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### Viewing cable 07MANAGUA2185, SILENCING CRITICS: ATTACKING THE OPPOSITION LEADER

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07MANAGUA2185 | 2007-09-24 22:20 | 2011-06-01 08:00 | SECRET | Embassy Managua

Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758464.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4103/la-embusa-y-el-gabinete-de-ortega
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4104/d-rsquo-escoto-en-onu-ldquo-un-desafio-de-ortega-a-ee-uu-rdquo
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4102/estrada-y-la-ldquo-doble-cara-rdquo-ante-ee-uu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4041/millones-de-dolares-sin-control-y-a-discrecion
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4040/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-venezuela-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu

`

    VZCZCXRO2223
    PP RUEHLMC
    DE RUEHMU #2185/01 2672220
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 242220Z SEP 07
    FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1335
    INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAGUA 002185

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2017
    TAGS: PGOV ECON EFIN RELAM KDEM KCOR NU
    SUBJECT: SILENCING CRITICS: ATTACKING THE OPPOSITION LEADER

    MANAGUA 00002185  001.2 OF 004

    Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli, reason 1.4 (b) & (d)

    Summary
    - - - -

    ¶1.  (S) The anti-democratic forces of the Ortega government
    combined with the corrupt powerbroker Arnoldo Aleman are
    mounting a politically motivated attack against the leader of
    the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) Eduardo Montealegre.
    The Comptroller General's office has accused Montealegre of
    criminal activities related to his effort as Finance Minister
    in 2003 to renegotiate government issued bonds, known as
    Negotiable Indemnization Certificates (CENIs).  It is not
    clear how personally damaging to Montealegre these charges
    will be ultimately, but the threat is real, and there are
    indications that ALN party members are jittery.  On September
    19, ALN National Assembly Deputy Ramiro Silva announced he
    was leaving the party.  With the ALN genuinely shaken by the
    attacks on Montealegre, we need to continue to find ways to
    foster the democratic forces of Nicaragua.  Comment begins at
    paragraph 9.  Extended background on the CENI issue begins at
    paragraph 11.  End Summary.

    The Messy Politics
    - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶2.  (C) Montealegre's involvement in the CENI case became a
    political weapon for his political opponents during the 2006
    election campaign.  One of the most outspoken critics of
    Montealegre's links with the CENI case was PLC National
    Assembly Deputy Enrique Quinonez.  2006 election polling data
    suggests that the CENI accusations did hurt Montealegre.

    ¶3.  (C) Montealegre has told us before that he expected that
    the "Pacto" alliance formed by President Ortega and former
    President and convicted felon Arnoldo Aleman would continue
    to pursue him on the CENI issue.  The question is, according
    to ALN party strategist Eliseo Nunez, Jr., why has the
    Comptroller General decided to pursue the case against
    Montealegre now?  It could have done so last year before the
    elections.  The answer, it appears, may have something to do
    with the five-year statute of limitations in Nicaragua.  The
    Comptroller General's office September 12 announcement
    indicated that all five members of the Central Bank
    responsible for re-financing the CENIs, including
    Montealegre,  are culpable for acting without a legal basis
    in  refinancing the CENIs; however, the statute of
    limitations  for the other CENI-linked notables -- including
    Arnoldo Aleman and former Central Bank President Noel Ramirez
    -- has  already expired.  The sole real target is clearly
    Montealegre, and the Comptroller General's office had to wait
    until now to avoid any political collateral damage, Nunez
    told us.

    ¶4.  (C) Nunez doubts that the Ortega regime intends to do
    more than fire a warning shot at Montealegre.  Liberal
    opposition disunity favors the Sandinistas, Nunez argues, and
    as long as Montealegre continues to lead an anti-Aleman
    liberal movement, the Sandinistas benefit -- particularly as
    the country enters the municipal election period.  He
    indicated that the threat to Montealegre was real, however,
    and that Montealegre could face as much as 14 years'
    incarceration, should the Prosecutor's office decide to act
    on the Comptroller's conclusions.  Nunez also noted that if
    the case winds up in the Pacto-controlled courts,
    Montealegre's chances of a fair judicial process are limited.
     Admitting that the ALN would be leaderless without
    Montealegre (Note:  Nunez's father is a National Assembly
    Deputy and one of the more important ALN politicians.  End
    note.), Nunez added that the CENI case made it all the more
    urgent for the ALN to reach an institutional cooperation
    agreement with the Constitutional Liberal Party (PLC).  If
    something happens to Montealegre, he opined, the only way to
    maintain a separate ALN identity within the liberal current
    of Nicaraguan political life would be through some kind of
    arrangement between the ALN and the PLC.

    ALN Supporting Their leader?
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶5.  (C) Kitty Monterrey, ALN Chief Advisor, told us on
    September 19 that the situation is dire.  The ALN party
    members are rattled by the possibility that Montealegre may
    not survive the CENI issue.  "They are looking for other

    MANAGUA 00002185  002.2 OF 004

    options," she argued.  On September 19, ALN Deputy Ramiro
    Silva Gutierrez announced that he was leaving the party, to
    become an independent National Assembly Deputy.  Monterrey
    told us that the ALN leadership knows that the Sandinistas
    have been courting Silva.  She doubted however, that it was
    money alone that tempted Silva away.  She told us that Silva
    and his family have received personal threats.  "They are
    attacking Eduardo (Montealegre) on all fronts.  The party is
    on the verge of complete disintegration," Monterrey warned.

    ¶6.  (C) On September 17, PLC Whip Maximino Rodriguez and PLC
    heavyweight Enrique Quinonez both told the press that they
    would not support removing Montealegre's immunity as a
    Deputy, if CENI-related criminal charges are eventually
    brought against him.  "It's not a good sign," Monterrey
    argued, "when members of the PLC are out there defending
    (Montealegre) and the ALN itself is silent."  On September
    18, PLC Chief Spokesman Leonel Teller "clarified" the PLC
    position, claiming that PLC wants what's best for the nation,
    and that Montealegre should concentrate on liberal unity and
    not on attacking PLC leader Aleman.

    Next Steps
    - - - - - -

    ¶7.  (C) The Comptroller General's Office does not have the
    ability to bring charges against any individual.  At this
    point it is up to the Prosecutor General (Fiscal).  It is not
    clear what steps the Prosecutor General will take, and that
    office has announced that it would conduct its own
    investigation into the CENI issue.  Monterrey told us that
    despite his close ties to Aleman, she doubted that Prosecutor
    General Julio Centeno Gomez would directly attack
    Montealegre, given the strong personal relationship between
    the two.  However, if there is sufficient pressure on him,
    Monterrey guessed that Centeno would find away to excuse
    himself from the action, letting others in the
    Aleman-dominated Prosecutor's Office take the lead.

    ¶8.  (C) Monterrey outlined for us the three choices
    Montealegre faces:  cut a deal with Ortega; cut a deal with
    Aleman; or, go it alone.  Going it alone will fail, she
    opined.  Without the solid backing of a united ALN,
    Montealegre has neither the financial resources nor the
    political capital to take on the Pacto.  However, she said
    that there was no chance that Montealegre would cut a deal
    with either Ortega or Aleman.  "Eduardo (Montealegre) doesn't
    have a plan," Monterrey lamented, and as one of the ALN's
    chief financial officers during the 2006 campaign, "they will
    be coming after me next."

    Comment
    - - - -

    ¶9.  (S) Monterrey is correct that the ALN is facing its most
    serious challenge.  Montealegre has known for some time that
    the FSLN/Aleman Pacto would come after him on the CENI issue
    and neither he nor his party have developed an effective
    strategy to counter it.  We also note that even the
    Comptroller's findings alone could conceivably bar
    Montealegre from being certified as a municipal candidate in
    2009 or as a Presidential candidate in 2011.  Further, we see
    no reason to discount Monterrey's assertion that the
    weaker/less loyal members of the ALN are scouting for options
    should Montealegre, and thus the ALN, go down.  Silva's
    departure from the party has the potential to be the first of
    several such defections and is exacerbating existing tensions
    within the ALN and with ANL's coalition partner, the
    Conservative Party.  Montealegre may be the best
    representative for a democratic future in Nicaragua, but he
    is under serious attack and will need to go on the offensive
    internally and externally to maintain his party and his
    position.  The CENI case has the potential to substantially
    weaken Montealegre's ability to be the leader of any united
    democratic front for the 2008 elections.

    ¶10.  (S) Nonetheless, there are many liberal supporters for
    democratic change at the municipal and local level, people
    who want to see an end to Aleman's corruption of the liberal,
    anti-Sandinista movement and Montealegre remains massively
    popular among them.  Recent public opinion polls give
    Montealegre a 64 percent approval rating, higher than any
    other political figure in the country.  Montealegre's
    difficulties make it all the more imperative that we find

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    ways to promote this democratic movement from the ground up
    by aiding them with the resources and the training they need
    to strengthen their institutions and to resist the combined
    forces of the Pacto.  End Comment.

    Convoluted Background - The Cliff Notes Version
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶11.  (SBU) Accusations that Montealegre abused his former
    capacity as Finance Minister for personal profit have been
    circulating since before the 2006 Presidential elections.
    The charges stem from Montealegre's association with
    BANCENTRO, one of the banks that, critics argue, benefited
    unduly during Nicaragua's 2000-2001 banking crisis.  On 12
    September, the office of Nicaragua's Comptroller General's
    office announced to the press that Montealegre should face
    criminal charges for his role in the 2003 refinancing of
    certain sovereign Nicaraguan bonds, known as Negotiable
    Indemnization Certificates (CENIs).

    ¶12.  (U) Four Nicaraguan banks failed in 2000-2001 after
    approving bad loans (many to insiders) and making unwise, if
    not fraudulent, investments.  Most of the board members of
    the first and largest bank to fail were Sandinistas, who were
    never charged with the financial impropriety that led to this
    string of failures.  The first two banks to fail were also
    used by a shell company to launder money out of Nicaragua.
    When the company's pyramid scheme fell apart, it took the
    banks with it.  At the time, there was no government deposit
    guarantee agency, but the Central Bank, responsible for
    ensuring the stability of the monetary system, deemed it
    necessary to protect depositors and issued short term (2-4
    year) bonds, CENIs, to facilitate the takeover of the failed
    banks by other Nicaraguan banking institutions.  The final
    value of these CENIs was approximately USD 450 million.  USD
    118 million were issued to cover deposits and an initial USD
    63 million were issued to the banks to encourage their
    purchase of the failed banks, assets.

    ¶13.  (U) Under the terms of the takeovers, the acquiring
    banks accepted responsibility for the deposits of the failed
    banks' customers (e.g. liabilities for the banks).   Given
    that the cause of the failures was the poor quality or
    overvaluation of the failing banks' assets (loans, government
    paper carried at face value, real estate, equipment,
    artwork), the acquiring banks were given the option of
    declining certain assets of the failed institutions.  The
    Central Bank issued CENIs to make up the difference with an
    initial payment of USD 63 million in CENIS to cover the gap
    between assets and liabilities.  The deposits from the failed
    banks passed to the acquiring banks overnight, but the terms
    of the acquisition gave the acquiring banks six months (plus
    a three month extension) to evaluate the value of the assets
    (loans) which they had accepted, and reclassify the loans --
    if necessary -- with the agreement of Central Bank experts.
    If loans that one of the failed bank had classified as "A"
    were in fact non-performing, the Central Bank issued
    additional CENIs to ensure an adequate level of loan
    provisioning.  The assets that the acquiring banks had
    declined were returned to the "liquidation boards" of each
    failed bank for disposition.  After the evaluation period,
    the Central Bank issued an additional USD 269 million in
    CENIS to the acquiring banks to cover loans deemed
    non-performing.

    ¶14.  (U) BANCENTRO, of which Montealegre had been General
    Director and a minority (10 percent) shareholder, was one of
    the successful bidders on the assets and liabilities of the
    failed banks.  Critics charge that the failed banks' assets
    were seriously undervalued and that the value of the CENIs
    that BANCENTRO and the other acquiring banks received were,
    therefore, excessive.  Haroldo Montealegre, distant cousin
    and rival of Eduardo Montealegre, and former President of one
    of the failed banks, leaked the names of several well-known
    borrowers whose loans had been classified as "A grade" by the
    failed bank, then reclassified as "C grade" by BANCENTRO and
    the Central Bank, but were subsequently reclassified as "A"
    again -- leading to a widespread belief that BANCENTRO had
    pulled a fast one on the Nicaraguan public.

    ¶15.  (U) The Central Bank, BANCENTRO and the other acquiring
    banks insist that the process was transparent, and that if
    loans were reclassified it was because the failed banks had
    improperly classified them in the first place.  BANCENTRO

    MANAGUA 00002185  004.2 OF 004

    officials have explained in the past that  most of the CENIs
    provided to their institution were in  fact issued to cover
    the face value of the assets that they  had declined at the
    start of the process (real estate,  Property Indemnization
    Bonds (BPIs) carried at face value,  and obviously hopeless
    loans), not because of subsequent  reclassification.  With
    respect to the cases leaked to the press, BANCENTRO maintains
    that they were indeed non-performing loans when acquired, and
    only subsequently became loans in good standing because
    BANCENTRO restructured and refinanced them.  The Comptroller
    General's Office investigated these accusations of faulty
    revaluation, but it was never able to prove any fraud or to
    tie it to Montealegre.  (Note: An analysis by the Central
    Bank in August of 2006, determined that the revaluations and
    devaluations were correct.  End note.)

    The Montealegre Puzzle Piece
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶16.  (U) In January 2003, Montealegre became Finance Minister
    in the newly elected Bolanos administration.  At that time,
    he resigned as General Director of BANCENTRO and divested his
    minority shareholding of BANCENTRO.  The purchaser of
    Montealegre's BANCENTRO holding did not have sufficient funds
    to pay for the entire holding at one time, so Montealegre
    agreed to an extended payment plan for the sale.

    ¶17.  (U) In his capacity as Finance Minister, Montealegre
    faced the immediate challenge of how to deal with the fast
    approaching maturity dates of the CENIs issued by the
    previous administration.  There was no possibility that the
    Nicaraguan government could have repaid the maturing CENIs.
    As Finance Minister and ex officio Chairman of the Board of
    the Central Bank, Montealegre oversaw the process of
    renegotiation of the payment terms and interest rates of the
    CENIs.  The maturity terms were extended to ten years, and
    the some of the interest rates were substantially decreased,
    on average from 14.5% to 8.29%.  At this point the bonds
    renamed Bonos Bancarios and CENIs as such ceased to exist.

    ¶18.  (SBU) In August 2005, the Comptroller General's office
    issued a finding that the Central Bank did not have the
    authority to issue the bonds and therefore the CENIs were
    null and void.  At the time, the financial institutions did
    not appear to take the finding seriously, believing that
    some accommodation would be found to regularize the
    situation, as no government would allow the now stable
    financial system to be jeopardized by wiping out a
    significant portion of the assets of half of the banks of the
    system.  Both the previous and the current Central Bank
    presidents have stated that the Central Bank will honor the
    Bonos Bancarios, despite the Comptroller General's statement.
     They both felt that not to honor the bonds would seriously
    damage Nicaragua's recently hard won reputation as a good
    financial performer.

    ¶19.  (C) However, the 2005 finding by the Comptroller General
    did provide the basis for what appears to be the current
    politically motivated attack on Montealegre.  Montealegre can
    not be held responsible for the original decision in 2000 to
    issue CENIs, but by extension of the Comptroller General's
    2005 finding on the legality of the CENIs, the charge is that
    Montealegre exceeded his authority in renegotiating the
    bonds' terms.  To add to the gravity of the charges,
    according to Nunez, the Comptroller General's office may seek
    to link the 2003 renegotiation of the CENIs with the terms of
    Montealegre's sale of his shares in BANCENTRO.  The argument
    is that because the purchaser's payments to Montealegre for
    the sale of his minority BANCENTRO holding were still being
    made when he was in office, his renegotiation of the CENIs as
    Minister of Finance resulted directly in personal financial
    benefit.
    TRIVELLI

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