Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 14239 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden 00. Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Jordan Yemen

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05 2011/06
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04 2011/05/05 2011/05/06 2011/05/07 2011/05/08 2011/05/09 2011/05/10 2011/05/11 2011/05/12 2011/05/13 2011/05/14 2011/05/15 2011/05/16 2011/05/17 2011/05/18 2011/05/19 2011/05/20 2011/05/21 2011/05/22 2011/05/23 2011/05/24 2011/05/25 2011/05/26 2011/05/27 2011/05/28 2011/05/29 2011/05/30 2011/05/31
2011/06/01 2011/06/02 2011/06/03

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/05 1985/06
1986/05
1987/06
1988/01 1988/03 1988/07 1988/08
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05
1992/01 1992/03 1992/06 1992/09 1992/12
1993/01 1993/10
1994/12
1995/04
1996/07 1996/11
1997/06 1997/10 1997/12
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11 2002/12
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Belfast Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown Consulate Fukuoka
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples Consulate Naha
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sapporo Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ASEC AEMR AMGT AR APECO AU AORC AJ AF AFIN AS AM AFFAIRS AA AG ADM ALOW ACOA ARABL ATRN AID AND APER ADANA APEC ADPM ADCO AL AADP AMED AY AORG ASEAN ABUD AROC ABLD AE AO ARF APCS AINF AGAO AODE ACABQ AX AMEX AZ ASUP ARM AQ ATFN AMBASSADOR ACBAQ AFSI AFSN AC ASIG ASEX AER AVERY AGRICULTURE ASCH AFU AMG ATPDEA ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AORL AN AIT ANET AGMT ACS AGR AMCHAMS AECL AUC AFGHANISTAN ACAO
BR BB BG BEXP BY BA BRUSSELS BU BD BK BL BH BM BTIO BP BO BE BILAT BX BIDEN BC BF BBSR BT BMGT BWC BN BTIU
CPAS CA CASC CS CBW CIDA CO CODEL CI CROS CU CH CWC CMGT CVIS CDG CD CV CG CF CHIEF CJAN CBSA CE CY CT CM CR CONS CW CN CDC CONDOLEEZZA CICTE CYPRUS COUNTRY CBE COM CTR CARSON COUNTER CIVS CFED COPUOS CKGR CHR CVR CLINTON COUNTERTERRORISM CITEL CLEARANCE COE CARICOM CB CSW CIC CITT CARIB CAFTA CACM CDB CJUS CTM CAN CONSULAR CLMT CBC CIA CNARC CIS CEUDA CAC CL CACS CAPC
DR DJ DHS DAO DCM DO DEFENSE DOMESTIC DK DOD DA DE DPRK DEPT DEA DISENGAGEMENT DOE DTRA DS DEAX
ECON ETTC EFIS ETRD EC EMIN EAGR EAID EU EFIN EUN ECIN EG EWWT EINV ENRG ELAB EPET EN EAIR EUMEM ECPS ELTN EIND EZ EI ER ET EINT ECONOMIC ENIV EXIM EFTA ES ECONOMY ERNG ELECTIONS ENERG EK EDEV EPA ENGR ETRC ENVI EXTERNAL ELN EAIDS ECA EDU EFINECONCS ECOSOC EUREM EINVEFIN ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ETC ENVR EAP EINN EXBS ENGY ECONOMICS EIAR EINDETRD ECONEFIN EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS ECIP EFIM EREL EINVETC ECONCS ETRA ESA EAIG EUR EUC ERD ETRN EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ESENV ENNP ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN
FR FI FOREIGN FAS FTAA FREEDOM FBI FINANCE FAA FM FJ FTA FARC FAC FAO FINR FDA FOR FOI FO FMLN FISO
GM GG GERARD GT GA GR GTIP GLOBAL GV GH GL GOV GOI GF GE GTMO GANGS GCC GAERC GZ GAZA GY GUILLERMO GASPAR
HR HO HA HYMPSK HK HUMAN HU HILLARY HI HUM HURI HSTC HEBRON HUMOR
IZ IN IAEA IS IMO ILO IR IC IT ITU IV IMF IBRD IWC IRAQI IDB ISRAELI ITALY ITPGOV ITALIAN INDO ICAO ITRA IPR INMARSAT ID ICRC INTERNAL IIP IRS ICJ ILC IO ICTY IQ IEFIN IA INTERPOL IEA INR INRB IAHRC ISRAEL IZPREL IRAJ IF ITPHUM IL IACI IDA ISLAMISTS IGAD ITF INRA INRO IBET INTELSAT IDP ICTR IRC
JA JO JM JP JUS JAMES JOHN JOSEPH JOHNNIE JIMENEZ
KOMC KNNP KFLO KDEM KSUM KIPR KFLU KPAO KE KCRM KJUS KAWC KZ KSCA KDRG KCOR KGHG KPAL KTIP KMCA KCRS KPKO KOLY KRVC KVPR KG KWBG KMDR KTER KSPR KV KTFN KWMN KFRD KSTH KS KN KISL KGIC KSEP KFIN KTEX KTIA KUNR KCMR KMOC KCIP KTDB KBIO KU KO KIDE KSTC KICC KIRC KIRF KSEO KSAF KR KNUP KCSY KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KOCI KMPI KNUC KPAONZ KHLS KPRP KHDP KHIV KTRD KNAR KWAC KTAO KJUST KTBT KCRCM KNPP KMRS KBTS KAWK KHSA KPRV KMFO KNNPMNUC KACT KSCI KERG KBCT KVRP KPWR KVIR KFSC KENV KPIR KCFE KX KCOM KAID KTLA KPOA KNDP KRCM KCFC KNEI KCHG KPLS KREL KFTFN KTFM KLIG KDEMAF KRAD KBTR KGIT KGCC KICA KHUM KSEC KPIN KESS KDEV KWWMN KOM KWNM KRFD KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KRGY KREC KIFR KSAC KWMNCS KPAK KOMS KFPC KRIM KDDG KCGC KPAI KID KMIG KNSD KWMM
LY LE LABOR LU LA LI LTTE LG LH LO LAB LT LOG
MARR MX MASS MOPS MNUC MCAP MTCRE ML MR MRCRE MTRE MASC MY MK MAS MO MIL MTCR MG MAPP MD MAR MU MZ MP MA MOPPS MTS MLS MILI MEPN MEPI MEETINGS MERCOSUR MW MT MCC MIK MAPS MV MILITARY MARAD MDC MEPP MASSMNUC MUCN MEDIA MI MQADHAFI MPOS MPS MC
NZ NATO NI NO NG NL NU NPT NS NC NA NATIONAL NSF NDP NIPP NR NSSP NP NE NGO NAS NZUS NH NSG NAFTA NEW NRR NT NASA NAR NK NOVO NATOPREL NEA NSC NV NPA NSFO NW NORAD NPG
OTRA OECD OVIP OREP OPRC ODC OIIP OPDC OAS OSCE OPIC OMS OEXC OPCW OPAD ODIP OVIPPRELUNGANU OIE OFDP OFFICIALS OSCI OHUM OTR OMIG OSAC OBSP OFDA OVP ON OCII OES OCS OIC
PGOV PREL PARM PINR PHUM PM PREF PTER PK PINS PBIO PHSA PE PBTS PL POL PAK POV POLITICS POLICY PERL PA PPA PCI PAS PALESTINIAN PROP PREZ PTE PAIGH PO PROG PJUS POLITICAL PMIL PGOF PINO PG PARMS PDOV PSI PRAM PREO PTERE PAO PRGOV PORG PP PS PKFK PSOE PEPR PDEM PINT PMAR PRELP PREFA PNG PTBS PFOR PUNE PGOVLO PHUMBA PNAT POLINT PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PY PLN PHUH PEDRO PF PHUS PU PARTIES PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PHUMPREL POGOV PEL PINL PBT PINF PRL PSEPC POSTS PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOC PNR PROV
QA
RS RP RU RW RFE RCMP RIGHTSPOLMIL RM ROBERT RICE REGION RO ROOD RELAM RSP RF RELATIONS RIGHTS RUPREL REMON REACTION REPORT RSO
SZ SENV SOCI SNAR SY SO SP SU SI SMIG SYR SA SCUL SG SW SR SYRIA SNARM SPECIALIST SC SEN SF SENVSXE SL SAARC SNARIZ STEINBERG SARS SCRS SWE SN SAN ST SIPDIS SSA SPCVIS SOFA SENVKGHG SANC SHI SEVN SHUM SK SH SNARCS SPCE SNARN SIPRS
TRGY TBIO TSPA TU TPHY TI TX TH TIP TSPL TNGD TP TW TZ TF TN TC TL TV TS TT TK TD TWI TERRORISM TO TRSY TURKEY TINT TFIN TAGS TR TBID THPY
UK UNSC UNGA UN US USTR UZ USEU UV UG UP UNAUS UNMIK UY UR USPS UNSCR UNHRC UNMIC UNESCO UNCHR USUN UNHCR USGS USNC UNEP USOAS USAID UE UNVIE UAE UNO UNDP UNODC UNCHS UNFICYP UNDESCO UNC UNPUOS UNDC UNICEF UNCHC UNCSD UNFCYP UNIDROIT UNCND
VE VM VT VZ VTEG VTIZ VTPREL VENZ VAT VC VI VN
WHTI WIPO WTRO WS WHO WTO WZ WI WBG WMD WWARD WHA WITH WTRQ WEU WMO WA WFP WB
XA XR XW XX XK XL XM XS XF XG XT XH XB XU XY XV XD XC XE XZ XQ XI XTAG
YI YM YL YMCS YE
ZU ZI ZP ZR ZOELLICK ZF ZL ZJ ZO ZB ZEALAND ZN ZA ZK ZANU

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 08PANAMA77, PANAMA POST: 4TH EDITION -- THE DIRECTOR'S CUT --

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08PANAMA77.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08PANAMA77 | 2008-01-25 21:53 | 2011-05-31 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Panama

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHZP #0077/01 0252153
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 252153Z JAN 08
    FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1675
    INFO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
    RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 000077

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2017
    TAGS: PGOV PREL PM
    SUBJECT: PANAMA POST:  4TH EDITION -- THE DIRECTOR'S CUT --
    VOLUME II

    REF: A. (A) PANAMA 51 (AND PREVIOUS)

         ¶B. (B) PANAMA 72

    Classified By: POLCOUNS Brian R. Naranjo.  Reasons:  1.4 (b) and (d).

    -------
    Summary
    -------

    ¶1. (C) The January 17-21 visit of State's Director for
    Central American Affairs John Feeley provided the Panama Post
    an excellent opportunity to touch base with numerous
    political heavy hitters.  Feeley met with all the
    "presidenciables," except for Panamanista aspirant Alberto
    Vallarino who was out of town and on the stump and Minister
    of Housing and frequently cited front-runner for the
    governing Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) presidential
    nomination Balbina Herrera.  (Note:  Ambassador lunched with
    Herrera on January 24 (REFTEL B).)  Several common themes
    emerged from the Feeley's visit:

    (a) opposition leaders uniformly stated that they believe
    that ultimately the governing Revolutionary Democratic Party
    (PRD) presidential nominee would be Balbina Herrera, the
    current Minister of Housing;

    (b) only Panamenista Party leaders believe that there will be
    an inter-party primary, all other opposition leaders rejected
    it, and not even Panamenista President and presidential
    candidate Juan Carlos Varela mentioned it during his meeting
    with the Director; and

    (c) PRD and Torrijos Administration contacts uniformly
    asserted that National Assembly President Pedro Miguel
    Gonzalez (PMG) would not be re-elected.

    If Herrera is sincere in her desire to run for Mayor of
    Panama City, not President, then the opposition could be
    preparing to run against the wrong PRD opponent.  The
    universal rejection of the inter-party primary by
    non-Panamenista candidates and Varela's omission to advocate
    for it may suggest that this idea's time has come and passed.
     While unlikely to take place, the inter-party primary may
    continue to be a political football in intra-opposition
    wrestling.

    ------------------------------------
    Ford Concedes Panamenista Preference
    ------------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) "I am leaning towards the Panamenista party," UP
    President Guillermo "Billy" Ford told Director on January 17.
     Ford conceded, UP needed to bargaining to bargain hard when
    negotiating an opposition alliance, in short, whether UP
    would support the CD's eventual presidential nominee
    Martinelli or to support the eventual Panamenista nominee.
    Aware that UP VP Jose Raul Mulino was for all intents and
    purposes already working on Panamanista presidential nominee
    candidate Alberto Vallarino and that UP VP Anibal Galindo was
    coordinating closely with Martinelli, Ford said that he had
    assembled a team of thinkers to develop some "programmatic
    ideas" for which UP would seek the support of an eventual
    alliance partner.  "We need to get the best deal for UP,"
    Ford explained.  During the meeting, Ford spotted Delia
    Cardenas, noting that Cardenas was spearheading the work on
    these programmatic ideas.  (Note:  Cardenas, a fellow
    life-long Movement of Liberal Republican Nationalists
    (MOLIRENA) member, jumped to UP with Ford.)  "Ideology is not
    that important these days in Panama," Ford said.  "What
    people want are ideas to solve problems."

    ¶3. (C) Asked if Endara's early formalization of his status as
    VMP's presidential candidate would limit Endara's ability to
    maneuver and form alliances, Ford, who was Endara's First VP,
    said, "No.  Endara needs the clout that being a candidate
    brings. He will be able to make deals."  Ford said he
    expected that Minister of Housing Balbina Herrera would be
    the PRD's eventual presidential candidate and asserted that
    there would not be an inter-party primary.

    ¶4. (C) Comment:  Okay, so now UP appears to be headed not
    just in two directions, but rather three.  Mulino is working
    on Vallarino's campaign, Galindo on Martinelli's campaign,
    and Ford is trying to hold his party back from splitting so
    that they can get the best deal from either whoever
    ultimately wins the Panamenista primary or Martinelli.  There

    also appear to be three groups working on "programmatic
    ideas:"  former Solidarity Party members led by Mulino,
    former Liberals led by Galindo, and former MOLIRENistas led
    by Ford.  Stay tuned.

    ---------------------------
    Martinelli Gets a Face-Lift
    ---------------------------

    ¶5. (C) Arriving at the chic Decapolis Hotel bar for drinks
    with Feeley, Martinelli, with two badly bruised eyes, looked
    like he had been on the losing side of a bad bar fight.  Not
    exactly.  Martinelli explained that he had just had a
    face-lift.  Not a shrinking violet, Martinelli strode into
    this very public setting without a care in the world for what
    others might think of his facelift.  That was essentially it
    for news at this meeting as Martinelli went over well trod
    ground providing Feeley with a first-hand opportunity to
    taste Martinelli's confidence, witness his brash and direct
    manner, and to see that, hell or high water, Martinelli would
    run for president. As Ford noted, Herrera would be the PRD's
    eventual presidential candidate, and there would not be an
    inter-party primary, according to Martinelli.

    ¶6. (C) In an aside to POLCOUNS, Martinelli political advisor
    Jimmy Papademetriu said, "I am very suspicious of Varela.  If
    he wins the Panamenista presidential nomination, I do not see
    how Varela will be able to hold himself back from running for
    president."  Papademetriu confided that he was "working on
    Martinelli" to get him to understand that Varela might not
    follow through on his private pledge to back Martinelli if
    Martinelli is leading the polls as of May 2008.  (Conversely,
    Martinelli had pledged to step down in favor of Varela should
    he be trailing Varela.)  Slowly, Martinelli was coming to
    realize that he might not bring Varela to his side.  As for
    the internal Panamenista race, Papademetriu asserted that
    Varela "was clobbering" Vallarino.

    ¶7. (C) Comment:  Martinelli values youth and vigor.  His
    advisors are young, he likes to hang out in hip places, and
    now he is trying to appear younger.  While visiting
    Transparency International, Feeley saw a picture of
    Martinelli from 2004.  It was apparent that Martinelli has
    already undergone hair treatment to cover what was a balding
    pate..  Indeed, Martinelli sees projecting an image of youth
    and vigor as essential to his political success and probably
    sought an alliance with Varela in part for his youthful image
    and track record for having revitalized the Panamenista Party.

    ------------------------------------
    Endara to Embark on "Listening Tour"
    ------------------------------------

    ¶8. (C) "I will begin my campaign with a listening tour," VMP
    Presidential Candidate Guillermo Endara told Director on
    January 18.  Noting that people were tired of "empty
    promises," former President Endara said that he needed to
    hear their concerns.  "We will not be doing big events.
    People are insulted by them because they diminishes
    individuals," Endara explained.  "Instead we will be doing
    smaller events and speaking directly to voters.  I want to
    treat the voters with respect."  Ultimately, the Panamenista
    party would end up tearing itself to pieces, Endara asserted.
     Ameglio, Varela and Vallarino are going to spill a lot of
    blood in the Panamenista primary," this life-long Panamenista
    claimed.  Furthermore, there would not be an inter-party
    primary; "Only the Panamenista candidates event talk about it
    any more."  As Ford and Martinelli noted, Herrera would be
    the PRD's eventual presidential candidate, and there would
    not be an inter-party primary, Endara said.

    ¶9. (C) Comment:  One wonders whether Endara truly prefers
    small gatherings or if he is attempting to make a virtue out
    of the fact that he is broke and cannot afford to hold large
    events.  Absent any clear proposal for what he wants to do or
    how he would govern, Endara is choosing to go listen instead.
     Endara's strategy appears to be to sustain enough visibility
    to remain alive politically (He pulled seventeen percent in
    2004.), wait for the Panamenistas to collapse, and then ride
    the wave of surging Panamenista faithful looking for a true
    Panamenista to support:  him.  To facilitate coalition
    building, Endara also appears to be refraining from attacking
    other presidential aspirants.

    --------------------------------------------- ---------
    Juan Carlos Navarro Confident Will Secure PRD CEN Seat

    --------------------------------------------- ---------

    ¶10. (C) Panama City Mayor and PRD presidential nominee
    candidate Juan Carlos Navarro said that there would not be
    any surprises when the PRD faithful went to the polls on
    January 20 to elect delegates for the party's March 9
    convention.  "I expect that thirty percent of the party's
    membership will turn out," the mayor predicted.  (Note:
    Navarro's expectations were exceeded when some forty-two
    percent of PRD members voted, about twelve percent of all
    voters.)  "I have a good machine and expect to have the
    support of about fifteen percent of the elected delegates.
    That should be enough to secure a seat on the CEN" (National
    Executive Committee) of the PRD.  Navarro went on to add, "El
    Toro (former President Ernesto Perez Balladares) will not do
    well."

    ¶11.  (C) Comment:  Navarro is probably right that he will be
    able to handily win election to a seat on the PRD CEN.
    Though results of the January 20 PRD election have not yet
    been released, Navarro has refrained from playing the numbers
    spin game.  While Perez Balladares asserted that he had
    "surprised" everybody be securing fifty percent of the
    delegates and Herrera wildly asserted that she had the
    support of ninety-five percent of the delegates, Navarro has
    not thrown out numbers, but has argued that Panama's mayors,
    city councilman, and district representatives form the base
    of his machine.  Navarro asserted that he was being
    conservative in his estimation of his support.  Herrera later
    explained to Ambassador on January 24 that she arrived at the
    ninety-five percent number by subtracting the percentage of
    delegates committed to supporting El Toro (about five
    percent).  Navarro's ultimate goal remains securing the PRD's
    presidential nomination.  He exhibited no loss of confidence
    in his belief that Herrera would support him, not run against
    him, for the presidential nomination.

    ---------------------------------------------
    Varela:  "I am beating Vallarino two to one."
    ---------------------------------------------

    ¶12. (C)  "I am beating Vallarino two to one, according to
    internal Panamenista polls.  I am getting fifty percent to
    Vallarino's twenty-five percent support," Panamenista Party
    President and candidate for the party's presidential
    nomination Juan Carlos Varela stated on January 21.  Varela
    predicted that the general elections would between Herrera,
    Martinelli and him.

    ¶13. (C)  Comment:  Varela made no mention of his pledge to
    Martinelli to bow out of the race should he be trailing
    Martinelli in the polls in May 2008.  His mention that the
    race would eventually come down to a three-way race between
    Herrera, Martinelli, and himself suggests that Varela is
    already looking forward to the generals.  As for listening
    for the dogs that do not bark, it is interesting to note that
    Varela did not push the inter-party primary as a way to unify
    the opposition as he is usually wont to do.

    -------------------------------------
    Lewis Ecstatic with High PRD Turn-Out
    -------------------------------------

    ¶14. (C) Meeting with Feeley and DCM the day after PRD members
    went to the polls, First VP and FM Samuel Lewis beamed at the
    high turn-out for the PRD's internal election for delegates.
    "I told you guys on January 18 that about one-third of the
    party's members would vote," Lewis said on January 21.
    "Well, it looks like forty-two percent went to the polls.
    That's more than people that the entire Panamenista party,"
    Panama's largest opposition party.  Lewis noted that he had
    not decided whether to run for a seat on the CEN.  Lewis told
    us that PMG would not be re-elected as President of the
    National Assembly.  Believing that PRD centrists had carried
    the day, Lewis asserted that El Toro would not be a force at
    the party's convention.

    ¶15. (C) Comment:  Lewis may still be nurturing dreams of
    running for president.  Absent popular support, Lewis would
    have to rely on party movers and shakers to line up delegates
    in his favor for a CEN seat.  Depending upon how successful
    he were at securing such a seat, he might then return to a
    presidential run that begins with efforts to lock up the
    support of party luminaries before turning to work its bases,
    where Lewis iss clearly outpaced by Herrera.
    EATON

`