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### Viewing cable 07NAHA47, DEFENSE MINISTER KYUMA AGREES TO PRESS AHEAD ON FRF PLAN

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07NAHA47 | 2007-03-12 08:33 | 2011-05-04 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Consulate Naha

`

    VZCZCXRO7033
    PP RUEHNH
    ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
    UTS7247
    PP RUEHC
    DE RUEHNH #0047/01 0710833
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY PARA MARKINGS AD8EE562 TOQ3200)
    P 120833Z MAR 07
    FM AMCONSUL NAHA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0729
    INFO RHMFISS/18WG CP KADENA AB JA
    RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
    RUSFNSG/CDR10THASG TORII STATION JA
    RHMFISS/CG FIRST MAW
    RUHBABA/CG III MEF CAMP COURTNEY JA
    RUHBBEA/CG THIRD FSSG CAMP KINSER JA
    RUHBABA/CG THIRD MARDIV
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/COMFLEACT OKINAWA JA
    RHMFISS/COMMARCORBASESJAPAN CAMP BUTLER JA
    RHMFISS/COMMARFORPAC
    RHHMHAA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
    RHOVVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT
    RUHBVMA/CTF 76
    RUYLBAH/DODSPECREP OKINAWA JA
    RUESOK/FBIS OKINAWA JA
    RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 0236
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
    RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 0783
    RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/NAVCRIMINVSERVRA OKINAWA JA
    RUHBANB/OKINAWA AREA FLD OFC US FORCES JAPAN CAMP BUTLER JA
    RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 0311
    RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 0271
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/USARPAC COMMAND CENTER FT SHAFTER HI
    RUALBCC/YOKOTA AB HQ USFJ
    RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0001
    RUEHWW/BAGHDAD GULF WAR COLLECTIVE
    RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0726

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NAHA 000047

    SIPDIS

    C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y - REPLACED SBU WITH C PARAMARKINGS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/12/2032
    TAGS: MARR PGOV PINS PREL JA IZ
    SUBJECT: DEFENSE MINISTER KYUMA AGREES TO PRESS AHEAD ON FRF PLAN

    CLASSIFIED BY: KEVIN K. MAHER, CONSUL GENERAL, U.S. CONSULATE
    GENERAL NAHA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
    REASON: 1.4 (B), (D)

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  DEFENSE MINISTER KYUMA TRAVELED TO OKINAWA FOR
    A ""PRIVATE"" BUT WIDELY REPORTED MEETING WITH THE CONSUL GENERAL
    TO DISCUSS THE WAY FORWARD ON IMPLEMENTING THE FUTENMA
    REPLACEMENT FACILITY (FRF) PLAN THAT HAD BEEN AGREED TO BY THE
    TWO GOVERNMENTS AT THE OCTOBER 2005 AND MAY 2006 SECURITY
    CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE MEETINGS.  MINISTER KYUMA AGREED TO
    REFRAIN FROM SHOWING FLEXIBILITY TOWARDS THE GOVERNOR IN TERMS
    OF THE GOVERNOR'S REQUEST FOR CHANGES TO THE PLAN.  WE AGREED TO
    PERSUADE THE OKINAWA GOVERNOR AND NAGO MAYOR TO ACCEPT THE
    CURRENT PLAN WITHOUT REVISIONS.  MINISTER KYUMA SAID JAPAN FULLY
    SUPPORTS THE U.S. ON IRAQ, AND THAT HE IS FULLY COMMITTED TO
    GETTING THE DIET TO PASS LEGISLATION EXTENDING JAPAN'S
    PARTICIPATION IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM.  END SUMMARY.

    ¶2. (C) I HAD A MUCH-PUBLICIZED LUNCH MEETING WITH DEFENSE
    MINISTER KYUMA SUNDAY AFTERNOON IN OKINAWA.  HE DECIDED TO
    CANCEL OUR SCHEDULED GOLF OUTING DUE TO ALL THE PUBLICITY.
    INSTEAD, WE HAD A 2 AND A HALF HOUR LUNCH IN A LOCAL RESTAURANT,
    FOLLOWED BY AN HOUR AT MY HOUSE FOR COFFEE AND TO LOOK AT THE
    VIEW OF MCAS FUTENMA WHILE HE KILLED TIME WAITING FOR HIS FLIGHT
    BACK TO TOKYO.  HE DID NOT MEET WITH GOVERNOR NAKAIMA OR NAGO
    MAYOR SHIMABUKURO, EVEN THOUGH I OFFERED DURING LUNCH TO CALL
    THEM AND INVITE THEM OVER TO THE HOUSE.  SO IN THE END, AS WAS
    WIDELY REPORTED IN THE PRESS, THE DEFENSE MINISTER CAME TO
    OKINAWA ON A ""PRIVATE VISIT"" JUST TO MEET ME IN MY ROLE AS
    CONSUL GENERAL.

    ¶3. (C)  THE MEETING WAS POLITE BUT A LITTLE HEATED AT FIRST.
    HE BEGAN BY REPEATING WHAT WE HAVE HEARD EARLIER ABOUT DELAYING
    ANY DECISIONS ON FUTENMA REPLACEMENT FACILITY (FRF)
    IMPLEMENTATION UNTIL AFTER THE APRIL 22 BY-ELECTION.  KYUMA THEN
    ARGUED STRONGLY THAT WE NEED A FIFTY-METER REVISION IN THE FRF
    PLAN IN ORDER TO GET GOV NAKAIMA TO AGREE TO COOPERATE WITH THE
    ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT.  I RESPONDED THAT WE DO NOT,
    AND THAT TO SHOW ANY FLEXIBILITY ON THIS POINT IS A MISTAKE AND
    A MISREADING OF THE SITUATION IN OKINAWA.

    ¶4. (C)  WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF REVISIONS, I SHOWED
    KYUMA THE MAP WE AGREED AT THE DPRI MEETING OF APRIL 13, 2006
    (WHICH WAS THE BASIS FOR THE ROADMAP'S MORE GENERAL MAP), AND
    EXPLAINED ALL THE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS WITH EACH OF THE
    SUGGESTIONS FOR MOVING THE RUNWAY IN VARIOUS DIRECTIONS.  I ALSO
    EXPLAINED THAT NONE OF THESE ARE NEW IDEAS - ALL HAD BEEN VETTED
    AND DISCARDED AS UNWORKABLE TECHNICALLY AND/OR POLITICALLY.  I
    STRESSED WE HAD ACCEPTED THE JAPANESE PROPOSAL, A PROPOSAL THAT
    WAS THE BEST CONSENSUS THE GOJ ITSELF COULD REACH INTERNALLY.

    ¶5. (C)  I TOLD KYUMA THAT FRANKLY SPEAKING, BASED ON MY OWN
    PERSONAL EXPERIENCE IN THE HOURS OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GOJ IN
    THE DPRI PROCESS, THE GOJ COULD NOT MAINTAIN THIS CONSENSUS ON
    FRF IF WE WERE TO START A DISCUSSION ON MAKING ANY ADJUSTMENT AT
    ALL TO THE PLAN.  HE RESPONDED THAT AS THE RESPONSIBLE MINISTER,
    HE COULD MAKE THE DECISION AND MAINTAIN THE CONSENSUS HIMSELF.
    I THEN TOLD HIM THAT, AT THE RISK OF SOUNDING RUDE, I DOUBT
    ANYONE COULD, INCLUDING HIMSELF, AND AGAIN EXPLAINED THAT MANY
    OF THE PEOPLE ASKING FOR ADJUSTMENTS ARE DOING SO IN THE
    ABSTRACT, WITHOUT ANY REAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROBLEMS EACH

    NAHA 00000047  002 OF 004

    PROPOSAL PRESENTS.

    ¶6. (C)  WE SPENT QUITE A WHILE STUDYING THE MAP OF THE FRF AND
    GOING OVER EACH OF THOSE PROBLEMS.  FOR EXAMPLE, MOVING TOWARDS
    THE OCEAN RUNS INTO THE ISLANDS, MOVING TO THE LEFT INCREASES
    ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ON THE SEA GRASS, MOVING TO THE RIGHT PUTS
    IT INTO DEEPER WATER AND MAKES CONSTRUCTION MUCH MORE DIFFICULT.
     HE SEEMED TO GET THE PICTURE, AND ADMITTED THAT GOVERNOR
    NAKAIMA'S AND MAYOR SHIMABUKURO'S CALLS FOR ""REVISIONS"" ARE
    MERELY FOR FACE-SAVING, SINCE THEY HAVE MADE THESE CALLS IN
    PUBLIC.
    ¶7. (C)  I THEN EXPLAINED THAT IF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT WERE
    TO SUGGEST ANY CHANGES TO THE AGREED PLAN, WE THEN ALSO COULD
    EXPECT TO HEAR VOICES FROM WITHIN THE U.S. FOR CHANGES AS WELL.
    FOR EXAMPLE, SOME IN THE MARINE CORPS WANT A LONGER RUNWAY.
    ""THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE,"" HE REPLIED, ""SINCE WE'VE ALREADY AGREED ON
    1800 METERS."" I TOLD HIM THAT IS EXACTLY THE POINT, WE HAVE
    ALREADY AGREED ON THIS PLAN.  BUT IF THE GOJ STARTS ASKING FOR
    CHANGES, HOW CAN WE PREVENT SIMILAR CALLS FOR CHANGES FROM THE
    U.S. SIDE AS WELL?  WE ARE TRYING TO MAINTAIN AND MOVE FORWARD
    ON A DELICATE CONSENSUS ABOUT A PLAN AGREED AFTER MANY HOURS OF
    DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS.  REOPENING THAT CONSENSUS BY MAKING
    CHANGES TO THE RUNWAY LOCATION WILL ONLY DESTROY THAT CONSENSUS,
    DELAY THE ENTIRE PROJECT, AND PUT THE ENTIRE REALIGNMENT PLAN
    FOR OKINAWA AT RISK.

    ¶8. (C)  I TOLD HIM IT'S LIKE THE GAME IN JAPANESE ARCADES,
    ""MOGURA TATAKI"" (WHACK-A-MOLE, THE GAME IN WHICH MOLES KEEP
    POPPING UP FROM HOLES AND YOU KEEP HAMMERING THEM DOWN).  THAT'S
    WHAT WE'RE DOING NOW, TRYING TO KEEP THIS PROJECT ON TRACK.  HE
    SMILED AT THIS, AND THE MOOD SEEMED TO LIGHTEN AT THAT POINT.
    ¶9. (C)  I THEN PROCEEDED TO EXPLAIN MY VIEW OF THE SITUATION
    IN OKINAWA, AND WHY I THINK WE CAN BRING GOVERNOR NAKAIMA AROUND
    TO GET HIS COOPERATION ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT,
    AND HIS REQUIRED APPROVAL FOR THE LANDFILL.  IN MY VIEW, NAKAIMA
    WANTS TO GET THIS SETTLED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE SO HE CAN FOCUS
    ON ECONOMIC ISSUES IN OKINAWA.  BUT UNFORTUNATELY HE MADE
    PROMISES IN THE CAMPAIGN WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING THEIR REAL
    MEANING.  NOW HE IS LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT, AND RECENTLY IS
    SHOWING MUCH MORE FLEXIBILITY IN FINDING AN ESCAPE ROUTE FROM
    THOSE PROMISES.

    ¶10. (C)  THE ""NEGOTIATED OVER OUR HEADS"" ISSUE IS SETTLED -
    THE CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM HAS TAKEN CARE OF THIS COMPLAINT.
    THE ""CLOSED STATE IN THREE YEARS"" IS FIXED AS WELL - ALL NAKAIMA
    WANTS IS A STATEMENT FROM KYUMA THAT THE GOJ WILL MAKE BEST
    EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE DANGER AT FUTENMA; HE DOESN'T EVEN WANT TO
    HEAR HOW.

    ¶11. (C)  THAT LEAVES THE ""V"" PLAN.  RECENTLY THE GOVERNOR HAS
    REPEATED TO THE PRESS THAT HE WILL FOLLOW THE VIEWS OF NAGO
    CITY.  SO, I EMPHASIZED TO KYUMA, I'M CONFIDENT THAT IF WE BRING
    MAYOR SHIMABUKURO AROUND, THE GOVERNOR WILL COME AROUND AS WELL.
     AND I THINK WE CAN BRING SHIMABUKURO AROUND.

    ¶12. (C)  I MET FRIDAY WITH THE THREE KU-CHO (DISTRICT MAYORS)
    OF THE NAGO CITY DISTRICTS DIRECTLY AROUND CAMP SCHWAB.  AFTER
    DISCUSSION SIMILAR TO THAT ABOVE, AND AN EXPLANATION OF THE
    ACTUAL PLAN FOR FRF, THEY ALL SAID THAT THE PLAN WE HAVE AGREED
    TO IS OK FOR THEM, WITHOUT ANY REVISIONS OR ADJUSTMENTS.  THEY
    CLAIMED IT WAS THE FIRST TIME ANYONE HAD ACTUALLY EXPLAINED THE

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    PLAN TO THEM (AT THE LEVEL OF DETAIL IN THE APRIL 13, 2006 MAP),
    AND THAT ALL THEY HAD SEEN BEFORE WAS THE MORE GENERAL MAP
    ATTACHED TO THE ROADMAP.

    ¶13. (C)  BUT, THEY SAID, WE'VE BEEN ASKING THAT THE RUNWAY BE
    ""PLACED AS FAR AS POSSIBLE AWAY FROM THE TOWNS TOWARDS THE
    OCEAN"".  IN OUR VIEW, THEY CONTINUED, THE ROADMAP PLAN OF MAY
    2006 IS JUST A CONCEPTUAL PLAN, SO NOBODY KNOWS WHERE THE ACTUAL
    BASELINE IS FOR THE RUNWAY LOCATION.  SO COULDN'T THE TWO
    GOVERNMENTS JUST MAKE PUBLIC THE DETAILED FRF MASTER PLAN, AND
    WITHOUT ACTUALLY MAKING ANY CHANGES, STATE THAT IT HAD BEEN
    ""ADJUSTED"" OR ""SLIGHTLY REVISED (SHUSEI IN JAPANESE)""?  I
    RESPONDED THAT NO, WE COULD NOT SAY THAT.  EVEN STATING THERE
    HAD BEEN A REVISION, EVEN IF THERE HAD NOT BEEN, WOULD OPEN UP
    THE CAN OF WORMS ABOUT MAKING CHANGES TO THE PLAN, AND PUT THE
    CONSENSUS AT RISK, SINCE WE COULD EXPECT CALLS FOR CHANGES FROM
    OTHER DISSATISFIED PARTIES AS WELL.

    ¶14. (C)  HOWEVER, I SUGGESTED, HOW ABOUT IF, WHEN WE MAKE
    PUBLIC THE MASTER PLAN, AS IT IS NOW WITHOUT ANY CHANGES, BOTH
    GOVERNMENTS WERE TO STATE SOMETHING LIKE ""IN AGREEING ON THE
    ROADMAP AND THE MASTER PLAN BOTH GOVERNMENTS GAVE STRONG
    CONSIDERATION TO LOCAL VIEWS AND THE DESIRE THAT THE RUNWAY BE
    AS FAR AS POSSIBLE FROM THE TOWNS, AND WE HAVE PLACED THE
    RUNWAYS AS FAR TOWARD THE OCEAN AS POSSIBLE.""  WE CANNOT SAY WE
    HAVE CHANGED THE PLAN, BUT WE COULD TRUTHFULLY SAY WE HAVE
    PLACED THE RUNWAY AS FAR TOWARDS THE OCEAN AS POSSIBLE, SINCE
    THAT IS IN FACT WHAT WE DID IN AGREEING TO THE PLAN IN THE MAY
    1, 2006 ROADMAP.

    ¶15. (C)  THE THREE KU-CHO LIKED THIS APPROACH, AND SAID THEY
    WOULD MEET SOON WITH MAYOR SHIMABUKURO TO TRY AND PERSUADE HIM
    TO ACCEPT THE CURRENT PLAN, AND ALSO TO ASK HIM TO PERSUADE
    NAKAIMA.  MY STRONG IMPRESSION, WHICH I CONVEYED TO KYUMA, IS
    THAT THEY ARE VERY WORRIED ABOUT LOSING OR HAVING DELAYS IN THE
    ECONOMIC PROMOTION MEASURES.

    ¶16. (C)  BASED ON THIS CONVERSATION, I TOLD KYUMA I THINK WE
    CAN BRING THE MAYOR AND GOVERNOR AROUND.  THE BIGGEST MISTAKE WE
    COULD MAKE WOULD BE TO SHOW ANY FLEXIBILITY AT ALL ON THE POINT
    OF REVISIONS TO THE PLAN.  LANGUAGE SUCH AS THAT ABOVE COULD BE
    USED BY NAKAIMA TO EXPLAIN TO THE PUBLIC WE HAVE TAKEN HIS VIEWS
    INTO ACCOUNT, BYPASSING THE ISSUE OF ASKING FOR REVISIONS.  I
    NOTED TO KYUMA THAT THE LANGUAGE OF ""PLACING THE RUNWAYS AS FAR
    TOWARD THE OCEAN AS POSSIBLE"" IS LANGUAGE THAT THE GOVERNOR
    HIMSELF HAS USED WITH ME IN EXPLAINING HIS REQUESTS TO THE GOJ.
    THE GOVERNOR THEREFORE COULD EXPLAIN THAT THE MASTER PLAN HAS
    TAKEN HIS VIEWS INTO CONSIDERATION.

    ¶17. (C)  KYUMA RESPONDED THAT HE IS NOT AS OPTIMISTIC AS I
    THAT NAKAIMA CAN BE PERSUADED WITHOUT ANY REVISIONS TO THE PLAN,
    BUT HE AGREED THAT HE WOULD NOT EXPRESS ANY FLEXIBILITY TO THE
    GOVERNOR (DESPITE WHAT WE KNOW HE HAS BEEN SAYING IN PUBLIC, AND
    PERHAPS IN PRIVATE).  I TOLD KYUMA I WOULD BE MEETING WITH MAYOR
    SHIMABUKURO AND GOVERNOR NAKAIMA SHORTLY TO TRY AND PUSH THEM
    FORWARD.

    ¶18. (C) I MENTIONED TO KYUMA THAT THERE ARE RUMORS IN OKINAWA TO
    THE EFFECT THE NAGO CONSTRUCTION MAGNATE NAKADOMARI IS
    PRESSURING THE NAGO MAYOR TO MOVE THE RUNWAY TOWARDS THE OCEAN
    IN ORDER TO GET MORE LANDFILL WORK FOR HIS COMPANY.  KYUMA SAID
    HE IS AWARE OF THOSE RUMORS, BUT NOTED THAT IN HIS EXPERIENCE
    THE FACT THAT SUCH RUMORS ARE WIDELY CIRCULATING WOULD IN ITSELF

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    PUT AN END TO THIS PRESSURE, SINCE NAKADOMARI'S INVOLVEMENT
    WOULD BE WIDELY KNOWN, AND LEGAL ISSUES WOULD ENSUE.  (NOTE:
    KYUMA DID NOT TELL ME HE HAD MET PRIVATELY THAT MORNING WITH
    NAKADOMARI, ALTHOUGH REPORTERS WHO WERE STAKING OUT HIS HOTEL
    TELL ME THAT HE DID.)

    IRAQ

    ¶19. (C) WHEN I ASKED KYUMA WHAT HIS MOST DIFFICULT ISSUE IS NOW
    WITHIN MOD, HE REPLIED IT IS HIS EFFORT TO GET EXTENSION ON
    JAPAN'S SPECIAL LEGISLATION FOR CONTINUED PARTICIPATION IN
    OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM.  HE NOTED THAT IN HIS PERSONAL VIEW IT
    WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER TO DELAY THE ATTACK ON IRAQ, BUT
    NEVERTHELESS JAPAN FULLY SUPPORTS THE U.S. IN IRAQ, AND HE
    PERSONALLY IS FULLY COMMITTED TO GETTING AN EXTENSION TO THE
    LEGISLATION.  HE ASSURED ME HE WILL GET THIS DONE.  IT IS A
    SENSITIVE ISSUE POLITICALLY IN JAPAN, HE SAID, BECAUSE THE
    EXTENSION WOULD COME VERY CLOSE TO THE TIME OF THE UPPER HOUSE
    ELECTIONS IN JULY.  THIS IS ONE REASON, HE EXPLAINED, THAT JAPAN
    HAS DECIDED TO DELAY THE 22 MEETING.  HE DOES NOT WANT TO GO TO
    WASHINGTON WHEN STILL EMPTY HANDED ON FRF IMPLEMENTATION
    DECISIONS AND IRAQ LEGISLATION EXTENSION, SO IT IS BEST TO DELAY
    THE 22.

    ¶20. (C)  PRESS.  KNOWING THERE WERE MANY REPORTERS OUTSIDE
    WAITING FOR OUR DEPARTURE, WE AGREED THAT KYUMA WOULD SIMPLY SAY
    HE HAD COME TO OKINAWA TO HEAR ""THIRD PARTY VIEWS"" (MINE) ON THE
    SITUATION IN OKINAWA.  WHEN TALKING TO THE PRESS, HE SAID THAT
    THE CONSUL GENERAL HAD STATED THAT IN HIS VIEW THE PEOPLE OF
    OKINAWA ARE MOST CONCERNED ABOUT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
    EMPLOYMENT ISSUES, WITH BASE ISSUES THIRD ON THE LIST OF
    CONCERNS.  HE ALSO SAID IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION WHETHER WE HAD
    DISCUSSED REVISIONS TO THE FRF PLAN THAT ""THE U.S. VIEWS ARE
    WELL KNOWN.""  IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS I TOLD THE PRESS ""WE HAD
    A WIDE-RANGING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON ISSUES AFFECTING OKINAWA.""
    WITH RESPECT TO FRF AND REALIGNMENT, I SAID ""BOTH AGREED IT IS
    IMPORTANT TO IMPLEMENT THE REALIGNMENT PLANS AS QUICKLY AS
    POSSIBLE, SINCE THE REALIGNMENT PLAN IS VERY MUCH TO THE BENEFIT
    OF OKINAWA.  I AM CONFIDENT THAT MOST OKINAWANS WHO UNDERSTAND
    THE PLAN SUPPORT THIS.""

    ¶21. (C)  ALL IN ALL IT WAS A MOST INTERESTING AFTERNOON WITH
    KYUMA.  I NOTE THAT DURING THE ENTIRE MEETING NOT ONCE DID KYUMA
    MENTION MOD VICE MINISTER MORIYA, EVEN THOUGH MORIYA HAS PLAYED
    THE KEY ROLE WITHIN MOD ON FRF.  I HAD THE IMPRESSION KYUMA HAD
    MADE THE ASSUMPTION HE NEEDS TO OFFER REVISIONS TO NAKAIMA
    WITHOUT REALIZING THE REAL DIFFICULTIES OF SUCH REVISIONS, AND
    WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING THE FLEXIBLE DIRECTION IN WHICH THE
    GOVERNOR IS HEADING.  I THINK HE UNDERSTANDS THOSE DIFFICULTIES
    BETTER NOW.  HOPEFULLY HE WILL REFRAIN FROM SHOWING FLEXIBILITY
    TO THE GOVERNOR SO THAT THE GOVERNOR CAN BE PERSUADED TO
    COOPERATE WITH THE CURRENT PLAN.
    MAHER

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