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### Viewing cable 08MADRID518, WHA ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON'S VISIT TO MADRID,

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08MADRID518 | 2008-05-09 16:22 | 2011-03-26 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Madrid
Appears in these articles: http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1360470-cuatro-paises-denunciaron-corrupcion-en-el-gobierno

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHMD #0518/01 1301622
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 091622Z MAY 08
    FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4739
    INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 5352
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0627
    RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 0381
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1292
    RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAY LIMA 1905
    RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0670
    RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN 0172
    RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 1413
    RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 1491
    RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0517
    RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0270

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 000518

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2018
    TAGS: PREL KSUM AR BL CO CU PE SP
    SUBJECT: WHA ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON'S VISIT TO MADRID,
    APRIL 30-MAY 1, 2008

    Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HUGO LLORENS, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D).

    ¶1. (C) WHA Assistant Secretary Tom Shannon visited Madrid
    April 30-May 1, 2008. He met with Secretary General of the
    Presidency Bernardino Leon and former President Jose Maria
    Aznar. He also attended a lunch in his honor hosted by
    Charge d' Affaires Hugo Llorens with Spanish private sector,
    media, and government experts on Latin America and gave
    interviews to daily El Pais and with Antena 3 TV. Leon
    stressed the need for the U.S. and Spain to work together in
    Latin America. Aznar emphasized the importance of Colombia
    and Mexico and urged the U.S. to maintain strong support for
    both. Both Leon and Aznar expressed concerns about Argentina.

    Leon Stresses Desire to Work with U.S. in Latin America
    --------------------------------------------- ----------

    ¶2. (C) A/S Shannon and CDA Llorens met April 30 with newly
    installed Secretary General of the Presidency (and former MFA
    number two) Bernardino Leon. A/S Shannon told Leon the U.S.
    wanted to maintain continuity in policy towards Latin America
    through the next Administration. He emphasized the
    importance of strategic partners such as Spain, and thanked
    Leon for the effort he and MFA Secretary of State Trinidad
    Jimenez had made to work with the U.S. Leon said President
    Zapatero would need to make Latin America a foreign policy
    priority and work it intensively. He suggested this was an
    area where Spain and the U.S. should coordinate closely and
    at the most senior levels. He said the strategic effort
    should be to work closely with countries such as Brazil,
    Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. Looking ahead to the new
    Zapatero administration, Leon predicted the opposition
    Popular Party (PP) might be more conciliatory than in the
    past. He said Zapatero would put more emphasis on foreign
    policy, and he stressed that good relations with the U.S.
    would be a priority. Leon mentioned he had met recently with
    foreign policy advisors to all three U.S. Presidential
    candidates. He suggested both governments should begin
    thinking about a meeting between Presidents Bush and Zapatero
    in September at the UNGA. Leon noted that this meeting with
    A/S Shannon was the first he had held with anyone outside the
    Spanish Government since assuming his new post.

    ¶3. (C) A/S Shannon explained the U.S. was looking forward to
    two key events: the OAS General Assembly (OASGA) in Medellin
    in June 2008 where the Deputy Secretary would lead the U.S.
    delegation and the Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and
    Tobago in April 2009. He noted Mexico and others were
    working to reduce tensions between Colombia and Ecuador in
    advance of the OASGA as well as to avoid disruptions by
    Venezuelan President Chavez. A/S Shannon said the Summit of
    the Americas would be the new U.S. President's first
    multilateral event with Latin America, and a major goal would
    be to put the summit process back on a positive track after
    the Mar de Plata experience. He indicated the Administration
    would continue to push its free trade agenda.

    ¶4. (C) Leon said Argentina was very worrisome. Spanish
    companies in Argentina were concerned by the populist tone of
    the government, political polarization, and the level of
    corruption. There were "complicated" people and movements
    around the presidency. He suggested some lived by the old
    adage that "a politician who is poor is a poor politician."
    He said there was much work for Spain and the U.S. to do with
    respect to Argentina and complemented President Bush for
    setting a positive tone with President Cristina Fernandez
    Kirchner. A/S Shannon mentioned that he had recently visited
    Argentina and that in June a USG team would visit Buenos
    Aires to reinitiate the lapsed high-level dialogue. The goal
    was to define the bilateral relationship by shared interests
    rather than by differences. He predicted strife between
    various Argentine sectors was just beginning; the
    agricultural strike was merely the first round. He said the
    Peronist tendency once a crisis was past was to look for
    wealth and figure out how to spend it. Ironically, the more
    complicated internal situation might lead the government to
    seek to mend fences internationally. He said the costs of
    too close association with Chavez were now clear to the GOA,
    as evidenced by Chavez's recent decision to nationalize the
    Argentine firm SIDOR.

    ¶5. (C) Leon said Spain hoped to use the EU-Latin America and
    the Caribbean summit in Lima in May to seek a trade pact
    where those Latin American countries who wanted in could be
    in and those who wanted out could stay out. The goal was to
    keep a country like Bolivia or Ecuador from dragging down the
    others. A/S Shannon noted this might help with the U.S.
    Congress on the free trade issue.

    ¶6. (C) Leon said a post-Uribe Colombia raised concerns,
    although there were sensible people on the left (e.g., Polo
    Democratico leader Gaviria). He noted that post-Uribe,
    especially if the situation in Peru deteriorated, the Andean
    region would be even more problematic. He said Peru was a
    very key country.

    ¶7. (C) Leon said he was worried about Bolivia and the threat
    to Spanish business interests there. He predicted Morales
    would lose the May 4 referendum. A/S Shannon said the U.S.
    was looking past May 4 and talking to the group of friends
    (Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia) as well as the Vatican. He
    predicted the referendum results would provide greater
    legitimacy to the state governors and blunt the GOB's
    criticism of the opposition and the U.S. (he noted wryly that
    the GOB had blasted the U.S. Ambassador at the same time the
    Bolivian FM was in the U.S. seeking USG assistance). A/S
    Shannon said the governors needed to exercise caution and not
    be overly aggressive. The U.S. message was that we supported
    dialogue but not secession. He doubted secession would come
    to pass. He said the U.S. was also talking to the armed
    forces and urging them to work within the constitution. He
    noted the military understood the risk to it as an
    institution. Leon asked if the GOB was arming civilians.
    A/S Shannon replied that some such activity was possible, but
    he doubted it was on a large scale. He said some Morales
    advisors might be pushing confrontation in order to paint the
    provinces as rebellious, but the U.S. message was that the
    provinces had to work within the confines of the law. He
    noted the Bolivian FM was in Washington recently and tried
    without success to interest the OAS Permanent Council in a
    resolution condemning the provinces. Leon said Spain's
    message was complimentary: territorial integrity but respect
    for the provinces as political units.

    ¶8. (C) A/S Shannon noted New Mexico Governor Richardson had
    recently visited Caracas in connection with the three
    Americans in the hands of the FARC. Chavez told him the U.S.
    should help Morales and work with the governors to make sure
    Morales was not backed into a corner. This was unusual given
    Venezuela had in the past urged on Morales. It appeared
    Chavez might be genuinely worried about the turn matters
    could take in Bolivia. Leon said he too was nervous about
    the situation. He noted Spain would regard a deployment of
    troops or police to the oil installations as a very bad sign.

    ¶9. (C) Leon said it was essential that the next Iberoamerican
    summit (El Salvador in November 2008) move beyond the famous
    incident in Chile between King Juan Carlos and Chavez. He
    mentioned Zapatero would see Chavez in Lima to try and set
    the stage for a more positive summit. Regardless, there were
    no guarantees someone would not seek confrontation in El
    Salvador.

    Aznar Looks to Colombia and Mexico
    ----------------------------------

    ¶10. (C) A/S Shannon and CDA Llorens also met April 30 with
    former President Jose Maria Aznar. Aznar said he was worried
    about Latin America. He described what he called an
    anti-NAFTA, anti-Colombia FTA theme in the U.S. Presidential
    primaries. At the same time, he criticized an excessive
    emphasis on free trade and open markets in dealing with Latin
    America. Both were fundamental, but the U.S. also needed to
    focus on how it could isolate Chavez and also should keep a
    wary eye on Chinese and Muslim influence in Venezuela. He
    argued the U.S. and the EU needed to articulate a policy more
    understandable to the common people and more comprehensive.
    A/S Shannon agreed on the need to support civil society and
    NGOs in Latin America. He said many people in the U.S. had a

    view of Latin America frozen in the 1990s, but the region was
    changing rapidly. The U.S. and Spain should be looking for
    catalytic ways of supporting democratic governance, civil
    society, and economic development. He noted that in the past
    the U.S. had sometimes ignored Latin America until a crisis
    arose; in contrast, President Bush had a record of solid
    engagement in the region.

    ¶11. (C) Aznar mentioned he had spoken with Mexican President
    Calderon before the New Orleans summit and Calderon had
    expressed concern about waning Congressional support for
    NAFTA and the Merida initiative. Aznar said failure of the
    Colombia FTA would be catastrophic. He said Uribe was the
    best friend the U.S. had in Latin America, and the end of the
    FARC was in sight. He noted both Chavez and Ecuadorian
    President Correa were implicated by information obtained as a
    result of the GOC operation against Raul Reyes. It was more
    important now than ever for the U.S. to support Colombia.
    Aznar said Colombia and Mexico were the key countries in the
    region. Aznar said the U.S. and Spain should be working
    together to get Mexico to be more active regionally.
    Although Brazilian regional engagement was positive, it
    needed to be complemented by more Mexican engagement. He
    urged the U.S. to continue supporting both Colombia and
    Mexico, saying that if Calderon and Uribe were successful, it
    would shift the entire region in a positive direction. A/S
    Shannon briefed Aznar on the Administration's continuing
    efforts to win approval for the FTA with Colombia as well as
    the Merida initiative, which represented a very constructive
    U.S. response to the concerns of Mexico and Central America
    regarding security and law enforcement. He also briefed
    Aznar on the New Orleans meetings and the emphasis Presidents
    Bush and Calderon and PM Harper put on a common vision for
    trade, security, and border management.

    ¶12. (C) Despite his worries for the region, Aznar noted many
    countries were doing well. He cited Chile, Panama, and Peru.
    Aznar said the electoral results in Paraguay were a good
    step; the ideological leanings of the new government would
    not make much of a difference. Aznar said Brazil appeared to
    have put populism firmly behind it. He described Lula as a
    mainstream figure, albeit one who presented a friendlier face
    to the disadvantaged. He urged that the U.S. and Spain
    support good governance regardless of whether it came from
    the left or the right.

    ¶13. (C) Aznar said the situation in Argentina was very
    complicated. They appeared to be reverting to the vicious
    cycles of Peronism in which sectors with money were shaken
    down by the government. One interesting sign was the
    emergence of a more critical middle class, but Cristina
    Fernandez Kirchner was a disappointment. He had once hoped
    she would conduct a more sophisticated foreign policy, but
    she appeared now to be a puppet of her husband. A/S Shannon
    said Argentina was underperforming in terms of attracting
    foreign investment and was conducting an erroneous foreign
    policy. The last six years had seen economic improvement,
    but the Peronists again seemed to be looking for the money.
    Aznar agreed the growth had been notable, sustained in large
    part by favorable international commodity prices, but he said
    the recovery remained fragile. The GOA lacked credibility
    with the international business community, and the Argentine
    banking sector was weak. A/S Shannon hoped Argentina had
    learned a lesson from Venezuela's nationalization of the
    steel company SIDOR. Playing with Chavez was a good way to
    get burned. Nevertheless, he noted the GOA, for all its
    faults, was not in the same camp as Chavez. A/S Shannon and
    Aznar agreed it was important for the U.S. and Spain to
    remain actively engaged with the GOA and maintain a dialogue
    with it. A/S Shannon noted his recent visit there and the
    resumption of a regular, formal dialogue between the USG and
    GOA. Aznar applauded the initiative.

    ¶14. (C) Aznar praised President Bush's strong stance in
    support of a democratic transition in Cuba and his most
    recent speech on the subject. He said we needed to monitor
    carefully the steps Raul Castro was taking, some of which
    were in the right direction. Nevertheless, both the U.S. and
    the EU needed to stay on the record as promoting democratic
    transition and openly supporting civil society and the

    dissidents. A/S Shannon noted the GOC was attempting to
    isolate the U.S. Aznar said anything the U.S., EU, and Spain
    could do to publicize the truth on Cuba would help. He cited
    the recent crackdown on the Damas de Blanco, noting the news
    in Cuba was more than just cell phones and computers. The
    public needed to know what was really happening. He said
    that was the way to keep the pressure on Raul Castro, whom he
    said should not be allowed to consolidate power. Fidel would
    continue to be an immobilizing element as long as he lived,
    but when he died, it might set in motion events Raul could
    not control.

    Experts' Lunch
    --------------

    ¶15. (C) Lunch at the CDA's residence brought together a
    variety of Latin America experts: Roman Escolano of BBVA;
    Jaime Malet of the Amcham; Alberto Carnero of FAES; Asis
    Martin de Cabiedes of Europa Press, Juan Luis Cebrian of
    Grupo Prisa, and Eduardo San Martin of ABC; and Javier
    Sandomingo, MFA Director General for Iberoamerica. The
    discussion was off the record and vigorous. Topics included
    Cuba, Venezuela, Mexico, the Colombia FTA, and Argentina.
    Sandomingo made a point of saying during the lunch and again
    afterwards in private that Spain would strongly prefer the
    U.S. did not try to split EU opinion on Cuba. A/S Shannon
    emphasized the need for the international community to work
    together for meaningful democratic change and to continue to
    reach out to civil society and the dissidents. Several of
    the guests unconsciously echoed Leon's and Aznar's concerns
    about Argentina. Views on Venezuela were negative,
    especially on the economic situation. A/S Shannon used the
    opportunity to describe the Merida initiative, and he heard
    strong expressions of support for a U.S. FTA with Colombia.

    Comment
    -------

    ¶16. (C) We were especially struck by the emphasis Bernardino
    Leon laid on cooperation with the U.S. in Latin America. His
    move from MFA to the Presidency is rumored to have been
    prompted by Zapatero's dissatisfaction with the functioning
    of his first-term foreign policy apparatus. Reportedly his
    "odd man out" experience at the NATO Summit in Bucharest was
    the last straw. Leon is a credible player on foreign affairs
    and well-disposed towards the U.S. Having him in a key
    position at the Presidency bodes well as does the resonance
    of Spanish views with our own on most things Latin American.
    Cuba will continue to be the exception, at least when it
    comes to tactics, but on a great many other important issues
    in the Western Hemisphere we believe Spain is genuinely
    interested in working with the U.S. and highly values A/S
    Shannon's continuing attention. Aznar remains well-briefed
    on Latin America, knows the players, and frequently travels
    to the region, all good reasons for U.S. officials to stay in
    touch with him.
    Llorens

    .

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