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### Viewing cable 08KUALALUMPUR644, MALAYSIA'S POLITICAL CRISIS

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08KUALALUMPUR644 | 2008-07-22 08:29 | 2011-07-22 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Appears in these articles: http://www.malaysia-today.net/mtcolumns/42094-wikileaks-malaysias-political-crisis

`

    VZCZCXRO2974
    OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
    DE RUEHKL #0644/01 2040829
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 220829Z JUL 08
    FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1398
    INFO RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 4554
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0123
    RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2590
    RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0454
    RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2547
    RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0565
    RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KUALA LUMPUR 000644

    SIPDIS

    FOR EAP AND INR
    SINGAPORE - PASS TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2028
    TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM KJUS MY
    SUBJECT: MALAYSIA'S POLITICAL CRISIS

    REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 609 - UMNO RESISTS REFORM
         ¶B. KUALA LUMPUR 160 - ELECTION SHOCK

    Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES R. KEITH, FOR REASON 1.4 (B AND D).

    Summary and Introduction
    ------------------------

    ¶1.  (C) The next four weeks will be a telling period in the
    history of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO)
    rule in Malaysia. For the first time in its fifty-year
    dominance, UMNO is faced with a multi-racial opposition
    alliance that has some credible prospect for forming the next
    government. To date, it appears the ruling party finds this
    situation intolerable. UMNO leaders, united behind but also
    in a sense using Prime Minister (PM) Abdullah, have made it
    clear that they are willing to blacken Malaysia's reputation
    to ensure the end to opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim's
    political challenge. The coming Parliamentary session in the
    latter half of August is the next likely setting for a
    showdown, and could precipitate another arrest of Anwar if he
    is deemed to be doing to well politically between now and
    then. Conversely, if the ruling party concludes it has him
    boxed in UMNO may be content to use short-term measures such
    as judicial restraining orders and the like to prevent him
    from addressing and attracting a national audience.

    ¶2.  (C) We should continue to speak out publicly in support
    of the rule of law, taking care not to undermine our
    principled position by being perceived to be too close to the
    opposition. If the authorities escalate their rhetoric in
    anticipation of another arrest of Anwar, we will need to
    adjust accordingly. If, on the other hand, the ruling party
    restrains itself from arresting Anwar again in August, we
    will want to consider our longer-term approach to a period of
    prolonged uncertainty. For the time being, we should continue
    to press hard the bilateral initiatives currently underway as
    these are tied directly to profound U.S. interests and
    support the development of a more transparent and accountable
    set of systems in Malaysian government and society. As we
    begin to develop our public diplomacy programs for the coming
    fiscal year, we will seek to give pride of place to the rule
    of law.  End Summary and Introduction.

    What does UMNO want?
    --------------------

    ¶3.  (C) The ruling party wants to stay in power indefinitely,
    and that means Anwar and the multi-racial opposition front he
    is leading must fail. At least so far, there is scant
    evidence of a more thoughtful and forward-looking analysis
    within UMNO. In fact, the ruling party could find some common
    ground with the opposition if it were willing to countenance
    gradual development of a two-party system of checks and
    balances.  Instead, the ruling party defines national
    security primarily as a matter of protecting UMNO's
    superiority and ensuring that "people power," or a level
    electoral playing field, cannot become the opposition's means
    of toppling the ruling party.

    How is UMNO getting what it wants?
    ----------------------------------

    ¶4.  (C) The ruling party is relying primarily on its own
    party structure and the embedded system of carrots and sticks
    to keep party membership in line. As in other one-party
    states, the party is seen opportunistically as a mechanism
    for personal advancement and enrichment. There is an
    ideological component, in terms of Malay supremacy, but that
    is in practice a matter of institutionalized opportunism. In
    good times UMNO can maintain control by distributing power
    and money to get what it wants. In bad times, it uses the
    stick, and for now that means intimidation. The ruling elite
    maintains control over the security apparatus through party
    stalwarts who run the security institutions, mainly the
    police but also the military. We believe the military will
    remain loyal to legitimate leadership and is not a likely
    tool to overturn an elected, royally-approved and Malay-led
    government from either the ruling or opposition side. The
    police, on the other hand, follow orders from the ruling
    party. The "commando-style" arrest of Anwar last week, the
    roadblocks and security checks throughout the city of Kuala
    Lumpur, the recent arrest of blogger Raja Petra, intimidation
    of Sabah politicians, and the authorities' strident rhetoric
    are all part of a broad message to the Malaysian people that
    they had better not stand in UMNO's path. In today's
    Malaysia, one can get along by going along (and of course one
    can go farther as a Malay rather than a Chinese or Indian),
    but it is also true that one can be run over. We only have
    anecdotal evidence for this, but the sad spiral into past
    patterns may have become the predicate for some middle and
    upper class Malaysians who have the option of emigrating.
    Rather than wait to be run over, it is far preferable to get
    out of the game.

    What happened to post-election reforms?
    ---------------------------------------

    ¶5.  (C) It is deja vu all over again. Just as in Abdullah's
    first term, characterized by lofty rhetoric in support of
    political reform but virtually no action, after the March
    elections Abdullah's prominent reform initiatives seem to
    have evaporated into nothing (ref A). Despite strong popular
    support for political reform, there is evidently even
    stronger opposition to reform within the ruling party. Those
    who have the most to lose through reform are the same ruling
    elites, including Abdullah's own circle, who must be
    persuaded to allow reform to happen. It would take strong
    leadership to push that sort of initiative through the party
    structure, perhaps going over the heads of party elites and
    enlisting the support of the masses. Abdullah doesn't seem to
    have that kind of leadership in him, even if that were his
    goal.

    ¶6.  (C) Instead, the ruling party seems intent on sustaining
    the patina of reform without actually undertaking any step
    that might genuinely involve systemic change or weakening of
    executive power. For example, against the backdrop of
    opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim's arrest, last week the
    government arrested a number of immigration officials for
    corruption. These men are to be forgiven for wondering, "why
    me?" Of all who might be prosecuted, including the most
    senior leaders or their families, why these relative small
    fry? Through their sacrifice UMNO can claim action against
    corruption without actually doing much of anything.

    What does Anwar want?
    ---------------------

    ¶7.  (C) This question is not as easily answered as one might
    think. For the short term, he wants to be Prime Minister.
    First and foremost Anwar is a pragmatist, as evidenced by his
    ability to yoke together in an opposition front the Islamist
    party (PAS) and the Chinese. What are his firm guiding
    principles? What are the limits of his ability to compromise
    or accommodate? We are not sure. It was clear, for example,
    that he tolerated PAS's use of America as a political foil
    during the recent campaign season, and opposition foreign
    policy announcements on Mideast issues since the election
    have tended to follow PAS lines. But broadly speaking, he
    wants political liberalization and he can be expected to be
    an ardent supporter of the rule of law and a market economy,
    given his personal history. Malaysian foreign policy might
    not change as much as we would like to think under and Anwar
    government, especially in areas relating to Islam and the
    Middle East in which PAS will have an important say.

    ¶8.  (C) For now, we may have to content ourselves with
    identifying what Anwar does not want. He does not want to be
    boxed in and made irrelevant by UMNO, or jailed.  Anwar
    currently speaks in terms of "becoming Prime Minister or
    going to jail," as an either/or proposition.  At age 61, he
    does not want to let slip what may be his last, best chance
    to lead the Malaysian government.  He also does not want
    arch-nemesis DPM Najib Tun Razak to become Prime Minister, as
    Anwar believes Najib is much more likely than Abdullah to use
    harsh authoritarian measures to stop him and the Opposition.

    What will happen in the months ahead and what should we do?
    --------------------------------------------- --------------

    ¶9.  (C) UMNO will try to keep Anwar on the defensive and
    prevent him from winning defections to his opposition front
    from the ruling party's coalition. The loose coalition of
    UMNO loyalists who seem to have banded together around
    Abdullah will likely try to limit the cost of each step they
    feel they must take to contain and eventually eradicate
    Anwar's influence. If they can preserve the status quo
    without putting Anwar in jail on the sodomy charge perhaps
    they will do so, content to keep it as a ready tactic to
    deploy against him whenever necessary. If Anwar is unwilling
    to remain boxed in by that tactic, and history suggests
    precisely this outcome, the authorities seem entirely
    prepared to put him in jail for a longer period of time. The
    government has taken a strong stand against popular street
    demonstrations, hoping to prevent Anwar from developing the
    kind of national popular response that will be necessary to
    create an environment in which he can win converts from the
    ruling party coalition.

    ¶10.  (C) The skirmishing around these objectives will
    continue throughout July and August, and we can expect the
    opposition to seek to up the ante the closer we get to the
    Parliamentary session in the latter half of August. The
    initiative rests with Anwar. If he goes quiet, his political
    hopes fade and his personal freedom is more secure in the
    coming weeks; over a longer period Anwar sees himself as
    vulnerable to jailing or government action unless he removes
    himself from politics. The greater his political success, the
    greater a threat he is to UMNO, and the more his personal
    freedom becomes problematic.

    ¶11.  (C) We need to continue to speak with authority from
    Washington and this Embassy in support of the broad
    principles underlying the debate in Malaysia. We should avoid
    undermining our principled position, and the opposition
    parties themselves, by appearing too close to the
    personalities involved, especially Anwar. Publicly, our words
    should continue to revolve around universal values, the
    criticality of the rule of law to every dimension of our
    bilateral relationship and Malaysia's political and economic
    success.

    ¶12.  (C) Privately, we will want to underline the futility of
    the Malaysian effort to deny the political nature of the
    crisis before them. Whatever they believe about the "facts"
    of the sodomy case, at this point the ruling party has no
    chance of success in conveying to the Malaysian or
    international audience that this is merely a case of one
    citizen's charge against another. The authorities themselves
    betray that fiction on a daily basis in the pages of the
    domestic press, and barely one in ten Malaysians are buying
    into the party line a survey tells us. UMNO leaders may fail
    to grasp the consequences of upping the ante; they hear what
    we are saying, but do not understand sufficiently well how
    difficult it will be for them to overcome the shadows they
    are casting on the country. They no doubt thought they were
    choosing the more palatable path in using the criminal law,
    and thus the sodomy charge, rather than detaining Anwar as a
    matter of national security under the Internal Security Act.
    But contrary to their intent, many in the international
    community will take this as escalation. Now the criminal law
    is laid bare as a political tool, just as useful to the
    ruling party as the national security law.

    What is the long-term horizon for bilateral ties?
    --------------------------------------------- ----

    ¶13.  (C) Most of our relationship already hews tightly to the
    principle of mutual benefit. Our liaison, law enforcement,
    military, and commercial ties are well developed and tied
    directly to key national interests on both sides. Regardless
    of the heat of the rhetoric between us, I would expect
    Malaysia to seek to preserve the core relationships it has
    with us. With regard to the political dimension of our
    policy, Malaysia already has a less than inspiring record at
    the UN and is keen to preserve its options with the likes of
    the Nonaligned Movement. It may not be possible for Malaysia
    to become less helpful in international political areas
    identified with the United States, and it is unlikely to
    retreat in areas that are primarily multilateral
    (peacekeeping, for example). The biggest costs to us over the
    long term if Malaysia continues to undermine its own legal
    system are precisely in the domestic legal arena.

    ¶14.  (C) Much of the promise of our bilateral ties is rooted
    in the notion of a transition towards a thriving civil
    society and robust rule of law in Malaysia. We wish to expand
    our export control and non-proliferation cooperation with
    Malaysia, for example. It is neither in our interest nor
    Malaysia's for this country to become increasingly a place
    where smugglers can do good business. Thwarting such a
    development (or rolling it back) requires a sophisticated set
    of export control laws and robust enforcement by a strong and
    secure government, not one struggling to justify itself to
    its citizens. Despite the local paranoia about U.S.
    intervention in internal affairs, our influence is actually
    being brought to bear to support and promote precisely those
    objectives that most Malaysians want for their own benefit.

    ¶15.  (C) If the authorities are able to get through the next
    several months without doing fatal damage to the rule of law
    in Malaysia, I hope the public diplomacy dimension of our
    bilateral ties will take on a decidedly more legal and
    judicial cast. We should push ahead with our FTA talks if
    possible because that serves both our own economic interests
    as well as the broader goal of establishing more transparent
    and accountable systems in this country. In addition, to try
    to bring public focus to the centrality of the rule of law in
    our ties, we might want to organize visits in the short and
    medium term by a Supreme Court Justice, the Attorney General,
    and representatives of the American Bar Association. We will
    also review our international visitor program and other
    people-to-people exchanges in the coming fiscal year to
    ensure a central focus on the rule of law. My speeches and
    those of my staff will put the rule of law at the center.

    ¶16.  (C) We will continue to monitor closely the situation
    for signs that more robust policy responses are needed. In
    the meantime, we should continue to exploit every opportunity
    for authoritative bilateral exchange to ensure we have done
    all we can to open Malaysian leaders' eyes to the
    international costs of efforts that diminish the rule of law.

    KEITH

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