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### Viewing cable 08PANAMA725, PANAMA'S NEW SECURITY LAWS PASSED AMIDST OPPOSITION

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08PANAMA725 | 2008-09-05 12:44 | 2011-05-31 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Panama

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHZP #0725/01 2491244
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 051244Z SEP 08
    FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2477
    INFO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
    RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 000725

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2018
    TAGS: PGOV PREL PM
    SUBJECT: PANAMA'S NEW SECURITY LAWS PASSED AMIDST OPPOSITION

    REF: A. REF A:PANAMA 00669
         ¶B. REF B: PANAMA 00325
         ¶C. REF C: PANAMA 00704

    Classified By: Amb. Barbara J. Stephenson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    -------
    Summary
    -------

    ¶1.  (C)  The GOP approved five controversial security laws by
    decree on August 18 and 20. The decrees will: 1) create an
    independent civilian intelligence service (SENIS); 2) create
    a coast guard (SENAN); 3) create a frontier force to protect
    the borders (SENAFRONT); 4) reform the Panamanian National
    Police law to allow a uniformed officer to lead the force;
    and 5) develop the legal framework of the existing
    Institutional Protection Service (which provides protection
    to the President and other VIPs), including allowing a
    uniformed officer to lead that force. The GOP has argued that
    these laws are necessary to modernize the security forces to
    deal with potential threats to the Canal, increasing
    organized crime and drug dealing activity, and increasing
    rates  of common crime.  The proposals had drawn sharp
    protest from civil society groups, the main business
    organizations, and some government officials. The protests
    centered on the approval of politically sensitive laws by
    decree, and the perception among some groups that the GOP was
    attempting to "re-militarize" Panama. This perception was
    reinforced by the presence in the GOP of several Ministers
    with ties to the Noriega regime, including Minister of
    Government and Justice Daniel Delgado. (Note: The Ministry of
    Government and Justice controls almost all Panama's security
    forces. End Note). Those opposing the laws have tried to tie
    them to the Merida Initiative, and have accused the USG of
    pushing the reforms as part of the Global War on Terrorism.
    It remains to be seen if the passage of the laws will lead to
    a decline in protests.  The security laws have already become
    an issue in the upcoming elections, thus drawing the robust
    and far-reaching U.S. security relationship with Panama into
    the domestic political debate. Post encourages all USG
    agencies to treat this issue cautiously, as Post attempts to
    separate the USG's long-term security relationship with
    Panama from internal Panamanian politics.  End Summary.

    --------------------------------------------
    Laws Passed Under the Cover of Olympic Party
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶2.  (C)  President Martin Torrijos decreed two of the five
    security laws that had been under consideration for the last
    month (see Ref A) on August 18, and the remaining three on
    August 20. The laws were approved by Torrijos after being
    debated by the Cabinet under special decree powers that were
    granted to Torrijos by the National Assembly (NA) on July 3,
    prior to its summer recess. The powers were set to run out on
    August 31, thereby putting the GOP under pressure to act
    quickly. The GOP had been engaged in a "consultation"
    process, whereby officials met with civil society leaders to
    explain the proposals, in an attempt to blunt growing
    opposition among civil society groups and the major
    newspapers. The "consultation" process failed in this goal,
    as almost every group that met with the officials came out in
    the papers the following days questioning the laws, and
    calling for a wider debate over the proposed changes.
    Further, many opposition political, NGO, civil society,
    media, and other leaders refused to participate in these
    last-minute consultations.

    ¶3.  (C)  Political analyst Jose Blandon, Sr., a political
    analyst who was working with the Cabinet on this project,
    told PolCouns August 15 that he had recommended to President
    Torrijos that the laws be passed quickly to prevent the
    opposition from reaching critical mass. Blandon reported that
    Torrijos would approve the laws on August 18-20, hoping that
    reaction would be muted due to popular recent wage increases,
    and the distraction of an intense primary contest for the
    Presidential nomination within the ruling Democratic
    Revolutionary Party (PRD). The GOP caught a lucky break when
    Irving Saladino won Panama's first ever gold medal on August
    ¶18. Torrijos declared a holiday to celebrate on August 21,
    the same day the papers announced the approval of the last
    three laws.

    --------------------------------
    New Intelligence Service Created
    --------------------------------

    ¶4.  (C)  The most controversial of the five laws approved by
    the GOP is the Decree Law Number 9, that reorganizes the
    Committee of Public Security and National Defense (CSPDN) and
    creates the National Intelligence and Security Service
    (SENIS). Up to now, the CSPDN has served as a Panamanian
    version of the U.S. National Security Council (NSC), with an
    unofficial spy agency, the Executive Secretariat, appended to
    it. The original structure of the CSPDN was established by an
    Executive Decree from 1991, modified in 2001. The new law
    breaks the SENIS off from the CSPDN, creating a stand alone
    intelligence agency (SENIS) and a true Panamanian NSC, the
    CSPDN. The law places the SENIS under the Minister of the
    Presidency. The SENIS is responsible for providing the
    President and the GOP, "the information, analysis, studies
    and proposals that allow (the GOP) to prevent and avoid any
    danger, threat or aggression against the independence,
    sovereignty and territorial integrity (of Panama), as well as
    against the national interests and the stability of the Rule
    of Law and the institutions of the State." The SENIS is thus
    empowered to act against a wide range of ill-defined threats,
    though the officers are required to "respect human rights and
    fundamental guarantees," and forbidden to engage in political
    or union activities, political espionage, release information
    they have gathered in the course of their official duties, or
    any other activity which, "damages the life, honor, or
    property of people."

    ¶5.  (C)  The law as passed is significantly different from
    the draft law as first proposed and presented to the public
    on GOP websites and in the consultation process. Indeed, it
    is five pages shorter. All mention of the SENIS's
    responsibility for classifying information is omitted, as is
    the new classification system that was proposed, and much of
    the language referring to the secret nature of the SENIS. The
    new law also omits the entire judicial and legislative
    oversight provision. (Comment: It seems likely that these
    changes were designed to take out of the public view some of
    the aspects of the law which were more controversial, and
    those that required more detailed work, like the oversight
    provisions. Furthermore, the fact that changes recommended
    during the GOP's limited consultation process were
    incorporated has been lost on the public as the Torrijos
    Administration has done a poor job at communicating these
    changes. End Comment.)

    ¶6.  (C)  Jaime Abad, former Director of the Judicial
    Investigative Police (PTJ) and GOP consultant on the security
    laws, told PolOff August 18 that the SENIS law was needed
    because the CSPDN already engaged in all the espionage
    activities the law described, but with no legal safeguards at
    all. He said the requirement of judicial approval for
    "preventative" wiretaps (Note: Removed from the version of
    the bill that was decreed. End Note)  was particularly
    important. Speaking before a Forum on the laws organized by
    the opposition alliance of the Democratic Change party (CD)
    and the Patriotic Union (UP) party on August 11, Abad said
    that Panama faced real threats due to the presence of the
    Canal, and the proximity of Colombia, and had to develop
    institutions that could detect and prevent attacks before
    they occurred.

    ------------------
    Return of the G-2?
    ------------------

    ¶7.  (C)  The SENIS has been the most criticized aspect of the
    five laws. Opposition has been led by a new civil society
    organization called the Democratic Citizen's Network (RDC).
    The head of Transparency International in Panama, Angelica
    Maytin, who is now also RDC's spokesperson, told PolOff
    August 6 that the main promoters of this movement were three
    famous leaders of the "civilista" resistance to the Noriega
    regime: Roberto "Bobby" Eisenmann, businessman, founder of La
    Prensa newspaper, exiled under Omar Torrijos; Mauro Zuniga, a
    doctor who was almost beaten to death for opposing the
    Noriega regime; Miguel Antonio Bernal, independent candidate
    for Mayor of Panama City, university professor, exiled under
    Omar Torrijos at the same time as Eisenmann. The RDC has been
    sponsoring weekly protests in front of the same church in
    central Panama City where anti-Noriega protests took place at
    the end of the 1980s. Eisenmann told PolCouns August 8 that
    he could not understand why the GOP would try to legislate on
    such a sensitive issue by decree. He noted that while some of
    the changes might look fine on paper, the history and
    institutional weakness upon which they were being built made
    it impossible to give the GOP the benefit of a doubt. Maytin,
    at the same meeting, said that Torrijos was rushing to
    approve the reforms now because he would loose his authority
    among the PRD NA deputies after the PRD primaries scheduled
    for September 7. Maytin said the proper place to discuss an
    issue as sensitive as security reform was either the NA, or
    the "Concertacion," a national dialogue committee that has
    frequently been used to discuss important issues in Panama.
    Eisenmann said that the RDC would attempt to make the
    security laws, and the SENIS in particular, an issue in the
    upcoming elections if the GOP approved the reforms, and that
    he believed it could tip the balance in the elections away
    from the PRD.

    ¶8.  (C) Mauro Zuniga told PolOff August 12 that the proposed
    reforms would "create a monster," and that the secrecy the
    law granted to the operations of the SENIS would lead to a
    large increase in drug trafficking, as under Noriega. In a
    theme that has been repeated by almost all the SENIS's
    critics, Zuniga accused the GOP of attempting to recreate the
    feared G-2 intelligence service of Noriega's time. Zuniga,
    and many of the other opposition leaders, was a direct victim
    of the G-2. Zuniga said he believed that the laws would
    contribute to "instability," as they indicated that the GOP
    was planning to deal with potential social protests
    associated with the sharp rise in food prices (see Ref B),
    through violence and repression. Miguel Bernal echoed this
    idea in an August 21 meeting with PolOff. He predicted that
    there would be a social explosion in Panama soon, and that
    the SENIS was the GOP's way of responding to that threat. He
    said the worst thing about the SENIS was that it was
    preventative. (Note: Bernal was referring to preventative
    wiretapping power the first version of the bill gave the
    SENIS, but which dropped out of the version which was
    approved. End Note) He said that preventive cases would give
    SENIS agents great latitude to bring false investigations to
    obtain information for real blackmailing or political
    espionage.

    ¶9.  (C)  Javier Martinez Acha, former Executive Secretary of
    the CSPDN under President Torrijos, told PolOff August 18
    that the proposal was far too broad and did not do enough to
    prevent political abuse. He said that people were right to
    suspect that the SENIS would be used for political espionage,
    as the CSPDN has always been used for political espionage.
    Martinez specifically accused current CSPDN Executive
    Secretary Erick Espinosa of having engaged in political and
    even personal, espionage. Martinez said a law was needed to
    limit the authority of the SENIS, but that this law was badly
    written (referring to the original proposal), and did not
    adequately differentiate from true international threats to
    Panama, and potential local threats to the government. He
    said he believed Julio Lopez Borrero, a Spanish intelligence
    agent working for President Torrijos, was behind the law, and
    that his influence was negative for Panama, and U.S.
    interests. Spanish DCM Miguel Moro told PolCouns August 20
    that the proposed SENIS law did track similar Spanish
    legislation very closely, and that Lopez was making things
    very difficult for the Embassy. He denied Martinez's claim
    that Lopez was still actively working for the Spanish
    Government, though he acknowledged that Lopez was accredited
    to the GOP as a counselor of the Spanish Embassy.  Moro
    professed that the Spanish Embassy had little contact with
    Lopez and was visibly uncomfortable by the position Lopez's
    activities had placed the GOS.

    -----
    SENAN
    -----

    ¶10.  (C)  Decree Law Number Seven creates the National
    Aero-Naval Service (SENAN), by fusing the National Air
    Service (SAN) and the National Maritime Service (SMN). The
    law lays out the internal regulations for the SENAN and seems
    to be largely consistent with a Coast Guard like
    law-enforcement agency. The SENAN is created to replace a SAN
    without operational airplanes or helicopters, and a SMN with
    serious operations deficiencies (see Ref C).  Abad said that
    the SENAN was necessary because Panama was too small to
    maintain two separate services, while having to patrol twice
    as much area offshore as onshore. Danilo Toro, Director
    General of the Ministry of Government and Justice's Integral
    Security Program, told PolOff August 11 that the creation of
    the SENAN would require a total reorganization of the
    structures, models and staff of the existing SAN and SMN, and
    would lead to the disappearance of these organizations, not
    just their merger. Minister of Government and Justice Daniel
    Delgado told Deputy SouthCom Commander Lt. Gen. Spears August
    21 that the GOP was working on a $50 million budget
    allocation to buy more equipment for the SENAN, including the
    refurbishing of seven helicopters, and the training of ten
    helicopter pilots.

    ¶11.  (C) The SENAN proposal has drawn the least opposition of
    the five laws.  Ebrahim Asvat, President of La Estrella de
    Panama daily that has taken a strong editorial line against
    the reforms, told the CD-UP Forum that the creation of the
    SENAN was an attempt to re-militarize services (SAN and SMN)
    that had only failed to perform adequately because they had
    been starved of resources. Bernal asked rhetorically why
    Panama needed a coast guard if it already had the U.S. Coast
    Guard patrolling its waters under the Salas-Becker Agreement
    (See Ref C). Martinez called the SENAN proposal "empty
    posturing" unless serious financial resources were put into
    building an operational service.

    ---------
    SENAFRONT
    ---------

    ¶12.  (C)  Decree Law Number Eight creates the National
    Frontier Service (SENAFRONT) to patrol Panama's frontiers.
    This law actually takes an existing unit of the PNP, called
    the National Frontier Directorate (DINAFRONT), and spins it
    off into a separate unit. The DINAFRONT is a de-facto
    para-military unit. Abad, the former head of the PTJ, said
    there were many administrative reasons why breaking the
    DINAFRONT off made sense, including ending the practice of
    transferring the para-military DINAFRONT troops to temporary
    street duty in Panama City, for which they are ill-prepared.
    Toro stressed the danger the increasingly disorganized and
    chaotic FARC represented to Panama's security and stability,
    as Colombian pressure continues to break the organization
    apart. He pointed to the chaos caused in Guatemala and El
    Salvador after the de-militarized guerrillas and soldiers
    turned to crime at the end of their respective civil wars. He
    said a defeated FARC was a greater danger to Panama than a
    strong and disciplined FARC, and Panama needed to get control
    of the Darien before that threat manifested itself. Abad,
    when speaking to the CD-UP Forum, called into question
    Panama's ability to do that, saying that turning SENAFRONT
    into a real deterrent would be too expensive, and calling on
    the Darien to be internationalized.

    ¶13.  (C)  Opposition to the SENAFRONT proposal has been
    sharp. Zuniga called the SENAFRONT a "mini-army," (Note:
    Panama's constitution does not allow for the creation of an
    army. End Note) that was not justified by the threat posed by
    the increasingly weak FARC. This argument was repeated by
    Eisenmann, who said development would be a much more
    effective tool for controlling the Darien. Asvat told A/DCM
    August 15 that the creation of the SENAFRONT would lead to
    greater insecurity as the likelihood of a confrontation with
    the FARC grows.  Domingo Latorraca, former Vice-Minister of
    Economy and former head of the Chamber of Commerce, told
    PolOff August 26 that the SENAFRONT was clearly
    unconstitutional, as the constitution only allowed for the
    creation of "temporary" frontier forces, and the SENAFRONT
    was called permanent in the recently passed law.

    -----------
    PNP and SPI
    -----------

    ¶14.  (C)  Decree Law Number Five contains just one article,
    that modifies the 1997 Organic Law of the PNP, in that it
    allows the Director of the PNP to be a civilian with a
    university degree, or a Police Officer of the highest rank,
    Commissioner. Minister Delgado said that he hoped that this
    change would lead to an improvement in morale and
    effectiveness in the PNP. The Acting Director, Jaime Ruiz, is
    already a Commissioner, and he is likely to be confirmed in
    the position.  Martinez told PolOff that the idea of changing
    this law had come straight from President Torrijos, and had
    been his position since before he was elected. Martinez
    defended the measure, on the condition that the head of the
    PNP be forced to retire after each presidential period, to
    prevent he or she from accruing so much power they could
    unduly influence the elected government.

    ¶15.  (C)  Maytin attacked this proposal because it undermined
    the consensus reached by a national dialogue in 1997 when the
    Organic Law of the PNP was passed. That law re-certified the
    practice since the return of democracy that the PNP should
    always be led by a civilian. Much of the debate about this
    law has revolved around the argument about the advantages and
    disadvantages of having a "military officer" in charge of the
    PNP, given that the law allows for a uniformed PNP officer to
    head the PNP. Latorraca noted that most of the senior PNP
    leadership have been trained in military academies, and not
    police academies.

    ¶16.  (C)  Organic Law Number 6 also allows a uniformed
    officer to run the Institutional Protection Service (SPI),
    and makes a number of other administrative changes. It has
    been the least commented law, though the "militarization" of
    the leadership has been criticized. Maytin has publicly
    criticized the increase in the number of body guards for
    ex-presidents to 12, but it has not been an important part of
    the debate.

    -------------------------
    It's all the Gringos' Fault
    -------------------------

    ¶17.  (C)  A recurring theme in the opposition to the security
    laws has been the attempt to link the reform proposals to the
    USG. Asvat at the CD-UP Forum said that the announcement of
    "Plan Merida" and the security reforms in July was no
    coincidence. He said that the security reforms aimed to
    create an army to fight the U.S.'s wars on drugs and
    terrorism. Several other opposition supporters in the
    audience of the Forum also voiced strong suspicions that the
    ultimate inspiration for the proposals was the USG. Zuniga
    has written several op-ed pieces in local papers accusing the
    USG of being behind the proposals. Latorraca said the groups
    opposed to the laws could be broken into two groups; the
    first, led by many of those who suffered under the
    dictatorship first hand, holds the more emotional and radical
    position that these laws are part of a U.S.-led conspiracy,
    and consitute an immediate threat to Panama's democracy; the
    second group is concerned that the changes in the security
    services constitute a long term threat to Panama's democracy,
    leaving it vulnerable to a military take over in the future.
    The anti-American arguments have been strongest among the
    former group, and are based on their understanding of the
    U.S. role leading up to the Omar Torrijos dictatorship, and
    our relationship to Noriega. An unfortunate series of
    coincidences, including Minister Delgado's visit to the U.S.
    in July at Secretary of Defense Gates' request, and the
    announcement of the Merida Initiative in July, has provided
    the lines that the opposition has been able to connect to
    find a U.S. hand behind the reforms.

    ---------------------------------
    Will Security Become Politicized?
    ---------------------------------

    ¶18.  (C)  The opposition parties are still coming to grips
    with how best to respond to the protests surrounding these
    reforms. While Ricardo Martinelli, the Presidential candidate
    of the Democratic Change-Patriotic Union alliance (CD-UP),
    has come out publicly in the press saying he would repeal the
    laws, no party officials spoke at the CD-UP Forum.  On
    September 2, Panamenista Presidential candidate Juan Carlos
    Varela raised the specter of "militarization" and rejected
    the security reform laws on two grounds; process, lamenting
    inadequate consultation and slamming the Torrijos
    Administration for its "undemocratic" tendencies; and
    substance, stating that the laws were unnecessary, failed to
    meet average Panamanians' immediate security concerns and
    constituted a threat to democracy. PRD presidential candidate
    Balbina Herrera, who is likely to win the PRD primary on
    September 7, told PolCouns on August 22 that she was
    "furious" with the way Torrijos "mismanaged the security
    laws. "They (the Torrijos Administration) painted a target on
    my back, and created a political campaign issue where none
    existed before," lamented Herrera. Civil society groups
    marched on the National Assembly on September 3 to protest
    these laws.

    -------
    Comment
    -------

    ¶19.  (C)  The GOP's effort to reform its security services is
    long overdue. The SAN and SMN in particular, suffer from
    major problems, which gravely affects their ability to
    effectively cooperate with the U.S. in the anti-drug effort.
    Only the wholesale reform Toro talks about will really make a
    difference, however, as the SMN in particular does not suffer
    from a lack of resources, but rather from corruption and
    extremely poor leadership. A robust coast guard is far more
    in line with the country's needs rather than a pretend navy
    and pretend air force. Creating an effective coast guard will
    require, as Martinez pointed out, massive resources to really
    make a difference. SENAFRONT is also a long overdue and
    worthwhile endeavor, as Panama has real problems exerting
    effective government control in the Darien, and an
    operational border force can only help. The U.S. should
    engage in the process of buiding up the SENAN and SENAFRONT,
    but only after two conditions are met: 1) we get clear
    evidence that the kind of needed personnel and cultural
    reforms are taking place within these instutions; 2) we are
    sure that the reforms are not being implemented in any way
    that might undermine democracy, accountability, human rights
    and the rule of law in Panama. The complaints about U.S.
    involvement in the militarization of the SENAN and SENAFRONT
    could be met by designating DHS assets, such as Coast Guard,
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Customs and
    Border Protection (CBP) to take the lead on assistance
    efforts, rather than only having Department of Defense led
    military training and assistance. The other three laws,
    SENIS, PNP and SPI, are not as significant for USG
    cooperation. The SENIS law is about bringing something hidden
    into the open, and will probably not effect our cooperation
    much, while the PNP and SPI laws are purely internal matters.
    If they improve operational effectiveness, as Minister
    Delgado hopes, so much the better.

    ¶20.  (C)  That said, the GOP's public handling of this issue
    has been an absolute disaster. Many of these reforms, such as
    the SENAN and the SENAFRONT, would have been relatively
    uncontroversial if the case had been made in public as to why
    they were necessary. Others, such as the SENIS and the
    modification of the law allowing officers to run the PNP and
    SPI, should never have been attempted without getting wide
    public buy-in through some sort of consensus-building
    mechanism. It has become increasingly clear as this debate
    has developed that the wounds of the Noriega era have not
    fully healed. While the GOP has succeeded in passing the
    laws, that was never really the issue. The real test was to
    get public support so the changes would become
    institutionalized, and a new security structure could be
    built upon them. Instead, the SENIS is likely to cast a pall
    upon all the reforms, turning them into a political
    opportunity too good for the opposition to pass up. As a
    result the leaders of the new security organizations must now
    work to implement the changes, knowing that they may be
    undone by the incoming administration. Worse for the U.S.,
    the debate risks casting U.S. security cooperation with
    Panama in a partisan light, which is not beneficial to the
    USG, or to Panama. For this reason, the Embassy is working
    hard to separate the long term U.S. security cooperation
    relationship with Panama from the debate surrounding these
    laws.  While we will not go out of our way to comment,
    when/if we must take a public position, we will say that an
    issue as important as security reform needs the buy-in a
    full, democratic vetting would give it, and we will reject
    the false dichotomy of security or democracy, insisting that
    the best security solutions are always anchored in democracy.
    STEPHENSON

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