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### Viewing cable 09KABUL3865, KARZAI LOOKS FORWARD

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09KABUL3865 | 2009-12-03 11:27 | 2011-05-19 17:00 | SECRET | Embassy Kabul
Appears in these articles: http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3992475.ece

`

    VZCZCXRO6291
    OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
    DE RUEHBUL #3865/01 3371127
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 031127Z DEC 09
    FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3704
    INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 003865

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2019
    TAGS: PREL PROG AF
    SUBJECT: KARZAI LOOKS FORWARD
    Classified By: Ambassador Karl Eikenberry; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
    ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: On December 2, Ambassador Eikenberry met
    twice with President Karzai. At the first meeting, the
    Ambassador and General McChrystal discussed President Obama´s
    December 2, speech with Karzai and his national security
    team. Ambassador Eikenberry advised that at the national
    level, the United States will focus on three categories of
    essential ministries: Security, Economy, and Human Services.
    We will also work through the Independent Directorate for
    Local Governance (IDLG) to improve sub-national governance.
    In the meeting, Karzai provided criticism and a puzzling
    overview of the root causes of corruption in Afghanistan,
    largely casting blame on expat-Afghans and foreigners. In
    Eikenberry´s second meeting with Karzai and NSA Rassoul, they
    discussed the roll-out of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.
    Ambassador Eikenberry cited the December 2 signing of a lease
    for the Mazar-i-Sharif Consulate as an example of our
    long-term commitment to Afghanistan. The Ambassador also
    warned Karzai that Afghanistan will receive intense media and
    Congressional attention. Karzai, who consulted with
    Ambassador Eikenberry on his potential Cabinet picks, shared
    his plan to announce his choices in two stages. END SUMMARY.
    ---------------------------------
    Strategy Roll-out Tops Discussion
    ¶2. (S) The December 2 morning meeting began with Karzai
    asking General McChrystal to elaborate on President Obama´s
    December 2 speech. General McChrystal briefed on the
    deployment schedule of forces over the next 12 months. He
    assessed that the number of non-U.S. NATO forces would also
    increase. General McChrystal also mentioned his recent trip
    to Pakistan where he met with Chief of Army Staff Kiyani.
    Ambassador Eikenberry emphasized to Karzai that at the
    national level, future U.S. development and aid initiatives
    will focus on three categories of essential ministries:
    - Security ministries, consisting of the Ministries of
    Defense, Interior, and the National Directorate of Security
    (NDS);
    - Human services ministries, comprising the Ministries of
    Education and Health; and,
    - Economic ministries, including the Ministries of
    Agriculture, Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD),
    Energy, Mining, Transportation, Commerce, and Finance.
    Also at the national level, the United States will place
    additional emphasis on governance and policy, on civil
    service training and electoral reform. Ambassador Eikenberry
    explained that we will work through the IDLG to improve
    delivery of basic services to Afghans. In a clear reference
    to President Obama´s statement that we will support
    "...Afghan Ministries, Governors, and local leaders that
    combat corruption", Karzai said he was concerned about the
    establishment of "parallel structures" in the government.
    ¶3. (S) When the conversation turned to UNAMA, Karzai
    responded that he had lost faith in UNAMA. Karzai then said
    "why not talk about the Government of Afghanistan to
    coordinate donations?" The Ambassador replied that it was a
    matter to discuss in the months to come.
    ¶4. (S) Returning to President Obama´s strategy as laid out
    in his speech, Karzai advised that engaging community leaders
    was key because they were the "doors" to communities.
    "Taliban find space in communities", said Karzai, "You can´t
    call for meetings at Camp Bastion (the main British base in
    Helmand Province)". Further, if the Afghan/Pakistan border
    remained porous, Afghanistan´s security situation would
    remain insecure, said Karzai, who added that he would
    accompany British PM Brown to Khandahar and Helmand in the
    future.
    --------------------------------------------- -
    Eikenberry to Karzai, "You´re too Thin-Skinned"
    --------------------------------------------- --
    ¶5. (S) President Karzai complained that international
    criticism undermined his government. He expressed a desire
    for our bilateral relationship to improve and joked that
    mutual respect between the two countries might improve to at
    least the level that existed in the waning days of the Bush
    administration. Karzai requested that both sides pay more
    attention to the language employed with each other. The
    Ambassador cautioned that the United States will now enter a
    period of intense, even caustic, debate over the merits of
    the President´s Afghanistan strategy. Warning Karzai that
    some American media and some in Congress can be expected to
    sharply criticize Afghanistan and its president, the
    Ambassador suggested Karzai "develop a thicker skin" in the
    weeks to come to prepare for the onslaught. It is essential
    to look forward and take concrete steps to build mutual trust
    and confidence. In response, Karzai said he would mobilize
    sympathetic Parliamentarians to respond to criticism directed
    at him.
    ¶6. (S) Karzai requested another teleconference in the
    short-term with President Obama to discuss the political
    context of the President´s announced troop surge. Karzai
    suggested three main issues for the next discussion:
    --The development of a strategic understanding for our
    partnership and a plan for him to hold a jirga with Afghan
    leaders to build a consensus for our strategic relationship;
    --President Karzai´s plan to increase support for community
    leaders. Karzai said some 177 Pashtun tribal leaders have
    been killed by insurgents and complained that in 2006 we
    refused his request for a USD 25-million fund that he had
    planned to use to build up tribal governance. He emphasized
    the need to focus on the protection of Afghanistan´s rural
    populations and that his government can´t be seen as "stooges
    of the United States, Iran, Pakistan, and India"; and,
    -- The impact of our Pakistan and India policies on the
    U.S.-Afghan relationship. Referencing his November 30
    teleconference with President Obama, Karzai said he would
    also like to speak to the President about his (Karzai´s)
    election. Ambassador Eikenberry informed him that the weeks
    ahead will bring a tough, bruising battle played out in the
    media before Congress and the American public and that should
    be Karzai´s focus -- not Afghanistan´s August 2009
    Presidential elections. The elections should be consigned to
    the history books. Karzai conceded the point.
    ¶7. (S) Lamenting the poor state of sub-national governance,
    Karzai expressed his desire to improve support to district
    governors. He said 200 of Afghanistan´s 364 districts do not
    have district governance buildings, nor can his government
    provide vehicles to the district governors. Eikenberry told
    Karzai that we will support efforts to strengthen
    district-level governance.
    Kabul Conference Will Require Much Preparation
    ¶8. (S) In the first meeting, Foreign Minister Spanta said he
    was disappointed he would not be included in the London
    Conference schedule. He then complained about Pakistan
    Foreign Minister Qureshi´s recent comment to the BBC that
    social and political factors in Afghanistan contribute to
    recent Taliban successes in Afghanistan. Regarding the
    timing of the Kabul conference, Ambassador Eikenberry noted
    it was useful that Spanta had mentioned to Secretary Clinton
    during their recent telephone call a possible time frame of
    late March-early April for the conference. The Ambassador
    said the lapse of a few months between the London and Kabul
    conferences would permit the Afghans to prepare well for the
    latter conference. Taking the Ambassador´s point seriously,
    Karzai endorsed the need for good preparation.
    --------------------------------------------- -------
    Karzai Attributes Corruption to Expats and Foreigners
    ¶9. (S) Addressing the need to deal with corruption, Karzai
    intoned that the problem wasn´t caused by "real" Afghans.
    Rather, corruption was caused by expatriate Afghans, those
    holding U.S. and foreign passports who have returned. Karzai
    claimed that the Afghan side of his family lived modestly,
    while the American side of his family was getting rich in
    Afghanistan. Expanding on the "us vs. them" theme, he said
    the country-side dwellers were "at war with the government"
    because they were poor and city dwellers were rich. Further,
    the luxury of city dwellers was induced by U.S. foreign
    policy. "The problem", said Karzai, "is with foreign
    relatives". Hearing this, National Security Advisor Rassoul
    retorted emotionally, "You are not talking about me." An
    equally angry Spanta interjected, "Are you talking about me?
    What about the Mujahadeen?". Responding to Spanta´s question,
    Karzai said that the Mujahadeen got rich before the United
    States arrived, adding that he needed to have a "frank talk"
    with America about this issue.
    --------------------------------------------- --------------
    Karzai Laments Shortcomings in the ANA, Questions the Brits
    ¶10. (S) Turning his attention to the Afghan National Army
    (ANA), Karzai announced that the ANA leadership should lead
    simpler, more spartan lives. He criticized widespread
    reports of ANA generals driving expensive cars and NDS
    reports that only no officers had died in battles with
    insurgents, only ANA soldiers died (the latter account was
    disputed by Minister of Defense Wardak). Reflecting on ANA
    recruitment, Karzai asked why so few Afghans from the
    provinces of Zabul, Ghazni, Helmand, Herat, and Farah enlist
    in the ANA. He bemoaned the fact that only drug users join
    the Afghan National Police (ANP) in Khandahar and Helmand
    Provinces. Upon hearing the latter, Minister of Interior
    Affairs Atmar interjected that a partially completed
    personnel asset inventory conducted in Khandahar and Helmand
    turned up the surprisingly good news that only 20 percent of
    ANP personnel were drug users.
    ¶11. (S) Exhibiting displeasure, Karzai said he was concerned
    about British "unwillingness" to work with (former Helmand
    governor and suspected drug lord) Sher Mohammed from the Ali
    Zada clan. Indicating that he felt the Ali Zada clan was key
    to the fight against insurgency, Karzai asked rhetorically
    whether the British wanted to fight the Taliban, or were they
    only willing to work with people who looked pretty and spoke
    well, in which case he could provide names. He charged the
    British with hypocrisy, saying they preferred dealing with
    four drug lords they knew well.
    --------------------------------------------- ------
    Consulate Lease-Signing Sign of American Commitment
    ¶12. (S) Ambassador Eikenberry raised the December 2, signing
    of a lease for the Mazar-i-Sharif Consulate as an example of
    our long-term commitment to Afghanistan. Further, this act
    served as a clear rebuttal to political pundits asserting
    that President Obama´s statement that U.S. troops will begin
    to come home in 18 months signaled our intent to abandon
    Afghanistan. Building on the theme of our long-term
    commitment, the Ambassador pointed to the White House press
    release stating support for economic development in the areas
    of water, energy, and mining.
    --------------------------
    Two Stage Cabinet Roll-out
    ¶13. (S) Karzai informed Ambassador Eikenberry of his plan
    to appoint Cabinet members in two stages. He expected to
    send some of his names to Parliament within a week
    (Parliament´s Lower House must confirm the President´s
    nominees and then send the remainder of the names to
    Parliament for confirmation once Parliament returns from its
    December 6 - January 21 recess). Karzai said he his first
    tranche of nominees will include the following:
    -- Defense: Abdul Rahim Wardak will remain at Defense,
    -- Foreign Affairs: Karzai may ask current NSA Rassoul to
    assume this position,
    -- Finance: Omer Zakhiwal will remain in place,
    -- National Security Advisor: Ali Ahmad Jalali (former
    Minister of Interior),
    -- Agriculture: Asif Rahimi will return as Minister of
    Agriculture,
    -- Mining: Amirzai Sangin (currently Minister of
    Telecommunications)
    -- Interior Affairs: Karzai said that Atmar has lost the
    confidence of the Northern Alliance, who say he is bringing
    the former Communist Khad (Afghan secret police during the
    Soviet occupation) into MoI. Responding to the Ambassador´s
    question if it was essential for Atmar to leave MoI, Karzai
    said it was not, but he was under considerable political
    pressure to remove Atmar from his current position. Karzai
    said if he decides to remove Atmar, he might appoint Atmar as
    Minister of Energy. A possible replacement for Atmar was
    current ANA Chief of Staff Muhammadi Bismullah. Karzai asked
    Eikenberry´s opinion on Bismullah Khan, who responded that he
    would consult with General McChrystal.
    --Energy: Karzai said he will remove Ismail Khan as Minister
    of Energy, but was struggling to find the right person to
    replace him (though Atmar was mentioned).
    ¶14. (S) Karzai also shared his plan to name three women to
    as-yet-undetermined posts in his Cabinet. Candidates
    included Sima Samar (Chair of the Afghan Independent Human
    Rights Commission), another unnamed woman to perhaps the
    Ministry of Public Health (Karzai mentioned that current
    Minister of Public Health Fatimie may remain in that
    position, but it would depend on his health), and a third,
    unnamed woman to a third position. (NOTE: The Ambassador has
    heard separately that Bamiyan Governor Habiba Sarabi is
    under consideration for the Ministry of Labor and Social
    Affairs and that NDS Director Saleh will also remain in
    place. END NOTE)
    ¶15. (S) COMMENT: In the two meetings Karzai manifested both
    encouraging and discouraging tendencies. General McChrystal
    and Ambassador Eikenberry agreed that Karzai in some ways
    appeared to excude the spirit of a wartime commander, an
    important quality he has heretofore not demonstrated. As
    Commander in Chief, Karzai appears to be focused on the right
    issues, in particular how to make the ANA a more effective
    fighting organization. The Ambassador gave Karzai credit for
    his genuine willingness to consult on Cabinet picks.
    However, Karzai´s dismaying qualities include his seeming
    unwillingness to take any responsibility for corruption and
    poor governance, and his continuing obsession that foreign
    influences are to blame for these problems. Karzai
    acknowledges the corruption, but blames it on outsiders.
    Another related negative was the revelation that Karzai still
    contemplates returning the corrupt, narco-trafficking former
    governor of Helmand Province, Sher Mohhammed to power.
    Karzai remains extremely thin-skinned, consumed by foreign
    criticism, always reacting to perceived slights. Karzai´s
    plan to seek confirmation for Cabinet nominees in two stages
    suggests that he may first announce palatable choices and
    then reserve more questionable choices to meet the
    expectations of his jihadi political campaign allies for the
    second tranche. However, those possible nominations
    mentioned up to this point are of high caliber. END COMMENT
    Mussomeli

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