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### Viewing cable 06MANAGUA2225, NICARAGUAN PRESIDENTIAL POLLS -- WHAT DO THE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06MANAGUA2225 | 2006-10-07 00:00 | 2011-06-01 08:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Managua

Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758464.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4103/la-embusa-y-el-gabinete-de-ortega
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4104/d-rsquo-escoto-en-onu-ldquo-un-desafio-de-ortega-a-ee-uu-rdquo
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4102/estrada-y-la-ldquo-doble-cara-rdquo-ante-ee-uu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4041/millones-de-dolares-sin-control-y-a-discrecion
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4040/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-venezuela-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu

`

    VZCZCXYZ0002
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHMU #2225/01 2800000
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 070000Z OCT 06
    FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7825
    INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0786
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002225

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR WHA/CEN

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2016
    TAGS: EAID KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL
    SUBJECT: NICARAGUAN PRESIDENTIAL POLLS -- WHAT DO THE
    NUMBERS MEAN?

    Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).

    ¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  The presidential polls from March to the
    most recent in September all point to the likelihood of a
    runoff in the November 5 presidential election.  From poll to
    poll the candidates have gained and lost percentage points,
    but none of the candidates has attained the level (40 percent
    or 35 percent and 5 percent over the next closest candidate)
    required to win on the first round.  Although Sandinista
    Liberation Front (FSLN) candidate Daniel Ortega was well in
    the lead in June and July polls, Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance
    (ALN) candidate Eduardo Montealegre has gained on him in the
    past few weeks.  The polls show that Ortega and Liberal
    Constitutional Party (PLC) candidate Jose Rizo are still the
    strongest players among the rural population.  The Sandinista
    Renovation Movement (MRS) suffered a setback after
    presidential candidate Herty Lewites' sudden death, but the
    party has gained back some points after an initial loss in
    the polls and their numbers seem to have stabilized.  Sample
    sizes and methodologies vary for each poll and must be taken
    into account when analyzing the results.  The percentage of
    voters who declare they are undecided remains high and these
    are the voters who may determine the outcome of the November
    5 election.  END SUMMARY.

    THE NUMBERS
    - - - - - -

    ¶2. (C) Surveys -- intention for presidential vote

    09/06 - M&R Consultants
    Daniel Ortega -- 30.9%
    Eduardo Montealegre -- 26.4%
    Herty Lewites/Edmundo Jarquin -- 15.9%
    Jose Rizo -- 16.3%
    Undecided -- 9.6%

    09/06 - Greenberg Consultants
    Daniel Ortega -- 29%
    Eduardo Montealegre -- 27%
    Herty Lewites/Edmundo Jarquin -- 19%
    Jose Rizo -- 16%
    Undecided -- 7%

    09/06 - M&R (phone)
    Daniel Ortega -- 16.7%
    Eduardo Montealegre -- 36.2%
    Herty Lewites/Edmundo Jarquin -- 19.7%
    Jose Rizo -- 11.7%
    Undecided -- 16.2%

    08/06 - Borges y Asociados (ByA)
    Daniel Ortega -- 26.8%
    Eduardo Montealegre -- 23.9%
    Herty Lewites/Edmundo Jarquin -- 19.1%
    Jose Rizo -- 16.4%
    Undecided -- 13.3%

    08/06 - New Link
    Daniel Ortega -- 28%
    Eduardo Montealegre -- 21%
    Herty Lewites/Edmundo Jarquin -- 12%
    Jose Rizo -- 15%
    Undecided -- 23%

    08/06 - CID Gallup
    Daniel Ortega -- 28.7%
    Eduardo Montealegre -- 22.8%
    Herty Lewites/Edmundo Jarquin --  14.2%
    Jose Rizo -- 13.5%
    Undecided -- 19.1%

    08/06 - M&R
    Daniel Ortega -- 32.1%
    Eduardo Montealegre -- 25.0%
    Herty Lewites/Edmundo Jarquin -- 19.9%
    Jose Rizo -- 13.7%
    Undecided -- 8.0%

    O8/06 - ByA
    Daniel Ortega -- 27.5%
    Eduardo Montealegre -- 24.8%
    Herty Lewites/Edmundo Jarquin -- 17.1%
    Jose Rizo -- 18.6%
    Undecided -- 11.1%

    07/06 - ByA
    Daniel Ortega -- 31.4%
    Eduardo Montealegre -- 29.1%
    Herty Lewites/Edmundo Jarquin -- 15.2%
    Jose Rizo -- 15.7%
    Undecided -- 7.6%

    06/06 - ByA
    Daniel Ortega -- 30.1%
    Eduardo Montealegre -- 24.4%
    Herty Lewites/Edmundo Jarquin -- 17.2%
    Jose Rizo -- 21.6%
    Undecided -- 5.8%

    06/06 - CID Gallup
    Daniel Ortega -- 23%
    Eduardo Montealegre -- 17%
    Herty Lewites/Edmundo Jarquin -- 15%
    Jose Rizo -- 11%
    Undecided -- 32%

    05/06 - M&R
    Daniel Ortega -- 27.2%
    Eduardo Montealegre -- 27.9%
    Herty Lewites/Edmundo Jarquin -- 13.3%
    Jose Rizo -- 13.3%
    Undecided -- 12.5%

    05/06 - ByA
    Daniel Ortega -- 28.7%
    Eduardo Montealegre -- 27.0%
    Herty Lewites/Edmundo Jarquin -- 13.3%
    Jose Rizo -- 17.0%
    Undecided -- 12.1%

    EARLY POLLS
    - - - - - -

    ¶3.  (U) Early surveys, such as the Borges y Asociados
    countrywide poll conducted in early May, showed a small gap
    between Ortega and Montealegre -- Ortega leading with 28.7
    percent, followed by Eduardo Montealegre with 27 percent.
    Poll results when analyzed by department, showed that Ortega
    was strong in Managua, Carazo, Nueva Segovia, Madriz,
    Jinotega, Esteli, Chontales, the RAAN, Rio San Juan and
    Matagalpa.  In contrast, Montealegre was stronger in
    typically Sandinista Leon, as well as in Masaya, Granada,
    Rivas, Chinandega, Boaco and the RAAS.

    ¶4.  (U) Ortega's numbers began to climb in June, while
    support for other candidates dropped, as highlighted in the
    CID Gallup poll, conducted June 16-23.  Ortega,s numbers
    rose to 23% versus 16% in April, while support for the other
    candidates dropped: Montealegre 17% versus 22% in April;
    Lewites 15% versus 18% in April; and Rizo: 11% versus 13% in
    April.  Support was also strong for the FSLN as a party.  In
    a Borges y Asociados countrywide poll conducted between June
    20 and July 2 Nicaraguans were asked about their party
    preferences (without using the names of the Presidential
    candidates) and the FSLN was clearly ahead with 30.6%
    followed by the PLC (24.2%), the ALN (17.7%), the MRS (11.3%)
    and the AC (.78%).

    ¶5.  (U) The earlier polls also showed preferences among
    voters by education level and department that still hold true
    in more recent surveys.  The Borges y Asociados pollsters
    compared education levels of the respondents, and among those
    who supported the FSLN, 33.5% had only completed a primary
    education in contrast to those who supported Lewites (11% had
    a primary education and 22% has a university education).
    Respondents with no education overwhelmingly favored Rizo and
    Ortega.  The poll also measured the candidates' popularity
    among urban versus rural populations.  Ortega, Montealegre
    and the MRS led in urban areas, whereas Ortega and Rizo were
    stronger in rural areas.

    RECENT POLLS
    - - - - - - -

    ¶6.  (SBU) M&R, August -- According to the M&R Consultants
    nationwide poll conducted August 4 - 10 (sample size 4,020)
    Ortega was in the lead with 32.1%, followed by Montealegre
    25.0%, Jarquin (19.9%), Rizo (13.7%) and Pastora (1.3%).  If
    the election goes to a second round, Montealegre would win
    over Ortega, according to poll results.  Of those polled, 8%
    said they would not vote or declined to respond.  If it is

    assumed that those 8% would not vote, Ortega could win.  The
    adjusted figures (without the 8%) are:  Ortega (34.9%),
    Montealegre (27.2%), Jarquin (21.6%), Rizo (14.9%) and
    Pastora (1.4%).  According to regional breakdowns, Ortega is
    still strongest in urban and rural areas.  Montealegre has
    the advantage on the Atlantic Coast and in the center of the
    country.  Also according to the poll, if the elections were
    held tomorrow, none of the parties would win enough seats to
    control the National Assembly.

    ¶7.  (C) CID Gallup, August -- showed Ortega in the lead with
    29%, followed by Montealegre with 23%, Rizo (14%), Jarquin
    (14%) and Pastora (1%).  The nationwide poll, conducted
    August 16 - 19, had a sample size of 1,258 people, all with
    cedulas.  Of the people polled, 19% said they were undecided.
     Of note is that on a second round, according to the poll,
    Montealegre, Rizo and Jarquin would all beat Ortega.
    (COMMENT:  The press ran articles highlighting Ortega's lead
    and declaring him the probable victor, but they were based on
    the assumption that the 19% of undecided voters will either
    abstain from voting or that some will vote for Ortega.  In
    the past, the undecided (or those who simply declined to
    reveal who they plan to vote for) do not vote FSLN or PLC.  A
    majority of the 19% will go to Montealegre or Jarquin.  END
    COMMENT.)

    ¶8.  (C) ALN Commissioned Poll, August -- A private poll
    conducted by New Link Political (protect) for the ALN showed
    FSLN presidential candidate Daniel Ortega with the highest
    vote intention but with ALN candidate Eduardo Montealegre
    winning in a second round.  Ortega polled highest with 28% of
    the vote, followed by Montealegre (21%), Rizo (15%), Jarquin
    (10%), and Pastora (1%).  Seventeen percent were undecided.
    Montealegre, who the poll showed as being able to capture the
    most votes from other candidates, would defeat Ortega in a
    runoff election 35% to 32%, though the other candidates would
    lose to Ortega.  About 32% of respondents indicated that they
    would consider voting for a presidential candidate and deputy
    candidates from different parties, most preferring
    Montealegre.

    ¶9.  (C) MRS Commissioned Poll, September -- A private poll
    commissioned by the MRS shows Montealegre a close second to
    Ortega.  MRS spokesperson Israel Lewites provided Poloff with
    a copy of the latest Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research poll
    (August 26 - September 2; 1,000 respondents, of them 746
    likely to vote).  Greenberg, which is providing consulting
    serving to the MRS campaign, concluded the following: of the
    1,000 respondents: 29% would vote for Ortega, 27% for
    Montealegre, 19% for Jarquin, 16% for Rizo, and 6% undecided.
     Of the 746 respondents most likely to vote: 32% would vote
    for Ortega, 28% for Montealegre, 20% for Jarquin, and 18% for
    Rizo.  (COMMENT:  Unlike other polls that the PLC can claim
    are financed by Montealegre, the Greenberg poll, if anything,
    should favor Jarquin, not Montealegre.  The fact that this
    poll tracks with the other polls lends credence to these
    trends.  END COMMENT.)

    ¶10.  (C) PLC Commissioned Poll, September -- CID Gallup
    fielded a small anonymous (without the CID Gallup name)
    proprietary poll at the request of the PLC.  The net results
    of the poll, tracked fairly closely with CID Gallup,s last
    poll, and in fact showed Montealegre consolidating and
    improving, Rizo improving a bit, Jarquin slipping, and Ortega
    holding at the same level.  When asked who would they would
    vote for right now, 28 percent of respondents indicated
    Ortega.  Montealegre garnered 24 percent, followed by Rizo
    (16%), Jarquin (12%) and Pastora (1%).  Nineteen percent were
    undecided.

    ¶11.  (C) M&R phone poll, September -- According to an M&R
    poll released September 11 (poll conducted on September 7-8,
    sample size 802 nationwide, 3.5% error), 35.2% of the
    respondents believe Montealegre will be the next president of
    Nicaragua; 22.3% think Ortega will win; 18.6% are uncertain
    or did not respond; 12.5% believe Jarquin will win; 11.1%
    think Rizo will be the next president; and, only .1% think
    Pastora has a chance.  Regarding voter preference,
    Montealegre gained 36.2%, Jarquin 19.2%, Ortega 16.7%, Rizo
    11.1% and Pastora .1%.  Undecided/no response totaled 16.2%.
    (COMMENT:  The results of the poll are encouraging, however,
    the sample size is very small and respondents polled outside
    Managua were all queried by phone, thus limiting the type of
    person who could respond, excluding poorer rural voters who
    tend to favor Ortega or Rizo.  It should also be noted that
    this poll is an extreme outlier in relation to the other

    polls.  END COMMENT.)

    LATEST POLL
    - - - - - -

    ¶12.  M&R, September -- According to the M&R poll released
    September 29, Ortega (30.9%) and Montealegre (26.4%) are the
    two leading candidates followed by Rizo (16.3%), Jarquin
    (15.9%) and Pastora (0.9%).  The percentage of people who
    will not vote or are still undecided is 9.6%.  The poll was
    conducted between September 15 and 21, with a sample size of
    4,204, and a margin of error of 1.5%.  A majority of voters,
    66 percent, declared themselves "anti-Ortega."  In this poll,
    Montealegre is gaining on Ortega, and the most likely outcome
    is a second round runoff between these two candidates.  In a
    second round, Montealegre would win with 44.2% of the vote --
    9 points over Ortega,s 35%.  Jarquin,s numbers appear to be
    slipping and Rizo is now in third place.

    ¶13.  No party would have the 47 votes in the National
    Assembly needed to pass a law, though the FSLN would still
    enjoy the largest voting block, according to the results of
    this poll.  The FSLN would win 35 deputy seats, the ALN 29,
    the MRS 14 and the PLC 12 (down from 40 currently).
    Alliances would still be necessary in order to pass
    legislation.  The combined votes of the PLC and FSLN would
    total 47 votes.  Regarding the rural vote, the poll suggests
    that the FSLN has gained considerable ground with this
    segment of the population as Ortega leads with 34.9%,
    followed by Montealegre 24.9%, and Rizo 21.5%.  (NOTE:
    Contacts tell us that Chavez, donation of fertilizer to the
    FSLN has drawn more support for Ortega.)

    THE HERTY FACTOR
    - - - - - - - - -

    ¶14.  (C) The MRS suffered a setback in the polls with Herty
    Lewites' death, which they recouped in the following months
    as Jarquin and Carlos Mejia Godoy began actively campaigning.
     Recent polls, however, show their numbers may be slipping.
    MRS spokesman Israel Lewites is convinced that the FSLN has
    reached the peak of its support and that the poll numbers may
    decline, which will provide the MRS with an opportunity to
    gain ground.  A bump in the polls in favor of Ortega occurred
    in June and his numbers appeared to have crossed the 30%
    threshold, though there are now indications that his numbers
    are beginning to decrease.  Lewites believes that Ortega's
    numbers are overstated in the polls, because some people who
    claim to be FSLN supporters may only be professing their
    allegiance to avoid antagonizing local party members.  The
    MRS is now actively targeting FSLN supporters to try to win
    their vote -- Lewites claims that they have much better
    chance in pulling away FSLN voters than they do Montealegre
    supporters.  Recent advertisements speak directly to
    Sandinistas and portray the MRS as party that is true to
    Sandinista ideals.  The MRS is working hard to increase its
    support in urban areas and among students.

    ¶15. (C) Edmundo Jarquin was the clear winner in an M&R poll
    measuring public reactions to the September 13 presidential
    debate sponsored by CNN en espanol and Canal 2, a Nicaraguan
    TV channel.  According to the poll, 113,000 households in
    Managua tuned in to watch Edmundo Jarquin (MRS), Eduardo
    Montealegre (ALN), Jose Rizo (PLC) and Eden Pastora (AC) give
    one-minute answers to a broad set of questions ranging from
    economic growth strategies to Daniel Ortega,s absence from
    the debate, to the candidates, views on abortion.  Aided by
    his large physical presence and deep voice, Jarquin,s
    answers were concise and well-crafted and made an impact.
    Although over made-up and visibly nervous at times,
    Montealegre placed a solid second in the debate by delivering
    clear, concise, on-message answers.  Rizo and Pastora were
    unable to use the forum effectively, offered few tangible
    solutions, and frequently ran out of time.  Lewites recently
    told emboffs that Jarquin's performance during the debate has
    resulted in several small campaign donations (around 20,000 -
    30,000 each).

    HAS MONTEALEGRE TURNED IT AROUND?
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶16.  (C) In the June polls, support for Montealegre declined,
    possibly because of the internal divisions among individuals
    and parties forming his alliance, and a poorly defined
    campaign focus and message.  Montealegre's numbers slipped
    especially in rural areas, while Ortega and Rizo gained

    strength. Ortega and Rizo are still the strongest players
    among the rural population and Montealegre had not focused on
    campaigning in rural areas.  In recent polls, this trend
    seems to have turned around.  The most recent polls show an
    upturn in Montealegre's numbers and an increased likelihood
    that the race will go to a second round between Montealegre
    and Ortega.

    ¶17.  (C) The more positive poll results do not indicate
    smooth sailing for Montealegre's campaign, however.  Embassy
    contacts have speculated that Montealegre's numbers could
    still fall due to problems articulating his message and the
    CENIS (debt bonds) smear campaign orchestrated by his
    opponents.  We continue to hear reports of problems with his
    campaign, although fewer than before.  Others have noted that
    the divide between the center right is likely to remain
    protracted because polls have undercounted the rural vote,
    thus PLC numbers may increase in the run-up to the elections.

    COMMENT
    - - - -

    ¶18.  (C) One of the most notable trends in the polls is large
    number of undeclared or undecided voters, which may indicate
    that the people polled do not want to discuss their party
    affiliation or that they are undecided.  The undecided vote
    has varied from poll to poll, ranging from a low of 5.8% to
    32%.  The last two polls show an undecided vote of around 7
    to 10 percent.  This still large segment may reflect the
    indecision on the part of traditional liberal voters who are
    torn between party loyalty and Montealegre, but mostly do not
    want to waste their votes, preferring to rally behind the
    "winning horse" that will beat Ortega.  These undecided votes
    traditionally do not go to Ortega; they are potential votes
    for Montealegre or Jarquin.  However, if these voters abstain
    from voting, Ortega could win.  The next month will be
    critical as Montealegre and Jarquin court the undecided
    voters.  The availability of funds, or lack thereof, may be
    the determinant in whether they can reach these voters, who
    will likely determine the outcome of the November 5 election.
     The next few polls may give a more accurate prediction of
    what will happen as these voters make their decisions.

    ¶19.  (C) Recent polls continue to point toward two options:
    a win by Ortega in the first round or a second round run-off
    between Ortega and Montealegre.  (NOTE: The INR-funded CID
    Gallup poll also reflects this and fits within recent
    trends.)  At this point, an ALN-PLC alliance is unlikely.
    Rizo does not appear willing to cede to Montealegre, whether
    or not Aleman steps down.  Even if Rizo did step down, the
    additional votes for Montealegre would be minimal and he
    could risk losing some of his anti-pact vote.  An alliance
    with Jarquin also seems unlikely, though something could
    emerge closer to the election.  When asked about a possible
    alliance between Montealegre and Jarquin, Lewites denied the
    possibility and pointed out the ideological differences
    between the MRS and the ALN.

    ¶20.  (C) What also seems clear from the polls is that
    Montealegre is the best candidate to beat Ortega.  Jarquin
    might be able to win in a second round over Ortega, but most
    likely Rizo would not.  The independent vote will be key in
    determining the outcome of the November 5 election; 60% to
    70% of independent voters (depending on the poll) reject the
    FSLN-PLC pact.  According to recent polls, most voters
    believe that the pact is alive and well -- 62.4% of those
    polled by M&R in September.  If Montealegre focuses on
    winning Liberal voters to ensure a runoff election and
    strengthens his campaign messages, he may be able to rally
    the undecided voters and the "anti-Ortega" vote.  The
    September M&R poll showed that even among voters who align
    themselves with other parties, Montealegre is a strong
    candidate -- 55.2% of PLC voters and 47.% of MRS voters
    believe Montealegre is the best candidate to beat Ortega.
    Montealegre's campaign efforts should focus on the undecided
    and "anti-Ortega" voters with strong, clear statements and a
    simple refutation of the CENIS charges.  END COMMENT.
    TRIVELLI

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