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### Viewing cable 07OSLO1161, NORWAY'S DEFENSE POLICY AT A CROSSROADS: CLARITY

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07OSLO1161 | 2007-12-18 13:17 | 2011-05-12 13:30 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Oslo

Appears in these articles:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsnight
http://www.bbc.com/news/
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/9483790.stm
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13378567
http://www.greenpeace.org.uk
http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/en/news-and-blogs/campaign-blog/new-wikileaks-revelations-shed-light-on-arcti/blog/34736
http://www.thenation.com/blog/160631/wikileaks-news-and-views-blog-thursday-day-166
http://blogs.ft.com/energy-source/2011/05/12/the-battle-over-greenlands-oil/
http://www.google.com/hostednews/canadianpress/article/ALeqM5ihhnQuXHwVOFswGcLlhFwiCs9gRQ?docId=6832936
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jchSEXNkbkPvlAB4mJOcmsY2WddA?docId=CNG.4232f6ae19eb54c58c9d35b7f0b4995b.861

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHNY #1161/01 3521317
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 181317Z DEC 07
    FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6495
    INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
    RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 7964
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3979
    RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 3242
    RUEHNY/ODC OSLO NO
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 001161

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2017
    TAGS: MARR MASS MCAP PREL PINR PINS PGOV NO
    SUBJECT: NORWAY'S DEFENSE POLICY AT A CROSSROADS: CLARITY
    FROM USG IS KEY

    REF: A. OSLO 1093
         ¶B. OSLO 988
         ¶C. OSLO 382
         ¶D. OSLO 184

    Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin M. Johnson
    for reasons 1.4 b and d

    Summary
    -------
    ¶1. (SBU) Norway is undergoing a philosophical, bureaucratic
    and public debate on what its defense policy, obligations and
    needs will be for the next five to ten years.  The outcome
    will have significant implications for Norway,s ability to
    fulfill NATO obligations as well as its ability to cope with
    the potential of increased military threats in the Arctic.
    An additional factor in the debate is increased official
    interest in Nordic defense cooperation, with a particular
    focus on Sweden.  The planned purchase of 48 new fighter
    aircraft (relevant to the Joint Strike Fighter program), and
    a decision on a costly fast patrol boat program top
    procurement concerns.  As the debate intensifies, 2008 will
    be a decisive year for Norway,s defense capabilities and
    strategy. It is vital that the USG speak and act clearly and
    at senior levels when Norway is an outlier on key issues.
    Norway is changing and USG engagement is key to avoid further
    drift.  End Summary

    What?  Soldiers Actually Shoot?
    --------------------------------
    ¶2. (SBU) Background to this debate includes a government
    which rhetorically affirms NATO as Norway,s primary security
    provider but which is at heart skeptical of the use of
    military power in all but the most benign ways, tempted by
    the idea of closer Nordic defense cooperation and includes an
    anti-NATO party, the Socialist Left (SV) as a member of the
    governing coalition.  The vigorous internal governmental
    debate over Norway,s contributions to ISAF, as well as
    repeated public negative comments concerning NATO and U.S.
    missile defense plans are illustrative of the general impulse
    of this government (see reftels for details).

    ¶3. (SBU) The deaths of two Norwegian soldiers in Afghanistan
    over the past year have forced the government to finally
    publicly explain why Norway is in Afghanistan.  Public
    support for Norwegian deployment to Afghanistan is roughly
    50% but in large segments of society, and certainly in SV,
    there is a strong belief that military force creates rather
    than solves problems and that the military should be used
    only for UN mandated peacekeeping missions.  This view is
    particularly prevalent among younger Norwegians who have no
    direct memories of U.S. assistance during the Cold War or
    WWII.  This has led the GON to keep silent about Afghanistan
    or to stress the development side only, implying that
    &others8 do force, and Norway does reconstruction.

    Flat Budgets
    ----------
    ¶4. (C) Governmental skepticism of defense has been reflected
    in flat budgets for the last five years, meaning in real
    terms, decreases in funding.  This at a time when Norway
    accumulated a vast 380 billion dollar surplus in its &oil
    fund8.  An additional factor is that the Minister of
    Defense, Anne-Grete Strom Erichsen, is one of the weakest
    cabinet members.  She is a former Mayor of Bergen with no
    previous defense experience and is completely overshadowed in
    intergovernmental debates by the strong personalities of the
    Foreign Minister (Jonas Gahr Stoere), the Finance Minister
    (Kristin Halvorsen, head of SV) and the Development and
    Environmental Minister (Erik Solheim also SV).

    Norway,s Future Defense Capabilities Limited
    --------------------------------
    ¶5. (C) In contrast to the Minister, the Norwegian CHOD,
    General Sverre Diesen is very capable and well respected and
    has been fighting hard to protect Norwegian defense
    capabilities, to restructure the military away from a static
    territorial defense to a more expeditionary force and to make
    the political case for the need for the military and for
    increased resources for the MOD.   He headed the MOD Defense
    Study (released recently along with a concurrent study
    conducted by largely civilian defense experts).  The studies

    largely concurred with his assessments and judged future
    security threats against Norway to be not invasion but an
    isolated and limited use of force against Norwegian
    interests, likely to be in the Arctic.  In a speech on
    November 26, Diesen specified further, saying that increased
    Russian military activity in the Arctic could lead to such a
    conflict or to the use of military power to force the
    Norwegian government to change its policy on a controversial
    issue. Diesen stated further that in such a situation Norway
    would need to have the capability to cope without NATO
    support.  The Studies also called for increased cooperation
    with Sweden and other countries to save money on equipment
    purchases, training and exercises.  (Note: MOD claims that
    the fighter purchase is explicitly excluded from equipment
    coordination with Sweden).  Newspaper editorials called the
    Studies brutally honest and compared the current funding
    levels (in terms of GDP) to defense spending in the 1930s,
    which was historically low and left Norway ill prepared to
    deal with the German invasion in April 1940.

    ¶6. (C) The Studies reached the same conclusions on the impact
    of current funding, namely that a continued flat defense
    budget will require cuts in some equipment purchases, require
    international cooperation to save money, the closure of many
    bases and the consolidation of Norway,s joint headquarters,
    and create limitations on the effectiveness of the military
    both in international operations and in Norway.  The civilian
    defense study stated that without increases in the budget
    Norway will be hard pressed to defend its interest in the
    Arctic region, will be unable to respond to crises in Norway
    if parts of the military are engaged in international
    operations and will find it difficult to justify the
    purchases of frigates, fast patrol boats or fighter aircraft
    that currently are planned or under consideration.  The
    studies called for the purchase of new fighter aircraft and
    frigates but recommended canceling the fast patrol boat
    program.  In recent years only the Coast Guard has seen
    increases in budget and staffing.  This trend would continue
    with the exception of an increase in professional soldiers in
    the army (a decrease in overall number would continue).
    However, the funding increases for the Coast Guard have
    largely been to increase capabilities for policing fisheries
    and have very limited military application.
    Impacting NATO's Joint Warfare Center
    ---------------------------------------
    ¶7. (C) The Studies recommended relocating the current
    Norwegian joint headquarters in Jatta near Stavanger
    (co-located with NATO,s Joint Warfare Center) to Bodo,
    possibly leaving the Joint Warfare Center without sufficient
    support, the closure of all but two naval bases and five air
    bases and the reduction of the Home Guard. (Comment:
    Relocation of the Norwegian HQ in Jatta could have a
    significant impact on the Joint Warfare Center as the
    Norwegians currently provide much of the logistical support.
    The Norwegian MOD has promised to maintain the current level
    of support).

    Tough Choices and Russian Behaviour
    -----------------------------------------
    ¶8. (C) By presenting such a stark picture, Diesen appears to
    be calling the GON,s bluff, saying in effect, if you
    continue to give us insufficient support, this is what you
    will get, a military without capabilities either to defend
    Norway or to participate in international operations.  It
    remains to be seen how the GON will react to the Studies or
    what revisions the Minister of Defense and Parliament will
    make during their review and the subsequent debate on this
    issue.  The multimillion dollar purchase of six fast patrol
    boats seems likely to be a hot political topic as the boats
    are made in Norway and large amounts of money have already
    been spent on this project.  Recently, media reports
    indicated that the head of the Navy reversed his earlier
    agreement with the Defense Study and is now saying that
    Norway needs to keep its MTB fleet.  Recent Russian aircraft
    carrier activity off Norway,s coast caused FM Stoere to joke
    at a meeting attended by the Ambassador that &Russia is
    helping us refute those who question our need for fighter
    aircraft.8  We are watching how increased Russian activity
    affects defense policy and budget debates.

    Nordic Defense: Supplement or Substitute for NATO?
    -------------------------------------
    ¶9. (C) Unlike the debate over budgets and capabilities,

    interest in increased defense cooperation with Sweden and
    Finland commands broad agreement between the GON and MOD.
    Along with the favorable mention of this concept in the
    Defense Studies, Diesen and the Swedish CHOD, Hakan Syren,
    meet regularly and have called for closer cooperation in
    speeches in the fall of 2006.  Late this summer they wrote
    joint editorials in leading Norwegian and Swedish papers
    calling for increased formal cooperation in defense issues.
    This cooperation would entail joint procurement, training,
    exercises and deployments on international operations.  A
    recent proposal by an influential advisory body for a change
    in Swedish defense policy, in which Sweden stated that it
    would not be passive in the case of a catastrophe or attack
    on EU or Nordic members, caused jubilant headlines in Norway
    which stated that Sweden will defend Norway.  Norway,s
    Deputy Defense Minister welcomed the statement and said that
    Norway would reciprocate.  The enthusiastic welcome of the
    announcement demonstrates the significant public and official
    appetite for cooperation with Sweden.

    ¶10. (C) On the MFA side, the Swedish, Norwegian and Finnish
    Foreign Ministers have begun regular meetings, the most
    recent held in Bodo (the location of Norway,s Northern
    command center) on October 10.  (Note: The GON briefed that
    Russian bombers flying just outside Norwegian air space
    simulated what appeared to be a cruise missile attack on Bodo
    the day of the Nordic Minister,s meeting.)  Increased
    defense cooperation with Sweden is welcome by the GON as it
    sees Sweden and Finland as countries with experience in the
    North (read with Russia) who share the same rough political
    ideology.  In particular SV strongly supports closer defense
    ties to Sweden, which in their view could weaken NATO ties.
    On the opposite side of the political spectrum the
    conservative Progress Party also welcomes increased ties with
    Sweden based on the belief that security cooperation would
    strengthen Norway's territorial defense.  It is clear that
    relations with Russia form a substantial rationale for
    increased Nordic cooperation along with the publicly stated
    goal of increased savings on military purchases.   MFA
    Political Director Kai Eide tells us increased Nordic
    cooperation is easier now because Sweden and Finland are
    close partners with NATO, arguing that this initiative brings
    others closer to NATO rather than drawing Norway away.

    ¶11. (C) Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Stoere has made repeated
    speeches welcoming increased Nordic cooperation and has
    entertained several high- level Swedish industry delegations.
     In past public comments Stoere took pains to state that NATO
    remains the anchor of Norway,s security.  More recently he
    has spoken of the unique potential for Nordic defense
    cooperation, calling great power objections relics of
    history.  In a recent December conference Stoere stated that
    the GON sees NATO as a strategic &hedge8.  According to
    Stoere,s and Diesen,s public comments, Norway would like to
    develop, in cooperation with Sweden and Finland, joint
    participation in international operations, joint procurement
    of increasingly expensive military equipment, and joint work
    to increase the focus on northern issues in NATO, the UN and
    the EU.  There has been less mention of cooperation with
    fellow NATO allies Denmark and Iceland, who would be perhaps
    more natural partners in the Arctic, but lack Sweden and
    Finland's expertise and long experience with Russia.

    ¶12. (C) In private conversations with the embassy, MFA
    Political Director Kai Eide stated that Norway,s interest in
    Nordic Defense Cooperation is to encourage others to
    participate in joint operations in Afghanistan.  Eide also
    stated that Finland is more interested in broad defense
    cooperation than in joint operations.  He mentioned that
    Russian embassies in the region have expressed concern that
    the Nordic initiative is aimed at them.  Other Embassy
    contacts have reported that they heard Eide mention privately
    that the GON,s interest in increasing contacts with Sweden
    and Finland is to somehow take advantage of those countries,
    knowledge of Russia and access to the Russian economy.

    Return to the Sagas: Norwegian Defense of Iceland?
    ---------------------------------------------
    ¶13. (U) After the U.S. withdrew its presence at the Keflavik
    airbase, the Icelanders asked Norway and other NATO allies
    for help in providing air surveillance.  Norway was willing
    to cooperate and signed a security agreement with Iceland
    committing them to hold joint exercises on Iceland annually

    and to help monitor the busy sea-lanes off Iceland,s coast.
    The first joint exercise under this new agreement, named
    Northern Viking, was held this year and included U.S.,
    Norwegian, and Danish forces.  Despite some Icelandic claims
    that Norway has now taken over responsibility for the defense
    of Iceland, the Norwegian agreement was very clear in
    restricting its role with Iceland to peacetime operations,
    including joint exercises and training and periodic visits by
    Norwegian forces to Iceland.  It specifically does not
    include security guarantees or basing arrangements.

    Implications for the Joint Strike Fighter
    ----------------------------------
    ¶14. (C) Any discussion of closer Norwegian-Swedish defense
    industry cooperation inevitably brings up the ongoing Swedish
    campaign to sell the Gripen fighter to Norway.  Norway is
    considering the purchase of Gripen, Eurofighter or the Joint
    Strike Fighter (JSF).  Sweden has conducted an aggressive
    marketing campaign, promising a wide range of industrial
    cooperation and dominating the media coverage of the fighter
    competition.  The Embassy has been concerned that the Swedish
    effort is intended to change the rules of the competition
    away from a discussion of the needs of the Norwegian Air
    Force to one over the desirability of closer defense and
    industrial cooperation with Sweden.  The MOD assures us that
    their recommendation on which fighter to purchase will be
    based on a competition among all three competitors in which
    the planes, abilities, the industrial compensation package
    and the needs of the Air Force are the primary factors.
    Diesen has publicly stated (and others have privately
    claimed) that the fighter competition is separate from his
    proposals to increase cooperation on defense procurement with
    Sweden. Despite these statements many in Parliament and the
    government will be eager to push the debate towards a
    discussion of a closer relationship with Sweden vs. a closer
    relationship with the United States. This debate has already
    begun in the media with political cartoonists and editorial
    writers enjoying the chance to cast a technical debate over
    fighter planes into a debate over strategic orientation.

    Conclusion: Looking for Security and Ideological Comfort
    ---------------------------------------
    ¶15. (C) Comment: FM Stoere realizes the need for continued
    close security ties to NATO and the U.S. but at the same time
    is uncomfortable with the direction of U.S. and NATO security
    policy.  His evolving public comments indicate the GON is not
    looking to replace NATO but seeks additional partners in
    security which are a better ideological match with the GON
    and can balance the U.S. heavy NATO alliance.  One example is
    Norway's increased defense ties with the EU and its
    participation in the EU Nordic Battle Group, despite being a
    non-EU member.  Cooperation with Sweden and Finland offers
    both the possibility of savings on equipment purchases and
    the chance to work with likeminded nations who prioritize UN
    involvement, favor peacekeeping over peacemaking and who are
    concerned about Russia.  Stoere's coalition partners from SV,
    of course, are unabashedly anti-NATO and anti-defense.

    Implications for U.S. Policy
    ------------------------
    ¶16. (C) The decisions made by the GON on the Defense
    Studies, recommendations on funding, the purchase of new
    aircraft and on its relations to its neighbors will have a
    significant impact on Norway,s ability and desire to meet
    NATO commitments and spark a reassessment of Norway's defense
    policies.  We expect Norway's move toward Nordic cooperation
    and preference for UN mandated peacekeeping missions to
    remain, even if the current government does not win the 2009
    election.  This tend combined with a general antipathy to
    missile defense, efforts to ban cluster munitions, focus on
    disarmament instead of non-proliferation and reluctance to
    use its vast energy wealth to fund defense spending open
    questions regarding Norway's commitment to be a serious and
    dependable ally.  Thus, despite continued close and
    productive military to military relations, the GON,s actions
    and long-term trends bear watching in NATO and bilaterally.
    In this atmosphere it is more vital than ever that we speak
    and act clearly and at senior levels when Norway is an
    outlier on key issues.  Eager to act more independently but
    loathe to be seen as weakening trans-Atlantic ties, the GON
    will listen and respond when confronted.  Assuming generally
    common interests and policies, however, would be a mistake.
    This is not the Norway many remember, and failing to make

    clear our objections will encourage more drift.  End Comment
    WHITNEY

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