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### Viewing cable 08STATE94723, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IRISL CARGO INSPECTION

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08STATE94723 | 2008-09-04 15:26 | 2011-06-09 00:00 | SECRET | Secretary of State
Appears in these articles: http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3988563.ece

`

    VZCZCXYZ0004
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHC #4723 2481531
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O P 041526Z SEP 08
    FM SECSTATE WASHDC
    TO RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 0000
    RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0000
    INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0000

` `

    S E C R E T STATE 094723

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2033
    TAGS: GR IS ECON EFIN EWWT ETRD PARM PREL KNNP EUN
    SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IRISL CARGO INSPECTION
    PROVISION OF UNSCR 1803

    REF: A. REF A: STATE 69339
         ¶B. REF B: PARIS 1291

    Classified By: ISN Patricia A. McNerney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1.  (U)  This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 3.

    ----------------------
    SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND
    ----------------------

    ¶2.  (C) The Department sent a demarche (REF A) to initiate
    discussions with key countries on the importance of
    implementing robustly the inspection provision of UNSCR 1803
    and warn them of the risks of doing business with IRISL.  We
    would like to provide this information to Greece, per the
    recommendation from Martin Briens, Office Director for
    Disarmament and Nuclear Nonproliferation at the French MFA,
    who commented in discussions with Embassy Paris officials
    (REF B) on the importance of reaching out to Greece to
    sensitize it to the potential risks involved in conducting
    business with IRISL.  We also would like the information
    transmitted to the Government of Israel to keep them aware of
    our strategy to target IRISL.

    -------------------------
    OBJECTIVES/ACTION REQUEST
    -------------------------

    ¶3.  (S) Washington requests Posts deliver the non-paper in
    paragraph 4 to appropriate host government officials in the
    foreign affairs and finance ministries, and other appropriate
    government agencies, including those responsible for shipping
    and customs activities.  This information is being provided
    to the Government of Israel for information purposes only, no
    action is required.  Embassy Athens should pursue the
    following objectives:

    -- Emphasize UNSCR 1803's call for member states, in
    accordance with national and international law, to inspect
    the cargoes to and from Iran, of aircraft and vessels, at
    their airports and seaports, owned or operated by Iran Air
    Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line (IRISL),
    provided there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
    aircraft or vessel is transporting goods prohibited under
    resolution 1803 or resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747
    (2007).

    -- Recall that UNSCRs 1737and 1803 also establish a
    requirement for states to prevent the transfer, directly or
    indirectly from their territories or by their nationals, to
    or for the benefit of Iran, of specified nuclear and
    missile-related items (including Nuclear Suppliers Group
    (NSG) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)-controlled
    items).

    -- Encourage Greece to carefully monitor financial activity
    with regard to IRISL, noting that UNSCR 1737 also requires
    states to prevent the provision to Iran of financial
    assistance and transfer of financial resources or services
    related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, or use of
    prohibited items. Paragraphs 9 and 11 of UNSCR 1803 calls for
    vigilance in entering into new commitments for
    public-provided financial support for any trade with Iran,
    including the granting of export credits, guarantees, or
    insurance, to their nationals or entities involved in such
    trade.

    -- Inform Greece that cargo on four IRISL vessels was
    interdicted in 2007 because the cargo (consisting of dual-use
    items) was destined for entities that had been sanctioned by
    the UN Security Council for their role in Iran's nuclear or
    missile programs, or to entities acting on their behalf.

    -- Highlight that IRISL is increasingly employing deceptive
    measures to disguise the end-user, the destination of its
    cargo, or IRISL's involvement, which suggests such transfers
    could be of a sensitive nature and possibly
    proliferation-related.

    -- Inform Greece that IRISL has continued to carry cargoes
    for entities including the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group
    (SBIG), Defense Industries Organization (DIO), and the Sanam
    Industrial Group (SIG), all of which have been designated by
    the UN Security Council under resolutions 1737 or 1747 and by
    the United States under domestic authority (Executive Order
    13382).

    -- Remind Greek authorities of the risk that companies doing
    business with IRISL could, even inadvertently or unwittingly,
    facilitate the proliferation of items for use in a WMD,
    military, or missile program.

    -- Note in particular the increased possibility that IRISL
    vessels could be searched (due to the call in UNSCR 1803),
    resulting in increased costs to businesses shipping through
    IRISL.  These inspections could lead to delays in shipments
    of legitimate cargoes.  Stress the reputational difficulties
    that may fall upon those entities found to be associated,
    even inadvertently, with IRISL's proliferation activities.

    -- Note that companies that continue conducting business with
    IRISL could facilitate - unwittingly - transfers to or from
    Iran of WMD- or military-related items prohibited under
    UNSCRs 1737, 1747 and 1803.

    -- Emphasize that we are providing this information in the
    spirit of our cooperation as Proliferation Security
    Initiative (PSI) partners, and we hope for host government's
    energetic response in the same spirit.

    ¶4.  (SECRET/ REL Greece and Israel)

    -- In light of our commitment to share information with your
    government on proliferation-related activities, we would like
    to raise concerns about Iran's Islamic Republic of Iran
    Shipping Lines (IRISL).

    -- As you know, IRISL was named in United Nations Security
    Council Resolution 1803.  Operative paragraph 11 of this
    resolution calls upon all UN Member States, in accordance
    with national and international law, to inspect the cargoes
    going to or from Iran, of aircraft and vessels, at their
    airports and seaports, owned or operated by Iran Air Cargo
    and Iran's Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL),
    provided there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
    aircraft or vessel is transporting prohibited items under
    UNSCR 1803 or UNSCRs 1737 or 1747.

    EXERCISE VIGILANCE REGARDING IRISL ACTIVITIES

    -- We urge you to take into account and emphasize to
    companies in your jurisdiction the significant risks of
    conducting business with IRISL.

    -- Specifically, we urge you to exercise vigilance with
    regard to all IRISL-related transport of goods through your
    jurisdiction, and any financial support for those transfers,
    in light of paragraphs 9 and 11 of UNSCR 1803 mentioned
    above.  This vigilance will also facilitate your
    implementation of the provisions of UNSCRs 1737 and 1803 that
    require states to take steps to prevent the transfer through
    or from their territories of certain items to or for the
    benefit of Iran.

    -- We urge you to issue an advisory to companies involved in
    the shipping industry in your jurisdiction to encourage them
    to practice enhanced due diligence when dealing with IRISL,
    since companies conducting business with IRISL could
    facilitate - unwittingly - transfers prohibited by UNSCRs
    1737, 1747, and 1803.

    -- We would note that potential delays caused by inspections
    conducted in response to the call in UNSCR 1803 or cargo
    seizure aboard IRISL vessels could add costs to businesses
    that choose to continue to ship legitimate cargoes through
    IRISL.

    -- We also request that you not share this information with
    any third parties.

    INTERDICTIONS OF IRISL CARGO INVOLVING DESIGNATED ENTITIES

    -- Cargoes on four IRISL vessels were interdicted in 2007
    because they were transporting dual-use items to entities
    that have been sanctioned by the UN Security Council for
    their role in Iran's nuclear missile programs, or to entities
    acting on their behalf.  All of the following activities
    occurred after the UNSC imposed sanctions on the entities
    involved, through the adoption of UNSCRs 1737 (December 2006)
    and 1747 (March 2007):

    - An IRISL vessel in late 2007 was carrying potassium
    perchlorate destined for Iran's Defense Industries
    Organization (DIO).  Potassium perchlorate can be used as a
    propellant for artillery rockets and can potentially be used
    to produce the solid rocket propellant oxidizer ammonium
    perchlorate.

    - An IRISL vessel in mid-2007 was attempting to ship
    electronic parts and machine tools, for possible use in
    Iran's missile program, to a front company for the Sanam
    Industrial Group (SIG) and an entity that has procured for
    the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG).  SIG and SBIG have
    been designated in UNSCRs 1747 and 1737, respectively, for
    their involvement in Iran's missile program.

    - Another IRISL vessel in mid-2007 was carrying cargo of
    electronic parts and lathes that could contribute to Iran's
    nuclear or ballistic missile program to a front company for
    the SIG and an entity that has procured for SBIG.

    - An IRISL vessel in mid-2007 was carrying aluminum sheets
    and plates intended for Iran that could be used in Iran's
    missile program.  Documentation associated with this shipment
    indicated a connection to Iran's DIO and a DIO subsidiary.
    DIO was designated in UNSCR 1737 as an entity involved in
    Iran's nuclear program.

    IRISL EMPLOYING DECEPTIVE MEASURES

    -- IRISL is increasingly employing deceptive measures to
    disguise the end user, and/or destination of its cargo, and
    IRISL's involvement in the transaction.

    -     During the period 2003 to 2006, we are aware of IRISL
    ships diverting or attempting to divert from their originally
    scheduled port calls, probably in order to avoid possible
    inspection or seizure of missile-related cargo.  Although
    ships occasionally skip port calls for commercial reasons, we
    have evidence these diversions were in response to perceived
    threats of interdiction.

    -     In mid-2003 an IRISL vessel departed from North Korea
    carrying missile-related and other military items destined
    for Iran.  Instead of going to its original destined port in
    Iran, it changed course and deviated to the nearest available
    Iranian port.  We believe the change in course was due to
    fear of being interdicted during its voyage.

    -     In early 2006, another IRISL vessel attempted to skip
    one of its destined ports of call.  We believe this ship was
    carrying material for possible use in Iran's missile program.

    -     In mid-2006, another IRISL ship diverted course and
    avoided making a scheduled port call, after becoming aware
    that it might be inspected and its cargo seized in port.  We
    believe this ship was also carrying material for possible use
    in Iran's missile industry.

    -- Skipping port calls where cargo needs to be unloaded
    probably costs IRISL tens of thousands of dollars, concerns
    its customers, and from a business perspective makes no sense
    for IRISL, which is a profit-making venture.  It is also
    likely that the ship captains are not aware of the nature of
    the cargo that they are carrying, but know only that it is of
    a special interest to the government of Iran.

    -- We also know that IRISL directed its international offices
    to obtain and use deceptive documents - including false bills
    of lading that remove references to IRISL and the Iranian
    recipient - to negotiate letters of credit with banks
    refusing to deal with Iranian entities.

    -- We are also aware that Iranian entities designated under
    United Nations Security Council resolutions are using
    deceptive tactics to obtain materials such as chemicals that
    could be used in missile fuel.  Again, these deceptive
    tactics include concealing the true identity of the intended
    Iranian recipient.  This is done by changing the name of the
    recipient to one that is not designated by the United Nations
    Security Council and changing the dates on paperwork in an
    attempt to provide cover for the shipment to avoid seizure
    while in transit through other states' ports.

    -- We are also aware that IRISL is likely adapting to
    increased scrutiny of its sensitive cargoes.  In late 2007,
    IRISL officially changed the policy of one of its shipping
    lines to avoid refueling while en route to Iran, thus
    preventing the possibility of inspection and seizure of
    sensitive cargo.  This is the same line that had two of its
    ships inspected in 2007.  Both of these ships were carrying
    materials, including chemicals prohibited by UNSCR 1737, for
    Iran's ballistic missile entities that are designated by the
    UN Security Council.

    CONTINUED TRANSPORT OF ITEMS FOR DESIGNATED ENTITIES

    -- IRISL continues to carry cargoes for entities designated
    by the UN Security Council.  As stated previously, four
    shipments were interdicted in 2007 from IRISL vessels that
    were carrying dual-use goods destined for entities designated
    by the UN Security Council, including Sanam Industrial Group,
    Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group, and the Defense Industries
    Organization.

    -- Other SBIG-related shipments include:

    - In early 2008, an IRISL vessel was en route from Dalian,
    China, to Bandar Khomeini, Iran, carrying a cargo of
    materials that are useful in the production of solid-fuel for
    ballistic missiles.  The intended recipients were cover
    companies for Iran's SBIG.  SBIG is responsible for Iran's
    solid-fueled ballistic missile program, and was designated in
    UNSCR 1737.

    - In mid-2007, an IRISL vessel was en route from Dalian,
    China, to Bandar Abbas, Iran, carrying a cargo to a cover
    company for Iran's Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG).
    The cargo is useful in the production of solid-fuel for
    ballistic missiles.

    -- Other DIO-related shipments include:

    - In late 2007, an IRISL vessel was carrying a variety of
    military-related goods from China to Iran that were consigned
    to a known front company for Iran's DIO.

    - In late 2007, an IRISL vessel loaded military-related
    material supplied by Iran's DIO through a company using a
    cover name at Bandar Abbas, Iran, for delivery to Syria's
    defense industries.

    - In mid-2007, an IRISL vessel also loaded military-related
    cargo supplied by the DIO for Syria's defense industries.

    -- We would note that, in addition to the designation under
    UNSCRs 1737 and 1747, Sanam Industrial Group (SIG), SBIG, and
    the DIO, have been designated (as subject to financial
    sanctions) by the United States under domestic authority
    (Executive Order (E.O.) 13382).

    - SIG was designated under E.O. 13382 on July 18, 2006, for
    its ties to missile proliferation.  SIG is a subordinate of
    Iran's Aerospace Industries Organization, previously
    designated by the United States under domestic authority
    (E.O. 13382), that has purchased millions of dollars worth of
    equipment on behalf of AIO from entities associated with
    missile proliferation.

    - SBIG was designated under E.O. 13382 on June 29, 2005.
    SBIG is an affiliate of Iran's AIO and is also involved in
    Iran's missile programs.  Among the weapons SBIG produces are
    the Fateh-110 missile, with a range of 250 kilometers, and
    the Fajr rocket systems, a series of North Korean-designed
    rockets produced under license by SBIG with ranges of between
    40 and 75 kilometers.  Both systems are capable of being
    armed with at least chemical warheads.

    - The DIO was designated under E.O. 13382 on March 30, 2007,
    for engaging in activities that materially contributed to the
    development of Iran's nuclear and missile programs.  DIO has
    been identified by the IAEA as involved in centrifuge
    component production for Iran's nuclear program.

    END SECRET NONPAPER.

    ------------------
    REPORTING DEADLINE
    ------------------

    ¶5.  (U) Posts should report in a timely manner.  Please slug
    replies for ISN, T, TREASURY, IO and NEA.  Please include
    SIPDIS in all replies.

    ----------------
    POINT OF CONTACT
    ----------------

    ¶6.  (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up information
    is Jennifer Chalmers, ISN/CPI, (202)
    647-9715, CHALMERSJA@STATE.SGOV.GOV, or Anthony Ruggiero,
    ISN/CPI, (202) 647-5181, RUGGIEROAJ@STATE.SGOV.GOV.

    ¶7.  (U) Department thanks Posts for their assistance.
    RICE

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