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### Viewing cable 09DAMASCUS804, IS NOW THE TIME TO RAISE HIZBALLAH WITH SYRIA?

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09DAMASCUS804 | 2009-11-19 09:00 | 2010-12-06 21:30 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Damascus

`

    VZCZCXRO2489
    OO RUEHROV
    DE RUEHDM #0804/01 3230900
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 190900Z NOV 09
    FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7038
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 5866
    RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0787
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0861
    RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0744
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0759
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000804

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, S/CT
    NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
    PARIS FOR NOBLES
    LONDON FOR LORD

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2029
    TAGS: PTER PREL LE IZ IS SY
    SUBJECT: IS NOW THE TIME TO RAISE HIZBALLAH WITH SYRIA?

    Classified By: CDA Charles Hunter, Reasons 1.4 b and d.

    ¶1.  (S/NF) Summary: Syria's determined support of Hizballah's
    military build-up, particularly the steady supply of
    longer-range rockets and the introduction of guided missiles,
    could change the military balance and produce a scenario
    significantly more destructive than the July-August 2006 war.
    If rockets were to rain down on Israeli civilians in Tel
    Aviv, Israel would still have powerful incentives, as it did
    in 2006, to keep Syria out of the conflict, but it might also
    face compelling reasons for targeting Hizballah facilities in
    Syria, some of which are in and around populated areas.
    Syria's current strategic mindset appears to assume Syria
    could avoid involvement in a new conflict, based largely on
    its 2006 experience.  Syrian leaders also appear convinced
    that arming Hizballah will increase Syria's leverage in
    bringing Israel to the negotiating table.  As Washington
    weighs how to approach Syrian officials in upcoming
    engagement efforts, discussing Hizballah from the perspective
    of the regional strategic landscape may help to facilitate a
    "big picture" conversation in which we could challenge these
    assumptions and focus Damascus on the importance of taking
    cooperative steps with the U.S. now.  Though raising this
    subject could well distract from a cooperative approach that
    shows signs  of progress after months of investment, we
    believe sounding a warning, probably in a one-one-on meeting
    with President Asad, would be worth considering in pursuit of
    a broader, more strategic dialogue. End Summary.

    ----------------------------------
    Is the Strategic Balance Changing?
    ----------------------------------

    ¶2.  (S/NF) Syria's determined efforts to re-arm Hizballah
    during and after the July-August 2006 war between Israel and
    Hizballah have consistently grabbed Israeli headlines, most
    recently with Israeli Chief of Staff Ashkenazi's November 10
    revelation that Hizballah possessed 320-kilometer range
    rockets.  Jane's Defense Weekly reported October 28 on
    Hizballah's deployment of the first guided surface-to-surface
    M600 missile on Lebanese soil, with a range of 250 kilometers
    and circular error probability of 500 meters.  Public
    estimates put Hizballah's stockpile as high as 40,000 rockets
    and missiles, reinforcing assessments by some experts that
    this build-up may portend a shift in the military balance
    between Israel and its northern nemesis.  Hizballah SecGen
    Nasrallah's recent claims of possessing a capability to
    "destroy" the IDF may overstate the case for domestic and
    regional propaganda purposes, but reporting in other channels
    confirms Nasrallah's bragging on November 11 that Hizballah
    can sustain fire on Tel Aviv and reach "all of Israel."  This
    capability, if fully used, would represent a quantum leap
    over the damage and psychological terror Hizballah rockets
    caused in northern Israel during the 2006 war.

    ¶3.  (S/NF)  There is overwhelming evidence that shows Syria
    provided not just logistical and other support in moving the
    weapons, but was the main source of the weapons.  Syria's
    integration of Hizballah into its military doctrine,
    moreover, means that Hizballah operatives and facilities
    enjoy a growing footprint in Syria.

    ¶4.  (S/NF) At least two potential consequences flow from
    Hizballah's increased capabilities and Syria's role in
    creating them:  (1)  If there is another war between
    Hizballah and Israel, it will be far deadlier than the 2006
    conflict; (2) as in 2006, there would be compelling reasons
    for Israel to want to keep Syria out of any future war if
    possible, but there might be a countervailing need to hit
    Hizballah and perhaps targets in Syria, some of which are
    located in populated areas.

    ---------------------------------
    Agreeing to Disagree on Hizballah
    ----------------------------------

    DAMASCUS 00000804  002 OF 003

    ¶5.  (S/NF)  U.S.-Syrian discussions on Hizballah have tended
    to "agree to disagree" after hitting the wall of conflicting
    views on the legitimacy of armed resistance and Israeli
    occupation.  Syrian officials, including President Asad,
    emphasize their political link to Hizballah and flatly deny
    that Syria is arming Hizballah.  They then defend the right
    to armed resistance in response to prolonged Israeli
    occupation of Syrian and Lebanese territory.  When
    convenient, Syrian officials claim they no longer have
    responsibility for Hizballah, noting "we are out of Lebanon."
    President Asad and FM Muallim have also suggested that the
    challenge of disarming Hizballah would be solved after Syria
    and Israel signed a peace treaty.  This agreement would lead
    naturally to a deal between Lebanon and Israel, thereby
    removing the rationale for Hizballah's resistance movement
    and setting the stage for the transition of Hizballah to a
    purely political party.

    ¶6.  (S/NF)  The Syrian government's strategic view of
    relations with Hizballah is difficult to assess with high
    confidence.  According to various contacts, President Asad
    appears to be focused on the possibility of a new conflict
    between Israel and Syria, but many suggest he believes that
    the red lines of the 2006 war would be preserved.  According
    to this model, Syria could avoid direct involvement as long
    as Israel refrained from striking targets on Syrian soil.
    Syria also seems to be hedging its bets through improved
    relations with Turkey, France, and Saudi Arabia, which,
    Syrian officials probably hope, would object to Israeli
    attacks against Lebanon and/or Syria.

    ¶7.  (S/NF) Asad nonetheless appears more convinced than ever
    that arming Hizballah is necessary for Syrian security and
    perhaps as a stick to bring the current Israeli government
    back to negotiations on the return of the Golan.  Syrians
    remain resistant to the notion that Syria bears
    responsibility for managing a potentially explosive situation
    that could draw Damascus into a war neither sought nor
    winnable.  They have ably deployed a force field of cognitive
    dissonance to resist arguments linking Syria's arming of
    Hizballah and the future prospects of Syrian-Israel peace
    negotiations.  Israel, they insist, remains the problem, and
    only a more active U.S. role can bring and sustain a
    resolution.  According to the prevailing Syrian view,
    however, U.S.-Syrian relations must normalize before the U.S.
    can play the role of a credible honest broker.

    ----------------------------------------
    The Cooperative Approach Shows Potential
    ----------------------------------------

    ¶8.  (S/NF)  As the interagency continues to plot future plans
    to engage Syrian officials and thinks about how to recruit
    other countries to support our efforts, we face a choice not
    only about the level of our engagement, but about the
    approach itself.  Up to now, U.S. efforts have largely
    focused on developing a cooperative relationship on issues of
    mutual interest, such as Iraq and U.S. sanctions.  Our four
    month pursuit of military-to-military cooperation on Iraqi
    border security represented, in effect, a first step toward
    establishing a broader and higher-level dialogue on Iraqi
    security issues, including Syrian support of foreign
    fighters.  After the August 19 bombings Baghdad rendered
    implementation of this initiative impracticable, discussions
    in late-September shifted toward a possible CT dialogue.
    This new focus provides an alternative mechanism to continue
    discussions on Iraqi security issues such as foreign
    fighters.  Syrian officials appear willing to go along with
    this approach, as long as the emphasis is on building
    bilateral relations first.  After months of investment, our
    engagement efforts are close to enabling both sides to
    exchange positive gestures.  This cooperation should help to
    the stage for more focused discussions on a broad range of
    issues and strategic choices about the future direction of

    DAMASCUS 00000804  003 OF 003

    the relationship.

    ¶9.  (S/NF)  During this process, U.S. officials have
    carefully placed markers on key issues, including human
    rights, IAEA compliance, Bank Aman, Lebanon (e.g., border
    demarcation), and Palestinians (pushing Hamas to accept the
    Quartet principles), and the new embassy compound.  We have
    addressed these issues mainly in discussions with Vice
    Foreign Minister Miqdad and the Syrian Embassy in Washington
    (with less dialogue between Embassy Damascus and the Syrian
    MFA).  Our view is that the cooperative approach will have
    more chance of success if we continue to use these channels
    to deal with such issues, until the relationship can sustain
    discussion at higher levels that will yield a higher
    probability of favorable progress.

    ¶10.  (S/NF)  Against this backdrop, sending U.S. officials to
    focus on Syrian relations with Hizballah could distract
    significantly from our efforts to build a cooperative
    foothold.  There is unlikely to be common ground or any
    breakthroughs, and a new focus on Hizballah-related issues
    could further set back our efforts to re-energize the
    engagement process, not least by spurring the Syrians to
    demand a reciprocal change in U.S. behavior, e.g., lifting
    sanctions.  Focusing our higher political-level discussions
    on the issue of foreign fighters provides a more familiar
    subject with a higher chance for initial progress.

    --------------------------------------------- --
    But Hizballah's Arsenal Poses Urgent Challenges
    --------------------------------------------- --

    ¶11.  (S/NF)  While the near-term chances for a successful
    dialogue on Syria's strategic relationship with Hizballah are
    much lower, the stakes -- the possibility of a regional
    conflict and significant obstacles to achieving comprehensive
    peace -- are just as, if not more, urgent.  Sharing our
    concerns about the dangers of Syria's arming of Hizballah,
    probably best done privately in a one-on-one session with
    President Asad, could serve to establish the basis of a more
    frank exchange about Syria's role, and enable us to challenge
    potentially dangerous Syrian assumptions as part of a wider
    strategic dialogue.  Recent revelations about Syria's role in
    weapons shipments create some urgency in turning Syrian
    attention toward ending these supplies and restraining
    Hizballah from making good on its provocative rhetoric.

    ¶12.  (S/NF) We don't expect these points immediately to
    change Syrian behavior or its relations with Hizballah, but
    we believe sounding this warning would put President Asad and
    others (such as Turkey and France) on notice that Syria's
    actions have created a situation in which miscalculation or
    provocative behavior by Hizballah could prove disastrous for
    Syria and the broader region.  This message could likewise
    underscore our belief that Syria needs to demonstrate a more
    active role in achieving peace with Israel and better
    relations with the United States.  Even if a war between
    Israel and Hizballah does not materialize in the immediate
    future, we should try find a way to use our ongoing
    cooperative engagement with Syrian officials to help them
    recognize their overriding interest and responsibility in
    preventing this unappealing scenario altogether.

    HUNTER

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