (which excluded controversial items
    such as transfer of royalties, expropriation, and, of course,
    binding international arbitration for state-owned enterprises).
    A/USTR noted that in any BIT protection for investors in disputes
    with state parties would be of critical importance to the USG.

    ¶6.  (SBU)  The next day U.S. del explored Brazil's international
    trade scenario with Azevedo as well.  With respect to the
    EU-Mercosul talks, Azevedo echoed many of Arslanian's statements,
    noting that the two sides were testing to see if progress could be
    made on agriculture, services, and flexibilities.  Notwithstanding
    the expectations of some, he said, non agricultural market access
    (NAMA) had not proven to be a great stumbling block nor had the
    imminent accession of Venezuela to Mercosul.  What had proven to be
    a problem, he continued, was the EU's insistence on the concept of
    Doha Round "downpayments" in the context of the agriculture
    discussions.  Under this concept, if whatever the EU offered under
    an eventual Doha Round agreement was greater than what Brazil
    received under the Mercosul-EU FTA, then Brazil would have to make
    further concessions to pay for the difference.  Azevedo
    characterized this as negotiating twice for the same benefit, adding
    that this was unfair.  Azevedo also noted that Mercosul was
    discussing a trilateral agreement with India and the SACU (a
    long-term goal), looking at broadening its bilateral goods-only pact
    with India to include greater product coverage, and moving forward
    on bilaterals with Pakistan and India.

    ¶7.  (SBU)  Finally, both Arslanian and Azevedo (the latter in
    informal remarks on the margins) stated that in Brazil's
    multilateral and Mercosul trade negotiations the country was doing
    all that it could to be forward-leaning.  Doing more on services,
    Arslanian noted, would require the GOB to amend up to 33 statutory
    and constitutional provisions.  For his part, Azevedo opined that
    opening up Brazil's manufacturing sector to greater competition
    could end up knocking the country's macro-economic adjustment
    off-track.  Brazil would do what it could, he continued, but would
    be careful not to sign up to commitments that politically it could
    not deliver.

    WTO Issues
    ----------
    ¶8. (SBU)  AUSTR Eissenstat's emphasized the rationale for the
    creation of the Bilateral Consultative Mechanism, that is to work
    towards solution of problems.  The agenda proposed by Brazil did not
    provide many opportunities to find solutions, as most issues raised

    BRASILIA 00002314  003 OF 006

    were being dealt with in the WTO or were beyond the scope of USTR to
    resolve.

    ¶9.  (SBU)  Leading off the discussion on WTO, Azevedo raised issues
    which the GOB has broached with the USG a number of different times
    during the past year.  He stated that the GOB was concerned about
    the need to make progress on the Doha Round, and saw several
    critical events upcoming:  i.e., both the U.S. and Brazilian
    elections, expiration of TPA in mid-2007, and U.S. congressional
    consideration of the Farm Bill.  He declared that for Brazil, it was
    essential that the USG improve its offer on agricultural subsidies
    and ensure that our Doha commitments included compliance with the
    WTO cotton panel ruling.  A/USTR Broadbent noted that to date, the
    USG felt that it had been unable to get substantive commitments from
    Brazil on NAMA and services and that in the end a balanced package
    would be necessary.  Azevedo said that a successful Doha Round would
    allow the U.S. and EU to lock in lower Brazilian tariffs and that we
    should not underestimate the value of binding Brazilian tariffs at a
    particular level.  While during the recent 20 years Brazil tariffs
    had fallen, he observed, it could well be that in the wake of a
    failed Doha Round protectionist elements within the country managed
    to reverse this trend.  A/USTR Eissenstat replied that the USG has
    consistently embraced the concept of an ambitious Doha Round and
    that we would need something beyond binding lower tariffs to be
    successful.   He noted the frustrations in Congress regarding
    movement on tariffs, in particular bills that would raise tariffs.
    AUSTR Broadbent noted that U.S. industry does not view percent cuts
    in bound tariff rates that do not penetrate applied tariffs as a
    significant tariff concession in the NAMA negotiations.  To earn the
    support of U.S. manufacturers for the Doha Round, Brazil will need
    to offer cuts in real tariffs paid at the border, cuts that are
    large enough to increase trade flows.  Cuts in bound tariffs are not
    enough.

    ¶10.  (SBU)  Turning to the issue of trade remedies, Azevedo stated
    that the GOB had concerns about the methodology the ITC used in
    anti-dumping cases.  In one recent case, he said, in calculating
    anti-dumping margins the ITC had not acknowledged the possibility of
    the exporter recouping the value added (ICMS) tax paid.  While he
    did not definitively state that the GOB would challenge this in the
    WTO, he characterized this agenda item as "early warning" for the
    USG.  Azevedo went on to complain about the continued used by the
    USG of "zeroing" methodology after it had been outlawed by the WTO.
    Eissentat noted that WTO rulings on zeroing were complex and that
    under certain circumstances zeroing was permissible.  On the issue
    of USG pre-privatization subsidies, Azevedo stated that as time
    passed this was becoming much less of a problem in countervailing
    duty cases.  On orange juice, Azevedo observed that next year the
    GOB might seek to argue that Hurricane Katrina had changed
    circumstances with respect to past USG anti-dumping determinations.
    On shrimp, he said that the GOB had a number of complaints about the
    USG methodology in its anti-dumping determinations (zeroing,
    definition of injury, definition of domestic industry, etc.) and
    would participate in the India/Thailand/Ecuador WTO case as a third
    party.  And on cotton, Azevedo opined that the USG had not complied
    with the previous WTO panel decision and if the Doha Round remains
    stalled, the GOB "could not sweep this under the rug."  Finally,
    Azevedo declared the rules negotiations in the Doha Round were "not
    a minor issue" for the GOB.  Part and parcel of its desire for gains
    on market access, he said, was the need to protect these gains
    through a good package on rules.

    BRASILIA 00002314  004 OF 006

    ¶11.  (SBU)  Responding to the concerns on GOB's trade remedies,
    Eissenstat noted that all these matters had been in dispute for some
    time and it was clear that the USG viewed the rights and obligations
    on rules differently from the GOB.  Specifically, that the United
    States would reserve that right to use its trade remedy law to
    ensure fair trade practices.  On the rules negotiations he made the
    point that this was an important area for the USG as well.  He also
    noted that the U.S. and Brazil have found areas where their
    interests converge in the rules negotiations and that we shared
    Brazil's desire for a balanced package.  On cotton, Eissenstat noted
    that the United States had taken significant steps to comply with
    the WTO ruling.  Eissentat went on to observe that the USG was
    concerned that recently someone had leaked to the press the story
    that the U.S. had objected to one of the proposed judges on the WTO
    cotton compliance panel.  Such a leak was counter to long-standing
    WTO norms.  After consulting with his colleagues, Azevedo replied
    that the GOB also was concerned that such a leak had occurred but
    assured the U.S. side that no one in Brasilia was responsible for
    it.

    Agriculture/GSP
    ---------------
    ¶12.  (SBU)  Leading on agenda item of agriculture, Eissenstat stated
    that while some had focused on the impending expiration of TPA, both
    the GSP and the Farm Bill would soon expire as well.  The USG has
    recognized that given the upcoming review of the Farm Bill, some
    reform of U.S. programs was in order.  In response to Azevedo's
    query as to how Doha Round talks could proceed without TPA in place
    -- i.e., foreign negotiating partners could not be sure that the
    U.S. Congress wouldn't change any deal agreed to --, both Eissenstat
    and Broadbent reiterated that for Doha to succeed, all parties must
    move together.  Eissenstat emphasized that it would not make sense
    to put something on the table in the negotiation if the other side
    could simply pocket it and move on.  Broadbent added that we were
    looking for reciprocal progress, that U.S. industry does not feel
    that it has much to gain at this juncture. Azevedo replied that
    based upon his reading of the consensus of analysts, it did not
    appear that the U.S. was ready to move on agriculture.

    ¶13.  (SBU)   With respect to GSP renewal, Broadbent explained that
    the U.S. was conducting the first review of this program in 20
    years.  In 2005 the USG had completed its first stage review, she
    said, and the second stage review (focusing on 13 large GSP
    beneficiary countries, including Brazil) was now ongoing and looking
    at, inter alia, the 83 current competitive need limit waivers
    (CNLs).  During this process over 800 parties had submitted public
    comments, including nearly 200 from, or associated with, Brazil.
    Broadbent noted that the results of USTR's review would soon go to
    Congress and that we hoped to persuade the legislature to extend the
    program.  Azevedo stated the Brazilian Ambassador Abdenur was
    following the GSP debate closely.  The GOB would take it very badly,
    he declared, if it appeared that the country had lost GSP
    eligibility because of: 1) a misperception in Congress that it had
    not been helpful on WTO, 2) discrimination on the part of the USG,
    or 3) some sort of WTO-inconsistent act.   A/USTR Broadbent assured
    the Brazilians that the USG decision on GSP would be
    non-discriminatory and consistent with WTO rules.

    ¶14.  (SBU) Closing out the discussion of GSP, Azevedo stated that
    the GOB had an ongoing issue with the USG's import classification of

    BRASILIA 00002314  005 OF 006

    Brazilian cachaca - which was being treated the same as rum even
    though its taste was "distinctively different."  USTR Southern Cone
    Director Cronin replied that the United States was aware of Brazil's
    interest in getting cachaca designated as a beverage typical of
    Brazil (i.e., a designation similar to that done for Irish whiskey)
    but  that under the CFR this required a 60-day public comment
    period.  She noted that domestic spirits manufacturers would
    certainly submit comments, and that it was not clear that they would
    support such a designation.

    Ethanol
    -------
    ¶15.  (SBU)  Azevedo turned to Claudia Vieira Santos, Deputy Chief of
    the MRE's Energy Department, to brief on the GOB's efforts on
    ethanol.  Santos stated that Brazil saw ethanol as a strategic issue
    on which it could cooperate with both the developing and the
    developed countries.  Joint initiatives on ethanol could have a
    positive effect on bilateral relations in general, she continued,
    with increased trade represent just one possible impact.  (Santos
    promised to provide the U.S. del - through the Brazilian Embassy in
    Washington - a list of areas on which the Brazilian government was
    moving forward on bilateral international cooperation.)  Santos
    pointed to President Bush's early October speech to the Renewable
    Energy Conference in St. Louis as evidence that other countries
    shared this vision.  Azevedo seconded this assessment, noting that
    biofuels cooperation could possibly be a major element in Brazil's
    agenda with the U.S.   Still, he characterized the USG's imposition
    of a 54 cent per gallon tariff on imported ethanol as an area of
    concern for Brazil.  In addition, he made clear that Brazil would
    oppose any efforts by the USG to exclude this levy from any general
    tariff reduction formulas agreed to in the Doha Round.  Such a move
    would set a dangerous precedent, he said, which Brazil would
    "forcefully seek to correct."

    ¶16.  (SBU)  A/USTR Eissenstat made it clear that the USG viewed the
    54 cent per gallon tariff as a national security measure and had no
    intention of making this issue part of any tariff-cutting
    discussions in the Doha Round or that it was subject to discussion
    in the biofuels initiative.

    The Commercial Dialogue
    -----------------------
    ¶17.  (SBU)  Embassy Commercial Attache Dinah McDougall briefed the
    group on the progress made to date in the bilateral Commercial
    Dialogue initiated in June 2006 by Secretary Gutierrez and Minister
    of Development, Industry, and Commerce Luiz Fernando Furlan.
    McDougall noted that the Dialogue and its four Working Groups
    (Business Facilitation, Investment Promotion, IPR, and Standards)
    did not overlap with the BCM process as the Dialogue focused on
    doing business issues not trade negotiations.  She stated that the
    two ministers - Gutierrez and Furlan - were set to meet in early
    November in Washington; thereafter, a Brazilian delegation planned
    to travel to the United States pursuant to a U.S. Customs-related
    program on "Moving Goods Efficiently."  MDIC staffer Mauricio do Val
    echoed McDougall's remarks, declaring that the GOB was happy with
    how the Dialogue was evolving.

    Intellectual Property Rights
    ----------------------------
    ¶18.  (SBU)  On IPR, the Brazilian side had its MRE IPR Office
    Director brief on the status of the GOB's efforts.  In addition,

    BRASILIA 00002314  006 OF 006

    officials from the public-private Anti-piracy Council, the Federal
    Police, and the Federal Highway Police spoke on their individual
    agency's workplans.  Eissenstat stated that the USG applauded the
    progress that Brazil had made over the past year on copyright
    piracy.  He asked whether the Brazilian government would be willing
    to receive a USTR delegation later this year to look at IPR issues
    in greater depth.  Azevedo responded that the GOB felt that the U.S.
    was unwilling to recognize what Brazil had done on IPR.  It was
    extremely frustrating, he said, for Brazil to constantly be subject
    to scrutiny from the USG but not receive any credit for its
    achievements.  Typical of this, he stated, was the USG's
    unwillingness to downgrade Brazil's Special 301 status from Priority
    Watch List to Watch List in the wake of the January 2005 dismissal
    of industry's copyright piracy petition.  Eissenstat noted that
    copyright piracy was an important issue for the USG and that
    notwithstanding the GOB's efforts the size of the problem remained
    immense.   In the end, Azevedo appear to acquiesce to the travel of
    the proposed USTR IPR delegation.

    USTR Comment
    ------------
    ¶19.  (SBU)  Brazil asked for this meeting of the BCM.  Given the
    offensive nature of its proposed agenda, it is not clear what Brazil
    hoped to achieve, other than to rehash issues that trouble the
    bilateral and multilateral trade relationship.  At the lunch that
    followed the meeting, Azevedo made it clear that he did not expect
    to chair subsequent meetings of the BCM, so it does not seem the
    meeting was called in order to establish Azevedo as AUSTR
    Eissenstat's new counterpart.  In terms of Brazil's trade policy,
    the meeting with Arslanian, the BCM, and the lunch all pointed to a
    continuation of a trade policy that does not lend itself to finding
    solutions to bilateral problems or additional, significant common
    ground in the multilateral negotiations.  USTR will, of course,
    continue to engage - but is not overly optimistic. End USTR Comment

    ¶20.  (U)  This cable was cleared by USTR prior to transmission.

    SOBEL

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