Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 15404 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden 00. Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Jordan Yemen

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05 2011/06
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04 2011/05/05 2011/05/06 2011/05/07 2011/05/08 2011/05/09 2011/05/10 2011/05/11 2011/05/12 2011/05/13 2011/05/14 2011/05/15 2011/05/16 2011/05/17 2011/05/18 2011/05/19 2011/05/20 2011/05/21 2011/05/22 2011/05/23 2011/05/24 2011/05/25 2011/05/26 2011/05/27 2011/05/28 2011/05/29 2011/05/30 2011/05/31
2011/06/01 2011/06/02 2011/06/03 2011/06/04 2011/06/05 2011/06/06 2011/06/07 2011/06/08 2011/06/09 2011/06/10 2011/06/11 2011/06/12 2011/06/13 2011/06/14 2011/06/15 2011/06/16 2011/06/17 2011/06/18 2011/06/19 2011/06/20 2011/06/21 2011/06/22

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/05 1985/06
1986/05 1986/08 1986/12
1987/06
1988/01 1988/03 1988/04 1988/07 1988/08 1988/12
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05
1992/01 1992/03 1992/06 1992/09 1992/12
1993/01 1993/10
1994/11 1994/12
1995/01 1995/04
1996/07 1996/09 1996/11
1997/02 1997/05 1997/06 1997/10 1997/12
1998/05
1999/09
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/04 2001/05 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11 2001/12
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11 2002/12
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Belfast Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chiang Mai Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown Consulate Fukuoka
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guangzhou Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hong Kong Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Mission Geneva Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Nuevo Laredo Consulate Naples Consulate Naha
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sapporo Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE UN Rome Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ASEC AEMR AMGT AR APECO AU AORC AJ AF AFIN AS AM ABLD AFFAIRS AMB APER AA AG AE ADM ALOW ACOA AID ATRN ADCO AND ADANA APEC ARABL ADPM ANARCHISTS AADP ANET AGAO AMED AY AORG ASEAN ABUD AO AL AGRICULTURE AINF ARF AROC ACABQ APCS AODE AX AMEX AZ ASUP ARM AQ ATFN AMBASSADOR ACBAQ AFSI AFSN AC ASIG ASEX AER AVERY ASCH AFU AMG ATPDEA ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AORL AN AIT AGMT ACS AGR AMCHAMS AECL AUC AFGHANISTAN ACAO
BR BB BG BEXP BY BA BRUSSELS BU BD BK BL BM BH BO BE BTIO BILAT BP BMGT BIDEN BX BC BBG BF BBSR BT BWC BEXPC BN BTIU
CPAS CA CASC CS CBW CIDA CO CODEL CI CROS CU CH CWC CMGT CVIS CDG CG CF CHIEF CJAN CBSA CE CY CD CT CM CONS CDC CR CW CN COUNTRY CONDOLEEZZA CZ CICTE CYPRUS CARICOM CBE COM COE CACS CIVS CTR CAPC COUNTER CFED CARSON COPUOS CV CKGR CHR CVR CLINTON COUNTERTERRORISM CITEL CLEARANCE CB CSW CIC CITT CARIB CAFTA CACM CDB CJUS CTM CAN CONSULAR CLMT CBC CIA CNARC CIS CEUDA CHINA CAC CL
DR DJ DHS DAO DCM DO DEFENSE DA DOMESTIC DK DOD DE DOT DPRK DEPT DEA DISENGAGEMENT DOE DTRA DS DEAX
ECON ETTC EFIS ETRD EC EMIN EAGR EAID EU EFIN EUN ECIN EG EWWT EINV ENRG ELAB EPET EN EAIR EUMEM ECPS ELTN EIND EZ EI ER ET EINT ECONOMIC ENIV EFTA ES ERNG ECONOMY ELECTIONS EXIM ENERG ECIP EREL EK EDEV ECOSOC EPA ENGR ETRC ENVI EXTERNAL ELN EAIDS EINVEFIN EUREM ECA EDU EFINECONCS ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ETC ENVR EAP EINN EXBS ENGY ECONOMICS EIAR EINDETRD ECONEFIN EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EFIM EINVETC ECONCS ETRA ESA EAIG EUR EUC ERD ETRN EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ESENV ENNP ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN
FI FR FAS FOREIGN FTAA FREEDOM FBI FINANCE FAO FAA FJ FTA FARC FAC FM FDA FINR FOR FOI FO FMLN FISO
GM GG GERARD GT GA GR GTIP GLOBAL GCC GV GL GOV GOI GF GH GANGS GE GTMO GAERC GZ GAZA GY GUILLERMO GASPAR
HR HO HA HYMPSK HK HUMAN HURI HU HILLARY HI HUM HSTC HEBRON HUMOR
IZ IN IAEA IS IMO ILO IR IC IT ITU IV IMF IBRD IWC IRAQI ID IDB ISRAELI ITALY ITPGOV ITALIAN ISCON ICRC ICAO IFAD IPR IRAQ INMARSAT INTERNAL ITRA IQ ICJ INDO IO IRS IIP ILC IEFIN ICTY IA INTERPOL IEA INR INRB IAHRC ISRAEL IZPREL IRAJ IF ITPHUM IL IACI IDA ISLAMISTS IGAD ITF INRA INRO IBET INTELSAT IDP ICTR IRC
JA JO JM JP JUS JOHN JOSEPH JAMES JOHNNIE JML JIMENEZ
KOMC KNNP KFLO KDEM KSUM KIPR KFLU KPAO KE KCRM KJUS KAWC KZ KSCA KDRG KCOR KGHG KPAL KTIP KMCA KCRS KPKO KOLY KRVC KVPR KG KWBG KMDR KTER KSPR KV KTFN KWMN KFRD KSTH KS KN KISL KGIC KSEP KFIN KTEX KTIA KUNR KCMR KMOC KCIP KTDB KBIO KU KIRF KSTC KICC KIRC KIDE KNUC KSEO KCFE KPWR KSAF KR KNUP KCSY KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KHLS KOCI KMPI KCRIM KPAONZ KNAR KPRP KHDP KNPP KTBT KMCC KPRV KHIV KTRD KTAO KHSA KWAC KJUST KMRS KCRCM KSCI KGIT KBCT KENV KACT KVRP KAWK KBTS KFSC KVIR KO KMFO KNNPMNUC KERG KPIR KCOM KAID KTLA KPOA KX KNDP KRCM KCFC KNEI KCHG KPLS KREL KFTFN KTFM KLIG KDEMAF KRAD KBTR KGCC KICA KHUM KSEC KPIN KESS KDEV KWWMN KOM KWNM KRFD KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KRGY KREC KIFR KSAC KWMNCS KPAK KOMS KFPC KRIM KDDG KCGC KPAI KID KMIG KNSD KWMM
LY LE LABOR LTTE LU LO LA LI LG LH LAB LT LOG
MARR MX MASS MOPS MNUC MCAP MTCRE MRCRE MTRE MASC MY MK MAS MO MCC MCA MIL MTCR MEPP MG ML MAPP MU MAR MZ MD MP MR MA MOPPS MTS MLS MILI MEPN MEPI MEETINGS MERCOSUR MW MT MIK MAPS MV MILITARY MARAD MDC MASSMNUC MUCN MEDIA MI MQADHAFI MPOS MPS MC
NZ NATO NI NO NU NG NL NPT NS NP NA NATIONAL NC NSF NDP NIPP NSSP NR NATOIRAQ NE NGO NAS NZUS NH NSG NAFTA NEW NRR NT NASA NAR NK NOVO NATOPREL NEA NSC NV NPA NSFO NW NORAD NPG
OTRA OECD OVIP OREP OPRC ODC OIIP OPDC OAS OSCE OPIC OMS OEXC OPCW OSCI OPAD ODIP OFDP OIE OFFICIALS OSHA OVIPPRELUNGANU OHUM OTR OMIG OSAC OBSP OFDA OVP ON OCII OES OCS OIC
PGOV PREL PARM PINR PHUM PM PREF PTER PK PINS PBIO PHSA PE PBTS PL POL PAK POV POLITICS POLICY PERL PA PCI PNAT PAS PALESTINIAN PPA PROP PERM PETR PREZ PO PRELPK PAIGH PROG POLITICAL PJUS PMIL PDOV PTE PAO PARMS PG PRAM PREO PGOF PTERE PSI PINO PRGOV PORG PP PS PKFK PSOE PEPR PDEM PINT PMAR PRELP PREFA PNG PTBS PFOR PUNE PGOVLO PHUMBA POLINT PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PY PLN PHUH PEDRO PF PHUS PETER PU PARTIES PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PHUMPREL POGOV PEL PINL PBT PINF PRL PSEPC POSTS PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOC PNR PROV
QA
RS RP RU RW RFE RCMP RIGHTSPOLMIL ROBERT RM RICE RO RELAM ROOD REGION RSP RF RELATIONS RIGHTS RUPREL REMON RPEL REACTION REPORT RSO
SZ SENV SOCI SNAR SY SO SP SU SI SMIG SYR SA SCUL SW SR SYRIA SNARM SPECIALIST SF SEN SN SC SMIL SCRM SENVSXE SARS SL SAARC STEINBERG SWE SCRS SG SNARIZ SAN ST SIPDIS SSA SPCVIS SOFA SENVKGHG SANC SHI SEVN SHUM SK SH SNARCS SPCE SNARN SIPRS
TRGY TBIO TSPA TU TPHY TI TX TH TIP TSPL TNGD TS TW TP TZ TN TC TR TF TT TK TRAD TD TL TV TWI TERRORISM TO TRSY TURKEY TSPAM TRT TINT TFIN TAGS TBID THPY
UK UNSC UNGA UN US UZ USEU UG UP UNAUS UNMIK USTR UR UY UA UNHRC USPS UNSCR UNESCO UNFICYP USAID UV UNMIC UNCHR USUN UNDP UNHCR USGS USOAS USNC UNEP UE UNVIE UAE UNO UNODC UNCHS UNDESCO UNC UNPUOS UNDC UNICEF UNCHC UNCSD UNFCYP UNIDROIT UNCND
VE VM VT VZ VTEG VTIZ VISIT VTPREL VENZ VAT VC VI VN
WHTI WIPO WTRO WTO WFP WS WHO WA WZ WI WBG WMD WWARD WHA WITH WTRQ WEU WMO WB
XA XR XW XX XK XL XM XS XF XG XT XC XH XD XB XU XE XV XZ XY XQ XI XTAG
YI YM YL YE YMCS
ZU ZI ZP ZR ZOELLICK ZF ZK ZO ZL ZB ZH ZT ZJ ZEALAND ZN ZA ZANU

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 07MANAGUA1067, ORTEGA,S FIRST 100 DAYS -- AUTOCRATIC TRENDS DRAW

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07MANAGUA1067.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07MANAGUA1067 | 2007-04-25 22:35 | 2011-04-25 19:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Managua

Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-04-25/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2743916.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-04-25/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2743919.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-04-25/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2743922.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-04-25/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2752792.aspx

`

    VZCZCXRO7160
    PP RUEHLMC
    DE RUEHMU #1067/01 1152235
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 252235Z APR 07
    FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9973
    INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1072
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0044
    RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
    RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MANAGUA 001067

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    WHA/CEN, DRL, NEA, USAID FOR AA/LAC

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2017
    TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL KDEM NU SNAR IR
    SUBJECT: ORTEGA,S FIRST 100 DAYS -- AUTOCRATIC TRENDS DRAW
    CONCERN

    REF: A. MANAGUA 1028
         ¶B. MANAGUA 0583

    Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli.  Reasons 1.4 (B,D).

    ¶1.  (C) Summary: In its first 100 days, President Ortega's
    government was characterized by a blur between party and
    state; autocracy and secrecy; dependency on Chavez; disregard
    for law and human rights; the dismissal of thousands of
    government employees; and, a pointed effort to financially
    "starve" independent media and threaten certain foreign
    business interests.  The administration's most resounding and
    uncontested success was its refusal to back the Japanese on
    whaling, while the downtick in electrical blackouts came at a
    steep price: political and economic bondage to Chavez.  The
    announcement of free health and education looked good on
    paper, but these sectors lack the required infrastructure,
    qualified personnel, and material resources to provide
    adequate services.  The National Police's flawed interception
    of a Mexican drug cartel was partly due to its failure to
    coordinate with the DEA.  We also note a downturn in
    cooperation from airport, immigration, and customs
    authorities in terms of access and information sharing.

    ¶2.  (C) Ortega exploited every available media opportunity to
    laud Chavez and their common allies Cuba and Iran, while he
    criticized the United States for being the root cause of
    narcotrafficking, failing to compensate Nicaragua for mining
    its harbors in the 1980s, violating human rights in Iraq and
    Guantanamo, and releasing Posada Cariles on bond.  Countries
    on good terms with the United States also came under fire,
    even Brazil for having the "moxy" to cooperate on ethanol.
    The rudderless opposition was increasingly vocal, while
    Nicaragua's frightened business elite curried Ortega's favor
    and avoided confrontation.  Signs emerged that left and
    right-leaning civil society and political leaders are
    starting to coalesce to counter Ortega's authoritarian
    tendencies and apparent ambitions to turn Nicaragua into an
    autocratic, populist regime.  Sandinista dissidents tended to
    be the most vigorous critics of the government, while to
    Ortega's delight, Liberals spent most of their time
    bickering.  The opposition faces a foe flush with Chavez
    petrodollars, thus far free from the scrutiny of the National
    Assembly -- the only partially independent government
    institution remaining.  End Summary.

    Whales the Most Solid Beneficiaries
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶3.  (C) During its first 100 days, Ortega's government was
    characterized by the blur between party and state; a close
    association with the Chavez axis; autocracy and secrecy;
    disregard for rule of law and human rights; the dismissal of
    thousands of government employees; and, a pointed effort to
    financially "starve" independent media and threaten certain
    foreign (and domestic) business interests.  Likely, Ortega's
    most resounding and uncontested success was his refusal to
    back the Japanese on whaling.  The downtick in electrical
    blackouts was welcome, but came at a price: the Venezuelan
    diesel burning gensets produce some of the country's most
    costly power, whether or not Nicaragua has to pay for them.
    While the government decided to negotiate a new IMF deal,
    Ortega also declared that Nicaragua will be "IMF free" within
    five years through a home grown, Chavez-financed "Zero
    Poverty" initiative, whose centerpiece is a project that
    provides chicks and a pregnant cow and pig to poor families.

    ¶4.  (C) The new government's decision to reduce senior-level
    government official salaries and offer free health and
    education for all citizens sounded good on paper, but thus
    far has produced dubious results.  Cynical Nicaraguans claim
    that Ortega's cuts in the salaries of senior officials will
    also force out high-level civil servants, who do not support
    the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN).  Those who
    remain will ultimately receive bonuses or supplemental FSLN
    salaries behind the scenes.  (Note: This was a common
    practice during previous governments.)  Skeptics also note
    that inadequate infrastructure, insufficient personnel, and a
    scarcity of a number of basic medicines make Ortega's
    promises for free education and health care ring hollow.

    ¶5.  (C) The spate of education and health worker protests for

    MANAGUA 00001067  002 OF 005

    higher wages and the Ortega administration's heavy-handed
    response in some cases, also drew well-merited fire from
    human rights organizations.  In its 100-day report, the
    Nicaraguan Human Rights Center (CENDIH) -- a left-leaning,
    traditionally pro-Sandinista human rights NGO -- lambasted
    Ortega for allowing an armed mob led by a Cuban-Nicaraguan to
    raid one of the secondary schools and physically remove its
    besieged director while the National Police looked on.
    Similarly, the inaction of the Ortega government in
    responding to the right-leaning Permanent Human Rights
    Commission's (CPDH) repeated pleas for protection after a
    number of its leaders received death threats caused CENIDH to
    question the new government and prompted it to file an appeal
    on behalf of the CPDH before the OAS Inter-American Human
    Rights Commission (IAHRC).  Ortega's insistence on running
    the Presidency from FSLN headquarters, which is also his
    private residence, drew considerable fire as well.

    ¶6.  (C) Opposition media continued to feel the heat.  As
    government-sponsored advertising dried up, some media outlets
    were forced to lay off employees, including journalists.  In
    President Ortega's latest public appearance the evening of
    April 23, he launched a five-minute tirade against "the other
    media, we know who they are, who are guilty of censorship and
    attempting to limit freedom of expression."  He praised all
    Nicaraguan television stations for covering the event, except
    for one, Channel 2, which he did not mention by name, but
    blasted for refusing to broadcast unedited versions of
    Ortega's increasingly frequent and long diatribes.

    Daniel Slips Some in the Polls
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶7.  (C) According to an M and R poll released on April 24
    (septel), President Ortega's popularity slipped somewhat in
    comparison to the results of a February Cid Gallup poll.  In
    the April poll, 42.5% of the respondents opined that that
    Ortega is leading the country in the right direction, down
    from 57% in February.  While 27.9% believe the president's
    performance is good to very good, 63.7% believe he is doing a
    fair to terrible job.  First Lady Rosario Murillo received
    lower marks: only 22.7% believed her performance is good-very
    good.  Over 64% of the respondents either do not support or
    have their doubts about the government.  Over 50% of the
    April respondents questioned Ortega's authoritarianism,
    including 26.6% of the Sandinista respondents.  About 78%
    rejected Ortega's substitution of the state seal with a
    psychedelic party-based emblem, 77.8% opposed presidential
    reelection, 73.3% disapproved of Cardinal Obando's
    participation in the Ortega government, and 70% think Ortega
    has not delivered on his campaign promise to reduce
    unemployment.

    Economic Picture, Business Climate
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶8.  (C) As promised, Ortega has made few changes to fiscal
    and monetary policy since taking office, and the government,
    of its own volition, is negotiating a new program with the
    IMF.  By most accounts, consumer demand has remained strong,
    tax receipts are up, and people continue to deposit money
    into their bank accounts.  Large investments announced before
    the elections, most noticeably ITG/Cone Denim's $100 million
    textile plant, are going forward.  Exports continue to grow
    in number and volume as the result of CAFTA and Central
    American economic integration.  Ortega's presence is felt on
    his "Zero Hunger" program (which has yet to take shape),
    "free education and health care," and forging cooperative
    agreements and off-budget financing with "new friends."
    (Note: Free and universal education and health care systems
    have been in place in Nicaragua for years.  The difference
    now is that the Ortega government has eliminated the system
    of supplemental payments for school supplies, medicines,
    etc.).

    ¶9.  (C) This otherwise bright picture contrasts with the
    consistent drum beat of Ortega's political message that
    liberal economic policies have not worked and that the role
    of government must be enhanced.  Ortega compares the
    fraternal, socialist nature of his relations with Venezuela,
    Cuba, Bolivia, and Iran with the self-interested,
    capitalistic nature of the United States.  This has been

    MANAGUA 00001067  003 OF 005

    coupled with an agency-by-agency review of the activities of
    the previous administration to drum up accusations of
    corruption and discredit "neoliberalism."  Highly educated
    technocrats who do not support the FSLN have been forced out
    of key positions in economic ministries and replaced by party
    hacks.  Major government contracts with the private sector
    have come under review, especially foreign companies in the
    energy sector, with frequent revelations to the press that
    one or the other contract is null and void.  La Prensa
    recently reported on an internal government document
    proposing that all public services in which the private
    sector participates be "renationalized".

    ¶10.  (C) The result has been that investors, both domestic
    and foreign, have begun to re-evaluate their presence in
    Nicaragua.  Ortega's political discourse and embrace of
    self-declared enemies of the United States is unsettling.
    Legal challenges to long-standing government contracts raise
    questions about the motivation of government, the rule of
    law, and the sanctity of contracts.  While foreign investors
    with ongoing concerns continue to do business, they have
    started to consider contingencies.  Others who once
    contemplated Nicaragua have put their investment plans on
    hold.  The perception of rising political risk is affecting
    business decisions.  (Comment:  Three different Nicaraguan
    investors have told us that they have been shifting their
    holdings and assets outside of the country, mostly to Costa
    Rica and the United States.)

    Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran Can Do No Wrong
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶11.  (C) Ortega consolidated his alliance with Venezuela,
    Cuba, and Iran.  While the Venezuela and Cuba connection drew
    some criticism, of even more concern was Ortega's association
    with Iran following the Iranian President's visit to Managua
    on the heels of Ortega's inauguration in January.   Then
    during the Iranian Foreign Minister's "surprise" visit to
    Managua on April 22, Ortega publicly endorsed Iran's efforts
    to enrich uranium and rejected the UN-imposed sanctions.
    (Note: To date, the National Assembly has not ratified the
    GON's agreement with the Government of Iran.  Nicaraguan
    Liberal Alliance (ALN), Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS),
    and many Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) National Assembly
    deputies oppose the agreement, in large part because of the
    clause that stipulates mutual support in international fora.)

    "Gringo Bashing" is Back . . .
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶12.  (C) President Ortega exploited every available media
    opportunity to laud Chavez and their common allies Cuba and
    Iran, while he criticized the United States for being the
    root cause of narcotrafficking and much of the region's other
    criminal activities, failing to compensate Nicaragua for
    mining its harbors in the 1980s, violating human rights in
    Iraq and Guantanamo, and releasing Posada Cariles on bond.
    Countries on good terms with the United States -- including
    Costa Rica, Honduras, and Colombia also came under fire, and
    to a lesser degree, Mexico and Brazil -- the latter for its
    "moxy" in cooperating with the United States on ethanol.

    .. . And Bilateral Cooperation Dips
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  -

    ¶13.  (C) The Nicaraguan National Police's (NNP) recent
    interception of a Mexican drug cartel (septel) at first drew
    rave reviews, but then the facts came to light.  Instead of
    cooperating in operational planning as it had in the past,
    this time, the NNP failed to share critical information
    before mounting the operation.  Their lack of cooperation and
    information sharing resulted in the arrest of insignificant,
    low-level "laborers and enforcers" for the Mexican
    trafficking organization.  Due to the flawed police
    intervention and lack of evidence, these subjects will
    probably be released shortly.  The preemptive arrests of
    these individuals could jeopardize current investigations and
    future operations throughout Central America.  Similarly,
    cooperation from airport, immigration, and customs
    authorities also declined, specifically increasingly limited
    access to facilities and information, including eliminating
    our access to the immigration data base.  Since Ortega took

    MANAGUA 00001067  004 OF 005

    office on January 10, there have also been no resolutions of
    property claims filed by U.S. citizens.

    Divide and Conquer
    - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶14.  (C) One of President Ortega's overarching objectives was
    to keep the opposition divided, and encourage new fissures
    within the church and private sector.  As part of these
    efforts, Ortega revitalized his political power sharing pact
    with PLC leader/convicted money launderer Arnold Aleman as a
    means to deter PLC unity with the ALN.  In March, the
    Nicaraguan government released Aleman on country-wide "house
    arrest" and PLC and FSLN caucuses voted jointly for a slate
    of judicial appointments, all along party lines.  In April,
    "pact" caucuses made revisions to money laundering
    definitions and sentence terms that, if passed as is, could
    allow Aleman to walk free by December.  Ortega's insistence
    that Archbishop Obando y Bravo head a new "peace and
    reconciliation" council caused the Vatican and local church
    authorities to scramble -- clearly pitting Archbishop
    Leopoldo Brenes against Obando y Bravo.  Similarly, Ortega
    attempted to drive a wedge between economic heavy hitters
    like Carols Pellas and the owners of medium enterprises by
    courting the former and attacking the latter.

    Opposition
    - - - - - -

    ¶15.  (C) Despite the growing skepticism, even alarm,
    political opposition leadership remained largely rudderless,
    while the once-fearsome business class curried Ortega's favor
    and avoided confrontation.  Sandinista dissidents tended to
    be the most vigorous critics of the government, while to
    Ortega's delight, Liberals spent most of their time bickering
    amongst themselves.  Nonetheless, there were some encouraging
    signs that left and right-leaning civil society and political
    leaders are starting to coalesce to defend Nicaragua from
    Ortega's apparent ambitions to turn the country into an
    autocratic, family-run regime under Venezuelan President
    Chavez's sphere of influence (Ref. A).  On the legal front,
    ALN, MRS, and PLC caucuses drafted a joint bill that would
    establish the Taiwanese-donated "Mamon" building as the
    official Office of the Presidency, the site of the Bolanos
    presidency.  ALN, MRS, and PLC caucuses also inserted a
    clause in the 2007 national budget reiterating the
    requirement that government to government transactions be
    included in the budget and subject to Assembly scrutiny.

    Discord and Discontent within Ortega Ranks
    - - - - - - - - - -- - - - -  - - - - - - -

    ¶16.  (C) While Ortega attempted to sow discord among his
    rivals, his own party unity has also come under strain.
    First Lady Rosario Murillo appeared to be in the middle of
    much of the discord and discontent.  Nicho Marenco, the Mayor
    of Managua was told to mind his own business after he
    publicly suggested that the Presidency operate in
    installations separate from FSLN headquarters and most
    recently indicated that he might not run for the presidency
    in 2011 because he feared for his life.  During the period,
    three ministers, all female, were summarily fired, while
    Ortega insisted on defending  the most controversial figure,
    Education Minister Miguel de Castilla, despite education
    sector work stoppages and calls for his resignation.  The
    Minister of Culture was fired after questioning Ortega's gift
    to Chavez of valuable poems written by famed Nicaraguan poet
    Ruben Dario.  The Minister of Family's dismissal appears to
    be linked to a personal spat between economic advisor Bayardo
    Arce and Murillo.

    About Ortega's Health
    - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶17.  (C) Rumors continued to percolate regarding President
    Ortega's health.  According to stepdaughter Zoilamerica
    Narvaez, for years now Ortega has traveled to Cuba for blood
    cleansing treatments to treat a rare cholesterol problem.
    CENIDH's Vilma Nunez commented that as Ortega ages, these
    ozone blood cleansing procedures must be administered more
    frequently and are less effective.  Other contacts claim
    Ortega suffers from a form of lymphoma or leukemia.  Heart

    MANAGUA 00001067  005 OF 005

    trouble and high blood pressure round out Ortega's reported
    health problems.

    Comment
    - - - -

    ¶18.  (C) The opposition confronts a power-hungry foe flush
    with Chavez petrodollars, thus far free from the scrutiny of
    the National Assembly -- the only partially independent
    branch of government remaining.  If the Ortega administration
    replaces private Albanic with state-owned Petronic to run its
    oil operations, then by law these revenues must be included
    in the national budget and the National Assembly is required
    to monitor the agreement.  The growing rejection of Ortega's
    abrasive rhetoric may eventually prompt him to tone down his
    public discourse.  Nonetheless, we expect Ortega's natural
    belligerent instincts towards the United States will continue
    to surface and Chavez will continue to pressure him to
    confront us.
    TRIVELLI

`