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### Viewing cable 05USNATO3,

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
05USNATO3 | 2005-01-05 16:59 | 2011-06-08 00:00 | SECRET | Mission USNATO
Appears in these articles: http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4028319.ece

`

    ACTION EUR-00

    INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   CIAE-00  INL-00   DOEE-00  PERC-00
          EB-00    VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    LAB-01   L-00
          VCE-00   AC-00    NRC-00   NRRC-00  NSAE-00  OES-00   OIC-00
          NIMA-00  PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     FMPC-00
          SP-00    IRM-00   SS-00    TRSE-00  T-00     SSD-00   PMB-00
          DRL-00   G-00     SSR-00   NFAT-00  SAS-00     /001W
                      ------------------9F5B3E  051720Z /38
    R 051659Z JAN 05
    FM USMISSION USNATO
    TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7915
    INFO NSC WASHDC
    JCS WASHDC
    OSD WASHDC

` `

    05.01.2005: NATO MOVES FORWARD WITH LANDMARK BALLISTIC MISSILE
    THREAT ASSESSMENT

    S E C R E T USNATO 000003
    STATE FOR EUR/PRA, EUR/RPM, NP/PPC, AC/DS
    OSD/ISP FOR SCHLESS, ROSE
    OSD/MDA FOR KIEFER, SEARSE
    NSC FOR VOLKER, DICASAGRANDE
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2014
    TAGS: NATO KNNP PARM MNUC
    REF: C-M(2004)109

    Classified By: Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns for Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

    ¶1. (S) Summary: During the December 9 Ministerial meeting of
    the North Atlantic Council, Foreign Ministers noted the
    completion of the Longer-Term Analysis of Ballistic Missile
    Risks and Threats. The fruit of more than 18 months of
    negotiations, the Analysis fulfills in part a 2002 Prague
    Summit tasking to examine options for addressing ballistic
    missile threats to the Alliance. At 180 pages, it provides
    the most comprehensive assessment of WMD and ballistic
    missile (BM) proliferation trends the Alliance has ever
    produced. Among the documents key findings are that some
    countries currently have the capability to launch a ballistic
    missile attack on NATOs southeastern flank and U.S. forces
    in the Pacific, and that the risk of a ballistic missile
    attack on any Alliance territory, population centers or NATO
    forces, while moderate, will remain a concern in the decade
    to come. The Analysis contains unprecedented consensus
    positions on the intentions, capabilities and proliferation
    record of Iran, Syria and North Korea as well as Russia and
    China. It also addresses the contributions of
    non-proliferation instruments, including new approaches such
    as PSI and UNSCR 1540, as well as the implications of the
    A.Q. Khan network.

    ¶2. (C) Combined with two major feasibility studies and
    ongoing technical consultations, the Analysis provides NATO
    with the political consensus and general assessment necessary
    to move forward with Alliance deliberations on the
    acquisition and fielding of defense capabilities against the
    full range of ballistic missile threats. In this context,
    USNATO fully appreciates the Intelligence Communitys strong
    support for the Analysiss development, will continue to
    request relevant U.S. intelligence releasable to NATO, and
    welcomes high-level and expert USG officials available to
    brief Allies in the Senior Politico-Military Group on
    Proliferation (SGP) and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on
    WMD and BM proliferation-related topics. End Summary.

    Context of the Longer-Term Analysis
    -----------------------------------

    ¶3. (U) While NATO has yet to make a definitive decision on
    missile defense for populations and territories, NATOs
    Strategic Concept notes that NATOs posture against the
    proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery "must
    continue to improve, including through work on missile
    defense." At the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO Heads of State and
    Government agreed "to examine options for addressing the
    increasing missile threat to NATO territory, forces and
    population centers in an effective and efficient way through
    an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts, along
    with deterrence" as well as to initiate a Theater Missile
    Defense (TMD) Feasibility Study.

    ¶4. (C) This TMD feasibility study, which focuses on the
    technical requirements, costs, and time scale of possible
    architectures for an Active-Layered Theater Ballistic Missile
    Defense (ALTBMD) system to protect NATO deployed forces, was
    completed in 2003. In January 2004, a second Missile Defense
    Feasibility Study was contracted to examine options for
    protecting Alliance territory and population centers. Upon
    its scheduled completion in July 2005, this study will be
    submitted to the Conference of National Armaments Directors,
    which will review and approve a consolidated report in late
    ¶2005. This report in turn will be forwarded to the Executive
    Working Group (Reinforced) (EWG(R)), NATOs primary forum for
    missile defense consultations.

    ¶5. (C) During the December 9 Ministerial meeting of the
    North Atlantic Council, Foreign Ministers noted the
    completion of the Longer-Term Analysis of Ballistic Missile
    Risks and Threats (reftel), which fulfilled another 2002
    Prague Summit tasking to assess current and potential WMD and
    ballistic missile threats to the Alliance over the next ten
    years. The fruit of more than 18 months of negotiations,
    this 180-page Analysis contains unprecedented consensus
    positions on key countries of proliferation concern and
    provides the most comprehensive assessment of WMD and BM
    risks and threats the Alliance has ever produced.

    ¶6. (S) The Analysis is divided into five chapters, which
    address non-proliferation regimes and national measures;
    capabilities and intentions; alternative means of delivery;
    secondary proliferation and procurement networks; and
    intelligence gaps. As a whole, it clearly demonstrates that
    NATO already faces certain risks and potential threats, and
    that the Alliance must continue to closely monitor the
    intentions and capabilities of countries of proliferation
    concern.

    ¶7. (C) Combined with the EWG(R)s ongoing work and the two
    Missile Defense Feasibility Studies, the Analysis provides
    NATO with the political consensus and general assessment
    necessary to move forward with Alliance deliberations on the
    acquisition and fielding of defense capabilities against
    ballistic missile threats. This includes the goal of
    achieving initial operational capability for an ALTBMD system
    to protect NATO deployed forces by 2010 as well as possible
    steps toward acquiring capabilities to protect Alliance
    territory and population centers against the full range of BM
    threats.

    Key Findings of the Longer-Term Analysis
    ----------------------------------------

    ¶8. (S) The risk of a ballistic missile attack on any
    Alliance territory, population centers, or NATO deployed
    forces, while moderate, will remain a concern in the decade
    to come. Iran and Syria have ballistic missiles that can
    reach parts of NATO territory and deployed forces, and they
    have chemical weapons (CW) for use as warheads. Concerns
    over Russian and Chinese BM capabilities are currently
    primarily limited to the potential for accidental or
    unauthorized launches, and the risk that their technology
    will proliferate to unstable countries.

    ¶9. (S) Current and future assessments of BM capabilities
    must take into account scenarios where components
    indigenously developed or acquired from abroad are integrated
    into existing missile programs to improve accuracy and
    operational readiness. Countries developing BMs may not
    necessarily follow U.S. or Russian patterns of development or
    deployment. North Korea began fielding and selling the No
    Dong after a single flight test, and countries today may rely
    in part on computer modeling or other means aside from easily
    observable test launches to keep their development programs
    covert.

    ¶10. (S) Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are not widely
    recognized as an immediate threat to the Alliance, but an
    indirect risk to NATO deployed forces is possible. In the
    future, there will be an increased risk that UAVs could be
    converted to carry and dispense CW and biological weapons
    (BW). The willingness of some states and illegal entities to
    transfer UAV or cruise missile (CM) components, peripheral
    equipment or technology is increasing and requires effective
    counter-proliferation measures to reduce their availability.
    There is currently no disarmament or non-proliferation
    agreement that restrains the production, development or
    possession of UAVs and CMs.

    ¶11. (S) Possession of WMD and their means of delivery has
    become a major goal for both state and non-state actors for
    reasons of prestige, influence or deterrence. Proliferating
    states and entities are employing increasingly sophisticated
    measures to obtain WMD- or BM-related equipment, materials
    and technologies. Some countries that were proliferation
    customers in the 1980s have themselves become suppliers. The
    development of indigenous capabilities in relevant dual-use
    applications such as nuclear power, biotechnology and space
    launch systems can help to conceal ultimate intentions.
    North Korea and Iran as well as Russian and Chinese entities
    are likely to remain the major suppliers of WMD- and
    BM-related equipment, materials and expertise. The
    identification, monitoring, and eventual dismantlement of the
    A.Q. Khan network show that there is a complicated worldwide
    marketplace for these inputs.

    ¶12. (C) Although arms control agreements and
    non-proliferation regimes will continue to slow the
    proliferation of WMD and BMs, the capability of both
    suppliers and proliferants are likely to improve. The
    adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 is the
    strongest affirmation of the international communitys
    support for multilateral treaties and other international
    instruments that seek to prevent WMD proliferation.
    Traditional diplomatic measures are enhanced by new tools
    such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and Operation
    Active Endeavour, which serve to complement and strengthen
    international norms and mechanisms.

    Select Country-Specific Conclusions
    -----------------------------------

    North Korea:
    ¶13. (S) Recent developments in North Korea seem to indicate
    ambitions to use WMD combined with BMs not only as a
    deterrent but also as a political bargaining chip and a means
    of blackmail to obtain economic or financial aid. Various
    sources place North Korea has having 10 to 30 kg of
    weapons-grade plutonium, and while North Korea claims to have
    a nuclear deterrent, there is uncertainty as to whether it
    currently has operational nuclear weapons for military use.
    It is possible that North Korea would use WMD and BMs if it
    felt that the survival of the regime was at stake.

    ¶14. (S) Pyongyang is reportedly developing a new land-mobile
    intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) derived from the
    Soviet SS-N-6 submarine-launched BM; if confirmed, this
    potential to use a more advanced propulsion technology would
    be of serious concern. North Korea has continued with
    development work and ground-based testing of the Taepo
    Dong-2, which according to some Allies experts with a third
    stage could deliver a weapons payload of 500 kg up to 15,000
    km--i.e., all of the United States and Europe, albeit with
    very poor accuracy. U.S. forces in the Pacific are within
    range of North Korean missiles, and it is cause for serious
    concern that North Koreas willingness to proliferate
    longer-range BM technology will hasten the risk to broad
    expanses of NATO territory.

    Iran:
    ¶15. (S) Iran continues to put a high priority on an
    ambitious BM program focused on the development of both
    liquid and solid propellant short-range BMs and medium-range
    BMs with assistance from Russia, North Korea and China.
    Tehran has announced its intention to put satellites into
    orbit, which would establish the technical base to develop an
    IRBM or intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability.
    Iran already has BM capabilities that put the southeastern
    flank of NATO within range, and within the next ten years, it
    is likely to produce qualitative and quantitative changes to
    its military capabilities that will significantly increase
    the potential threat to the Alliance and NATO forces deployed
    in the region.

    ¶16. (S) Concerns have been widely expressed over Irans
    nuclear program and its failures and breaches regarding its
    Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy
    Agency (IAEA), and the IAEA cannot positively identify that
    Irans nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes.
    Should its nuclear program continue to proceed at the same
    pace, Iran could produce sufficient fissile material for a
    first nuclear device by 2010. Iran is assessed to have an
    offensive BW program and has almost certainly conducted
    BW-related research using spray devices and adapted munitions
    for delivery. Despite its ratification of the Chemical
    Weapons Convention (CWC), Iran is also assessed to be
    retaining an offensive CW program and has the technological
    capability to develop a CW warhead for use on BMs.

    Syria:
    ¶17. (S) There is no evidence that Syria plans to attempt to
    acquire or develop a nuclear weapons capability, and it
    currently lacks the resources, infrastructure and scientific
    expertise to pursue one. Syria is judged to have a BW
    program in the research and development phase, as well as an
    advanced CW program that includes several facilities for
    testing, production and storage of CW. Syria can produce
    SCUD missile fuel and various solid propellant ingredients,
    and continues to make progress in this area with probable
    Chinese and Iranian assistance. It can deliver both sarin
    and VX with aerial bombs, SCUD-Bs and possibly SCUD-Cs.
    Qualitative and quantitative improvements in Syrias WMD and
    BM capabilities over the next ten years will increase the
    potential threat to NATO territory, notably the southeastern
    flank of the Alliance.

    China:
    ¶18. (S) China has a mature capability to develop and launch
    BMs with nuclear warheads and is carrying out a strategic
    modernization program to improve the quality of its arsenal,
    including replacing liquid-fueled ICBMs with solid-fuel
    systems and deploying more of its BMs on road-mobile
    launchers. China is believed to have an advanced CW program
    as well as an offensive BW capability, and its voluntary
    declarations under the Biological and Toxin Weapons
    Convention are believed to be inaccurate and incomplete.
    While China has the capability to pose a potential threat to
    NATO territory or deployed forces, at present Beijing focuses
    on a strategic posture that defends its regional influence in
    Asia. The greatest concern regarding Chinese capabilities is
    the risk of onward proliferation of technology and material
    to other countries. In light of all these elements, NATO
    must remain aware of developments in China.

    Russia:
    ¶19. (S) While Moscow has no intention of executing military
    operations against the Alliance, Russia has a mature arsenal
    of BMs capable of delivering nuclear weapons to any part of
    NATO territory. It is also modernizing its BMs at a measured
    pace and is pursuing warhead refurbishment. While the
    Cooperative Threat Reduction program will continue to improve
    the security of non-deployed nuclear warheads, weapons-grade
    fissile material will likely remain vulnerable to theft.
    Russias BW program, which is probably still offensive,
    remains active and declarations to date have failed to reveal
    the full size and scope of the Soviet program. Russia
    possesses a number of unacknowledged CW agents and weapons,
    and it cannot be entirely excluded that Russia could pursue
    some non-compliant activity without detection. It has given
    priority to the development of modern CW systems and agents
    designed to defeat NATO protective systems and circumvent the
    CWC. In light of its WMD and BM capabilities, NATO must
    remain concerned about the potential threat from Russia.

    Small Step for NATO MD, Giant Leap for SGP
    ------------------------------------------

    ¶20. (S) Comment: While the Longer-Term Analysis is but one
    of many inputs into the equation that will determine how NATO
    will face the spread of WMD and BM capabilities, it has also
    succeeded in highlighting proliferation issues of key
    importance to the U.S. Spirited and sometimes contentious
    debate with Allies (especially France and Germany) over Iran,
    North Korea, and China in the SGP has in the end produced a
    broad and agreed foundation for continued engagement with
    Allies on tough proliferation questions. In this context,
    USNATO fully appreciates the Intelligence Communitys strong
    support for the Analysiss development, will continue to
    request relevant U.S. intelligence releasable to NATO, and
    welcomes high-level and expert USG officials available to
    brief Allies in the SGP and the NAC on WMD and BM
    proliferation-related topics. While such briefings--and the
    debates they provoke--may seem to parallel discussion in
    other fora, it is essential that we raise these issues at
    NATO Headquarters if the U.S. is to play a leadership role in
    shaping Alliance policy, guiding the development of
    collective capabilities, and considering operational
    responses to curb and counter the proliferation of WMD and
    their means of delivery. End Comment.
    BURNS

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