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### Viewing cable 07KABUL1032, HOW NOT TO LOSE THE NORTH

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07KABUL1032 | 2007-03-28 11:46 | 2011-01-23 19:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Kabul

`

    VZCZCXRO7602
    PP RUEHDBU
    DE RUEHBUL #1032/01 0871146
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 281146Z MAR 07
    FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7143
    INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
    RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
    RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
    RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3561
    RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3885
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001032

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR SA/FO, SCA/A, S/CT, S/CR, SCA/PAB, EUR/RPM
    STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
    NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
    OSD FOR SHIVERS
    CENTCOM FOR, CG CJTF-82 POLAD

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2016
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM PINR SNAR AF
    SUBJECT: HOW NOT TO LOSE THE NORTH

    REF: A. KABUL 5679 06
    ¶B. KABUL 940 07
    ¶C. KABUL 979 07

    Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD E. NEUMANN FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) & (d)

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Having been caught off guard by the
    Taliban's opportunistic efforts in the South, post stepped
    back to look at the situation in the North to assess how best
    to avoid destabilizing violence and power vacuums in the
    region. The current stability in northern Afghanistan can be
    credited less to the effectiveness of local or national
    government than to the control wielded by local power brokers
    and the lack of a focused insurgency like the Taliban in the
    south. Corruption, drug trafficking, and criminality plague
    the north. Improving good governance and establishing
    legitimate stability require credible government structures,
    an operational justice system, and an economy strong enough
    to survive the removal of drug traffickers and corrupt
    officials. Focusing on one issue to the exclusion of others
    would leave critical gaps in our overall strategy to ensure
    lasting security. Implementation challenges are substantial.
    The GOA's political must play a vital role. ISAF could have
    a key role to play, but NATO as an organization has not shown
    the political will even to seriously discuss the issues. END
    SUMMARY.

    ---------------------------------
    Northern Stability Is Superficial
    ---------------------------------
    ¶2. (C) Despite the pressures of the insurgency in the South,
    we cannot wholly divert resources or attention from the North
    on the mistaken assumption that all is well there. The
    superficial stability that exists is fragile and masks
    considerable public disenchantment with the central
    government. Badakhshan's remote location helps protect the
    narco-economy that dominates the political and economic
    landscape. Takhar is dealing with organized crime and the
    control that local power brokers have over the province.
    Baghlan is plagued with local criminality based largely on
    tribal clashes and banditry. Balkh is mired in a corrupt
    provincial government structure with a dominant governor
    whose personal interests outweigh his sense of public
    service. Kunduz is struggling to deal with a large influx of
    Pashtun refugees. Jowzjan is faced with a power struggle
    between Tajik, Uzbek, and Pashtun leaders who are vying for
    control. In each case, the veneer of stability rests on
    factors that represent an obstacle to responsive governance,
    which feeds discontent.

    --------------------------
    Corruption Must Be Reduced
    --------------------------
    ¶3. (C) Unless provincial governments and federal
    authorities ensure that arrested criminals are prosecuted and
    imprisoned, locals have no reason to believe that the current
    economy and governance system, which has been dominated for
    so long by corrupt and nepotistic leaders, can function
    differently. If governmental corruption could be reduced to
    a minimum, locals would be more willing to support efforts by
    provincial government to establish itself as the legitimate
    guarantor of security. Currently, removing corrupt officials
    from their positions often results in nothing more than their
    transfer to another post within the provincial or district
    government. The selection of the new district police chiefs
    as part of the phase III rank reform will help address this
    issue, but more remains to be done.

    ¶4. (SBU) Pay reform is also a critical part of this
    equation. All Northern provinces are scheduled to undergo a
    pay reform over the next few months which will allow
    policemen to be paid directly from a local officially
    recognized bank. Ensuring that provincial departments receive
    their budget money will also help instill hope in the local
    population that change is coming to the North, and not all of
    the profit is going to the drug traffickers and corrupt

    KABUL 00001032 002 OF 003

    officials.

    ------------------------------------
    Stronger Economy Will Help Stability
    ------------------------------------
    ¶5. (C) There is a strong entrepreneurial tradition in many
    parts of the North, and establishing legitimate, transparent
    business processes such as customs and tax collection,
    business registration, legally addressing complaints, hiring
    on merit, and contracting via open competition is vital to
    strengthening the economy, especially in Mazar e Sharif.
    Strengthening the Mazar economy would sideline Governor
    Atta's corrupt government by reducing the populace's
    dependency on the government for survival. To this end, the
    USG is working on strengthening the private sector by
    facilitating a reform of the tax and customs processes.
    Anti-corruption efforts, such as prosecuting officials linked
    to Atta or going after Atta himself, should be pursued but in
    a balanced way so that such actions do not become
    destabilizing.

    ------------------------------------------
    Removing Narco-Traffickers Key to Security
    ------------------------------------------
    ¶6. (C) In contrast to Balkh province, the economies of
    Baghlan, Takhar, and especially Badakhshan provinces are much
    more dependent on narco-trafficking and smuggling of goods
    and weapons. Efforts to strengthen the local economy in
    these provinces would have little effect on wresting control
    of the province from local power brokers in the short-term.
    Without action taken to marginalize the entrenched
    criminally-connected power centers in Badakhshan, we stand a
    fair chance of winning the war on terror in the north by
    preventing mass Taliban/other opposing force infiltration,
    only to lose the province to narco-threats.

    ¶7. (C) Several actions could be taken to marginalize the
    entrenched narco-barons power centers. The Disbandment of
    Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) process can be seriously
    strengthened, with a push to collect weapons other than the
    old, often unusable arms that have been collected in the
    past. To accomplish this, more resources need to be invested
    into building local police capacity and strengthening the
    judicial institutions to prosecute successfully. Major
    arrests of the most prominent drug traffickers would send a
    strong signal that the GOA is committed to installing rule of
    law in the North. We will continue strongly to encourage
    Karzai to appoint clean individuals to official positions
    in the provinces. A more rigorous vetting procedure would
    help eliminate individuals with narco-connections from being
    slotted into government positions. A message needs to be
    sent to the criminal elements currently in control that they
    will no longer be able to operate freely; efforts are being
    made to bring rule of law to the north.

    -------------------------------
    National Police Need Shoring Up
    -------------------------------
    ¶8. (C) The Ministry of the Interior is increasing the pace
    of recruitment and training to deploy more Afghan National
    Army (ANA) soldiers to the North. However, the numbers of
    Afghan National Police (ANP) being deployed to the North are
    growing more slowly because the focus is currently on the
    south. Regional Command North has said that an additional
    200 police advisors are needed to provide adequate mentoring
    and training of the 11,000 ANP that work in the north.
    Providing more advisors for the police would help create the
    capacity within the local police that is needed to minimize
    the possibility of creating a power vacuum that other
    criminal elements could take advantage of and establish
    themselves as the new local power brokers.

    ¶9. (SBU) Rank reform, particularly the replacement of
    district police chiefs, will improve the quality of police
    leadership. Pay reform should provide incentives to improve
    recruitment and retention. The creation of a civil order

    KABUL 00001032 003 OF 003

    police unit will allow for a quick reaction force to respond
    to civil disturbances. However, these are all medium-term
    solutions that require time and resources to implement. They
    depend on the GOA's political will to see them through.

    -------
    COMMENT
    -------
    ¶10. (C) Dislodging the status quo of corrupt officials and
    narco-barons without creating the kind of instability which
    has been fertile ground for the insurgency in the South will
    take careful planning, time, and determination. It is vital
    that these problems be tackled concurrently. Arresting
    corrupt officials should be accompanied by developing a
    functioning justice system. Removing drug traffickers from
    power should be followed with providing employment
    opportunities for poppy farmers who find themselves out of a
    job. Focusing on one issue to the exclusion of others would
    leave critical gaps in our overall strategy to ensure lasting
    security in the North.

    ¶11. (C) Implementation difficulties associated with
    addressing these issues are substantial. Significantly
    reducing corruption, strengthening the local economy,
    removing narco-traffickers, and shoring up the National
    Police require time and resources. GOA political will and
    its ability to back it up are also key factors. ISAF thus
    far has not shown the will to confront criminality with force
    in the north. It does not have a mandate to do so. It will
    need to engage more on these issues if we want to ensure
    lasting stability in the north, particularly if we are not to
    be content with just waiting for years for GOA institutions
    to develop. But for ISAF to do more, its guidance would have
    to change and that is a discussion that needs to occur in
    capitals and Brussels.

    ¶12. (C) Removing a few corrupt senior officials, warlords,
    or drug-traffickers will be viewed as nothing more than
    window dressing by locals. Real and lasting change will
    require substantial investments of time, energy, and capital.
    The GOA needs to demonstrate more political will to engage
    substantially on these challenges in the North.
    Nevertheless, attention needs to be paid to the varied
    challenges presented in the North. While the Taliban may not
    be poised at the doorstep of the northern provinces, locals
    are looking for alternatives. Now is the time to establish
    good governance and rule of law before northerners find
    another, less desirable way to deal with their current
    circumstances. END COMMENT.
    NEUMANN

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