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### Viewing cable 08ATHENS874, GREECE ON IRAN: CARROTS BETTER THAN STICKS, BUT

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08ATHENS874 | 2008-06-19 14:24 | 2011-05-31 08:00 | SECRET | Embassy Athens
Appears in these articles: http://www.tanea.gr

`

    VZCZCXRO3307
    OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
    DE RUEHTH #0874/01 1711424
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 191424Z JUN 08
    FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2027
    INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 2027
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0340

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000874

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2018
    TAGS: AORC EFIN ETRD ETTC EUN GR IR KCRM KNNP KTFN
    PARM, PGOV, PINR, PREL, PTER, SNAR, TRGY, UNSC
    SUBJECT: GREECE ON IRAN: CARROTS BETTER THAN STICKS, BUT
    GREECE "WON'T BREAK EU CONSENSUS"

    REF: A. SECSTATE 64530
         ¶B. BRUSSELS 924
         ¶C. USEU/SYNDER E-MAIL OF 06/17/2008
         ¶D. ATHENS 651
         ¶E. ATHENS 833

    Classified By: DCM THOMAS COUNTRYMAN.  REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Greek MFA officials dealing with various
    aspects of Iran issues indicated that Greece did not intend
    to break an EU consensus on stiffening Iran sanctions, but
    that it had concerns about the direction of Iran policy.
    Greece believed the evidence did not indicate the Iranians
    were actually trying to acquire a nuclear weapon at this
    point.  As for the efficacy of sanctions, the Iranians were
    in a wait-and-see mode in anticipation of the U.S.
    Presidential election, and further sanctions now would
    unlikely impact their behavior.  We pushed back hard, noting
    that Iranian behavior did appear to be responsive to
    international pressure and that it was particularly important
    now to demonstrate Western unity on Iran policy.  Greek
    reluctance to stiffen sanctions appears to be motivated by
    several factors, including a principled belief that sanctions
    are ineffective, Greek shipowners' business dealings with the
    Iranians, and a GOG desire to play a "bridging role" between
    Iran and the West.  END SUMMARY.

    ¶2. (C) On June 17, EmbOffs delivered ref A demarche on the
    updated P5 1 package for Iran to Counselor on Disarmament
    Issues Pantelis Margaris and First Secretary Loukas Tsokos of
    the MFA D1 Directorate for UN and International
    Organizations.  Margaris provided a pat answer, stressing
    that Greece shared the cncerns of its allies and supported
    Solana's icentives package to Iran.  Furthermore, the GOG
    believed Iran had to answer questions posed by IAEA Director
    General El Baradei regarding the latest developments of
    concern, specifically the centrifuge machines and metallic
    spheres.  At the same time, he said Iran needed a diplomatic
    "face-saving" solution.  "Iran is a nation that needs special
    handling, given its long history similar to ours.  We need to
    pay attention to the long history and try not to damage its
    face."  Margaris added, "We hope to breathe fresh air into
    this problem and find a solution with diplomatic means."

    ¶3. (S) In a June 18 meeting with MFA A6 Directorate for
    Middle East and Arab Countries deputy head Giorgos Ayfantis,
    DepPolCouns also delivered ref A demarche and took the
    opportunity to raise the question of reported Greek
    foot-dragging in Brussels on strengthening Iran sanctions,
    particularly in advance of the expected June 23 designation
    of Bank Melli (refs B, C).  DepPolCouns stressed that the
    rest of the EU was getting on board and asked whether Greece
    was concerned about ending up the lone hold-out.  Ayfantis
    said Greece would not be the last to approve further
    sanctions, if that was the way the EU was headed, and that
    Greece would not break an EU consensus.  At the same time,
    Ayfantis signaled that Greece had concerns about the
    direction of EU Iran policy.

    ¶4. (C) Ayfantis said Greece desired a broader discussion at
    the EU on Iran policy.  It was important to establish an EU
    red line on Iran.  No one wished to see Iran acquire nuclear
    weapons, but at this point the evidence did not indicate that
    Iran was actually trying to build a weapon.  It was much more
    likely that the Iranians were trying to acquire enough
    Qtrate that they could Qwanted to.  The Irania.
    gain the respect and clout in the Middle East and the world
    they thought they deserved.

    ¶5. (C) As for the immediate question of toughening sanctions,
    Ayfantis said Greece believed whatever we did at this point
    would have little impact on Iranian behavior.  The Iranians
    now had gone into a wait-and-see mode in anticipation of the
    U.S. Presidential election.  They wanted to see who won the
    election and would then calculate their next moves based on
    what they perceived their options to be under a McCain or
    Obama Presidency.  Given this dynamic in Teheran, Greece
    believed now was not the time to try to stiffen sanctions.
    Greece assessed that waiting several months until the
    election made no difference in the larger scheme of things,
    especially since Iran was unlikely to change its behavior in
    the short term.

    ¶6. (C) DepPolCouns pushed back, noting that the evidence did,
    in fact, indicate that the Iranians were responsive to
    international pressure, as the U.S. NIE of last December had
    shown.  Indeed, the Iranians appeared more responsive to
    sticks than carrots.  Furthermore, if we assumed that Iranian
    policy was driven by a desire to gain respect on the
    international scene, it was all the more important now, when
    a consensus was developing in the EU for tougher sanctions,
    for Greece to demonstrate that there were no cracks in
    Western unity.  Iran needed to gain international respect
    through cooperation and playing by the rules, not through
    scare tactics and defying the international community.
    Ayfantis appeared to take this on-board and ended the meeting
    by reiterating that Greece, despite its misgivings, would not
    break an EU consensus.

    ¶7. (C) COMMENT: Greek reluctance to strengthen sanctions on
    Iran seems to be driven by several factors.  One is Greece's
    oft-stated belief that, in principle, cooperation and
    discussion are more effective than sanctions.  Another factor
    is the economic interests of Greek shipowners, who apparently
    have considerable dealings with the Iranians and are a major
    player in Greek domestic politics with great influence over
    the Karamanlis government (ref d).  A third factor is
    Greece's historical -- and apparently growing -- self-image
    as a "bridge" between East and West, whether in terms of Iran
    or Russia or the Arab states/Palestine and Israel (see, for
    example, ref e).  To accomplish the latter, Greece believes
    it needs to show that it is an honest broker and more
    accommodating than others.  Greece may, indeed, be able to
    play such a role, but it would require that Greece produce
    results.

    ¶8. (C) COMMENT CONT.: As for the immediate problem of Greece
    joining the growing EU consensus on stiffening Iran
    sanctions, including designation of Bank Melli, Greece on
    just about all other issues has not been willing to buck EU
    consensus (the one exception is the Macedonia name issue,
    where it perceives its vital interests are at stake).  We
    have put the Greeks on notice that they are falling behind
    the EU curve on Iran sanctions and that we are watching.  We
    believe further discussion in Brussels highlighting Greece's
    increasing risk of isolation could have a positive impact.
    SPECKHARD

`