Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 19397 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden 00. Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Jordan Yemen Thailand

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05 2011/06 2011/07
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04 2011/05/05 2011/05/06 2011/05/07 2011/05/08 2011/05/09 2011/05/10 2011/05/11 2011/05/12 2011/05/13 2011/05/14 2011/05/15 2011/05/16 2011/05/17 2011/05/18 2011/05/19 2011/05/20 2011/05/21 2011/05/22 2011/05/23 2011/05/24 2011/05/25 2011/05/26 2011/05/27 2011/05/28 2011/05/29 2011/05/30 2011/05/31
2011/06/01 2011/06/02 2011/06/03 2011/06/04 2011/06/05 2011/06/06 2011/06/07 2011/06/08 2011/06/09 2011/06/10 2011/06/11 2011/06/12 2011/06/13 2011/06/14 2011/06/15 2011/06/16 2011/06/17 2011/06/18 2011/06/19 2011/06/20 2011/06/21 2011/06/22 2011/06/23 2011/06/24 2011/06/25 2011/06/26 2011/06/27 2011/06/28 2011/06/29 2011/06/30
2011/07/01 2011/07/02 2011/07/04 2011/07/05 2011/07/06 2011/07/07 2011/07/08 2011/07/10 2011/07/11 2011/07/12 2011/07/13 2011/07/15

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/05 1985/06
1986/05 1986/08 1986/12
1987/06
1988/01 1988/03 1988/04 1988/07 1988/08 1988/12
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05 1991/07 1991/11
1992/01 1992/03 1992/06 1992/09 1992/12
1993/01 1993/02 1993/10
1994/11 1994/12
1995/01 1995/04 1995/06 1995/11
1996/07 1996/09 1996/11
1997/02 1997/03 1997/05 1997/06 1997/08 1997/10 1997/12
1998/05 1998/12
1999/01 1999/09
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/04 2001/05 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11 2001/12
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/06 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11 2002/12
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Belfast Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chiang Mai Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Freetown Consulate Fukuoka
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guangzhou Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hong Kong Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy Libreville Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Mission Geneva Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne Consulate Matamoros
Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Nuevo Laredo Consulate Naples Consulate Naha Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sapporo Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE UN Rome Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vientiane Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ASEC AEMR AMGT AR APECO AU AORC AJ AF AFIN AS AM ABLD AFFAIRS AMB APER AA AG AE ADM ATRN ALOW ACOA AID ARF AND ABUD AL AMED AY ASPA ADPM ADANA AFSI APEC ARABL ADCO ANARCHISTS AZ ANET AMEDCASCKFLO AADP AO AGRICULTURE AGAO AROC ASEAN AORG APRC AFSN AFSA ACABQ AINF AINR AODE APCS ARCH ADB AX AMEX ASUP ARM AQ ATFN AMBASSADOR ARAS ACBAQ AC AOPR AREP ASIG ASEX AER AVERY ASCH AFU AMG ATPDEA ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AORL AN AIT AGMT ACS AGR AMCHAMS AECL AUC AFGHANISTAN ACAO
BR BB BG BEXP BY BA BRUSSELS BU BD BK BL BM BE BO BTIO BH BAIO BRPA BUSH BILAT BMGT BX BC BIDEN BOL BP BF BBG BBSR BT BWC BEXPC BN BTIU
CPAS CA CASC CS CBW CIDA CO CODEL CI CROS CU CH CWC CMGT CVIS CDG CG CF CHIEF CJAN CBSA CE CY CB CW CM CDC CONS CN CHR CD CT CR COUNTRY CONDOLEEZZA CZ COM CICTE CYPRUS CARICOM CBE CACS COE CTR CIVS CAPC CFED CARSON COUNTER COPUOS CV CITES CKGR CVR CLINTON COUNTERTERRORISM CITEL CLEARANCE CSW CIC CITT CARIB CAFTA CACM CDB CJUS CTM CAN CAJC CONSULAR CLMT CBC CIA CNARC CIS CEUDA CHINA CAC CL
DR DJ DB DHS DAO DCM DO DEFENSE DA DE DOMESTIC DISENGAGEMENT DK DOD DOT DPRK DEPT DEA DOE DTRA DS DEAX
ECON ETTC EFIS ETRD EC EMIN EAGR EAID EU EFIN EUN ECIN EG EWWT EINV ENRG ELAB EPET EN EAIR EUMEM ECPS ELTN EIND EZ EI ER ET EINT ECONOMIC ENIV EFTA ES ECONOMY ENV EAG ENGR EET ELECTIONS ETRO EPEC ECIP EXIM ENERG ESTH EREL EK EDEV ERNG EPA ETRAD ELTNSNAR ETRC EUREM EEB EETC ENVI EXTERNAL ELN ECOSOC EAIDS ENGY ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EDU EPREL EINVEFIN ECA EIDN EFINECONCS EINVKSCA ETC ENVR EAP EINN EXBS ECONOMICS EIAR EINDETRD ECONEFIN EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EFIM EINVETC ECONCS EDRC ENRD EBRD ETRA ESA EAIG EUR EUC ERD ETRN EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ESENV ENNP ECINECONCS ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN
FI FR FOREIGN FTAA FARC FREEDOM FAS FAO FBI FINANCE FCS FAA FJ FTA FK FT FAC FINR FDA FM FOR FOI FO FMLN FISO
GM GERARD GT GA GG GR GTIP GE GY GH GLOBAL GB GEORGE GCC GV GC GAZA GL GOV GOI GF GANGS GTMO GAERC GZ GUILLERMO GASPAR
HR HA HYMPSK HO HK HUMAN HN HUD HU HURI HILLARY HI HUM HSTC HEBRON HUMOR
IZ IN IAEA IS IMO ILO IR IC IT ITU IV IMF IBRD IWC IPR IRAQI IDB ISRAELI ITALY IADB ITPGOV ITALIAN ID ICAO ICRC INR IFAD ICJ IO IRAQ INL INMARSAT INRA INTERNAL INTELSAT ITRA INDO IRS IIP ILC ICTY IQ IEFIN ISCON IAHRC IA INTERPOL IEA INRB ISRAEL IZPREL IRAJ IF ITPHUM IL IACI IDA ISLAMISTS IGAD ITF INRO IBET IDP ICTR IRC
JA JO JM JP JOHN JUS JOSEPH JAMES JOHNNIE JML JIMENEZ
KOMC KNNP KFLO KDEM KSUM KIPR KFLU KPAO KE KCRM KJUS KAWC KZ KSCA KDRG KCOR KGHG KPAL KTIP KMCA KCRS KPKO KOLY KRVC KVPR KG KWBG KMDR KTER KSPR KV KTFN KWMN KFRD KSTH KS KN KISL KGIC KSEP KFIN KTEX KTIA KUNR KCMR KMOC KCIP KTDB KBIO KU KSAF KHIV KGIT KSTC KIRF KIRC KIVP KMPI KIDE KNUP KSEO KSCS KNUC KGLB KICC KBCT KTDD KPWR KCFE KO KNNNP KRFD KHLS KR KCOM KESS KWN KCSY KREC KICCPUR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KOCI KREL KMCC KAID KPRP KVIR KPRV KPAOPREL KAUST KIRP KLAB KCRIM KCRCM KPAONZ KNAR KHDP KHSA KICA KGHA KTRD KTAO KPAOY KFSC KINR KJUST KWAC KNPP KSCI KAWK KMRS KENV KNNPMNUC KNDP KHUM KTBT KBTS KACT KPIR KERG KTLA KMFO KVRP KX KPOA KRCM KCFC KNEI KCHG KPLS KFTFN KTFM KLIG KDEMAF KRAD KBTR KGCC KSEC KPIN KDEV KWWMN KOM KWNM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KRGY KIFR KSAC KWMNCS KPAK KOMS KFPC KRIM KDDG KCGC KPAI KID KMIG KNSD KWMM
LY LE LABOR LO LH LAB LI LTTE LU LA LVPR LG LT LOG
MARR MX MASS MOPS MNUC MCAP MTCRE MRCRE MTRE MASC MY MK MO MCC MCA MAS MZ MIL MU ML MTCR MEPP MG MI MINUSTAH MAR MA MP MD MAPP MR MOPPS MTS MLS MILI MEPN MEPI MEETINGS MERCOSUR MW MT MIK MN MAPS MV MILITARY MARAD MDC MACEDONIA MASSMNUC MUCN MEDIA MQADHAFI MPOS MPS MC
NZ NI NATO NO NU NG NL NPT NS NSF NA NP NATIONAL NASA NC NDP NIH NIPP NSSP NK NE NAS NEGROPONTE NATOIRAQ NR NGO NAR NZUS NARC NH NSG NAFTA NEW NRR NT NOVO NATOPREL NEA NSC NV NPA NSFO NW NORAD NPG NOAA
OTRA OECD OVIP OREP OPRC ODC OIIP OPDC OAS OSCE OPIC OMS OM OEXC OPCW OSCI OIE OPAD ODIP OFDP OEXP OFFICIALS OPEC OVIPPRELUNGANU ODPC OSHA OHUM OSIC OTR OMIG OSAC OBSP OFDA OVP ON OCII OES OCS OIC
PGOV PREL PARM PINR PHUM PM PREF PTER PK PINS PBIO PHSA PE PBTS PL POL PAK POV POLITICS POLICY PA PNAT PCI PPA PAS PALESTINIAN PERL PO PH PRELBR PERM PETR PROP PJUS PREZ PAO POLITICAL PRELPK PAIGH PROG PU PG PGOVSOCI PGOF PDOV PMIL PINO PTE PGOR PBTSRU PY PSI PTERE PRAM PARMS PREO PRGOV PORG PP PS PKFK PSOE PEPR PDEM PINT PMAR PRELP PREFA PNG PTBS PFOR PUNE PGOVLO PHUMBA POLINT PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PLN PHUH PEDRO PF PHUS PETER PARTIES PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PHUMPREL POGOV PEL PINL PBT PINF PRL PSEPC POSTS PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOC PNR PROV
QA
RS RP RU RW RFE RCMP RIGHTSPOLMIL RO ROBERT RM RICE REGION ROOD RELAM RSP RF RELATIONS RIGHTS RUPREL REMON RPEL REACTION REPORT RSO
SZ SENV SOCI SNAR SY SO SP SU SI SMIG SYR SA SCUL SW SR SYRIA SNARM SPECIALIST SN SF SG SENS SENVQGR SEN SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR SC SNA SK SL SMIL SCRM SENVSXE SAARC SNARIZ STEINBERG SWE SARS SCRS SAN ST SIPDIS SSA SPCVIS SOFA SENVKGHG SANC SHI SEVN SHUM SH SNARCS SPCE SNARN SIPRS
TRGY TBIO TSPA TU TPHY TI TX TH TIP TSPL TNGD TS TW TRSY TP TZ TN TINT TC TR TIO TF TK TRAD TT TD TWI TERRORISM TL TV TO TURKEY TSPAM TREL TRT TFIN TAGS THPY TBID
UK UNSC UNGA UN US UZ USEU UG UP UNAUS UNMIK USTR UY UNRCR UNESCO UNHRC UR UNICEF USPS UNSCR UNFICYP UNCSD UNEP USAID USOAS UNDP UV UNTAC USDA UNMIC USUN UNCHR UNCTAD USGS UNHCR USNC UA UE UNVIE UAE UNO UNODC UNCHS UNDESCO UNC UNPUOS UNDC UNCHC UNFCYP UNIDROIT UNCND
VE VM VT VZ VEPREL VN VTEG VTIZ VTPREL VISIT VENZ VAT VC VI
WHTI WIPO WTRO WTO WHO WFP WS WA WZ WI WBG WMD WWARD WHA WITH WTRQ WEU WMO WB
XA XW XX XK XL XM XS XR XF XG XT XY XC XH XD XE XV XB XU XZ XQ XI XTAG
YI YM YE YL YMCS
ZU ZI ZOELLICK ZP ZR ZO ZK ZF ZL ZB ZN ZH ZT ZJ ZEALAND ZA ZANU

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 07SANTIAGO983, A SOUTHERN CONE PERSPECTIVE ON COUNTERING CHAVEZ

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07SANTIAGO983.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07SANTIAGO983 | 2007-06-18 14:45 | 2011-07-11 00:00 | SECRET | Embassy Santiago

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHSG #0983/01 1691445
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 181445Z JUN 07
    FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1664
    INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 2994
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 3691
    RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 0361
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1429
    RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JUN 5253
    RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 3682
    RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SANTIAGO 000983

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2017
    TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KCRM AR BO BR PARM UY VE CI
    SUBJECT: A SOUTHERN CONE PERSPECTIVE ON COUNTERING CHAVEZ
    AND REASSERTING U.S. LEADERSHIP

    REF: ASUNCION 396

    Classified By: AMBASSADOR CRAIG KELLY; Reasons 1.4(b), (d)

    -------
    Summary
    -------

    ¶1. (C) Hugo Chavez,s effort to expand his influence into the
    Southern Cone was the subject of ref A.  This, part two in a
    series of joint cables from Southern Cone embassies, looks at
    ways the U.S. can counter Chavez and reassert U.S. leadership
    in the region.  From posts' perspectives, there are six main
    areas of action for the USG as it seeks to limit Chavez's
    influence:

    --Know the enemy:  We have to better understand how Chavez
    thinks and what he intends;
    --Directly engage:  We must reassert our presence in the
    region, and engage broadly, especially with the "non-elites";
    --Change the political landscape: We should offer a vision of
    hope and back it up with adequately-funded programs;
    --Enhance military relationships: We should continue to
    strengthen ties to those military leaders in the region who
    share our concern over Chavez;
    --Play to our strength:  We must emphasize that democracy,
    and a free trade approach that includes corporate social
    responsibility, provides lasting solutions;
    --Get the message out: Public diplomacy is key; this is a
    battle of ideas and visions.  Septel provides detailed
    suggestions.

    ¶2. (C) We should neither underestimate Chavez nor lose sight
    of his vulnerabilities.  Many of the region's leaders and
    opnion makers appreciate the importance of relations with the
    U.S. and generally want to see us more deeply engaged.  They
    reject the notion that Chavez best represents the region's
    interests.  We must convince not only government leaders but
    civil society - the person on the street - that we are
    committed to a progressive and democractic vision for the
    Americas and to helping our neighbors meet their challenges.
    If we can, we will make quick inroads into marginalizing
    Chavez' influence, bolster democracy and reassert our own
    leadership in the region.  End Summary.

    --------------
    Know Thy Enemy
    --------------

    ¶3.  (S/NF) Notwithstanding his tirades and antics, it would
    be a mistake to dismiss Hugo Chavez as just a clown or old
    school caudillo.  He has a vision, however distorted, and he
    is taking calculated measures to advance it.  To effectively
    counter the threat he represents, we need to know better his
    objectives and how he intends to pursue them.  This requires
    better intelligence in all of our countries.  Embassy
    Asuncion,s getting hold of Chavez's MSP equivalent, for
    example, and then sharing it with policy makers and
    implementers in Washington and the region helps inform and
    coordinate our response.

    ¶4. (S/NF) When we have concrete intelligence on an issue
    about which our friends in the region share our concern --
    e.g., Venezuela's relationship with Iran -- we should share
    it to the extent we can.  And when Chavez's programs feed
    local elite appetites for corruption or otherwise fail to
    deliver on their promises, we need to make it known.

    ---------------
    Directly Engage
    ---------------

    ¶5. (SBU) We must challenge the mistaken notion that the U.S.
    is absent and aloof from the region.  President Bush's visit
    to five countries in the region in March, and his follow-on
    meeting with President Lula at Camp David, made a hugely
    positive impression.  A/S Shannon's April visit to Chile and
    Paraguay was similarly applauded by local leaders and the
    press.  We need to build on this good will with a regular
    stream of senior-level visits, including by Cabinet members,
    speaking to our positive agenda for the region and producing
    concrete programs and agreements that respond to its

    problems.

    ¶6.  (SBU) To obtain the greatest return on these visits, we
    encourage Washington to explore multiple-country itineraries.
     When we make these visits, it is important we be seen not
    just with government officials and elites, but also with
    those who have been marginalized or are on the fringes of
    society.  We need visits not only to those countries where
    leaders praise us, but even more
    importantly where governments have distanced themselves from
    us.  In these places, showing the flag and explaining
    directly to populations our view of democracy and progress
    can change views about the U.S. that may have become
    distorted or out of date.

    ------------------------------
    Change the Political Landscape
    ------------------------------

    ¶7. (C) Chavez' agenda is about expanding his influence and
    power, using the "Bolivarian Revolution" as his vehicle.
    This rubs a lot of the region's governmental and
    non-governmental leaders and opinion makers the wrong way --
    particularly those who don't want to be associated with his
    methods or regard Chavez as a growing threat to their own
    leadership.  We have to play to that resentment by
    strengthening our ties with these leaders, praising their
    governance, and fostering broad public respect for the
    progressive models they are seeking to build within their
    societies.  Fortunately, local "case studies" of countries
    that are leftist-led but are democratic and fiscally
    responsible offer glistening counterpoints to Chavez's
    retrograde project.

    -- Because of its sheer size and economic weight, Brazil has
    outsized influence over the rest of the continent.  In this
    regard, it can be a powerful counterpoint to Chavez's
    project.  We should help present Brazil's course -- i.e.,
    pursuit of fiscal responsibility and strong democratic
    institutions, openness to the global the community, and
    mature engagement with both its neighbors and the U.S. --
    as a progressive and hopeful model for the region.

    -- Chile offers another excellent alternative to Chavez.  FM
    Foxley seeks to integrate Chile more fully into the global
    economy.  Chile has not only stated but demonstrated -- e.g.
    Bachelet's letter to House leader Nancy Pelosi expressing
    Chilean support for congressional ratification of FTAs with
    Peru, Colombia, and Panama -- its willingness to help bring
    along other Latin American countries into the global economy.
     We should look to find other ways to give Chile the lead on
    important initiatives, but without making them look like they
    are our puppets or surrogates.

    -- Argentina is more complex, but still presents distinct
    characteristics that should inform our approach to countering
    Chavez's influence there.  Argentina has a large middle class
    and a vibrant civil society open to our ideas and vision of a
    market-based democracy and wary of Chavez's "revolutions."
    Venezuela does not appear to have provided Argentina any
    significant subsidies or outright grants, but Chavez has been
    able to exploit Buenos Aires, lack of access to investment
    capital and international financing.  Domestic and foreign
    investors are not providing adequate long-term investment
    capital to quickly develop needed infrastructure.  And still
    unresolved post-crisis defaults on official Paris Club and
    private bondholder debt are restricting Argentina's access to
    the volume of new sovereign credits in global capital markets
    it would need to fund infrastructure development on its own.
    The obvious counter to the influence that Chavez' financial
    support has bought him in Argentina is to help the GoA regain
    direct access to international financial markets and to work
    with the GoA to develop the kind of investment climate that
    will attract the volume of domestic and foreign investment
    needed to build new foundational infrastructure at
    competitive costs.  This needs to be complemented by engaging
    actively with civil society and key non-economic actors in
    the government on areas of shared concern (anti-crime,
    anti-terror, peacekeeping, etc.).

    -- Our growing economic relationship with the pragmatic
    leftist government in Uruguay puts the lie to the claim that
    greater trade and investment with the U.S. is tantamount to

    betrayal of local populations.  This is critical because poor
    countries, like Uruguay, are vulnerable not so much to
    Chavez,s ideology but to his petrobolivars.  We need to draw
    attention to and build on these success stories borne out of
    engagement with the U.S., as alternatives to Chavez' vision
    of a region cut off from the U.S.  Even Paraguay's leftist
    priest-turned presidential candidate Fernando Lugo has stated
    he is closer to Bachelet or Lula than to Chavez.

    ¶8. (C) Of course, we also need to make sure that the truth
    about Chavez -- his hollow vision, his empty promises, his
    dangerous international relationships starting with Iran) --
    gets out, always exercising careful judgment about where and
    how we take on Chavez directly/publicly.   While it remains
    preferable that we take the high road focusing attention on
    our "vision of hope of hope and prosperity for the region,"
    there will continue to be times we need to speak out on the
    concerns his authoritarian bent raises.  However, we
    shouldn't be alone nor necessarily always in the lead.
    Rather the NGO
    community and local civil society groups, the region's
    leaders and international organizations, the UN and OAS in
    particular, must assume a greater role in addressing this
    problem and put Chavez on the defensive -- not by
    exaggerating the threat but speaking to the facts. The recent
    closing of RCTV is one such area where international
    organizations and local media and civil rights groups could
    have been more vocal.

    ¶9. ( C) With regard to Mercosur, we should not be timid in
    stating that Venezuela's membership will torpedo U.S.
    interest in even considering direct negotiations with the
    trading bloc, and in questioning when and how Mercosur plans
    to apply its democracy clause strictures to Chavez's regime.
    Without voicing hostility to Mercosur per se, we can continue
    to pursue FTA's with interested countries, and encourage
    alterative arrangements, such as Chile,s "Arco del Pacifico"
    initiative.

    -----------------------------
    Play to our Mil-Mil Advantage
    -----------------------------

    ¶10. (C) Southern Cone militaries remain key institutions in
    their respective countries and important allies for the U.S.
    These militaries are generally organized and technically
    competent.  Their desire to maintain interoperability, access
    to U.S. technology and training are something we can turn to
    our advantage.  As they seek to modernize, professionalize,
    and transform, they seek closer relations with the US to
    assist in those processes.  Over the past several years we
    have seen a steady decrease in funds for critical programs
    such as International Military Education and Training (IMET)
    and traditional Commander Activities (TCA) and the
    elimination of other important programs such as Foreign
    Military Financing (FMF) and Excess Defense Articles (EDA)
    due to sanctions under ASPA.  To effectively maintain our
    mil-to-mil relations and guide pol-mil events in the region
    in support of our interests, we must reverse the slide.  Now
    is precisely the time we need to be increasing our pol-mil
    engagement
    and programs vice decreasing and limiting them. We also need
    to revisit some long-held and frankly rigid positions on SOFA
    agreements and insistence on certain privileges and
    immunities with a view to gaining flexibility to negotiate
    new defense cooperation agreements with regional militaries.

    ¶11. (C) An increasingly unifying theme that completely
    excludes Chavez, and isolates Venezuela among the militaries
    and security forces of the region, is participation in
    international and regional peacekeeping operations.  The
    Southern Cone is doing very well in this area, with all
    countries active contributors to PKO missions worldwide.
    Argentina and Chile have even formed a combined peacekeeping
    brigade, which is expected to be available for deployment
    sometime in 2008.  Uruguay is the highest per-capita
    contributor of PKO troops.  We should make more GPOI funds
    available to Southern Cone countries to increase and
    strengthen their peacekeeping capabilities and cooperation.
    Additionally, we should explore using the mechanism that the
    region's contributors to MINUSTAH (Haiti) have established to
    discuss ways of increasing peacekeeping cooperation on a
    broader scale.

    --------------------------
    Stress Our Winning Formula
    --------------------------

    ¶12. (C) Chavez has made significant inroads, particularly
    with local populations, by providing programs for the
    underprivileged and by casting the U.S. as elitist and only
    interested in promoting free trade to the benefit of big
    business.  The slogans are facile: Neoliberalism makes the
    rich richer and the poor poorer; the Bolivarian Revolution
    guarantees our region's sovereignty and dignity.  But they
    ring true with some local populations and make others feel
    better about their own lack of progress.

    ¶13. (C) Transforming our image does not mean we walk away
    from our commitment to free trade and the promise it delivers
    to impoverished populations.  However, it does mean we should
    do a better job of promoting free trade by pointing to local
    and global success stories, making it easier to forge FTAs,
    and by expanding access to U.S. markets, and by promoting
    investment.  Concluding the Doha Round is critical to
    revitalizing more local trade negotiations and bolstering our
    own credibility.  In the meantime, we should support programs
    that promote regional exports, particularly favoring small
    and medium-size enterprises, and emphasize good corporate
    citizenship.

    ¶14. (C) We must also emphasize social responsibility among
    corporations and investors, and as a USG priority. President
    Bush's March 5 speech about social justice struck a chord
    throughout the region.  We should be seen standing with local
    populations, delivering programs that speak directly to their
    economic and social needs, particularly in the areas of
    health and education.  This is vital not only in the poorer
    countries, but equally in places like Chile and Argentina,
    where our very small community and youth action programs are
    welcomed and receive excellent media attention.

    ¶15. (C) Projects which foster greater transparency and
    democracy are important; they empower local citizens,
    strengthen democratic institutions, and contribute to a
    foundation for growth. When it comes to programs, there is no
    getting around the fact that we must back up policies with
    more resources to counteract Chavez,s easy walking around
    money, which is making a huge impact in countries like
    Uruguay.  Chavez isn't waging his campaign simply on
    rhetoric.  He is investing millions in his campaign for the
    hearts and minds.  We can use greater discretion and use our
    funds in a more strategic, targeted manner, but we aren't
    going to transform the perception that we are not committed
    seriously to this region by waging our own campaign on the
    cheap.

    -----------------------
    Getting the Message Out
    -----------------------

    ¶16. (U) Public diplomacy will be absolutely vital to our
    success.  We cannot win in the marketplace of ideas unless we
    have active and effective outreach, especially to the young
    and those active in addressing social ills and education
    needs. Embassy Santiago septel addresses many PD areas in
    which we could be more active.  People-to-people contact at
    the grassroots level with local leaders, NGOs, youth groups,
    community activists, and cooperatives is key.

    -------
    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶17. (C) As Chavez seeks to take on the mantle of this
    generation,s Castro, he starts with built-in advantages, not
    the least of which is a whole lot of money.  Add to that the
    bluster of his anti-imperial, anti-U.S. rhetoric, and a
    certain squirrelly charisma, both of which continue to find a
    sympathetic audience in much of Latin America, and he
    presents a formidable foe.  But he certainly can be taken.
    Washington policy-makers have already hit on one sure-fire
    tactic:  Don,t fire back at every provocation, especially
    when it,s clear that Chavez,s mouth has opened before his
    brain has engaged.  His recent dust-ups with both the
    Brazilian and Chilean senates over the RCTV closure are

    examples where Chavez,s ranting lost him points with
    ostensible friends without our having to lift a finger.

    ¶18. (C) But we cannot hope for Chavez,s blunders alone to
    derail him in the Southern Cone.  Hence the package of
    measures we propose:  A more muscular USG presence in the
    region that builds on high-level visits, underscores the
    strengths of viable, successful alternatives (i.e., Brazil
    and Chile) to Chavez,s brand of socialism, targets enhanced
    resources to regions and populations beyond the elites, and
    which uses public diplomacy to make our message loud and
    clear - democracy, freer trade and investment, work and that
    along with that come active and effective programs to address
    social ills and the needs of the region's youthful
    population.  Enough said.  End comment.

    KELLY

`