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### Viewing cable 08PANAMA872, PANAMA: DEALING WITH THE DARIEN

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08PANAMA872 | 2008-11-17 22:59 | 2011-05-28 00:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Panama

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHZP #0872/01 3222259
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    R 172259Z NOV 08
    FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2666
    INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2711
    RHMFISS/DIRJIATF SOUTH
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RHMFISS/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RHFJUSC/USCUSTOMS WASHDC
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
    RUEABND/DEA WASHDC
    RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
    RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
    RUCNFB/DIRFBI WASHDC

` `

    S E C R E T PANAMA 000872

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    WHA FOR CEN AND AND

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2018
    TAGS: PGOV PREL PM
    SUBJECT: PANAMA: DEALING WITH THE DARIEN

    REF: A. A:PANAMA 00650
         ¶B. B:PANAMA 00725

    Classified By: Ambassador Barbara J. Stephenson for reasons 1.4 (b) and
     (d)

    -------
    Summary
    -------

    ¶1.  (S//NF)  The Darien, Panama's forgotten frontier, is
    under pressure from drug traffickers and remnants of the
    FARC. The FARC do not present a serious military threat to
    Panama or Colombia, but they do threaten to degenerate into
    banditry, as the organization implodes. While the U.S. is
    helping to strengthen Panama's security forces on the border,
    it will be some time before they are strong enough to
    militarily confront the FARC. There is an extensive law
    enforcement investigation underway against the FARC
    logistical infrastructure in Panama, that may deal a stronger
    blow than any military blow could. Meanwhile the FARC and the
    drug dealers pose a threat to the indigenous communities, as
    drugs and guns flood in, alienating the local population.
    Post believes the best way to limit the ability of all
    illegal groups to operate in the Darien is reinforce the
    negative reaction local groups have to the illegal groups by
    assisting the GOP to effectively govern the Darien, following
    on the successful experience of the Government of Colombia in
    the Social Recovery of Territory. End Summary.

    -------------------------------------
    Panama's Step-Daughter Under Pressure
    -------------------------------------

    ¶2.  (C)  The Darien region of Panama is a forgotten corner of
    the country that few Panamanians know, travel to, or care
    about.  Dominated by thick forest and criss-crossed by major
    rivers, it is the ultimate frontier for Panamanians. The most
    famous thing about the Darien is what there is not - a
    continuation of the Pan-American Highway (the Darien Gap).
    Its very underdevelopment has long been seen by Panamanians
    as an effective barrier against Colombia's political and drug
    violence.  As a result, it has never received significant
    public or private investment.  There are schools or health
    clinics in the Darien, and even fewer roads.  Most
    transportation is by foot or by boat, making it very
    difficult to move people or goods (licit or illicit).  The
    population of the Darien is less than 50,000, grouped in
    three main types of population centers: the mestizo
    agricultural communities, concentrated along the one main
    road; the mestizo and Afro-Panamanian fishing communities,
    grouped in water-side communities; and traditional
    Embera-Wounaan Indian communities, grouped in two separate
    semi-autonomous "comarcas", one to the north of the
    Pan-American Highway (Cemaco), and one to the south (Sambu).
    Abandoned by the central government for the last 100 years,
    the people of the Darien have largely ignored the central
    government in response, being more or less content to scratch
    out a meager living from the land and the water. This status
    quo has been challenged lately by two factors: an increased
    interest on the part of the GOP in exploiting the economic
    potential of the Darien, and the increased presence in the
    Darien of drug traffickers and members of illegal armed
    groups, especially the FARC.

    -------------------
    No Eight Foot Giant
    -------------------

    ¶3.  (S//NF)  Post believes that there are at any given time
    between 200-600 members of the FARC in the Darien. Reports
    from indigenous leaders indicate that they are concentrated
    in two river valleys near the border, and far away from any
    population centers. These camps are R&R points, where FARC
    fighters retreat to when things in Colombia get too "hot."
    Unofficial reports from U.S. military personnel who have
    close contact with Panamanian Frontier Forces in the Darien
    indicate that the FARC fighters are arriving over the border
    in deplorable condition, without adequate equipment, and
    ill-nourished. Recent FARC activities in the Darien have
    included the repeated holding up of a small bodega in the
    tiny town of Bajo Chiquito, apparently because the FARC do
    not have money to pay for supplies, as they traditionally
    have done (see reftel a). It is Post's view that the FARC
    fighters in the Darien are an increasingly rag-tag group,
    without effective leadership, communications, or logistical
    support.  The Darien is less a secure base for them as it is
    a log a drowning man grabs onto for dear life.  As such, the
    FARC camps in Panama do not represent a strategic threat to
    Colombia. Rather, these groups represent a growing threat to
    Panama, as the FARC disintegrates into criminal bands. This
    is the threat the GOP had in mind when they reformed the
    police to create a separate Frontier Police Service
    (SENAFRONT) (see reftel b).

    ---------------------
    US Help In the Darien
    ---------------------

    ¶4.  (S//NF)  It is also Post's view that SENAFRONT does not
    yet have the capacity to confront the experienced FARC
    fighters without significant risk of defeat.  SENAFRONT
    theoretically has 2,000 men under its control, but many of
    them have been pulled away from the frontier in recent months
    to augment the undermanned Panamanian National Police (PNP)
    in Panama City and other population centers, in an attempt to
    control a crime wave that has caused social alarm.  This
    constant cannibalizing of the Frontier Forces was a major
    justification for creating a separate force -- SENAFRONT --
    which could concentrate on the Darien.  But SENAFRONT still
    needs to be organized, trained, properly equipped, and to
    incorporate more manpower  before it can be expected to
    provide any greater capacity than at present.   While Post's
    ODC and NAS are working on training and equipping this force,
    it will take time before their efforts bear serious results.
    ODC has a 12 soldier strong Joint Planning and Assistance
    Team (JPAT), which trains SENAFRONT on basic logistics,
    maintenance, combat life saver, and light infantry tactics in
    training areas near Panama City, and then takes "technical
    assistance visits" to Meteti, in the near part of the Darien,
    to observe their trainees in action. A 10-man SEAL team works
    with a smaller group from SENAFRONT on advanced Counter-Narco
    Terrorism training. ODC is also working on equipping
    SENAFRONT with some trucks, boats, communications equipment
    and night vision kits, as well as building barracks. NAS,
    accompanied by ODC, recently took the commander of the
    SENAFRONT, Commissioner Frank Abrego, to Colombia to meet the
    leadership of the Colombian National Police, who promised up
    to 60 training slots for SENAFRONT in their Jungle Training
    School. The trip helped forge connections between the
    Colombians and the Panamanians which Post hopes will lead to
    fruitful cooperation in the future.

    ---------
    Red Lines
    ---------

    ¶5.  (S//NF)  Even when all this training and equipping is
    finished, the GOP will be reluctant to confront the FARC
    directly.  While the GOP realize they must begin to exert
    greater sovereignty over their border in order to control the
    FARC as it disintegrates, the Minister of Government and
    Justice has told us that he plans to use SENAFRONT to reduce
    the FARC's operating room in Panama little by little until it
    is essentially pushed out of Panama and back into Colombia,
    without having to confront it directly. In this process, the
    GOP has clearly rejected USG offers to directly assist it in
    the Darien. Current GOP policy refuses to allow U.S. military
    personnel to train Panamanian forces in the Darien, though
    the "technical assistance visits" mentioned above are
    allowed. The GOP is reviewing our diplomatic notes on
    upcoming training very closely to make sure we are not trying
    to bend the rules. The GOP also rejected a recent DEA offer
    to fly a FAST team in to the Darien to provide helicopter
    coverage for anti-drug operations.  It seems the GOP is
    worried that U.S. forces might be wounded or kidnapped by the
    FARC, or might militarily engage with the FARC on their own
    authority. Should any of these scenarios play out, the GOP
    would lose by being forced into a major confrontation for
    which it is not prepared, and in the process drawing
    attention to the presence of the FARC, which would be bad for
    business in bustling, thriving Panama City.

    -----------------------
    Judicializing the Fight
    -----------------------

    ¶6.  (S//NF)  There is a second more serious FARC presence in
    Panama. The 57th Front, based on the Colombian side of the
    border, is a logistical Front that runs a drug and arms
    trafficking operation that helps to supply FARC forces in
    western Colombia. This Front has a strong presence in Panama
    City, smuggling routes throughout Panama, and a permanent
    presence in the Darien. DEA and the U.S. Attorney's Office
    for the Southern District of New York are running a complex
    investigation of this group, based on a very sensitive
    judicialized wire-tap program (called "Matador"), funded by
    NAS.  Post hopes this investigation will lead to a decisive
    judicial blow against the 57th Front later in the year,
    though serious obstacles to taking down or arresting the ring
    leaders are still to be overcome. This would greatly weaken
    the FARC in Panama and Colombia. Matador represents an
    extraordinary level of cooperation from the GOP, who are
    essentially allowing the USG to run phone taps on Panamanian
    phones. The GOP has done an excellent job of using the
    information picked up by Matador to capture drug shipments
    without revealing where the information is coming from, thus
    allowing us to deal powerful blows to drug traffickers, while
    maintaining our overall investigation of the FARC.
    Information from Matador has allowed the USG to obtain
    tremendous amounts of information on the 57th Front, other
    drug trafficking organizations, and other high profile and
    sensitive criminal investigations.  Post considers defending
    the Matador program, and the GOP goodwill which makes it
    possible to be of paramount importance, even at the cost of
    not pushing other issues such as direct U.S. action in the
    Darien.

    ---------------------
    Socio-Cultural Threat
    ---------------------

    ¶7.  (C) The FARC is a major drug trafficker in the Darien,
    but not the most important. Many other Drug Trafficking
    Organizations (DTOs) operate in the Darien. They tend to
    bring drugs into the Darien by go-fast, and then transfer
    them to land, either coming up the Pan-American Highway, or
    taking them overland by paths cut through the jungle.  The
    traffickers are using the indigenous Embera-Wounaan, either
    willingly or by force, to facilitate this trade.  Some
    organizations kidnap members of the Embera-Wounaan to guide
    them, while others hire young people to work for them. This
    is doing tremendous damage to the social fabric of the
    indigenous comarcas, as the Grand Cacique (Chief) of the
    Embera tribe, Betanio Chiquidama, told the Ambassador October
    ¶24. Chiquidama explained that Embera youth are being
    recruited by drug traffickers to guide them and work for
    them, and are being paid in weapons and drugs. They are also
    being encouraged to form youth gangs to work for the
    traffickers, which in turn challenges the traditional social
    structure of the Embera-Wounaan.  Chiquidama asked the
    Ambassador for help bringing the trafficking under control.
    Post believes the position taken by the Embera leadership
    gives us a major opportunity to increase cooperation and
    coordination in the region on security and other issues, as
    detailed below.

    ------------------------------------------
    Drain the Water, Before They Learn to Swim
    ------------------------------------------

    ¶8.  (C)  The key limiting factor on FARC activity in the
    Darien is the lack of a sympathetic local population.
    Panamanians in general do not like Colombians, and there is
    no local sympathy for the FARC in the Darien. While some
    villages may engage in low-level commerce with FARC elements,
    it is on a strictly pay-as-you-go basis. The recent FARC
    incursion into Bajo Chiquito to steal goods from a local
    store (see reftel a) led the locals to call in SENAFRONT.
    This lack of local support for the FARC or other Colombian
    groups gives Panama a major advantage as it struggles to
    respond to the threat the potential disintegration of the
    FARC represents. But given the lack of effective governance
    on the ground in the Darien, the central government has few
    options to respond should the situation take a turn for the
    worse.

    ---------------
    Colombian Model
    ---------------

    ¶9.  (C)  Post believes that the Colombian experience with the
    "Social Recovery of Territory (SRT)," as coordinated by the
    Center for the Coordination of Integrated Action (CCAI)
    within the Office of the President of Colombia, offers an
    excellent example of what the way forward should look like.
    The extension of effective Panamanian sovereignty over the
    Darien requires a holistic approach, and not just a military
    approach. The real threat in the Darien is the potential
    disaffection of the local population, which might turn the
    latent military threat of the rag-tag FARC elements into a
    genuine problem. Bringing effective government to the people
    of the Darien is the best way to prevent that. In analyzing
    the Colombian experience with SRT, Post believes that there
    are valuable lessons for Panama. The Government of Colombia
    (GOC) has stressed the need to provide local security and
    rule of law, by bringing local police, judges and prosecutors
    to remote regions. Cacique Chiqidama specifically complained
    to the Ambassador that SENAFRONT does not enter the
    semi-autonomous indigenous Comarcas where most of the
    Embera-Wounaan live, instead remaining in their base in
    Meteti or patrolling the highway. They are thus not seen as
    providing protection to the local population, or helping them
    protect their children from the threat of co-optation by
    armed groups. Post has proposed organizing a meeting between
    Commissioner Abrego of SENAFRONT and the Embera leadership to
    encourage joint patrols with local Embera volunteer community
    police. Even relatively small moves to re-deploy SENAFRONT
    forces to villages and towns could have a major effect on
    local opinion, and provide the police with excellent sources
    of intelligence. Commissioner Abrego and NAS Panama heard
    over and over from Colombian police officials on their recent
    visit to Colombia that community policing was the key to
    Colombia's success. Post wants to use Merida funds to
    encourage the Panamanian police to adopt community policing
    in the Darien as well as in inner-city neighborhoods.

    ¶10.  (C)  Cacique Chiqidama also asked the Ambassador to help
    convey the message to the GOP that the Embera want increased
    coordination between the central government and their local
    government, so that resources are aimed at the real problems
    of the people. 27 of 28 Embera villages in Cemaco have do not
    have easy access to fresh water. Relatively easy steps which
    could eliminate bottle-necks to economic growth, like
    improving access to markets for local bananas, have not been
    taken. Again, this is a key element of the Colombian SRT
    strategy, with all government agencies being coordinated by
    the CCAI to help improve governance and service delivery in
    marginal communities. Post will try to leverage our
    Merida-funded Darien programs to convince the GOP to
    establish a coordinating mechanism in the Darien which can
    ensure that the voice of the people of the Darien is heard in
    policy making.

    ---------------------------------
    Put Our Money Where Our Mouth Is?
    ---------------------------------

    ¶11.  (C)  Realistically speaking, our call for coordinated
    action in the Darien will be more readily heard if the USG
    brings resources to bear on the issue. USAID has a proposal
    for funding under 1207, if funds are available, for a local
    government strengthening program in the Darien which would be
    an excellent way to focus the GOP on the issue, and give the
    USG a say in how the problems are addressed. Post will try to
    use a forest management program that USAID has in the Darien
    to promote this issue, but it is not clear how far that will
    get us. USAID also plans to use some of the Merida Community
    Action funds to work on gang prevention in the Darien, with
    an eye towards promoting this overall strategy. Post will
    also continue to work creatively with ODC to make maximum use
    of its Humanitarian Assistance Program and Medical Readiness
    Training exercises to promote greater government
    coordination, and local development in the Darien. ODC
    conducted the first Medical Readiness Training exercises in
    the Darien in many years in May 2008, signaling a loosening
    of the previous GOP policy to refuse all requests for U.S.
    military deployments in the Darien.

    ----------------------
    Step-Daughter No More?
    ----------------------

    ¶12.  (C)  This strategy will not work if there is not buy-in
    from the GOP. This may now be possible because the GOP is
    beginning to focus on the economic potential of the Darien.
    During the Panamax exercise in August, PolOff was given a
    briefing by a GOP official on the potential economic
    development of the Darien, especially as an exporter of
    organic beef and valuable timber. The briefer stressed the
    relationship between the economic development plans in the
    Darien and the security reforms. The clear impression was
    that Panama needed to gain control of its territory to fully
    exploit it. Post will stress to GOP counterparts that
    effective governance, provision of basic services, and
    community support are also keys for the success of any
    attempt to promote economic development in the Darien. The
    more legitimate activity there is in the Darien the less room
    there will be for illegal activities, and the more support
    there will be for a strong, integrated police presence. This
    is the best path forward to bring the Darien into Panama's
    social structure, and to push out the FARC and other armed
    groups.
    STEPHENSON

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