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### Viewing cable 09AMMAN813, WARY OF U.S.-IRAN ENGAGEMENT, JORDAN OFFERS WORDS

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09AMMAN813 | 2009-04-02 05:49 | 2010-11-28 18:00 | SECRET | Embassy Amman

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHAM #0813/01 0920549
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 020549Z APR 09
    FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
    TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4793

` `

    S E C R E T AMMAN 000813

    SIPDIS

    NEA/ELA AND INR/TCA

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2029
    TAGS: PREL PINR IR JO
    SUBJECT: WARY OF U.S.-IRAN ENGAGEMENT, JORDAN OFFERS WORDS
    OF CAUTION

    REF: A. STATE 25892
         ¶B. 08 AMMAN 3329
         ¶C. AMMAN 668
         ¶D. 08 AMMAN 3189
         ¶E. 08 AMMAN 2660
         ¶F. 08 AMMAN 3372

    Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft
    for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    ¶1.  (S) Summary: This cable responds to Ref A request for
    evaluations of third-country reactions to possible U.S.
    engagement with Iran.  Jordan's leaders believe such
    engagement would reward regional hardliners while undermining
    Arab moderates - without convincing Iran to cease its support
    for terrorism, end its nuclear program or drop its hegemonic
    aspirations.  Jordanian officials argue that the best way to
    counter Iran's ambitions is to weaken the salience of its
    radicalism on the Arab street by fulfilling the promise of a
    "two-state solution," resolving other Arab-Israeli disputes,
    and making sure that Iraq's political and security
    institutions are not overwhelmed by Iranian influence when
    the U.S. drawdown is complete.  If U.S.-Iran engagement does
    proceed in earnest, Jordan hopes to be closely consulted in
    advance and for its interests to be taken into account.  End
    Summary.

    Beware the Iranian Tentacles ... and Cut Them Off
    --------------------------------------------- ----

    ¶2.  (S) The metaphor most commonly deployed by Jordanian
    officials when discussing Iran is of an octopus whose
    tentacles reach out insidiously to manipulate, foment, and
    undermine the best laid plans of the West and regional
    moderates.  Iran's tentacles include its allies Qatar and
    Syria, Hizballah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Palestinian
    territories, an Iraqi government sometimes seen as supplicant
    to Tehran, and Shia communities throughout the region.  While
    Jordanian officials doubt dialogue with the U.S. will
    convince Iran to withdraw its "tentacles," they believe they
    can be severed if Iran is deprived of hot-button issues that
    make it a hero to many on the Arab street, such as its
    championing of the Palestinian cause.

    ¶3.  (C) According to the GOJ analysis, Iran's influence
    derives from the perception that Tehran is able to "deliver"
    while moderates are not.  The main failure of moderates as
    cited by radicals is ongoing Palestinian suffering and
    dispossession despite an international consensus favoring a
    viable, independent Palestinian state living peacefully next
    to Israel.  The MFA's Deputy Director of the Arab and Middle
    East Affairs Department, Muwaffaq Ajlouni, put it this way:
    "Iran is not welcomed in the Arab world, but it is taking
    advantage of helpless people."  From Jordan's perspective,
    the U.S. would benefit from pressing Israel to proceed to
    final status negotiations, which would garner Arab support to
    deal with shared security concerns about Iran.

    ¶4.  (S) In Lebanon, the GOJ fears Iran's Hizballah proxy has
    been given too much rope and could be poised to increase its
    political influence during upcoming parliamentary elections.
    The King sees the Lebanon-Israel War of 2006 as having
    benefited Iran and Hizballah, by allowing a Sunni Arab street
    enamored of "resistance" to see past its suspicions of the
    Shia.  And then-Foreign Minister Salah Al-Bashir in late 2008
    described the spring 2009 vote as "when we will know who won
    last May," referring to the outcome of the Doha Accords that
    put an end to Lebanese infighting.  Much like with the
    Palestinian issue, Jordanian leaders have argued that the
    only way to pull the rug out from under Hizballah - and by
    extension their Iranian patrons - would be for Israel to hand
    over the disputed Sheba'a Farms to Lebanon.  With Hizballah
    lacking the "resistance to occupation" rationale for
    continued confrontation with Israel, it would lose its raison
    d'etre and probably domestic support.

    ¶5.  (S) In Iraq, signs of growing security and political
    stability over the past year in particular have served
    somewhat to calm Jordanian nerves about Iran's interference.
    The King and others have cited indications that Iraqi Prime
    Minister Nuri Al-Maliki is showing himself to be a national
    rather than a parochial or Iranian-controlled leader.  During
    the U.S.-Jordan Political Dialogue in November 2008, FM
    Bashir noted that the Iraqi government had a "tendency to
    appease Iran," but he saw increased Jordanian (and Sunni
    Arab) diplomatic engagement with Baghdad as a potential
    bulwark against Iran (Ref B).  Positive trends
    notwithstanding, many of our Jordanian interlocutors stress
    that the U.S. should leave Iraq only when it "makes sense,"
    and thereby avoid a political and security vacuum that could
    be easily filled by Iran (Ref C).

    Prepare for Iran to Disappoint
    ------------------------------

    ¶6.  (S) Jordan's leaders are careful not to be seen as
    dictating toward the U.S., but their comments betray a
    powerful undercurrent of doubt that the United States knows
    how to deal effectively with Iran.  Foreign Minister Nasser
    Joudeh has suggested the Iranians would be happy to let talks
    with the U.S. continue for ten years without moving them
    forward, believing that they can benefit from perceived
    acceptance after years of isolation without paying a price.

    ¶7.  (S) Upper House President Zeid Rifai has predicted that
    dialogue with Iran will lead nowhere, arguing that if the
    U.S., the EU, and the Arab states agree that under no
    circumstances should Iran be allowed to obtain a nuclear
    weapon, military force becomes the only option.  "Bomb Iran,
    or live with an Iranian bomb.  Sanctions, carrots, incentives
    won't matter," was how he put it to visiting NEA DAS David
    Hale in November.  While Rifai judged a military strike would
    have "catastrophic impact on the region," he nonetheless
    thought preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons would
    pay enough dividends to make it worth the risks (Ref D).

    ¶8.  (C) Speaking to PolOffs in early February 2009, Director
    of the Prime Minister's Political Office Khaled Al-Qadi noted
    that the Gaza crisis had allowed Iranian interference in
    inter-Arab relations to reach unprecedented levels.  He urged
    the U.S. to "understand the history," explaining that "after
    the Israelis, the Iranians are the smartest.  They know where
    they are going and what they are doing."  He doubted there
    would be any diplomatic breakthrough before Iran's June
    elections, partly because Iranian pragmatists cannot be
    practical due to religious and ideological considerations.
    He hoped any dialogue would be aimed at weakening hardliners,
    many of whom believe their "Great Satan" rhetoric.

    Talk If You Must, But Don't Sell Us Out
    ---------------------------------------

    ¶9.  (S) If direct U.S.-Iran talks must happen, the Jordanian
    leadership insists it not be at the expense of Arab
    interests, particularly those of moderates like Jordan,
    Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority.
     Furthermore, they worry that engagement will set off a
    stampede of Arab states looking to get ahead of the curve and
    reach their own separate peace with Tehran.  King Abdullah
    counseled Special Envoy George Mitchell in February that
    direct U.S. engagement with Iran at this time would just
    deepen intra-Arab schisms and that more "countries without a
    backbone" would defect to the Iranian camp.  The Prime
    Ministry's Qadi has assessed that Iran sought to "transform
    the Israeli-Arab conflict into an Islamic-Israeli conflict"
    and that this strategy was already working with Syria and
    Qatar.  Even more conspiratorially, then-FM Bashir in
    September 2008 highlighed Arab fears to a visiting CODEL that
    the United States and the West would allow Iran to play a
    hegemonic role in Iraq and throughout the region in exchange
    for giving up its nuclear program (Ref E).

    ¶10.  (S) Asked late last year whether he advocated engaging
    Iran or working against its interests without engagement, the
    King told visiting U.S. Senators that U.S. should undertake
    both approaches concurrently but that engagement needs to be
    done "smartly" by setting benchmarks for behavior (Ref F).
    International Affairs Director at the Royal Court Jafar
    Hassan on April 1 operationalized Jordan's position as
    follows: the U.S. must not only consult its friends in the
    region, but declare that it is doing so publicly as a signal
    to Iran that the Arabs are full parties to the U.S. policy
    review.  He called for the U.S. and the Arabs to work
    together to determine what deliverables are required from
    Iran, what subjects are appropriate for discussion, and also
    to set clear redlines.  (Note: Hassan said Jordan was trying
    to work with its friends in the region to develop a
    joint-Arab strategy, but that this has yet to materialize.
    End Note.)

    ¶11.  (S) Comment: Believing the U.S. is predisposed toward
    engagement with Iran, Jordanian officials have avoided
    forthrightly rejecting such overtures, but they remain
    anxious that Iran will be the only one to benefit - at their
    expense.  Given Jordanian skepticism that Iran's regional
    ambitions can be reined in, they probably see establishing
    benchmarks as a way to keep U.S.-Iranian engagement limited
    and short-lived.  Re-engagement could trigger a review of
    Jordan's relationship with Iran and with Islamic groups like
    Hamas, with which Jordan held limited security talks last
    year.  When asked periodically whether by engaging with
    Hamas, Jordan was undermining PA President Mahmoud Abbas,

    official interlocutors simply pointed out that Israel meets
    with Hamas through Egypt, that Syria and Iran are actively
    engaged with Hamas, and that Jordan cannot be disengaged.
    End Comment.

    Visit Amman's Classified Website at
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman
    Beecroft

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