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### Viewing cable 08STATE91332, AFTER-ACTION REPORT FOR DEMETER'S RESILIENCE, THE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08STATE91332 | 2008-08-25 20:32 | 2011-04-28 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Secretary of State

`

    VZCZCXYZ0003
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHC #1332 2382040
    ZNR UUUUU ZZH
    R 252032Z AUG 08
    FM SECSTATE WASHDC
    TO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0000
    RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0000
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0000
    RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0000
    RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0000
    RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0000
    RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0000
    RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

` `

    UNCLAS STATE 091332

    SENSITIVE
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: CA EUN FR GM IT JA PTER RS TBIO UK
    SUBJECT: AFTER-ACTION REPORT FOR DEMETER'S RESILIENCE, THE
    G8 FOOD DEFENSE EXERCISE

    REF: A. STATE 14591
         ¶B. STATE 39260

    ¶1.  (U) Summary: Following the recommendations of the G8
    Bioterrorism Experts (BTEX) Group in 2005, a series of G8
    workshops dealing with decontamination, food defense and
    public health/law enforcement cooperation was organized.
    "Demeter,s Resilience" was the second G8 food defense event
    and was held May 27-29, 2008 at the U.S. National Center for
    Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD) in Minneapolis, Minnesota
    (reftels).  The exercise was designed to stimulate national
    and international cooperation and communication in
    identifying, responding to and recovering from a terrorist
    attack on the food supply.  The NCPFD, a DHS Center of
    Excellence, designed the exercise scenario and facilitated
    the exercise.  Exercise participation was lively and robust,
    although not all G8 nations attended.  The After-action
    Report (para 4) contains further details on the exercise
    format, scenario, emerging themes and key recommendations.
    End Summary.

    ¶2.  (U) U.S. Delegation: The U.S. delegation consisted of
    Lindsey Hillesheim (State), John Guzewich (FDA), Perfecto
    Santiago (USDA), Robert Hooks (DHS), and Bill Zinnikas (FBI).
     The U.S. also sent several additional observers from FDA,
    USDA, DHS, FBI, and OSTP.

    ¶3. (SBU) Other Delegations:
    - The Government of Germany,s (GOG) delegation came
    well-prepared for the exercise with answers in hand for many
    of the discussion questions.  Their delegation was composed
    of representatives from the Federal Foreign Office, the
    Federal Institute for Risk Assessment, and the Federal
    Ministry for Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection.
    Since Germany is organized as a federal system like the U.S.,
    much of the detection and response tasks fall to the Landers
    (similar to states).  Thus GOG emphasized the importance of
    robust local public health and food safety systems and the
    need to coordinate these systems across a federal
    organization.
    - In addition to several observers, the Government of
    Canada,s (GOC) official delegation was robust and balanced
    including representatives from the Department of Foreign
    Affairs and International Trade Canada, Royal Canadian
    Mounted Police (RCMP), Canadian Food Inspection Agency,
    Health Canada, and the Department of Public Safety.  The GOC
    food defense response system is similar to the U.S. system,
    thus providing significant opportunities to share best
    practices.
    - Her Majesty,s Government,s (HMG) delegation, while
    missing a foreign affairs representative, was very active
    during the exercise and included officials from the Health
    Protection Agency, Food Standards Agency, and the Centre for
    the National Protection of Infrastructure.  Participants from
    the G8 other delegations  found many of the lessons
    identified by HMG as a result of the Sudan Red recall in 2005
    to be particularly useful, including the use of "scoping
    meetings" that include experts from industry to map out how
    an ingredient was distributed.
               - The Government of Japan (GOJ) sent only one
    person from the Cabinet Office,s Consumer Safety Division.
    This small delegation was surprising given that GOJ holds the
    G8 presidency and gave approval for the exercise to be held
    and hosted by the USG.
    -  The Government of France (GOF) sent technical experts from
    the Ministries of Health, and of Agriculture and Fishery.
    Due to the lack of foreign affairs and law enforcement
    officials, a complete picture of GOF,s response to a
    terrorist attack on the food supply is not possible.
    - The Governments of the Russian Federation and Italy did not
    send delegations.
    - The European Commission and the World Health Organization
    both sent observers to the exercise.

    ¶4.  (U) The following "After-action Report for Demeter,s
    Resilience" includes input and comments from the countries
    present at the exercise.  A formatted version of the
    After-action Report has already been shared with participants
    and G8 BTEX points of contact.

    Begin text of After-action Report.

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    Demeter,s Resilience was a three-day exercise on food supply
    protection for the G8 nations with fifty participants from
    Japan, Canada, France, Germany, United Kingdom, and United
    States.  The exercise aimed to strengthen coordination,
    cooperation, and communication between G8 nations in the
    event of an intentional attack on the food supply.  In
    addition, the World Health Organization and the European
    Commission along with a private industry representative
    participated in the exercise.  The exercise was hosted by The
    National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD) at
    the University of Minnesota.

    The exercise provided nations an opportunity to discuss roles
    and responsibilities of various stakeholders in event of a
    terrorist attack, and enhance strategies for working together
    to prevent and respond to a terrorist attack on the food
    supply.  In addition, Country representatives shared insights
    on preparedness planning and lessons learned from previous
    experiences.

    Key recommendations resulting from this exercise include:
    ¶1. Establish and maintain key functional contacts in areas
    relevant to food defense.
    ¶2. Establish a mechanism or leverage an existing one to
    develop complementary risk communication messages during a
    widespread outbreak.
    ¶3. Foster collaboration between countries to address gaps in
    knowledge and capabilities in food-related surveillance,
    diagnostics, decontamination procedures, and risk assessments
    of threat agents.
    ¶4. Foster and develop relationships among stakeholders within
    and between countries as these informal networks can enhance
    the communications between nations and between sectors
    relevant to food defense, as well as strengthen the
    collective capacity of G8 nations to anticipate, prevent,
    respond to, and recover from intentional contamination of the
    food supply.

    EXERCISE DESIGN AND FORMAT

    In 2004 and 2005, G8 leaders committed to defending against
    bioterrorism by; strengthening national and international
    biosurveillance capabilities, increasing protection of the
    global food supply, and improving bioterrorism investigation,
    response and mitigation capabilities.  In 2005 the G8
    Bioterrorism Experts Group (BTEX) agreed on a work plan that
    included the development of a food defense tabletop exercise.

    Demeter,s Resilience served to initiate a dialogue between
    G8 member nations on communication mechanisms during an
    intentional bioterrorist attack upon the G8 food supply.  The
    exercise provided an opportunity for G8 nations to strengthen
    lines of communication, which may enhance prevention,
    mitigation and recovery efforts on food system events.  The
    simulated attack was based around a hypothetical food product
    that is widely exported to and/or imported from all G8
    nations.

    Demeter,s Resilience was intended to accomplish the
    following primary objectives:
    -- Examine food defense communication and coordination
    procedures within and among G8 countries in response to a
    terrorist attack on the food supply.
    -- Discuss the roles and responsibilities of the various
    ministries, organizations, and sectors in responding to a
    terrorist threat or attack on the food supply (e.g. law
    enforcement, foreign affairs, food/agriculture/public health
    agencies, and the private sector).
    -- Through facilitated discussion and simulation, examine G8
    countries, responses to a bioterrorism incident targeted at
    the food supply system.

    Demeter,s Resilience took place on May 27-29, 2008, and was
    hosted by the National Center for Food Protection and Defense
    (NCFPD) at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis,
    Minnesota.  Established in 2003 and led by the University of
    Minnesota, the NCFPD is a Department of Homeland Security
    Center of Excellence.  The Center is a consortium of
    academic, public sector, and private sector partners tasked
    with developing technologies and strategies to prevent,
    respond, and recover from intentional contamination of the
    food system in order to mitigate the public health and
    economic impact of the event.

    In addition to the time participants spent engaged in the
    exercise itself, an informal evening reception and lunches
    allowed participants to interact outside of the structured
    exercise.  These informal events strengthened the personal
    relationships and communication networks of exercise
    participants.   Besides the interactions among participants
    physically present at the exercise, World Health Organization
    (WHO) representatives participated via a web link from the
    WHO,s global Strategic Health Operations Center (SHOC) in
    Geneva, Switzerland.

    To familiarize participants with other countries, response
    plans and capabilities, each country provided an overview of
    how response to food safety and/or food defense events was
    organized in their respective country.

    Demeter,s Resilience employed a fictitious scenario and
    scenario elements or information--including descriptions,
    timelines, and instructions--were provided by the exercise
    facilitators to stimulate participant activity. The scenario
    ensured necessary events occurred so that all objectives were
    met. The exercise was divided into four distinct phases
    representing significant periods in a food defense event:
    notification, identification, investigation, and recovery -
    followed by an interactive discussion session to capture key
    features, lessons learned, and identify opportunities for
    further work. Each phase began with an overview of key events
    and communications occurring within the phase. Following the
    phase overview and facilitator instructions, participants
    reviewed the situation and engaged in group discussions
    within and between G8 countries regarding an appropriate
    response.

    The exercise was intended to be a safe, open, and stress-free
    environment to allow all participants to openly share their
    perspectives.  Varying viewpoints were encouraged, as there
    are no international standards for handling a terrorist
    attack on the food supply.  Participants were encouraged to
    focus on the communication process, and identify
    opportunities to strengthen communication within and between
    governments. Participants were encouraged to move among
    groups and interact with the experts to ensure thorough,
    thought-provoking discussion and problem resolution.

    Exercise participants representing various government
    agencies from six of the eight G8 countries were present.
    Government agencies represented included those in the fields
    of law enforcement, food safety, public health, agriculture
    and foreign affairs.  The World Health Organization and the
    European Commission also had representatives present at the
    exercise.  A representative from industry was also present to
    answer questions about their experiences in responding to
    incidents of contamination occurring in the food supply.

    SCENARIO OVERVIEW

    An unspecified poultry processing facility in the United
    States is the source of a breaded chicken product designed
    primarily for restaurant distribution both in the United
    States and for export.  The contaminated poultry product is
    shipped from the United States to all G8 member countries
    through various modes of transport.  The product is
    contaminated during production via adulteration of the
    breading mix, resulting in 24 breading batches contaminated
    in a single day.  The contaminant is relative heat stable,
    with little or no organoleptic impact on the finished product
    (i.e. not altering the taste, texture or smell).  Clinical
    presentation of acute gastroenteritis, often accompanied by
    vomiting and diarrhea, occurs after a one day latency period.
     Severely affected patients developmultiple organ failure
    five days after apparent initial recovery.

    Phase one consisted of public health identification and
    notification of the initial illness.  Because shipment times
    and product consumption varied over different countries,
    various numbers of illnesses were reported to the relevant
    agencies at different times.  This phase focused on illness
    reporting within country, and how this information would be
    both handled within the country and relayed internationally.
    The phase ended with a fictional video news clip shown to the
    entire group from "Global News Network" announcing unusual
    and widespread illnesses occurring around the globe.

    Phase two consisted of the initial epidemiological
    investigation suggesting a single common source for many of
    those affected during the outbreak.  Some individuals, who
    had previously gone to hospitals with vomiting and diarrhea,
    returned later with multiple organ failure.  This led to a
    large number of hospitalizations, with several patients
    dying.

    Phase three began with a video news clip from "World News" in
    which a terrorist organization claimed responsibility for the
    outbreak.  During this phase the specific product responsible
    and the lot and shipment information were also confirmed.

    Phase four focused on recovery.  Contaminated product lots
    were retrieved, and decontamination protocols were issued.
    The rate of new illnesses rapidly declined, while new threats
    to the food supply were received.

    EMERGING THEMES

    Food safety authorities and responsibilities are distributed
    in different ways across countries and investigations into a
    food borne illness outbreak vary by agency, country and
    event.  When an event is recognized as a food safety problem,
    the roles of various agencies involved are fairly well
    defined; however in intentional contamination (e.g. a food
    defense problem), the triggers which initiate a concurrent
    criminal investigation are more difficult to determine.

    Recognition of a food borne disease outbreak is driven by the
    characteristics of the illness, rather than actual numbers of
    ill individuals.  Some patterns considered were geography,
    population demographics, as well as exposure information.
    The event characteristics often determine which agencies are
    involved in the investigation, and how soon other agencies
    would be contacted.  While international reporting may vary
    due to legal constraints and uncertainty during an outbreak,
    the effectiveness of international communication channels are
    greatest when utilized as soon as possible after
    identification of an outbreak.

    During the course of a food borne disease outbreak there are
    often multiple levels of communication underway.  These often
    include government communications to their affected or
    at-risk populations, within country communications between
    agencies or ministries, bilateral ministerial communications
    between countries, ad hoc communications between scientists,
    and perhaps communication with the media.  Due to the
    multiple levels of communication which occur, it is often
    difficult to achieve consistent risk communication messages.
    In addition, multiple communication messages may be needed to
    reach different cultures or audiences.

    On a global scale, it is challenging to develop a common case
    definition.  Several factors contribute to this challenge
    including country differences in data collection and one
    country,s ability, or inability, to utilize another
    country,s investigative data.  There is also variability in
    the degree to which countries would involve the private
    sector and civil organizations at different stages in a
    response.

    During an intentional contamination event, the health and
    safety of the public remain the priority of all agencies
    involved.  A claim or suspicion of terrorism shifts
    leadership of the overall investigation to law enforcement,
    but not at the expense of the public health investigation.
    Multiple agencies continue to provide active support for the
    investigation.  Uncertainty as to the route of contamination,
    the contaminating agent, and the scale of the event all
    contribute to the challenge of managing the response to a
    widespread food contamination event.  Law enforcement, food
    safety, and public health working together on a major food
    defense issue is a relatively new paradigm, and, as such,
    there is a recognized need for increasing the knowledge of
    public health, food safety, and law enforcement response
    protocols within each country and between countries.

    KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

    Establish and maintain key functional contacts in areas
    relevant to food defense.  A system for up to date
    information for key contacts and for promoting a network
    among key individuals/agencies is needed both within
    countries and across the G8 to ensure a timely and
    coordinated response to a food contamination event.  Existing
    global forums should be utilized and expanded to discuss and
    share lessons identified after an international bioterrorism
    attack on the food supply.

    Establish a mechanism, or leverage an existing one, to
    develop complementary risk communication messages during a
    widespread outbreak.  Current global communication channels
    (e.g. WHO INFOSAN and IHR notification) can be strengthened
    to facilitate multi-national communication in the event of a
    terrorist attack on the food supply. The sharing of
    information needs to be fostered, and processes created to
    forewarn countries of upcoming public announcements, as well
    as exchange public messages and risk communication materials.

    Foster collaboration between countries to address gaps in
    knowledge and capabilities in food-related surveillance,
    diagnostics, decontamination procedures, and risk assessments
    of threat agents.  A process to facilitate collaboration
    among relevant researchers in multiple countries to address
    these gaps should be developed.

    Foster and develop relationships among stakeholders within
    and between countries as these informal networks can enhance
    the communications between nations and between sectors
    relevant to food defense, as well as strengthen the
    collective capacity of G8 nations to anticipate, prevent,
    respond to, and recover from intentional contamination of the
    food supply.  Particular attention should be given to
    developing relationships among public health, food safety,
    and law enforcement agencies within countries and to
    understanding the roles, responsibilities, and statutory
    authorities of the various agencies required in responding to
    an intentional contamination of the food supply. Tabletop
    exercises could continue to be integrated to build capacity
    and expand the personal networks of individuals responding to
    during a bioterrorism event. Developing memoranda of
    understanding and agreements between agencies ahead of time
    will avoid confusion during an actual event.  In addition to
    public health, food safety, and law enforcement agencies,
    non-traditional partners, such as private industry
    representatives, consumer organizations, environmental
    agencies and other stakeholders, should also be considered
    for inclusion in training exercises.

    CONCLUSION

    Demeter,s Resilience increased participants, awareness of
    G8 member nation,s food safety authorities and protocols in
    G8 member nations for responding to incidents of intentional
    contamination of the food supply.  Exercise discussions
    recognized the need for increased communication and
    information sharing on an international level during a
    bioterrorism attack on the food supply.  The discussions also
    reinforced the need for international communication channels
    to be utilized early during an emerging event.

    End text of After-action Report.

    ¶5.  (U)  Additional Information: Please contact OES/IHB,s
    Lindsey Hillesheim (HillesheimLN@state.gov, 202-647-6922) for
    additional information on this event, including the
    participant list and a formatted version of the report.
    Other inquiries related to G8 BTEX activities should be
    directed to ISN/CTR,s Kendra Chittenden
    (ChittendenKA@state.gov, 202-647-6294).
    RICE

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