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### Viewing cable 06MANAGUA221, NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS REGIONAL REPORTING: CARAZO

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06MANAGUA221 | 2006-01-30 22:28 | 2011-06-01 08:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Managua

Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758464.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4103/la-embusa-y-el-gabinete-de-ortega
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4104/d-rsquo-escoto-en-onu-ldquo-un-desafio-de-ortega-a-ee-uu-rdquo
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4102/estrada-y-la-ldquo-doble-cara-rdquo-ante-ee-uu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4041/millones-de-dolares-sin-control-y-a-discrecion
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4040/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-venezuela-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu

`

    VZCZCXYZ0013
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHMU #0221/01 0302228
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 302228Z JAN 06
    FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5067
    INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0532
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000221

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2016
    TAGS: PGOV KDEM SOCI NU
    SUBJECT: NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS REGIONAL REPORTING: CARAZO

    REF: MANAGUA 124

    Classified By: AMBASSADOR PAUL TRIVELLI. REASONS 1.4 (B,D).

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  Meetings with political, economic and
    religious leaders in the Department of Carazo suggest that by
    far the two most popular presidential candidates there are
    Eduardo Montealegre and Herty Lewites.  Montealegre has
    successfully siphoned off elements of the PLC departmental
    organization and enjoys significant urban and rural support,
    while the candidacy of native-son Lewites has sharply divided
    the FSLN, particularly in urban areas.  The FSLN retains a
    hard core of supporters and the PLC departmental organization
    remains dogmatically loyal to Arnoldo Aleman, but none of the
    would-be presidential candidates of either of the two
    traditional parties have campaigned seriously in Carazo.
    Most observers remain deeply concerned that a combination of
    CSE incompetence and malfeasance could prevent free and fair
    elections in November, citing local examples of CSE officials
    facilitating issuance of voter identification cards for FSLN
    supporters, while obstructing the efforts of others to obtain
    the documents.  The loyalty of rural voters who have
    historically voted for the PLC remains a wild card in what
    most observers describe as a "naturally" anti-Sandinista
    department.  END SUMMARY.

    ¶2. (C) On January 26, poloff and political FSN traveled to
    the Department of Carazo, just south and east of Managua, and
    met local leaders of "Vamos con Eduardo", the Alliance for
    the Republic (APRE), the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC),
    and the one non-Sandinista mayor in the Department, the PLC
    mayor of the tiny municipality of La Conquista.  Embassy
    officials also discussed politics, economics, and social
    issues with leaders of the Carazo Chamber of Commerce and the
    head of the Catholic Church's hierarchy in the department.
    The departmental representative of the Supreme Electoral
    Council, a Sandinista, refused a meeting, and referred
    emboffs to the CSE magistrates in Managua.  It was clear that
    the real electoral campaign has yet to begin in Carazo, as
    its cities, towns, and highways were largely empty of
    electoral propaganda.  The only visible posters, painted
    signs, and billboards dated from the 2004 municipal electoral
    campaign or earlier; most were for either the PLC or APRE.
    This cable focuses on the political elements of the Carazo
    trip.  Post will report on social and economic issues septel.

    MONTEALEGRE POPULAR AND CAMPAIGNING ACTIVELY, BUT STRENGTH OF
    ORGANIZATION AND DEPTH OF RURAL SUPPORT STILL UNCLEAR
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶3. (C) Except for the local PLC leaders, everyone emboffs met
    reported that Eduardo Montealegre is taking large numbers of
    party activists and supporters away from the PLC in both
    urban and rural areas.  Along with Lewites, Montealegre is
    one of only two presidential candidates to have campaigned
    seriously in Carazo, with regular visits that have included
    even the smallest municipality.  Most interlocutors believed
    that the national opinion polls portraying Montealegre and
    Lewites as the two most popular politicians in the country
    are reflective of popular sentiment in Carazo.

    ¶4. (C)  Chamber of Commerce leaders stated that most of the
    current FSLN mayors in the department are performing poorly,
    and that both the PLC and the FSLN were largely discredited
    with all but their most die-hard supporters.  They added that
    Herty Lewites had drawn away a significant number of FSLN
    supporters, especially in urban areas.  Virtually all
    business people, they claimed, support either Montealegre or
    Lewites (primarily the former), hoping that one or both of
    the two outsiders could bring the stability that Carazo and
    Nicaragua need in order to develop.  The business sector
    opposed the disqualification, or "inhibition" of any
    candidate, but feared that the FSLN and PLC would use their
    control of the CSE and the judiciary in efforts to manipulate
    the outcome of the elections.

    ¶5. (C) Wilber Lopez, the Carazo coordinator of "Vamos con
    Eduardo", met emboffs along with representatives from
    individual municipalities.  Almost all were relatively young
    (in their 30s), but with long local experience in Nicaragua's
    turbulent politics, dating back to 1990 in most cases.  Many
    were former PLC youth leaders.  All described themselves as
    "100 percent Liberal" and stated that they still considered
    themselves to be PLC members even though most have been
    thrown out of the party for supporting Montealegre.  Lopez
    and his subordinates asserted that they are building a strong
    departmental organization, going house to house to rally
    support, and have garnered over 10,000 supporters in seven
    months of work thus far.  They claimed that even many of
    those who remain in local PLC structures privately support
    Montealegre as the most viable liberal candidate.

    ¶6. (C) In addition to training party activists to defend the
    vote as "fiscales" on election day, the "Eduardo" movement is
    also preparing a campaign to assist voters in obtaining the
    required identity documents ("cedulas").  Although they
    welcomed the idea of a broad center-right alliance free of
    Aleman, they doubted whether such an alliance is possible,
    asserting that if voter turnout is sufficiently high, they
    could win in Carazo without such an alliance.  While most
    outside observers acknowledged Montealegre's popularity and
    his regular campaigning in Carazo, many questioned the
    movement's claims regarding the strength of its organization
    and its ability to change the allegiance of die-hard rural
    PLC voters.

    NATIVE-SON LEWITES POPULAR IN CARAZO TOWNS, BUT NOT MUCH
    IMPACT IN COUNTRYSIDE
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶7. (C) Although he was most recently mayor of Managua, Herty
    Lewites is originally from Jinotepe, the departmental capital
    of Carazo.  His "Hertylandia" theme/waterpark is located in

    the department, and when he was Minister of Tourism in the
    1980s, he helped bring a variety of tourism-related
    investments to Carazo.  Lewites thus enjoys a reputation for
    pragmatism and promotion of jobs and development in Carazo,
    and has a natural base of support there.  The mayor of
    Jinotepe, who was elected on the FSLN ticket in 2004, is
    actually from the Sandinista Renewal Movement (MRS), one of
    the members of Lewites' electoral coalition, and is actively
    supporting his campaign.

    ¶8. (C) Except for one FSLN town counselor from La Conquista
    who "crashed" emboffs meeting with the PLC mayor there,
    everyone else agreed that Lewites enjoys widespread support
    in urban areas of Carazo, particularly with many small
    business owners and educated public sector workers (teachers,
    doctors, etc.).  Some officials of other parties feared that
    Lewites might draw as many urban votes from the center-right
    parties as he would from the FSLN, and many questioned
    whether the Herty/Daniel split is anything more than a
    Sandinista tactic to divide the "democratic" vote.  Most
    interlocutors questioned the strength of Lewites' local
    organization and doubted that his support extended into rural
    areas.  However, everyone acknowledged that Lewites is
    campaigning actively and visibly throughout the department.

    ALVARADO SUPPORTERS LEANING TOWARDS PLC, BUT CANDIDATE
    INVISIBLE IN CARAZO
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶9. (C) Although his local supporters claim otherwise, emboffs
    saw and heard little to suggest that APRE pre-candidate Jose
    Antonio Alvarado has much of a campaign organization in
    Carazo, has campaigned in the department at all, or enjoys
    any real degree of popular support there.  Other than APRE
    officials, no one even mentioned Alvarado in any context
    until emboffs asked about him.  When asked, virtually
    everyone reported that, as far as they know, Alvarado is not
    active in Carazo.

    ¶10. (C) Emboffs heard a very different story from APRE
    Departmental President Erick Mendieta, who is also the
    departmental president of the "Amigos de Alvarado."
    Mendieta and a small group of APRE departmental officials met
    emboffs in the town of Diriamba, in a building with a large
    sign proclaiming it to be the local office of APRE National
    Assembly deputy Miguel Lopez Baldizon.  Mendieta proclaimed
    APRE the "Third Force" in Carazo (after the PLC and FSLN), a
    reference to its performance in the 2004 municipal elections
    that does not take into account the subsequent fracturing and
    desertions the party has suffered.  In keeping with the
    recent tentative rapprochement of APRE leaders Lopez and
    Alvarado with Aleman's PLC, Mendieta asserted that APRE
    maintains good relations with the PLC and Camino Cristiano in
    Carazo and that a grand center-right alliance of all these
    parties will be required to defeat the FSLN.

    ¶11. (C) In a refrain often used by Alvarado and his
    supporters (as well as by the PLC), Mendieta dismissed as
    inaccurate and flawed polls showing Montealegre and Lewites
    to be the country's two most popular politicians.  Mendieta
    insisted that the polls do not represent sentiments in
    Carazo, neglecting both Alvarado's support and the rural
    strength of the PLC.  Early in the meeting, Mendieta
    dismissed Eduardo Montealegre's chances in Carazo, claiming
    that while he might enjoy a certain popularity, h?Q8]practical people, the party's departmental
    leaders were among the most unpleasant, intransigent PLC
    officials emboffs have ever met.  Such differences are not
    uncommon (see reftel), as local PLC elected officials are
    often more open and flexible than their counterparts in the
    party structures.  While Chavez and his councilors agreed
    that the PLC needs to become more democratic and stated that
    theQQBH3I]0g and that of the "Vamos con Eduardo" group were
    striking.  While Wilber Lopez of "Vamos con Eduardo" acted as
    though he was leading a meeting of equals, and the other
    "Vamos con Eduardo" officials present all spoke their minds
    when they wished, it was obvious that Tapia was the local PLC
    caudillo, and that no one could speak without his approval.
    The PLC representatives, as a group, were also significantly
    older than their "Vamos con Eduardo" counterparts, and did
    not give the impression of being the sort of people who had
    ever been out defending the vote on election day.

    ¶14. (C) In a wide-ranging, reality-defying diatribe, Tapia
    insisted that in Carazo, the PLC organization and support are
    as strong as ever, that Montealegre has no organization and
    has met with "total rejection" in the department, that every
    PLC member in Carazo agreed one hundred percent with every
    decision ever taken by Aleman and his inner circle in
    Managua, that Aleman was a "political prisoner" who had never
    stolen a cent, and that no Aleman-Ortega "pact" had ever
    existed.  Tapia and his cohorts insisted that Aleman is the
    "indispensable leader" of the PLC and that the party could
    not change leadership in a time of "crisis."  Tapia claimed
    that the local PLC enjoys good relations with all of the
    other local political forces on the right of the
    spectrum--except for "Vamos con Eduardo", with which they
    have no relations whatsoever.  Tapia and company were
    unwilling or unable to offer any commentary on the various
    PLC presidential "pre-candidates", save to proclaim that
    whichever one is ultimately selected will win the general
    election.  While some kind of rapprochement with Jose Antonio
    Alvarado might be possible in Tapia's view, no accommodation
    could possibly be reached with Montealegre, whom he derided
    as rejecting primary elections now that the PLC had accepted
    them.

    ¶15. (C) While the PLC organization in Carazo is a shadow of
    its former self and while no PLC presidential pre-candidate
    enjoys any significant support there, Tapia and his followers
    were not the only ones to claim that uneducated rural voters
    accustomed to voting for the PLC slot on the ballot
    ("casilla") would unthinkingly punch the same ticket as
    usual, effectively making the PLC an indispensable part of
    any strategy to win the rural areas.  Such claims are
    difficult to evaluate, but anti-Sandinista rural voters in
    Nicaragua have a history of voting for whichever force they
    believe is most likely to prevent an Ortega victory.

    FSLN DIVIDED BY LEWITES, BUT RETAINS ITS HARD CORE
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶16. (C) Carazo has been strongly anti-Sandinista since the
    inception of democracy in Nicaragua in 1990, and the current
    predominance of FSLN mayors in the department is largely a
    result of high voter abstention in 2004 and the sharp
    divisions amongst the "democratic" parties that year (see
    paragraph 18).  Virtually all of emboffs' interlocutors
    agreed that the Sandinista vote in Carazo tops out at 30
    percent of the electorate.  Only disillusionment with
    politics and corresponding high abstention, shenanigans by
    the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), and divisions among the
    "democratic forces" allowed the FSLN to make significant
    inroads in Carazo in the 2004 municipal elections.  With
    Lewites apparently drawing off a significant portion of these
    voters, at least in urban areas, numerous observers
    characterized the FSLN as "badly divided" in Carazo.  Given
    these circumstances, only a Lewites return to the FSLN fold,
    high voter abstention (which is not common in Nicaraguan
    presidential/legislative elections), or new CSE machinations
    could enable an FSLN breakthrough in Carazo.  Perhaps in part
    as a result of these realities, Daniel Ortega has yet to
    campaign in any serious way in the department.

    EVERYONE WORRIED ABOUT CSE INCOMPETENCE AND PRO-FSLN BIAS
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶17. Everyone emboffs met expressed concern on the ability and
    the desire of the CSE to carry out free and fair elections in
    November.  All of the representatives of the center-right
    parties stated that they are planning and implementing
    projects to obtain cedulas for their voters, as the local CSE
    official actively obstructed the efforts of their voters
    while facilitating the applications of FSLN militants and the
    delivery of their cedulas.  This was particularly a problem
    for non-FSLN rural voters, who must travel to Jinotepe to
    apply for and obtain cedulas.  Sandinista voters do not
    suffer such difficulties, as their cedulas are delivered to
    them by CSE officials.  Emboffs also heard regular complaints
    that the CSE is issuing cedulas to underage FSLN
    sympathizers.  Aside from such biases, numerous party
    officials also complained that the CSE has never made any
    kind of effort to update the electoral register or issue
    cedulas until a few months before each election.

    CARAZO: DEMOGRAPHICS AND VOTING PROFILE
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶18. (U)   Total Population (2003 est.): 178,818
              Total Urban Population:         109,614
              Total Rural Population:         69,204

              Votes Received by Party, 2004 Municipal Elections

              PLC:   17,080
              FSLN:  25,167
              APRE:  8,459
              CCN:   1,014
              PLI:   600
              AC:    488
              PLN:   390
              PRN:   307
              MSL:   120

    COMMENT
    - - - -

    ¶19. (C) Since 1990, Carazo has been a strongly
    anti-Sandinista department.  When the non-Sandinista parties
    were more united, they won six out of eight municipalities in
    the 2000 municipal elections.  But when they were sharply
    divided in the 2004 municipal elections, and their voters
    disillusioned with the direction of national politics,
    abstention was over 50 percent and the FSLN took seven out of
    eight municipalities.  However, even with historically high
    abstention in 2004, the combined votes of anti-FSLN parties
    were larger than the Sandinista tally in all but two of the
    eight municipalities.  Particularly if Herty Lewites remains
    in the race and divides the FSLN vote, Carazo is a department
    that the center-right forces should win--if they can overcome
    their differences.  Herty Lewites and Eduardo Montealegre
    have started their campaigns with the advantage of widespread
    popularity, but the depth of their organizational strength
    remains in doubt, as well as their ability to change
    ingrained rural voting preferences.  However, despite PLC and
    APRE claims that poor campesinos are blindly loyal to Aleman
    and the PLC, they and other anti-FSLN voters have
    demonstrated considerable electoral savvy in the past,
    casting their ballots for whatever force seemed most capable
    of defeating Daniel Ortega.  If Montealegre can build a solid
    organization and convince people that his movement has
    eclipsed the PLC, he stands a good chance of persuading rural
    voters in Carazo and elsewhere not to "waste" their ballots
    by casting them for the PLC.
    TRIVELLI

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