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### Viewing cable 06SOFIA198, NEW CHIEF PROSECUTOR READIES FOR "WAR"

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06SOFIA198 | 2006-02-07 16:27 | 2011-05-13 19:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Sofia
Appears in these articles: http://www.bivol.bg/wlvelchev.html http://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2011/05/13/1089147_na_chetiri_ochi_s_boris_velchev/

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 000198

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2011
    TAGS: PREL KCOR KCRM BU
    SUBJECT: NEW CHIEF PROSECUTOR READIES FOR "WAR"

    REF: SOFIA 82

    Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle, for reason 1.4 (b) & (d)

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a February 3 meeting with the Ambassador,
    newly elected Chief Prosecutor Boris Velchev made clear that
    despite pressure to produce immediate results for an EU
    audience, his main focus would be on building solid cases
    against OC figures and asserting control over a deeply
    dysfunctional prosecution service.  Velchev conceded the
    challenge of managing short-term expectations, but displayed
    impressive candor and resolve in outlining his priorities and
    the obstacles he expects to face once in office.  We should
    be prepared to support Velchev's reform of the prosecution
    service with technical assistance, however difficult a time
    he may have meeting the high expectations of Bulgaria's
    political elite and EU observers. END SUMMARY.

    -------------------------------------------
    DISARMING A 'TERRORIST' PROSECUTION SERVICE
    -------------------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) Velchev spoke frankly about the current state of
    affairs in Bulgaria's prosecution service, stating that from
    what he has learned in recent weeks, the situation is "even
    worse than I had imagined."  In his words, the prosecution
    service under current Chief Prosecutor Nikola Filchev has
    evolved into "some kind of terrorist organization" used to
    settle political and business scores, but totally incapable
    of fighting crime.  So entrenched is the outgoing Chief
    Prosecutor's influence that just three weeks shy of Velchev's
    inauguration, his future deputies refuse to speak with him,
    openly hinting at fears of repercussions from Filchev.
    Citing a lack of access to information, Velchev declined to
    provide a detailed "100-day plan," but outlined three
    potential sources of opposition to change: criminals,
    politicians, and the prosecutors themselves.  Velchev
    declared that he was "not afraid" of criminals, and "could
    find a way to deal with" politicians, but was most surprised
    and discouraged by resistance from within the prosecution
    service.  He indicated that his first moves as Chief
    Prosecutor would be to prepare for "some kind of a war" with
    corrupt incumbent prosecutors.

    ¶3. (C) Velchev did not expect this struggle to be easy.  Like
    the Chief Prosecutor, Deputy Chief Prosecutors are elected
    rather than appointed, and the current deputies have several
    years remaining in their terms.  In Velchev's evaluation, his
    only near-term chance to build a team he can trust will be to
    approach these deputies individually and convince them to
    resign.  As he attempts to assemble his team of trusted
    deputies, Velchev plans to simultaneously tackle the "easy
    work" of sending signals that political influence in
    prosecutions will no longer be tolerated, as well as the more
    challenging task of beginning to collect hard evidence on 15
    years of unchecked OC activity.  After a house-cleaning
    period of 3-4 months, Velchev hopes to start moving against
    high-profile OC and corruption targets.

    ¶4. (C) On the issue of Filchev's future, Velchev acknowledged
    the conventional wisdom that he will likely be sent abroad as
    ambassador to Belarus or Kazakhstan.  Filchev, who counts
    Belarussian President Lukashenko as a personal acquaintance
    and has made several official and unofficial trips to Minsk
    in the past year, has lobbied for such a post unabashedly.
    Velchev acknowledged that many aspects of his job would be
    easier if Filchev were physically out of the country and not
    "looking over my shoulder."  However, Velchev also worried
    out loud that as details of Filchev's activities became
    clear, pressure to investigate him might build, causing
    bilateral problems with the country of his posting.

    ---------------
    EU EXPECTATIONS
    ---------------

    ¶5. (C) Velchev acknowledged the importance of the EU's April
    monitoring report on Bulgaria's readiness for accession, but
    said he could not plan his priorities as Chief Prosecutor
    based on the European Commission's timeline.  The previous
    Chief Prosecutor's lack of progress in fighting corruption
    and solving over 30 high-profile OC-related killings has long
    been a concern of the EU and the U.S. Embassy alike.
    Although many OC figures in Bulgaria continue to operate in
    plain sight, progress toward speedy prosecutions will be
    hampered by years of shoddy evidence collection and a team
    whose previous lack of success indicates they are
    "incompetent, afraid, or corrupt."  In his meetings with EU
    officials, Velchev intends to stress the importance of real,
    rather than cosmetic reform, while holding out hope that a
    reformed, functioning prosecution service will eventually
    "give hope to people" that the war on organized crime and
    corruption can be won.  With regard to domestic public
    opinion, the future Chief Prosecutor mentioned the possible
    need to publicly reveal "the facts" regarding the state of
    the prosecution service in order to manage expectations and
    illustrate the scope of the challenges before him.

    ------------------
    BENDING THE RULES?
    ------------------

    ¶6. (C) Despite his respect for the rule of law, Velchev
    argued that bending rules of evidence and procedure was
    justified in the case of certain organized crime leaders.
    Referring again to the failure of Bulgarian prosecutors and
    law enforcement officials to collect more than "feeble
    evidence" against OC figures, Velchev announced his intention
    to pursue a "contract with the courts" - i.e., to appeal to
    judges to convict OC leaders based on evidence that otherwise
    might not pass muster.  He estimated that such an arrangement
    would be justified against the country's 20-30
    highest-ranking criminals, in whose cases adherence to
    "strict legal principles will be counterproductive."
    According to Velchev, Interior Minister Petkov had already
    enlisted his support in deploying this strategy in the
    high-profile prosecution of the Marinov brothers for
    attempted murders linked to organized crime.

    --------------
    THE U.S. ANGLE
    --------------

    ¶7. (C) Velchev said he appreciated the Ambassador's offer of
    USG support, and agreed with the Ambassador's statement that
    while the U.S. could help build the technical competency of
    prosecutors, the moral and ethical foundation for an
    effective prosecution service would have to come from the
    Bulgarian side.  Velchev stressed that while technical
    assistance would be necessary in time, the need to
    consolidate control of the prosecution service and initiate
    successful cases made USG cooperation in gathering and
    sharing information a more pressing priority.  Velchev cited
    Bulgarian law enforcement's lack of previous success against
    OC as justification for a lack of confidence in
    "professional" officials of the Ministry of Interior, raising
    the possibility that even USG information previously shared
    with GoB law enforcement counterparts might be "filtered"
    before making it to his desk.  In a request that highlighted
    his lack of support among the corps of prosecutors, Velchev
    asked Post's Resident Legal Advisor to suggest a shortlist of
    effective regional prosecutors we have worked with in other
    cities who could serve as potential allies in his reform
    efforts.

    -----
    LIBYA
    -----

    ¶8. (C) Despite working extensively on the issue of the
    Bulgarian medics in Libya in his role as the President's
    Legal Advisor, Velchev was not aware of the outcome of recent
    meetings in London.  He expressed guarded optimism about the
    prospects for an eventual favorable resolution of the case.
    Specifically, he predicted that the Libyan side would push
    for a solution "in the hardest possible way for us" - by
    re-convicting the nurses, sentencing them to death again, and
    finally pardoning them, perhaps by late summer.  He thanked
    the Ambassador for the USG's efforts on behalf of the nurses,
    and noted that the last six months had seen a notable
    increase in Libya's willingness to find a quick resolution to
    the crisis.

    -------
    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶9. (C) Velchev is clearly open to cooperation with the U.S.:
    he specifically mentioned that some public expression of U.S.
    support for his efforts once in office would send a strong
    and positive message to the Bulgarian people and strengthen
    his position.  Velchev's outline of his concerns and
    priorities struck us as right on target: only a short-term
    focus on internal house-cleaning will make the longer-term
    war against organized criminals effective.  However, even if
    his attempts at meaningful reform are fully successful,
    results are likely to materialize in months, not days.  The
    high expectations of many observers for short-term results
    are unrealistic given the extent to which the "old way of
    doing business" is entrenched in the prosecution service.
    Nonetheless, after seven years of pervasive, systemic
    corruption under the outgoing prosecutor, Velchev offers the
    best chance for change Bulgaria could have hoped for, and we
    should be ready to offer all the support he can use.  END
    COMMENT.
    Beyrle

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