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### Viewing cable 07MANAMA659, REFLECTIONS ON AL-WIFAQ'S EFFORTS IN PARLIAMENT

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07MANAMA659 | 2007-07-16 12:30 | 2011-05-04 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Manama

Appears in these articles:
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9115
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9116
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9117
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9118
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9119
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9120
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9121
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9122
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9123
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9124
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9125
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9126
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9127
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9128
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9122
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9129
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9131
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9562
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9952
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9950
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9951
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9954
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9953

`

    VZCZCXRO3592
    OO RUEHDE RUEHDIR
    DE RUEHMK #0659/01 1971230
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 161230Z JUL 07
    FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7020
    INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT  PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAMA 000659

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2017
    TAGS: PGOV PREL BA POL
    SUBJECT: REFLECTIONS ON AL-WIFAQ'S EFFORTS IN PARLIAMENT

    REF: A. REF. MANAMA 476
    ¶B. REF. 06 MANAMA 1214

    Classified By: Ambassador William T. Monroe for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

    -------
    SUMMARY
    -------

    ¶1. (C) In this, al-Wifaq's first legislative session in
    Bahrain's Council of Representatives (COR), the society has
    fielded inexperienced MPs and endured poor relations with the
    government and other political societies as a result of
    al-Wifaq's boycott of the 2002 elections. However, al-Wifaq
    has built trust among the other COR blocs and the government,
    which has allowed it to pass proposals that are held in
    common by other blocs. Al-Wifaq supported a 15% public
    sector pay increase, income subsidies for those awaiting
    public housing, a welfare system, and unemployment insurance.
    On the more controversial issues of political rights,
    individual freedoms, and constitutional reform, however,
    al-Wifaq has seen a lack of support from other parliamentary
    blocs, due largely to government influence over them. The
    lack of cooperation from the government and other blocs has
    led to increasing constituent discontent for al-Wifaq, which
    has pushed the party to place a premium on widely supported
    standard of living and general services legislation to retain
    constituent support. Al-Wifaq also contends with the
    rejectionist Haq, which actively discredits al-Wifaq to
    advance its own cause. By allowing al-Wifaq to achieve more
    results in the COR, the government can continue to bolster
    al-Wifaq's legitimacy among its constituents and encourage
    participation in government, rather than with Haq. However,
    by continuing to limit al-Wifaq,s ability to pass
    legislation, the government may risk delegitimizing al-Wifaq
    and increasing the credibility of Haq in what may be a zero
    sum game between the two Shiite groups. End Summary.

    ------------------------------------------
    Al-Wifaq,s Experience in the First Session
    ------------------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) Meeting with Emboffs June 19, head of leading Shia
    political society al-Wifaq,s 2006 election campaign Jassim
    Redha said that he had been dissatisfied with his society's
    election candidates because many were religious figures
    without political experience. He explained that al-Wifaq
    officials had been limited in how much they could influence
    the slate of candidates because constituents recommended
    candidates to the party. While society officials could veto
    a choice, they worried that doing so widely would alienate
    constituents. Instead, al-Wifaq accepted the nominations of
    religious figures because it needed as many votes in
    parliament as possible. The result, according to Redha, has
    been a crop of MPs among which only five or six are qualified
    and capable of producing results in parliament, while the
    rest were elected for religious reasons.

    ¶3. (C) Al-Wifaq,s boycott of the 2002 elections resulted in
    poor relations with the government and participating
    political societies. When al-Wifaq,s MPs assumed their
    roles in parliament following the 2006 elections, they were
    initially faced with the need to repair those relationships.
    Regarding the building of trust with the government, al-Wifaq
    MP Dr. Jassim Hussein expressed satisfaction at al-Wifaq,s
    access to ministers and the ministers, willingness to listen
    and act on al-Wifaq,s concerns, with the exception of the
    Sunni-dominated Ministry of Defense. (Note: Hussein, a
    former Bahrain University professor who currently authors
    several economic columns in the local press, told Econoff
    July 15 that ministers were afraid not to respond to him.
    "They always answer me quickly. They know I can make trouble
    for them." End note.) According to al-Wifaq MP Jawad
    Fairooz, when they started working with the other societies
    in parliament, they found agreement on 40-50% of their
    agenda, including raising the standard of living and
    improving general services. However, while al-Wifaq had
    additional issues on their agenda, Fairooz indicated that the
    other societies did not. Thus, in order to gain political
    allies and build trust, al-Wifaq chose to focus primarily on
    these common issues of wages, housing, welfare, unemployment,
    education, and the building of additional health centers.
    They delayed pursuing the political reform portion of their
    agenda, namely political rights, individual freedoms, and
    constitutional amendments.

    ¶4. (C) Fairooz indicated that al-Wifaq supported a wage
    proposal increasing salaries by 15% in the public sector.
    Al-Wifaq also supported a bill that provided income subsidies
    for those awaiting government housing. For poor families in
    need of financial assistance, al-Wifaq supported a one-time

    MANAMA 00000659 002 OF 004

    BD100 ($265) payout and a monthly BD150 ($398) welfare
    payment from the Ministry of Social Development. All three
    of these measures have passed the COR with al-Wifaq,s
    support and are awaiting a government response. Al-Wifaq
    supported an unemployment insurance program approved by the
    government by Royal Decree. As it became clear that the
    program would include a 1% mandatory deduction from
    employees' salaries, al-Wifaq's constituents became
    unsettled. (Note: This issue has since become a political
    and religious issue and al-Wifaq has clarified that it
    supports the program in principle, but does not support
    mandatory salary deductions. The deductions began from
    June's salary. End note.)

    ---------------------------------------
    Challenges on Controversial Legislation
    ---------------------------------------

    ¶5. (C) Political rights and individual freedoms, Fairooz
    explained, are points of contention among the parliamentary
    blocs. While other blocs do not include these issues in
    their agenda, al-Wifaq considers them essential in building a
    functioning democracy. Despite low support from other blocs,
    al-Wifaq expects to receive drafts of a freedom of assembly
    law and a press freedom law in the next session. However,
    Fairooz speculated that the government would delay that
    process as long as is legally permissible because the
    proposed legislation was not supported by the government or
    by pro-government blocs.

    ¶6. (C) According to Fairooz, al-Wifaq considers the eventual
    transformation of the government into a constitutional
    monarchy critical to the long-term viability of the state.
    However, no other bloc shares al-Wifaq,s interest in
    constitutional reform, thus limiting their ability to pass
    amendments to the constitution. In this parliamentary
    session, Fairooz explained, al-Wifaq tested the political
    will of the other blocs by submitting two proposals for
    changes to the lawmaking process. First, al-Wifaq proposed
    to eliminate Article 87, which created a "fast track" process
    for laws related to finance or the economy, allowing the King
    to enact them by Royal Decree if the COR or Shura failed to
    express approval or disapproval of it. (Comment: The GOB's
    use of Article 87, though sparing, has been controversial.
    Ref. B. End Comment.) Al-Wifaq,s second proposed amendment
    was to eliminate Article 109C, which allowed the government
    to pass a two year budget instead of an annual budget.
    Deleting the article would make the process revert to a one
    year budget by default. Fairooz indicated that other blocs
    in parliament had agreed to support all three measures in
    private discussions, but the support disappeared on the day
    of the vote. Fourteen MPs were absent that day, making it
    impossible for the proposed amendments to secure the 2/3
    majority (27 votes) required for the amendments to move to
    the Shura.

    -------------------------------------------
    Government Response to al-Wifaq Initiatives
    -------------------------------------------

    ¶7. (C) The largest opposition to al-Wifaq,s parliamentary
    initiatives is the government and those who benefit from the
    status quo. The foundation of this resistance, according to
    Jassim Redha, is the parliament's established structure,
    which includes the elected COR and the appointed Shura
    Council. With a 2/3 approval requirement from both houses to
    change the constitution, Redha said that parliament would
    only be able to pass such an amendment if the government
    supported the changes and appointed reformist members to the
    Shura Council. Furthermore, Redha asserted that the Prime
    Minister's preference is to show that "majlis democracy" is
    better suited to Bahrain than a constitutional monarchy. In
    this "majlis democracy," instead of allowing legislation to
    work its way through parliament a system of patronage from
    the Prime Minister and King allows those capable of gaining
    an audience with the royal family to push through change
    without involving the parliament and thereby undermining the
    parliamentary system. For further evidence of government
    resistance to change, Redha cited eight bills and 52
    proposals that al-Wifaq initiated, added to 42 bills put
    forth by the rest of the parliamentary blocs, to which the
    government responded to zero within the parliamentary
    session. (Note: The constitution does not require a
    government response within the same session, but allows for a
    response in the succeeding year's legislative session. End
    note.)

    ¶8. (C) In light of the relationships other parliamentary
    blocs had built with each other and the government in the
    2002-2006 parliament, Jawad Fairooz indicated that al-Wifaq
    was at a disadvantage in trying to form its own coalition and

    MANAMA 00000659 003 OF 004

    support base within parliament. He said that the Royal
    Court's influence over the Sunni parliamentary blocs was so
    significant that the Court could deliver "suggestions" to MPs
    to vote for or against a particular bill, a concern echoed by
    Dr. Jassim Hussein. Examples Fairooz provided were issues on
    which al-Wifaq thought it had secured the support of other
    blocs in private discussions, but later the blocs voted
    against. According to Fairooz, for one such vote a Sunni MP
    came from the hospital, where he was scheduled to undergo an
    operation that day, in order to cast his dissenting vote. A
    second example was of a Sunni MP who left his dying mother to
    vote against an al-Wifaq supported bill, causing him to miss
    the final moments of his mother's life. Fairooz presented
    these as obvious evidence of government influence over the
    Sunni blocs, saying that this represents "control" over their
    votes.

    ----------------------
    Constituent Impatience
    ----------------------

    ¶9. (C) Dr. Jassim Hussein explained that al-Wifaq MPs meet
    regularly with their constituents to gauge public opinion of
    the society. He felt that while their constituents continue
    to support the society and remain dedicated to the
    parliamentary process, they are increasingly discontent with
    al-Wifaq's inability to pass reform legislation. Mohammed
    al-Shaikh and Yousif Zainal, former MPs defeated by al-Wifaq
    candidates in the 2006 elections, asserted that al-Wifaq,s
    action in this first session was more reactive to constituent
    discontent over perceived al-Wifaq ineffectiveness than
    proactive. Both cited the last-minute proposal to question
    Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs Shaikh Ahmed bin
    Atiyatullah al-Khalifa on corruption allegations as a direct
    response to constituent impatience and displeasure.

    ¶10. (C) Regarding constituent impatience, Fairooz explained
    that the society's constituents are inexperienced in the
    political process. He admitted that while al-Wifaq was
    building trust with members of the other blocs, progress on
    al-Wifaq's agenda was too slow for some of its constituents,
    due in part to al-Wifaq MPs' inexperience. Fairooz explained
    that al-Wifaq was further distracted from its parliamentary
    duties by the need to defuse growing tensions between its
    constituents and security forces over continuing
    demonstrations. While al-Wifaq MPs felt a sense of
    accomplishment at the end of this legislative session, more
    tangible action to improve the standard of living and general
    services needs to be taken in order to retain constituent
    support.

    -----------------
    The Haq Challenge
    -----------------

    ¶11. (C) Al-Wifaq MPs Dr. Jassim Hussein and Jawad Fairooz
    and Dr. Abdul Aziz Abul, an independent Sunni MP who aligns
    himself with al-Wifaq on non-religious issues, convey a sense
    of urgency that al-Wifaq needs to attain tangible results in
    the next parliamentary session to prevent al-Wifaq,s
    constituents from changing their allegiance to Haq. Hussein
    explained that in the first parliamentary session al-Wifaq
    MPs in areas where Haq is strongly supported have already
    experienced strong discontent from their constituents. Abul
    explained that in his own district a portion of his
    constituents felt al-Wifaq was too passive in parliament and
    wanted a more hard-line stance in line with Haq. Fairooz
    asserted that Haq actively discredits al-Wifaq by claiming it
    passes negative laws, such as the 1% salary deduction, so as
    to draw al-Wifaq supporters to Haq. Mohammed al-Shaikh
    explained that since Haq and al-Wifaq pull from the same
    Shiite pool, if current al-Wifaq supporters view the bloc as
    inactive, they are likely to reject political participation
    and support Haq. Al-Shaikh explained that the more support
    Haq takes from al-Wifaq, the harder it will be for al-Wifaq
    to achieve political solutions to constituent issues, and the
    more likely it will be for Haq to act on its rejectionist
    rhetoric.

    -------------
    Looking Ahead
    -------------

    ¶12. (C) Dr. Jassim Hussein indicated that al-Wifaq intends
    to draft concrete proposals on salaries and living conditions
    over the summer recess. Jawad Fairooz expressed optimism
    over the cooperation al-Wifaq has built with Sunni blocs in
    parliament and believed that cooperation would continue in
    the next session as al-Wifaq pursues its standard of living
    agenda. In addition, he explained that al-Wifaq remained
    concerned that working strictly through parliament may take

    MANAMA 00000659 004 OF 004

    too long or be ultimately too ineffective for the society to
    maintain its support base. Thus, he indicated that al-Wifaq
    will seek to open channels of communication with the
    government outside of parliament so as to use every resource
    at its disposal to realize its agenda. Dr. Abdul Aziz Abul
    indicated that the al-Wifaq bloc would support a
    parliamentary audit of government finances in the following
    legislative session; including an approval of the 2004-2005
    budget and an inquiry into the 2005-2006 budget.

    ¶13. (C) Even though al-Wifaq failed to gain enough support
    to question Shaikh Ahmed in the closing days of the session,
    Jassim Redha indicated that al-Wifaq will renew the call for
    an investigation into corruption allegations of Shaikh Ahmed.
    Yousif Zainal speculated that the King may reassign Sheikh
    Ahmed during the parliamentary recess to a position outside
    of COR oversight so as to avoid questioning of his
    activities.

    -------
    Comment
    -------

    ¶14. (C) While al-Wifaq,s inexperience in governance is
    itself a significant challenge to realizing tangible
    progress, the extent of government resistance to future
    al-Wifaq efforts remains to be seen. To create political
    legitimacy for al-Wifaq and counter Haq support, the
    government has granted al-Wifaq public relations victories
    regarding security and Haq. The highest profile such
    incident was al-Wifaq leader Shaikh Ali Salman receiving
    partial credit for the King's order to drop the criminal case
    against Haq's leader, Hasan Mushaima, and Abdulhadi
    al-Khawaja on the eve of their trial for promoting change to
    the political system through illegitimate means and inciting
    hatred of the political system (Ref. A). However, public
    relations victories are not sufficient to counter government
    efforts to block parliamentary accomplishments. In order to
    avoid boosting the profile of Haq and perhaps inviting
    increasingly violent demonstrations from the group, the
    government could allow al-Wifaq some success in parliament to
    reward them and their constituents for participating in the
    democratic process.

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