Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 19406 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden 00. Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Jordan Yemen Thailand

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05 2011/06 2011/07
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04 2011/05/05 2011/05/06 2011/05/07 2011/05/08 2011/05/09 2011/05/10 2011/05/11 2011/05/12 2011/05/13 2011/05/14 2011/05/15 2011/05/16 2011/05/17 2011/05/18 2011/05/19 2011/05/20 2011/05/21 2011/05/22 2011/05/23 2011/05/24 2011/05/25 2011/05/26 2011/05/27 2011/05/28 2011/05/29 2011/05/30 2011/05/31
2011/06/01 2011/06/02 2011/06/03 2011/06/04 2011/06/05 2011/06/06 2011/06/07 2011/06/08 2011/06/09 2011/06/10 2011/06/11 2011/06/12 2011/06/13 2011/06/14 2011/06/15 2011/06/16 2011/06/17 2011/06/18 2011/06/19 2011/06/20 2011/06/21 2011/06/22 2011/06/23 2011/06/24 2011/06/25 2011/06/26 2011/06/27 2011/06/28 2011/06/29 2011/06/30
2011/07/01 2011/07/02 2011/07/04 2011/07/05 2011/07/06 2011/07/07 2011/07/08 2011/07/10 2011/07/11 2011/07/12 2011/07/13 2011/07/14 2011/07/15 2011/07/16 2011/07/17 2011/07/18

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/05 1985/06
1986/05 1986/08 1986/12
1987/06
1988/01 1988/03 1988/04 1988/07 1988/08 1988/12
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05 1991/07 1991/11
1992/01 1992/03 1992/06 1992/09 1992/12
1993/01 1993/02 1993/10
1994/11 1994/12
1995/01 1995/04 1995/06 1995/11
1996/07 1996/09 1996/11
1997/02 1997/03 1997/05 1997/06 1997/08 1997/10 1997/12
1998/05 1998/12
1999/01 1999/09
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/04 2001/05 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11 2001/12
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/06 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11 2002/12
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Belfast Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chiang Mai Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Freetown Consulate Fukuoka
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guangzhou Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hong Kong Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy Libreville Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Mission Geneva Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne Consulate Matamoros
Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Nuevo Laredo Consulate Naples Consulate Naha Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sapporo Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE UN Rome Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vientiane Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ASEC AEMR AMGT AR APECO AU AORC AJ AF AFIN AS AM ABLD AFFAIRS AMB APER AA AG AE ADM ATRN ALOW ACOA AID ARF AND ABUD AY AMED ASPA APEC ADPM ADANA AFSI ARABL AL ADCO ANARCHISTS AZ ANET AMEDCASCKFLO AADP AO AGAO AGRICULTURE AROC ASEAN APRC AORG AFSN AFSA ACABQ AINF AINR AODE APCS ARCH ADB AX AMEX ASUP ARM AQ ATFN AMBASSADOR ARAS ACBAQ AC AOPR AREP ASIG ASEX AER AVERY ASCH AFU AMG ATPDEA ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AORL AN AIT AGMT ACS AGR AMCHAMS AECL AUC AFGHANISTAN ACAO
BR BB BG BEXP BY BA BRUSSELS BU BD BK BL BM BE BO BTIO BH BAIO BRPA BUSH BILAT BMGT BX BC BOL BIDEN BP BF BBG BBSR BT BWC BEXPC BN BTIU
CPAS CA CASC CS CBW CIDA CO CODEL CI CROS CU CH CWC CMGT CVIS CDG CG CF CHIEF CJAN CBSA CE CY CB CW CM CDC CONS CHR CD CT CR CN COUNTRY CONDOLEEZZA CZ COM CICTE CYPRUS CARICOM CBE CACS COE CARSON CIVS CAPC CFED COUNTER CTR COPUOS CV CITES CKGR CVR CLINTON COUNTERTERRORISM CITEL CLEARANCE CSW CIC CITT CARIB CAFTA CACM CDB CJUS CTM CAN CAJC CONSULAR CLMT CBC CIA CNARC CIS CEUDA CHINA CAC CL
DR DJ DB DHS DAO DCM DO DEFENSE DA DE DOMESTIC DISENGAGEMENT DK DOD DOT DPRK DEPT DEA DOE DTRA DS DEAX
ECON ETTC EFIS ETRD EC EMIN EAGR EAID EU EFIN EUN ECIN EG EWWT EINV ENRG ELAB EPET EN EAIR EUMEM ECPS ELTN EIND EZ EI ER ET EINT ECONOMIC ENIV EFTA ES ECONOMY ENV EAG ENGR EET ELECTIONS ESTH ETRO EPEC ECIP EXIM ENERG EREL EK EDEV ENGY ERNG EPA ETRAD ELTNSNAR ETRC EUREM EEB EETC ENVI EXTERNAL ELN ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EAIDS ECOSOC EDU EPREL ECA EINVEFIN EIDN EFINECONCS EINVKSCA ETC ENVR EAP EINN EXBS ECONOMICS EIAR EINDETRD ECONEFIN EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EFIM EINVETC ECONCS EDRC ENRD EBRD ETRA ESA EAIG EUR EUC ERD ETRN EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ESENV ENNP ECINECONCS ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN
FI FR FOREIGN FTAA FARC FREEDOM FAS FAO FBI FINANCE FCS FAA FJ FTA FK FT FAC FINR FDA FM FOR FOI FO FMLN FISO
GM GERARD GT GA GG GR GTIP GE GY GH GLOBAL GB GEORGE GCC GV GC GAZA GL GOV GOI GF GANGS GTMO GAERC GZ GUILLERMO GASPAR
HR HA HYMPSK HO HK HUMAN HN HUD HU HURI HILLARY HI HUM HSTC HEBRON HUMOR
IZ IN IAEA IS IMO ILO IR IC IT ITU IV IMF IBRD IWC IPR IRAQI IDB ISRAELI ITALY IADB ITPGOV ITALIAN ID ICAO ICRC INR IFAD ICJ IO IRAQ INL INMARSAT INRA INTERNAL INTELSAT ITRA INDO ILC IRS IIP ICTY IQ IEFIN ISCON IAHRC IA INTERPOL IEA INRB ISRAEL IZPREL IRAJ IF ITPHUM IL IACI IDA ISLAMISTS IGAD ITF INRO IBET IDP ICTR IRC
JA JO JM JP JOHN JUS JOHNNIE JAMES JOSEPH JML JIMENEZ
KNNP KFLO KDEM KOMC KSUM KIPR KFLU KPAO KE KCRM KJUS KAWC KZ KSCA KDRG KCOR KGHG KPAL KTIP KMCA KCRS KPKO KOLY KRVC KVPR KG KWBG KMDR KTER KSPR KV KTFN KWMN KFRD KSTH KS KN KISL KGIC KSEP KFIN KTEX KTIA KUNR KCMR KMOC KCIP KTDB KBIO KU KSAF KHIV KNNNP KSTC KIRF KIRC KGIT KIVP KMPI KIDE KNUP KSEO KSCS KNUC KGLB KICC KTDD KPWR KO KCFE KHLS KR KCOM KESS KCSY KWN KRFD KREC KBCT KICCPUR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KOCI KREL KMCC KAID KPRP KVIR KPRV KPAOPREL KAUST KIRP KLAB KCRIM KCRCM KPAONZ KNAR KHDP KHSA KICA KGHA KINR KTRD KTAO KPAOY KFSC KJUST KWAC KTBT KNPP KSCI KAWK KMRS KNDP KENV KNNPMNUC KHUM KBTS KACT KPIR KERG KVRP KTLA KMFO KX KPOA KRCM KCFC KNEI KCHG KPLS KFTFN KTFM KLIG KDEMAF KRAD KBTR KGCC KSEC KPIN KDEV KWWMN KOM KWNM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KRGY KIFR KSAC KWMNCS KPAK KOMS KFPC KRIM KDDG KCGC KPAI KID KMIG KNSD KWMM
LY LE LABOR LO LH LAB LI LTTE LU LA LVPR LG LT LOG
MARR MX MASS MOPS MNUC MCAP MTCRE MRCRE MTRE MASC MY MK MO MCC MCA MAS MZ MIL MU ML MTCR MEPP MG MI MINUSTAH MA MAR MP MD MAPP MR MOPPS MTS MLS MILI MEPN MEPI MEETINGS MERCOSUR MW MT MIK MN MAPS MV MILITARY MARAD MDC MACEDONIA MASSMNUC MUCN MEDIA MQADHAFI MPOS MPS MC
NZ NI NATO NO NU NG NL NPT NS NSF NA NP NATIONAL NASA NC NDP NIH NIPP NSSP NK NEGROPONTE NE NAS NATOIRAQ NAR NGO NR NZUS NARC NH NSG NAFTA NEW NRR NT NOVO NATOPREL NEA NSC NV NPA NSFO NW NORAD NPG NOAA
OTRA OECD OVIP OREP OPRC ODC OIIP OPDC OAS OSCE OPIC OMS OEXC OM OPCW OSCI OIE OPAD ODIP OFDP OEXP OFFICIALS OPEC OVIPPRELUNGANU ODPC OSHA OHUM OSIC OTR OMIG OSAC OBSP OFDA OVP ON OCII OES OCS OIC
PGOV PREL PARM PINR PHUM PM PREF PTER PK PINS PBIO PHSA PE PBTS PL POL PAK POV POLITICS POLICY PA PNAT PCI PPA PAS PALESTINIAN PERL PO PH PRELBR PERM PETR PROP PJUS PREZ PAO POLITICAL PRELPK PAIGH PROG PU PMAR PG PDOV PGOVSOCI PGOF PMIL PTE PGOR PBTSRU PY PSI PTERE PRAM PREO PARMS PINO PRGOV PORG PP PS PKFK PSOE PEPR PDEM PINT PRELP PREFA PNG PTBS PFOR PUNE PGOVLO PHUMBA POLINT PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PLN PHUH PEDRO PF PHUS PETER PARTIES PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PHUMPREL POGOV PEL PINL PBT PINF PRL PSEPC POSTS PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOC PNR PROV
QA
RS RP RU RW RFE RCMP RIGHTSPOLMIL RO ROBERT RM RICE REGION ROOD RELAM RSP RF RELATIONS RIGHTS RUPREL REMON RPEL REACTION REPORT RSO
SZ SENV SOCI SNAR SY SO SP SU SI SMIG SYR SA SCUL SW SR SYRIA SNARM SPECIALIST SG SN SF SENS SENVQGR SEN SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR SC SNA SK SL SMIL SCRM SENVSXE SAARC SNARIZ STEINBERG SWE SARS SCRS SAN ST SIPDIS SSA SPCVIS SOFA SENVKGHG SANC SHI SEVN SHUM SH SNARCS SPCE SNARN SIPRS
TRGY TBIO TSPA TU TPHY TI TX TH TIP TSPL TNGD TS TW TRSY TP TZ TN TINT TC TR TIO TF TK TRAD TT TD TWI TERRORISM TL TV TO TURKEY TSPAM TREL TRT TFIN TAGS THPY TBID
UNSC UK UNGA UN US UZ USEU UG UP UNAUS UNMIK USTR UY UNRCR UNESCO UNHRC UR UNICEF USPS UNSCR UNFICYP UNCSD UNEP USAID USOAS UNDP UV UNTAC USDA UNMIC USUN UNCHR UNCTAD USGS UNHCR USNC UA UE UNVIE UAE UNO UNODC UNCHS UNDESCO UNC UNPUOS UNDC UNCHC UNFCYP UNIDROIT UNCND
VE VM VT VZ VEPREL VN VTEG VTIZ VTPREL VISIT VENZ VAT VC VI
WHTI WIPO WTRO WTO WHO WFP WS WA WZ WI WBG WMD WWARD WHA WITH WTRQ WEU WMO WB
XA XW XX XK XL XM XS XR XF XY XG XT XC XH XD XE XV XB XU XZ XQ XI XTAG
YI YM YE YL YMCS
ZU ZI ZOELLICK ZP ZR ZO ZK ZF ZL ZB ZN ZH ZT ZJ ZEALAND ZA ZANU

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 06SEOUL4116, SMA NEGOTIATIONS ROUND VI: ONE LAST PUSH

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06SEOUL4116.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06SEOUL4116 | 2006-12-01 00:21 | 2011-05-31 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Seoul

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHUL #4116/01 3350021
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 010021Z DEC 06
    FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1614
    INFO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1733
    RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP// PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 004116

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO PM SENIOR ADVISOR LOFTIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2016
    TAGS: KS PM PREL MARR MASS MCAP
    SUBJECT: SMA NEGOTIATIONS ROUND VI: ONE LAST PUSH

    REF: SEOUL 03468

    Classified By: POL/MC JOSEPH Y. YUN.  REASONS 1.4 (b/d).

    ¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In a small group meeting and plenary
    session that followed, Ambassador Loftis and his ROK
    counterpart, Ambassador Cho Tae-yong, presented their
    respective negotiating positions on the 2007-2008 Special
    Measures (burden-sharing) Agreement (SMA).  The ROKG proposed
    a contribution of 725.5 billion won in 2007.  For 2008, they
    offered that amount plus an increase tied to the 2006
    Consumer Price Index, which is expected to be approximately 3
    percent.  The ROK offer included the addition of 45 billion
    won over their earlier proposal, designed to make up for the
    equivalent shortfall in Korean labor costs resulting from the
    previous SMA.  Ambassador Cho explained he could sell such an
    increase to the National Assembly, but said it would be
    extremely difficult to secure ROKG approval for anything
    beyond the figures he proposed.  Ambassador Loftis responded
    by pointing out that the ROK proposal falls short of the USG
    "red line" of 752 billion won, and far short of our goal that
    the ROK pay 50 percent of USFK's non-personnel stationing
    costs.  Both sides reviewed the draft SMA agreement.  Each
    delegation suggested minor changes to the text which will now
    be reviewed by our respective legal experts.  During a
    one-to-one meeting on November 30, Ambassador Cho told
    Ambassador Loftis that 725.5 billion won offer was predicated
    on the ROKG's assumption that, if accepted by the U.S., there
    would be no/no significant or visible adjustments to U.S.
    force posture.  Ambassador Loftis responded that there could
    be no such guarantees.  Ambassadors Loftis and Cho agreed to
    report the current status of the negotiations to their
    superiors and defense colleagues, and to meet again (via DVC)
    on December 5 at 6 p.m. (Washington time) to provide the
    response of their respective governments.  END SUMMARY

    NOVEMBER 29 SMALL GROUP MEETING
    -------------------------------

    ¶2.  (C) The Sixth Round of Special Measures Agreement (SMA)
    burden-sharing negotiations began with a small group meeting
    on November 29, 2006 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
    Trade (MOFAT).  During that opening session, both sides
    stated their negotiating positions.  Ambassador Cho Tae-yong,
    the South Korean delegation head, summarized the ROKG
    proposal as follows:

    -- The ROK believes a short-term (no more than 2 year)
    transitional agreement with no increase is warranted because
    this is a transitional period in the U.S.-ROK Alliance, owing
    to U.S. military transformation and the drawdown of USFK
    troops on the Korean Peninsula.

    -- Having learned of the negative impact on USFK caused by
    the shortfall resulting from the previous SMA agreement,
    however, the ROK has decided to increase its proposal by
    approximately 45 billion won.

    -- That additional amount is designed to make up for the
    shortfall in Korean labor costs that occurred as a result of
    the previous agreement.

    -- The ROK proposal would "maintain present funding" levels
    in the other three SMA categories.

    -- The overall ROK proposal now totals 725.5 billion won in
    ¶2007.

    -- For 2008, they offer that amount plus an increase tied to
    the Korean Consumer Price Index (CPI).  (NOTE:  The 2006 CPI
    would be used when it becomes available in January 2007.  The
    2005 CPI was approximately 3 percent.  END NOTE).

    ¶3.  (C) Ambassador Cho characterized the ROK proposal as his
    "final offer," stressing that it had been approved only after
    weathering considerable dissent in the ROK inter-agency
    principals committee (PC).  He explained that he sold the
    additional 45 billion won amount to the PC, and would be able
    to sell it to the ROK National Assembly as well, because it
    directly affects Korean laborers.  He cautioned, however,
    that it would be extremely difficult for him to secure the
    approval of the executive and legislative branches of his
    government for anything beyond the 725.5 billion won figure
    he proposed.

    ¶4.  (C) Cho warned that time was running out to get the
    agreement through the National Assembly by the end of the
    year.  He said the ROK therefore sought to conclude the
    negotiation within the next week to allow sufficient time for
    gaining legislative branch approval.  To hasten the process,
    Cho said he had decided to drop the ROK request for
    consideration of its in-kind contributions.  He claimed that
    with time running out his latest proposal was, in fact, the
    ROK bottom line, and not merely a negotiating tactic.  "I
    have no other offers up my sleeve," Cho insisted.

    ¶5.  (C) Ambassador Loftis thanked the ROKG for its
    willingness to raise its proposal from its previous offer of
    680 billion won to 725.5, but pointed out that the new
    proposal still falls short of the USG "red line" of 752
    billion won, and far short of reaching 50 percent of USFK's
    non-personnel stationing costs.

    ¶6.  (C) Ambassador Loftis also informed Cho that he had
    already run the new ROK proposal (which Cho had previewed to
    him on November 23) by his superiors in the Department, and
    his colleagues at DOD, but that he was not authorized to
    finalize anything less than USFK's red line.  He warned Cho
    that USFK would have to compensate for any SMA shortfall,
    including the possibility of moving part of our force
    structure off the peninsula.  Although no decisions have been
    made, the ROKG should be aware that such moves could/could
    include combat units.  He stated that the current ROK
    proposal does not meet the U.S. goal of achieving an
    equitable arrangement, and asked Cho to take the ROK proposal
    and USG response back to his government for further
    consideration.

    NOVEMBER 29 PLENARY MEETING
    ---------------------------

    ¶7.  (C) During the follow-on plenary session later in the
    day, Ambassadors Loftis and Cho summarized their
    aforementioned negotiating positions in front of the members
    of both delegations.  Ambassador Cho stated that although the
    task was not an easy one, an agreement could be reached if
    approached with "a common attitude."  Ambassador Loftis
    responded that he too hoped the two delegations would reach a
    conclusion soon, but added that in getting to that point the
    importance of the U.S.-ROK alliance and the U.S. ability to
    defend the ROK ought to be remembered as well.

    ¶8.  (C) Expressing regret for the lack of U.S. enthusiasm for
    his proposal, Ambassador Cho stated that while the difference
    between the ROK proposal and USFK red line (a gap of
    approximately 27 billion won) "may not be small, it was also
    not very big."  He said he was therefore "not convinced" that
    cuts being considered by USFK to address an SMA shortfall
    would be visible or substantial.  Ambassador Loftis and USFK
    Assistant Chief of Staff Major General Duane Theissen
    reminded the ROK side that the actual difference was 106
    billion won, far greater than 27 billion won mentioned by the
    ROK.  Every dollar or won not contributed to USFK by the ROK
    would compel the Command to cut equivalent costs somewhere
    else, they explained, pointing out that the repercussions of
    a ROK shortfall could go beyond the sum of 27 billion won.
    Loftis stated it was not clear what the Command would cut
    because no decisions had been made, but that the ROK should
    understand that the Commander could not, under any
    circumstances, allow the stationing of hollow forces on the
    Peninsula.

    ¶9.  (C) Ambassador Cho responded by once again reiterating
    the domestic political difficulties he would face in
    attempting to gain approval from the National Assembly for a
    better offer.

    REVIEW OF THE SMA DOCUMENT
    --------------------------

    ¶10. (C) During the plenary meeting, the two delegations
    reviewed the text of the draft SMA agreement.  Each side
    suggested minor changes to the language and agreed that
    although the revisions appeared to be non-substantial, the
    new text would have to be reviewed by their respective legal
    experts.

    SONG MIN-SOON SEEKS A BETTER PROCESS
    ------------------------------------

    ¶11.  (C) In both the small group and plenary sessions,
    Ambassador Cho stated that the ROKG preferred no more than a
    two-year SMA agreement.  Cho explained that Foreign
    Minister-designate Song Min-soon "felt very strongly" that a
    new process needed to be developed in order to spare the
    Alliance from the "always painful" SMA negotiations.  Song
    wants the U.S. and South Korean governments to begin
    discussing how to reform the process in January 2007, reach
    agreement on new procedures by the end of that year, and
    utilize those new procedures, starting in 2008, to negotiate
    the next SMA.

    ¶12.  (C) Ambassador Loftis responded by noting that if the
    ROK regards the next SMA as a transitional document, it would
    be more logical to reach three-year agreement, because U.S.
    military transformation on Peninsula (and the construction
    needed to carry it out) will not be completed in less than
    three years.  He also pointed out that because Song Min-soon
    would be in office for, at most, the remaining 15 months of
    the current Roh Administration, he will have left ROK
    government service before the next SMA negotiation, even if
    only a two year agreement is reached this time around.

    1-ON-1 DISCUSSIONS
    ------------------

    ¶13.  (C) Ambassador Cho and Loftis met for a heads of
    delegation session over breakfast on November 29.  Ambassador
    Cho reiterated that he was unable to go beyond his "final
    offer" of 725.5 billion won.  Moreover, the ROKG assumes that
    if the U.S. accepts the ROKG offer, there would be no need to
    make any visible or substantive cuts to the U.S. force
    structure.  In particular, they would not want to see any
    further reductions to U.S. combat forces beyond those already
    agreed.  Ambassador Loftis responded that the ROKG should not
    operate on this assumption.  At 725.5 billion won of SMA,
    there would be a shortage of funds that would have to be
    addressed.  While stressing that no decisions had been made,
    the U.S. was looking at all of its options, and those options
    included the possibility of taking some combat forces or
    capabilities out of Korea.  The ROKG should not be surprised
    by this statement, as it had been made in several SPI
    sessions, during the SCM/MCM and during Congressional
    testimony by senior DOD officials.   Ambassador Cho said that
    some in his government would ask why the ROKG should offer
    any increase, seeing that the U.S. could be pulling assets
    off the peninsula.  Why not simply offer a rollover?
    Ambassador Loftis noted that pulling back the Korean offer
    would be very poorly received in Washington, and would
    certainly result in the U.S. having to make even greater
    adjustments.  He concluded that the USG was not trying to
    embarrass the ROKG, but we simply have to face fiscal
    realities.

    PREPARING FOR THE END GAME
    --------------------------

    ¶14.  (C) Ambassadors Loftis and Cho agreed to report the
    outcome of the 6th round of SMA negotiations to their
    superiors and defense colleagues.  They agreed to meet again
    (via DVC) on December 5 at 6 p.m. (Washington time) to
    provide the responses of their respective governments.

    ¶15.  (C) COMMENT:  We do not anticipate that the ROKG will
    come in with a higher figure, as Cho indicated that some
    senior ROKG officials had "hardened" their stance against an
    increase in response to the potential movement of assets.
    Ambassador Loftis recommends that we use the December 5 video
    conference to accept the ROKG offer as presented by Cho and
    finalize the SMA.  This will give Cho barely enough time to
    complete his domestic requirements and send the SMA to the
    National Assembly before the end of the year.  In accepting
    the ROKG offer, however, we would not/not accept the ROKG,s
    assumption that there be no changes to the U.S. force
    structure.  END COMMENT.

    PARTICIPANTS:
    ------------

    ¶16. (SBU) U.S. Delegation:

    Ambassador Robert Loftis, Senior Advisor, Bureau of
    Political-Military Affairs (PM)
    Major General Duane Thiessen, Assistant Chief of Staff J5,
    USFK
    Commander Thomas Herold, Judge Advocate General's Corps
    Mr. David Wolff, Political Military Chief, U.S. Embassy
    Seoul, DOS (Small group notetaker)
    Colonel Christopher Dinenna, Chief of J5 Strategy and Policy
    Division, USFK
    Mr. Andrew Hyde, ROK Unit Director, EAP/K, East Asian and
    Pacific Affairs Bureau, DOS
    LTC Mike Finnegan, Office of the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for International Security Affairs, DOD
    Lieutenant Colonel Phillip Janzen, Military Advisor, PM, DOS
    Lieutenant Colonel William Conwell, Chief of J5 Policy
    Analysis Branch, USFK
    Dr. Warren Switzer, International Relations Officer, J5
    Policy Analysis Branch, USFK
    Mr. Mark Shoemaker, International Relations Officer, US SOFA
    Secretariat, USFK

    SIPDIS
    Ms. Shawn Duncan, Pol-Mil Officer, U.S. Embassy Seoul, DOS
    (Plenary notetaker)

    ROK Delegation:

    Ambassador Cho Tae-yong, Director General, North American
    Affairs Bureau, MOFAT
    Mr. Lee Jeong-kyu, Director, North America Division (NAD)
    III, MOFAT
    Mr. Chun Young-hee, First Secretary, NAD III, MOFAT
    Mr. Nam Dae-hyun, Advisor, NAD III, MOFAT
    Mr. Kim Jung-han, First Secretary, Bilateral Treaties
    Division, MOFAT
    Ms. Kim Sin-sook, Deputy Director, U.S. Policy Division, MND
    Colonel Lee Jong-sik, Assist. Secretary to the President for
    National Security Policy

    Small Group Participants:

    Ambassador Robert Loftis, Senior Advisor, Bureau of
    Political-Military Affairs, DOS
    Ambassador Cho Tae-yong, Director General North American
    Affairs Bureau, MOFAT
    Major General Duane Thiessen, Assistant Chief of Staff J5,
    USFK
    Mr. David Jonathan Wolff, Political-Military Affairs Chief,
    Embassy Seoul
    Mr. Lee Jeong-kyu, Director, North America Division III, MOFAT
    LTC Mike Finnegan, Office of the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for International Security Affairs, DOD
    Mr. Chun Young-hee, First Secretary, NAD III, MOFAT
    Ms. Kim Sin-sook, Deputy Director, U.S. Policy Division, MND

    ¶16. (U) Ambassador Loftis has cleared this cable.
    VERSHBOW

`