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### Viewing cable 06HELSINKI63, FINLAND'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: SUDDENLY, IT'S A

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06HELSINKI63 | 2006-01-25 13:31 | 2011-04-24 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Helsinki

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HELSINKI 000063

    SIPDIS

    SENSITIVE

    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: PGOV PREL FI
    SUBJECT: FINLAND'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: SUDDENLY, IT'S A
    RACE

    REF: A. HELSINKI 16

         ¶B. 05 HELSINKI 1296

    ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Incumbent Tarja Halonen made an
    impressive showing in the first round of Finland's
    presidential election, besting her nearest rival,
    Conservative Sauli Niinisto, by more than 21
    percentage points.  However, Halonen was unable to
    secure a first round victory and, for the first time
    in the campaign, she and the SDP may have reason to be
    concerned.  The two-candidate race has quickly
    tightened into a far closer contest than any pundit or
    pre-election poll had predicted, as PM/Center Party
    Candidate Matti Vanhanen - - who finished a
    disappointing third with only 18 percent of the first
    round vote - - announced he would support Niinisto.
    This effort to rally "non-socialist support" may be
    bearing fruit, as current surveys give Halonen 53
    percent and Niinisto 47, and has caused consternation
    among the SDP and its allies on the left.  However a
    fifth of voters remain undecided.  Even though the
    winner will not be determined until Jan. 29, pundits
    have listed Vanhanen among the bigger "losers"
    following the first round.  Meanwhile, Niinisto and
    the Conservatives have already been dubbed "winners,"
    simply by dint of forcing a second round.  And should
    Niinisto pull off an upset -- which we, like most
    Finnish analysts, still view as unlikely -- the once-
    heavily favored Halonen and her SDP will clearly be
    viewed as the biggest losers.  End Summary.

    Suddenly, It's a Race
    ---------------------
    ¶2. (SBU) The wind chill in Helsinki dipped below -40
    degrees in the week following the first round of
    Finland's presidential election but, for the first
    time during this winter campaign, incumbent Tarja
    Halonen of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) may have
    broken a sweat.  Her showing on Jan. 15 was
    impressive, to be sure:  Halonen netted 46 percent of
    the vote, easily outdistancing her nearest rival,
    Conservative Party (CONS) candidate Sauli Niinisto,
    who took 24 percent.  Center Party (CEN) candidate and
    current Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen won 18 percent,
    followed by the Green Party's Heidi Hautala (3.4%);
    the True Finn Party's Timo Soini (3.3%); and three
    others who won less than 1.5% each.  Halonen's
    supporters within the SDP note that a 46 percent
    first-round showing is among the highest in Finnish
    history, and that even a six point lead going into
    round two is quite high.  One SDP strategist told us
    that women and voters on the left still overwhelmingly
    favor Halonen, and he suggested that both the
    narrowing of her lead and the very fact of a second
    round will energize her base -- some of whom may have
    stayed at home during round one -- to get out and
    vote.  Others have suggested that the SDP
    "enthusiasts" (see reftel) who eagerly pushed for a
    first round win were never realistic, and that the
    machinery remains in place to ensure success in the
    second round.

    ¶3. (SBU) Still, the enthusiasts and even Halonen
    herself found it difficult to hide their
    disappointment at being forced to face a run-off
    against Niinisto.  Overall turnout was only 73
    percent, the lowest since Finns began electing their
    president directly.  To compound Halonen's
    disappointment, Finland-Gallup quickly offered further
    reasons for apprehension.  Its first poll following
    the first round, released on January 17, showed 53
    percent voting for Halonen in the second round and 47
    percent for Niinisto.  Before the first round, polls
    asking voters whom they would support in a
    hypothetical runoff between Niinisto and Halonen had
    indicated that the President would win better than 60
    percent of the vote in an one-on-one contest.
    However, the recent narrowing appears to reflect that
    Niinisto's significant surge in momentum before the
    election has continued.

    ¶4. (SBU) According to one SDP analyst, the turnout
    factor not only spelled the difference in preventing
    Halonen's first round win, but also may have reflected
    a bit of a failure in terms of the party's own efforts
    to get out the vote.  It also contributed to a
    surprising surge by Niinisto in the final days, he
    noted.  Meanwhile, Halonen supporters from non-SDP
    parties were less circumspect.  The party chair of the
    Left Alliance -- which supported Halonen from the
    beginning and ran no candidate of its own -- placed
    blame for the run-off squarely on the SDP, asserting
    that it had run a lethargic campaign and failed to
    attract the "cross-over" voters needed for a first
    round victory.  On the other hand, she said, her
    party's voters had done their share to support
    Halonen.

    ¶5. (SBU) Despite the concern and disappointment,
    nearly all our SDP contacts still predicted that
    Halonen would withstand the challenge and win.
    Indeed, most hold that, barring a major gaffe by
    Halonen, the President should win handily.  However,
    an increasing number also fear that Halonen's failure
    to win a knock-out in the first round offers two
    dangers.  Aside from leaving the door open to an
    albeit unlikely Niinisto upset, it also offers the
    "bourgeois" parties (CEN and CONS) two weeks to test
    their ability to cooperate -- something that could
    result in stronger "anti-socialist" campaigns down the
    road.  Several of our contacts on the left have made
    no attempt to hide their concern about the March 2007
    parliamentary elections, in which many say the
    emboldened bourgeois parties may be able to portray
    the left as vulnerable.

    Vanhanen Breaks with Halonen
    ----------------------------
    ¶6. (SBU) A significant reason for Niinisto's surge --
    and for Halonen's concern -- was the prompt
    announcement by CEN candidate Matti Vanhanen that he
    would support Niinisto.  The speed and verve of
    Vanhanen's move -- a huge boon for Niinisto -- came as
    a surprise to many.  First, as Prime Minister,
    Vanhanen has made his close cooperation and excellent
    personal relationship with Halonen a point of pride,
    even though many suggested it hurt him during the
    presidential campaign.  Second, the two "bourgeois"
    parties (CEN and CONS) historically have had a
    difficult time cooperating during elections, prompting
    one of Vanhanen's own advisors to express surprise at
    the PM's early and forceful endorsement of Niinisto.
    She and others have suggested that Niinisto -- despite
    winning Vanhanen's vote -- will still have to court
    skeptical CEN voters actively if he hopes to defeat
    Halonen, but that process may already be bearing
    fruit:  the same Jan. 18 Finland Gallup poll showed 80
    percent of self-identified Vanhanen voters lining up
    behind Niinisto.

    ¶7. (SBU) That said, Vanhanen clearly brings far fewer
    voters with him than he would have hoped.  In fact,
    many pundits are portraying Vanhanen as the big loser
    so far.  The day after the election two of Vanhanen's
    key advisors told poloff that the results were very
    disappointing, although not a surprise.  The PM's
    internal polling had indicated for at least two weeks
    that a more distant than hoped for third-place showing
    was likely.  Vanhanen did what he had to do during the
    election and conducted his campaign with a courtesy
    and respect for Halonen that most Finns admired.  He
    may have lost votes to Niinisto because of this, they
    said, but he also showed that he could shelve his ego
    for the good of the country and his party.  The
    advisors opined that the electorate would remember
    Vanhanen's respectful campaign and his good
    cooperation with Halonen and reward him and the Center
    Party during next year's general election.  However,
    many others have suggested that Vanhanen and CEN both
    now face a rough road, and that even the PM's position
    as party chairman could be weakened unless he
    orchestrates a reconsolidation, cabinet reshuffle, or
    some other internal shake-up.

    Niinisto: Already a Winner, Even if he Loses
    --------------------------------------------
    ¶8. (SBU) While some are calling Vanhanen an early
    loser, many have already called Niinisto a de facto
    winner regardless of whether or not he upsets Halonen
    in Round Two.  The fact that he not only made it to
    the second round but also quickly narrowed the gap
    between himself and the incumbent attest to both his
    party's strong campaign and his own personal charisma.
    Niinisto's campaign attracted praise from other
    parties from the beginning, and the CONS youth
    organization, in particular, devised innovative ways
    to reach out to young, left-leaning Finns.  Indeed,
    his advisors sought to run a high-tech campaign
    replete with messages considered controversial or even
    aggressive by Finnish standards -- but which always
    attracted significant attention.  One poll noted that
    Niinisto's campaign attracted a more "negative
    response" from voters than any other, to which one of
    his strategists responded, "Negative response is still
    response."

    ¶9. (SBU)  Comment: Niinisto's impressive efforts
    notwithstanding, any analysis of the first round
    should put one thing in perspective first:  Tarja
    Halonen won by an impressive margin and received more
    votes than Niinisto and Vanhanen combined.  She won
    the majority of votes in several provinces that
    traditionally are Center Party bastions, and barring
    the unexpected, should win the second-round.  That
    said, her numbers--  just over 46% of the total-- were
    in the low end of what even the SDP's more frugal
    strategists expected.  Meanwhile, Vanhanen's quick
    endorsement of Niinisto may be the most intriguing
    element of the entire campaign and may prove to have
    the most long-term impact.  Should Halonen win, the
    PM's close and effective working relationship with her
    -- which has paid dividends for his Government and for
    the Center Party's reputation -- will most certainly
    be strained.  However, it may indeed foreshadow the
    emergence down the road of enhanced "bourgeois"
    cooperation -- something that CONS and CEN have always
    dreamed of but never achieved.  Their history of non-
    cooperation is long and difficult, even though many in
    the business-friendly wing of Vanhanen's Center Party
    would prefer the Conservatives as a junior coalition
    partner over the SDP.  In any case, we still view a
    Niinisto win as unlikely, despite CEN's support.
    However, should he pull off the upset, both the SDP
    and Halonen would clearly become the election's
    biggest losers, both in round two and perhaps further
    down the road as well.
    HYATT

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